



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# PEACE & SECURITY

## CUBA: THIRTY YEARS OF FIDEL

*What became of  
the revolution  
that was  
supposed  
to work?*

BY CAROLE JEROME



*Also in this issue:*

**Kim Richard Nossal**  
There was no debate about defence policy during the election because there was nothing to debate.

**Yves Bélanger and Pierre Fournier**  
The usefulness of investment in military production is increasingly in doubt.

**Nancy Gordon**  
Better late than never, the Soviets have begun to take the UN seriously.

**Bernard Wood**  
Hostile domestic constituencies could come together on a new meaning of "security."

**Stephen Handelman**  
Soviet Uzbekistan operates according to political imperatives much older than those of Lenin.



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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

As *Peace&Security* goes to press this fourth week in February, international news is dominated by the escalating diplomatic struggle over Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*. And the affair is getting ever more bizarre: many Western countries, including Canada, are recalling their senior diplomats (to whom the government of Iran has essentially said "good riddance"); the press is asking anyone with the remotest connection to Islam for their opinion – the answers to Western ears seem to range from non-committal (King Hussein of Jordan) to hostile (70s soft-rock crooner and Moslem convert Cat Stevens says Rushdie should die for his writing); and bookstore chains are pulling the books from their shelves then selling copies out of the back room.

For the record, this editor expresses solidarity with Mr. Rushdie and the international writers organization, PEN, in condemning the actions of the government of Iran and denouncing the book burning and threats to life and property that have accompanied the publication of his book. But these words come very easily

to someone rooted in Western liberal, secular traditions. The drama we are watching unfold arises because such sentiments do not come easily, or do not come at all, to many whose roots lie elsewhere. Khomeini's assassination squads aside, many Moslems just don't buy the "free expression" argument when it comes to Salman Rushdie.

The controversy over *The Satanic Verses* is one of those little decisive moments in history that ripples down through months and years, altering perceptions, creating new opportunities, and changing the future. It forcefully demonstrates, in case we needed reminding, that the system of relations among different states and peoples is fragile and pitifully inadequate. Most of the countries of the West have frozen diplomatic contacts with a powerful and dynamic regional superpower over the reaction of that power's religious leaders to the contents of a novel. How can we expect to carry on civilized discourse among diverse cultures, with the goal of finding solutions to the problems that beset us all, when what minimal consensus there is about how to conduct the discourse is so easily undermined?

The most disquieting part of this affair is that it could make the finding of answers to this question much more difficult. The action of Iran against Rushdie is alarming not only because it menaces the life of an individual outside Iran, nor even because it sets a terrible new precedent for modern interstate behaviour, but also because it creates a chilling effect among the very people we need most. Whatever else happens to Rushdie, his creative life is permanently altered for the worse. He is now a symbol – a hero to some, a villain and defiler to others. He can never again be just an excellent writer. The best and the brightest thinkers in the world are on notice that their work could cost them their lives if it happens to cause "offense" to some group or other.

The world frequently seems to be heading straight to hell in a hand basket. This is hardly the time in human history for a new dark age; we need all the ideas we can get.

– Michael Bryans

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## PEACE&SECURITY

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7  
(613) 990-1593

**Editorial Board:**  
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■ **Carole Jerome** is a documentary reporter for CBC Radio's *Sunday Morning* and is the author of *The Man in the Mirror* – an inside story of the Iranian revolution; **Kim Richard Nossal** is a professor of political science at McMaster University; **Yves Bélanger** and **Pierre Fournier** are with the political science department of the Université de Québec à Montréal; **Nancy Gordon** is the Director of Public Programmes at the Institute; **Bernard Wood** is the new Chief Executive Officer of the Institute and the former head of the North-South Institute; **Stephen Handelman** is Moscow bureau chief for *The Toronto Star*.

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**F**OR SO MANY, THE IMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CUBAN REVOLUTION is still that wildly romantic portrait of Che Guevara, dark hair windblown under the guerrilla beret, smouldering eyes fixed on a shining vision of the Marxist future. Ah, Che. That photo became an icon of the 1960s counter-culture Che, a leftist's heart-throb, the romantic hero of the revolution that was going to work. In Cuba he still is; huge billboards of Che festoon the country, "*El Hombre Modelo*," they proclaim. "The model man. Be like him."

When thirty-three year old Fidel Castro finally overthrew Fulgencio Batista and took power on 1 January 1959, Che, the Marxist Argentine doctor and revolutionary, was with him. An oft-repeated story has it that as Fidel chose his cabinet he was at a loss who should run the economy, and asked his assembled cohorts, "Is anyone here an economist?" "I

am," said Che, thinking Fidel had asked if anyone was a communist. Che was made Minister of the Economy.

There is more than nastiness or nonsense to the story. Fidel vows that he himself was not a communist or a Marxist then. At his trial for his first failed attempt against Batista in 1953 (an assault on the Moncada barracks), the young middle class lawyer, Castro, talked of reinstating the constitution of 1940 and holding free elections. "I did not lie in the Moncada speech," he later told American journalist Lee Lockwood, author of the fascinating profile, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel*. Fidel says he became a Marxist-Leninist later, out of necessity, the only way he saw to achieve everything from land reform to creating the *Hombre Modelo*.

Castro himself said it clearly in 1961. "Inside the revolution, everything; outside the revolution, nothing." When I visited last December, Karl Marx Theatre was presenting Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs for the kiddies. Even Disney and fairy tales were "inside," as are the lavish, erotic stage shows at that ultimate in night club decadence the Tropicana. Latino Marxism can live with it.

This kind of thing created for Che's supporters in North America a reassuring atmosphere of fun and freedom.

*Rejecting the Soviet  
model for economic  
and political reforms,  
Cuba struggles on ...  
almost alone.*

BY CAROL JEROME

Nicholas Vitaro

This wasn't drab and deadly Soviet-style socialist realism. But what Inside vs Outside meant was that *real* political dissent was to be crushed. And it was, as in all the other revolutions. Over 20,000 were put in prisons and re-education camps – often peasants who had said an unwise word or signed a paper in ignorance. When they began to question and oppose censorship, intellectuals and liberals of the middle class, who had first supported the revolution, were singled out for some of the most brutal prison treatment anywhere in the world.

The prison memoirs of Jorge Walls, a writer once sympathetic to Castroism, who tried to defend a friend from unfair imprisonment, are some of the most appalling and painful that I have read. In *Twenty Years and*

*Forty Days*, the time he served, Walls describes ghastly cruelties in a strangely objective manner. He was one of the *plantados* (well dug in) political prisoners who refused to give up a single principle. But the Sixties leftists knew nothing of all this or refused to know. To criticize was to play into the hands of Washington or the ex-Batista crowd in Miami. They saw only the literary crusade, the new schools, the bare-foot doctors, new rural medical clinics and hospitals. All of these were very real; illiteracy has been virtually wiped out. The six year-old Almajeiras hospital in Havana is a gleaming twenty-three story modernity with 950 beds. Wealthy Europeans pay to come here for heart surgery, but any Cuban citizen receives all medical treatment free.

All of this costs money Cuba doesn't have. The economy is a shambles largely attributable to declines in international markets for sugar and oil, Cuba's bread and butter. The US trade embargo imposed in 1962 and still in force, is not the only cause. The Cuban government admits that a lot of the problem is a result of the inefficiencies and irrationalities in its own system. Fidel has gone so far as to call his early Soviet planners "tribal witch doctors."

**S**O NOW CUBA HAS "RECTIFICATION," FIXING UP ITS OWN MISTAKES, in everything from factory management to bus schedules. The Cubans I met took great pride in blaming themselves for the mess, not the CIA or the Soviets, and they are rectifying all over the place. Still, the buses don't come. There are no eggs from the farms because the transport vehicles are broken down and there's no money to repair them. Ships wait hopelessly to be unloaded. In the shops people line up for scarce items.

Rectification has been dismissed by many foreign analysts and Western diplomats in Cuba as "tinkering" and even then, said one local journalist I met, "comfy officials resist the changes, even though the majority want them." Castro wants to tackle the inertia of an over-centralized system without decentralizing it. Experiments with free markets in the 1970s reduced shortages, but they also produced price gouging, hoarding, and entrepreneurs getting rich – creeping capitalism. So they were closed. An incipient business class would be an intolerable threat to Fidel's philosophy and ultimately his regime. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* open too many such Pandora's boxes for Fidel. While Gorbachev says reform and openness are all justified in Lenin, Fidel will stick to Che, thanks very much. But he has yet to find a spark to adequately replace human greed as a motivator.

In his speeches and on the omnipresent billboards, Fidel keeps calling for "sacrifice," for the people to give up frills like food and clothing to pay for education, hospitals and progress. The cost of the military is never mentioned, though. The faithful heed his call happily: "If it weren't for Fidel, we'd have nothing," said a hospital technician. But others are getting fed up with "Téqué" (literally blah, blah), their nickname for Fidel – making fun of his long-winded speeches and endless talk. "Basta de Téqué" is a phrase gaining popularity; enough talk, the government should fix things and not ask us for more sacrifice.

Cuba is desperate for foreign exchange. Tourist taxis deal in dollars. Tourist stores ring up prices in dollars, selling whisky and other goods Cubans can't hope to find anywhere. The result is a whole new class: people with dollars. I went to one of Havana's most famous watering holes, the Bodeguita del Medio, with an American friend. With our dollars we were jumped over the sizeable queue by the *maitre d'*, just as in the Soviet Union. The Bodeguita is an old Hemingway haunt, a fact used to entice the tourists. Hemingway is as much an industry as Che and ordinary Cubans are beginning to resent it all: we get Hemingway and the good life; they get Che and the sacrifice.

The situation is not good. And whether it gets worse depends in large measure on Moscow. The only reason Cuba is afloat at all is the \$5 billion a year the Kremlin pours in, for a Cuban population of ten million. Moscow pays an artificially high price for sugar as the main form of



subsidy. Gorbachev has made it clear that he wants Fidel to get with some *perestroika* and pull more economic weight. Fidel has replied, essentially, "take your *perestroika* and stuff it." In a December speech, Fidel pointedly stated that Cuba's errors originated "in the imitation of experiments of other socialist countries ... which now tell us these are no good. But we would not like them to tell us the same in twenty years."

The Soviets take this with great dignity. One look at the Soviet embassy in Havana tells you these folks are here to stay, regardless of insults from their host. The embassy is a huge white affair dominated by a tower with turrets and projections that scream electronics. The lobby is a cavern of dark green Cuban marble, furnished only with a bust of Lenin on a ten-foot pedestal. The first secretary, Gennadi Sizov, emerged from a heavy wooden door near Lenin and greeted me in affable Spanish. "We appreciate that Cuba has its own special problems and needs its own special solutions," he said, "and the Soviet Union will always support its friend and ally."

So that was the official line. But most seasoned observers believe Gorbachev is putting the screws on behind the scenes, trying to persuade Castro that economic failure is by far a greater threat in the long run than a few democratic adjustments. No one is sure, however, that he would not go further and use economic threats.

**C**UBA IS STILL THE *BÊTE NOIRE*, OR RATHER *ROUGE*, OF WASHINGTON. The ferocity of the US government's hostility is truly amazing, more even than I encountered in briefings on Iran at the State Department during the hostage crisis. When he was Secretary of State, George Shultz said there was no chance for normal relations in the foreseeable future, and that Fidel had "to cease acting against the US in this hemisphere." No one expects the Bush administration policy to be any different.

For Washington, the recent Angola agreement on the pullout of Cuban troops is not the "warming trend" hailed by so many. What matters is closer to home: Nicaragua, El Salvador and US-Cuban immigration talks. Washington also takes an extremely serious view of human rights in Cuba. Unfortunately, the recent State Department report on the subject is so exaggerated as to be, as one writer put it, "hallucinatory." This again gives Che's North American faithful an excuse to continue to ignore very real repression: the muzzling, arrest and exile of genuine human rights leaders and the people they defend – people like Ricardo Bofill and Elisardo Sanchez, and the Arcos brothers, of the two main Cuban human rights committees. These organizations are not "legal" but they are harassed rather than closed. Bofill and Sanchez have fled.

"Bofill is a liar and a fraud, just looking for power," Minister of Culture Armando Hart hissed at me when I interviewed him. "Valladares is a Batista criminal," he added, referring to the former prisoner now heading the US delegation to the UN Committee on Human Rights in Geneva. There are genuine questions about Valladares' credentials. But thus is all opposition dismissed and discredited. Cuba had released almost four hundred political prisoners by last summer, concurrent with unprecedented visits by Amnesty International, and other non-government human rights groups. But after they departed, arrests began again.

As I left one night to visit Dr. Samuel Martinez Lara, a psychiatrist who started the Party for Human Rights, a friend warned me not to go. The people the doctor was staying with, fellow human rights activists, had just been arrested: Tania Diaz Castro and her son Guillermo Vladimir Rivas, were sentenced overnight to a year each, allegedly for attacking police at a prison when they went to visit her husband, a prisoner for over twenty years. Subsequently, the husband and son were released after a visit from some US Congressmen.


Americas Watch, a US Human Rights group, says that their impression is that "the Cubans are concerned about their human rights image and are making significant concessions to the international community, but all the same laws are in place. There are no guarantees of freedom of expression and all the repressive machinery remains."

Nothing here is not political," asserted the Minister of Education José Fernandez Alvarez, the military hero who routed the Bay of Pigs invasion. "We are ninety miles from the USA." The American bogeyman is highly useful – all repression is ultimately justified by "Ninety miles ..." "The US boycott and isolation is a useful game for both sides," said Jorge Walls when I talked to him in Miami. "It leaves pro- or anti-Castro as the only choices." Many American analysts, including Wayne Smith, formerly chief of the US interest section in Havana, argue that ultimately this works against US interests, fortifying Castro, creating a false "emergency" he can use at will. They see Canada's policy as sane, pragmatic and practical; pursuing cordial relations and as much trade as possible, (especially since the US has left a vacuum) and pressuring for human rights behind closed doors.

In a Havana hotel bar, I met an Ontario government trade delegation in town to push everything from apples to greenhouses. Another was looking after a long-term project involving Canadian Holstein cattle. Canadian ambassador in Havana, Michael Kergin believes the Cubans care about what we think regarding Canada as a "barometer" of how far they can go. But he admits they have studiously ignored us on many human rights cases for years. And Canada does not apply any serious pressure or threats, only diplomatic noises.

Lee Lockwood, who knew Fidel well, has speculated that Castro's harsh treatment of his opponents is rooted in a kind of guilt at coming from the bourgeoisie himself, and in the fact that for all that he likes to claim his was an ideal peasant revolution, it owed its success to the liberal middle class fed up with Batista. Most of the *plantados* were of this group; the revolution, as usual, devoured its own. Fidel clings to an old and puritanical interpretation of Marx, the way he cultivates his image as just another peasant. But everyone I met says Fidel, at least, believes in it all. Fidel is not in it for power, as are some of the vindictive men around him. There is much of the macho swaggerer about him, the peremptory political road hog. But he believes in his mission for his people.

I'm tempted to compare him with other revolutionary leaders from Robespierre to Khomeini to Mao – all genuine believers who sacrificed many of those they claimed to be saving in relentless pursuit of their Grail. But it is worth saying that if monarchs of the past left palaces and cathedrals and legal codes, and Batista left casinos and prisons, Fidel Castro will leave schools and hospitals and his own prisons full of ghosts. □



# ALL IN FAVOUR, SAY AYE

*The lack of debate during last November's election about matters of national security is neither puzzling nor discouraging. Perhaps there is nothing to debate about.*

BY KIM RICHARD NOSSAL

**W**HILE MUCH EMOTIONAL heat was generated on the issue of the Canadian-American relationship during the 1988 Canadian general elections, other facets of foreign policy were virtually ignored in the long seven weeks of campaigning. This was particularly true of defence policy. To be sure, there were initial indications that national security issues would play a major role in the electoral contest. In 1987, the peace movement had chosen the 1988 election campaign to be the target of an extensive riding-by-riding public awareness effort – the so-called “Peace Pledge” campaign. The Progressive Conservative government under Brian Mulroney had brought out a White Paper on Defence in 1987 outlining a set of policy options that were both hawkish and expensive. In particular, the proposal to purchase nuclear-powered submarines promised to fuel debate. Finally, the New Democratic Party, the only political party in Canada to offer a genuinely alternative defence policy, had been surging in public opinion polls in the year prior to the elections.

In the event, however, defence policy did not become an important issue during the election; indeed it was hardly mentioned. The “Peace Pledge” campaign gained little support and collapsed. Protests by peace groups over the nuclear-powered submarines proved to be ragged and ineffectual. Neither of the opposition parties fixed their sights on the submarines in anything but a cursory fashion; the free trade agreement proved a more solid and rewarding target for criticism. Both the Liberal and Progressive

Conservative leaders did allow themselves the indulgence of a couple of snide digs at the NDP's defence platform. And for his part, the NDP leader, Ed Broadbent, made only a half-hearted effort to flog the party's 1969 promise to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence command agreement; most of the time, one had the distinct sense that he wished that the promise, even as revised in April 1988 to make it more palatable, would just go away. In all, the political exchanges on security policy during the campaign were both vapid and superficial.

The superficiality of the discussions on defence in 1988 was by no means out of the ordinary. Not since the debate over the acceptance of nuclear weapons for the Canadian forces in 1962 and 1963 has defence been the subject of extended and spirited concern during an election. Indeed, in the last generation, election-time discussions of defence have, without exception, been lacking in depth and sophistication. Important technological developments, changes in defence doctrine, and shifts in Canada's strategic role in the Western alliance, have all emerged in the last twenty-five years without Canadians having been engaged in a discussion about these changes and their implications. Instead, what the electorate has been offered by both governors and would-be governors during election campaigns is little more than a periodic mumbling match posing as political debate.

AT FIRST BLUSH, ONE MIGHT BE both puzzled and concerned that

defence policy is not the subject of election debate. After all, defence policy – the security of the polity itself – cuts to the very heart of a political community's existence. Moreover, a great deal of treasure is invested annually in this element of public policy. Why does such a policy area, by its very importance, not foster more public discussion? There are also normative concerns raised by the absence of debate: is not the public discussion of issues of concern to the community as a whole the essence of a healthy and vibrant democratic polity? Could it not be suggested that election campaigns provide the most appropriate forum for the airing of a country's defence options, and an excellent opportunity to review and discuss aspects of national security? Indeed, could it not be argued further that politicians have a responsibility to encourage, not discourage, debate among an informed electorate on matters of such importance as a country's security policy and its general orientation to the international system? In short, is the failure of our governors to debate defence issues not an abdication of responsibility to the nation?

Let me propose another perspective: that the lack of debate on security matters in Canada is neither puzzling nor discouraging: we have no debate because there is nothing to debate. On defence policy, Canadians are in unusual agreement and that is not such a bad thing.

This argument rests on the assumption that serious political debate is not possible unless there is serious political conflict within a

community. And serious political conflict requires that at least two conditions be present. First, there must be a clash of opinion on an issue between significant numbers of individuals within the political community. Division on issues cannot be at the margins, involving but a few members of the political community. Second, clashes of opinion tend to be serious when they are deeply rooted in the concrete, rather than the symbolic, interests of the protagonists. In other words, when each side's position in a political conflict is grounded in a desire to protect its real interests against the directly harmful effects of the other side's policy preferences, that conflict tends to be more intractable. If these conditions are not present, one is unlikely to have serious political division. Instead, one has consensus, which hampers debate: for there can be no debate of any meaning when one fundamentally agrees with one's opponent.

IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT NEITHER of these conditions is present in the case of Canadian defence policy. First, there is no clash of opinion over defence priorities that involves significant numbers of Canadians. In effect, what some have called the “counter-consensus” in foreign policy is simply not there. For example, despite the proliferation of peace groups in Canada in the 1980s, the peace movement has been singularly unable to convince large numbers of Canadians that a firm attachment to NATO and NORAD – the traditional pillars of Canadian security – is sufficiently wrong-headed that they should do something concrete to change our defence posture.



Instead, the peace movement has encountered the inertia of a citizenry which has traditionally demonstrated a persistent and seemingly paradoxical ambivalence on the issues of "peace," as the results of the most recent CIIPS annual public opinion survey demonstrate so nicely. On the one hand, Canadians in large numbers are more than willing to support the good works of "peace." They will dutifully register their dislike of nuclear weapons with pollsters; they will show a disinclination to spend too much on defence during peacetime; they support their government in its peacekeeping missions and other good works internationally; they even acquiesce in the channelling of state funds to groups which are self-consciously devoted to altering current government defence policy.

On the other hand, Canadians in equally large numbers are as prone to support all of the *bêtes noires* of the peace movement: nuclear weapons (as long as they aren't Canadian) and nuclear deterrence, alignment with the West in international politics, membership in a military alliance, cooperation with the United States in air defence, and military spending. Their definition of "peace," in other words, does not involve a rejection of the tools for war.

More important, and no doubt much to the chagrin of the peace movement, Canadians show a stubborn consensus on such questions. One conspicuous measure of this consensus is that pollsters who plumb the depths of Canadian opinion always find in their representative samples hugely high levels of support for the North Atlantic alliance and the aerospace defence agreement with the United States. Whether it be the United States Information Agency (USIA), Gallup, Goldfarb, or CIIPS, the result is invariably the same: indeed, the USIA poll in 1984 uncovered an almost unbelievable level of support for NATO membership – eighty-nine percent – as close to political unanimity as one is likely to get. Likewise, the annual CIIPS public opinion surveys for 1987 and 1988, both confirm that widespread consensus.

Another measure of this consensus is to be found in the voting pattern of Canadians over the last three decades. To be sure, we have little direct evidence that most Canadians persistently consign the NDP to the margins of politics *because* it advocates abandoning an aligned defence posture. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that if Canadians had wanted an alternative defence policy seriously enough, they would not have allowed the NDP, as the only party which embraces a genuine alternative, to languish in political oblivion for so long. Likewise, if the attitudes of Canadians on defence had shifted significantly, it is likely that this shift would have been reflected in the policy platforms of one, or both, of the "major" parties.

BUT IT IS NOT SIMPLY THE ABSENCE of divergent opinion that dampens debate on defence. A second reason is that there is no clash of concrete interests. It is important to recognize that what opposition there is to Canada's present security posture stems from symbolic, as opposed to concrete, interests. The difference, it can be suggested, is significant for an understanding of why there is so little conflict in Canada over defence matters, for there are very few Canadians whose real interests are directly and negatively affected by the defence policies being pursued by the government in Ottawa. For example, the interests of a member of a peace group advocating non-alignment will not be directly and concretely affected by the Canadian government's maintenance of ties with the North Atlantic alliance – protestations to

the contrary notwithstanding. This is not to deny that peace activists may have a deeply-felt symbolic interest in having their country withdraw from military alliances; but their concrete interests will not be affected by a failure to achieve that goal. Such a perspective, for example, underlay the Supreme Court's response to Operation Dismantle's suit in 1984 that cruise missile testing violated Canadians' right to life under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In throwing out the suit, the Court argued that testing did not pose an imminent threat to the concrete interests of Canadians.

The symbolic nature of the interests of the opponents of Canada's current defence posture may be usefully contrasted with those whose concrete interests would be affected by a change in alignment. And there can be little doubt that a Canadian withdrawal from NATO or a renegotiation of NORAD would involve some considerable concrete, predominantly economic, costs. For example, a government which implemented the kind of policy embraced by the NDP – taking over all air surveillance and interception roles for the Arctic approaches to North America – would have to cover the costs of acquiring all of the North Warning System facilities, approximately ninety percent of the capital costs of which were paid for by the United States, and which would surely not be simply donated to Canada. Similarly, all of the costs of appropriate military hardware, infrastructure, and maintenance would have to be borne by Ottawa. And while the NDP has argued that what Canada spends now on maintaining troops

in Europe would be transferred to pay for a Canadianized air defence system, the figures make little sense. Not only would they not pay for it, but the resources cannot be transferred in such a simplistic manner in the first place. (Indeed, it is ironic that the NDP, whose opposition to NATO and NORAD is in large measure fuelled by antipathy towards military spending, would end up embracing the most militaristic peacetime defence budget in Canadian history.) Of course, to this burden one has to add the costs, economic and other, which would surely be imposed on Canada by our present allies, who, not unnaturally, would not be at all well disposed to a Canadian defection from the Western defence system. In short, the concrete interests of the vast majority of Canadians would be adversely affected by a shift in defence posture.

HOWEVER FASHIONABLE IT MAY BE in some quarters to characterize the average Canadian as one gulled into support for alignment by a system dutifully acting as a cat's paw for a continental capitalist class, in fact most Canadians have made a careful calculation about the consequences of embracing an alternative defence policy. They have consistently acted as though their concrete interests would be adversely affected by such a move. Moreover, they have exhibited in their political behaviour (that is, their periodic voting) a willingness to be more active in defence of those concrete interests than those individuals whose interests in an alternative defence policy are only symbolic.

Viewed from this perspective, it is little wonder that we have no real debate on security matters. There is too much agreement on the essentials, and too few divergent concrete interests to make a difference where they have the most impact in democratic politics: in the electoral arena. Likewise, it is not clear that one should be concerned about the implications of this for the vibrancy of politics in Canada; Canadians show far too much disposition to debate vigorously policy issues that genuinely do divide them for one to be too worried about the health of democratic debate. [





# BEST WEAPONS TO COMBAT A MILITARY ECONOMY

*The usefulness of investment in military production is increasingly in doubt – so what are the alternatives?*

BY YVES BÉLANGER AND PIERRE FOURNIER

IT IS DIFFICULT TO GAUGE PRECISELY the influence of the armaments industry on Canadian economic development. This is not because of a lack of information. Indeed, as far as the manufacture of arms is concerned the Canadian economy is one of the most open in the world. In 1988 the total value of arms production in Canada came to more than \$8 billion, and it is conceivable that production for export to world markets and for use at home could amount to between \$100 and \$120 billion over the next decade. This is not a sum to be sneezed at, and it is hard to imagine that such a windfall would not be of benefit to the economy.

Nonetheless, doubts are being expressed by various experts as to whether military investment is really beneficial. They argue that the cost of development is too high, the rate of productivity from the investments too low, and the spin-offs in industrial benefits increasingly marginal. The manufacture of arms is also seen as a major waste of resources. Add to this frequent and highly critical analyses of Canada's dependence on the US military-industrial complex and the unfortunate effects on regional development and industrial modernization, and the picture that emerges is much darker than one might expect.

Nevertheless, the Canadian trend towards continentalism, not only as far as the physical defence of the country is concerned but also in weapons procurement policy, seems to favour an industrial strategy geared towards the defence sector. It is likely that in the long term the Canadian government will adjust its economic policy to fit that of the United States,

where the defence sector is a key element in industrial strategy. We should be concerned about Canada's defence industrial base, not only because it has an impact on collective defence and national sovereignty – as the 1987 White Paper on Defence pointed out – but also because of its increasing influence on economic development. On this question, Canada has some important choices to make.

IT IS, THEREFORE, WORTH STUDYING in some detail the various strategies whose aim is to reduce military expenditures. Criticism of military expenditure in general, and of the development of nuclear weapons in particular, tends to gravitate towards three separate endeavours: the reduction of the national defence budgets, the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and the conversion of the armaments industry to civilian production. Although proposals concerning these separate issues usually give rise to complementary actions, proponents are sometimes at odds over the question of whether the focus of their efforts should be on the local rather than the national level.

Initially, those who promoted such actions were responding to moral and political imperatives. Recently, however, there has been more and more criticism of the sheer cost of defence to national economies. In the United States and elsewhere municipal authorities are becoming particularly severe in attacking the priority accorded defence in national budgets. For example, the United States Conference of Mayors, at its annual meeting in June 1987,

was preoccupied with cuts of more than US\$60 billion in federal funds for health, housing and education, and decided to commission a study of the social and economic effects of a reduction in the US defence budget.

The report – prepared by Employment Research Associates, independent consultants in Lansing, Michigan – was released in October 1988. It tried to estimate the effect of transferring \$30 billion a year for five years (\$150 billion from 1986 to 1990 or eleven percent of the defence budget) from defence purposes to various municipal programmes dealing with health, education, social services, employment, public transport, housing and community development.

The study came to the conclusion that this transfer would have a positive effect on the US economy. The Gross National Product would increase by \$3.5 billion per year; 197,500 new jobs would be created over the five-year period; total personal disposable income would increase by \$2.2 billion per year and revived investment in the construction industry (residential and non-residential) would amount to \$550 million per year. The additional \$30 billion which the municipalities would receive each year would enable them to hire 195,000 additional teachers; to spend an additional \$2.2 billion on infrastructure for public transport; to build 900,000 low-rental housing units; to treat 6.5 million people in community clinics; to immunize every child; and to provide an additional \$606 million for school equipment each year. All this, in the opinion of the

authors of the report, would greatly improve the quality of urban life in the United States.

In addition to emphasizing the economic advantages which would result from a such a cut in defence expenditures, this sort of approach has the additional advantage of dealing with the issue in a comprehensive way. Since defence policy is at the heart of the problem, supporters of this strategy would assert, it is the policy which must be modified. Other issues such as the need for conversion, the dangers associated with nuclear weapons, and the lack of money to meet peoples' socio-economic needs would automatically be resolved once the government changed its priorities. The defence industry would have to adapt, with or without governmental assistance.

It is far from certain, however, that the changeover from defence to civilian production could take place smoothly. Those who suggest that the transition should be the responsibility of the state overestimate the capacity of a government, whether in Canada or elsewhere, to draw up a national plan for industrial redeployment acceptable to the major participants in the economy.

DEMANDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and for industrial conversion are easily brought forward at the national level. In Canada, Project Ploughshares has been lobbying the federal government to enact a series of laws which would result in the whole country becoming a nuclear weapon-free zone. In the US, members of Congress have brought forward similar proposals in the hope of

inducing the federal government to play a more active role. In general, however, most initiatives in support of NWFZs and conversion have originated in factories or in regional and municipal governments. The time is not yet ripe for any major advance nationally. It is easier at present to arouse public opinion at the local level regarding the negative effects of military expenditures on jobs and social services.

At first, nuclear weapon-free zones were mainly symbolic, in that they were designed to make the public aware of the dangers of nuclear escalation and to put pressure on national governments to support disarmament. As time went on, however, municipal councils and local populations made greater efforts to set up practical obstacles to opening or developing factories making nuclear weapons or components. Certain American cities, such as Chicago and Oakland, have chosen to pass laws forbidding the production, stockpiling, development or deployment of nuclear weapons. Other cities have adopted purchasing and investment policies which exclude firms manufacturing nuclear weapons. They have also banned the transport of any nuclear weapons across city limits and laid down provisions for the eventual conversion of the firms which make such weapons. Despite many mistakes and some back-tracking, and regardless of the difficulty of putting such provisions into effect, the movement to establish NWFZs in the United States is growing rapidly. Several peace organizations have made this the central point of their platforms and are convinced that the pressure they are putting on both industry and government will eventually bear fruit.

Since 1982, about 175 Canadian municipalities, including most of the largest cities, have adopted resolutions in favour of NWFZs. As a result, almost two-thirds of the Canadian population now lives in nuclear weapon-free zones. Apart from Vancouver, however, which has taken a few timid steps, none of the municipalities concerned have introduced any detailed plans, so the

initiatives remain symbolic. Why is this the case? Part of the reason, no doubt, is that Canadian cities have much more limited powers than their American counterparts. It is also possible that the political groups in favour of disarmament are better represented at the national level in Canada and that individual Canadians feel less affected by rising military expenditures.

It is worth adding that since proposals for NWFZs focus on the abolition of nuclear weapons they are of limited use as far as general

obstacles in the way of disarmament and reduced military spending. Conversion is seen, therefore, as a way of bolstering workers' feeling of security by enabling them to participate in the plans for converting their factories, particularly those factories which are already in financial difficulty because of reduced demand or changed requirements for military goods.

Many workers are well aware that a cut in military spending would enable more money to be spent on social services but they



disarmament is concerned. Since, in the strict sense of the term – and putting cruise missile tests aside – there are no nuclear weapons in Canada, the whole question of NWFZs seems somewhat abstract. Moreover, a study of the various resolutions which have been adopted throughout North America leads to the conclusion that the more regulations a municipality imposes the narrower the area to which these apply. It is also possible that setting up NWFZs distracts attention from the need to reduce the manufacture of conventional arms, and yet the latter place the heaviest strain on resources and are hardly inoffensive from a military point of view.

THE MOVEMENT IN FAVOUR OF conversion has developed around the reality that fears about full employment and economic prosperity constitute some of the main

are nonetheless alarmed at the prospect of losing their jobs and being unable to find new ones. From the point of view of the trade unions, conversion achieves two objectives: keeping peace and maintaining full employment. The dilemma is how to reconcile cuts in the national defence budget with protecting jobs in the arms industry.

Experience in Europe demonstrates that conversion programmes are possible. On the other hand, several attempts have met with failure. Too often the firms concerned are already in economic difficulty; they have been abandoned by their owners and have little further potential. In several cases, owners have tried to unload their problems onto the state. For there to be any chance of success, conversion cannot rely on government intervention alone. It is essential to have the support of all those concerned in order to make full use of the resources of the

company. Conversion may well involve more than just a change in the type of goods being produced or in the customers who buy them. It may also require profound changes in the structure of the company and in the relationships among all those associated with it.

ONE OF THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES FOR conversion in Canada is the lack of practical experience – the whole notion engenders incredulity. It is largely to overcome this obstacle that several groups have suggested undertaking pilot projects in order to show that conversion is indeed feasible; however, dealing with individual cases has advantages and disadvantages. Limiting the procedure to a single firm greatly simplifies the problem and makes it easier to reach a consensus as to the economic principles involved. On the other hand, the infrastructure required for one successful experience involves setting up mechanisms to prevent the military production in question from being simply transferred to rival firms. This requires government assistance on a large scale and the high cost makes it unlikely that the process will spread to other firms in a given industrial sector.

One drawback to this whole approach is that it reduces issues of disarmament to purely economic questions rather than beginning with a clear political message. It is, therefore, just as difficult to formulate a strategy which copes with all the problems that arise from the arms industry as it is to get all those involved to agree on a solution. What is important, however, is to get the debate off the ground, and the best way of doing this is to put forward concrete proposals. The current discussions in Quebec, concerning Montreal's decision to ask its voters to support the establishment of a NWFZ, are relevant, as is growing interest in conversion on the part of trade unions, and will probably lead to some practical steps in the not too distant future. Such initiatives could imbue the disarmament movement with the energy it currently lacks. □

(Translation by Mary Taylor)



# BETTER LATE THAN NEVER, MOSCOW COURTS THE UN

*One of the reasons for the UN's new-found vigour is that the Soviets are now paying serious attention to the organization they helped to create.*

BY NANCY GORDON

IN THE PROCESS OF "NEW THINKING" about foreign policy the Soviet Union is giving more emphasis to the United Nations. The curtain on the world which is now being raised has revealed to the Soviet citizens a United Nations which is to be taken seriously, and at which they are prepared to risk being a player. The UN, unaccustomed in recent years to such approving glances from the Soviets, has shown itself willing and able to accommodate the increased responsibilities thrust upon it.

During 1988 we were witness to a number of demonstrations of this "new thinking" in New York and Geneva and the other centres where the UN gathers. There was Mikhail Gorbachev in early December, choosing the General Assembly as a forum for a major announcement of conventional force reductions. There was George Shultz, listening impassively, in the same building. There was Dan Rather and CBS news covering the event live.

In September at the opening of the Assembly, Eduard Shevardnadze, making the traditional foreign minister's speech, presented a long list of proposals both for UN action and for improvements to the UN structure. The rhetoric which had come to be associated with Soviet speeches at the UN wasn't there. One of his deputy foreign ministers, Vladimir Petrovski, spelled out in detail, for the Assembly's Special Political and Sixth Committees, Soviet views on "Comprehensive Security" and what the role of the UN should be. In Kingston, Ontario, in October, Mr. Petrovski gave the keynote address at a conference on war-

risk-reduction centres; he supported the concept and suggested ways and means of moving the process forward with UN participation.

The Soviets made use of the UN to help bring about a withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan; along with the Americans, they engaged in discreet diplomacy to involve the UN in the settlement of conflict in the Namibia-Angola region; they supported the notion of an international conference on the Middle East under UN auspices; they began to pay their debts for past peacekeeping operations.

WHAT'S GOING ON HERE? AREN'T these the same people, who not so many years ago, paid only lip-service, if that, to the UN and other international organizations? Who objected to initiatives by the Secretary-General? Who wouldn't pay portions of their dues for undertakings they didn't support? And who, above all, were cautious about playing in any multilateral game in which they couldn't control the rules and the umpires?

Soviet reassessments of the state of the world, a process in which they have been engaged since Mr. Gorbachev took office in 1985, are based on a number of assumptions which lead naturally to an increased role for the UN. In his book, *Perestroika*, written in 1986, Gorbachev stressed the interdependent nature of the world in the 1980s, the futility of reliance on nuclear weapons for security, the recognition of a multipolar, as opposed to bipolar, balance of

power, the growing threats posed by environmental degradation.

In September 1987 he spelled out more details in a much-quoted article in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* entitled "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World." Gorbachev listed the various components of a comprehensive security package which would involve the UN, and invited states to comment on it. These ideas evolved during 1987 and 1988, and recently he has emphasized the need for the development and primacy of international law. During a series of interviews conducted in Moscow in November 1988, Soviet officials and academics discussed their specific proposals for making the UN more effective. The list is extensive. Among the measures the Soviets have proposed are meetings of the Security Council, at the foreign minister level, for discussions of nuclear and naval disarmament, and at the head of government level, to examine all disarmament and development issues before the UN; expansion of the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament to one with universal membership, meeting year-round; a UN register of conventional arms sales and transfers; and UN mechanisms to monitor and verify arms control agreements and new technologies.

IN HIS SPEECH TO THE GENERAL Assembly in September, Mr. Shevardnadze supported and proposed measures which would give more power to the Secretary-General by increasing his access to information. Shevardnadze proposed a direct communications

link between UN headquarters, Security Council members, and the chairman of the non-aligned movement – such a link, he said, might help avert international crises and conflicts. Vladimir Petrovski, in an aide-memoire and in a speech to the Sixth Committee elaborated on these ideas: the Secretary-General, on his own initiative, should warn Security Council members of potential conflicts; UN military observers might engage in preventive diplomacy in a pro-active way; and the Security Council should have the power to authorize the sending of UN military observers to potential hot-spots. Such action would alter considerably the current practice of the UN sending peacekeepers or observers only when asked by both parties, and when a cease-fire is in effect.

During the summer of 1988 the Soviets proposed a UN Naval Force for patrol in the Gulf, a suggestion to which they returned in the fall. This thinking is in line with their support of war-risk-reduction centres within the UN secretariat which would deal with prevention of both nuclear and conventional wars. They have also made suggestions about UN peacekeeping forces, and have revived a proposal for permanent UN military observers and armed forces. They have also offered to participate in specific peacekeeping operations if the circumstances were appropriate, and if other states agreed. Such a move would be a departure from the current wisdom about peacekeeping which holds that superpowers should not be involved. Citing the expense involved in maintaining a peacekeeping force in Namibia



the Soviets have offered to contribute logistic or other support. However, they made it clear that if there were opposition to their participation, especially from the Americans, they would not press the issue.

OBSERVERS OF THE SOVIET UNION have noted that in domestic politics, the new leaders are moving towards the development of the rule of law, as opposed to rule by arbitrary decree enforced by the secret police. The process of restructuring and openness requires freedom of expression and dissent, and those freedoms require rules – the rules of civil society which govern our relationships with one another. Internationally, Soviet diplomats have stressed the same thing – they say that international law should serve as the cornerstone of their own and every other state's international relations. They have asked all states to recognize the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and have offered to consider the possibility of the ICJ playing a greater role in the settlement of disputes which have political overtones – such as arms control.

The proposals on international law illustrate dramatically the changes in the Soviet approaches to the UN: Not many years ago they strongly resisted the measuring of any Soviet policy, whether foreign or domestic, by any international standards of behaviour which they associated with Western ideals and concepts. Indeed, as Edward Luck and Toby Gati of the US United Nations Association point out in an article in the *Washington Quarterly*, during 1988 Gorbachev called for the

harmonization of Soviet domestic law with international norms even in such traditionally sacrosanct areas as terrorism, humanitarian issues, and protection of the environment, seeing this trend as the harbinger of the new international order envisioned in his nuclear-free world of the twenty-first century.

The "new thinking" has not taken over completely, and it co-exists with some of the old

rhetorical support for perennial anti-Western resolutions. But an important element in the new policy is the recognition that the UN in the 1980s is not the confrontational arena it was in the 1970s and that Soviet support for anti-imperialist resolutions does not fill stomachs in the Third World. Indeed, leaders of many of the poorer countries have come to see cooperation with Northern governments as essential to both economic development and regional stability. And when they look for models of economic progress they do not wish to emulate, the traditional Soviet client states of Ethiopia, Vietnam and Cuba spring immediately to mind.

SOVIET SPOKESMEN, FROM Gorbachev on down, have made it clear that altruism is not a motive for their new proposals. Like every other nation state, the USSR is looking after its own interests. It is true that multilateralism through the UN is one way of containing US unilateralism, a motive which Canadian supporters of the UN will understand. It is also evident that the Soviets want to move towards a more open economic system in order to bring some vitality and growth to their declining economy; this will require cooperation with the UN and its members over trading rules and the myriad of commercial relationships which govern international economic life. But the overriding factor is that the Soviets now define their own interests

in terms of the interdependent nature of the planet, and thus wish to use the UN as an instrument of their foreign policy.

The Soviets are more willing to join in the international give and take, to risk losing face, to propose ideas that other states may not accept, and to go back to the drafting table and try again. Other governments have had some difficulty responding, partly because of suspicion about motives, partly because of the initial vagueness of some of the proposals such as the early versions of the comprehensive security resolution, and partly because they are simply not accustomed to positive and helpful behaviour by the Soviets at the UN.

But respond they should. The UN has not developed in the way its founders hoped for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to work together. For most of its forty-three year existence, the USSR did not cooperate in a serious way: as Mr. Shevardnadze said in his address to the General Assembly in September, 1988, "Let us say frankly that many of us, including particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, are to blame for the fact that at some point, certain fundamental values of our organization [the UN], embodied in its Charter, were diminished." It is ruefully ironic, that at a time when the Soviets begin to play a constructive role, the Americans are lukewarm, at best. However, mul-

tilateralism in the US reached its nadir earlier in the decade and, particularly with a new administration, opportunities for positive responses exist. President Bush was, after all, the American ambassador to the UN between 1970 and 1973, and is therefore aware of the potential as well as the limitations of the organization. The new US secretary of state, James Baker, was, as secretary of the treasury in the previous administration, involved in the multilateral economic system which operates under the aegis of the UN.

CANADA'S MEMBERSHIP ON THE Security Council for the next two years provides this country with a unique opportunity to contribute to the reassertion of the importance of the UN in international life: we have not been on the Council since the two-year term which ended in 1978, and this time around we are the only non-permanent member which is also a member of NATO. Successive Canadian ministers of external affairs have spoken earnestly about Canada's interest in and support of the UN. While we continue to pay our dues promptly and in full, it is necessary also for us to play a constructive part in the debates about strengthening the organization. We fought hard for a seat on the Council: now we should work just as hard at making it an important instrument of our foreign policy. Canadians have a reputation for taking an active role at the UN, and it has always been thought that a strong United Nations was in the Canadian interest. With the Soviets proposing a host of ideas, we should respond in a serious and constructive way to them, and urge our alliance partners to do likewise.

Many of the Soviet proposals have serious flaws and need debate and consideration. But what is interesting about the process is that the Soviets are taking initiatives to make the UN a more effective body. Joining a game whose outcome is in doubt is a departure for the Soviets, it may also be the mark of a country which is beginning to feel secure in its relationships with others. □



Bob Feller

# Is PEACE STILL AT WAR WITH SECURITY?

BY BERNARD WOOD



Bernard Wood is the  
Chief Executive Officer of CIIPS

**I** WAS IN AUSTRALIA LAST AUGUST WHEN MY appointment to head CIIPS was announced by Mr. Clark. It was striking to see the quizzical reaction of a diverse sample of Australians to the Institute's double-barrelled (forgive me) mandate. After nearly five years this odd coupling has become familiar to interested Canadians, but its comfort level is still low and, for many, its plausibility still in doubt. Perceptions, of course, are realities and if enough people insist on identifying themselves as part of a "peace" community or a "security" community and insist on seeing the other as a hostile camp, then they will be at odds.

For most people – voters, citizens and taxpayers – the roots of the dispute rapidly become arcane. Ordinary people ask themselves why, if a Reagan and a Gorbachev can start finding some common ground, the two domestic constituencies concerned with the same problem are still at each other's throats.

Practically no one denies any longer the reality or the historic significance of the new moderated rhetoric, a concrete if modest disarmament agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, and serious prospects of reductions of strategic and conventional forces. Optimism is bolstered by the recognition of the economic constraints on both East and West. But there is still a long way to go, with differing interpretations of how much real progress has been achieved and how much trust can yet be afforded.

It is precisely in these diagnoses and prescriptions that basic disagreements arise. There are people whose roles and professional responsibilities require them to approach international security issues with a predominant concern to protect against worst-case possibilities, to ensure first, and foremost that any attack against the physical security of the state and its people is deterred or repelled. Others come at the problem from the opposite end: they look in every circumstance for the best-case possibilities of defusing hostility and diminishing confrontation.

As survey after survey of public opinion testifies, most Canadians share both sets of instincts about the current state of East-West confrontation. They are still persuaded of the need for strong defences and a posture of negotiating from strength, but they are impressed, too, by the tone and content in the Gorbachev campaign to de-escalate the Cold War, and they are ready to support vigorous Western initiatives towards the same end – even ones that involve prudent risktaking. Canada's decision-makers, too, are wrestling with the same instincts and judgments on East-West relations in their own work.

WHAT ARE REASONABLE OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS for advancing a productive discussion of "peace" and "security"? If the adherents of the two main rallying points are battling with each other, both sides will get a hearing from the interested public and from decision-makers, but their excesses will reduce the possibilities for creative democratic dialogue. On the other hand, if there are forums and habits for the civil exchange of views, there will still be wide areas of disagreement, but there may also be a better crystalization of a range of serious options for consideration by the public and policy-makers. In the process, the best analysts and ad-

vocates of both communities are likely to have more impact on the ultimate policy result than they would operating from splendid isolation.

A climate of improved East-West relations and serious prospects for arms control should increase the possibilities for such a constructive dialogue – although the present changing situation also throws up destabilizing new challenges. The forums are also better developed than ever; CIIPS is one and there are others. Thoughtful people in both communities have learned about the other's thought-patterns and language, and engaged in both technical and policy discussions. In addition, both sides of the debate now see it as useful and necessary to talk about new approaches to security – "common" or "mutual" security, and wider concepts of security. These approaches may help carry us toward a broader base of shared objectives.

MUCH CREATIVE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO confront the wider set of challenges to security as the end of the 20th century approaches. The deep-rooted Canadian traditions of multilateral cooperation and functional participation are pathbreaking examples of the kind of order-building and maintenance which the age of global interdependence demands. So are Canada's leading efforts to combat Third World poverty and promote the respect of human rights around the world.

Canada has direct stakes in three of the world's dynamic ocean regions and many links and responsibilities elsewhere. Our territorial and maritime surveillance and defence will remain a huge challenge, our collective defence responsibilities taxing, and a plethora of new peacekeeping, conflict resolution and institution-building demands will call on all our diplomatic and military capabilities. Without diluting the concept of security, or underrating the role of military force which will be near its core for a long time to come, the new imperative is to create less competitive security relationships and to defuse underlying causes of international hostility.

In many of these other challenges to peace and security one quickly finds that the depth of polarization and mutual mistrust among interested Canadians is at least as great as it is on East-West relations. In regional conflicts such as the Middle East, Central America or Cyprus, Canadians seeking ways to help resolve conflict and reduce confrontation discover that some of their most even-handed efforts are greeted with suspicion or hostility by those with special sympathies to one party or another.

Some conflicts will be more amenable to Canadian assistance, some less, but there are few where Canada has no interest or stake, especially when serving on the UN Security Council. In general, Canada's claim to impartiality is one of the strongest in the world. In war, however, truth is the first casualty and anyone who seeks to get between combatants can expect some blows – deserved or not. These are sobering reminders that conflict is a serious business; the motivations of all who take an interest in a conflict will come under scrutiny and sometimes under fire.

"Peace" and "security" need not be at war and there are now many opportunities for advancing both goals on converging paths. We should never expect, however, that there will not be "conflict" about conflict. □



# REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



*Editor's Note: With the start of Canada's two-year term on the United Nations Security Council, Peace&Security begins a new regular column dealing with UN Security Council affairs. The author of Report From the Security Council, Trevor Rowe, is based in New York and has been a regular contributor to CBC Radio on UN matters for the last seven years. Mr. Rowe has also written for The Toronto Star, La Presse, The Independent (London), the Boston Globe, and Southam News, and is a frequent contributor to the Christian Science Monitor radio service.*

## Downing of Libyan Fighters

After waging an all-out campaign to secure a seat on the United Nations Security Council, Canada got off to an urgent start when the world organization's supreme body met in early January to deal with the tensions sparked by the US downing of two Libyan jets. "It's started with a bang, literally," noted Yves Fortier, Canada's newly appointed ambassador, as he left the Council chamber after a round of consultations with the fourteen other members.

The Council had to weigh two versions of events and to decide whether or not the US action was justified. Libya contended that its planes were unarmed and, while on a reconnaissance mission, the victims of an unprovoked attack. The US insisted the Libyan jets had acted with hostile intent, repeatedly tailing the US fighter planes even as they took evasive

action. The Libyans maintained throughout that the US evidence about the incident had been faked.

Canada's initial reaction was one of caution. From 4 January when the council began informal consultations, to the next evening, Mr. Fortier told reporters Canada intended to weigh all the evidence before reaching a decision. He added that Canada wanted to hear all the speakers in the debate. When pressed on the issue of whether the US attack was justified, Fortier told reporters, "let us hear all the speakers ... we're in mid-stream. It's not over till it's over and the fat lady hasn't sung as far as I'm concerned." But the next day, before all the speakers had addressed the council, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark declared in Paris that Canada accepted the US version of events.

The incident, although minor, raised the possibility that perhaps the Ambassador was not being kept as well informed as he could have been. Former Ambassador Stephen Lewis complained on his departure of friction with the upper echelons of External Affairs because he was an outsider. Mr. Fortier, a successful Montreal lawyer, is also a political appointee. But afterwards, he insisted repeatedly there were no problems with his department. "Communication with Ottawa as far as this ambassador is concerned is perfect," he said in an interview.

A resolution deploring the downing of the two Libyan planes was ultimately defeated by the triple veto of the US, Britain and France. Canada was the only other country to oppose the resolution while Brazil and Finland abstained.

## PLO Recognition

Before the Libyan issue could be voted on, a strictly procedural initiative by the Palestine Liberation Organization intruded on the

deliberations. Under the rules, the PLO, which has observer status, was unable to address the Security Council unless sponsored by a member state. But during the debate on Libya, the PLO demanded the state-like privilege of being able to speak in the Council without having to seek a sponsor.

It also wanted to be recognized as the Permanent Representative of the Bureau of Palestine rather than the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The changes had already been accorded in the General Assembly, but the US was opposed to a similar move by the Security Council. However, because the issue was deemed a procedural one, the US was unable to use its veto and could only vote against. Canada, the United Kingdom and France abstained. The rest of the Council voted in favour.

In an explanation of vote, Ambassador Fortier said Canada was not opposed to the Bureau of Palestine addressing the UN but was of the view that past procedure should be followed. He reiterated that Canada did not recognize the Palestinian State declared in Algiers. However, the ambiguity of the abstention seemed to indicate that while Canada did not favour a procedural change that enhanced the PLO status, it would not stand in the way.

## Namibian Independence

A lot of time was devoted to the implementation of Resolution 435, which paves the way for Namibian independence, a question on which Canada was active during its previous stint on the Council ten years ago and as a member of the Contact Group of Western nations. Under the original plan, the UN would deploy a force of as many as 7,500 military

personnel. Known as the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), its purpose is to ensure the peace and create the conditions for free elections. However, the five permanent members of the council – the US, USSR, UK, France and China – all favour a reduced force. The Secretary General has suggested 4,650 military personnel, of which Canada would provide several hundred.

The reduction was vigorously opposed by the African front-line states and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO). Canada's position was that the force be as effective as possible and while it would like to see a reduced force, with the resulting reduced costs, it would support whatever levels were deemed necessary to ensure a smooth transition to independence.

## Other Issues

Among other issues before the Council was the renewal of the mandate for the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in Iran and Iraq (UNIMOG). The Council also held consultations on a draft statement critical of Israeli behaviour in the Occupied Territories as well as to decide on a date for elections to fill a vacancy on the International Court of Justice.

Rarely has the council been as active on the question of peace-keeping. Diplomatic initiatives in the Western Sahara and Kampuchea could also see the use of UN troops and these issues could well come before the Council as early as this year. □

– TREVOR ROWE

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons

An international conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW), attended by delegates from 149 countries including eighty foreign ministers, met in Paris from 7 to 11 January. The purpose of the conference, proposed by President Reagan last September, was to reaffirm support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of CW, and to add impetus to the effort at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to negotiate a global ban on the production and stockpiling of such weapons.

The conference met amidst high tension over US charges that Libya had built a huge chemical weapons plant at Rabta, southwest of Tripoli. The meeting itself was a rocky one. Iran and Iraq accused each other of violating the Geneva Protocol; many delegates boycotted speeches by the Israeli and South African foreign ministers; various Arab states, citing Israel's reported possession of nuclear weapons, insisted on linking progress in CW control to nuclear disarmament; and India and other Third World states argued against controls on the export of materials used in CW, on the grounds that they would hinder the development of peaceful chemical industries and discriminate in favour of states already possessing CW.

Of perhaps greatest interest, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze acknowledged on 8 January that his country had been "late" in stopping its production of CW and "taking other repressive measures against them." However, he declared that the USSR would soon complete an installation for the destruction of CW and immediately begin destroying its old stocks without waiting for a

new CW convention. American and other Western officials and observers welcomed the announcement, but noted that the installation in question was a small one which would take a great many years to make a dent in the enormous Soviet CW stockpile. They also pointed out that the US had been destroying its obsolete stocks for some years, although it began in December 1987 to produce an entirely new generation of such weapons.

In his speech, Shevardnadze also pledged his country's support for investigations by the UN Secretary-General of the alleged use of CW, "no matter where," with "no one ... hav[ing] the right to refuse the holding of such investigations on his territory."

In a speech the same day, Canada's Joe Clark stated that Canada had "already advised other nations of the destruction" of its own CW stockpiles dating from the Second World War; that it did not intend ever to initiate the use of CW, even against non-Parties to the Geneva Protocol; and would not "develop, produce, acquire or stockpile such weapons, unless these weapons are used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its allies." As for biological and toxin weapons, Canada had never possessed them and "does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future."

A number of other positive developments took place during the conference. Ten countries – including North and South Korea, Laos, and Bangladesh – announced that they would sign the Geneva Protocol. Iraq repeated a pledge to abide by the Protocol in the future (while admitting to having used CW in its war with Iran, Iraq maintains that Iran had used them first). It also promised that it would not make its new-found CW expertise available to other states. For its part, Iran said that it

would sign a global CW ban regardless of whether Iraq did so or not.

In the end, the conference adopted by consensus a six-point "Final Declaration" pledging not to use CW and to condemn its use by others; calling for additional states to join the Geneva Protocol; stressing the need to conclude a global ban on production and stockpiling "at the earliest date"; and supporting a UN role in ensuring compliance with CW controls, including investigations by the Secretary-General of alleged violations of the 1925 Protocol.

After the conference had ended, chief US delegate, Ambassador William Burns, declared that it had "forged a powerful global consensus" and "given significant political impetus" to the CD negotiations. He conceded that Washington would have preferred an explicit endorsement of new export controls and the use of sanctions against CW users. Joe Clark described the final declaration as "a major step on the road to banning these weapons," noting that "the international community, as never before, [had] resoundingly endorsed the objective of a total chemical weapons ban." Nevertheless, many outside observers were skeptical of the claims, criticizing the conference for having failed to condemn recent CW users by name (particularly Iraq). Some also feared that the meeting may have been counterproductive, by demonstrating the political value of having or threatening to acquire CW (as reflected in Third World demands for a linkage between chemical and nuclear disarmament).

### Conventional Arms Control in Europe

In a speech to the UN on 7 December, Soviet President Gorbachev announced that the USSR would take a number of unilateral steps, including:

- reducing its total armed forces by 500,000 men, including "sub-

stantial cuts ... in conventional armaments," over the next two years;

- withdrawing 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks, including six tank divisions and "landing-assault" and "landing-crossing" units, from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, also by 1991. Remaining Soviet divisions in these countries would be "restructured" and "become strictly defensive";

- reducing additional troops and armaments in the European part of the USSR, making total reductions within Europe of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft;

- making "considerable reductions" in forces stationed in Soviet Asia; and

- withdrawing a "large number" of Soviet troops from Mongolia.

By Western estimates, the reductions would amount to about ten percent of total Soviet military manpower; more than a quarter of its tanks in Europe, including about half of those in Eastern Europe; a quarter of its European-based artillery; and ten to thirteen percent of its European-based combat aircraft.

US Secretary of State Shultz welcomed the announced reductions as a "significant step in the right direction." However, he cautioned that even after they were completed in 1991, there still would be a "major asymmetry in important categories of force structure for the Soviet Union." Other Western officials noted the possibility that the cuts could come primarily in support troops (the Soviet armed forces include about 1.5 million men engaged in railroad work, construction, civil defence, and so on), and in older tanks and artillery pieces. This was denied by Maj. Gen. Yuri Lebedev of the Soviet General Staff during a press conference in Moscow on 22 December. He said that the tank divisions would be removed with all of their modern



equipment; the weapons dismantled, with their engines salvaged for civilian use; and foreign observers invited to watch the demobilization and destruction.

The day after Gorbachev's UN speech, the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels revealed elements of a new Western proposal for reducing conventional forces in Europe. Focussing on weapons rather than manpower, these included:

- overall cuts of about fifty percent in various categories of armaments. For example, tanks would be limited to "about 40,000" in Europe as a whole. If equal levels on each side were envisaged, as suggested by various top officials, this would require cuts of at least 37,000 for the Warsaw Pact, as compared to just 2,000 for NATO. Similarly disproportionate reductions would be required in the case of artillery and armoured troop carriers, in order to achieve equality at a level slightly below what the West maintains now; and

- national sub-limits amounting to perhaps thirty percent of the total holdings in any category – for example, no more than 12,000 tanks. This would require the USSR to eliminate 15,000 tanks more than announced by Gorbachev in New York.

During December and January, Soviet allies Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria all announced unilateral reductions of between ten and seventeen percent in their defence budgets, as well as cuts in manpower, tanks, and combat aircraft. East German leader Erich Honecker revealed that four of the six Soviet tank divisions to be withdrawn, as well as an air-assault brigade, would come from the front line in East Germany. Most Western military experts agreed that such withdrawals would be "militarily significant" and would greatly reduce the threat of surprise attack.

Finally, after more than two years, the Vienna review conference of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) ended on 17 January, with the signing of a Concluding Document establishing two new sets of arms control negotiations begin-

ning in Vienna in March. The first of these, the "Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," will involve the twenty-three members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Replacing the fruit-

verification, arms transfers, the nuclear freeze, outer space, and the furnishing of objective information on military matters (the latter merging a UK draft with one sponsored by the Warsaw Pact

### Early Warning

9 March:	opening of Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna
April-May:	NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting, Brussels
1-5 May:	first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 1990 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, New York

less fifteen-year-old MBFR talks, they will cover the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. A second forum, the "Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures," is the successor to the Stockholm Conference successfully concluded in 1986, and will involve all thirty-five CSCE participants.

### Canada and Arms Control at the UN General Assembly

The 43rd General Assembly of the UN on 7 December considered seventy-two draft resolutions on disarmament and security issues recommended by its First Committee. Of forty-four resolutions put to a vote, Canada voted in favour of twenty-four, against five, and abstained on fifteen. Its position differed from that of the US on no fewer than thirty of the forty-four (sixty-eight percent). Canada introduced one resolution (43/75K), calling on the CD to consider the issue of prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It passed by a vote of 144 to 1 (France), with seven abstentions. Canada co-sponsored sixteen other resolutions. Its five negative votes were cast against resolutions on the security of non-nuclear states (43/68); the nuclear freeze (43/76B); prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons (43/76E); the no-first-use of nuclear weapons (43/78B); and cessation of the nuclear arms race (43/78E).

Canadian Disarmament Ambassador Douglas Roche, who chaired the First Committee, identified its most significant achievements as being: the merging of competing draft resolutions on

states); three consensus resolutions on CW; a resolution on arms transfers, which Roche described as a "breakthrough"; and resolutions on the dumping of industrial and nuclear wastes in Africa. The two most difficult areas, according to Roche, were outer space and the comprehensive test ban (CTB). Canada abstained on resolutions 43/63A calling for the CD to begin negotiations on a CTB Treaty, and 43/63B welcoming the proposed conversion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) into a comprehensive ban. France, the UK, and US voted against both resolutions, with only the USSR, among the nuclear weapon states, voting in favour. Resolution 43/64, calling on the CD to "intensify" work on the subject and for wider adherence to the PTBT, was co-sponsored by Canada and passed by 146-2-6, with the US and France opposed. Canada also voted for Resolution 43/70, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which passed by 154 to 1 (the United States), with no abstentions.

### Brief Notes

On 31 December, India and Pakistan signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations, including nuclear power and research facilities and uranium enrichment plants. As part of the agreement, the two countries will notify each other annually of the exact location of such facilities.

On 25 October, during German Chancellor Kohl's visit to

Moscow, the USSR and West Germany signed a Treaty on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas. The agreement, similar to earlier ones the USSR has with the US and UK, provides for regulations governing manoeuvres by warships, the exchange of information on incidents, and regular consultations between the two navies.

As of 19 December, under the INF Treaty, the USSR had destroyed 84 SS-20, 248 SS-12, and 28 SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and 80 SS-CX-4 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The US had destroyed 70 Pershing 1A and 18 Pershing II IRBMs, and 84 GLCMs. Belgium became the first NATO country to be cleared of INF missiles with the withdrawal of 16 GLCMs on 13 December.


On 25 January, Canadian Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had invited Soviet officials to visit the chemical weapons research establishment at Suffield, Alberta, and to observe the destruction of old CW stocks. He disclosed that all but a small amount of the current Canadian stockpile of sixteen tons would be destroyed over a period of three years, following environmental impact hearings. A spokesman for the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa indicated the Canadian invitation would be accepted and thought it "quite likely we will invite Canadian officials to inspect our facilities."

In late December it was disclosed that the US would invite Israel and Egypt to separate talks in Washington on limiting the development and use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Proposed measures include advance notice of missile test launchings to reduce fears of surprise attack.

During the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to Moscow in early December, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the two countries had agreed to form a "military and diplomatic experts group" to discuss methods of force reduction along their common border. □

– RON PURVER

## DEFENCE NOTES



### Allied Burden Sharing

In December 1988 NATO's Defence Planning Committee unanimously approved a report on shared roles, risks and responsibilities in the alliance. Unlike the annual report to Congress submitted by the US secretary of defense, the NATO report took a broader approach to burden sharing, emphasizing contributions to "wider security responsibilities, interests and concerns" as well as contributions to the common defence of the NATO members.

In the context of wider security concerns, the report made reference to support for UN peace-keeping and foreign aid, as well as to "out-of-area" activities such as sending naval forces to the Persian Gulf. In peacekeeping, the contributions of Canada, Denmark, Norway and Italy were particularly noted. "Adequate funding" of UN activities was also recognized as "a further dimension of the overall effort in support of peace." When foreign aid is considered as a percentage of GNP, within the alliance Canada ranks behind Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium.

In assessing contributions to the common defence of the NATO members, the report also departed from previous approaches by seeking to keep a balance between the traditional NATO emphasis on defence budgets and manpower, and other factors which help determine the defence burden. These include the social and economic costs borne by West Germany as a consequence of the large numbers of troops deployed there, and the damage caused by armoured exercises and low-level flying; the economic and political costs of conscription; and the problems associated with family separation

for those countries which base forces outside their national territory.

Of particular interest to Canada, the report recognized that Norway, Canada and the United States contribute to the collective effort through the surveillance and defence of their northern approaches. It was recognized that Canada is a significant contributor to the common and joint-funded activities of NATO (such as the NATO E-3A early warning aircraft and headquarters costs) from which it can expect to derive little or no direct economic benefit. The contribution of Canada, Turkey and Spain through the provision of training facilities was also noted.

### Canada's Report Card

On the basic indicators of money and people Canada's contribution to NATO continues to draw fire from its allies. Canada has less than one percent of its work-force employed in military activities, trailed only by Luxembourg among NATO military establishments.

Using the preferred NATO indicator of defence expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – defence expenditures per capita provides a more favorable indicator for Canada – Canada also trails all NATO countries except Luxembourg. In 1988, for example, the report indicates that Canada's defence expenditures were 2.08 percent of GDP, compared with 2.87 percent for Belgium, 2.98 percent for West Germany, 4.48 percent for Britain, and 6.07 percent for the United States. The 1987 NATO Ministerial Guidance policy requires members under the median spending level of around three percent to improve their performance. Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain are below

2.5 percent, and are singled out in the report.

The Canadian position is improved by reference to two other indicators: over the past ten years, Canada is one of a small NATO group which has approximated the NATO guideline to pursue real defence expenditure increases of about three percent per annum; and over the past five years Canada has spent an average of more than twenty percent of the defence budget on capital equipment. Only Britain and the United States have achieved significantly higher levels over the same period.

### Shift in Spending Priorities

Overshadowing the perennial issue of Canada's military contri-

bution, however, is a broader trend in military expenditures: as a percentage of GDP, the leading NATO countries, including the US, have started to spend less on defence. Britain and Germany peaked in 1984, and have dropped steadily since then. The US, under the impact of the Reagan military build-up, peaked in 1986, and has dropped since. Curiously, Canada's defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP peaked in the 1984 – the last year of the Trudeau government – and declined slowly through the first Mulroney government. Although it is likely that defence expenditures will continue to increase in real dollars while economies expand, it is evident that large

### CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE: FACTS AND MORE FACTS

In November 1988 Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and then Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty, released "a collective statistical assessment" by the member countries of NATO on the European force balance. Entitled "Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts," the document was presented as a contribution to the initiation of new East-West talks on conventional forces in Europe. The force statistics are based on the area to be covered in the new talks – from the Atlantic to the Urals – and include Spanish and French forces not previously included in NATO force figures.

The figures released show overwhelming Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) superiority in key military forces, including main battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and military personnel. In main battle tanks, the WTO advantage was estimated to be over three-to-one (51,500 to 16,424); in artillery the advantage was also put at three-to-one (43,400 to 14,458); and in combat aircraft the WTO advantage was judged to be more than two-to-one (8,250 to 3,977). Where overall military personnel was concerned, the study estimated WTO strength at 3.1 million compared with 2.2 million for NATO.

In the accompanying comment on these figures, Clark and Beatty declared that the force imbalance "gives the East a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action." Pointing to the urgent need for new negotiations on conventional forces, the study was described as a "contribution to military transparency" and an invitation to the WTO "similarly to provide figures for their forces."

The WTO countries apparently took up their invitation. On 30 January 1989 *Pravda* published, under the authority of the WTO defence ministers, a very different version of the force balance. Describing the NATO figures as "tendentious data based on a selective approach," the *Pravda* data showed the WTO a two-to-one advantage in tanks, a slight advantage in artillery, and rough parity in combat aircraft. Overall, *Pravda* gave NATO a slight advantage in the total number of military



deficits and competing claims for resources are problems common to all countries. In these circumstances, it seems likely that there will be a continuing trend in the NATO countries to allocate a proportionately smaller amount of their national wealth to military activities.

### US Nuclear Weapon Reactors

In the United States the plutonium and tritium used in the manufacture of nuclear warheads is produced at a large nuclear reactor complex at Savannah River in South Carolina. In the past a secondary supply was available from the Hanford reactor in Washington state. However, the Hanford "N" reactor, which is similar in design to the Chernobyl reactors, has been shut down for some time for safety reasons. In August the Savannah reactor complex was also closed for safety reasons, thus temporarily depriving the US of a

continuing supply of weapons fuel. The loss of supply is particularly important in the case of tritium, which must be periodically replaced in nuclear warheads. Reports in December suggested that the Savannah complex might remain closed until late 1989.

In October a leaked memorandum prepared for DuPont, the new operators of the Savannah complex, identified the thirty most significant accidents there for the period 1957-1988. The most serious was an incident in 1960 in which technicians accidentally allowed the reactor to increase power ten times faster than was considered safe, thus risking a runaway reaction. A similar incident in August 1988 led to the plant closing. Also in October, US Department of Energy officials testified that they had been aware for decades of significant radioactive emissions at other plants owned by the Department of

Energy in Ohio and Colorado, and used for weapon construction. The cost of the clean-up of these emissions is now estimated to be US \$1.7 billion.

For the long term, US Energy Secretary John S. Herrington has proposed building two new tritium producing reactors – one at the Savannah site, and another in Idaho – at a cost of US \$6.8 billion. In the short term, uncertainty continues as to the military consequences of the short supply of tritium. Proposals have ranged from decreasing the amount of tritium in nuclear warheads, thus shortening the time before they need to be replenished, to "cannibalizing" low priority warheads in the stockpile in order to maintain the most important ones.

The US debate is of some importance in Canada, since the absence of tritium for military purposes affects the market price – now reported to be approaching US \$30,000 per gram. Ontario Hydro has a large supply of tritium, and has requested a ruling from the Ontario government concerning international sales. Purchases from Canada, however, seem unlikely to appeal to US authorities. When asked about such a possibility, Assistant Energy Secretary Troy E. Wade is reported to have commented: "If I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I do not think that I would feel terribly comfortable relying on Canada for an assured supply." (*New York Times*, 9 October 1988)

### Brief Notes

In his first overture to Congress on the military budget, in early February President Bush proposed to tie the Pentagon's 1990 budget to the rate of inflation, allowing a one percent increase in the following two fiscal years. If accepted, the severity of the budget restraint might force cancellation of major new weapons systems such as the B-2 "stealth" bomber or the Sea-wolf attack submarine, rather than merely imposing cutbacks on all programmes.

In mid-December 1988 the Soviet Minister of Defence announced a successor to Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. In a surprise move, Colonel General Mikhail A. Moiseyev was named the new Chief of Staff. Previously commander of the Far Eastern Military District, the forty-nine year-old Moiseyev is largely unknown to Western observers. He will face the task of implementing the force withdrawals in Eastern Europe announced earlier by Gorbachev. The appointment of Moiseyev, the lowest ranking Chief of Staff since the beginning of World War II, is thought to signal the search for fresh approaches in the Soviet military leadership. Marshal Akhromeyev, who has played a prominent role in the Soviet arms negotiating team, will continue to serve as a special advisor to Gorbachev on the Soviet Defence Council.

In November President Bush announced the appointment of Brent Scowcroft as National Security Advisor. Mr. Scowcroft is on record as favouring a number of policies conflicting with the approach of the Reagan administration. He continues to support the development of the single-warhead Midgetman mobile missile, advocated in 1982 by a Presidential commission headed by Scowcroft, but afterwards spurned by the President and the Joint Chiefs. He has also suggested a ban on all sea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, believing that they would allow a serious Soviet threat to develop off the US coast. And he is skeptical of the near-term prospects for a comprehensive space-based missile defence, believing that Washington should restrict itself to SDI research. Unlike the position of secretary of defense, the appointment of the national security advisor does not require the approval of the US Senate. □

— DAVID COX

personnel, and concluded that the figures indicated "a rough parity which does not give either side the possibility to count on a decisive military advantage."

The considerable discrepancies in the figures are explained in large part by different counting rules. In tanks, for example, NATO excludes a large number – over 14,000 according to the WTO figures – because they do not qualify as "main battle tanks." In artillery, NATO counts only gun barrels more than 100 millimetres in diameter, thus excluding, according to the WTO, more than 42,000 artillery pieces. The WTO also claims that naval aircraft based on carriers and naval personnel should be included – a position which NATO has consistently rejected. Neither side sought to quantify two factors which are generally conceded to be critical to the force balance – the quality of equipment, and the morale and training of soldiers.

Preliminary response by NATO spokesmen to the WTO figures stressed the WTO departure from military secrecy rather than the debate about counting rules. However, ten days after the release of the NATO document, the NATO fear that the WTO has a capability for surprise attack was challenged from a more unexpected quarter. Early in December the US House Armed Services Committee released a report entitled *The Soviet Readiness for War*. After examining the "in-place forces" (forces ready to fight without mobilization) of NATO and the WTO, the Committee concluded that "the Warsaw Pact advantage in in-place forces does not appear large enough to give a Soviet political or military leader confidence in the capability of Warsaw Pact forces to conduct a surprise attack against NATO." The Committee concluded that the greatest danger to NATO lay in a fully mobilized attack, which would require up to three months of preparations by WTO forces. In turn, this emphasizes the need for Western governments to inform their publics of mobilization efforts, since an adequate response would require full public support. The Committee also underlined the importance of arms control measures designed to slow the momentum of mobilization.

## TESTING THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE

*"Defence Notes" background on the decision of the government to permit testing on Canadian territory of the newest American air-launched cruise missile.*

### How does the new Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) compare to the older air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)?

The ALCM was first deployed on B-52 bombers in 1981. Built by Boeing, it flies at subsonic speeds, and has a range of about 2,500 kilometres. Its effectiveness derives from its ability to fly at very low altitudes while providing a very small target to defending radars. The US Air Force planned to build about 4,000 ALCMs, but in 1983 curtailed production at around 1,500 after deciding to shift resources to the ACM then under production.

In 1983, General Dynamics was awarded the contract for the ACM which will be deployed, in the first instance, on B-52 and B-1B bombers. In contrast to the ALCM, the new missile is designed to incorporate critical new technologies, especially:

- a "regenerative" engine designed for greater fuel efficiency, thereby increasing the range of the missile and possibly decreasing the size;

- advanced composite materials, such as those used on parts of the space shuttle, designed to resist high temperatures and further reduce the ability of radars to detect and track the missile;

- new guidance systems which will increase the accuracy of the missile while detecting and evading defences.

In sum, the ACM is designed to fly higher than the ALCM, to allow the bomber from which it is launched to stand-off further from air defence interceptors, to penetrate deeper into the Soviet Union, and to hit targets with greater accuracy. The Canadian government has stated that the ACM will use the same nuclear warhead as the ALCM. Cruise missiles tested in Canada are not armed.

### What is the Canada-US Testing and Evaluation Programme?

On 10 February 1983 the Canadian and US governments ex-

changed notes confirming the Canada-US Testing and Evaluation Programme (CANUSTEP) agreement – frequently referred to as the "umbrella agreement." The thrust of the Agreement was to provide a framework within which specific weapons systems might be tested in Canada. An accompanying statement noted: "Systems to be tested under the agreement could include artillery equipment, helicopters, surveillance and identification systems, advanced non-nuclear munitions, and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles." Article 8 of the Agreement states that: "In no case shall nuclear, biological or chemical warfare materials be brought into Canada under this agreement. Cruise missiles shall be unarmed."

Although public attention has focussed almost entirely on the testing of cruise missiles, other systems have been tested under the umbrella agreement. According to DND, in 1988 these included night attack equipment for the USAF at CFB Cold Lake, sonobuoys off the Canadian West Coast, and vertical take-off-and-landing aircraft. The complete list of all tests under the agreement is not currently available, because the list is formulated by the Pentagon and subject to US security regulations. Article 17 of CANUSTEP requires "consultation and coordination" between the two parties prior to the release of information to the public.

The CANUSTEP Agreement allows the US to take the initiative in proposing weapons systems to be tested. The Agreement states that the proposals are for consideration by the Minister of National Defence or his representative, but it is evident that Canadian practice has been for the requests to be considered and approved by Cabinet. Canada may refuse any request, and both sides have the right to cancel, postpone or suspend tests. Agreement between DND and the Pentagon on the de-

tails of any specific proposal to test – a "project arrangement" – is required before actual tests can be carried out.

The Agreement states (article 14) that the Department of National Defence may review the data "expected to be acquired" from the tests and "may request" that data actually acquired be provided by the United States. Article 16 notes that tests involving US classified information will be carried out under US security control. It is apparent, therefore, that the Agreement does not obligate the US to provide such information. (This last provision may be of particular significance in testing the Advanced Cruise Missile – a "black," or completely secret, programme in the Pentagon budget.)

### Why does the US want to test cruise missiles in Canada?

Shortly after the umbrella agreement was signed in 1983, a project agreement to test the air-launched cruise missile was negotiated. The purpose of the test programme was to allow testing of the ALCM over Canadian terrain similar to that which the missile would encounter in the Soviet Union. Specifically, by launching the ALCM near the Mackenzie Delta it was possible to create a route of realistic length. The smooth terrain and ice conditions provide valuable tests for the guidance system and the radar altimeter.

To date the test programme of the Advanced Cruise Missile has been marked by failure. As a consequence it is now two years behind scheduled deployment with the prospect of further delays. In October 1988 the US Congress withheld production funding for the ACM, requiring as a precondition for future funding six successful tests before 31 March 1989. A third successful test was announced in February 1988. There have been no public announcements of successful tests since that date.

The project agreement permits up to seven tests per year. How-

ever, only about twelve tests have actually taken place to date. The ACM tests will be included in the annual quota.

### What was the public response to the 1983 decision to test?

The 1983 agreement was signed at the height of the public debate throughout Western Europe and Canada about the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (the ground-launched cruise missile and Pershing II ballistic missile) in Europe. In explaining its decision to test the ALCM, the Trudeau government placed great emphasis on the alleged link to NATO deployments in Europe even though the ALCM was part of the US strategic deterrent, under the control of the Strategic Air Command, and not subject to NATO discussions or approval.

In May 1983, then Prime Minister Trudeau wrote an open letter to the Canadian people in which he noted that "this whole question continues to weigh heavily on the consciences of those in government and the general public." Trudeau emphasized the Soviet nuclear build-up which particularly threatened Western Europe, and, "not without anguish," asserted the need for "solidarity with the other Western democracies, in a world which has turned a deaf ear to our suggested strategy of suffocation."

Since 1983 questions posed by various polling organizations suggest that Canadians remain divided on the merits of cooperation in the testing of cruise missiles. In May 1985 a Gallup poll found 45 percent in favour and 45 percent opposed. In March 1988 another Gallup poll found 54 percent opposed to testing and 38 percent in favour. Both the Liberal and New Democratic Parties have declared that they would end the cruise testing agreement.

— DAVID COX



## REPORT FROM THE HILL



*The 34th Parliament, elected on 21 November 1988, was called briefly into session to pass the required legislation to establish the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement by 1 January 1989. It then recessed until the spring, to return either in March or April.*

### Policy toward the PLO

Canada was among the many nations which asked the United States to reconsider its late November decision to deny Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat the visa he needed to speak to the United Nations in New York. In the end, Arafat was obliged to address the UN in Geneva on 13 December. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark welcomed Arafat's move toward explicit recognition of the right of Israel to exist, the rejection of terrorism, and the call for an international conference on peace in the Middle East.

The next day Clark also applauded the opening of talks between the US and the PLO as "an important step ... toward establishing the dialogue necessary for the successful resolution of the Middle East dispute." Since then, despite entreaties from PLO representatives, Canada has made no move to upgrade its own contacts with the organization.

### South Africa

Joe Clark's critical remarks about the treason conviction of four anti-apartheid activists by South African courts, in which he claimed the South African government was using the legal system to harass and suppress legitimate opposition to apartheid, drew a strong response from South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha. On 15 December Botha called the Canadian government

"arrogant and meddlesome" and instructed its ambassador to lodge a strong protest with Canada.

The next month two visiting black South African leaders, whose travel had been subsidized by the Canadian government, reproved Canada for the "disappointing and failed expectations" created by Prime Minister Mulroney's 1985 promise to act decisively against the South African government.

The release of a Statistics Canada report in the last week of January evoked more criticism. Despite the government's initiation of voluntary restrictions on trade in 1985, the report showed imports from South Africa in 1988 increasing by 68 percent over 1987, while exports increased by 44 percent. In reaction, Joe Clark indicated on 30 January that the government would consider alternatives such as mandatory restrictions, if the voluntary sanctions were not working. At a meeting in Zimbabwe from 6 to 8 February, chaired by Mr. Clark, of the eight-member Commonwealth committee of foreign ministers on South Africa, both the increase in trade and the \$600 million loan from the Bank of Nova Scotia to Minnorco, a Luxembourg-based company controlled by major South African interests, came under close scrutiny.

### Chemical weapons

On the eve of an international conference on chemical weapons, Canada joined France and Egypt on 6 January in supporting US contentions that Libya is capable of manufacturing poison gas at a factory southwest of Tripoli. On 8 January Joe Clark addressed the 140-country Paris conference intended to reinforce efforts to halt the spread of chemical weapons, by appealing to all countries to "get rid of them everywhere and forever." He reaffirmed Canada's policy since 1970 of no production, stockpiling or use of chemical arms.

Two weeks later on 25 January, then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty accepted all sixteen recommendations of a report he had commissioned last August on research, development and training in chemical and biological weapons defence within Canada. The report, by CIIPS Board of Directors Chairman William Barton, largely supported DND's current programme, but called for stricter controls on testing; greater openness about activities at the defence research establishment at Suffield, Alberta; and an automatic annual review "to confirm that stocks of all toxic agents are being kept to the minimum level necessary for the efficient conduct of the research and development programme."

### Cabinet Changes

On 30 January Prime Minister Mulroney named his new cabinet, retaining Joe Clark as secretary of state for external affairs, and Monique Landry as minister for external relations with responsibility for CIDA. New appointments included that of former Ambassador to France Lucien Bouchard as minister of the environment and Bill McKnight as minister of national defence with cabinet newcomer Mary Collins from British Columbia as associate minister.

McKnight, 48, a wheat farmer and the first Saskatchewanian ever named to the defence portfolio, has been minister of labour (1984-86) and minister of Indian and northern affairs (1988-89). First elected to Parliament in 1979, he is regarded as a close associate of Deputy Prime Minister Don Mazankowski. In his new position, he will serve as vice-chairman of the ten-member Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy (chaired by Joe Clark) and also joins the nineteen-member Priorities and Planning Committee (regarded as a kind of "inner cabinet") and the newly-created Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet, which is chaired by the prime minister with a mandate "to

ensure that the Government's expenditures continue to be directed to its highest priorities, and that expenditure control continues to contribute to deficit reduction."

### Opposition Critics

Liberal Leader John Turner released a list of shadow cabinet roles for his caucus on 4 February. Veteran Quebec MP and former Cabinet Minister André Ouellet was retained as external affairs critic and Labrador MP William Rompkey was named defence critic while Hamilton MP Sheila Copps became the new environment critic.

The NDP list announced in mid-January retained Winnipeg MP Bill Blaikie as external affairs critic and Derek Blackburn as defence critic, with James Fulton as environment critic.

### Short Notes from the Hill

In December 1988 the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development noted "with appreciation" the aid policy report adopted by Canada in March 1988. It welcomed Canada's emphasis on cooperation with voluntary aid agencies outside government. Canada's aid disbursements rose to US \$1.89 billion in 1987 from \$1.7 billion in 1986, overtaking the amount of aid given by Britain. Canada's aid levels are above average, though falling slightly as a proportion of GNP to 0.47 percent in 1987.

The first meeting of the reshuffled inner cabinet on 31 January agreed to give the United States permission to test its latest generation of cruise missiles in northern Canada. The new missile, designated AGM-129A, incorporates "stealth" technology which makes it harder to spot with radar or infrared sensors.

*(For more on the decision to permit testing see page 16 of this issue of Peace&Security.)* □

- GREGORY WIRICK

## REVIEWS



### United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations

Adam Roberts and Benedict  
Kingsbury (editors)

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 287  
pgs., \$82.50 cloth

This is an important book – written by a distinguished group of UN officials, including Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, national delegates to the UN, scholars like the eminent British historian Sir Michael Howard – which analyses the dilemmas and demands facing the United Nations. The work is broader in scope than most comparable studies on the UN and, in addition to chapters on the UN's primary function in the field of international peace and security, it covers other important activities like economic development, international law and human rights. Despite the complexity of the subject, the themes are presented with admirable clarity and should thus appeal to an audience wider than the restricted circle of UN specialists.

Most contributors maintain a position of muted optimism which recognizes both the limitations and the services of the organization, while avoiding a utopian stand or seeking recourse in utter cynicism, as can so often be observed in the treatment of the subject. The general tone is set by Sir Michael Howard who reminds us that the UN has failed in its primary task to create a new world order where members derive their strength from the collective strength of the whole. Instead it reflects the disorders and rivalries of the world, "and does what it can to mitigate them." The question – what can be done by the UN, given the political realities, and what might be done more ef-

fectively – forms the essence of most chapters and is capably summarized in the form of a ten-point programme in Evan Luard's concluding chapter. If there are any reservations, it is that the proposals all stress good will and common sense in an organization not always noted for dispassionate discourse.

The reflective chapter by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, and the accompanying analysis of case studies by Thomas Franck, will be of particular interest to the student of international conflict. Both chapters discuss the Secretary-General's formal responsibility for international peace and security as established by the UN Charter, and contrast this with the private diplomacy that has emerged in practice which entails discreet inquiries, good offices and mediation efforts. As Pérez de Cuéllar notes, the UN Secretary-General served as the sole channel of communication between all parties involved in the wars in Afghanistan, the Gulf and southern Lebanon, and the tense situation in Cyprus. Under these circumstances, he was often forced to improvise and sometimes to suggest means which diverged from those initially envisaged by the Security Council. Even with such liberties, it is the Security Council, as he insists, which has the responsibility and the Secretary-General who exercises a supportive role. If one takes the case of the 1988 Iran-Iraq ceasefire agreement, which occurred after the publication of the book, the relationship may well be reserved, for here was an instance where the leadership was clearly provided by the Secretary-General, with the Security Council lending support.

The Secretary-General also justifies his reluctance to invoke Article 99 for fear that bringing an issue to the formal attention of the Security Council might escalate an international conflict. Evan

Luard and Sir Anthony Parsons argue the contrary point: by taking bolder action and invoking Article 99, the Secretary-General would enhance his authority and force the Council to take a more active stand. The argument is of particular interest, given that it is made by former senior officials of the British government which, like all other Permanent Members of the Council, has been reluctant to enhance the authority of the Secretary-General.

In contrast to the well-tempered optimism of most contributors, Maurice Bertrand strikes a distinctly more pessimistic note. He questions the ability of the UN to achieve any meaningful internal reform. In his view, the principal failure of the UN, and its growing marginalization, stems from its inability to develop a political framework capable of providing a global response to the problems of increased international interdependence. There is partial evidence of such frameworks emerging elsewhere, as for example the Economic Summit and the European Economic Community, but these developments have bypassed the UN. As a remedy, Bertrand suggests the creation of a UN Economic Security Council, which would duplicate in the economic sphere the formal authority and effective decision-making structure of the Security Council. It promises to be more successful than the latter because the economic sphere offers a greater potential for consensus.

—Harald von Riekhoff

*Mr. von Riekhoff is a professor of  
political science at Carleton University*

### The Demilitarized Society: Disarmament and Conversion Seymour Melman

Montreal: Harvest House, 1988,  
120 pgs., \$9.95 paper

Columbia University professor and economist Seymour Melman argues that the United States economy is heavily militarized and

dominated by the arms procurement and defence contract bureaucrats of the Pentagon. The concentration of economic power and decision-making in the hands of the Pentagon, which began in the Kennedy administration, has resulted in unproductive state capitalism, the militarization of society and economic malaise and decline for the US.

Melman claims that the United States is already a second-rate industrial country because production has declined and incomes are no longer rising. He calls this situation "industrial depletion" and claims it is a direct consequence of the diversion of half the US industrial economy to military purposes. The production of guns, fighter planes and missiles makes no contribution to either ordinary consumption or to the means of economic production. At the same time that the US economy has been diverted to military production, the physical infrastructure has fallen into disrepair. Roads, railways and bridges are not being fixed; school, medical, public housing and other needs are not being met. "If the processes of depletion continue," writes Melman, "the United States could become a third-rate nation characterized by the pervasive inability to find and organize the resources necessary to restore economic competence."

The solution is economic conversion, says Melman. Conversion of military industries to civilian output would generate enough product and wealth to rebuild the entire physical infrastructure of the United States, he claims. In this 120-page essay, Melman sketches out the steps that could be taken to achieve this goal, and summarizes some of the political and economic obstacles that have so far prevented any serious effort in this direction.

What is lacking in polished writing is made up for in enthusiasm. Much of the value of this



book is the question and answer format through which Melman tries to answer opponents and skeptics.

For some, the work will be too Utopian and unrealistic. Melman expects that economic conversion can, at the same time, not only solve the problems of the US economy and the militarization of American society but can also create economic decentralization – the democratic control of economic planning and worker control of industry. The author also envisages the worker pension investment funds resulting from economic conversion, challenging the capital dominance of US corporations.

Although the book is entirely focussed on the US economy it will be of special interest to some Canadian readers. In Chapter three, Melman raises important questions about the peace movement, its goals and strategies. This decade has produced a peace movement that is in Melman's words a "political supermarket." Peace organizations have a long list of short-term objectives: the promotion of arms control measures or the banning of individual weapons. The Canadian peace movement's campaigns share these characteristics – Refuse the Cruise, Stop Star Wars, Make Canada a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Melman argues that such actions do not affect, and cannot change, the "warfare state." Single-issue and single-weapon campaigns can at best only result in incremental changes to the tactical plans of those who create and supply the war-making capabilities of the state. The peace movement, Melman says, must recognize the economic imperatives of the militarized society and advocate complete and general disarmament and economic conversion.

This book will also be of interest to Canadians curious about Free Trade and the future of the North American economy. The Canadian government has taken a number of initiatives in recent years to promote and enlarge the

North American defence industrial base. Both inside and outside the terms of the Free Trade Agreement, Canada is likely to increase its military industrial production in cooperation with the United States.

Although Canada is not a militarized society and is unlikely to become one in the near future, Melman reminds us that we are keeping close company with one. He makes a good argument that the US economy must, and can, undergo radical transformation if it is to survive as a modern and prosperous nation. – *Steve Lee*

*Mr. Lee is a research associate at the Institute*

### **The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster** David R. Marples

*Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1988, 313 pgs., \$29.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper*

With this book, David Marples, a professor of Slavic and East European studies and research associate with the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, has produced his second in-depth look at the nuclear power plant disaster which took place at Chernobyl on 26 April 1986. While Marples' first book examined the immediate effects of the disaster, his second attempts to assess the longer-term and wider impact the accident had on the people of the Chernobyl region and on the Soviet Union in general. The author is largely successful. It is readily apparent that the book has been extremely well researched and documented, and most of the sources listed are Soviet.

Following an introductory chapter by Victor Snell, of Atomic Energy of Canada, outlining the causes of the accident, the book examines the health, environmental, economic, and political repercussions. In these pages the author describes the disaster as possibly the "pioneer of glasnost under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and then subsequently its first casualty." Criticism is directed throughout the book toward the manner in which information on the accident was kept from the Soviet public, and particularly

from those directly affected by the disaster. For example, no announcements about the accident, and the potential dangers that accompanied it, were made until thirty-six hours after the mishap had occurred. At that point, a thirty kilometre radius "special zone" was created around the reactor and the evacuation of 162,000 people began. This last is a conservative estimate: Marples says as many as 500,000 were evacuated. Marples demonstrates that the overriding attitude of officials at the time of the accident and in its aftermath was that nothing particularly unusual had happened. Concerns over the effects of the accident have been dismissed by scientists and officials as scaremongering. They claim that this has raised the level of radiophobia, or "abnormal doubts" about the harmful effects of the accident. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, the author states, remains a "fanatically pro-nuclear power" nation. The book is informative and provides many insights, especially on conditions within the special zone. At times, however, the reader is bogged down by the number of officials and organizations involved in the accident and its clean-up, their relationship to each other, and the geographical context in which events took place. Appropriate use of lists, organizational charts and maps would have been a welcome addition to the book. The Soviets have concluded that the Chernobyl disaster was the result of human error – that technology cannot be held responsible. The author notes that reverence for the machine is ingrained in the Soviet psyche, unlike in the West where it is assumed that machines can and will go wrong. This assertion seems entirely misplaced given the number of examples in the West and other regions of the world where belief in the inherent good and infallibility of technology has led to tragic results. Chernobyl and its aftermath provide a clear illustration that the dangers that result from this belief have no boundaries. – *Michael Holmes*

*Mr. Holmes is a research assistant at the Institute*

### **BRIEFLY NOTED**

#### **New Weapon Technologies and the ABM Treaty**

Herbert Lin

*London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, 92 pgs., US \$12.95 paper*

If you spend more than a little time with people knowledgeable about the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and its implications it is not long before they start talking about lasers in terms of watts/steradian and quoting bits of obscure treaty language like "in an ABM mode" and "based on other physical principles." They are not being deliberately cryptic; much of the future of the arms control process, as we have come to know it over the last three years, depends on the outcome of negotiations between the US and USSR over just such details.

This little book by physicist Herbert Lin is a guide through the technical labyrinth. It contains clear definitions of scientific terms, an overview of the problems and controversies created for the existing Treaty by the advance of technology, and a set of alternative political and technical solutions to the apparent superpower impasse.

#### **Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis**

Tom Keating and Larry Pratt

*Edmonton, Alberta: Hurtig, 1988, 246 pgs., \$14.95 paper*

Pratt and Keating discuss the role of the North Atlantic alliance and Canada's place in it. The authors conclude that leaving NATO would not be in Canada's interest and make a case for increased Canadian contribution to the alliance – which they see as vital in "making it possible to pursue a mutually advantageous relationship with the Soviet Union." They also believe the proposal to purchase nuclear-powered submarines to be strategically unsound and state that a mixed fleet of surface ships and diesel subs would make a "more cost effective contribution to collective defence."

(This book was produced with the financial assistance of CIIPS.) □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Low-level flying good for caribou?

We would like to respond to several points made by Jocelyn Coulon ("This Labrador Business," *Peace&Security*, Autumn 1988); points that are either misleading or erroneous, and which are the standard lines given by the military in any discussion of the [low-level air training] issue. The military is very fond of citing the growth of the George River Caribou herd as proof low-level flying is compatible with caribou, if not good for them. The interesting thing is that the military continues to use the old estimates of the herd size despite concern on the part of some biologists for the past year that the size may be considerably less than the 600,000 cited in Coulon's article. The military knows about the discrepancy but cites the larger figure because it is to its advantage to cloud the issue. We realize that there were problems with the census that revealed a smaller herd; however, the constant use of the larger number is misleading. A census taken in fall 1988, should give a more accurate figure.

Furthermore, the emphasis on the number of the George River caribou herd is misleading. For the past three years, individual caribou from the George River herd have been monitored by satellite. The movements of these collared animals show that the herd appears to avoid the low-level flying zones during the time training is conducted. Scientists don't know why. The ironic aspect of all this is that the George River herd is not subject to a great deal of low-level flying. So for the military to hold this herd up as an example of the caribou's compati-

bility with low-level flying is again misleading. However, any change in migratory routes greatly affects our people's access to caribou during the hunting season, and the caribou is central to our culture and way-of-life.

It is also interesting that the military does not mention the Red Wine herd – the woodland caribou herd situated between the two flying zones and most frequently overflowed. This herd has a very low reproductive rate and has been hovering between 800 to 1,000 animals for years. It has been studied for the past three years to ascertain the effects of low-level flying. The results of this study are not in; it had to be extended for an additional year due to the lack of cooperation by pilots in the first year. The military also does not advertise that as of 1 February 1989, they will be introducing high-level combat training over this herd, thus introducing large numbers of sonic booms to the area. We also fear that the military will gradually lower the present height restrictions for supersonic flight in those zones – prime land-use areas for our people.

The second major issue is that the military likes to suggest that the Innu are divided on the issue of militarization. This is false. In May 1985, a meeting was held at Northwest Point in Labrador, where the Innu of communities in Quebec and Labrador declared: "We, the Innu people of Nitessin, from St. Augustin, La Romaine, Natasliquin, Mingan, Davis Inlet and Sheshatshiu unanimously oppose the use of our territory by the military and we will use any peaceful means at our disposal to put an end to the flights and their abuse to our people and our land." On three different occasions during our recent protest against the military occupation of our land, representatives from the

Innu communities of Quebec travelled to Goose Bay to sit in our tents of protest at the end of the runway.

The military also frequently talks about its cooperation with the hunting camps, by ceasing or diminishing flights "in an area as soon as natives are observed." We have documented three occasions when we did give the coordinates of camps to the military, but this did not keep the military from overflying the camps. Furthermore, the coordinates of all our camps are readily available from the company that transports us to the camps. For the military, this information is just a phone call away. This proves that the prime areas for low-level flying, (the river valleys and lake areas), are also the prime hunting areas of our people.

Avoidance of the camps is not the only issue. To have the jets avoid the camps does not lessen the negative impact on the wildlife, on which we depend. Furthermore, regular notification to the military of the location of the camps might legitimize Canada's theft of our land. We have never signed a treaty with Canada. The land is legally ours. The military should be seeking permission from us for any flights over our land. Yet we are not consulted on any flight paths or any escalation of military activities on our land. The military is intent on having its own way.

Daniel Ashini,  
Chief – Sheshatshiu Band  
Council, Labrador

### "Two-track" article on the wrong track

In "Dilemma for the Canadian Peace Movement," (*Peace&Security*, Spring 1988), Tony Rogers, in discussing the original political issue of cruise missile testing in Canada, refers to "the NATO two-track decision to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe..."

In fact, the "two-track" decision in 1979, in which the Allies made a collective commitment of a strategic response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, was an agreement to deploy *and* negotiate a joint end to both NATO and Warsaw Pact deployments.

The high point of this period of negotiation was the 1981 "zero option" disarmament proposal by US President Reagan, that was ultimately adopted on the basis of "mutual benefit," in 1987, at the culmination of the INF talks. The low point was the one-sided mass protest against the NATO response to a clear Soviet strategic challenge, in which the Soviets were able to pass off mobile, multi-warhead, accurate, long-range missiles as merely the technical product of a "modernization" policy.


R.G. Fulton, Vancouver

### Military mind at work

I mean no personal disrespect to its author, but the piece "What to do About the Submarines," (by Sharon Hobson, *Peace&Security* Winter 1988–1989) looked like a "plant" from the Department of National Defence: "why we have to go ahead with this purchase even though we now know it's a bad deal." The single item in the article which most strongly suggested this was the repetition of the sum "\$8 billion." Nobody outside DND thinks that Canada is going to get a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for that price. The theme, insistently repeated, that the country must carry on with plans once made, also suggested to me the operation of the military mind – evinced, for example, in the descent into war in 1914 described by Barbara Tuchman in *The Guns of August*. A. Frank Thompson, Kitchener □



## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



**Geoffrey Pearson**, first Executive Director of the Institute, retired at the end of December. **Bernard Wood** succeeded him on 1 February. Since 1976 Mr. Wood had been the Chief Executive Officer of the North-South Institute, an independent research organization concerned with relationships between industrialized and developing countries. During that period he also held a number of special appointments. In 1985 and 1986 he was the Personal Representative of the Prime Minister to leaders of Commonwealth states and in 1980 to 1982 he was a member of the UN Secretary-General's expert group on the relationship between disarmament and development. **William Barton**, Chairman of the Board of Directors, hosted a reception for Mr. Wood at the Institute in January.

**Johanne Di Donato**, joined the staff of the Institute in December as a research assistant, following studies at Concordia University, Leningrad State University and the Paterson School at Carleton University. **Gabrielle Mathieu**, is the new media relations officer. She studied at Laval University, the University of Ottawa, the University of Paris, and worked for several years as a journalist with Radio-Canada.

**John Toogood** spoke on superpower intervention to a conference of high school students organized by the international relations club at Martingrove High School in Toronto.

**Nancy Gordon** and **Brad Feasey** gave workshops at a conference in Brandon organized by the Marquis Project. The meetings brought together teachers, parents and school administrators from

Western Manitoba to discuss global conflict resolution. Mr. Feasey also led workshops at professional development days for teachers in Kitchener and Belleville.

**Katherine Laundy** participated in a workshop on peace education and the library, sponsored by the Greater Edmonton Library Association. She and **Susan Connell** organized and spoke at half-day conferences for librarians, academics and members of non-governmental organizations on information resources in peace and security. The mini-conferences were held in Victoria, Vancouver and Whitehorse.

**Roger Hill** was a discussant for two papers on Verification and

Confidence-Building Measures in Europe at a conference on Conventional Arms Control in Geneva. The conference was organized by the United Nation Institute for Disarmament Research in cooperation with the French Institute for International Relations. Mr. Hill also made a presentation on the implications of a conventional force reductions agreement for the future of Europe to a CIIPS sponsored discussion group on conventional arms control.

The third workshop on "Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-Party Mediators" was held in February in Ottawa. Organized by **Fen Hampson** of the Institute and **Brian Mandell** of Carleton University, the workshop

brought together specialists in area studies and in conflict resolution. Papers were given by **Liisa North**, on Central America; **Ashok Kapur** on Indo-Pakistan conflicts; **Robert Matthews** on Zimbabwe; **Christopher Brown** on Southern Africa; **Douglas Anglin** on sanctions; **G  rard Hervouet** on Indochina; and **Keith Krause** on arms transfers. **Ron Fisher** and **Loraleigh Keashly** along with the two organizers gave papers on theories of regimes and the social psychology of third-party mediation. With the resolution of some of the more intractable regional conflicts, the establishment and maintenance of new regimes are of prime importance; the necessity for institutionalization of such arrangements makes the results of the workshops relevant to the ongoing policy debate.

In mid-December the Institute sponsored and hosted another seminar in its regional conflict series, this time on the Middle East. Participants included academics and others with experience in the region. The workshop focussed on: the current situation in the area; policies of the US and USSR; the role of the United Nations; and Canadian policies in the area.

Cyprus is the site of another regional conflict the Institute is studying. Two workshops have taken place, and another is planned for the spring. A larger seminar will conclude the study which is being organized by CIIPS Research Associate **Norma Salem**.

**Malcolm Dando**, a professor at Bradford University in the United Kingdom gave a lecture at the Institute in February on the latest developments in alternative defence strategies in Europe. **Russell Trood** of the Asian and International Studies Division of Griffith University in Queensland, Australia led a discussion on recent trends in Australian defence policy. □

### New Publications from the Institute

#### ANNUAL GUIDE

**A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1987-1988**, 327 pages.

#### OCCASIONAL PAPERS

**6. The Return of Vietnam to the International System**, by G  rard Hervouet, December 1988.

#### BACKGROUND PAPERS

**23. Peacekeeping and Peace-making in Cyprus**, by Robert Mitchell, October 1988.

**24. Cruise Missiles and Strategic Arms Control**, by Jane Boulden, January 1989.

**25. Non-offensive Defence: The Way to Achieve Common Security in Europe**, by Robert Neild, January 1989.

#### POINTS OF VIEW

**6. New Dimensions in Canadian-Soviet Arctic Relations**, by John Hannigan, October 1988.

**7. Of Fire-Proof Houses: Canada's Security**, by Geoffrey Pearson, October 1988.

#### WORKING PAPERS

**13. Regions of Peace - Oases of Hope**, by Arnold Simoni, October 1988.

**14. Security, Arms Control and Defence: Public Attitudes in Canada**, The 1988 CIIPS Public Opinion Survey, by Michael Driedger and Don Munton, December 1988.

**15. Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Western Opening Positions**, by John Toogood, December 1988.

**16. Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean**, by Paul George, February 1989.

#### FACTSHEETS

**4. Peacekeeping**, October 1988.

**5. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones**, January 1989.

#### ANNUAL REVIEW

**Review of Peace and Security Issues in 1988 and the Canadian Response**, by Geoffrey Pearson, December 1988.

## LETTER FROM SOVIET UZBEKISTAN BY STEPHEN HANDELMAN



**A young man in trousers and open-necked shirt walks across the sunny courtyard of a sixteenth-century Muslim seminary.**

Stopping just beyond the volleyball net and the hanging lines of student laundry, he positions himself in the direction of Mecca, raises his hands, palms facing inwards, and begins to chant the afternoon prayer. Standing in the shade are two young Soviet Red Army officers, looking on with friendly curiosity.

A few years ago, such a scene would have been hard to imagine in the Soviet Union. The peaceful tableau in the Mir-Arab *medresse* (school) of Bukhara in Soviet Uzbekistan, with the Red Army men present as mere tourists, ought to be the perfect symbol of the new liberal age of Gorbachev. All the same, the scene contains other, darker, implications.

If Communist power and Islam have reached a kind of truce after some seventy years of open hostility, it is not out of any particular humanitarian impulse. By displaying greater tolerance for Muslim sensitivities, Moscow is playing practical politics. At current birth rates in Central Asia, by the year 2000 one in every three Soviet citizens will be of Muslim origin. Ethnic assertiveness and the revival of religious fervour already represent a potential for trouble that would make the current unrest in the Baltics and Caucasus look tame. It is reasonable to assume that one factor in Gorbachev's refusal to grant many of the most radical demands of Estonians, Armenians and their comrades-in-spirit is the explosive effect such a decision would have on the peoples and nationalities in the most unsimulated part of the Soviet empire.

Even a brief journey across the flat, arid plain that stretches from the Aral Sea to the mountains of Afghanistan turns up horrified comments from the local officials about what would happen if things

were allowed to get as far as they have in Tallinn and Yerevan. Not surprisingly, political leaders in this part of the country were among the most vociferous opponents of Baltic nationalism when new amendments to the Soviet constitution were debated last November.

"We just don't need that sort of thing here," Alla Lavrushko, third secretary in charge of ideology at the Samarkand communist party

**The ancient cities of Bukhara and Samarkand still operate according to political imperatives much older than those brought by the Soviet revolution.**

headquarters, told me one afternoon during what became a tense encounter at her office. Lavrushko was referring to popular fronts, unofficial groups and the panoply of new political structures which have been allowed to flourish in other parts of the country. Lavrushko, an ambitious young woman assigned here three years ago from Moscow, was evidently responding to signals very different from the ones most Western observers have been getting from the Kremlin. While the Gorbachev reform group outlines far-reaching plans for democratic elections this spring, Moscow's representatives in Central Asia know their job is to prevent democracy from getting out of hand.

After agreeing to meet with a few Western journalists, she appeared to regret it five minutes into the conversation. Our first question cut short what was about to be a long paean to the region's cultural and economic achievements. "How have you begun preparing for the new election

law?" We asked. "Will there be several candidates nominated?"

"Why do you ask that?" she responded suspiciously.

"Because that's what Mr. Gorbachev said was going to happen."

"Why should there be two candidates for the same post – the best person will always be chosen anyway," came the snappish reply.

"Okay, what about popular fronts?"

"What about them?"

"We've heard one has been formed here – are you supporting it, as party officials are doing in Estonia?"

"You have been misinformed," said Lavrushko.

It seemed futile to go on.

Lavrushko is not to be blamed for her testiness. In this part of the world, idealistic notions of greater democracy have to be balanced with local realities, and Moscow is very far away.

The ancient cities of Bukhara and Samarkand still operate according to political imperatives much older than those brought by the Soviet revolution. In a region whose leaders until recently ran fiefdoms oiled by family ties and widespread bribery, the heritage of Alexander the Great and Tamurlaine seems more relevant than that of Lenin. In the *chai-khanas* (tea houses) of Bukhara local merchants and political bosses, wreathed in the smoke from shashlik broiling on open stoves, intrigue and gossip as they have for centuries. The ferocious-looking men with drooping moustaches who stalk the streets in quilted coats could have come straight out of the Bible. It is no surprise to learn that ethnic consciousness is alive and growing.

Local newspapers have started to publish complaints about early Bolshevik and Stalinist policies

which disrupted tribal and clan ties in the region. Under *glasnost*, long-buried language and territorial problems have emerged as a source of ethnic friction. Tadjiks recall that they were forced to change their alphabet from Arabic to Latin script and then to Cyrillic. "Now some of our young people cannot read the inscriptions on their grandparents' graves," wrote one young student.

Another factor in the discontent is Moscow's recent attempt to clean up political corruption in Central Asia. Some of the most important figures in Uzbekistan are now facing charges in connection with an eight billion dollar scandal involving the falsification of cotton production figures. The sensational coverage of the affair in the Moscow press has angered Uzbeks and Tadjiks alike. They detect in the tones of official self-righteousness a hint of racism and paternalism.

Which brings us back to religion. One recent article by a communist party member noted with alarm the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Young men were refusing to take the oath of military service, and babies were being given the name of "Ayatollah," he claimed.

At the Mir-Arab *medresse*, the Soviet Union's only Muslim school, hundreds of applications for the eighty available spots are arriving monthly. Abdurachim Tadjekhatmatov, the school's deputy director, offers one reason for the Islamic revival that is sure to disturb loyal *apparatchiks* like Alla Lavrushko. "There's no doubt that more young people are turning back to religion because they just don't believe in the communist party," he said. "They feel betrayed by our leaders." Indeed, the afternoon prayers in Bukhara contain an ominous message for Moscow itself. □

*Stephen Handelman is Moscow bureau chief for The Toronto Star.*





Un jeune homme portant pantalon et chemise blanche à col ouvert traverse en marchant la cour ensoleillée d'un sémi-

naire musulman datant du seizième siècle.

## LETTRE DE L'OUBÉKISTAN SOVIÉTIQUE

PAR S. HANDELMAN

sur les élections ?», demandons-nous. «Y aura-t-il plusieurs mises en candidature ?» — «Pourquoi me demandez-vous cela ?», répond-elle avec suspicion. «Parce que c'est la ce que M. Gorbatchev a annoncé.» — «Pourquoi y aurait-il deux candidats ? Pourquoi j'aurais-je choisi de toute ma vie pour un même poste ? Le meilleur sera toujours choisi, de toute manière, nous fait-elle d'un ton cas-sant. — «Très bien ! Que dire des populations ?» — «Les fronts populaires ?» — «Nous avons en-tendu dire qu'un tel front avait été formé ici; est-ce que vous l'ap-puyez, comme le font les dirigeants du parti en Estonie ?» — «Vous avez été mal informés», de répliquer notre interlocutrice.

Il nous parut futile de continuer. Il ne faut pas en vouloir à Mme La-Allia Lavroushko, troisième secrétaire chargée de l'idéologie au siège du parti communiste de Samarkand, un après-midi où j'ai eu avec elle un entretien assez tendu dans son bu-reau. Allia Lavroushko faisait allu-sion aux fronts populaires, aux groupes officiels et à la panoplie de nouvelles structures politiques dont on a permis l'épanouissement dans d'autres parties du pays. C'est une jeune femme ambitieuse qui a été affectée ici, depuis Moscou, il y a trois ans, et elle réagissait de toute évidence à des signaux fort dif-férents de ceux que les observateurs occidentaux recevaient du Kremlin. Tandis que le groupe de réforma-teurs mis en place par M. Gorbat-chev dressé des plans d'une portée considérable pour la tenue d'élec-tions démocratiques au printemps, les représentants de Moscou en Asie centrale savent que leur rôle con-siste à empêcher une croissance débridée de la démocratie.

Après avoir accepté d'accueillir quelques journalistes occidentaux, Mme Lavroushko donne aussitôt l'impression de regretter sa déci-sion. Notre première question inter-rompt brusquement ce qui promet d'être un long panegyrique sur les réalisations culturelles et écono-miques de la région. «Avez-vous commencé à vous préparer pour la mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle loi

S'arrêtant juste un peu plus loin que le filet de volley-ball et les cordes à linge des étudiants, il s'oriente vers la Mecque, lève les mains les paumes tournées vers lui, et com-mence à réciter la prière de l'après-midi. Debout dans l'ombre, deux jeunes officiers soviétiques de l'Armée rouge l'observent d'un oeil curieux mais amical.

Il y a quelques années, il aurait été difficile d'imaginer une telle scène en Union soviétique. Le la-béau paisible observé dans la cour de Boukhara, en Ouzbékistan sovié-tique, est sans aucun doute le symbole parfait de la nouvelle ère libérale de M. Gorbatchev. Malgré tout, il y a derrière cela des aspects plus sombres.

Si le pouvoir communiste et l'Islam en sont venus à une sorte de trêve après quelque soixante-dix ans d'hostilités ouvertes, ce n'est pas dû à un accord soudain d'humanité. En affichant une plus grande tolérance pour les susceptibilités musulmanes, Moscou fait preuve d'un sens poli-tique pratique. Avec les laux de na-tionalité acquis en Asie centrale, un citoyen soviétique sur trois sera d'origine musulmane d'ici l'an 2000. La hardiesse à caractériser ethniquement la région revient rel-que et le réveil de la fervente reli-gieuse représentée déjà des motifs potentiels de soulèvement risquant de faire paraître bien anodin l'agré-Batliques et le Caucase. Il est raison-nable de supposer que M. Gorbat-chev refuse d'accéder à bon nombre des demandes les plus radicales des Estoniens, des Arméniens et de leurs frères spirituels, car il craint l'effet explosif qu'une décision inversive aurait sur les peuples et les milles de l'empire soviétique.

La plaine aride et plate qui s'étend de la mer d'Aral aux montagnes d'Afghanistan pour entendre les propos des autorités locales horri-ffées au sujet de ce qui arriverait si l'on autorisait ici l'évolution qu'on

## Les hommes au regard féroce et aux moustaches tombantes qui déambulent dans les rues, vêtus de manteaux matelassés, semblent sortir directement de la Bible.

Les anciennes cités de Boukhara et de Samarkand fonctionnent en-core selon des impératifs politiques beaucoup plus vieux que ceux amenés par la révolution soviétique. Dans une région où les chefs fiers privés régis par les liens fami-liaux et la corruption généralisée, Grand et Tambourinaire paraissent plus à propos que celles de Lénine. Dans les *ichai-khanas* (salle de thé) de Boukhara, les marchands et les chefs politiques de l'endroit, bai-gnant dans la fumée des *shashlik* cuisant sur des poêles, complètent et croient tout simplement plus au regard féroce et aux moustaches tombantes qui déambulent dans les rues, vêtus de manteaux matelassés, semblent sortir directement de la Bible.

Les journaux locaux ont com-mencé à publier des plaintes au sujet des anciennes politiques bolche-viques et stalinistes qui ont boule-versé les rapports tribaux et les clans dans la région. Sous le régime cyrillique. «Aujourd'hui, certains de nos jeunes gens sont incapables de lire les inscriptions figurant sur les tombes de leurs grands-pères», écrivait un jeune étudiant.


Autre facteur de mécontentement, Moscou a récemment tenté d'élimi-ner la corruption politique en Asie centrale. Certaines des personnalités les plus importantes de l'Ouzbékis-tan font maintenant face à des accusations relativement faibles. La production de coton, le scandale concerne des sommes de 8 milliards de dollars. Le bagage de l'affaire de la presse de Moscou a mis en rogne Ouzbeks et Tadjiks. Ils perçoivent dans le pharisme officiel un soupçon de racisme et de paternalisme.

Voilà qui nous ramène à la reli-gion ! Dans un article récent, un membre du parti communiste s'alar-mait de la montée de l'intégrisme musulman. Des jeunes gens refu-saient de servir dans les forces armées, et l'on donnait même à des bébés le nom d'«ayattollah», s'exclamait-il.

Chaque mois, la *madressah* Mir-Abab, seule école musulmane de l'Union soviétique, reçoit des cen-taines de demandes d'admission, même s'il n'y a que quatre-vingt places. Abdourachim Tadjeckhama-rov, directeur adjoint de l'école, fournit, pour expliquer le réveil de l'Islam, une raison qui va certaine-ment troubler les loyaux *appa-trachis* tels qu'Allia Lavroushko. «Il n'y a pas à douter que plus de jeunes gens et de jeunes filles re-viennent à la religion, car ils ne croient tout simplement plus au

part communiste», déclare-t-il. «Ils se sentent trahis par nos dirigeants.» De toute évidence, les prières de l'après-midi à Boukhara continuent un inquietant message pour le Kremlin lui-même. □

Stephen Handelman est chef du bureau du Toronto Star, à Moscou.



# NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT

conflits dans le monde. M. Feasey a par ailleurs dirigé des ateliers dans le cadre de journées de perfectionnement professionnel à l'intention du personnel enseignant de Kitchener et de Belleville.

**Katherine Laundry** a participé à un atelier sur le rôle de la bibliothèque et des membres d'organismes d'une demi-journée à l'intention des bibliothécaires, du personnel universitaires, M. Hill a par ailleurs fait un exposé sur les conséquences qu'un accord sur la réduction des armements classiques aurait pour l'avenir de l'Europe.

Le troisième atelier sur le thème «La gestion des conflits régionaux : régimes et tierces parties médiant-ces» a eu lieu en février à Ottawa. Il était l'oeuvre de **Fen Hampson** (ICPSI) et de **Brian Mandlel** (Université Catelton), et il a réuni des spécialistes des études régionales et

**Geoffrey Pearson**, premier Directeur général de l'Institut, a quitté son poste à la fin de décembre, et c'est **Bernard Wood** qui lui a succédé le 1<sup>er</sup> février. Depuis 1976, M. Wood avait été Directeur général de l'Institut Nord-Sud, un organisme de recherche indépendant qui s'intéresse aux rapports entre le monde industrialisé et les pays en développement. Entre 1976 et 1989, il a également détenu des titres spéciaux, dont celui de représentant personnel du premier ministre auprès des chefs de pays du Commonwealth; de 1980 à 1982, il a fait partie du groupe d'experts mis sur pied par le Secrétaire général de l'ONU pour étudier la relation existant entre le désarmement et le développement. **William Barton**, président du conseil d'administration de l'ICPSI, a offert une réception en l'honneur de M. Wood, à l'Institut, en janvier.

**Johanne Di Donato** s'est jointe à l'Institut en décembre en tant qu'auxiliaire de recherche, après avoir étudié à l'Université Concordia, à l'Université de Leningrad et à la *Norman Patterson School of International Affairs* de l'Université Carleton. **Gabrielle Mahieu** est la nouvelle agente des relations avec les médias. Elle a étudié à l'Université Laval, à l'Université d'Ottawa et à l'Université de Paris, et elle a travaillé plusieurs années comme journaliste à Radio-Canada.

**John Toogood** a participé de l'interventionnisme américain-soviétique, à une conférence du niveau secondaire organisée par le Club des relations internationales de l'école secondaire *Martingrove*, à Toronto.

**Nancy Gordon et Brad Feasey** ont pris la parole et présenté des ateliers à une conférence organisée à Brandon par les dirigeants et enseignants. Des enseignants et étudiants, des parents et des administrateurs scolaires de l'ouest du Manitoba ont participé aux réunions qui ont porté sur le règlement des

## Publications nouvelles de l'Institut

- Le Guide**
- Introduction aux politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à la solution des conflits, 1987-1988.** 295 pages.
- Les Cahiers de l'Institut**
- 6. La réinsertion du Vietnam dans le système international par Gerard Hervouet, décembre 1988.**
- 24. Les missiles de croisière et la limitation des armes stratégiques** par Jane Boulden, janvier 1989.
- 25. La défense non-offensive ou comment assurer la sécurité collective de l'Europe** par Robert Neild, janvier 1989.
- Opinions**
- 6. Les nouvelles dimensions des relations canado-soviétiques au sujet de l'Arctique** par John Hanigan, octobre 1988.
- 23. Établir et maintenir la paix à Chypre** par Robert Mitchell, octobre 1988.
- 24. Les missiles de croisière et la limitation des armes stratégiques** par Jane Boulden, février 1989.
- Fiches d'information**
- 4. Les opérations de maintien de la paix, octobre 1988.**
- 5. Les zones d'ennucléarizées,** janvier 1989.
- Revue annuelle**
- 6. Les nouvelles dimensions des relations canado-soviétiques au sujet de l'Arctique** par John Hanigan, octobre 1988.
- réaction du Canada** par Geoffrey Pearson, décembre 1988.

## 7. Défendre le Canada contre qui et contre quoi? par Geoffrey Pearson, octobre 1988.

- DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL**
- 13. «Regions of Peace - Oases of Hope»** par Arnold Simoni, octobre 1988.
- 14. «Security, Arms Control and Defence: Public Attitudes in Canada»** *The 1988 CIIPS Public Opinion Survey* par Michael Driedger and Don Munton, décembre 1988.
- 16. «Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean»** par Paul George, février 1989.
- 23. Établir et maintenir la paix à Chypre** par Robert Mitchell, octobre 1988.
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L'Institut s'intéresse aussi au conflit chypriote. Deux ateliers ont déjà eu lieu sur la question, et un troisième doit se tenir au printemps. Un colloque de plus grande envergure conclura la série; il sera organisé par **Norma Salem**, chargée de recherche à l'ICPSI.

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un marché d'États, ce qui veut dire

égalité d'armes par l'État. L'aide étrangère, rappelle l'auteur, adopte parfois des détours sinués qui font perdre de vue que sans support gouvernemental le commerce des armes perdrait une grande partie de son attrait.

Ce raisonnement amène la question qui est à la base de la troisième partie de l'ouvrage : l'exportation apporte-t-elle une aide directe à l'État ? La multitude de problèmes que se confronte l'industrie de l'armement atténue l'impact potentiellement positif des exportations et fait en sorte qu'il serait probablement plus sage de fabriquer les siens.

C'est tout cela qui amène Jean-Paul Hébert à la conclusion que le débat sur le rendement de l'industrie de l'armement est un faux débat. La vraie question interpelle les intérêts stratégiques des États. Or, pour défendre ces intérêts, nul besoin de maintenir une infrastructure militaire-industrielle aussi élaborée, pourait-on ajouter. Le maintien de la paix réclame autant d'éducation et de culture que de canons.

L'intérêt du livre réside dans son approche nuancée du rôle des armes et de leur fabrication. L'auteur est un réaliste et son objectif est de dénoncer le recours à une armementation économique fallacieuse afin de justifier la croissance des investissements en équipement militaire. Dans cette perspective, son livre est un instrument précieux axé sur la compréhension du système économique rattaché aux ventes d'armes. — Yves Bélanger

*Yves Bélanger est professeur au département de science politique de l'Université du Québec à Montréal.* □

*Voici l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique Reviews de Peace&Security.*

**Les ventes d'armes**  
Jean-Paul Hébert  
Editions Syros, Paris, 1988.  
166 pages, 19,25 \$

La croissance récente des bud-  
gets de défense des pays de l'OTAN a fait s'élever de nombreuses voix partant dans le monde pour dénoncer la progression des investissements militaires. Avec la publication du livre *Les ventes d'armes*, celle de l'économiste français Jean-Paul Hébert vient de s'ajouter au nombre.

Situons immédiatement le propos de l'auteur. Selon l'auteur, l'argument selon lequel les ventes d'armes sont justifiées par leur profitabilité est inacceptable, autant d'ailleurs que ne l'est le raisonnement opposé. Il ne serait en effet pas admissible de mettre fin à la fabrication d'armement sous prétexte qu'il s'agit d'investissement non rentables. « Les ventes d'armes sont un fait politique majeur dont l'État doit assurer le contrôle et la responsabilité en ayant pesé les conséquences », écrit l'auteur. Le commerce militaire doit donc être soumis à des impératifs strictement politiques, ce qui n'est pas le cas en France, présente-ment pas le cas en France, s'attaque dans son livre.

Le livre comporte trois parties. Dans la première, l'auteur y discute de la thèse de la dérive des prix. Comment se fait-il qu'un matériel puisse se vendre 435 \$ lorsqu'il est destiné aux forces armées alors qu'il n'en coûte que 20 \$ sur le marché commercial ? La réponse à cette question réside dans l'incapacité de contrôler les coûts à cause de l'adaptation des instruments dont disposent les entreprises face aux besoins des militaires et de l'énorme production. Bref, le problème relève de la gestion du progrès militaire et les coûts exorbitants sont souvent à l'origine d'une fuite en avant vers les exportations, sujet de la deuxième partie du livre.

La France présenterait un solide positif de sa balance commerciale militaire évalué à 31 milliards de dollars. Jean-Paul Hébert conteste cet aspect bénéficiaire du négocié français. Il est vrai que les exportations jouent souvent un rôle crucial pour les fabricants d'armes. Pour plusieurs entreprises, les ventes internationales permettent d'atteindre le niveau critique du seuil de rentabilité. Le marché des armes est

gais fuyaient Luanda. «Nulle part au

monde, je n'avais vu une ville pareille», soulignent l'auteur. Non vraiment, ça n'a rien du grand reportage écrit sous une pluie de balles par un journaliste fraîchement débarqué, qui, après s'être inscrit à l'hôtel, est sorti voir cette guerre de plus près pour rapporter chez lui, le lendemain. Le récit de ce journaliste est celui d'un homme qui se perd dans une guerre sale. Dans une guerre où le front est partout et nul part et qu'il a soudainement repéré par «l'odeur inhumaine des corps en décomposition».

«Le monde contemple le grand spectacle du combat et de la mort qui lui est finalement difficile d'imaginer car l'image de la guerre n'est pas communicable, ni par la plume, ni par la voix, ni par la caméra. La guerre n'est une réalité que pour ceux qui la vivent de l'intérieur et ne voient l'aspect sanglant, effroyable. Pour les autres, c'est les pages d'un livre, des images sur un écran, rien de plus», écrit-il.

Pendant les années de guerre qui ont suivies, l'Angola n'a plus fait les manchettes des médias. Cette guerre misérable s'est «normalisée». En fait, Cuba s'est depuis rallié, affirme Kapuscinski.

avec une expertise militaire non négigeable, aux côtés du Mouvement populaire pour la libération de l'Angola (au pouvoir) tandis que les deux groupes d'opposition, le Front national de libération de l'Angola et l'Union nationale pour l'indépendance totale de l'Angola, sont soudés par le Zaïre et l'Afrique du Sud. Une conjoncture qui a permis au conflit de s'enliser et de perdurer jusqu'à tout récemment.

Ce n'est que le 10 août dernier, à la faveur de négociations incluant l'Afrique du Sud qu'un cessez-le-feu était annoncé. Les troupes sud-africaines ont ainsi été rapatriées à la fin août et La Havane devrait en faire autant bientôt avec ses 50 000 soldats stationnés sur le territoire. On reforme le livre de Kapuscinski avec la sensation d'être désorienté par cet épisode de l'histoire angolaise. Un témoignage ému sur la fuite des guerres et la folie des hommes. — Raymond Lemieux

*Raymond Lemieux est journaliste-pigiste à Montréal.*

Le bilan du développement

économique et social est aussi peu concluant, selon l'auteur. Bien que les deux tiers du budget de l'ONU y soient consacrés, les ressources affectées au développement économique et social représentent moins de 7 p. 100 du montant total de l'aide mondiale. De plus, il semble qu'il y ait entre les diverses institutions spécialisées un manque de coopération double d'un esprit de

compétition. Parmi les diverses propositions pour une ONU de «troisième génération», l'auteur privilégie celle de la commande à formule européenne du Conseil de l'Organisation, une réorganisation des secrétariats internationaux et de la Commission de sécurité économique, une réduction des dépenses militaires et de ses institutions spécialisées sur le plan du fonctionnement mais elle est peut-être trop sévère en ce qui concerne la réalisation des objectifs de l'Organisation. Les lecteurs y trouveront un bon exposé des difficultés rencontrées par cette dernière depuis

1970. — Annie Bourrier  
\* Maurice Bertrand, «Réviser l'ONU ! Un programme pour la paix», Editions Zoé, Genève, 1986.


Annie Bourrier est membre du Groupe de recherche sur la paix de l'Université Laval à Québec.

**D'une guerre à l'autre**  
Ryszard Kapuscinski  
Editions Flammarion, Paris, 1988.  
164 pages, 21,50 \$.

Ryszard Kapuscinski est un cas d'espèce parmi les journalistes. Ce reporter polonais a été témoin de vingt-sept révolutions au fil de sa carrière. En 1975, il était en Angola au moment de la décolonisation portugaise. Un événement qui devait malheureusement conduire le pays vers la guerre.

Kapuscinski ne fait nullement abstraction de la peur qui l'a tenu au fur et à mesure que cette guerre approchait et que les colons portaient la guerre.





**Iran-Irak : une guerre de 5000 ans**

Paul Balta  
Éditions Antropos, Paris, 1988.  
315 pages, 29,90 \$.

M. Paul Balta est bien connu des lecteurs du *Monde* et du *Monde diplomatique*, par ses articles sur les différents problèmes du Moyen-Orient et particulièrement du monde arabe. Excellent analyste, il démontre une connaissance détaillée et approfondie de ces problèmes. Dans le conflit Iran-Irak, il distingue trois thèmes principaux :

par les Iraniens et l'utilisation de nouvelles tactiques. Comme le livre prend fin en septembre 1987, l'auteur ne mentionne pas les armes chimiques et leur rôle crucial durant les phases terminales de la guerre. Dans le chapitre sur les grandes puissances, Paul Balta trace avec brio les engagerments américains, soviétiques, chinois, français et juifs d'Israël.

Le chapitre suivant sur les enjeux arabes dans le conflit dénote une analyse de la question bien plus valable que celle qu'on retrouve couramment dans la littérature spécialisée américaine qui laisse de côté le Maghreb et le Mashrek. L'auteur n'hésite pas à considérer le rôle du Maroc autant que celui du Yémen du Sud en passant par Damas, La Mecque et la Libye, dans le conflit Iran-Irak.

Paul Balta remarque qu'ils sont très nombreux «ceux qui avaient prévu sa durée et sa dureté (de la guerre)». Le résultat premier de cette guerre est qu'elle «a raffermi le pouvoir des ayatollahs et celui-ci est solidement structuré». Les opposants sont pour la plupart en exil, divisés et inefficaces. En fait, la révolution islamique n'a pas réussi à s'exporter sans parmi les groupes cules de Chittes au Liban. La question qui se pose alors est «Quelle est la vision du monde qui prévaudra à longue échéance? Celle, possible en Irak, d'une société agressive, intégrée, équilibrée entre une centralisation nécessaire et le respect des différentes composantes de la nation, offrant une place de marque à l'émancipation de la femme et au processus de démocratisation et de de Dieu», qui cherchent la symbiose moderne? Le n'ai trouvé qu'un reproche à faire à Paul Balta. Un reproche qu'il aurait dû éviter suite aux critiques faites par Edward Saïd dans son livre *Orientalisme*, sur le manque de le double emploi et le manque de performance du personnel (surtout

– les «trois niveaux», national, régional et idéologique qui forment la base du processus de construction de l'État-nation;

– les enjeux régionaux, c'est-à-dire la volonté de chacun des deux pays de devenir la puissance régionale dans cette partie du monde;

– les intérêts des grandes puissances.

**La crise du système des Nations-Unies**  
Victor-Yves Ghébal  
La Documentation Française, Paris, 1988, n° 4854  
136 pages, 10 \$.

On évoque souvent la plus récente crise des Nations-Unies (ONU) en se référant à la réduction de la contribution financière des États-Unis en 1985. Selon Victor-Yves Ghébal, auteur spécialisé dans le domaine du contrôle des armements, cette crise a en fait connu quatre dimensions importantes : politique et budgétaire.

L'auteur divise son analyse en trois sections. Dans la première, il rappelle l'évolution de l'ONU depuis sa fondation et campe les grandes lignes de son «vieillessement naturel» : accroissement du nombre des États-membres, qui fait passer au banc de l'opposition les pays fondateurs; alourdissement bureaucratique, dû à la prolifération des structures. La mauvaise gestion, le double emploi et le manque de performance du personnel (surtout

La deuxième section présente deux études de cas d'institutions spécialisées : l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT) et l'UNESCO. La dernière section est consacrée à l'examen des problèmes budgétaires et politiques du système de l'ONU. On y trouve également les conclusions du Groupe des 18 experts formé en 1986, qui avait pour mandat de formuler des recommandations pour réformer le fonctionnement administratif et budgétaire de l'ONU.

Les griefs des pays occidentaux envers les institutions spécialisées de l'ONU concernent leur philosophie constitutionnelle (surtout les Droits de l'Homme), les procédures, les programmes, la prise de décision et la gestion (budgétaire et administrative).

La réduction de la contribution américaine en 1985 a obligé l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU à prendre des mesures d'urgence pour régler son problème d'insolvabilité ainsi qu'à former le «Groupe des 18» dont le rapport, franc et sévère, a été vivement critiqué à l'Assemblée générale. L'adoption de certaines des recommandations a permis de la reprise graduelle de sa contribution à l'initiative des États-Unis, entre-temps, l'effet non-négligeable d'accélérer le paiement de certains arriérés, notamment celui de l'URSS.

Selon Ghébal, les objectifs fondamentaux de sécurité collective et de développement économique et social n'ont pas été atteints. Dans le premier cas, l'auteur rappelle que les activités de l'ONU incluent les opérations du maintien de la paix. Toutefois, depuis 1945 le recours à la violence dans les conflits s'est accru, et la zone belliqueuse s'est déplacée de l'Europe vers le tiers-monde. Quant au contrôle des armements, les superpuissances ont constitué leurs propres mécanismes de négociations, en faisant fi des Nations-Unies.

Balta divise le déroulement même de la guerre en sept phases : l'arabique et la vision cartennement religieuse de la révolution islamique plurié laïcisme du nationalisme concentrant sur la vision du monde dans la partie navigable du Golfe, et des frontières entre les deux pays guerre, particulièrement la question de l'ingue les causes «réalistes» de la et qui a duré plus de huit ans. Il décrit en détails la guerre meurtrière les plus intéressants car Paul Balta Les chapitres IV, V et VI sont mourabi à Saddam Hussein.

– les intérêts des grandes puissances.












# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



## Le partage du fardeau au sein de l'Alliance

En décembre 1988, les membres du Comité des plans de défense de l'OTAN ont approuvé à l'unanimité un rapport sur le partage des rôles, des tâches et des responsabilités au sein de l'Alliance. Contrairement au rapport annuel soumis au Congrès par le secrétaire à la Défense des États-Unis, le document de l'OTAN a adopté une perspective plus large face au partage du fardeau, en soulignant que les membres de l'Alliance se devaient d'assumer des responsabilités plus vastes en matière de sécurité, de nourrir des intérêts plus profonds à cet égard et de contribuer ensemble à la défense commune. Relativement aux intérêts plus considérables au chapitre de la sécurité, le rapport évoque l'aide extérieure et le soutien des missions onusiennes de maintien de la paix, ainsi que la participation à des activités en dehors de la zone d'influence de l'Alliance (par exemple, envoyer des forces navales dans le golfe Persique). Quant au maintien de la paix, le rapport cite tout particulièrement les contributions du Canada, du Danemark, de la Norvège et de l'Italie. Il souligne aussi que l'Alliance pourrait fournir des fonds raisonnables pour soutenir les activités de l'ONU et ajouter ainsi une autre dimension à ses efforts en faveur de la paix. Pour ce qui est de l'aide extérieure exprimée en pourcentage du produit national brut, le Canada se classe derrière la Norvège, les Pays-Bas, le Danemark et la Belgique, au sein de l'OTAN. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'évaluer les contributions à la défense commune, le rapport s'éloigne aussi du format traditionnel mis en œuvre par l'OTAN sur les budgets et les effectifs militaires, d'autre part, les effectifs militaires, les effectifs militaires qui aident à définir ce qu'est le fardeau de défense. Parmi ces derniers, citons le coût socio-économique que suppose l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, vu les troupes nombreuses déployées sur son territoire et les dommages causés par les manœuvres des blindés et les vols à basse altitude; le coût socio-politique de la conscription, et les problèmes allant de pair avec la séparation des familles dans le cas des pays qui basent des unités militaires en dehors de leur territoire national.

Fait particulièrement digne d'intérêt pour notre pays, le rapport reconnaît que la Norvège, le Canada et les États-Unis contribuent à l'effort collectif en surveillant et en défendant les approches septentrionales de leur territoire. Le document souligne que le Canada participe beaucoup aux activités communes et finance conjointement (par exemple, l'utilisation des avions E-3A d'alerte lointaine et le fonctionnement du quartier général de l'OTAN), même s'il ne peut espérer en retirer des avantages économiques directs dignes de mention. Le rapport mentionne également la contribution que le Canada, la Turquie et l'Espagne font en fournissant des installations d'entraînement.

En ce qui concerne le critère fondamental qu'est la contribution en argent et en main-d'œuvre, le Canada continue de s'attirer les critiques de ses alliés. Chez nous, moins de 1 p. cent de la main-d'œuvre travaille dans le secteur militaire, de sorte que le Canada ne devance plus que le Luxembourg à l'avant-dernier rang de l'Alliance, devant le Luxembourg. D'après le rapport, les budgets militaires du Canada équivalent en 1988 à 2,08 p. 100 du PIB, comparativement à 2,87 p. 100 pour la Belgique, l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis respectivement. La Directive ministérielle de l'OTAN établie en 1987 exige des membres consacrant moins de 3 p. cent de leur PIB à la défense d'accroître leurs budgets sur ce plan. Le Canada, le Danemark, l'Italie, le Luxembourg et l'Espagne

## Les forces classiques en Europe : des faits et encore des faits

En novembre 1988, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, et M. Perrin Beatty, alors ministre de la Défense nationale, ont diffusé une «évaluation statistique collective» faite par les membres de l'OTAN sur l'équilibre des forces en Europe. Le document s'intitule *Forces classiques en Europe : les faits et il a été présenté en tant que contribution de l'Alliance, à l'approche des nouveaux pourparlers Est-Ouest sur les forces classiques en Europe. Les statistiques en question visent la zone qui fera l'objet des nouveaux entretiens (de l'Atlantique à l'Oural) et elles prennent en compte les forces espagnoles et françaises qui, jusqu'ici, avaient été exclues des calculs.*

Les chiffres révèlent l'existence d'une supériorité écrasante de l'Organisation du Traité de Varsovie (OTV) dans des domaines clés, tels que les chars de combat, l'artillerie, les avions de combat et le personnel militaire. En ce qui concerne les chars, on a estimé que l'OTV possédait plus de trois fois le nombre d'unités dont l'OTAN dispose (51 500 contre 16 424), et la même proportion a été établie dans le cas des pièces d'artillerie (43 400 contre 14 458); quant aux avions de combat, on pense que l'inventaire de l'OTV équivaut à plus du double des ressources de l'OTAN (8 250 contre 3 977). Les effectifs militaires de l'OTV se situaient à 3,1 millions, comparativement à 2,2 millions dans le cas de l'OTAN.

Dans les observations qu'ils ont fournies avec ces chiffres, MM. Clark et Beatty ont déclaré que le déséquilibre des forces confère à l'Est la capacité de déclencher une attaque-surprise et de vastes manœuvres offensives. L'étude de l'OTAN souligne que de nouvelles négociations sur les forces classiques s'imposent d'urgence, et elle est décrite comme une «contribution à la transparence militaire» et un document par lequel l'Alliance atlantique invite l'OTV à fournir de la même manière des données sur ses propres forces.

Les pays de l'OTV ont apparemment répondu à l'invitation. Le 30 janvier 1989, la *Pravda* a publié, avec l'assentiment des ministres de la Défense du Pacte de Varsovie, un document très différent sur l'équilibre des forces. Qualifiant les chiffres de l'OTAN de «données tendancieuses de couloir», d'une perspective sélective», le journal soviétique affirme que l'OTV a deux fois plus de chars que l'OTAN, un léger avantage au chapitre de l'artillerie, et un nombre d'avions de combat à peu près identique à celui de l'Alliance atlantique. Comme toute la *Pravda* accorde un faible avantage à l'OTAN quant aux effectifs militaires et elle conclut que les chiffres révèlent une

se situent sous le niveau de 2,5 p. 100, et le rapport ne manque pas de le signaler. Le Canada a cependant fait mieux sur deux autres plans : au cours des dix dernières années, avec quelques autres membres de l'OTAN, il a consacré un budget de défense à l'achat de gros équipements. Seuls les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ont atteint des niveaux sensiblement supérieurs pendant la même période.

**Dépenses : l'ordre des priorités**  
La tendance générale que suivent les budgets de défense a échappé en quelque mesure à l'ordre des priorités change.

Le gouvernement Mulroney. Il est probable que les budgets de défense continueront d'augmenter en dollars

continueront d'augmenter en dollars

continueront d'augmenter en dollars


continueront d'augmenter en dollars

continueront d'augmenter en dollars

M. Roche, ce furent les débats sur l'espace extra-atmosphérique et l'interdiction complète des essais



## CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



### La Conférence de Paris sur les armes chimiques

Une conférence internationale sur l'interdiction des armes chimiques (AC), à laquelle ont assisté des délégués de 149 pays, dont quatre-vingt ministres des Affaires étrangères, a eu lieu à Paris du 7 au 11 janvier. La Conférence, dont le président Reagan avait proposé l'organisation en septembre dernier, avait pour objet de réaffirmer l'absence de la Convention de Genève (1925) qui défend l'emploi des AC, et de l'ajout de la vigueur aux efforts que la Conférence du désarmement (CD) déploie à Genève pour négocier l'interdiction totale de fabriquer et de stocker de tels engins.

De vives tensions régnaient au moment de la Conférence, car les États-Unis avaient accusé la Libye d'avoir construit une immense usine d'armes chimiques à Rabia, au sud-ouest de Tripoli. La Conférence elle-même s'est déroulée dans un climat orageux. L'Iran et l'Irak se sont mutuellement accusés d'avoir violé le Protocole de Genève; de nombreux délégués n'ont pas assisté aux allocations des ministres des Affaires étrangères d'Israël et d'Afrique du Sud; divers États arabes, alléguant qu'Israël possédait des armes nucléaires, ont insisté pour lier au désarmement nucléaire la fabrication des AC, en faisant valoir que de tels contrôles gêneraient le développement d'industries chimiques à buts pacifiques et qu'ils instauraient une discrimination favorable aux pays déjà munis d'AC.

Fait pressant peut-être plus d'intérêt, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Chevardnadze, a reconnu le 8 janvier que son pays avait tardé à mettre un terme à la production d'AC et à ce sens. Il a cependant déclaré que

L'URSS terminerait bientôt la construction d'un centre de destruction des AC et qu'elle amorcerait immédiatement l'élimination de ses anciens stocks sans attendre l'adoption d'une nouvelle convention sur les AC. Des porte-parole et observateurs des États-Unis et d'autres pays occidentaux ont accueilli la nouvelle favorablement, mais ils ont signalé que le centre en question était petit et que, même après de très nombreuses années, on n'y aura détruit qu'une infime partie de l'énorme arsenal chimique soviétique. Ils ont également fait observer que les États-Unis s'adonnaient depuis quelques années à la destruction de leurs stocks vétustes, bien que ce pays eût commencé en décembre 1987 à produire une génération endépendante de l'ONU pour l'exécution d'enquêtes en cas d'emploi présumé d'AC, peu poursuivi; aucun pays, d'ailleurs, n'aurait le droit de s'opposer à la tenue de telles enquêtes.

Le même jour, M. Joe Clark a affirmé dans son discours que le Canada avait déjà fait savoir aux autres pays qu'il avait détruit ses propres stocks d'AC datant de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qu'il ne comptait même contre des États non parties au Protocole de Genève, et qu'il ne mettrait pas au point, ne produirait pas, n'acquiescerait pas ni ne stockerait de telles armes, à moins qu'elles soient employées contre ses forces armées ou sa population civile, ou encore contre celles de ses alliés.

Parlant des armes biologiques et toxiques, M. Clark a rappelé que le Canada n'en avait jamais possédé et qu'il n'avait aucunement l'intention d'en mettre au point, d'en fabriquer, d'en acquiescer, d'en stocker ou d'en utiliser dans l'avenir.

D'autres événements encouragèrent les pays à se réunir pendant la Conférence. Dix pays, dont les deux Corées, le Laos et le Bangladesh, ont annoncé qu'ils signeraient le Protocole de Genève. L'Irak a

réitéré sa volonté de se conformer au Protocole dans l'avenir (tout en admettant avoir employé des AC dans sa guerre contre l'Iran, l'Irak a reconnu en premier). L'Irak a par ailleurs promis de ne pas mettre à la disposition d'autres pays les nouvelles connaissances qu'il avait acquises sur les AC. Quant à elle, l'Iran a déclaré qu'elle signerait une entente sur l'interdiction totale des AC, peu importe que l'Irak la parache ou non.

À la fin, les participants à la Conférence ont adopté par consensus une «Déclaration finale» en six points par laquelle ils promettent de ne pas utiliser les AC et de continuer leur emploi par d'autres, ils exhortent les États ne l'ayant pas encore fait à signer le Protocole de Genève, ils soulignent la nécessité d'intervenir à l'échelle mondiale la production et le stockage des AC, et ce, de que possible, et ils recommandent que l'ONU joue un rôle pour garantir le respect des mesures restrictives visant les AC, y compris les enquêtes que le Secrétaire général mènerait en cas de violations présumées du Protocole de 1925.

Après la Conférence, le chef de la délégation américaine, l'ambassadeur William Burns, a affirmé que la Déclaration exprimait un puissant consensus mondial et qu'elle allait donner un élan politique considérable aux négociations de la CD. Il a cependant avoué que Washington aurait préféré voir les délégués accepter explicitement la nouvelle réglementation des exportations et adopter des sanctions contre les utilisateurs de l'interdiction de ces armes; il a fait observer que la col-lectivité internationale n'avait jamais auparavant favorisé aussi clairement l'objectif que représente l'interdiction complète des armes chimiques. Malgré tout, de nombreux observateurs de l'extérieur ont affirmé un certain scepticisme, en disant des participants à la Conférence qu'ils n'avaient pas su condamner nommément les pays qui s'étaient servis d'AC peu de temps auparavant (l'Irak en particulier).

D'autres ont exprimé la crainte que la Conférence ait été nuisible en un certain sens, du fait qu'elle ait montré l'intérêt politique qu'il y a à posséder des AC ou à menacer d'en acquiescer (comme l'ont attesté les pays du tiers-monde qui ont exigé la signature d'un lien entre l'établissement d'un lien entre les désarmements chimique et nucléaire).

### La limitation des armements classiques en Europe

Dans un discours prononcé devant l'ONU le 7 décembre, le président soviétique, M. Gorbatchev, a annoncé que son pays prendrait une série de mesures unilatérales, dont les suivantes :

- au cours des deux prochaines années, l'URSS réduira de 500 000 membres les effectifs de ses forces armées et elle éliminera aussi une partie importante de ses armements classiques;
- d'ici 1991 également, elle retirera de l'Allemagne de l'Est, de la Tchecoslovaquie et de la Hongrie 50 000 militaires et 5 000 chars, dont six divisions de chars ainsi que des unités de débarquement et d'assaut; les divisions soviétiques qui resteront dans ces pays seront «restreintes»;
- Moscou réduira davantage ses troupes et ses armements dans la partie européenne de l'URSS, ce qui portera l'ensemble des réductions en Europe à 10 000 chars, 8 500 systèmes d'artillerie et 800 aéronavals de combat;
- l'URSS réduira considérablement ses forces basées en Asie soviétique; et
- elle retirera une «grande partie» de ses troupes déployées en Mongolie.

Selon les estimations occidentales, ces réductions équivalaient à environ 10 p. 100 de toutes les troupes soviétiques, à plus du quart des chars de l'URSS déployés en Europe, dont à peu près la moitié de ceux présents en Europe de l'Est, au quart de ses pièces d'artillerie



# À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

En vertu d'un plan original, l'ONU déploierait un contingent de 7 500 militaires, les cinq membres permanents du Conseil, à savoir la Chine, les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni et l'URSS, pensent tous que ce chiffre est trop élevé. Le Secrétaire général a proposé de consacrer une force de 4 650 militaires, dont plusieurs centaines seraient fournis par le Canada. Les pays africains de la ligne de front et la South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) se sont vivement opposés à toute réduction des effectifs de la force proposée. Le Canada soutient que celle-ci devrait être le plus efficace possible; il aimerait en réduire les effectifs, car cela entraînerait des économies, mais il se dirait en faveur de tout niveau jugé nécessaire pour garantir un passage en douceur à l'indépendance.

## Autres questions

Parmi les autres questions examinées par le Conseil, citons le renouveau de la Force internationale des Nations-Unies au Liban (FINUL) et du GOMNUII (Iran-Irak). Le Conseil a par ailleurs tenu des consultations sur un projet de déclaration critiquant le comportement des Israéliens dans les Territoires occupés, ainsi que sur la date où devraient avoir lieu les élections pour remplir un poste vacant à la Cour internationale de justice.

Le Conseil a rarement accordé autant d'attention au maintien de la paix. En raison des démarches diplomatiques entreprises dans le Sahara occidental et au Kampuchea, il se pourrait que des troupes onusiennes soient aussi déployées dans ces régions et que le Conseil soit appelé à se pencher sur ces questions dès cette année. □

- TREVOR ROWE

d'ordre strictement procédural involsans avoir à obtenir la caution d'un membre. Mais pendant le débat sur la Libye, l'OLP a exigé de pouvoir prendre la parole devant le Conseil sans avoir à obtenir la caution d'un

répondant.

L'OLP voulait aussi être reconnue comme le Représentant permanent du Bureau de la Palestine, au lieu d'avoir simplement le titre d'Observateur. L'Assemblée générale avait déjà acquisé à ces changements, mais les États-Unis en contestaient la mise en oeuvre au Conseil de sécurité. Cependant, comme il s'agissait d'une question de procédure, les États-Unis n'ont pas pu faire usage de leur droit de veto et ont dû se contenter de voter contre. Le Canada, la France et le Royaume-Uni se sont

abstenus. Les autres membres du Conseil ont voté pour.

Afin d'expliquer la position du Canada, l'ambassadeur Fortier a déclaré que son pays n'était pas opposé à ce que le Bureau de la Palestine prenne la parole à l'ONU, mais qu'il fallait, selon lui, suivre la procédure établie. M. Fortier a répété que le Canada ne recommandait pas l'État palestinien créé à Aïge.

Cependant, l'ambiguïté de l'abstention semble indiquer que, même si le Canada n'appuie pas un Management de l'OLP, il ne s'y opposerait pas, en fin de compte.

## L'indépendance de la Namibie

Les États membres ont consacré beaucoup de temps à la mise en application de la résolution 435 qui prépare l'accession de la Namibie à l'indépendance; c'est là une question dont le Canada a activement poursuivi l'étude quand il siégeait au Conseil il y a dix ans et en tant que membre du Groupe des Cinq. Par ailleurs, le Groupe d'assistance des Nations-Unies pour la période de transition (GANUT) a pour objectif de garantir la paix et de créer les conditions nécessaires à la tenue d'élections libres.

américains, même quand ceux-ci exécutaient des manoeuvres de désengagement. Pendant tout le débat, les Libyens ont maintenu que les preuves avancées par Washington au sujet de l'incident étaient fabriquées de toutes pièces.

Le Canada a d'abord réagi avec prudence. Du 4 janvier, date où le Conseil a commencé ses consultations officielles, jusqu'à la prochaine réunion, M. Fortier a déclaré aux journalistes que le Canada continuait d'examiner tous les faits avant de prendre une décision. Il a ajouté que notre pays voulait entendre tous les intervenants dans le débat. Quand les reporters l'ont pressé de dire s'il estimait l'attaque américaine justifiée, M. Fortier a affirmé: «Écoutons d'abord tous les intervenants... nous sommes encore en plein milieu du débat et, ce que je sache, rien n'a encore été tranché.» Mais le lendemain, avant que tous les intervenants se fussent effectivement faits entendre par le Conseil, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a déclaré à Paris que le Canada acceptait la version américaine des faits. Bien que sans grande importance, l'incident a fait penser que l'ambassadeur n'avait peut-être pas été aussi bien informé qu'il aurait dû l'être. Quand il a quitté son poste à New York, l'ancien ambassadeur Stephen Lewis s'était plaint d'accrochages avec les autorités supérieures des Affaires étrangères, qui le traitaient comme quelqu'un n'étant pas des leurs. M. Fortier, avocat montalais prospère, a lui aussi été nommé pour des raisons politiques. Par la suite, cependant, il a répété à maintes reprises qu'il s'entendait bien avec son ministre. «En ce qui me concerne, mes rapports avec Ottawa sont excellents,» a-t-il précisé pendant une entrevue.

Une résolution qui déplorait la mise hors de combat des deux chasseurs libyens a finalement été rejetée. Les États-Unis, la France et la Grande-Bretagne ayant opposé leur veto. Le Canada a été le seul autre pays à s'opposer à la résolution; quant à eux, le Brésil et la Finlande se sont abstenus.

## La reconnaissance de l'OLP

Avant que le vote ait pu avoir lieu sur la question libyenne, un détail

Note de la Rédaction: Avec l'élection du Canada au Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies pour une période de deux ans, nous instituons une nouvelle rubrique qui portera sur les affaires de cet organe de l'ONU. L'auteur, M. Trevor Rowe, est basé à New York et fait régulièrement, depuis sept ans, des reportages sur l'ONU pour le compte de la presse de dire s'il estimait l'attaque américaine justifiée, M. Fortier a affirmé: «Écoutons d'abord tous les intervenants... nous sommes encore en plein milieu du débat et, ce que je sache, rien n'a encore été tranché.» Mais le lendemain, avant que tous les intervenants se fussent effectivement faits entendre par le Conseil, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a déclaré à Paris que le Canada acceptait la version américaine des faits. Bien que sans grande importance, l'incident a fait penser que l'ambassadeur n'avait peut-être pas été aussi bien informé qu'il aurait dû l'être. Quand il a quitté son poste à New York, l'ancien ambassadeur Stephen Lewis s'était plaint d'accrochages avec les autorités supérieures des Affaires étrangères, qui le traitaient comme quelqu'un n'étant pas des leurs. M. Fortier, avocat montalais prospère, a lui aussi été nommé pour des raisons politiques. Par la suite, cependant, il a répété à maintes reprises qu'il s'entendait bien avec son ministre. «En ce qui me concerne, mes rapports avec Ottawa sont excellents,» a-t-il précisé pendant une entrevue.

## Mise hors de combat de chasseurs libyens

Après avoir mené une vigoureuse campagne pour obtenir un siège au Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies, le Canada s'est immédiatement retrouvé au coeur de l'action quand l'organe suprême de l'ONU s'est réuni au début de janvier pour calmer les tensions engendrées par la mise hors de combat de deux chasseurs libyens par des avions américains. «C'est ce qu'on appelle entrer dans le feu de l'action, littéralement,» a déclaré M. Yves Fortier, nouvellement nommé ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU, au moment où il quittait la chambre du Conseil après une ronde de consultation avec les quatre autres membres.

Le Conseil a dû évaluer deux versions des faits et décider si l'action des États-Unis avait été justifiée. La Libye a soutenu que ses avions n'étaient pas armés et qu'ils avaient été victimes d'une attaque non provoquée pendant une mission de reconnaissance. Les États-Unis ont fait valoir avec insistance que les appareils libyens avaient affiché des intentions hostiles en talonnant plusieurs chasseurs repris les chasseurs



# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ : DEUX CONCEPTS ANTAGONISTES ?

PAR BERNARD WOOD



Bernard Wood est Directeur général de l'ICPSI.

J'ÉTAIS EN AUSTRALIE EN AOÛT DERNIER QUAND M. Clark a annoncé mon affectation au poste de Directeur général de l'ICPSI. La réaction perplexe d'un échantillon diversifié d'Australiens face au mandat ambivalent de l'Institut m'a frappé.

Après presque cinq ans, cette association singulière de concepts est devenue familière à la partie de la population canadienne que la chose intéresse, mais elle gêne encore énormément, pour beaucoup, sa plausibilité est encore douteuse. Les perceptions, bien sûr, sont des réalités, et si suffisamment de gens insistent pour s'identifier à une collectivité «pour la paix» ou à un groupe «pour la sécurité», l'activité «pour la paix» persiste à se voir comme l'ennemie d'une de l'autre, alors elles seront en conflit.

Pour la plupart des gens (électeurs, citoyens et contrabables), les origines du différend deviennent rapidement mystérieuses. En effet, l'homme de la rue se demande pourquoi, si M.L. Reagan et Gorbatchev peuvent commencer à trouver des terrains d'entente, les deux groupes intéressés par le même problème au Canada sont encore à court-circuits.

Il n'y a presque plus personne pour nier la réalité ou l'importance historique du nouveau dialogue soviéto-américain, de l'accord modeste mais bien concret de désarmement conclu sur les forces nucléaires à portée inter-médiaire, et des perspectives sérieuses de réduction des arsenaux stratégiques et classiques. Et il y a d'autant plus lieu d'être optimiste que l'Est et l'Ouest ont tous deux reconnu le fardeau économique que ces derniers représentent. Mais on est encore loin du but.

Il existe des personnes qui, en raison de leurs responsabilités, de leurs fonctions et de leur formation, doivent aborder les questions de sécurité internationale en se préoccupant principalement de protéger l'État contre les pires perspectives et de garantir d'abord et avant tout que le pays pourra déjouer ou repousser toute attaque susceptible de menacer sa sécurité physique et ses habitants. D'autres abordent le problème à l'inverse : ils recherchent, dans toutes les circonstances, les meilleures perspectives pour désamorcer l'hostilité et réduire les affrontements.

Comme les sondages d'opinion successifs l'ont attesté, la majorité des Canadiens et Canadiennes éprouvent des sentiments ambivalents face à l'état actuel des relations Est-Ouest. Ils sont encore persuadés de la nécessité de posséder des défenses puissantes et de négocier depuis une position de force, mais le ton et la teneur de la campagne que M. Gorbatchev mène pour modifier la Guerre froide les impressionnent également; ils sont disposés à appuyer de vigoureux initiatives occidentales qui traitent dans le même sens (même celles qui comporteraient certains risques). Les décideurs canadiens sont tiraillés eux aussi, dans leur propre travail, par ces perceptions ambivalentes au sujet des relations Est-Ouest.

QUE PEUT-ON RAISONNABLEMENT ESPÉRER FAIRE POUR FAVERORISER une discussion productive sur la «paix» et la «sécurité»? S'il y a un conflit entre les deux points de vue opposés, et entre les partisans des deux camps, le public averti et les décideurs les écouteront, mais les excès commis de part et d'autre réduiront les chances pour que s'instaure un dialogue démocratique créateur. En revanche, si l'on prend l'habitude de tenir des échanges polis dans le cadre de tribunes appropriées, le désaccord subsistera à bien des égards, mais on réussira aussi sans doute à définir beaucoup mieux toute une gamme d'options valables à l'intention du public et des décideurs. À la faveur du processus, les milieux analytiques et avocats des deux groupes antagonistes mettront probablement davantage sur la politique adoptée en fin de compte que s'ils se cantonnent dans l'isolement le plus parfait.

Des ouvertures intéressantes en matière de limitation des armements et l'amélioration des relations Est-Ouest devaient favoriser l'amorce d'un tel dialogue constructif, bien que l'évolution actuelle de la conjoncture engendre aussi de nouveaux défis déséquilibrés. Les tribunes sont par ailleurs plus développées que jamais (l'ICPSI est un bon exemple à citer, mais il y en a d'autres). Des membres réfléchis des deux groupes ont appris à connaître les modes de pensée et le langage les uns des autres, et ils ont entrepris des débats techniques et des discussions sur des questions de fond. En outre, les deux collectivités croient désormais utile et nécessaire de parler de concepts de sécurité plus vastes et des nouvelles voies à suivre pour parvenir à la sécurité (la sécurité «commune» ou «mutuelle»).

Il reste encore beaucoup de travail novateur à accomplir pour relever les multiples défis qui concerneront la sécurité Canada est un fervent partisan de la coopération multilatérale et de la participation fonctionnelle, et il montre par là le type d'ordre et de structures que nécessite l'être de l'interdépendance mondiale. Les efforts exemplaires qu'il déploie pour combattre la pauvreté dans le tiers-monde et promouvoir le respect des droits de la personne à l'échelle de la planète sont tout aussi élogieux.

La surveillance et la défense de notre territoire et de nos zones maritimes continueront de représenter un immense défi, nos responsabilités en matière de défense collective demeureront épuisantes, et toutes ces ressources diplomatiques et militaires seront sollicitées pour répondre à une pléthore de nouveaux besoins intéressant le maintien de la paix, le règlement des conflits et la mise en place d'institutions. Sans diluer le concept de sécurité ni sous-estimer le rôle des forces armées, qui demeureront quasi indissociables de ce concept pendant longtemps encore, il s'agira de satisfaire à un nouvel impératif : créer des rapports de sécurité moins antagonistes et éliminer les causes sous-jacentes (politiques, économiques, socio-culturelles et environnementales) de l'hostilité entre les peuples.

AU SUJET DE BON NOMBRE DE CES AUTRES OBSTACLES À LA PAIX et à la sécurité, on constate rapidement que la polarisation et la méfiance existant chez les Canadiens et Canadiennes intéressés par le débat sont au moins aussi prononcées que quand il s'agit des relations Est-Ouest. Relativement à des conflits régionaux tels que ceux sévissant au Moyen-Orient, en Amérique centrale et à Chypre, les Canadiens cherchant des moyens d'aider à régler les différences et à réduire les tensions découvrent que certains de leurs efforts les plus importants sont accueillis avec suspicion ou hostilité par ceux et celles favorisant une participation ou hostilité plus active. Certains conflits se prêtent plus à l'intervention canadienne, d'autres moins; il en existe peu, cependant, dans lesquels notre pays n'ait aucun intérêt, surtout maintenant que le siège au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. En général, le Canada est l'un des pays du monde qui puissent le mieux prétendre à l'impartialité. La vérité est toutefois la première victime de la guerre, et quiconque tente de s'interposer entre les combattants peut s'attendre à recevoir de coups, peu importe qu'ils soient mérités ou non. Voilà qui nous rappelle toutefois que les conflits ne sont pas des parties de plaisir; les motifs de tous ceux qui s'intéressent à un conflit doivent être minutieusement examinés, et l'on ira même jusqu'à les critiquer verbalement.

Il n'est pas nécessaire qu'il y ait antagonisme entre les concepts de «paix» et de «sécurité»; de nombreuses occasions se présentent maintenant d'en poursuivre la réalisation sur des voies convergentes. Mais attention ! Il ne faut jamais espérer éviter tout différend quand on parle de conflits. □

Bob Roney



Evolution des dépenses que sup-  
posait à leur participation, ils  
cependant précisé que, si diverses  
parties, notamment les États-Unis,  
contribuer à la justice qu'on a ni  
les Soviétiques se sont dits prêts à  
de maintien de la paix en Namibie,  
caractériste cependant la nouvelle  
politique : l'URSS reconnaît que les  
résolutions anti-impérialistes sovié-  
tiques n'aident en rien à nourrir le  
tiers-monde et que l'ONU des  
années 1980 n'est plus la tribune an-  
tagoniste qu'elle était dans la décen-  
nie précédente. En fait, les chefs  
d'un bon nombre des pays les plus  
pauvres en sont venus à voir la  
coopération avec des gouverne-  
ments du Nord comme un élément  
essentiel au développement éco-  
nomique et à la stabilité régionale.  
Et quand ils cherchent des modèles  
soutenables pour imiter les États-  
Unis traditionnels de l'URSS, et à  
l'Éthiopie, au Vietnam et à Cuba.  
Les porte-parole soviétiques, à  
tous les niveaux, ont bien précisé  
que les nouvelles propositions de  
Moscou ne sont pas motivées par  
l'altruisme. Comme tout autre État-  
nation, l'URSS cherche à protéger  
ses intérêts. Il est vrai que le multi-  
latéralisme de l'ONU représente un  
moyen de contenir l'unilatéralisme  
américain, et c'est là un motif que  
les partisans canadiens de l'ONU  
comprendront. Il est de plus évident  
que les Soviétiques veulent adopter  
un système économique plus ouvert  
afin de revitaliser leur économie  
pour cela coopérer avec  
l'ONU et ses membres en ce qui  
concerne les règles commerciales et  
les multiples relations d'affaires qui  
régissent la vie économique interna-  
tionale. Le facteur prédominant,  
toutefois, est que l'URSS définit  
maintenant ses propres intérêts en  
fonction de la nature interdépen-  
dante de la planète et qu'elle veut  
donc se servir de l'ONU comme  
d'un instrument de sa politique  
étrangère.

Les Soviétiques sont plus dis-  
posés à prendre part aux échanges  
internationaux, à risque de perdre  
la face, à proposer des idées suscep-  
tibles de ne pas plaire à d'autres  
États, et au besoin, à remettre leur  
ouvrage vingt fois sur le métier.  
D'autres gouvernements ont eu du  
mal à réagir, en partie parce qu'ils  
doutaient des motifs de Moscou, en  
partie à cause de l'imprécision ini-  
tiée de certaines de ses propositions  
(par exemple, les premières versions  
de la résolution sur la sécurité glo-  
bale), et en partie parce qu'ils ne  
sont tout simplement pas habitués à  
observer chez les Soviétiques à  
l'ONU un comportement positif et  
obligatoire.

Mais ces mêmes gouvernements  
doivent pourtant réagir. L'ONU n'a  
pas évolué comme ses fondateurs  
l'avaient espéré, et ce pour diverses  
raisons, dont la plus importante est  
que les membres permanents du  
Conseil de sécurité n'ont pas su tra-  
vailler ensemble. Pendant la ma-  
jorité de son existence, l'Assemblée  
générale, en septembre 1988, «di-  
sons franchement que beaucoup  
parmi nous, y compris notamment  
les membres permanents du Conseil  
de sécurité, sont responsables du fait  
qu'à un moment donné, certaines  
valeurs fondamentales énoncées ex-  
pressément dans la Charte ont été  
diluées». Il est tristement  
ironique qu'au moment où les So-  
viétiques commencent à assumer un  
rôle constructif, les Américains se  
fassent tirer l'oreille. Cependant, le  
multilatéralisme aux États-Unis a at-  
teint le creux de la vague plus tôt  
dans la décennie ci, avec l'arrivée  
d'un nouveau gouvernement, des  
réactions positives sont bel et bien  
possibles. Le président Bush était.

Après tout, ambassadeur de son pays  
aux Nations-Unies de 1970 à 1973.  
était Secrétaire du Trésor dans le  
gouvernement précédent et il a donc  
participé aux travaux du système  
économique multilatéral qui fonc-  
tionne sous la coupe de l'ONU.  
Comme le CANADA SIEGIRA AU  
Conseil de sécurité au cours des  
deux prochaines années, il aura une  
occasion unique d'aider l'ONU à  
réaffirmer son importance dans la  
vie internationale : notre pays n'a  
pas fait partie du Conseil depuis la  
fin de son mandat de deux ans en  
1978 et, cette fois-ci, il est le seul  
membre non permanent qui soit  
aussi membre de l'OTAN. Les mi-  
nistres canadiens des Affaires ex-  
trangères ont, chacun à leur tour,  
évoqué avec conviction l'intérêt  
manifesté par le pays à l'égard de  
l'ONU et l'appui qu'il lui accorde.  
Nous continuons de payer rapidé-  
ment et au complet nos contribu-  
tions, mais il nous faut aussi jouer  
un rôle constructif dans les débats  
sur le renforcement de l'Organisa-  
tion. Le Canada a lutté durement  
pour gagner son siège au Conseil; il  
lui incombe maintenant de travailler  
avec tout autant d'acharnement pour  
faire de ce siège un instrument clef  
de sa politique étrangère. Notre pays  
est resté pour le rôle actif qu'il as-  
sume à l'ONU, et il a toujours pensé  
qu'il était dans son intérêt que l'Or-  
ganisation soit forte. Maintenant  
que les Soviétiques proposent toute  
une panoplie d'idées, nous nous de-  
vons de répondre avec sérieux et ex-  
horter nos partenaires de l'Alliance  
à faire de même.

Bon nombre des propositions so-  
viétiques comportent de graves la-  
cunes et nécessitent discussion et  
analyse. Ce qui est intéressant au  
sujet de ce processus, cependant,  
c'est que les Soviétiques prennent  
des mesures pour accroître l'effica-  
cité de l'ONU. L'URSS entre dans  
une «jouite» dont l'issue est incer-  
taine, et c'est peut-être là le com-  
portement d'un pays qui commence  
à se sentir à l'aise dans ses rapports  
avec les autres.

Pour en savoir plus:

E. Luck et T. Gait, «Gorbachev, the  
United Nations, and US Policy», *The  
Washington Quarterly*, automne 1988,  
pages 19-35.

aux éternelles résolutions anti-  
occidentales. Un élément important  
caractériste cependant la nouvelle  
politique : l'URSS reconnaît que les  
résolutions anti-impérialistes sovié-  
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concerne les règles commerciales et  
les multiples relations d'affaires qui  
régissent la vie économique interna-  
tionale. Le facteur prédominant,  
toutefois, est que l'URSS définit  
maintenant ses propres intérêts en  
fonction de la nature interdépen-  
dante de la planète et qu'elle veut  
donc se servir de l'ONU comme  
d'un instrument de sa politique  
étrangère.

Les propositions concernant le  
droit international traduisent de  
manière frappante les changements  
dans la façon dont les Soviétiques  
perçoivent l'ONU : il n'y a pas si  
longtemps, ils s'opposaient vigo-  
reusement à ce que l'on évalue  
l'une ou l'autre de leurs politiques,  
qu'elle fut étrangère ou intérieure,  
par rapport à des normes interna-  
tionales de conduite qu'ils asso-  
ciaient à des idéaux et des concepts  
occidentaux. En fait, comme Ed-  
ward Luck and Toby Gait de la US  
United Nations Association le signa-  
lent dans un article paru dans le  
*Washington Quarterly*, M. Gor-  
batchev a réclamé, en 1988, l'har-  
monisation du droit intérieur  
soviétique avec les normes interna-  
tionales, même dans des domaines  
sacro-saints depuis toujours, tels  
que le terrorisme, les questions hu-  
manitaires et la protection de l'envi-  
ronnement, car il voyait là le stade  
précurseur du nouvel ordre interna-  
tional qui régirait son monde dénu-  
cléant du vingt-et-unième siècle.

Le «nouveau mode de pensée»  
n'est pas encore omniprésent et  
il coexiste avec certains aspects  
de l'ancienne rhétorique propre



# L'ONU TROUVE GRÂCE DEVANT

**L'URSS**

La vigneur retrouvée de l'ONU s'explique notamment par le fait que les Soviétiques s'intéressent maintenant avec sérieux à l'organisation qu'ils ont aidé à créer.

PAR NANCY GORDON

**D**ANS LE CADRE DE SON «nouveau mode de pensée» au sujet de la politique étrangère, l'URSS accorde

En 1988, nous avons été témoins de diverses manifestations de cette nouvelle «pensée» à New York, à

en direct.  
à l'ouverture de l'Assemblée, en septembre, M. Edouard Chevardenadze, ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, a présenté, dans le cadre du discours inaugurant traditionnellement au titulaire de son poste, une longue liste de propositions sur l'action de l'ONU et sur les améliorations à apporter à sa structure. Le discours était dénué de toute référence caractéristique à l'ONU. Un de ses sous-ministres, M. Vladimir Petrovski, a énoncé en détail, devant la Commission politique spéciale et la Sixième Commission, les points de vue soviétiques sur la «sécurité globale» et sur ce que le rôle de l'ONU devrait être, à Kingston (Omaria), en octobre, M. Petrovski a prononcé le

discours-thème à une conférence sur les centres pour la réduction des risques de guerre; il a appuyé le concept et il a proposé des moyens de faire progresser le processus avec la participation de l'ONU.

Les Soviétiques ont eu recours à l'ONU pour préparer un retrait de leurs troupes présentes en Afghanistan; de concert avec les Américains, ils ont entrepris des démarches diverses pour faire jouer à l'Organisation un rôle dans le règlement du conflit déchirant la Namibie et l'Angola. Ils se sont aussi dits en faveur du Moyen-Orient qui se tiendrait sous l'égide de l'ONU; et ils ont commencé à payer leurs dettes relatives à d'anciennes opérations de maintien de la paix.

QUE SE PASSE-T-IL AU JUSTE ? EST-CE bien là le même pays qui, il n'y a pas si longtemps, ne s'intéressait que pour la forme à l'ONU, et à d'autres organismes internationaux ? Le même pays qui s'opposait aux initiatives du Secrétaire général et qui refusait de payer une partie de ses cotisations pour des contreparties qu'il n'appuyait pas ? Et le même pays qui, d'abord et avant tout, paraît bien garder de ne participer à aucun jeu multilatéral dont les règles et les arbitres échappaient à sa maîtrise ?

non bipolaire du pouvoir, et les menaces grandissantes que la dégradation de l'environnement représente.

En septembre 1987, M. Gor-

article qu'on a beaucoup cité et qui initiait « Réalités et garanties pour un monde sûr ». Il énumère des divers éléments d'un programme complet de sécurité qui ferait appel à l'ONU, et il a invité les États à analyser. Ces idées ont évolué en 1987 et 1988, et M. Gorbatchev a souvent souligné la nécessité de réviser l'épandissement et la prépondérance du droit international. Pendant des entrevues accordées à Moscou en novembre 1988, des porte-parole et des universitaires

Dans son discours prononcé de-  
vant l'Assemblée générale, en  
septembre, M. Chevaradnadze a ap-  
puyé et proposé des mesures qui  
renforceront les pouvoirs du Se-  
crétaire général en lui donnant  
un meilleur accès à l'information. Il a  
également promis d'établir une liaison di-  
recte entre les sièges sociaux de  
technologies.

l'ONU, les membres du Conseil de sécurité et le président du groupe des pays non alignés; une telle liaison, a-t-il précisé, aiderait sans doute à éviter des crises et des conflits internationaux. Dans un aide-mémoire et un discours prononcé devant la Sixième Commission, M. Vladimir Petrovski a approfondi ces idées : le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, de son propre chef, signaler tout conflit potentiel aux membres du Conseil de sécurité; les observateurs militaires de l'ONU pourraient mener activement des démarches diplomatiques préventives, et le Conseil de sécurité devrait avoir le pouvoir de dépêcher des observateurs militaires de l'ONU dans les lieux de vives tensions. Cela modifierait considérablement la méthode

L'ONU, qui envoie des observateurs seulement si les deux adversaires le demandent et si un cessez-le-feu est en vigueur pendant l'été 1988, les Soviétiques ont proposé d'envoyer dans le Golfe persique une force navale de l'ONU, et ils ont repris cette idée à l'automne. Cette ligne de pensée va de pair avec la faveur qu'ils accordent aux centres pour la réduction des risques de guerre, lesquels seraient créés au sein du Secrétariat de l'ONU et se soucieraient de prévenir tant les conflits nucléaires que classiques. L'URSS a aussi émis des idées au sujet des casques bleus et elle a remis sur le tapis une proposition qui portait sur la création d'un corps onusien permanent d'observateurs militaires et de troupes. Elle a aussi offert de participer à certaines opérations de maintien de la paix, si la conjoncture s'y prêtait et si les autres États étaient d'accord. Pareille évolution des choses contrasterait avec la doctrine actuelle voulant que les superpuissances s'abstiennent d'intervenir dans de telles opérations.











L'absence de débat sur les questions de sécurité nationale (comme

PAR KIM RICHARD NOSSAL

ins a suscité des discussions, mais d'autres aspects de la étrangère ont été passés en revue, à toutes fins utiles, les sept longues semaines campagne. Ce fut notamment la politique de défense. Au divers éléments portaient à

Le gouvernement Conser-  
e Brian Mulroney avait pu-  
ême année son Livre blanc  
ense qui esquissait une  
d'options à la fois agres-  
coûteuses. Il y proposait no-  
d'acheter des sous-marins  
sion nucléaire, ce qui

qu'il a prôvé ces élections. Et tout, la politique de n'a pas retenu l'attention la campagne; en fait, c'est à on l'a mentionnée. La campagne mouvement pacifiste a Les manifestations organisées par les groupes pacifistes afin

trait pour les critiques. utrone y et Turner n'ont pu à la tentation de décocher s flèches à l'endroit de la

vernement néo-démocrate renon-  
cérat à l'aire pacifique de l'Organisation  
du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord  
(OTAN) et à l'Accord sur la défense  
aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord  
(NORAD): la plupart du temps, on  
avait l'impression très nette que  
M. Braddon espérait voir l'élec-

discussions ayant porté sur la défense en 1988 n'a rien d'extraordinaire. Depuis le débat sur l'acquisition d'armes nucléaires pour les forces armées canadiennes en 1962 et 1963, la défense n'a jamais suscité de discours soutenus et fougueux en période d'élections. Au cours de

l'Alliance occidentale se sont produits au cours des vingt-cinq derniers années sans que les Canadiens et Canadiennes se soucient d'amorcer des discussions sur ces transformations et leurs conséquences. Au contraire, pendant les

ne fait pas l'objet de débats en période d'élections et s'inquiéter de

lectivité politique. Qui plus est, le pays investit chaque année des fonds considérables dans ce volet du programme politique public. Pourquoi cette dimension de la politique nationale ne génère-t-elle pas, de par son importance même, plus de discussions publiques ? L'absence

offrent la meilleure occasion qui soit d'énoncer les options d'un pays en matière de défense, ainsi que d'examiner et de discuter divers aspects de la sécurité nationale ? Ne peut-on pas effectivement soutenir qu'il incombe aux hommes et aux femmes politiques d'encourager, et

Permettez-moi d'avancer une autre hypothèse : l'absence de débat au Canada sur les questions de sécurité n'est ni troublant, ni décourageant, il n'y a aucun débat parce

qu'il existe dans une collectivité un conflit politique digne de mention. Et pour qu'il y ait un tel conflit,

breux d'une collectivité politique. Les divergences ne doivent pas se situer à la périphérie, laquelle inclut seulement quelques membres de ladite collectivité. En deuxième lieu, les discordances deviennent sérieuses quand elles touchent les intérêts concrets, plutôt que

plus insoluble. Si toutes ces conditions ne sont pas réunies, une division politique digne de ce nom est peu probable. On observe plutôt un consensus, ce qui empêche tout débat de nature, car aucun débat véritable n'est possible si tout le monde s'entend au départ.

certains ont appelé le « contre-consensus » en politique étrangère n'existe tout simplement pas. Par exemple, en dépit de la multiplication de ses cellules au Canada dans les années 1980, le mouvement pacifiste a été singulièrement in-

fier notre « posture » de défense. Le mouvement pacifiste s'est en fait heurté à l'inertie d'une population qui a toujours affiché une





OMBRÉUX SONT CEUX POUR QUI LA RÉVOLUTION CUBAINE ÉVOQUE  
 vers les lendemains brillants d'un monde marxiste. Ah, «Che» !  
 à Cuba; d'immenses panneaux à l'enseigne de «Che» marquent encore le  
 pays, avec comme légende : «*El Hombre Modelo*» ou «l'homme modèle.  
 Suivez son exemple».  
 Quand, à l'âge de trente-trois ans, Fidel Castro a finalement réussi, le  
 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1959, à renverser Fulgencio Batista et à prendre le pouvoir, il  
 avait à ses côtés «Che» Guevara, ce docteur argentin, marxiste et révolution-  
 naire. Une anecdote souvent rebattue veut qu'au moment de choisir les  
 membres de son cabinet et ne sachant pas trop à qui confier la gestion de  
 l'économie, Fidel aurait demandé à ses fidèles réunis : «Y'a-t-il un  
 économiste dans la salle ?» C'est alors que «Che» s'est levé en disant :



Fidel cherchait un commu-  
 niste. Voilà comment «Che» est  
 devenu ministre de l'Économie.  
 Il n'y a pas dans cette histoire  
 que malice ou idiotie. En effet,  
 Fidel jure qu'à l'époque, il n'était  
 lui-même ni communiste ni  
 marxiste. En 1953, au procès intenté  
 contre lui après l'échec de sa première  
 tentative contre Batista (il avait pris  
 d'assaut les casernes de la Moncada),  
 Fidel Castro, alors jeune avocat mem-  
 bre de la classe moyenne, avait parlé  
 de relabler la constitution de 1940 et  
 d'organiser des élections libres. «Je  
 n'ai pas menti pendant mon discours  
 de la Moncada», devait-il dire plus  
 tard à Lee Lockwood, journaliste  
 américain auteur de la fascinant  
 biographie intitulée *Castro's Cuba*,  
*Cuba's Fidel*. Fidel prétend n'être  
 devenu marxiste-léniniste que plus  
 tard, par pure nécessité.

Tous ces éléments ont con-  
 tribué à créer pour les parti-  
 sans de «Che» en Amérique  
 du Nord une atmosphère ras-  
 surante où règnent le plaisir et la  
 liberté. De quoi se démar-  
 quer nettement de la grisaille et de la monotonie du réalisme socialiste  
 à la soviétique. Mais l'opposition entre ce qui était «adans» la révolution et  
 ce qui ne l'était pas allait en fait signifier pour Cuba la nécessité de réprimer  
 les autres révolutions d'ailleurs. Plus de 20 000 personnes ont été enfermées  
 dans des prisons et des camps de ré-éducation; souvent, c'était des paysans  
 qui avaient prononcé une parole malheureuse ou signé un document par  
 ignorance. Quand ils se sont mis à remettre en question la censure et à s'y  
 opposer, les intellectuels et les libéraux de la classe moyenne, qui avaient  
 appuyé la révolution à l'origine, ont subi les traitements les plus cruels ja-

Après avoir été à une certaine époque favorable aux thèses castrites,  
 Jorge Walla a été emprisonné pour avoir essayé de défendre un ami injuste-  
 ment enfermé. Il fait dans ses mémoires de prison l'un des récits les plus  
 pénibles que j'ai jamais lus. Dans *Twenty Years and Forty Days* (il a purgé  
 une peine de vingt ans et quarante jours). Walla décrit les atrocités dont il a  
 été victime sur un ton étrangement objectif. Il a fait partie de ceux qu'on a  
 appelés les *plantados* (leurs idées étaient profondément enracinées, d'où  
 l'image), ces prisonniers politiques qui ont refusé de renoncer à l'un quel-  
 conque de leurs principes. Mais les gaudicheries des années 1960 ignoraient  
 tout cela ou n'ont rien voulu en savoir. Pour ceux, ceux qui formulaient une  
 critique jouaument en fait le jeu de Washington ou celui des amis de Batista,  
 Miami. Ils n'ont vu que la croisade littéraire, les nouvelles écoles, les doc-  
 teurs aux pieds nus, les cliniques et hôpitaux construits dans les régions ru-  
 rales. Ce sont là des réalisations tout à fait indéniables; l'analphabétisme,  
 par exemple, a presque complètement disparu. Avec ses vingt-trois étages et  
 ses 950 lits, l'hôpital d'Almajar, construit à la Havane il y a six ans, est  
 un véritable symbole de modernité. De riches Européens paient pour venir y  
 subir des interventions chirurgicales cardiaques, mais tous les soins médi-  
 caux sont gratuits pour les citoyens cubains.  
 Tout cela coûte cher, et Cuba n'a pas d'argent pour payer. L'économie est  
 dans la pagaille la plus complète, en raison essentiellement des baisses, sur  
 dans les marchés internationaux, du prix du sucre et du pétrole, les deux produits  
 de base de l'économie cubaine. L'embargo commercial imposé par les  
 États-Unis en 1962, et toujours en vigueur à l'heure actuelle, n'est pas la  
 seule cause de la situation. Le gouvernement cubain reconnaît lui-même  
 qu'une grande partie du problème tient à l'inefficacité et à l'absurdité de son  
 propre système.



UBA PRATIQUE DONC AUJOURD'HUI LA «RECTIFICATION», S'EMPLOYANT À  
 corriger ses propres erreurs, que ce soit dans la gestion des usines ou  
 dans les horaires d'autobus. Les Cubains que j'ai rencontrés n'étaient  
 pas peu fiers de se déclarer eux-mêmes responsables du désordre actuel, et  
 de dire que la *Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA) ou les Soviétiques n'y  
 étaient pour rien. Et maintenant, les voilà qui «recroquent» dans tous les sens  
 Mais les autobus n'arrivent toujours pas. Les curés résistent à la ferme, car les  
 véhicules de transport sont en panne, et il n'y a pas d'argent pour les répa-  
 rer. Les bateaux attendent désespérément d'être déchargés. Dans les maga-  
 sins, on fait la queue pour quelques rares produits.  
 De nombreux analystes étrangers et diplomates occidentaux en poste à  
 Cuba accordent peu d'importance au phénomène de la «rectification», la  
 qualifiant de simple «tricotage». Castro veut remédier à l'incertitude d'un sys-  
 tème trop centralisé, sans passer par une véritable décentralisation. Dans les  
 années 1970, les quelques expériences de libéralisation des marchés ont  
 certes atténué le problème des pénuries, mais elles ont aussi débouché sur  
 des prix excessifs et favorisé la constitution de stocks, tandis que s'enrichis-  
 saient les entrepreneurs. Devant la menace d'un capitalisme rampant, on a  
 décidé de mettre fin à ces initiatives. La montée d'une classe d'industriels  
 aurait constitué une menace intolérable pour la philosophie de Fidel et, en  
 définitive, pour son régime. La *perestroïka* et la *glasnost* ouvrent pour Cas-  
 tro trop de boîtes de Pandore. Si M. Gorbatchev prétend que la réforme et la  
 transparence sont toutes deux légitimes en vertu de la philosophie de Lé-  
 nine, Fidel préfère, merci beaucoup, s'en tenir à «Che».

Que ce soit dans ses discours ou sur les omniprésentes affiches, Fidel ne  
 cesse de demander des «sacrifices», d'exhorter ses partisans à renoncer aux  
 futilités que sont l'habillement et la nourriture pour payer plutôt l'éducation  
 les hôpitaux et le progrès. On ne parle jamais toutefois des dépenses mili-  
 taires. Les croyants accueillent cet appel avec joie : «Sans Fidel, nous n'au-  
 rions rien», avance un technicien d'hôpital. Mais les autres commencent à  
 qu'il ont donné à Fidel pour se moquer de ses interminables discours et de  
 ses intarissables palabres. On entend de plus en plus la population dire :  
 «Basta de Tégé». Assez parlé ! Que le gouvernement se mette au travail  
 pour régler les problèmes et qu'il cesse de nous demander des sacrifices.  
 Cuba a absolument besoin de devises. Les touristes paient les taxis en  
 dollars. Dans les magasins qui leur sont destinés, les prix à la caisse sont af-  
 fichés en dollars. On y vend du whisky et d'autres denrées que les Cubains  
 ne peuvent espérer trouver ailleurs. Ce phénomène a donné naissance à  
 toute une nouvelle catégorie de personnes : les gens qui ont des dollars. La  
*Bodega del Medio*, l'un des bars les plus fameux de la Havane était l'un  
 des lieux favoris d'Hemingway, et l'on se sert de ce détail historique pour  
 attirer les touristes. À l'instar de «Che», Hemingway est devenu une vérité  
 ble industrie, et les Cubains de la rue commencent à en avoir assez de tout

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# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

## CUBA SOUS LE RÈGNE DE FIDEL

*Qu'a donné cette  
fameuse révolution  
qui devait  
réussir?*

PAR CAROLE JEROME



Dans le présent numéro :

de défense.

politique canadienne

tre au sujet de la

Il n'y a rien à débat-

Kim Richard Nossal

douteuse.

secteur militaire est

tissements dans le

L'utilité des inves-

Pierre Fournier

Yves Bélanger et

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dre le travail de

commencent à pren-

Les Soviétiques

Nancy Gordon

sécurité.

d'entente pour

trouver des terrains

nistes pourraient

Des groupes antago-

Bernard Wood

Stephen Handelman

L'Ouzbékistan fonc-

tionne suivant des

impératifs politiques

bien plus anciens que

ceux de Lénine.



# PEACE & SECURITY

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IPS  
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## LAND, POVERTY, ENVIRONMENT AND WAR

*Fundamental political  
questions in Central  
America are also key  
environmental issues.*

BY GREGORY WIRICK



*Also in this issue:*

### **Roger Hill**

A common market with the US for defence products could erode Canadian independence.

### **CIIPS Roundtable**

Pondering the federal government's cuts in foreign and defence spending.

### **Julie Morin**

Five North African countries take a tentative step towards political and economic union.

### **Ted Hopf**

A cool response to Gorbachev's foreign policy will leave the West standing at the dock.

### **Clyde Sanger**

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
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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



In late April, the Federal government brought down a budget which will have profound effects upon our foreign and defence policy. The steep reduction in spending levels adds yet another wrinkle to an international agenda for Canada that is undergoing rapid and unprecedented change. For one thing, we have a new and unsettling problem: the enemy refuses to cooperate, as it has unfailingly for forty years, in being menacing and warlike, thus making much more complex the business of formulating a coherent defence and national security policy. For another, it is dawning on just about everybody interested in the subject, that the need to raise living standards in poor countries, the economic and political choices that are made to achieve this goal, and humankind's ability to avoid widespread (perhaps global) ecological disaster, are interconnected in ways we have only just begun to comprehend.

Different parts of all these questions are dealt with in three articles in this issue: **Gregory Wirick** visited several countries in Central America this spring and brings back a fresh perspective on the

problems faced by this war-torn region; **Roger Hill** sheds light on some not very well-known but potentially very important proposals to further integrate Canada's defence industries with those of the US; and a **CIIPS Roundtable** features vigorous discussion of our foreign and defence policy in the wake of the April budget.

In addition, **Julie Morin** takes a look at North Africa's latest experiment in political and economic union; **Ted Hopf** offers a warning about the Western world's attitude to Gorbachev's overtures; and **Clyde Sanger** remembers an old friend and eminent Canadian. While **Leonard Zamor's** letter from Beijing came to us before the beginning of April's momentous events in Tiananmen Square, the political and economic tension which caused the crisis are evident in his acute observations of daily life in the Chinese capital.

— Michael Bryans

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## PEACE & SECURITY

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7  
(613) 990-1593

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Gregory Wirick was an advisor to the House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, and recently returned from a visit to the area to help the Canadian International Development Agency prepare a regional environmental strategy; Roger Hill is CIIPS Director of Research, and was formerly the Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; Julie Morin is a free-lance writer who lived in Tunisia for several years; Ted Hopf is an Olin Research Fellow at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs; Clyde Sanger is a free-lance writer; Leonard Zamor is a free-lance writer and the former editor of *Perspectives Internationales*.

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**T**O THE PERCEPTIVE OBSERVER, THE SIGNS OF ENVIRONMENTAL catastrophe in Central America abound: decimated forests, soil erosion, slash and burn agriculture, the sad shantytowns that surround the cities, the stench of untreated sewage, the sting of pesticides blown from the cotton fields – a litany of disaster that threatens the beleaguered isthmus no less than the current political turmoil.

So intricate are the interconnections between land and people and resources, it is difficult to separate one issue from another. Jeffrey Leonard, who has written the definitive work on natural resources in Central America, emphasizes the interrelationships:

Political instability undermines economic development; stagnating economic development in the face of rapid population growth adds to the numbers of people living in absolute poverty; extreme poverty coexisting alongside wealth and resources concentrated in the hands of a small percentage of the total population provides fertile ground for still further political chaos.

IT IS EASIER TO DESCRIBE A VICIOUS circle, however, than to prescribe for one. One brave attempt at a breakthrough has been the Central American peace process which, after a long gestation, was born at the town of Esquipulas in eastern Guatemala on 7 August 1987. There the presidents of five countries – Cerezo of Guatemala, Duarte of El Salvador, Azcona of Honduras, Ortega of Nicaragua and Arias of Costa Rica – agreed on a variety of interlocking procedures in an effort to achieve “a firm and lasting peace in Central America.” Since then there have been a flurry of meetings of officials, foreign ministers and, after months of diplomatic manoeuvring, of the five presidents again, in February of this year at Costa del Sol, El Salvador.

This incremental growth of cooperation has survived setbacks. What impelled the presidents to go even this far, despite substantial opposition was, in the analysis of one interested observer, a common perception of economic malaise. President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua said to a Canadian parliamentary committee last May, “One point unites us and that is our economic problems. [They] allowed us to speak to each other.”

It was a good thing – for their economies are burdened with debt loads higher in proportion to gross domestic product than those of most of their neighbours in Latin America, by declining prices for basic exports, by widespread unemployment and under-employment, by grossly inadequate infrastructure such as roads, water treatment facilities and electrification which, in Nicaragua and El Salvador, have actually been disintegrating because of their internal insurgencies. Moreover, the negative effect of all of these factors is exacerbated by rapidly-expanding populations, under-paid and ill-trained public servants, and a brain drain that accelerates as the crises mount.

At the heart of these economic problems are the use of land and renewable resources: forests, soils, water and fisheries. Natural resources account for more than half of the region’s economic production, half of all employment, and most exports. The economic crisis is thus, fundamentally, an environmental crisis – the degradation of natural resources – which, in turn, is at bottom a question of power-relationships and of politics.

THERE ARE THREE BASIC PROBLEMS: TOO MANY PEOPLE, TOO LITTLE LAND, and patterns of land use that can only be described as perverse. Land distribution began to be skewed in the last century with the gradual introduction of export crops. Coffee farming led to the expulsion from communal lands of many thousands of peasants who had grown corn,

beans and other basic foods to feed their families. Later, wealthy sugar and cotton planters accumulated vast tracts by ousting still more peasants. The most dramatic change occurred in the 1950s when the US market was opened to Central American beef, and huge areas of farmland were converted to cattle grazing, requiring plenty of land and very little labour.

Today, typically, the richest farmland in the river valleys is used as pasture for cattle – land much more suited to basic crops for domestic consumption. For the production of cotton, Central America has engaged in one of the world’s highest rates of pesticide application and suffered the consequences of widespread pollution and poisonings. Virtually all of the flat, fertile soils of the region are used by large landowners for commercial crops and cattle-ranching, and are often underutilized.

Meanwhile, small farmers are pushed onto more marginal land.

Throughout Central America land-poor farmers are driven either to cultivate hillsides or to colonize the pristine forests of the rapidly receding frontier. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, in 1960 about 61 percent of the region was in forest and woodland and about one quarter was devoted to agriculture. By 1980, only 40 percent remained forested while 35 percent was in agriculture – two-thirds of which was pasture. These same trends continue despite the small amount that the beef cattle industry contributes to export receipts in relation to the vast amounts of land in pasture. In 1980, for example, export receipts were between US \$18 and \$47 per square kilometre of pasture compared to coffee’s contribution of between US \$1,500 and \$1,800 per square kilometre of land.

Unfortunately for land-poor farmers both hillsides and frontier settlement are rarely sustainable: the hillsides erode within a few years, while the soils of most frontier areas are quickly exhausted by intensive farming and usually abandoned to cattle ranchers after two or three seasons. Then the small farmers are obliged once again to pull up stakes in a vain search for land that will permit them to feed their families.

Rapidly-growing populations make the search ever more doubtful. According to the Latin American Demographic Centre, a unit of the United Nations, the population of the five Central American countries today exceeds twenty-seven million, more than double the figure of twenty-five years ago. In 1986, the annual rates of population increase were 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 percent respectively for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and 2.8 percent for the region as a whole. The regional rate will see Central America’s population double again in the next quarter century.

These figures translate into relentless pressure on a limited and deteriorating natural resource base. El Salvador has been especially besieged. The most densely populated country in the continental Americas, El Salvador is unique in the region for its lack of an eastern frontier on the Atlantic coast to which people can be encouraged to migrate. For many years, a flow of Salvadorans to neighbouring Honduras, where work and land were more readily available, acted as a “safety valve.” But by 1969 resentments over this immigration erupted in the so-called Soccer War between the two countries and the virtual collapse of the Central American Common Market, one of the most promising attempts of the 1960s at regional integration.

In the ensuing decade, despite a continuing flow of migrants abroad, El Salvador exploded into violent civil war. Jorge Villacorta, who served briefly as the country’s deputy agriculture minister before joining

# ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY

## THE CASE OF CENTRAL AMERICA

*How is land used, what land, by and for whom?  
Fundamental political questions  
for this war-torn isthmus are also  
key environmental issues.*

BY GREGORY WIRICK



the rebel coalition, has remarked, "The rebel fighters in El Salvador today are drawn mainly from families that have lost land or who never had land." An estimated ninety-two percent of El Salvador's farms are unable to sustain even a single family's needs. This has already led to the country's complete deforestation; no forestry industry exists because there are no forests left. Some environmentalists refer to the conflict as the western hemisphere's first "ecological war."

THE RESULT HAS BEEN INCREASING PREOCCUPATION WITH SHORT-TERM SECURITY, both on the part of the Salvadoran and the US governments – and at tremendous cost. In 1986 the Salvadoran government spent US \$211 million on military activities; the number of military personnel had climbed from 10,000 in 1978 to 47,000 by 1987 – a total that does not include an additional 12,000 in the paramilitary security force.

The trend has been similar in the other countries. Guatemala's army numbered 14,270 in 1978 and is now at 38,000. Nicaragua's armed forces of 77,000 are the largest in the region, growing from 14,000 in 1981. Even Costa Rica, which boasts of its lack of an army, almost doubled its paramilitary security forces between 1980 and 1987. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, military spending in the region increased by fifty percent in real terms between 1979 and 1983.

These figures don't include all of the vast expenditures by both the US and the Eastern bloc in support of regimes they consider sympathetic. The United States became obsessed with security during the Reagan years. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed, "if we cannot manage in Central America, it will be impossible to convince threatened nations in the Persian Gulf and in other places that we know how to manage the global equilibrium." Yet the 1984 Bipartisan National Commission on Central America that Kissinger headed, while identifying poverty and inequality as two of the forces driving destabilization in the region, passed over the environmental linkages almost without mention.

THE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE INTERLOCKING CRISES IN CENTRAL America are clearly enormous. But no accounting can estimate the effect that fears about security have had in shifting the entire psychology and priorities of governments. Democratic governments are notorious for being obsessed with the short term; their horizons rarely extend beyond the next election. In countries where crises predominate – either military or economic – the reaction of governments can be even more short-sighted; they respond with crisis management to deal with the worst cases first, and environmental and natural resource issues do not qualify as worst cases until the disasters brought on by short-sighted planning are at hand. Only then do they generate the headlines which evoke an immediate response.

Yet these issues are central to the viability of national economies throughout Central America. The environment is not something that can be dealt with after peace is achieved; nor is it simply a matter of parks and conservation. Its full reach is both broad and profound, for it embraces fundamental questions: what land is used, by and for whom. The significance of these questions is magnified with the squeeze of population, land, and natural resources. If measured over available arable land, the population densities of the other countries of Central America are close to that of El Salvador.

The way the natural resource base is used or abused is, to a large extent, a function of decisions taken in capital cities. These decisions in-

volve land distribution questions, but they also include issues of land tax, farm credit, the control of prices and subsidies for various types of crops or inputs such as pesticides or fertilizers, entitlements and concessions to exploit resources, export promotion incentives, building and maintaining roads, and the coordination and funding of public agencies responsible for implementing policy.

The new and still fragile civilian government in Guatemala, for example, is currently planning a comprehensive survey in order to reveal the quantity, value and ownership of property. At the moment, this information is simply not known. The government is even seeking to include in its survey the vast northern frontier area of the Peten which for years has been under the control of the repressive Guatemalan army. The region is regularly shaded over on maps in Guatemala as if in recognition, whether conscious or not, of some dark spirit hovering over that part of the country. A survey of this scope promises to be political

dynamite in a country with among the most inequitable land distribution and regressive taxation systems in Latin America.



IDEOLOGY DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AS decisive a factor as might be thought in determining resource use. Revolutionary Nicaragua, which has come closer to solving the problem of land distribution than any of its neighbours, is poised in the post-war period to decimate its eastern frontier with settlement plans and export dreams for beef and cotton that rival any ambitions that Honduras or Guatemala might harbour – and with equal unconcern for, or innocence of, the long-term consequences.

The destruction of natural resources is not the root cause of political disruption in Central America. The reality is much more clouded and complex: there are many causes and many effects, with no single source. Less obscure is the correlation between economic development and social and political stability, and the specific connection between natural resources and economic growth. To turn the equation around, what seems clear is that social and political strains emerge when economic growth is halted or reversed. Since Central America is highly dependent on natural resources for its economic livelihood, it follows that only policies which stress the sustainable development of these resources are likely to have much success in achieving long-term economic growth and social peace.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence in the region that the idea of linkages between macro-economic decision-making and resource use – not to mention their connection with long-term security – has yet been grasped by people in a position of power. Nor have the international donors been noticeably far-sighted: both multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the aid agencies of most developed countries have tended to invest heavily in big agricultural operations and have neglected the ten million small farmers of Central America – despite the perversity of land use patterns. This is hardly surprising since the same implications – the interrelatedness of the economy and the environment – are only beginning to dawn on politicians and policymakers in Western Europe and North America.

The problems are the same everywhere, but their acuteness in Central America adds to the urgency of needed changes. Only when the linkages are appreciated and acted upon, will the triad of hope – peace, democracy and development – proffered by the five Central American Presidents at Esquipulas be sustainable. □

# UNIFIED CANADA-US DEFENCE PRODUCTION: A HAZARDOUS ROAD

*We should take care that a common market with the US in defence products does not erode Canada's ability to make an independent defence policy.*

BY ROGER HILL

LAST YEAR IN THE RUN-UP TO THE FEDERAL election, an intriguing story about defence production appeared briefly in the national press. It was reported that a task force of senior officials from National Defence, as well as External Affairs and other government departments (the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, constituted in 1985 by the Defence Management Committee of the Department of National Defence) had recommended that Canada and the United States create a common defence economic market, by moving to greater continental integration of defence production; and that the existing cooperative foundation in this area be expanded to make joint industrial planning by National Defence and the Pentagon an integral part of continental defence. Twenty specific recommendations intended to promote greater integration and institutionalization had apparently been made, and the group had also called on decision-makers in both countries to become "continental" in their orientation rather than "state-centric."<sup>1</sup>

In the middle of an election focussed on free trade and the question of Canada's future as a country, this story had obvious political connotations. But did it really mean that a group of powerful senior officials was already planning the next steps on the road to integration, even before free trade had gone through? The report of the task force "has been suppressed," one journalist commented, implying that it was too hot to handle for the time being. Not so, Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick told the House of Commons: "The report summary has been known to the public for about six months," i.e., since about June, 1988.<sup>2</sup>

In fact the strongly integrationist tone of the report could have made it a political embarrassment if its contents had become widely known. Completed one year earlier, in June 1987, at a time when Canada was deeply engaged in the negotiations on free trade, it blamed "a strong nationalistic, protectionist, domestic and political orientation" for restricting the free flow of defence goods between Canada and the United States, and argued that a common defence economic market and joint planning for defence industries would bring

dramatic gains in North American security, strengthen the defence industrial base in both countries, and boost the credibility of North America's deterrent contribution to NATO. It recommended a series of specific measures: more joint studies on new weapons systems; a "Buy North American" policy for military goods; creation of a North American support base to cover joint Canada-United States repair and spare parts sources, as well as common supply and transportation systems; stronger institutional linkages between the Department of National Defence and US agencies in the field of defence production; and minimizing trade barriers having an impact on defence industrial preparedness. The report noted the importance of the North American defence industrial base and stressed that its further integration was both essential and desirable.

The implications for Canada's defences were also spelled out quite clearly. "If these gains are to be maintained and potential future benefits realized," the task force argued, "both nations have to seek further improvements that will, in the area of defence, eliminate national boundaries."

The task force claimed that increased integration was necessary in order to follow up on the pledge of greater cooperation made by Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan at the Shamrock Summit in Quebec City in 1985. Doubtless it also felt that its recommendations were in line with a little-noticed section of the June 1987 Defence White Paper, which stated:

Through participation in Canada-United States Defence Development and Defence Production-Sharing Arrangements, Canada cooperates with the United States in the development and production of defence equipment.... We will continue to work closely with the United States in an effort to foster the common use of this base.

WITHIN A FEW MONTHS OF COMPLETING ITS FIRST report in June 1987, the task force had changed its tune somewhat. Its final report, issued in November 1987, no longer spoke of a "common market" for defence products or of eliminating boundaries in the area of national

defence, but recommended instead a step-by-step process starting with such practical measures as reduction of legislative and administrative barriers to trade and the launching of an educational programme to develop knowledge and perception of existing procedures, agreements and practices in the defence production field.<sup>3</sup>

Nonetheless, the goal of eventual total integration of the Canadian and United States defence industrial bases was upheld. This would be pursued through an evolutionary process, where all the barriers and impediments to the free flow of defence articles and defence services between the two countries would be progressively reduced.

From an economic point of view, such a change would probably have only a limited impact on Canada as a whole (even though the defence industry or certain firms or communities might experience significant benefits or losses). This country has been cooperating with the United States in the defence production field since the Ogdensburg Declaration of August 1940, which recognized a need to consider "in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere," and which set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence with the task of examining "sea, land and air problems, including personnel and material." A whole panoply of linkages and agreements has grown up in the defence production field since the Second World War, grouped together under the Defence Development and Defence Production Sharing Arrangements. Most of the \$3 billion per year of bilateral trade already proceeds without tariff barriers.

Moreover, defence production accounts for less than one percent of Canada's gross national product. Aircraft and parts, motor vehicles, communications equipment, naval shipbuilding and repairs, and chemical products, accounted for most of an estimated \$3.5 billion of military goods produced in 1986-1987. Total exports of these products were about \$2 billion that year, which amounted to less than one percent of total merchandise exports. Only one-half of one percent of Canada's labour force is employed in defence industries.



However, from a political point of view, a common market in defence products may be more problematical. Even if completely free trade in this area gave rise to an overall expansion in Canadian defence production, it could lead Canada into a subordinate position to the US unless measures were taken to maintain this country's role as an equal in some critical defence and defence production areas.

Space surveillance may be especially important in this respect. In the next twenty to twenty-five years, the surveillance of North American airspace will be carried out largely by satellite, and Canada will need to be an active participant in joint US-Canada space surveillance systems or arrangements if it wishes to remain as aware of developments in its own airspace, territories, and maritime approaches, as others are. Failure to do so could jeopardize Canada's ability to react effectively to events occurring in its Northern and frontier regions, and thus place in doubt the country's ability to uphold its sovereignty in these areas.

That means that Canada will have to play a full role in the collective space surveillance effort, and not allow itself to be relegated to peripheral or supporting functions. A central role in operations is the only way of ensuring access, as a matter of right, to a real role in decision-making and to day-by-day flows of information.

Canada will need to keep abreast of technological developments in this field as space surveillance systems evolve, otherwise this country will be perceived as lacking serious interest in a field that is vital to it. Canadian industry will have to be involved in research, development, and supply of satellites and related systems, and should remain in the front and centre of activity. It will not be enough for Canadian companies to serve as suppliers of parts or as beneficiaries of offset arrangements in other industrial areas.

A FREE, OPEN COMMON MARKET IS NOT LIKELY to be the best answer to this problem. It would only result in the major, American aerospace companies taking over most or all of the leading-edge work, and pushing the smaller Canadian firms aside. The Canadian government must ensure that Canadian corporations obtain a fair share of the most important contracts in key areas. This can be done by deploying some Canadian surveillance satellites as part of a NORAD space programme, for example, or by joint Canada-US purchasing arrangements, or by requiring Canadian involvement in industrial consortia.

In continental defence as a whole, Canada always needs to take care to maintain its own national sovereignty while joining in effective partnership arrangements with the United States. That means, at a minimum, doing enough to ensure that the Americans do not feel impelled to take over the whole responsibility, or major segments of it, for the sake of



their own protection. This has long been understood in the air defence field, where Canada contributes enough forces to claim a central role in command arrangements, decision-making and information gathering. Probably it was also a major impulse behind the earlier decision to acquire nuclear submarines. Their direct military tasks were to have been anti-submarine warfare work in support of the Alliance and sovereignty patrols in the Arctic, but in addition to that there may have been a determination to oblige the United States to take Canadian needs into account as regards naval operations in Arctic waters. If the US Navy needed to know where Canadian submarines were, it might have been argued, it would have had to agree to some cooperative planning and certain exchanges of information. Canadian knowledge of developments in the region would thus have been strengthened, and our claims to sovereignty in the Arctic enhanced.

The closer Canada moves into a continental defence partnership with the United States, the more it will have to pay attention to the requirements of its own sovereignty. And that may require a range of defence and defence production policies tailored to particular environments rather than the sweeping approach to integration reflected in the reports of the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force.

THE PROBLEM ARISES IN A RATHER DIFFERENT way in relation to the commitments to NATO. Here the goal is to enhance the readiness and sustainability of Alliance defences by developing the North American defence industrial base and making sure that it is organized to provide a steady flow of forces and supplies in the event of a major conflict. This is seen as vital to deterrence, especially in relation to the danger of prolonged warfare between East and West.

The final report of the task force argued that integrated defence industrial preparedness planning with the US Department of Defense is the most viable way of enhancing Canada's sus-

tainment capability. "Where practicable," it stated, "the program requirements of the two countries should be considered jointly and include production, procurement and coordinated surge planning, in order to provide Assured Sources for critical items." In other words, Canada and the United States would have a common system for tapping the industrial power of North America and for transporting its products to Europe or elsewhere in a crisis or wartime.

Even in the era of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the aim of enhancing the readiness and sustainability of NATO defences is still a valid one. Major agreements on conventional force reductions in Europe may still take years to work out. And even if they are established, they will still need to be underpinned by a sound military balance based partly on effective Western reinforcement capabilities.

However, Canada should not become preoccupied with NATO defence; its willingness to intensify integration of the North American defence industrial base as a means of contributing to the readiness and sustainability of Allied forces should be tempered by recognition that the same base is used for continental defence, where the imperatives are somewhat different. The requirements of Canadian sovereignty have to be kept in mind in all cases, and thus there are probably limits to how far integration should be pushed.

Going back to the beginnings of this discussion, what one saw in the press stories last year was the spectre of Canada slipping, sector by sector, into increasing integration with the United States. First free trade, then a common market in defence products, then common defence policies, then other areas of national life, until little true independence was left.

That does not have to be the outcome if Canadians display the skill in managing their relationship with the United States they have generally shown in the past. Canada can have a true partnership with the United States with high levels of cooperation in many sectors and freedom to pursue its own objectives in other areas such as peacekeeping, conflict resolution, arms control, relations with the Pacific Rim, and foreign aid. But to achieve this it must be careful to maintain national sovereignty where necessary. It must continue to deal selectively and carefully with the whole field of continental defence including its technological and industrial dimensions. The active pursuit of Canada's own defence and defence production objectives is essential to this country's sovereignty and, indeed, to the hopes for a true, lasting partnership with the United States. □

1 See Peter Calamai, "Report urges closer defence ties with US," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 July 1988.

2 The report in question was entitled: *The Environment for Expanding the North American Industrial Base*, DND, (June 1987).

3 See *Defence Industrial Preparedness: A Foundation for Defence*, DND, (November 1987).

# THE FEDERAL BUDGET: DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

## A MEDIA ROUNDTABLE

*On 2 May 1989 CIIPS sponsored a roundtable discussion on the implications for foreign and defence policy of the sharp reductions in federal spending announced in the 27 April budget. Members of a panel of experts assembled by CIIPS made short presentations; these were followed by questions from representatives of the print and electronic media. Interested journalists from across Canada participated by means of an audio hook-up. The following is excerpted from the discussion.*

### BERNARD WOOD

WHEN WE PLANNED this roundtable on the topic of the Budget – Defence and Foreign Policy, we had no idea just how much impact the budget would have in this area of national policy. We asked the question: what does the budget tell us about the Government's priorities in the coming years? We see, in fact, that foreign aid and defence, which together account for fourteen percent of federal spending, have taken sixty percent of the cut-backs in planned spending next year and nearly fifty percent the year after.

I mentioned foreign aid first because proportionately it has been cut back by far the most harshly. It will be cut by twelve percent. Defence spending will still grow slightly in absolute dollars although the pledge to stay two percent ahead of inflation is obviously gone.

Foreign aid's constituents will not be heard from in the same way as Canadians affected by the Budget. The half million people in Bangladesh who lost their homes in the [tornado] last week don't, I regret to say, see your reporting and will have no vote in Canada. But they will surely feel the impact of the cuts in ways that most of us cannot imagine.

On the defence side, nobody has won in the cut-backs. It seems to me quite clear that it was the deficit that won, but we will all be the losers if this dramatic change is not taken as the opportunity for solid, serious re-thinking of our defence commitments and capabilities, and our whole security policy in today's dynamic international environment. In Canada, much of the political debate will certainly centre around the closure of bases. While assisting the communities and workers affected is a legitimate priority for all of us, it is not, in the 1990s, going to be able to determine our defence policies.

Internationally, what is the impact? Our cuts will certainly not go unnoticed, but even after these reductions, by our Institute's count, Canada will still be the sixth largest military spender in NATO and the sixth largest aid donor in the world. For a country in our position we have nothing to be ashamed of around the table in NATO. Apart from the US, which is after all a global power, we are the only NATO country to keep thousands of our troops stationed thousands of miles from our shores. We have pledged to keep them there while arms negotiations proceed.... Because of our record in peacekeeping, which is second to none, and because of our highly respected aid programme, which is now larger than that of Britain, Canadian peacekeepers and peacemakers are going to be more and more in demand in many parts of the world where new moves to peace may now be possible.

### THE PANELISTS

#### KENNETH CALDER

*Director General for Policy Planning,  
Department of National Defence*

#### FEN OSLER HAMPSON

*CIIPS research associate;  
Associate Professor at Carleton University*

#### HAROLD KLEPAK

*Professor of Strategic Studies,  
Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean*

#### DOUGLAS ROSS

*Professor of International  
Relations at Simon Fraser University*

#### LOIS WILSON

*President of the World Council of Churches;  
former member of the board of directors of CIIPS*

#### BERNARD WOOD

*Chief Executive Officer of CIIPS*

This, it seems to me, is the context for our security policy and foreign policy now: how do we make the absolutely best use of the resources we will have, for the objectives Canadians support?

### KENNETH CALDER

I THOUGHT I SHOULD take a few moments

to make sure that we all have basically all of the information that we can put out on the table, so that we have covered the full spectrum of implications as we have been able to identify them so far.

As a result of the Budget the Department of National Defence will receive, over the next five years, \$2.74 billion less than we had anticipated. Even with that cut there will be real growth in the defence budget over that period of time. That real growth, however, will not be sufficient to allow us to implement the White Paper as fully or as quickly as we had anticipated. The achievement of some defence policy goals will be delayed, some programmes will be cancelled, others will be reduced in size, others will be put on hold....

We all know, of course, the government does not intend to proceed with the nuclear-propelled submarine. In addition to that our projects for additional long-range patrol aircraft, for additional night observation devices, for additional CF-18 aircraft and for the unmanned airborne surveillance and target acquisition system, will be cancelled. Projects for northern terrain vehicles, for equipment outfit electronic countermeasure training aircraft, land force radios and CF-5 avionics will be reduced in size. The acquisition of light armoured vehicles for the militia will be delayed and our project for the main battle tank will be put on hold. Nevertheless, we will continue in Canada with the implementation of the North American air defence modernization programme as currently planned and funded.

The two phases of the frigate replacement programme and the modernization of the Tribal class destroyers will continue. We will also acquire new helicopters for the navy ... and mine-sweepers for the Naval Reserve.... the government will not proceed with nuclear-propelled submarines. In the immediate future, however, the department will examine alternatives for the continued rebuilding of an effective navy.

Canadian forces will stay in Europe and the current level of stationed forces will be maintained. We will not, however, build up our military strength in Europe as had been envisaged in the White Paper. Our pol-



icy, in the short term, will be to pause in the development of our forces in Europe. In addition to putting the main battle tank on hold that also means that other major items of equipment, for both land and air forces in Europe, will be put on hold. With respect to the NATO Northern Region we will maintain our commitment to an infantry battalion in North Norway.

As for peacekeeping, we will ensure that we have the resources to respond to appropriate requests for peacekeeping forces whenever they arise and wherever they may be needed. With respect to the strength of the primary reserve in Canada, we will fall short of achieving the White Paper target of 65,000. We will construct fewer militia training centres and we will cancel some planned acquisition of new equipment for the reserves. We will, however, continue to develop and implement the total force concept and we do anticipate that in spite of all of this the reserves will expand.

In the face of fiscal restraint – our contribution to the reduction of the deficit – we will have to find, out of our personnel costs in the department, money to pay our other bills and to generate enough money to continue with some of our re-equipment programmes. We will, therefore, abandon the plans outlined in the White Paper to expand the regular force to 90,000 and we will move toward a somewhat smaller force than that of today.

We will, and this of course is an issue which is getting great public attention, close a number of Canadian forces bases and stations in Canada and we will re-organize the functions of some others.... The government however remains committed to an improved rate of real growth in defence expenditures over the longer term which should enable the department to move in the direction of fulfilling the objectives of the White Paper.

#### LOIS WILSON

THE FIRST THING I would like to say is that Canadian foreign aid has declined annually since 1984. Not in great numbers – we have had a relatively good record – but in 1984 it was 0.5 [percent] of the GNP, in 1988 0.46 [percent], and the budget calls for 0.43 [percent]. Our prime minister has promised that by 1995 it will be 0.6 percent of the GNP and [it] remains to be seen whether the government is able to stand by that pledge.

Canada is the only country, besides the US, to have decreased aid in that way over those years. The more troublesome thing is that most of the reduction in foreign aid will be reduction of food aid. For example, \$66 million will be cut from food aid whereas \$67 million will be allocated to move the offices and personnel overseas to decentralize CIDA, which is an administrative matter.

Secondly, I would like to say that, of all these seven departments where cuts were made, I understand that only foreign aid will actually have less dollars.

Thirdly, ... there is a sense in which one could say that Canada can be seen to be abandoning the "two-thirds world" [the two-thirds of the world with the most people and the least resources] just as they are starting to deal with their own debt crisis and trying to repay the debts. With the increased interest rates I think it is going to be increasingly difficult. One has to ask what responsibility does Canada have toward that matter....

Fourthly ... I find the cuts in foreign aid morally offensive when set in the certainly comparative affluence of Canada but as has been mentioned by the Chair, unfortunately the victims are very distant. Indonesians don't get a vote and they will be the ones to feel the effect of those

cuts. So that I see the focus very much on the domestic scene and not in terms of the international context of Canada's responsibilities.

#### DOUGLAS ROSS

I THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN FAR TOO much attention paid to the outcry about the impact of the tax increases. This rhetoric about a tax tidal wave and that we now have an accumulated mountain of debt which is turning us into, as Peter Newman said, a Zaire with polar bears, is really overblown. I think there has been in some respects a collapse of political vision in this country, certainly by all of our major federal parties, and this budget really reflects it.

... There are a lot of opportunities for closing the deficit gap which were not taken.... Generally profits have not been gone after, wealth has not been conscripted in the service of making a reasonable contribution to international order and maintaining our capacity to deploy an effective foreign and defence policy. I think these cuts are totally inappropriate, badly timed. Certainly I would echo Lois Wilson's comments that, on the aid side, I think they are a major mistake.

Now, in terms of aggregate capacity to pay and to contribute, when one looks at Canada's contribution over the past twenty years we see a steady decline in our contribution to both defence policy plus international development assistance. Back in the late 1960s we were well over 3.0 percent of GNP; we are now down towards 2.7 percent....

... If we compare our record with the Netherlands, with Norway or with Denmark we come off very, very badly. For example, the Netherlands, between 1967 and 1987, consistently spent an aggregate of about 4.4 percent and 4.3 percent of GNP on what you might call its contributions to international order. Now over those twenty years there was a re-allocation: as their defence spending decreased from 3.8 percent down to 3 percent, their international development assistance correspondingly rose. The same is true for Norway. Its defence spending declined from 3.5 percent to 3.1 percent, its development assistance went from .17 percent to 1.09 percent. Yes, there are even NATO members who spend more than 1 percent of GNP on development assistance.

What does the impact on defence mean? What I see in broad brush is the continued marginalization of Canadian defence policy and therefore foreign policy. We are not speaking on major international

issues and that is not coincidental. When you pay little, when you have marginalized yourself ... You don't take the kind of dynamic initiatives that a country with our incredibly positive and fortunate security situation should be taking.

Do we have a developing direct military threat? The 1987 White Paper has been criticized time and again for being too much of a Cold War document, ... The nuclear submarines created a huge target which has now been savaged. Is there no threat? I think this is an absolutely incorrect perception. Modern technology, the developing technology in strategic weapon systems, is such that there is a developing threat. The reason that we are going through NORAD modernization, the reason why we should be moving toward an extensive build-up of our coastal defence capabilities is precisely because of the advent of hard target kill-capable SLBMs [submarine launched ballistic missiles] and new advanced cruise missiles ...

We have quite rightly accepted an historical obligation to do our part in trying to stabilize deterrence. Are we doing that in this budget? No, we are turning away from it, we are simply saying to the US: sorry, you are going to have to do it for us ... ►

*"... the half million people in Bangladesh who lost their homes in the [tornado] ... have no vote ... but will surely feel the impact of the cuts in ways most of us cannot imagine."*

*"If we were in a position where the world had changed sufficiently since 1987 to justify a totally new strategic analysis we might think in terms of a new White Paper. We don't believe that has yet happened."*

## HAROLD KLEPAK

BASED ON THE SPENDING PLANS, WHAT can one deduce about the government's priorities for the country's foreign policy during the 1990s? With little doubt, the priority is the budget. And in this, I share Mr. Ross' opinion somewhat. The impact will be limited; the change in priorities observed here is not extraordinary. I think that the fundamentals of Canada's foreign policy have not changed.

In broad outline, the government wants the opportunity to "multilateralize" our relations with the United States. As far as Europe is concerned, the advantages of these links have been quite obvious since the 1970s. But we must be very frank about all this: it is much easier this year to talk about budget cuts because we can do it without attracting too much attention on the international scene.

In 1987, Australia published a White Paper on Defence that promised a much stronger policy and additional moneys. Nevertheless, two years later, for budgetary reasons, there has been a retrenchment. In New Zealand, the same thing happened, but drew much more attention because New Zealand came close to withdrawing from its alliance with the United States. In the eyes of Washington there are countries that undermine the global situation much more than Canada. It is, therefore, much easier for us to make cuts while remaining a US ally in good standing. In fact, Canada is not that far behind other countries of same or comparable size, either within NATO or in other alliances of which the US is a member.

The UN and peacekeeping: here we have an issue of increasing importance. Peacekeeping operations are sprouting up ... literally everywhere ... many more are under consideration ... Canada is asked to take part in almost each and every one of them, and every time we have been asked, we have accepted. Of course, we have established criteria for participation, but if we are asked to participate and if the operation is conducted in a proper manner, we do it. So cuts in the defence budget, such as the ones we know about now, could have an impact on operations of this kind.

In my opinion, peacekeeping issues and the link between defence and international aid – our commitment towards the outside world, towards the Third World – are the ones that worry me the most. I think that Canada enjoys a very special status; our country is very active within the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, the UN, peacekeeping operations, NATO, NORAD, and so on. It is very much part of the international system; it is a committed country. Therefore, I think that peacekeeping operations guarantee the maintenance of our armed forces' ability to act, not only to provide logistic support, but also in the task of providing infantry. We must keep a close watch on this.

Of course, Northern and sovereignty issues are, for many, linked to the nuclear-powered submarines. In my opinion, this is one of the main issues now before us: how do we go about meeting our commitments and maintaining our sovereignty in the North?

*"What I see in broad brush is the continued marginalization of Canadian defence policy and therefore foreign policy."*

*"It is simply ludicrous to undertake a major re-evaluation of defence posture every fifteen years ... as if the world and our defence needs only changed every fifteen years."*

This is really quite extraordinary. The purpose of the White Paper was to look ahead to Canadian defence requirements into the next century and provide steady and predictable funding programmes. Barely two years later Canadians are being told that the money is not there by the same government that wrote that document.

... I would suggest that right now we do not have a coherent method of planning for establishing our national defence requirements. Defence planning takes place in a vacuum without any consideration of budgetary limits or fiscal realities. The White Paper was a wish list and right now we are in danger of having our defence posture dictated to us by the Department of Finance if that wish list is chopped to accommodate new fiscal realities.

There is obviously a need for the government to undertake a fundamental re-evaluation of Canada's defence requirements and commitments, not only in the light of new fiscal realities and the resources available for defence, but also changing strategic and geostrategic trends. Moreover, I would argue this evaluation should become part of a regular, on-going, routinized process. It is simply ludicrous to undertake a major re-evaluation of our defence posture every fifteen years as has been done in previous White Papers, as if the world and our defence needs only changed every fifteen years....

Second, fiscal and budgetary considerations must be brought into defence planning much earlier in the game than they are now. Defence spending is too important to be left to the Department of National Defence and by the same token it is too important to be left to the Minister of Finance and Treasury Board ...

Third, accounting and budgeting methods for costing all major programmes should be made public. I think that there is far too much secrecy that plagues the weapons acquisition and budgeting process today. I think that the Department of National Defence hurt its own case for nuclear-powered submarines by not making its accounting methods and assumptions public.

Fourth, we need a much better basis for strategic assessment in how the changing strategic landscape will affect Canadian defence commitments and priorities in the years ahead. The critics justifiably attacked the 1960s Cold War rhetoric of the White Paper. Much of that criticism could have been anticipated before the White Paper was written. Such an assessment would involve the solicitation of views from the broader community of intelligence analysts not limited to the Department of National Defence ...

Fifth, there is an obvious and growing need to integrate strategic threat assessments with the functional requirements of Canadian security policy understood in the broadest sense. What sorts of roles in missions is Canada best suited for in preserving and maintaining international security? Are there certain kinds of missions which are more compatible with our foreign policy goals and objectives? ...

There are some that argue that the major challenges to our future security will increasingly come from drug smugglers, the illegal flow of immigrants across our borders and shores, oil spills and pollution, and the plundering of natural resources within our coastal waters. Does the military have a role to play in these sorts of non-traditional security operations, or do we need to create special forces to deal with these new and emerging challenges to our security? ...

... There are some important lessons that came out of the events of this past week. Lessons which have to do with the way we plan for our national security and defence. It will be extremely unfortunate if these lessons are ignored and the bureaucratic response is business as usual.

## FEN HAMPSON

THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE been truly remarkable. The scaling down of the defence procurement programmes and objectives of the government's White Paper on defence released barely two years ago, in my opinion, represents a significant turn in government policy. The subs have gone, other major programmes cancelled or deferred. To be sure not everything has been gutted, but the government's commitment to the basic parameters of the White Paper are just that: a set of paper commitments without an explanation as to the means available to achieve them.



**Mario Proulx (Radio-Canada)** [question to Kenneth Calder]: One got the impression, when the news came out, that the abandonment of nuclear-powered submarines was in some ways a political decision, but that it was also symbolic, in the sense that it was impossible to cut funds for foreign aid and child care, and build nuclear submarines at the same time. Was this really a financial matter, or was it a symbolic question?

**Kenneth Calder:** The reason for the cancellation of the submarine was essentially fiscal and one has to be careful here because it is not a question of saving money in the first five years of the defence budget because, of course, we all know that we were not committed to significant funding in the first five years. The problem with the submarines from the fiscal point of view was the magnitude of the total purchase over the longer period of time. The government was not prepared, in light of fiscal uncertainty over the longer term, to essentially sign up to an obligation of that magnitude in the outer ten years of the defence programme.

**Jack Spearman (Calgary Herald)** [by audio hook-up from Calgary]: Could the panelists give me their assessment on what impact the cancellation of the submarine programme will have on Canada's credibility to make future equipment purchases? Quite frankly why should anyone bother bidding on anything anymore after this? The French and British invested a lot of time and money only to be told at the last minute: cancel the order; we've changed our minds.

**Bernard Wood:** That is really, probably, the least interesting question that has emerged in this whole exercise. I'm not saying that to you Mr. Spearman, but it is the question that is around and on a lot of peoples' minds. And it seems to me very interesting that when the submarine idea was first raised pretty much all of our allies said that they thought it was a silly idea. But a couple of them, once they saw the commercial possibilities, seemed to change their appraisals in a massive way and say that our total credibility now hangs on it.... I have talked to NATO planners who have said that in terms of the total military posture, Canada's decision on the submarines means practically nothing at all. There are probably dissenting views on the panel ... [pause] ... it turns out there aren't.

**John Marteinson (Canadian Defence Quarterly):** I am a little surprised about the continued insistence from you [Kenneth Calder] and frankly from a lot of other people representing the Department of National Defence that the White Paper remains government policy. In reality, as a result of the budget, there has been a de facto disavowal of virtually every major aspect of the White Paper ... can we expect a coherent restatement of what we really are about by the Minister of National Defence and if so, when?

**Kenneth Calder:** What the government has said is that the parameters of the White Paper remain intact, the parameters still represent the policy of the government. What you have been focussing on are the programmes laid out in the White Paper to achieve those objectives. What the government is saying is: the objectives remain valid. What do I mean by that? In spite of these budget cuts the Canadian security policy will continue to rest upon the three pillars of defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.... Programmes have been delayed and cut not for policy reasons, not because the objectives have changed, but because the money is not there – simple as that, the money is not there.

If we were in a position where the world had changed sufficiently since 1987 to justify a totally new strategic analysis, then we might think in terms of a new White Paper. We don't believe that has yet happened. Contrary to many of our critics the Department of National Defence does acknowledge that things have changed since 1987 and that

we acknowledge that things have changed in East/West relations and the Soviet Union and so forth.... But they have not in our opinion changed sufficiently significantly to justify a new White Paper at this time.

**Paul Mooney (Canadian Press):** Dr. Hampson, you mentioned peacekeeping and the role in Europe. I wonder if you see a way of streamlining the mission that the Canadian forces have been given? How too thinly spread do you think they are now and how do you think we could go about changing that?

**Fen Hampson:** I would agree that they are pretty thinly spread and they are going to be spread even more thinly in the future. I guess I would take issue with Dr. Ross. I don't think one's influence in the international community is a function of how much one pays in dollar terms. Whether it is to NATO defence or to peacekeeping or what have you. That is an accountant's mentality of influence ...

I think that the greatest challenge to international security, right now, is not in the East/West conflict. There are opportunities there, but the challenge in the sense of the threats to international security do come from regional conflict, that is to say conflicts, most of which are in the third world ... Many of these conflicts are rooted in economic and social problems and, therefore, it is important for us not to be cutting back on development assistance and aid precisely at a time when many of these problems are getting worse; not getting better.

**Marc Clark (Maclean's):** It strikes me that the Canadian military has always tried to maintain a miniature example of the great militaries of the world with a reasonably complete army, navy and air force.... I am just wondering if it is time to forget this fiction and perhaps throw somebody out of the tent, to agree that we cannot be all things and have this glass-case miniature of the great militaries of the world.

**Douglas Ross:** I think that is absolutely correct – somebody will be kicked out of the tent and maybe land forces will be reduced to international peacekeeping capabilities only. But are we going to get the transports so that we can move our forces to Europe? No, we are not going to do that, not under any foreseeable budget from this government. Have the direct military threats to North America been increasing? Yes, they have. Basically air defence is going to be a black hole that has a very strong prospect of eating the defence budget entirely by the end of the century. Particularly as cruise missile development goes ahead dramatically.... Then we are going to have an incredible requirement for what is the prudent minimum for air defence ... The alternative, of course, will be having a much expanded American presence on our territory to fulfill that minimum requirement.

**Kenneth Calder:** I don't think that we are in a position to throw anything overboard. I think we have to probably do everything a little less well than we had hoped. How does a country facing on three oceans, with the longest coastline in the world, do without a navy for example. As Doug was pointing out we do have a threat from the Soviet Union in terms of bombers and cruise missiles – how do we do without aerospace defence and some sort of air capability in this country.... Probably if we had nothing else in the world we would want to have an air force simply so that we would know what is going on inside of the country ... How do we reduce in Europe when we belong to a collective alliance where the primary conventional threat is still in the European theatre ... and particularly in the context of arms control negotiations going on in Europe. Even the arms controllers in Canada are recognizing the importance of us maintaining our forces in Europe and remaining part of the European equation. □

# A GREATER ARAB MAGHREB – MYTH BECOMES REALITY?

*Five North African countries take a tentative step towards political and economic union.*

BY JULIE MORIN

**I**BN KHALDOUN, THE FAMOUS FOURTEENTH century Tunisian historian and sociologist, reminds readers in his masterly work *The History of the Berbers*, that the Arabs called all the land west of the Gulf of Sirte, the “Maghreb” – the West – and all the territory to the east of the Gulf, the “Machreq” or the East. Today the Greater Arab Maghreb contains five countries: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. Their heads of state are, respectively, Colonel Mouammar Qaddafi, President Ben Ali, President Chadli Bendjedid, King Hassan II and Colonel Ould Taya.

Ibn Khaldoun writes of a rich and tumultuous past which has made itself felt throughout the region: the same language, Arabic, is spoken everywhere, though with certain differences of accent and dialect. All these countries are deeply Muslim; from the shores of the Mediterranean to the heart of the desert, the faithful heed the calls to prayer that come from minarets at the centre of each village. Despite many quarrels these countries see themselves as brothers and have long dreamt of being united. It was not, however, until their leaders met at the Marrakech Summit in February 1989, that the idea of a union became a reality. And the path which led to the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union – *l'Union du Maghreb arabe* (UMA) – had indeed been fraught with difficulty.

In December 1988, a year after Tunisia and Libya resumed diplomatic relations, Tunis welcomed the leader of the Libyan revolution. It was Qaddafi's most important official visit to Tunisia since Ben Ali succeeded Habib Bourguiba in November 1987. By the time the Libyan head of state left three days later he had succeeded in shocking people by attacking the West, particularly the United States, and condemning Yasser Arafat for recognizing the state of Israel. Qaddafi's visit proved beneficial, however, for he offered Tunisia a significant amount of economic aid. The two heads of state reached agreement on a variety of projects which had been in abeyance because of earlier disputes.

Tunisia could not have asked for more. Like other countries in the Maghreb it is in the

throes of a serious economic crisis; there is high unemployment especially among young people just out of school. Relations between Bourguiba and Qaddafi had always been bad and had worsened steadily until in September 1985 diplomatic relations were severed. Ben Ali's new regime is anxious, therefore, to put aside previous disputes, despite the fact that the two governments continue to differ on various issues. And in Tunis as elsewhere Qaddafi's reckless outbursts give rise to a good deal of mistrust.

TUNISIA AND LIBYA ARE NOT THE ONLY COUNTRIES to be reconciled. In order for the UMA to come into being, Algeria and Morocco have also had to resolve their differences. This they accomplished after many years of disagreement over the Western Sahara. In March 1976 the Polisario Front, an organization which had been demanding the independence of this old Spanish colony, proclaimed the Democratic Sahrawi Arab Republic under Mohammed Abdelaziz. Algeria recognized the new state immediately, but this did not please Morocco, which itself laid claim to the territory. Morocco then severed diplomatic relations with Algeria.

The first attempts at reconciliation occurred in May 1987 when President Chadli Bendjedid met King Hassan II at Akid Lofti on the Algeria-Morocco frontier. A year later, in May 1988, Algeria and Morocco resumed diplomatic contacts, and last February just before the 1989 summit, King Hassan II received the Algerian President. In March the two heads of state settled a longstanding border dispute by ratifying the 1972 Convention which defined hundreds of kilometres of border between their two countries. This about-face in Morocco-Algerian relations had one unfortunate result – the isolation of the Polisario Front. Article 15 of the UMA constitution stipulates that the member states – in this case Algeria – will tolerate on their territory no activity which might threaten the security or frontiers of another member state; Polisario can no longer count on aid from Algeria.

As for Mauritania – to which Spain had ceded the southern part of the Western Sahara – it signed a peace treaty with Polisario in 1979 thus withdrawing from a conflict that had proved disastrous for its economy. It is only natural that Mauritania be part of the AMU, given the historical and cultural links it has with the other countries, and as the poorest of the five members it has the most to gain.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR MAKING THE UMA possible was that some of the governments concerned have succeeded in bringing greater social and political stability to their countries and are now pursuing a more democratic course. This is definitely the case with Tunisia where the date 7 November 1987 has taken on a certain magical connotation. It is the day when a new president, the second in Tunisia's history, was inaugurated – a moment long awaited by a people worried about rising social instability and tired of Habib Bourguiba.

On the night of 6 November 1987, after forty-one years as head of state, Habib Bourguiba, the founder of the New Destourien Party and father of independence, was removed from office. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, then prime minister, took control of the country. Tunisians welcomed Ben Ali's regime and its democratic aspirations; various influential groups, such as the Tunisian League for Human Rights, were delighted with the new approach. Ben Ali's first year in office was uneventful; the majority of Tunisians felt it was too early for criticism. However, there were worrying developments which some felt should not go unnoticed.

One incident was the government's confiscation of the 16 December 1988 issue of *Réalités*, an independent weekly that had suffered greatly from censorship under Bourguiba. The reason given for the seizure was that an editorial by a well-known Tunisian intellectual, Hichem Djait, contained defamatory remarks. This action by the government created a great stir among the journalists, several of whom asked, with some justification, whether the independent press was only “provisionally” free.

Later on, in April, Tunisians were called upon for the first time in their history to elect a



president. President Ben Ali was the only candidate and received more than ninety-nine percent of the vote. The Legislative Assembly remained unchanged – all 141 seats went to the party in power, the Democratic Constitutional Assembly (*Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique*). The opposition parties criticized the way the elections were conducted and although these organizations are now legal, until they can elect representatives to the Chamber, Tunisia will be a multi-party state in name only.

WHILE TUNISIA SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING ITS political structure without bloodshed, the same cannot be said for Algeria. Algerians did indeed get a new constitution in February 1989, but at considerable cost. They will not soon forget the riots of October 1988, nor the violence with which the government tried to suppress these demonstrations; there were arbitrary arrests, beatings, and torture. The reaction both inside and outside the country was one of stupefaction. How could the Front de libération nationale (FLN), the party which had led the nation to independence, act in such a repressive fashion?

The riots could have been foreseen; the Soviet-style one party state was going nowhere. By concentrating on heavy industry, based on hydrocarbon production, and making this sector the state's major source of income (ninety-five percent) the FLN had done the country more harm than good; when the price of crude oil fell in 1986 economic chaos was inevitable. The law reforms the government introduced proved useless. Algerians, two-thirds of whom were born since independence in 1962, were going hungry and were desperate for a change; they gave vent to a deep-seated anger that went well beyond mere discontent with the economic troubles.

In the face of this, President Chadli made a prudent choice: he promised to listen to the voices of discontent and the population re-elected him as president of the country in December 1988. A new constitution was drawn up and adopted by referendum in February 1989. Responding to the widespread desire for change and renewal,

references to socialism were deleted, the monopoly of the FLN gave way to a multi-party system, and the role of the army was reduced. Many observers have suggested, however, that the Algerian government has so much to do solving its own internal problems that it will neglect the Maghreb Union.

In Tunisia, the birth of the Union was greeted on 18 February 1989 with a huge headline in the Tunis *La Presse* proclaiming: "A United Maghreb." For President Ben Ali it was "a political choice of the utmost importance." But what had the heads of state agreed to? First of all, the act of Union strengthens the desire of the leaders to cooperate and gives concrete expression to longstanding diplomatic initiatives. The official declaration describes the Union as "welded together" in a way which will "contribute positively to international dialogue." The UMA will, according to the declaration, help to "protect the independence of the Maghreb countries and to safeguard what they have acquired." It should also "help the international community to promote a world order in which justice, dignity, freedom and respect for human rights predominate and where there is genuine cooperation and mutual respect."

The Union has been given a mandate to pursue joint policies in various areas in order to enhance industrial, agricultural, commercial, and social development in its member countries. The Union is a real organization, with its own structures, committees and councils. The presidency of the Union will be filled by each of the five heads of state in turn, for six-month periods; King Hassan II is the first president.

DESPITE THEIR ENTHUSIASM, HOWEVER, THE Maghreb leaders have not yet accomplished very much. Many problems remain unresolved, some of which could threaten the survival of the new organization.

First, the major conflict over the Western Sahara continues. Morocco laid claim to the territory in 1976 and has been engaged in a war with the Polisario Front ever since then. Recently Morocco's King Hassan agreed to

meet the Polisario leaders, and has endorsed the holding of a referendum, first proposed by the United Nations in 1976, which would allow the people of the Sahara to decide their own fate. When asked by the French weekly *Le Point* (30 January 1989) what he would do if he lost the referendum, the President of the Polisario's Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Mohammed Abdelaziz, replied, "If the vote is conducted freely we will accept the verdict of the people of the Sahara and we will go to the Moroccan authorities and say to them: 'We are Moroccans, do with us what you will.'"

However, even if this is a step in the right direction, the dispute in the Sahara is not over. Polisario will accept the results of the referendum only if it feels it has been conducted fairly.

At the time of writing there has been no further negotiations between the two and the date of the referendum has not been announced.

Second, if the member governments were to find themselves unable to maintain social stability in their respective countries, they might then be obliged to concentrate on internal problems and neglect the UMA.


Finally there is the danger that the Union will not succeed in "putting couscous on every table," to use the words of *The Economist*. Unless the Union manages to improve the living standards of the people of the Maghreb, it will be regarded as a failure. One of the factors which persuaded the Maghreb leaders to unite was the threat to their economies which they will face when the European Common Market becomes fully effective in 1992. The Union needs to show that it can operate as a viable economic partner with the EC and with other economic groupings. On a promising note for commercial relations: the members of the Arab Cooperative Council, an organization formed this year in Baghdad and which includes Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen, expressed its intention to work cooperatively with the UMA.

The Arab Maghreb Union embodies great hopes for peace, harmony and cooperation in the area – and many promises have been made. In view of the increasing poverty, unemployment and hunger in all these countries, this new organization is indeed fragile and keeping it afloat will be a formidable challenge. □



# J. KING GORDON 1900-1989

*On 24 February 1989  
J. King Gordon –  
distinguished journalist,  
teacher, and internation-  
alist – died at the age of  
eighty-nine.*



Berry Blair

## AN APPRECIATION BY CLYDE SANGER

*Clyde Sanger was King Gordon's  
friend and colleague.*

**W**HEN AN EXTRAORDINARY PERSON DIES, ONE is tempted to echo the words Hamlet used about his father to his friend Horatio: "He was a man, take him for all in all. I shall not look upon his like again." The temptation here is even stronger, because Horatio had just said: "I saw him once. He was a goodly King." But it would be a really sad prospect for Canada if we did not see the likes of King Gordon or Frank Scott and others of their generation again. Oh, how we need them!

What made King Gordon so special to so many people? A number of good thoughts were expressed at the memorial service to him in Ottawa. David MacDonald MP picked out the phrase "delighting in the truth" to describe "a life committed to exploring and confronting and revealing the truth." Precise, but never pedantic, a professor of ethics and a United Church minister who moved on to journalism, there was certainly joy and delight with him in clearly expressing important new ideas, and a rolling chuckle as he recalled tales of fine men from Father Jimmy Tompkins of Antigonish to Cookie Lavagetto and Dag Hammarskjöld – especially Hammarskjöld and Tommy Burns and all those UN peacekeeping men. King Gordon was the only person I have known who always carried a copy of the United Nations Charter in the pocket of his jacket. It seemed as important to him as the New Testament must have been to his famous father.

His brother-in-law, Humphrey Carver, spoke of the remarkable Gordon family – of King and his six sisters and his parents, and of his wife, Ruth, and their two children – and their "glowing and powerful bonds of affection." In this special kind of family love, he suggested, were the roots of all the friendships King made in many parts of the world. "For King, the distinguished internationalist, the expression 'The Family of Man' was not just a cliché."

And there was also the sense of belonging to a special place. His Gaelic-speaking grandfather, Daniel Gordon, came out from the Highlands as a Presbyterian minister to Glengarry in eastern Ontario and King wrote in 1984 that he had never quite lost the feeling that this was his native heath. But really his heart's home was in northwestern Ontario's Lake of the Woods, on their island called Birkencraig. It was there that his father, a moderator who led his Presbyterian church towards church union in 1925, did much of his writing under the pen-name of Ralph Connor; and it was there that King himself had what he called "a slight brush with the RCMP." In the summer of 1960 a police launch arrived (at a time when everyone was worrying about fishing licences) bearing a message that King was to get in touch with the UN. Three days later, instead of paddling his canoe on a tranquil Canadian lake, he was crossing the Congo River on a ferryboat on his way to grim adventures as a senior UN information officer.

IT ALL SOUNDS, DOESN'T IT, LIKE AN EXCITING LIFE lived from a privileged and secure base? So it was, to a degree; and, no doubt, these connections were often

helpful. But the point is that King Gordon used them to spread the seed of progressive ideas and to influence the thinking of policy-makers, rather than to gain some pinnacle of influence for himself. Nor can it be just coincidence that he was there at the creation of half a dozen political movements and international initiatives. When he received the Pearson Peace Medal in 1980, he told the folks in Rideau Hall, "I was just a witness and a reporter," and we all smiled at his modesty.

As a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford in the 1920s, he did not belong to the Raleigh Club that listened to Lord Lugard and wondered how to patch up the Empire; instead he, Graham Spry, George Ferguson and others formed the "Oh Canada! Group" whose ideas were more in line with the future Statute of Westminster. His part in helping Frank Underhill draft the Regina Manifesto for the first convention of the CCF has been mentioned most hilariously in a memoir "Fifty Years On" by Eugene Forsey (*Saturday Night*, July 1983). And of course he was in at the birth of the United Nations, as managing editor of *The Nation* and then the CBC's first correspondent, until he joined the UN Secretariat in 1950. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the repatriation of 60,000 prisoners-of-war from the Soviet Union, the rehabilitation of Korea after a devastating war, peacekeeping in the Sinai, civil operations in the Congo – King had a hand (and more than just a scribe's hand) in them all.

PEEL OFF A LAYER OF HIS ABIDING FAITH IN THE WORTH of the United Nations and you come to the core of his conviction that, if they only combine their efforts, the middle powers can do so much to lead the world to sanity. They had combined at San Francisco to modify the draft of a Charter which the big powers had put together at Dumbarton Oaks, and King had seen them in action in the Sinai and in the Congo. Mike Pearson and Dag Hammarskjöld, reasonable but risk-taking men from middle powers, were his heroes. The Law of the Sea Conference was steered by lawyers from such middle-sized countries. King wrote often of Canada's role as a middle power and, a latter-day Ulysses, he set off across the oceans to add wise words to several *Pacem in Maribus* (Peace at Sea) conferences. "Come, my friends, 'tis not too late to seek a newer world."

At a Group of 78 gathering at Stoney Lake in 1985 he recalled a morning in wartime in the New York publishing house where he worked alongside the poet Stephen Vincent Benét, who came in exclaiming, "We must tear up all these flat maps." He also quoted Sonny Ramphal's comment, about the first photograph of Earth from space, that "The world is not only round, but whole." King talked on about the linkages, South and North, peacekeeping and the New International Order, human rights. But to him they were not linkages, they were parts of the whole. And King Gordon was, in every sense, a whole man. □



**A**T A RECENT CONFERENCE IN NAKHODKA in the Soviet Far East, a number of Soviet academics and policy-makers expressed the fear that their country's foreign policy might fail. Their anxiety is based on the belief that the West is in danger of missing a unique opportunity to completely restructure its relationship with the Soviet Union. In fact, western missteps at this critical stage could very well reverse the current policy of Soviet retrenchment and cause Gorbachev's removal from power. An adept Western approach, however, could simultaneously advance Western interests and reinforce the present healthy tendencies in Soviet policy.

If Gorbachev continues to adhere to his present course, we are likely to see a string of Soviet withdrawals from the Third World. Western leaders can only welcome such events and indeed have expressed guarded optimism about the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Soviet contributions to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola and a Vietnamese departure from Kampuchea. However, there is a serious question of how much longer Soviet leaders can endure this ongoing series of unilateral retreats with its attendant costs for Soviet prestige in the world.

American leaders faced a similar problem after the fall of Saigon. They worried that a defeat in Vietnam would cause Soviet leaders to doubt American resolve and ability to resist future Soviet expansionism. They assumed that their NATO allies and Japan would doubt American security guarantees and predicted that allies around the globe would sense American impotence and accommodate themselves to the Soviet threat, rather than join with the US against it.

IT IS ONLY REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT SOVIET leaders have similar anxieties about the unravelling of their global alliances. Soviet pressure on Vietnam over Kampuchea will not increase its chances of maintaining a military presence at Cam Ranh Bay. Its efforts to promote a Namibia-Angola settlement will not demonstrate steadfastness in the eyes of the Mozambican government fighting against South African-backed RENAMO insurgents, or convince ANC fighters in South Africa that the USSR is committed to their cause. When the US was faced with this image problem, it chose a unilateral approach. Its most effective device was to support countries naturally inclined to resist the Soviets, such as China – an alliance which helped shatter any Soviet illusions that the US was relinquishing its position in Asia.

In other parts of the world the US found regional powers, such as Iran, to assume the

# IS THE WEST MISSING THE SOVIET BOAT?

*A chilly response by Western countries to Gorbachev's new foreign policy is not in anyone's interest.*

BY TED HOPF

burden of countering any Soviet encroachments. Though reliance on such regional strong points proved ultimately ineffective, at the time these alliances were formed the Soviets perceived them as evidence of renewed American commitment in the wake of its humiliation in Southeast Asia. Last, and often too casually dismissed, American leaders continually stated that the withdrawal from Vietnam did not signal any loss of power or the resolve to use it.

Judging from the statements of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and other Soviet foreign policy-makers, as well as recent Soviet behaviour, the Soviet Union has opted for a different antidote to its credibility problem. This has happy consequences for the West, but only if the latter responds in a way that lets the Soviets withdraw from their positions without having to admit total defeat. Gorbachev asserts that the days of unilateralism in international politics are past and that the only solution to regional conflicts must be at the negotiating table. One could dismiss such statements as mere rhetorical boilerplate, but for the fact that the Soviets are engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity.

While the US tried to restore its credibility by sending arms to its friends, the Soviet Union, in some cases at least, has cut its allies adrift. Mozambique has been left virtually defenceless against continual attacks by RENAMO guerrillas. Moscow has denied Syria advanced missiles capable of reaching Israel. In both cases, the Soviets have ignored military obligations under Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation.

DIPLOMATICALLY, THE SOVIETS SUPPORT THE resolution of regional conflicts in ways which contribute to the interests of the West. American policy-makers praised the Soviets for their role in softening the negotiating positions of Cuba and Angola in talks with South Africa.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's putative rival, Politburo member Igor Ligachev both pressed Vietnamese leaders to moderate their negotiating postures with the guerrilla coalition opposing the Kampuchean government. The PLO's decision to recognize Israel was probably due, in part, to Gorbachev's personal rebuke to Yasser Arafat that the PLO's previous position was "only an obstacle ... to a just resolution of the Middle East conflict."

Given this welcome trend, how can the West, and the US in particular, increase the chances that such a tendency will continue? The West should do everything possible to involve the Soviets in talks on the Middle East, Southern Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and Central America. In the latter case, future Soviet policy regarding military aid to Nicaragua is a litmus test for judging Gorbachev's commitment to negotiated settlements of such conflicts.

THERE ARE THREE REASONS WHY THE WEST should encourage Gorbachev's preference for multilateral solutions to the Soviet credibility problem. First, a responsive Western attitude channels Soviet energies away from searching for new foreign policy adventures to strengthen its image. Instead, the West will give Gorbachev a graceful way out of commitments, while ensuring that any settlement preserves Western interests.

Second, the resolution of these conflicts removes a major obstacle to the further development of detente. It may very well be that Gorbachev's priority of controlling military spending through arms control is precisely what dictates Soviet moderation in the Third World. The West should use Gorbachev's priorities to its advantage.

Last, if one believes that Gorbachev's domestic reform package of *perestroika*, *glasnost* and *demokratizatsiya* is in Western interests, then it is critical that the West help him stave off attacks from his more orthodox colleagues. Conservatives on the Politburo undoubtedly raise serious concerns about a foreign policy that seems to do nothing but make one unilateral concession after another. The orthodox alternative is most likely a hardening of Soviet positions not only in the Middle East or Southern Africa, but also on the central issues of arms control and human rights. A constructive Western response to Gorbachev's foreign policy not only can reduce Soviet activism in areas of importance to the West, but it can also help protect Gorbachev from the attacks of those who would like to return to the days of Brezhnevite stagnation at home and adventurism abroad. □

## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Namibia

The agreement to implement Security Council resolution 435 which paves the road to Namibian independence, was widely hailed as a reflection of the new world order and the enhanced role of the United Nations. But the resolution, a product of nearly a quarter century of diplomacy, had proven far more difficult and embarrassing to execute than initially anticipated by the Council.

No sooner had resolution 435 gone into effect on 1 April, than over 1,500 SWAPO guerrillas crossed the border into Namibia in apparent violation of the US-brokered agreement between South Africa, Cuba and Angola. As South African troops engaged and killed close to two hundred guerrillas, the independence plan began to look as if it might be falling apart. As members of the Security Council met during a series of informal consultations, criticism of the UN role mounted. The Secretary-General, virtually powerless to stop South African forces from engaging SWAPO, reluctantly endorsed Pretoria's action. The UN suddenly found itself in the embarrassing situation of countenancing the military activities of what until then had been the "illegal occupier."

The powerlessness of the UN to prevent South Africa from acting was mirrored in the Council where no formal debate was scheduled out of concern that it could quickly degenerate into an exercise in finger-pointing that would further imperil the independence plan. "Everybody is conscious of the fact the UN was criticized, that the UN image was tarnished," a Canadian diplomat observed at the time, "but the question is how to

deal with that and how to restore the lustre."

Behind the scenes, both at the UN and in capitals, intense pressure was brought to bear on the parties, particularly SWAPO and South Africa, in an attempt to secure the rebels' return to Angola. In the meantime, diplomats began to ponder what had gone wrong. While resolution 435 originally called for the deployment of 7,500 UN troops, this was reduced to 4,650 at the insistence of the US and the USSR who argued that the original number was not needed and constituted an unnecessary expense. Approval of the budget became bogged down in wrangling, leaving little time to dispatch UN troops. As of 1 April, there were only 900 members of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, and virtually none of them in northern Namibia where SWAPO rebels crossed the border.

"The six to eight weeks lead time which I had reiterated on many occasions as being the absolute minimum necessary to be fully effective, was instead reduced to four weeks," Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar complained to the Council.

In theory, the Council could have delayed the implementation of resolution 435 until preparations were complete, but diplomats feared that any postponement threatened the integrity of the independence plan and would have led to demands for other changes. "Everybody knew UNTAG wouldn't be fully in place by April 1, we also knew that in the course of the months there'd be violations, but nobody expected them so quickly," a Western diplomat said.

### Afghanistan

While Namibia dominated the attention of the Council in recent months, it did focus its attention on other matters. In mid-April it

met at the request of Afghanistan which charged neighbouring Pakistan with political interference and military aggression. Afghanistan also accused the US of being a "tool" for the implementation of Pakistani expansionism.

The charges of interference came amidst news reports of US aid to the Afghan Mujahideen and as plane-loads of Soviet war materiel were arriving in Kabul on an almost daily basis. Pakistan denied the charges and accused Afghanistan of refusing to bow to political reality and to recognize that the Kabul regime was unacceptable to the Afghan people. Peace and stability in Afghanistan, it added, could only be restored if power was transferred from the present regime to a broad-based government.

In a speech, Canadian ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier, said that in the absence of a request from "all the Afghan people" there was little the Council could do to help Afghanistan establish representative government and ensure a return of the millions of refugees. "My government believes that it is for the Afghan people to determine their common future without interference from outside parties," Fortier told the Council. Afterwards, when asked if by "interference" he meant not just the Soviet Union but the US and Pakistan, he replied: "definitely." What was left unclear is how vigorously Canada intends to pursue this objective, particularly in Washington and Islamabad.

### The Middle East

In February, the Council met informally to discuss the situation in the occupied territories as the PLO pressed an initiative to have Israel condemned. When it became clear that an attempt to obtain a statement from the President of the Council on the matter would be vetoed by the US, the initiative was taken to the General Assembly where, following a debate, Israel was condemned by an overwhelming majority including

Canada. Only Israel and the US opposed the resolution. Liberia abstained.

### Other Issues Before the Council

The Council also dealt with the ongoing civil war in Lebanon. Once again, it issued an appeal for a ceasefire in the conflict. After a brief lull, the fighting resumed between Syrian troops and their allies, and Christian forces. The statement also endorsed the efforts of the Arab League in seeking to resolve the conflict.

On 28 April, the Council heard a complaint from Panama that there had been "flagrant intervention" by the US in its economy and its political system. The complaint followed news reports that the US administration had approved a secret fund to channel \$10 million to Panamanian opposition candidates in the 7 May elections.

During a debate, the US denied there was any plot against Panama. It countered that Panamanian strongman General Manuel Antonio Noriega was intent on subverting the elections in that country. The US delegate added that the Panamanian foreign minister, who had travelled to New York to address the Council, would be wiser to return home and debate the issues with his political opposition. "The election can't be won in Panama through a debate in the Security Council," the US delegate said.

The Council took no immediate action on the complaint which, in the event a resolution was introduced, faced an almost certain US veto.

The Council also faced some routine business – the renewal of mandates to various peacekeeping forces is coming under closer scrutiny in the wake of events in Namibia. With the possibility that UN troops could eventually be sent to Central America, Kampuchea and Western Sahara, there is a keen awareness that future operations must be better coordinated. □

– TREVOR ROWE



## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



*Editor's Note: A major item on the arms control agenda this past quarter was the dispute between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany over the German government's desire to see early superpower negotiations on short-range nuclear forces in Central Europe. As Peace&Security went to press, parties to the on-going discussions hoped to reach a compromise in time for the 29 and 30 May NATO summit meeting in Brussels.*

### Conventional Arms Control

The first round of two new sets of European arms control talks – the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) talks – took place in Vienna from 9 to 23 March. NATO's opening proposals were tabled officially by the chief Canadian delegate, David Peel, on 9 March. They call for four types of limits:

- deep cuts in the overall numbers of certain weapons in Europe, to a level of 40,000 tanks, 33,000 artillery pieces, and 56,000 armoured troop-carriers, evenly divided between the two sides. Involving reductions of about fifty percent in tanks and artillery, this would leave each side with five to ten percent below the current NATO level;

- a national sub-limit of about thirty percent in each of these categories, meaning that no single country could hold more than 12,000 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces, and 16,800 armoured troop-carriers. This would require reductions of two-thirds in Soviet tanks and artillery, and over half of their armoured troop-carriers, based in Europe;

- limits on forces stationed outside their own countries of 3,200 tanks, 1,700 artillery pieces, and 6,000 armoured troop-carriers, for each side; and

a series of geographical sub-limits, to "prevent undue concentration of forces."

The Warsaw Pact's CFE proposal, introduced formally by the chief Soviet delegate, Oleg Grinevsky, on 9 March, calls for a three-stage reduction process. During the first stage, 1991–1994, "forces and armaments" on each side would be reduced to an equal level, ten to fifteen percent below the lowest level currently possessed by either side. Attention would be "focussed" on reducing attack combat aircraft, tanks, combat helicopters, combat armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, and artillery including multiple-launch rocket systems and mortars. The first stage would also see the establishment of partially-demilitarized zones or "strips" along the East-West frontier.

During the second stage (1994–1997), each side would further reduce its forces by approximately twenty-five percent (or about 500,000 men, together with their weapons). Finally, during the third stage (1997–2000), further reductions would be made, armed forces would be "given a strictly defensive character," and ceilings would be imposed on all other categories of arms. Verification measures would include mandatory on-site inspections, entry/exit checkpoints, and aerial monitoring.

As the talks got underway, independent observers differed about the prospects for agreement, although official representatives expressed considerable optimism. The two sides agreed on the desirability of equal limits, the approximate scale of first-stage reductions, and the need for intensive verification measures. However, they disagreed on which particular types of weapons should be singled out for reduction (especially on whether tactical aircraft should be included); their estimates of each other's holdings; the East's emphasis on personnel, as well as equipment, reductions; the Eastern proposal for demilitarized frontier

zones; and the NATO proposal for limits on "stationed forces" (outside their own countries).

In addition, the Soviets, while acknowledging that neither tactical nuclear weapons nor naval forces are included in the mandate of the talks, have called for separate negotiations (opposed by NATO) on each of these. Finally, NATO remains uneasy about reductions beyond the first stage, offering only to "contemplate" further reductions "in the longer term, and in the light of the implementation of" its current proposal.

Detailed proposals have also been made in the CSBM talks, although they have received much less publicity. NATO has called for improvements on the confidence- and security-building measures adopted in Stockholm in 1986, but without extending them to so-called "constraint" measures (i.e., actual limits on military activity). The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has proposed an ambitious array of new CSBMs, including constraints and other measures affecting independent naval and air exercises (successfully resisted by the West in the past).

### Fissionable Materials Restrictions

In a speech in London on 7 April, Soviet President Gorbachev announced that the USSR would end its production of enriched, weapons-grade uranium this year, and close two of its weapons-grade plutonium-producing plants this year and next. He described the move as "yet another major step towards the complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons."

The Bush Administration replied that the measures would have little military significance, since Moscow has stockpiled enriched uranium and possesses about ten military reactors producing plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons. However, US Congressman Edward Markey welcomed the Soviet announcement as "a major new opportunity for the US to

begin a dialogue on ways to end fissile materials production."

Over the past year, several American public interest groups have called for such limits, to take advantage of a lull in US production and to spur progress in strategic arms control. Canada has long sponsored a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling on the Conference on Disarmament to consider prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Last year the resolution passed by a vote of 144 to 1 (France), with seven abstentions.

### Brief Notes

By 28 March, a total of forty states had formally requested the convening of an amendment conference to convert the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) into a comprehensive test ban. Representing over one-third of the 116 parties to the PTBT, this ensures that the conference will take place. Any actual amendment, however, requires the agreement of all three original "depository" states. Two of these – the US and United Kingdom – have stated that they would not support any change in the existing Treaty whose prohibition on nuclear testing is limited to the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

Thirty-one Soviet T-64 tanks left Hungary on 25 April, in the first of the unilateral withdrawals from Eastern Europe announced by President Gorbachev last December. A further 419 tanks and ten thousand men are to be withdrawn from Hungary over the next year. The Soviets had earlier announced that over 1,000 tanks and ten thousand personnel would be withdrawn from East Germany by 15 August of this year. According to the commander-in-chief of Soviet troops in Germany, all of the tanks will be sent beyond the Urals, where some will be mothballed and others converted to civilian uses. □

– RONALD PURVER

## DEFENCE NOTES



### United States – Deficit Blues

US defence officials expressed regret at Canada's abandonment of the White Paper proposals for increased defence spending; Washington, however, is preoccupied with its own continuing struggle to find ways to curtail the US defence budget, now over US \$300 billion. Without waiting for the Bush administration's long-delayed review of US military strategy, in April the new Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney announced a series of measures intended to cut US \$10 billion from the Pentagon's budget. The cuts included:

- decommissioning of the carrier *USS Coral Sea*, which would effectively end the long-cherished quest for the six-hundred ship navy, and the commitment to a fifteen carrier fleet;

- a long-term slowdown of the recently revealed B-2 bomber programme;

- a reduction by 7,900 in the number of army troops;

- cancellation of the V-22 Osprey, a combination helicopter-aircraft with a US \$22 billion price tag intended for the Marines, and the slowdown or cancellation of a variety of other tactical aircraft including helicopters, and new versions of the F-14 and F-15.

In another important spending decision – the future of land-based strategic missiles – Cheney proposes to take the fifty ten-warhead MX missiles from their present silo deployments, and make them rail mobile. At the same time, the administration will continue limited funding for the single-warhead Midgetman missile, a

weapon favoured by new National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, but unpopular with the US Air Force, who see Midgetman as too expensive for its small payload. According to the *New York Times* (26 April) the proposed rate of funding for Midgetman would delay deployment until 1997 or 1998.

The cuts (almost equal to the annual defence budget of Canada) mark a continued struggle to reduce US defence expenditures. In February, President Bush proposed a freeze on defence spending for FY 1990, with a one percent increase in 1991 and two percent in 1992. In mid-April Cheney and the Congress reached agreement on a further reduction for 1990 to conform to Congressional legislation holding the annual deficit to about US \$100 billion. The 1990 defence budget now represents a real decrease in defence spending of about one percent, with little prospect that future years will reverse the trend.

In these circumstances the Bush-Cheney approach has been criticized for failing to address fundamental restructuring in US defence policy. The Pentagon now faces a situation in which many expensive weapons programmes initiated during the euphoria of the Reagan years need to be paid for in the lean years of the 1990s. Faced with painful choices, the first response of the administration has been to prune rather than to slash. Now underlying the debate in the United States is the emerging view that only significant reductions in active troop strength will meet the budgetary constraints. As this view gathers support, attention has begun to focus on the two large overseas commitments of US ground forces: Europe and South Korea.

### SDI – Brilliant Pebbles

The Pentagon is approaching the decision on full-scale development of the Boost Surveillance

and Tracking System (BSTS). Designed to give early warning of missile attack and to provide a tracking capability to allow interception of enemy missiles, the BSTS development decision will take place against the backdrop of continued debate within the administration about the SDI budget. Both the Joint Chiefs and the State Department are said to favour a lower level of SDI funding in the future, thereby possibly delaying the full-scale development of the BSTS tracking system. Despite his April announcement which restricts SDI funding, Cheney and other agencies support the higher levels originally proposed by President Reagan and necessary if

there is to be an early deployment of missile defences.

While the debate continues, a new favourite has emerged in the SDI sweepstakes. Brilliant Pebbles is a scheme to deploy tens (possibly hundreds) of thousands of small (one metre) rockets in space. They would have on-board computing power contained in small silicon chips, and revolutionary wide-angle optical sensors. The little rocket with the big brain could function without the supporting satellite sensors and communications systems which greatly compound the cost and complexity of currently planned space-based systems, and would be less vulnerable to counter-

### CANADA – DEFICIT DISARMAMENT

In 1987 the Conservative government issued "Challenge and Commitment," the defence White Paper intended to guide Canadian defence policy for the rest of the century. Echoing earlier statements both private and public by senior officials, the White Paper warned that the armed forces faced a dire future unless there was a significant and sustained increase in defence expenditures. It described a "commitment-credibility" gap which affected every major commitment of the forces. Despite the improvements achieved in the 1980s, the White Paper predicted that without a major infusion of funds, "rust-out" would occur in the early 1990s.

This meant that the forces stationed in Europe would cease to be effective and would need to be withdrawn by the mid-1990s. Without replacement aircraft, there would not be sufficient CF-18s to maintain commitments both to Europe and North America beyond the late 1990s. Most operational ships would be retired by the mid-1990s, leaving only four twenty-year-old destroyers and six new frigates as combat ships.

The White Paper proposed an ambitious programme to acquire new weapons systems, at the centre of which was the decision to acquire a new fleet of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines. These were considered to be the only way that Canada could develop a "three-ocean Navy" which would permit, among other things, the underwater patrol and surveillance of Canadian Arctic waters. To finance this rebuilding programme, the White Paper announced a formula whereby defence spending would increase at a rate of two percent real growth per year for fifteen years, with additional "bumps" to pay for capital procurement programmes as they came on stream. However, private calculations of the cost of the rebuilding programme suggested that four to five percent real growth per annum for fifteen years would be required to pay for the White Paper programme.



measures. As they picked up missile launches, the rockets would swarm to their targets and destroy enemy missiles in the slow, boost phase of flight. According to retiring SDI chief, James Abrahamson, Brilliant Pebbles would cost about US \$25 billion – significantly less than any other major SDI system discussed to date.

Critics, however, have raised familiar objections and one new one. The high IQ rockets might be fast enough to catch current Soviet missiles in the boost phase, but according to some scientists, would be easily defeated if the Soviets built fast-burn boosters which would need to fire their engines for only sixty seconds or less. The new objection is the pollution of space: tens of thousands of new objects in space would significantly add to the danger of collisions, and the accidental destruction of satellites would

produce even more space junk which might start a further round of collisions.

### ASATS – the Country Cousins

In his last Report to Congress, outgoing Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci made a determined pitch for anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. "...a comprehensive ASAT capability," he said, "is an absolute necessity to prevent the Soviets from using hostile space systems to the detriment of our forces." ASAT weapons would provide an early pay-off to SDI research, since many weapons now under development as possible ABM systems would be effective against satellites where they might not be against missiles. The US depends heavily on satellites for military communications, early warning, and navigation, as well as for civilian uses.

For this reason an ASAT race

with the Soviet Union would bring mixed blessings. While Carlucci and the Pentagon emphasize the need to transform some Star Wars projects into ASAT capabilities, others argue that the best protection would be to negotiate a ban on ASATs. Most US satellites are in high orbit, and currently out of the range of the elementary Soviet ASAT system. In the middle of this debate is new National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, the co-author of a recent report recommending a ban on high altitude ASATS on the grounds that this would preserve for both sides a warning and communication capability in a time of nuclear alert.

### NATO's Mid-Life Crisis

NATO's fortieth birthday party in May will be mainly remembered for the family squabble over short-range nuclear forces (SNF). The controversy over these weapons has been slowly building since the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,000 kilometres. For NATO this left in place a variety of nuclear weapons deliverable by aircraft, sea-based cruise missiles, and Lance, a short-range, land-based missile. In the aftermath of INF, the United States, strongly supported by Prime Minister Thatcher, is committed to a follow-on to Lance which would produce a warhead with a longer range – about 450 kilometres – and improved accuracy. The new missile would be phased in around 1995 as Lance reaches the end of its effective life.

Washington, however, wants West German support for the programme before proceeding with the development. Faced with an electorate well aware that SNF are intended for use on German soil, West German Chancellor Kohl has declined any such commitment. Increasing West German sentiment supports negotiations

with the Soviets on SNF, and Kohl hopes to postpone the decision until after the 1990 election in order to limit the electoral damage which would result from support of the US position. Many of the European NATO countries, including Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Italy and Spain, appear to side with the Federal Republic in seeking a delay in the decision.

### New European Visions

While efforts were made to paper over the differences, however, influential politicians were raising more fundamental questions. Echoing Soviet calls for a "European House," West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher appeared to lead the new thinking. In an April speech he described his vision of a new Europe:

The object is to demilitarize and de-ideologize East-West relations, and at the same time to expand and strengthen the co-operative elements. A peaceful order in Europe ... in which nations can live without fear of one another, and in which they can choose their own political and social system, is no longer merely a vision...

Meanwhile, in the country which gives its name to the Warsaw Treaty, Polish political leaders of all groups took part in a historic "Roundtable" at the beginning of April. The resulting agreement calls for elections in Poland in June. Thirty-five percent of the lower house is open to contest (the ruling Communist party has first claim on the rest), and all of the upper house will be contested. While the government cannot lose power, it is expected to suffer severe setbacks in the elections. Poland intends to remain in the Warsaw Pact, but it seeks stronger participation in pan-European discussions on security. In particular, the Government wants to make Poland the home of a European war-risk-reduction centre which would be a clearing house for all information on troop strengths and movements in Europe. □

– DAVID COX

The 1989 budget announced by Michael Wilson in late April has overturned or delayed all the main proposals of the White Paper. The 1989–1990 defence estimates provide for an increase of \$95.6 million, or 0.9 percent over the 1988 forecast expenditures. This represents a reduction of \$575 million from the anticipated 1989–1990 budget, which, following the White Paper, was intended to provide a 3.3 percent increase to compensate for inflation, and two percent growth. The Government has stated that \$2.74 billion will be stripped from defence expenditures over the next five years, but claims that in 1993–1994, at the end of the deficit-reduction period, the base of defence funding will be restored to the level that would have been achieved under the White Paper formula of two percent real growth per year.

Most of the major planned weapons programmes are affected by this reversal of policy. The nuclear submarine programme has been scrapped, leaving uncertain the question of a replacement programme for the three aging Oberon-class submarines now approaching the end of their useful life. Replacement CF-18 aircraft have been cancelled, as have additional long-range maritime patrol aircraft. The purchase of new tanks for Canada's European forces has been reduced by half, and delayed past the time when, according to the White Paper, the forces would need to be withdrawn from Europe for lack of equipment. The purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles for the militia has been reduced by more than half, implying that the planned large increases in the militia will probably also be abandoned or reduced. While 1988 saw an increase in military personnel of 1,174 in accordance with the government's promise to increase the size of the armed forces, the new measures call for a reduction of 2,500 personnel. Finally, fourteen military bases in Canada will be closed or reduced in size.

The defence estimates note that despite the "short term" funding reductions, "the White Paper remains an accurate statement of Canadian defence policy and the objective which the Government intends to pursue." There will be no formal revision of the White Paper, therefore, even though its central proposals have been shaken by the budget cuts.

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



*The 34th Parliament resumed in second session on 3 April with the reading of the Speech from the Throne by the Governor-General. The emphasis was on the economy and trade, but a lengthy section discussed the environment and a smaller one, Canada's international role.*

### Middle East Changes

On 30 March just prior to Parliament's reactivation, the government upgraded its level of contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), repeating its support for Palestinian self-determination without recognizing the PLO itself. The decision permits higher-level Canadian diplomats (to the ambassadorial level) to meet PLO representatives. According to Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, it will allow Canada to press the PLO to follow a moderate path and to foster peace negotiations. Mr. Clark noted: "There can be a difference between the right to participate in negotiations [about the future of Palestinians] and the right to have a separate, independent state.... We do not prejudice the results of those negotiations."

### Parliamentary Committees

Parliamentary Committees were also reformed in April. The total number of committees was reduced, but those pertaining to peace and security issues were largely unaffected. The House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) – its membership expanded by one to a total of fourteen (8 Conservatives, 4 Liberals, 2 NDP) – elected former House Speaker John Bosley (Don Valley West) as chairman. The House Standing Committee on National Defence also gained another

member to total eight and will now also cover veterans affairs issues. Alberta farmer and veteran MP, Arnold Malone (Crowfoot), was named chairman. During May both committees examined the government's spending estimates for 1989–1990 while preparing plans for more extensive studies later in the year.

The Senate Special Committee on National Defence also renewed its study of Canada's land forces, and is expected to conclude its work some time during the summer. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee is pursuing extensive investigations of specific aspects of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.

Patrick Boyer (Etobicoke-Lakeshore) and Jean-Guy Hudon (Beauharnois-Salaberry) were named Parliamentary Secretaries to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence respectively.

### Peacekeeping Activity

Three distant parts of the world were the subject of peacekeeping news early in April, all involving Canadian participation. It was announced that Canadian peacekeepers would fill the gap following the 4 April agreement between the governments of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities to withdraw their soldiers from three observation posts in Nicosia, the most tense part of the buffer zone dividing Cyprus. The agreement marked the first military withdrawal by the two sides since the Turkish intervention on the Mediterranean island in 1974. The latest effort to reunify the island and end the impasse that has divided the communities since 1962 remains deadlocked.

On 5 April the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia invited Canada, Poland and India to form a monitoring commission to verify the withdrawal of the 50,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese troops remaining in Cambodia – troops Vietnam

claimed would be removed by the end of September – fifteen months earlier than previously promised. Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia began in December 1978 when its forces toppled the Khmer Rouge government and installed the present regime. Joe Clark said that Canada will consider participating only if several conditions are met, including confirmation by all parties to the dispute of their full support for an international peacekeeping force with a clearly-expressed mandate and a limited time of operation.

The most dramatic events concerned Namibia and the initial collapse of the ceasefire, between South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which came into effect on 1 April. The government had agreed to send almost 250 Canadians in support of the one-year, 4,650 person UNTAG operation to supervise the withdrawal of South African troops from, and the independence process in, Namibia. Following the SWAPO incursion that set off the fighting, the Canadian government agreed to a UN request to hasten its troop deployment and provide additional air support for the entire UNTAG force.

On 12 April Defence Minister Bill McKnight rose in the House to deposit an Order in Council approving the deployment of the Canadian troops. Liberal External Affairs critic André Ouellet, while supporting the Order, criticized the Minister's silence about the actual situation in Namibia as well as the inadequate strength and tardy deployment of the UN force. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark had himself been critical both of SWAPO and of the UN for its lengthy debate over the costs and size of UNTAG, which, he said, had delayed the force from establishing a presence in Namibia before the transition to independence began.

(For more on the Namibia peacekeeping operation, see Report from the Security Council, page 14.)

### Lebanon

On 20 April External Relations Minister Monique Landry addressed the House about the latest round of violence in the fourteen-year civil war in Lebanon. Joe Clark had already made a statement on 30 March calling on all parties to redouble their efforts to achieve national reconciliation, but Landry fleshed out the general expressions of concern with specific Canadian actions to assist in the emergency: continuing support for the mediation efforts of the Arab League Ministerial Committee, the UN Security Council, and President Mitterrand of France; a special \$500,000 grant to the Red Cross for humanitarian assistance; temporary suspension of the deportation of unsuccessful refugee claimants back to Lebanon; and the dispatch of an immigration officer to Cyprus to handle additional cases.

### Federal Budget

The government opted for fiscal restraint in a deficit-cutting exercise that had a major impact both on the Department of National Defence, which suffered a variety of cuts to defence programmes and to the Canadian International Development Agency which saw funds for foreign aid substantially reduced.

Previously, the government had set a target of 0.5% of GNP for official development assistance (ODA) and had promised to attain a goal of 0.6% by 1995. The budget reductions will mean that ODA will drop to 0.43% in 1989–1990, with the ratio increasing to 0.45% the next year. It also postponed the achievement of the 0.6% target indefinitely. The effect of these cuts on actual programmes will take several months to work their way through the system. □

— GREGORY WIRICK



## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Rampant orientalist stereotypes

Your editorial note on the Rushdie imbroglio and Stephen Handelman's "Letter from Soviet Uzbekistan" (*Peace & Security*, Spring 1989) both play on simplistic images of Islam and its political dimensions. While the editorial note apparently does so unconsciously and even benignly, Handelman forthrightly wields an axe.

On the one hand, you judiciously question the logic of severing diplomatic relations with Iran and undermining "civilized discourse among diverse cultures" over an issue immersed in ethnocentric as well as religious complexity. Whatever the literary merits of *The Satanic Verses* (and there is no consensus among the book's reviewers that Rushdie is "among the very people we need most"), it has given profound offense to millions, a fact that should be kept in perspective despite the melodramatic execution order from Teheran.

But you fall into the familiar trap of reducing the debate to an easy dichotomy between absolute free expression in the West and absolute communal conformity in the Muslim world. Individual freedom of expression is as *relative* under the Canadian Criminal Code and the 1982 Charter of Rights, as is the priority accorded to communal rights under Islamic legal doctrine. If many Muslims "don't buy" the free expression argument when it comes to Rushdie, Canadians also seem to have trou-

ble acknowledging that there is a legitimate argument involved over the scope of free speech in this matter, under our own legal precepts.

After all, such arguments occur daily over the language issue in Quebec and over granting public platforms to "experts" who are anti-semitic or otherwise racist. Why do we abruptly develop an absolutist paralysis when it comes to Muslim sensibilities?

The answer lies partly in the legacy of orientalist discourse in the West, predicated on stereotypes of an irrational and exotic Muslim East contrasted with a rational and orderly Judeo-Christian West. Instead of being exposed and replaced by a more meaningful discourse, orientalism threatens to gain new ground for reasons evident in Handelman's report on Soviet Muslims.

Somehow the nationalism of Estonians, Latvians and Armenians against Moscow's overreaching authority is deemed perfectly reasonable, but that of Uzbeks, Tadzhiks or Kazakhs is portrayed as some dark fundamentalist prospect. Never mind that the churches have played a prominent role in rallying nationalist sentiment from the Baltic to the Caucasus. The slightest hint of Muslim fervour conjures up images of militancy on the march. For Handelman, even "afternoon prayers in Bukhara contain an ominous message for Moscow itself."

By comparison, Richard N. Ostling's essay on the same subject in *Time* ("Islam Regains its Voice," 10 April 1989) observes: "In Azerbaidzhan, a few Muslims have been waving photos of the Ayatollah Khomeini or sprouting Iranian-style beards. However, there is sparse evidence of religious fanaticism, either inspired by neighboring Iran and Afghan-

istan or encouraged by the Soviets' own tolerance."

Now that even *The New York Times* has proclaimed the Cold War to be dead, are we going to see a new bogeyman in Islam? To paraphrase von Clausewitz, prejudice is the conduct of war by other means.

Dr. Amyn B. Sajoo  
Ottawa

### Low-level flying issue not going away

In "This Labrador Business" (*Peace & Security*, Autumn 1988), Jocelyn Coulon's observation that the Montagnais Indians in Quebec appear to view the militarization of their lands as secondary to their land claims, deserves some clarification, lest readers go away with the impression that the Montagnais are just a few more red-skinned opportunists.

European pilots have been training in the hunting and trapping grounds of the Montagnais along the north shore of the St. Lawrence rivers since the summer of 1983. The hunters and their families from La Romaine have suffered most from the exercises in this area; only on occasion have band members from other communities been overflown. As military conquest has played an important role in the colonization of native people in North America and elsewhere, Montagnais leaders at La Romaine and at the offices of the Conseil Attikamek-Montagnais (CAM) were quick to react. They denounced the intrusions and spent approximately \$100,000 of council money on field studies and literature surveys in order to give their complaints

some credibility. (Native peoples are painfully aware that their opinions have not historically been held in very high esteem.)

La Romaine band, however, is only one among ten member bands of the CAM; the vast majority of the council members live far away from the training area. Naturally, they do not share the same concern over low-level military flight training as their La Romaine brothers and sisters. An all-out campaign centred on military flight training, along with categorical opposition to the training, is therefore out of the question. Furthermore, the Montagnais believe that through land claim negotiations they will be able, if not to eliminate the undesirable flights, at least to reduce the negative impact to their satisfaction. This process of negotiated mitigation of the impact of the flights would stand in stark contrast to the unilaterally imposed measures that the Department of National Defence has taken to reduce overflights of native encampments.

The CAM is now well on the way to land claims agreement after the signing of a framework accord with the two levels of government on 16 September. It is most likely that they will approach military flights in a less salient fashion, preferring to negotiate in private.

But the Innu in Labrador are a long way from negotiating any kind of agreement; they, in fact, produced a document in the 1970s that called for the virtual separation of the Innu nation from the rest of Canada. As their recent occupations of the runway in Goose Bay and the ensuing arrests attest, this issue is not about to go away.

Erik Poole,  
Quebec □

## REVIEWS



### Israel's Fateful Hour

Yehoshafat Harkabi

New York: Harper and Row, 1988,  
236 pgs., US \$22.50 cloth

Yehoshafat Harkabi is a former chief of military intelligence in the Israeli Defence Forces. For many years Harkabi was widely acknowledged to be the most authoritative proponent of the view that Arab and Palestinian hostility to Israel's existence was so intransigent as to preclude any resolution of the conflict.

Today Harkabi presents a very different outlook – not so much because his own orientation has changed but because he has noticed a significant change in the politics throughout much of the Arab world. It is this change – what he refers to as an increasing separation of grand design and policy – that Harkabi maintains Israel “must exploit for the sake of its security and the peace of future generations, especially today, when moderates still occupy important positions among the Arab states and the Palestinians.”

This book, first published in Hebrew almost three years ago and now in its fourth printing in Israel, presents a challenge to Israelis and friends of Israel throughout the world. Harkabi – currently professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem – is a tough-minded realist who discerns that the Arab-Palestinian position has grudgingly and equivocally been evolving in a more moderate direction and that Israel must take advantage of this shift now or else the opportunity will probably be lost as Arab-Palestinian attitudes harden in the face of Israeli intransigence.

Harkabi believes that Israel stands at a crossroads and the course chosen will determine “whether it can continue to exist.” His fundamental argument is that Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is untenable, and that unless Israel negotiates with the Palestinians and their leaders, the PLO, the region will move down the road to war: a dangerous dynamic that could, in an era of ever more destructive weapons, end in Israel's “national suicide.” He convincingly argues that the alternatives facing Israel are either a Palestinian state alongside Israel or continuing violence in response to the occupation.

No naive visionary, Harkabi presents himself as a “Machiavellian” dove. His positions are based on the view that Israel's security is best protected by a peace settlement with its neighbours which guarantees Israel's security needs through early warning installations and partial demilitarization of the new Palestinian state.

When Harkabi says “today, any demand for a settlement without the PLO is equivalent to demanding no settlement,” he is not alone. A large number of Israeli officers recently formed the Military Council on Peace and Security in support of the policy of trading territory for peace. Harkabi's successors as chiefs of military intelligence have also been critical of their government for not actively pursuing a peace settlement. A secret Israeli military intelligence report prepared last December noted that the PLO is truly ready to accept a two-state solution and that it is an illusion for the Israeli government to believe it can avoid negotiating with the PLO. A similar report written by the current head of military intelligence was leaked to the press in March. Not surprisingly, the government led by Prime Minister Shamir quickly rejected the document.

It is not only the ruling Likud party that comes in for Harkabi's harsh criticism. He is strongly opposed to the Labour party joining national unity governments and declares: “What we need in Israel is not a united front behind a wrong policy but searching self-criticism and a careful examination of our goals and means, so that we can differentiate between realistic vision and adventurist fantasy.” Similarly, he has no patience for the view that non-Israelis should refrain from criticizing Israel and argues that “allowing Israel to maintain its wrong policy is incomparably worse.”

Machiavellian or not, Yehoshafat Harkabi has written – and well before the Palestinian intifada – the most persuasive work on why Israel, and indeed all parties to the dispute, desperately need a peace based upon the principle of mutual recognition and self-determination. Turning the conflict into a zero-sum game, he continually reminds us, is fraught with danger: “There must be a realistic and humane understanding that the conflict is a tragedy for both sides, and while Israel's adversaries are indeed enemies, they are also allies in the struggle to end the conflict.” What Harkabi calls self-interest, others understand to be Common Security.

– Simon Rosenblum

Mr. Rosenblum is the Political Affairs Coordinator for Project Ploughshares

### Our Man in Moscow: A Diplomat's Reflections on the Soviet Union R.A.D. Ford

Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  
1989, 356 pgs., \$29.95 cloth

Robert Ford is a scholar of Russian history and Soviet government and a connoisseur of Russian literature, poetry and fine arts. In his twenty-one years of diplomatic service for Canada in the Soviet Union his sympathy for the country and its intellectual life never interfered with his profes-

sionalism as a diplomat. Nor did his understanding of the Soviet system soften his resolve in dealing with it.

In 1979 Ford foresaw Gorbachev's rise to leadership. He also predicted the systemic contradictions of implementing *glasnost* and *perestroika* within the Soviet system. According to the author, fundamental economic reform is not compatible with Soviet ideology. He argues that the Soviets would moderate their ideological objectives only in times of desperation or crisis. A declining Russian population, the emergence of an explosive nationalism among the Soviet Union's many minorities, Islamic irredentism and a growing restlessness within the Warsaw Pact, may signal the beginnings of such a crisis.

The author provides interesting glimpses of differing Soviet policies towards each Warsaw Pact state. He is also informative and accurate about how and why the Soviets became entangled in Afghanistan. The key objective in Soviet foreign policy, according to Ford, is international recognition of Soviet parity with the United States. The vagaries of Soviet-American relations over the years are briefly but brilliantly analyzed, focussing on human rights, strategic arms talks, and trade issues.

Ironically, the achievement of “peaceful coexistence” led to profound misunderstandings between the superpowers. Neither the Soviets or the Americans could agree on a mutually acceptable definition of the policy which in theory defined what was acceptable and prohibited international behaviour. For example, the Soviets believed their military involvement in Afghanistan was acceptable under the terms of the agreement. This was not the opinion of the Americans. Canada was wary of the ambiguities of “peaceful coexistence” and, on Ford's



recommendation, refused to endorse it.

The author claims that Canadian-Soviet relations are governed by four imperatives: national security, trade, Canada-US relations and consular cum human rights issues engendered by Canada's significant Jewish, Ukrainian and East European populations. He emphasizes that in Soviet eyes, Canadian relations are secondary to Soviet-US relations. During his service in Moscow, Ford was concerned about Prime Minister Trudeau's "fascination" with and unpredictable reactions to the Soviets. From time to time, Trudeau would stroll over to the Soviet residence in Rockcliffe in the evenings for private conversations with the Soviet Ambassador.

This book is well organized: five major headings cover Stalin and his successors; the Soviets' view of the West; domestic and frontier problems; detente and the Gorbachev generation. Unfortunately, what is missing is a synopsis of government structure in the context of the interplay of the party bosses, the KGB, the military and GRU within the military. The author could have better described and evaluated the significance of Andropov's role in setting up the Gorbachev succession. In addition, the huge Soviet military establishment might have been described and evaluated as a political force. Nonetheless, the book is a valuable contribution to Kremlin lore, and contains important warnings about handling the Soviets on both national and individual levels. — *George Hampson*

*George Hampson is a retired Canadian diplomat*

### **Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers** Steven Kull

*New York: Basic Books Ltd., 1988, 341 pgs., US \$ 19.95 cloth*

Why have US defence decision makers pursued policies and capabilities for fighting and winning a nuclear war despite the existence of considerable commentary suggesting that victory is unattainable? Why have they displayed continual concern with maintaining the strategic balance when

possession of secure second-strike capabilities by both superpowers affords each the ability to destroy the other regardless of the weapons each possesses beyond that point? Why do they develop nuclear systems capable of destroying hardened targets when technology now affords the Soviet Union the ability to launch their land-based missiles "out from under" an incoming attack? These and related questions lie at the heart of this original and well-written study of the thinking of defence policy makers.

Relying upon interviews with eighty-four past and present members of the US defence community, Kull launches into a detailed exploration of the rationales offered for the character of US nuclear policy. At times, the justifications are military in nature, with respondents arguing that only by possessing effective war-fighting, war-winning capabilities can the US deter Soviet aggression, or terminate a nuclear conflict on terms favourable to the US should deterrence fail. However, Kull notes that more often US policy is justified on the basis of a need to manipulate the peacetime perceptions of allies and adversaries about US resolve and the credibility of its nuclear threats. Indeed, the author's depiction of the various twists and turns official rationalizations can take is exceedingly rich in detail and a valuable reference source for anyone interested in the psychology of nuclear threats.

Kull also provides interpretations of the rationalizations he so effectively depicts. A psychologist and clinical therapist, the author's principal concern lies in how defence policy makers cope with the reality of mutual vulnerability that nuclear weapons impose upon them. Here, Kull offers an explanation for the behaviour of his subjects.

On the one hand, he observes that they often engage in a process of "denial" — ignoring nuclear reality and treating nuclear weapons much like conventional ones. On the other hand, the denial is rarely constant. At times, respondents

seem fully aware of the fundamental changes nuclear weapons imply for strategy. This leads Kull to view defence decision makers as torn by an inner conflict resulting from their adherence to two contradictory lines of reasoning, one denying nuclear reality, the other seeking to adapt to it. Moreover, when Kull confronts his subjects with this contradiction, he finds that they offer different justifications for US policy. More precisely, they put forth justifications based on a desire to gratify certain collective psychological needs. Kull contends that these desires and the need to satisfy them underlie the more common, security-oriented rationalizations for nuclear policy which defence decision makers offer, and may in fact constitute that policy's motivating force.

Kull's explanations for nuclear rationalization are intriguing, however, but his study contains problems which tend to weaken the argument. It is difficult to establish the extent to which the responses obtained reflect the true beliefs of his subjects. When Kull confronts them with the contradictions inherent in their arguments, it is hard to know whether their new rationalizations are fulfilling deep-seated psychological needs, or are employed as a means of bringing the interview to a speedy conclusion.

There are also questions regarding Kull's views of nuclear reality. While the author contends that his respondents sometimes seemed aware of the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons on strategy, military officials are under-represented in his sample. Yet it is these individuals who are most likely to present the strongest case for the acquisition of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, and most likely to resist the reality Kull claims is so pervasive.

While Kull's arguments may not be fully convincing, he does succeed in demonstrating the potential that inter-disciplinary approaches hold for the development of novel insights into defence decision-making. — *Peter Gizewski*

*Mr. Gizewski is a doctoral candidate at Columbia University and a research assistant at the Institute.*

## **BRIEFLY NOTED**

### **Middle Powers in the International System**

This is a series of five policy studies from a research project jointly funded by CIIPS and the Donner Canadian Foundation. Four of the titles are published by the North-South Institute; the fifth is published by CIIPS. Please note that the titles are available only from their respective publishers.

*The Middle Powers and the General Interest*  
Bernard Wood

*Limits on Middle Power Diplomacy: The Case of Commodities*  
Jock Finlayson

*The United Nations and Its Finances: A Test for Middle Powers*  
David Protheroe

*Middle Powers and Technical Multilateralism: The International Telecommunications Union*  
Janis Doran

The above titles are published by the North-South Institute, the price of the first title is \$7.50, the others cost \$10.50.

*Non-Nuclear Powers and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament: A Study in Multilateral Arms Control*  
Michael Tucker

CIIPS Occasional Paper Number 7, free (également disponible en français)

### **The Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism and Patriotism**


R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong  
*Wichester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989, 274 pgs., US \$24.95 cloth*

An examination of the origins of war in light of the authors' assessment of the human "propensity" for warfare. The book challenges contemporary theories of warfare and shows why "existing peace initiatives are inept."

(The study on which this book is based was financed in part by a grant from CIIPS) □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



**Bernard Wood**, newly appointed Chief Executive Officer of CIIPS, undertook a familiarization and dialogue tour during the late winter and early spring, in order to engage groups of Canadians in discussion about Institute activities and areas of future focus. Travelling to Vancouver, Victoria, Edmonton, Yellowknife, Halifax and Quebec City; Mr. Wood spoke to editorial boards, academics, members of non-governmental organizations, and others interested in the work of the Institute. During the same period, he addressed a joint Queen's University/CIIA session in Kingston and the Law Faculty at the University of Windsor. In early May he spoke to the Annual Meeting of the Toronto Branch of the CIIA on the role of a middle power in the 1990s.

The effects of the budget on defence and foreign policy was the subject of a media roundtable organized and held at the Institute five days after Michael Wilson presented his budget to the House of Commons. Addressing approximately twenty-five journalists were **Lois Wilson**, **Fen Hampson**, **Doug Ross**, **Harold Klepak** and **Kenneth Calder**. A number of journalists from outside of Ottawa participated by means of an audio feed. The subjects addressed included the ramifications of the budget on the spending priorities in the 1987 White Paper, and the changing international security context.

**Yevgeni Golovko** and **Nikolai Smirnov** of the Soviet Foreign Ministry led a seminar at the Institute in April on Soviet views of arms control. Emphasizing the need for serious negotiations on

all aspects of arms control, they paid special attention to the START talks, the conventional forces negotiations in Vienna, a ban on chemical weapons and a comprehensive test ban. During the question period, Mr. Golovko said that all aspects of Arctic arms control, including the military bases in the Kola Peninsula, were open to discussion. Several weeks earlier, two Arctic specialists from the Soviet Union spoke at the Institute: **J. Kazmin** and **A. Granovski** led a discussion on arctic security and naval arms control.

**Johan Holst**, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, visited the Institute to exchange views with staff members. He spoke of the Canadian and Norwegian shared experience in peacekeeping and the need for more conceptual thinking about this "international growth industry." Mr. Holst raised the question of the role of nuclear weapons in the decades ahead, and of the necessity for a reexamination in the West of the configuration of ground forces in Europe. He spoke of the forthcoming review conference for the non-proliferation treaty, the link between proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and the problems associated with ballistic missiles for both. In terms of naval arms control, Mr. Holst supported restraints on attack submarines and submarine-launched cruise missiles; the latter, he said, were particularly destabilizing.

Together with the Institute for International Development and Cooperation at the University of Ottawa, CIIPS co-sponsored a public lecture by **Oscar Arias Sanchez**, President of Costa Rica, during his recent visit to Canada. President Arias spoke of the prospects for the Esquipulas II peace plan, and fielded a wide range of questions from the audience. He was moderately optimistic that the

plan would come into effect, and urged all governments to support the development of democratic regimes in Central America. With the exception of Costa Rica, he said, the tradition of democracy was under-developed in Latin America. **Georges Hénault** chaired the session, and **Bernard Wood** thanked the President. Following the meeting the two Institutes hosted a reception.

The United Nations Association in Canada and CIIPS co-sponsored a series of seminars in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax on the UN Security Council and the opportunities and challenges to Canada for the two-year term which began in January. Participants examined the importance of Security Council membership for Canada, and the implications for Canadian foreign policy of current and future issues facing the Council, such as the Middle East, Southern Africa and peacekeeping operations. Addressing the seminars were officials from the UN and the Canadian government, as well as former Canadian ambassadors.

Another in the series of workshops on the situation in Cyprus took place at the Institute in mid-April. The series will conclude with a seminar in the late spring or early summer organized by CIIPS Research Associate **Norma Salem**.

**Bernard Wood** and **Roy McMurtry**, former Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, were the Canadian participants at a recent Carnegie Conference in New York on the policies of democratic nations towards Southern Africa. Mr. Wood met in Ottawa with **Toivo ya Toivo**, Secretary General of SWAPO just prior to the launching of the independence plan for Namibia. In late May, he participated in a conference sponsored by the International Peace Academy on peace, development and

security in Central America, and attended special sessions of the Caribbean Studies Association.

**Fen Hampson** and **Katherine Laundry** gave presentations at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in London in March. Mr. Hampson also presented a paper on NATO at Forty to a conference in Liechtenstein organized by Princeton University. **Ron Purver** attended the ISA as well as conferences on NATO in Halifax and Winnipeg.

In late April the Conseil de développement du loisir scientifique, in cooperation with CIIPS and a number of other organizations, sponsored the Expo-sciences pan-qubécoise 1989 in Rivière-du-Loup, where the winners of regional science fairs throughout Quebec exhibited their projects. The theme was science and peace. **Bernard Wood** addressed the opening ceremonies; **Roger Hill** was a judge and presented a number of prizes.

In early May CIIPS and Henson College of Public Affairs and Continuing Education at Dalhousie University, sponsored a conference for teachers and students on peace and security education. Keynote speakers were **Shelley Berman**, President of Educators for Social Responsibility in the US, and **Maxime Faille**, one of four members of the Youth Nuclear Disarmament Tour in 1986-87. **Nancy Gordon**, **Brad Feasey** and **Margaret Bourgault** spoke and led workshops.

**Leon Bagramov** of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow was a guest of CIIPS during May as part of the exchange agreement between the two Institutes. During the winter **Jacques Lévesque** of the University of Montréal, visited the Moscow Institute to undertake research on the nationalities questions in the Soviet Union. □



## PUBLIC PROGRAMMES GRANTS – Preliminary List, Second Half 1988–1989

<b>Les Ami-e-s de la Terre de Montréal</b> , Montréal, Québec Une seule terre, un seul monde (cahier de fiches pédagogiques)	\$ 8,750
<b>The Canadian Children's Book Centre</b> , Toronto, Ontario Best Friends: Canadian Children's Books on International Peace and Security (National Exposition)	20,000
<b>Defence Associations Network</b> , Eastern Canada Region, Ottawa, Ontario Project Protect – Reinforcing the National Fabric (Speakers Program)	7,600
<b>Groupe de recherche sur la paix</b> , Québec, Québec Production de treize émissions télévisées sur le thème général "Les chemins de la paix"	12,400
<b>Lawyers for Social Responsibility</b> , Ottawa, Ontario Publication of Newsletter	3,000
<b>McMaster University, Committee on Peace Studies</b> , Hamilton, Ontario Nonviolence in Violent Contexts: Nonviolent Strategies for Social Change in Central America and the Middle East (Conference)	20,000
<b>Niagara Peace Movement</b> , Welland, Ontario Peace Development and the Environment (Booth)	3,000
<b>North American Model United Nations</b> , Toronto, Ontario The Fifth Annual North American Model United Nations Conference	8,500
<b>Nuclear Awareness Project</b> , Oshawa, Ontario Tritium Education Project	12,250
<b>Nurses for Social Responsibility</b> , Ottawa, Ontario Biological Weapons – A Dark Side of the Biotech Revolution (Workshop)	2,000
<b>The Paper Crane</b> , Toronto, Ontario The Paper Crane – Canadian Youth Peace Newsletter	12,000
<b>Participatory Research Group</b> , Toronto, Ontario In Our Own Backyard: A Series of Educational Workshops on Peace, Security, Arms Control and Disarmament in Canada	14,000
<b>Peace and Conflict Resolution Group</b> of the University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta Conflict and Peace in the Middle East (Film/Discussion Series)	1,500
<b>Project Ploughshares</b> , Waterloo, Ontario Common Security: A Training Manual for Peace Educators	10,000
<b>Royal Commonwealth Society</b> , Ottawa, Ontario Student Commonwealth Conference	2,300
<b>Spooner, Kevin</b> , Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario The International Challenge – A United Nations Simulation	4,000
<b>St. Mary's Secondary School</b> , Cobourg, Ontario Speakers' Forum "Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa: Partners in the Future"	3,000
<b>The Theatre of Change</b> , Toronto, Ontario "The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui" by Bertolt Brecht	7,500
<b>United Nations Association</b> , London Branch, London, Ontario Making the Links: Peace and Ecology (Simulation)	5,500
<b>University of Alberta</b> , Edmonton, Alberta The Future of Multilateralism (Conference)	6,500

<b>University of Calgary</b> , Peace and War Studies Program, Calgary, Alberta The Press and the Cold War: A Comparative Sampling for Canada and the USSR (Peace Education Materials)	6,000
<b>University of Calgary</b> , Strategic Studies Program, Calgary, Alberta Living in the Nuclear Age (Film Series)	35,000
<b>University of Guelph</b> , Guelph, Ontario Ethical Choice in the Age of Persuasive Technology (Workshop on Peace and Security)	5,000
<b>Veterans Against Nuclear Arms</b> , Halifax, Nova Scotia The United Nations and the Evolving Common Security System (Public Workshop)	3,750
<b>Working Group on International Surveillance and Verification</b> Toronto, Ontario Workshop on the Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons	3,700
<b>Youth Art Works!</b> Vancouver, British Columbia Global Art Works! (Publication of Children's Art Collection on Peace and Security)	1,850
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$219,100</b>

## RESEARCH GRANTS

### Preliminary List, Second Half 1988–1989

<b>Copp, John Terry</b> Wilfrid Laurier University The Role of Tactical Air Power in North-West Europe 1944–45: An Analysis Based on Wartime Operations Research	\$12,000
<b>Dosman, Edgar J.</b> York University, York Centre for International and Strategic Studies Canadian/Cuban Conflict Management Workshop	9,450
<b>Fedorowicz, Hania M.</b> East-West Dialogue on European Security: Conditions for Changing the Status Quo as seen "From Below"	5,000
<b>Gal-or, Noemi</b> University of British Columbia State-Sponsored Terrorism – A Mode of Diplomacy	3,000
<b>Korany, Bahgat; Noble, Paul; Brynen, Rex</b> Université de Montréal, Etudes arabes Le nouveau visage de la sécurité nationale : dilemmes du développement et de la sécurité dans le monde arabe	15,000
<b>Mehmet, Ozay</b> Carleton University, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs The Turkish-EEC Relations: An Interdisciplinary Study in Conflict Resolution	15,000
<b>Thede, Nancy</b> Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe (CIDMAA) Southern Africa's Prospects for Peace: Peace on Whose Terms?	12,200
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$71,650</b>

## AMENDMENTS TO THE CRITERIA FOR GRANT PROGRAMMES

The CIIPS Board of Directors decided at their meeting in April to amend certain grants criteria. The first two items below apply to both Research and Public Programmes.

### 1. Overhead and Administrative Costs

The Institute will continue its policy of not funding indirect costs or overhead, but may be asked to make an exception to this rule in special circumstances. CIIPS may then contribute up to fifteen percent of the proposed project budget towards the overhead costs of non-governmental organizations or of an independent researcher.

Please note that neither governmental organizations (municipal, provincial or federal) nor universities are eligible under this clause.

### 2. Frequency of Applications

Previously, applicants could not hold more than one grant in each programme at a time. Also,

when an organization or individual had received funds from the Institute and wished to make a new application, the Institute would consider the request **only** if final reports had been satisfactorily reviewed and remaining funds disbursed for the prior grant.

From now on, an organization or an individual may submit **one** application per programme per six-month period.

In all cases, the Institute will require all the information (including progress reports on any earlier grant) necessary to determine whether in its sole judgement the organization can carry out the projects for which funding is sought.

### 3. Labour Costs: Public Programmes

Formerly, the Institute provided partial salaries to organizers of conferences, editors of publica-

tions, organizers of special projects, etc. if the individual was not a regular employee of the sponsoring organization.

From now on, labour costs will not normally be considered. However, in special circumstances where such project-related costs cannot be covered from other sources the Institute may be asked to make an exception to this rule.

### 4. Labour Costs: Research

Formerly, the Institute did not provide funds for sabbatical supplements, part or supplemental salaries of grant applicants or principal researchers, or the salaries of individuals applying as private scholars.

From now on, an independent researcher may request remuneration (based on a university pay scale in the region where the researcher is working) for the time spent on the research project.

A non-governmental organization may include in its application the remuneration of any researcher assigned to the proposed research; costs of social benefits are not admissible.

In the case of a researcher on sabbatical leave, a sum based on the loss to be recovered may be included in the application. This sum must be proportional to the rate of pay and to the amount of time spent exclusively on the proposed research project.

In all cases, including applicants on the faculty of universities, out-of-pocket labour costs for research assistants may be included in the application but not the costs of full-time, paid, principal researchers in universities or governmental organizations.

For more information please contact the Institute Grants Secretariat at (613) 990-1593.

## LETTER FROM BEIJING BY LEONARD ZAMOR



**People get up early in Beijing;\* as soon as dawn breaks the city begins to stir. In the chill mist of early morning the main roads into the city are choked with a continuous stream of bicycles, cars and buses crammed to bursting.**

On the sidewalks the vendors begin to set up their stalls. Life gets going once again. I landed on the planet China only a little while ago, so all the look out for what is exotic and different. Already I have a tale to tell which no doubt reveals my naivete and my preconceptions.

My early morning wanderings take me to Tiantan in the park of the Temple of Heaven. This huge park, which dates from the Ming period, is one of the best places in the capital to relax. Once the day begins people gather there to play cards, practice Tai Chi, listen to music. My presence attracts a certain amount of attention – surprise rather than curiosity and a few incredulous smiles. But soon everyone turns back to whatever he or she is doing. In one of the galleries in the park – and this is a sign of the times – a group of men and women of a “certain age” are learning to dance rock and roll to the strains of an old French hit “Promenez-vous sur la Costa del Sol.” It is ten below zero.

Mrs. Deng, a healthy, smiling sixty-year old, teaches nutrition. She tells me that for the last year disco has replaced Tai Chi as the morning exercise for members of her institute. She thinks this is all to the good. “It stirs the blood,” she says, as she goes back to the dance. “It stirs the blood,” could equally well describe the effects on China of the political reforms which Deng Xiaoping introduced ten years ago. After thirty years of Maoist sclerosis, China decided to open its doors to the outside world and modernize itself internally in order to become “richer and stronger.”

*\*Editor's note: this story was filed from China before the beginning of student demonstrations in late April.*

In the course of an ordinary walk in Beijing one comes across a great number of private businesses run by individuals or collectives, and one sees well-stocked free market stores and all sorts of peddlars. Certainly one of the success stories of the economic reform is the rekindling of the traditional Chinese talent for free enterprise – an object of con-

**... an increasing number of young people are “waiting for a job,” to use the accepted euphemism.**

tempt under Mao. The numbers speak for themselves. According to the English-language newspaper, *China Daily*, more than 24,000 new businesses were established in Beijing in 1988, bringing the total to 106,000. These enterprises are mainly in the service sector – small stores, transport, restaurants.

On Wangfujing, one of the main shopping streets in Beijing, there are hectic preparations for the “spring festival” – Chinese New Year. A brightly dressed crowd is milling around, anxious to buy food and gifts and, of course, fireworks. Many shops display goods that most Chinese can only dream about: Swiss watches, micro-computers, washing machines and so on. One often has the impression wandering the shopping streets of Beijing that this array of consumer goods is just a flashy facade. China is trying to look modern without spending too much money.

An opening to the outside world? Yes, that is happening. But most of all, that means a fascination with everything American, whether it be the English language, disco music, or the dollar.

Not far from Beijing's Buddhist monastery, young Chinese line up to taste a slice of America from the recently opened Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet. So, as often happens in Third World countries, a desire to copy America leads people to adopt the worst side of US life. Nevertheless, Chinese society does seem a bit more open, a bit more varied and also a bit more individualistic, now that a certain amount of originality is no longer treated as reprehensible behaviour to be discouraged.

Reform has not been without problems: already there are signs of the economy skidding out of control and of social instability.

First of all there is inflation, and while it is true that initially economic reform led to an increase in the average income, this has not kept pace with the dizzy rise in prices. Since 1984 the government has introduced free pricing for various goods in order to stimulate productivity. As a result, the rate of inflation which was three percent in 1984, is now more than twenty-five percent and has even reached sixty percent for certain items such as fruit and meat. There is growing discontent, particularly among the workers, and so the government has decided to postpone any further freeing of prices for at least two years. Businesses now have to make a profit and they cannot retain workers who are not productive. This means an increasing number of young people are “waiting for a job,” to use the accepted euphemism. Thus the two capitalist evils of unemployment and inflation have appeared in China and this has soured morale generally.

Reform has also produced a new privileged class of technocrats, entrepreneurs and traders. Take for example the case of a small-time trader who sells shirts on the sidewalks of Beijing. He may earn up to 200 yuan (about

\$60) a day, more than twice the monthly salary of a worker or even a university professor. After thirty years of relative economic equality these differences are difficult to accept, particularly since times are hard. Despite improvements over the last ten years, daily life is still hard for the great majority of the Chinese, and is fraught with all kinds of miseries, major and minor: extremely bad housing, harsh treatment by a contemptuous bureaucracy, difficulty in moving about and an overburdened railway system. To succeed in leaving Beijing by train is like winning a lottery. I had to wait three days before I could go on to my next destination.

The government speaks to the people, which took its promises of democracy literally, of a “democratic, popular dictatorship.” This somewhat surreal notion is used to justify and perpetuate the existence of the one-party state under Communist control. Its leaders, while preaching the cause of liberalization, have not hesitated to launch numerous attacks on “bourgeois liberalism” and on “spiritual pollution” in the cultural sphere. Add to this the sometimes violent repression of ethnic minority nationalist movements, most notably in Tibet, and we are left with the image of a government which fears that the reforms it has launched are a threat to its legitimacy, and which is determined to ensure its own survival at any cost.

There is a Chinese proverb, “When one lives in honey one doesn't know the taste of sugar.” Thanks to an open-door policy which has facilitated commercial and cultural exchanges with the outside world, and also to the availability of a much wider range of information, the Chinese have become more aware of their country's backwardness. They now know “the taste of sugar” and they want more. □

*Leonard Zamor is a free-lance writer and professional traveller based in Ottawa.*





On se lève tôt à Beijing. \* Des l'aube, la ville s'ébranle. Dans la brume frieuse du petit matin, un flot ininterrompu de bicyclettes, d'autobus bondés à craquer et de voitures engorgent les artères de la ville.

engorgent les artères de la ville.

sortes. La grande réussite de la réforme est sans doute d'avoir réengendré l'esprit d'entreprise traditionnelle des Chinois qui, sous Mao Zedong était voué aux géométries. Les chiffres à cet égard sont eloquents. Selon le quotidien de langue anglaise *China Daily*, plus de 24 000 nouvelles entreprises ont été créées à Beijing en 1988, ce qui porte le total à plus de 106 000, principalement dans le secteur tertiaire (services, boutiques, transport, restauration). À Wangjing, l'une des principales artères commerciales de Beijing, le gouvernement a libéré les prix de nombreux produits afin d'encourager la production.

... le nombre de jeunes « en attente d'un emploi », selon l'euphémisme consacré, augmente. Le chômage et l'inflation, deux plaies capitalistes ont donc fait leur apparition en Chine, et cela déconcerte les esprits.

ont donc fait leur apparition en Chine et cela déconcerte les esprits.

peut gagner jusqu'à 200 yuan (environ 60 \$) par jour, soit deux fois plus que le salaire ... mensuel d'un ouvrier ou même d'un professeur d'université. Après trente ans d'un relatif égalitarisme, les inégalités sont alors difficiles à accepter. Surtout lorsque les temps sont durs. Car la vie quotidienne de la grande majorité des Chinois, malgré les améliorations survenues au cours des dix dernières années, continue d'être ponctué de petites et grandes misères : conditions de logement particulièrement mauvaises, journaux d'un peu bureaucratique méprisants, difficultés des déplacements, sursaturation du réseau ferroviaire (nécessité à sortir de Beijing en train est une véritable loterie). En ce qui me concerne, j'ai dû attendre trois jours pour obtenir une place vers ma prochaine destination. À la population qui avait pris au pied de la lettre les promesses de

posent une alternative démocratique  
populaire». Concept hautement sur-  
réaliste dont l'objet est de justifier et  
de perpétuer l'hégémonie du Parti  
Communiste sur la vie politique du  
pays. Par ailleurs, les dirigeants,  
tout en prêchant la libéralisation,  
n'ont pas hésité à lancer de multi-  
ples campagnes contre «le libéra-  
lisme bourgeois» et, sur le plan  
culturel, à lutter contre la «population spiri-  
tuelle». Ajoutons à cela la ré-  
pression parfois violente des  
mouvements de libération de mi-  
norités ethniques, notamment au  
Tibet, et nous avons l'image d'un  
gouvernement qui craint que ses  
propres réformes remettent en ques-  
tion sa légitimité et qui est prêt à  
tout pour assurer sa survie.

Un proverbe chinois ait :

« Lorsque l'on vit dans le sucre, on ne connaît pas le goût du sucre. »

Mais grâce à une politique d'ouverture qui a favorisé les échanges commerciaux et culturels avec l'étranger, et grâce aussi à une plus libre circulation de l'information, de plus en plus de Chinois se rendent compte du retard qu'ils ont accumulé ; ils connaissent le « goût du sucre » et en redemandent.

□

À Wangfujing, l'une des principales artères commerciales de Bei-

la «fête du printemps», le Nouvel An chinois. La route se presse, multicolore, impatiente pour acheter des vicinales, des cadeaux et, bien entendu, des feux d'artifice. De nombreux magasins offrent des produits auxquels la plupart des Chinois ne pourraient que rêver : des montres suisses, des micro-ordinateurs, des machines à laver, etc. C'est pour cela que lorsque l'on promène dans les artères commerciales de Beijing, on a souvent l'impression que toute cette exhibition de consommation tient avant tout de la façade, du tape-à-l'oeil. La Chine cherche à se donner une image moderne à peu de frais. Mais surtout une fascination devant tout ce qui est américain : le dollar, l'anglais, le dollar.... Non loin de la lamasserie de Beijing, des jeunes Chinois font la queue

\*Note de la rédaction : l'article nous a été envoyé de la Chine, avant que commencent les démonstrations étudiantes vers la fin d'avril.


SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS -  
Liste préliminaire, Deuxième semestre 1988-1989

**\$059 1L**

## SUBVENTIONS AUX PROGRAMMES PUBLICS -



## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Les aspects de la limitation des armements, ils ont accordé une at-

STAR, aux négociations sur les forces conventionnelles se déroulant à Vienne, à l'interdiction des armes chimiques et à une interdiction com-

plète des essais nucléaires. Pendant la période de questions, M. Golovko a également parlé de l'Arctique, et il a déclaré que tout ce qui a trait à la

limitation des armements dans cette région du globe, y compris les bases militaires de la péninsule de Kola,

pouvaient faire l'objet de discussions. Quelques semaines plus tard, deux spécialistes soviétiques de l'Arctique ont pris la parole à l'In-

stitut : en effet, **J. Kazmin** et **A. Granovski** ont dirigé des entretiens sur les affaires de l'Arctique et la

limitation des armements navals. **Johan Holst**, ministre norvégien de la Défense, a rendu visite à l'Ins-

titut et y a échangé des points de vue avec les membres du personnel. Il a

parlé de l'expérience commune de part et des pays au chapitre du main-

tien de la paix, et il a souligné la nécessité de réfléchir plus en profon-

deur à cette activité internationale qui prend de plus en plus d'import-

tance. M. Holst a soulevé la ques- tion du rôle des armes nucléaires dans les décennies à venir, affirmant

rapport existant entre la prolifération du traité sur la non-prolifération, le

De concert avec l'Institut de développement international et de coopération (Université d'Ottawa), l'ICPSI a parrainé une conférence

Le nouveau directeur général de

l'ICPSI, M. Bernard Wood, a ef-

fectué à la fin de l'hiver et au début

au travail de l'Institut. Pendant la

même période, il a pris la parole au

cours d'une séance organisée con-

jointement à Kingston par l'Univer-

sité Queen's et le CIIA, et il a fait de

même à la faculté de droit de l'Un-

versité de Windsor. Au début de mai,

il a participé à l'Assemblée annuelle de la succursale torontoise du CIIA

et a parlé du rôle des puissances moyennes dans les années 1990.

Les effets du budget sur la poli-

tique de défense et la politique étrangère ont constitué le thème d'une table ronde organisée par l'In-

stitut, dans ses locaux, cinq jours après que Michael Wilson eut pré-

senté son budget à la Chambre des communes. Lois Wilson, Pen

Hampson, Doug Ross, Harold Klapak et Kenneth Calder ont

ainsi prononcé leurs points de vue devant environ vingt-cinq journa-

listes. Un certain nombre de re-

porters de l'extérieur d'Ottawa ont

pu participer à la séance grâce à un

relais audio. Les orateurs se sont

alors penchés, entre autres choses,

sur les conséquences qu'aura le

budget pour les priorités énoncées

dans le Livre blanc de 1987 et sur

l'évolution de la conjoncture inter-

nationale au chapitre de la sécurité.

**Yevgeni Golovko** et **Nikolai Smirnov**, du ministère soviétique

des Affaires étrangères, ont dirigé à

l'Institut en avril un colloque sur les

positions de l'URSS en matière de

limitation des armements. Mettant

l'accent sur la nécessité de mener

M. Arias a parlé des perspectives de

l'Esquipulas et il a répondu à un

large éventail de questions de la part

d'auditoire. Il a affiché un opti-

misme modéré quant aux chances

de voir le plan entrer en vigueur, et

il a exhorté tous les gouvernements

à appuyer l'implantation de régimes

démocratiques en Amérique cen-

trale. Si l'on exclut le Costa Rica,

pas aussi forte qu'elle devrait l'être

en Amérique latine. **Georges Hénault** a présidé la séance, et

**Bernard Wood** a exprimé les re-

mercements de l'assistance à M. Arias. Les deux instituts ont of-

fert une réception après la séance. L'Association canadienne pour les Nations-Unies et l'ICPSI ont co-

parrainé une série de colloques sur le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU

ainsi que sur les occasions qui s'of-

frirent au Canada de faire sa marque

pendant les deux ans où il siègera au

Conseil, cette période ayant com-

mencé en janvier 1989, les colloques

ont eu lieu à Vancouver, Winnipeg,

Toronto, Montréal et Halifax. Les

participants se sont interrogés sur

l'importance de ce rôle pour le Ca-

nada et sur les conséquences qu'au-

ront pour sa politique étrangère les

questions qui figurent et figureront à

l'ordre du jour du Conseil : citons le

Moyen-Orient, l'Afrique australe et

les opérations de maintien de la

paix. Ont alors pris la parole des

ambassadeurs du Canada. Un autre atelier sur la situation

existait à Chypre à eu lieu à l'In-

stitut à la mi-avril. La série se ter-

minera par un colloque qui se

tiendra tard au printemps ou au

début de l'été, sous la gouverne de

**Norma Saleem**, chargée de re-

cherche à l'ICPSI. **Bernard Wood** et **Roy McMurtry**, ancien Haut Commis-

saire du Canada à Londres, ont

représenté notre pays à une con-

férence organisée récemment à New

York par la Fondation Carnegie sur

les politiques des pays démocra-

tiques face à l'Afrique australe. **Totouya Totou**, secrétaire général

de la SWAPO, juste avant le lance-

ment du plan d'indépendance pour

la Namibie. À la fin de mai, il a par-

tiépé à une conférence parrainée

par l'*International Peace Academy*

sur la paix, le développement et la

sécurité en Amérique centrale, et il

a assisté à des séances spéciales de

la *Caribbean Studies Association*.

**Fen Hampson** et **Katherine**

**Laundy** ont présenté des exposés à

l'assemblée annuelle de l'*Internat-*

*ional Studies Association* (ISA), à

Londres en mars. M. Hampson a

également prononcé une allocution

sur « l'OTAN à quarante ans », dans

le cadre d'une conférence organisée

par l'Université Princeton au Litch-

tenstein. **Ron Purver** a assisté à

l'assemblée de l'ISA et à des con-

férences sur l'OTAN à Halifax et à

Winnipeg. À la fin d'avril, le Conseil de

développement du loisir scientifique

a parrainé, de concert avec l'ICPSI

et d'autres organismes, l'Expo-

loup, où les lauréats des Forces

scientifiques régionales du Québec

ont exposé leurs projets. Le thème

était « la science et la paix ». **Ber-**

**nard Wood** a pris la parole pendant

les cérémonies d'ouverture. **Roger**

**Hill** faisait partie des juges et il a

décerné un certain nombre de prix.

À la fin de mai, l'ICPSI et le

*Henson College of Public Affairs*

et *Continuing Education* (Univer-

sité Dalhousie) ont présenté, à l'in-

tervention du personnel enseignant et

des étudiants, une conférence sur

l'éducation concernant les questions

de paix et de sécurité. Les princi-

paux orateurs étaient **Shelley Ber-**

**man**, présidente des *Educators*

*for Social Responsibility* aux États-

Unis, et **Maxime Paillet**, un des qua-

rennes sur le désarmement nu-

cléaire en 1986-1987. **Nancy Gor-**

**don**, **Brad Feasey** et **Margaret**

**Bourgeault** ont pris la parole et

dirigé des ateliers. Dans le cadre du programme

d'échanges entre l'ICPSI et l'Insti-

tut des études canado-américaines

un séjour à Ottawa en mai. Au cours

de l'hiver, **Jacques Lévesque**, de

l'Université de Montréal, s'est

rendu à Moscou pour entreprendre

des recherches sur les poussées na-

tionnalistes en Union soviétique. □

brables points de vue analytiques sur le terrorisme en mettant en lumière la trajectoire idéologique et politique de l'acteur vers la lutte armée et finalement en mercenarisation de celle-ci en mercenariat international. — *Janine Kriebler*

*Janine Kriebler est chargée de cours au département de science politique, à l'Université Laval.*

## Les défis de Gorbatchev

Lilly Marcou  
Editions Pion, Paris, 1988.  
273 pages, 24 \$.

Lilly Marcou fait preuve d'optimisme quant aux chances de Mikhail Gorbatchev de réussir sa *perestroïka* en politique extérieure. Les défis de Gorbatchev est écrit par une femme qui n'est pas reconnue pour ses jugements biaisés et péremptores et qui, de surcroît, est spécialiste du mouvement communiste européen.

La section qui traite des conflits soviétiques et Israël est remarquable. Je n'en dirais pas autant de sujets tels les relations entre Mossad et Pékin ou l'Afrique. Il faut aussi regretter que fort peu d'attention soit consacrée à l'Europe de l'Est. Voilà pourtant une région stratégique, riche en changements profonds et fort susceptible d'augmenter la bonne réputation de l'URSS en Occident. Dans le passé, les réformateurs ont vu leurs projets échouer en Europe de l'Est. Rapetons les événements de Budapest en 1956 qui ont été provoqués en bonne partie par la désalinisation opérée au XX<sup>e</sup> Congrès du Parti communiste soviétique tenu plus tôt la même année.

La politique extérieure est aussi une affaire de gros sous, surtout maintenant que Gorbatchev veut tout rentabiliser. L'attitude du secrétaire général a beaucoup à voir avec les difficultés que son pays éprouve avec le commerce extérieur. Ce défi peut-être le plus important que le leader soviétique doit affronter, n'est pourtant pas étudié dans l'ouvrage. La réalité internationale ne sert guère les intérêts de l'URSS : la chute des prix pétroliers, l'incapacité d'exporter des produits manufacturiers et l'imposition de

paix de l'OTAN. Pourtant, depuis plusieurs années, elle chemine lentement, comme l'a montré le sommet franco-britannique du 27 février dernier, où, malgré un différentiel sur la modernisation des missiles *Lance* en Allemagne de l'Ouest, les deux États ont profité de l'occasion pour relancer les négociations sur le développement d'un nouveau type d'arme nucléaire tactique et sur la coordination éventuelle de leur flotte sous-marine stratégique. On est encore loin de l'axe Londres-Washington mais les nécessités économiques et les impératifs géopolitiques rendent la collaboration incontournable.

Pour expliquer cette nouvelle donnée de la politique internationale, quinze diplomates, militaires, chercheurs et journalistes français et du *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, ont produit le présent ouvrage sur la coopération franco-britannique en matière de sécurité. Ils abordent toutes les facettes des relations militaires, telles que l'échange d'informations sur les politiques de défenses, la coopération en matière de recherche militaire et de développement conjoint, les achats d'armes et les problèmes liés à la sécurité en Europe et dans le tiers-monde.

S'il est possible à ces deux puissances moyennes de trouver un terrain d'entente sur certains aspects de la sécurité internationale, deux problèmes fondamentaux empêchent l'harmonisation complète de leurs relations : la politique en matière d'armes nucléaires et la coopération industrielle.

John Roper et Yves Boyer soulignent les différences entre les doctrines nucléaires des deux pays. Paris tient fermement à son autonomie décisionnelle alors que Londres accepte un certain partage de souveraineté au sein de l'OTAN, légitime avec Washington. Le rapprochement entre ces deux pôles semble impossible mais, soulignent les auteurs, devant les offres soviétiques de désarmement et un certain désengagement américain « la Grande-Bretagne et la France doivent maintenant accélérer leur coopération, d'abord pour renforcer leur sécurité, mais aussi pour contribuer à l'avènement de la sécurité de l'Europe dans son ensemble ».

La coopération militaire entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne n'a jamais été chose facile tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur des structures. La coopération militaire entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne n'a jamais été chose facile tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur des structures. La coopération militaire entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne n'a jamais été chose facile tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur des structures.

Luc Duhamel est professeur de science politique à l'Université de Montréal.

— Luc Duhamel

Le livre de Lilly Marcou, malgré toutes ses insuffisances, a le grand mérite de sortir la soviétologie française de la stagnation. Elle a été soutenue jusqu'à maintenant par l'ouverture des États-Unis qui a aussi incité à mettre fin à certains conflits régionaux et à la poursuite aux armements. Le redéploiement de la diplomatie soviétique prend de cours beaucoup de géologues, en particulier en France, où de grands noms ont nié que le régime soviétique puisse être réformable et qui lui ont prêté les intentions dans l'arène internationale. Hélène Carrière d'Encasse et Cornélius Castoradis, pour ne nommer que ceux-là, se sont distingués. Le livre de Lilly Marcou, malgré toutes ses insuffisances, a le grand mérite de sortir la soviétologie française de la stagnation.

## Pour une nouvelle entente cordiale

Sous la direction de Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche et John Roper  
Editions Masson, Paris, 1988.  
220 pages, 45,50 \$.

La coopération militaire entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne n'a jamais été chose facile tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur des structures.

Sur le plan industriel, Farouk Hussain écrit que la coopération est indispensable à cause du coût astronomique des programmes militaires. Toutefois, il admet que les deux pays « ont des capacités industrielles trop semblables en matière de défense pour que la coopération puisse prendre la forme qu'imposerait le sens commun ». La seule solution demeure dans « la volonté tactique et sur la coordination d'un nouveau type d'arme nucléaire

La France face aux nouveaux enjeux stratégiques  
Charles-Philippe David  
Métivien, Montréal, 1988.  
168 pages, 24,95 \$

M. David fait un tour d'horizon des questions fondamentales relatives à la modernisation de la force de dissuasion, les défenses antimissiles, les nouveaux projets technologiques, l'espace, la position de la France vis-à-vis le démantèlement des euro-missiles, le couple franco-allemand et la sécurité européenne.

Le livre est un compte rendu de la conférence sur « le Canada et la neutralité militaire », qui s'est tenue en avril 1987 au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. Il permet de rapporter à d'autres choix politiques, comme le maintien du statu quo ou encore une politique de défense plus indépendante.

(Ouvrages publiés avec l'aide financière de l'ICPSI). □

Voilà l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique Reviews de Peace&Security.

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Voilà l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique Reviews de Peace&Security.

Les choix géopolitiques du Canada : l'enjeu de la neutralité  
Claude Bergeron, Charles-Philippe David, Michel Fortmann, William George  
Métivien, Montréal, 1988.  
280 pages, 24,95 \$

Ce livre est un compte rendu de la conférence sur « le Canada et la neutralité militaire », qui s'est tenue en avril 1987 au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. Il permet de rapporter à d'autres choix politiques, comme le maintien du statu quo ou encore une politique de défense plus indépendante.


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# LIVRES



## La nouvelle question

L'ère du conflit sino-soviétique

François Joyaux

Éditions Payot, Paris, 1988.  
493 pages, 67 \$.

Décrite l'histoire moderne de

passé. Les poussées vers une plus grande multipolarisation régionale se sont faites plus intenses. Enfin, devant les difficultés croissantes des États-Unis à contrôler la situation, la deuxième guerre d'Indochine a imposé une consolidation du camp pro-occidental. L'auteur, devant les États limitrophes à chercher plus de cohésion entre eux. Dans le camp adverse, le conflit sino-soviétique a interdit une approche commune, et cette guerre a cristallisé les divergences. L'année 1969 constitue pour l'auteur une période charnière, les événements préfigurant un profond «réaménagement des équilibres». La crise entre la Chine et l'URSS était à son paroxysme, à cause notamment des affrontements frontaliers au printemps, et la Chine s'inquiétait de la faiblesse de sa sécurité nationale et de son isolement diplomatique. Alors que les États-Unis lançaient la doctrine Nixon, annonçant un désengagement militaire partiel en Extrême-Orient, et qu'au même moment Moscou cherchait à étendre son influence aux dépens de Beijing, en mettant de l'avant un système de sécurité collective (doctrine Brejnev), le rapprochement sino-occidental apparaissait invivable. Celui-ci s'est concrétisé par l'adhésion de la Chine à l'ONU, par la visite du président Nixon à Beijing, et par la normalisation des relations avec plusieurs États occidentaux et pro-occidentaux, incluant le Japon.

Le présent ouvrage, qui s'inscrit dans une suite de trois volumes, est consacré à la période faisant suite à la guerre froide, et que certains ont qualifié de détente. Cependant, pour ce qui a trait à l'Extrême-Orient, l'auteur préfère désigner cette époque (1959-1978) comme l'ère du conflit sino-soviétique (même si celui-ci dépasse les dates retenues). tant il est vrai que l'affrontement entre les deux géants communistes a marqué l'histoire de cette partie du monde.

Le conflit sino-soviétique a mis un terme au monolithisme du bloc communiste, en brisant l'alliance Moscou-Beijing et en forçant les autres États socialistes de la région à s'allier sur l'un ou l'autre des deux protagonistes. Le rapprochement entre la Nouvelle-Delhi et Moscou, à la suite du conflit sino-vietnamien, a contribué lui aussi à modifier l'équilibre régional. Si le camp pro-occidental quant à lui est resté beaucoup plus uni, les volontés d'affirmation économiques et politiques de ses composantes ont empêché les États-Unis de maintenir une cohésion aussi forte que par le

la Chine. La chute des régimes non communistes indochinois a approfondi les équilibres» dont les principales manifestations ont été le renforcement de l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et de l'axe Beijing-Tokyo-Washington, et,

manuscripts indochinois a approfondi les équilibres» dont les principales manifestations ont été le renforcement de l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et de l'axe Beijing-Tokyo-Washington, et,

## Sociétés et terrorisme

Michel Wievorka

Éditions Fayard, Paris, 1988.  
565 pages, 55 \$.

Michel Wievorka nous livre ici

une relecture de sa volumineuse thèse d'État. L'ouvrage fera probablement date dans l'analyse du terrorisme. Surtout parce qu'il s'agit d'une véritable sociologie de la violence politique, articulée autour de quatre études de cas : le Sentier lumineux au Pérou, les Brigades rouges en Italie, l'ETA basque et les Pales-Unités associées à la montée du terrorisme international. Cas assez hétérogènes, à première vue, que Wievorka réussit à lier sous le dénominateur commun de l'analyse sociale.

Le terrorisme surgit au cœur de ce que l'auteur appelle un antimodernisme social. La trajectoire vers le terrorisme présente la particularité d'isoler de plus en plus l'acteur de ses référents sociaux, à travers un jeu de scissions en chaîne dans les groupes de protestation. Pour Wievorka, c'est là l'essence du terrorisme : il est dérivé de sens, et il y a une séparation entre le militant armé et le groupe élargi au nom duquel il se bat. Il ne peut pourtant être compris qu'à partir de ses origines sociales : mouvements étudiants, nationalistes, révolutionnaires ou religieux. Malgré cet enracinement social originel, il n'y a plus, à la fin du processus, que vide, absence de re-

processus, que vide, absence de re-


lation, repli sur soi sectaire. Ainsi s'explique l'apparence souvent absurde que prennent les actes de terrorisme. L'acteur n'agit plus au sein de la société mais dans un groupe totalement déconnecté qui sécrète sa propre logique.

Cette logique adopte – et c'est là la thèse de l'auteur – une spirale ascendante. À partir de références à des figures sociales ou communautaires l'acteur devient terroriste en s'en prenant à l'État et, finalement, il entre dans le jeu international où il devient instrument des politiques de puissance. À l'arrivée, le terroriste a entièrement abandonné les significations de sa lutte initiale. Le mérite de l'ouvrage de Wievorka est d'établir les liens et les distinctions entre les trois niveaux de manifestation du terrorisme qui, du politique, «s'élève toujours vers l'État puis se diffuse au sein du système international». Le passage au niveau international présente deux caractéristiques : 1) dérive par rapport au mouvement initial dont il se réclame encore mais avec lequel il n'a plus grand chose à voir ; 2) absence d'autonomie pratique et idéologique face aux puissances qui l'instrumentalisent.

Fidèle à l'école tourraine, Wievorka a réalisé des interventions sociologiques (ensemble de rencontres, d'entrevues et de discussions proches de la dynamique de groupe) avec des Italiens et des Basques engagés dans la violence politique. C'est ici que l'étude pose problème. Sans pour quelques moments forts de l'intervention – exemple, l'irruption soudaine d'un défilé totalitaire chez le groupe italien qui éclaire remarquablement les oppositions idéologiques géant l'émergence de la violence – on a l'impression que l'argumentation pourrait se passer facilement de cet appareil. Peu de démonstrations centrales à la thèse s'appuient directement sur ces interventions. La méthode documentaire et historique sied mieux à la problématique du terrorisme.

Le livre de Wievorka demeure une oeuvre importante pour la compréhension de la violence politique. Il pose une question centrale à laquelle il ne peut y avoir de réponse simple : pourquoi et comment devient-on terroriste ? Le mérite de ce livre est de faire un dépoussiérage méticuleux des innom-

## TRIBUNE



### Des clichés insistants

Voire note éditoriale sur l'affaire Rushdie et la « Lettre de l'Ouzbékistan soviétique » de Stephen Handelman (*Paix et Sécurité*, printemps 1989) jouent toutes deux sur des images simplistes de l'Islam et de ses dimensions politiques. Si cela même sans voir à mal dans la note éditoriale, Handelman, lui, ne mêche pas ses mots.

En revanche, vous vous demandez judicieusement s'il est logique de rompre les relations diplomatiques avec l'Iran et de saper le « discours civilisé entre diverses cultures » à cause d'un problème complexe d'un point de vue tant ethnique que religieux. Quels que soient les mérites littéraires des *Sept saintes* (et il n'y a pas consensus parmi les critiques littéraires pour classer Rushdie « parmi ces écrivains dont nous avons le plus besoin »), ils offensent profondément la liberté d'expression absolue en Occident et la conformité communautaire absolue dans le monde musulman. La liberté d'expression est aussi relative dans le Code criminel du Canada et dans la Charte des Droits de 1982 que l'est la communauté dans la doctrine légale islamique. Si nombre de musulmans ne « gobent » pas l'argument de la libre expression à propos de Rushdie, les Canadiens et Canadiennes semblent aussi avoir du mal à recon-

naître qu'en vertu de nos propres préceptes légaux, il y a ici un argument de légitimité qui intéresse la portée de la liberté de parole. Après tout, de tels différends surviennent quotidiennement sur le problème de la langue au Québec ou quand il s'agit de laisser s'exprimer en public des « experts » connus pour leur antisémitisme ou tout simplement leur racisme. Pourquoi sommes-nous brusquement frappés d'une paralysie totale dès qu'il est question de la susceptibilité musulmane ?

La réponse se trouve en partie dans le discours orientaliste hérité par l'Occident qui se fonde sur le cliché d'un Orient musulman irracionnel et exotique en contraste avec un Occident judéo-chrétien rationnel et ordonné. Au lieu d'être dénoncé et remplacé par un discours sur sensé, l'orientalisme menace de gagner davantage encore de terrain pour des raisons évidentes dans l'article de Handelman sur les musulmans soviétiques.

On ne sait trop pourquoi, le nationalisme qu'Estoniens, Lettons et Arméniens brandissent contre l'autorité omniprésente de Moscou est considéré comme parfaitement raisonnable, alors que celui des Ouzbèks, des Tadjiks ou des Cosaques est décrit comme quelque somme mouvement fondamentaliste. Peu importe que les églises aient joué un rôle prédominant dans le renforcement du sentiment nationaliste de la Balétique au Caucase ! Le moins étonnant est que le même sujet parue dans le *Time* (1989) fait remarquer : « En Azerbaïdjan, quelques musulmans exhibent la photo de l'ayatollah Khomeiny ou arborent des barbes à de signes d'un fanatisme religieux, il y a peu d'islamisme. Néanmoins, il y a peu de signes d'un fanatisme religieux, qu'il s'inspire de l'Iran et de l'Afghanistan voisins ou qu'il soit

encouragé par la tolérance même des Soviétiques. »

### La question des vols à basse altitude n'est pas close

Dans « Le dossier du Labrador » (*Paix et Sécurité*, automne 1988), la remarque selon laquelle les Indiens montagnais du Québec feraient passer la militarisation de leurs terres après leurs revendications territoriales mérite quelques éclaircissements, sinon les lecteurs garderaient l'impression que les Montagnais ne sont qu'une autre poignée de ces Peaux-rouges opportunistes.

Des pilotes européens s'entraînent au-dessus des terrains de chasse et de trappe des Montagnais sur la rive nord du St-Laurent depuis l'été 1983. Ce sont les chasseurs et leurs familles de La-Romaine qui pâtissent le plus des exercices dans cette région. En effet, les autres collectivités et leurs membres ne sont survolés que de temps à autre. Étant donné que la conquête militaire a joué un rôle important dans la colonisation des populations autochtones en Amérique du Nord et ailleurs, les chefs montagnais à La-Romaine et dans les bureaux du Conseil Atikamek-Montagnais (CAM) ont été prompts à réagir. Ils ont dénoncé les intrusions et dépensé environ 100 000 \$ à même les fonds du Conseil pour mener des enquêtes sur le terrain et des recherches bibliographiques afin

de confirmer leur suspicion que les vols à basse altitude sont une menace pour la zone d'entraînement. Naturellement, ils ne partagent pas la même inquiétude que leurs frères et sœurs de La-Romaine en ce qui concerne les vols d'entraînement à basse altitude. Une campagne collective axée sur les vols militaires, en même temps que sur une opposition catégorique à l'entraînement, est donc hors de question. En outre, les Montagnais pensent qu'à la faveur des négociations sur les revendications territoriales, ils pourront sinon éliminer les vols indésirés, du moins en réduire les effets négatifs à un seuil acceptable. Ce processus de réduction négociée trancherait certainement avec les mesures que le ministère de la Défense nationale a imposées unilatéralement pour limiter les survols des campements autochtones.


Après la signature, le 16 septembre, d'un accord-cadre avec les autorités fédérales et provinciales, le CAM est maintenant en bonne voie d'obtenir un accord sur les revendications territoriales. Il est fort probable qu'il discutera des vols militaires d'une manière moins salissante et qu'il préférera négocier en privé.

En revanche, les Innus du Labrador sont loin de négocier un accord quelconque. En fait, dans les années 1970, ils ont publié un document dans lequel il demandait quasiment la séparation de la nation innue du reste du Canada. Ainsi que l'attestent leur récente occupation de la piste d'envol à Goose Bay et les arrestations qui ont suivi, le dossier n'est pas près d'être clos.

*Erik Poole*  
Québec



## EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



en compte maintenant huit au total; les questions des anciens combattants ont été ajoutées à son mandat. Agriculteur albertain et député depuis longtemps, M. Arnold Malone (député de Crowfoot), a été nommé président de cette dernière

instance. Le Comité spécial du Sénat sur la Défense nationale a repris, quant à lui, son étude sur les forces terrestres du Canada, et il devrait achever ses travaux au cours de l'été. Le Comité sénatorial des Affaires étrangères continue son analyse approfondie de certains aspects de l'Accord canado-américain de libre-échange. Patrick Boyer (Étobicoke-Lakeshore) et Jean-Guy Hudon (Beauharnois-Salaberry) ont été nommés secrétaires parlementaires, respectivement auprès du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et au ministre de la Défense nationale.

### Opérations de maintien de la paix

Au début d'avril, trois événements se sont produits dans le domaine du maintien de la paix, dans les régions du monde éloignées: les gouvernements des communautés grecque et turque à Chypre sur le retrait des soldats de trois postes d'observation à Nicosie, la zone-tampon divisant Chypre. C'est la première fois que les deux parties en présence acceptent de retirer des forces militaires depuis que la Turquie est intervenue dans l'île méditerranéenne en 1974.

Le 5 avril dernier, les gouvernements du Vietnam et du Cambodge ont invité le Canada, la Pologne et l'Inde à former une commission de surveillance qui serait chargée de superviser le retrait des 50 à 70 000 soldats vietnamiens encore présents au Cambodge. Le Vietnam prétend qu'il aura retiré ces hommes d'ici la fin de septembre, soit quinze mois plus tôt que promis à l'origine. Les troupes de Hanoi occupent le Cambodge depuis décembre 1978, date où elles ont renversé le gouvernement.

Le Comité a élu son président en la personne de John Bosley (Don Valley West), ancien président de la Chambre. Le Comité permanent de la Défense nationale a, lui aussi, un nouveau membre: il

### Les changements survenus au Moyen-Orient

C'est avec la lecture du discours du trône par le gouverneur général que s'est ouverte, le 3 avril dernier, la deuxième session de la 34<sup>e</sup> Législature. Si le texte mettait essentiellement l'accent sur l'économie et le commerce, il y a aussi été longuement question de l'environnement et, plus brièvement, du rôle du Canada sur la scène internationale.

Le 30 mars, juste à la veille de la reprise des travaux du Parlement, le gouvernement canadien a décidé de relever le niveau de ses relations avec l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP), retirant son adhésion à la cause de l'autodétermination palestinienne sans pour autant reconnaître l'OLP en tant que telle. En vertu de cette décision, les diplomates canadiens des niveaux plus élevés (jusqu'aux ambassadeurs) pourront désormais se réunir avec des représentants de l'OLP. Si l'on en croit le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, le Canada va maintenant pouvoir faire pression sur l'organisation dirigée par M. Arafat pour qu'elle adopte la voie de la modération et oeuvre en faveur de négociations de paix.

Les comités parlementaires ont, eux aussi, repris leurs travaux en avril. Leur nombre a été réduit, mais les comités étudiant les questions de paix et de sécurité n'ont, pour l'essentiel, subi aucune modification. Le Comité permanent des Affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur compte désormais un membre de plus, ce qui porte ses effectifs au nombre total de quatorze (8 Conserveurs, 4 Libéraux et 2 Néo-démocrates). Le Comité a élu son président en la personne de John Bosley (Don Valley West), ancien président de la Chambre. Le Comité permanent de la Défense nationale a, lui aussi, un nouveau membre: il

ment des Khmers rouges pour y ins-taller le régime actuel. Joe Clark a précisé que le Canada n'enviagerait de participer à l'opération qu'à plusieurs conditions. L'une d'entre elles étant que toutes les parties au litige confirment qu'elles s'engagent à donner leur appui total à une force internationale de maintien de la paix, investie d'un mandat clair-ement défini et mise sur pied pour une durée déterminée.

C'est en Namibie que se sont produits les événements les plus dramatiques, avec l'échec initial du cessez-le-feu intervenu le 1<sup>er</sup> avril dernier entre l'Afrique du Sud et la SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization). Le gouvernement canadien avait consenti à détacher près de 250 hommes auprès du groupe d'assistance des Nations-Unies pour la période de transition (GANUPT), qui doit compter 4 650 militaires et super-viser pendant un an le retrait des troupes sud-africaines de la Namibie et l'accession de ce pays à l'indépendance. Après l'incursion de la SWAPO qui a déclenché les combats, le gouvernement canadien s'est plié à la requête des Nations-Unies en accélérant le déploiement de ses troupes et en fournissant un appui aérien supplémentaire pour l'ensemble des forces du GANUPT.

Le 12 avril dernier, le ministre de la Défense, M. Bill McKnight, s'est levé à la Chambre des communes pour déposer un décret autorisant le déploiement des troupes canadiennes. Le critique libéral aux Affaires extérieures, M. André Ouellet, tout en se déclarant favorable au décret, a tout de même reproché au Ministre d'avoir gardé le silence sur la situation existant en Namibie, sur l'insuffisance des effectifs de la force des Nations-Unies et, enfin, sur la lenteur de leur déploiement.

Namibie avant le début du processus de transition devant mener à l'indépendance. (Pour de plus amples informations sur les opérations de maintien de la paix en Namibie, voir la rubrique «A l'ordre du jour du Conseil de sécurité», page 14).

### Le Liban

Le 20 avril, la ministre des Relations extérieures, Mme Monique Landry, a évoqué devant la Chambre la dernière vague de violence survenue dans la guerre civile qui déchire le Liban depuis quatorze ans. Le 30 mars déjà, M. Joe Clark avait fait une déclaration et invité toutes les parties en présence à redoubler d'efforts pour parvenir à la réconciliation nationale, mais Mme Landry a renchérit sur les inquiétudes générales exprimées et elle a décrit certaines mesures prises par le Canada pour prêter main-forte dans ce dossier: notre pays continue d'appuyer les efforts de médiation du Comité ministériel de la Ligue arabe, et ceux du Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies et du président français Mitterrand; il a versé à la Croix-Rouge une subvention spéciale de 500 000 \$ pour financer des secours d'ordre humanitaire; il a suspendu temporairement la déportation de ceux à qui l'on avait refusé le statut de réfugié; et il a envoyé à Chypre un agent de l'immigration chargé de traiter des cas additionnels.

### Le budget du gouvernement fédéral

Le gouvernement a choisi la voie des restrictions budgétaires dans le cadre d'une opération de résorption du déficit qui a eu de sévères répercussions, tant sur le ministère de la Défense nationale, victime de multiples coupures dans ses programmes, que sur l'Agence canadienne de développement international, dont les crédits d'aide extérieure ont été considérablement réduits.

Jusqu'à présent, le gouvernement s'était fixé comme objectif de consacrer 0,5 p. 100 du produit national brut (PNB) à l'aide publique au développement (APD), et il avait promis d'atteindre 0,6 p. 100 d'ici 1995. Avec les réductions budgétaires, l'APD va tomber à 0,43 p. 100 en 1989-1990, pour remonter à 0,45 p. 100 l'an prochain. Autre conséquence, l'objectif de 0,6 p. 100 est reporté indéfiniment. □

— DAVID COX

Toutefois, avant de donner le feu vert aux recherches, les États-Unis veulent obtenir l'appui de l'Allemagne fédérale. Confronté à un des FNC sont destinées à servir en les FNC sont destinées à servir en Kohl s'est refusé à tout engagement en ce sens. Face à des favorables à l'Quest de plus en plus favorables à des négociations sur les FNC avec les Soviétiques, M. Kohl espère remettre la décision jusqu'après l'élection de 1990 afin de limiter les dégâts électoraux qu'il subirait en appuyant la position américaine.

**Nouvelles visions européennes**

Faisant écho à l'URSS qui appelle de ses vœux une « maison européenne », le ministre ouest-allemand des Affaires étrangères, M. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, se positionne en premier partisan de cette nouvelle philosophie. En avril, il a décrit dans une allocution sa vision d'un objet est de démythifier et de désidéologiser les relations Est-Ouest et, en même temps, de multiplier et de renforcer les éléments de coopération. Un ordre pacifique en Europe... dans lequel les nations peuvent vivre sans se craindre les unes les autres, et où elles peuvent choisir leur propre régime politique et social, n'est plus une simple vision...

Pendant ce temps, au début du mois d'avril, dans le pays qui donne son nom au Traité de Varsovie, les dirigeants politiques polonais de toutes tendances se retrouvaient pour une « table ronde » historique. Aux termes de l'accord qui en a résulté, les Polonais seront appelés aux urnes au mois de juin. Trente-cinq pour cent des sièges de la Chambre basse sont ouverts aux suffrages (le parti communiste au pouvoir a la mainmise sur le reste) ainsi que tous ceux de la Chambre haute. Le gouvernement, même s'il ne peut perdre le pouvoir, devrait essayer de séduire revêts au cours de ces élections. Bien qu'elle tende à rester dans le Pacte de Varsovie, la Pologne cherche à participer davantage aux discussions paneuropéennes sur la sécurité. En particulier, le gouvernement souhaite que soit établi en Pologne un centre de guerre où seraient centralisées toutes les informations sur les forces présentes en Europe et sur leurs mouvements. □

en tant que systèmes ABM potentiels seraient efficaces contre les satellites, alors qu'elles risqueraient de ne pas l'être contre des missiles. Les États-Unis dépendent grandement de satellites pour les communications militaires. L'alerte rapide et la navigation, ainsi que pour les utilisations civiles.

Pour cette raison, les avantages d'une course aux systèmes ASAT avec l'Union soviétique seraient mitigés. Alors que M. Carlucci et le Pentagone insistent sur la nécessité de réorienter certains projets de la Guerre des étoiles pour construire de nouveaux systèmes anti-satellites, d'autres font valoir que la meilleure protection serait de négocier une interdiction de ces derniers. La plupart des satellites américains sont placés en orbite haute et, pour le moment, hors de portée des systèmes ASAT soviétiques élémentaires. Au centre du débat se trouve le nouveau système ASAT déployé en haute altitude, afin d'assurer aux deux camps une capacité d'alerte et de communication en cas de conflit nucléaire.

**L'OTAN : la crise de la quarantaine**

On se rappellera le quarantième anniversaire de l'OTAN en mai 1993. La controverse ne sur les forces nucléaires à courte portée (FNC). La controverse ne cesse de s'amplifier depuis la signature du Traité sur les forces nucléaires intermédiaires (FNI) qui supprime les missiles ayant une portée de 500 à 5 000 km. Pour l'OTAN, cela laisse en place diverses armes nucléaires pouvant être montées sur des avions, des missiles de croisière mer-sol, ou des missiles sol-sol *Lance* (engins de courte portée). Après la signature du Traité sur les FNI, les États-Unis, avec le ferme soutien du premier ministre britannique, Mme Margaret Thatcher, entendent donner au missile *Lance* un successeur qui serait doté d'une ogive plus précise et à plus longue portée, soit environ 450 km. Ce nouveau missile serait déployé graduellement, vers 1995, quand le missile *Lance* arrivera à la fin de sa vie utile.

facilement déjouées si les Soviétiques fabriquent des propulseurs à combustion rapide dont les moteurs n'auraient besoin de tourner que pendant quelques secondes, voire moins. Le nouvel argument est la pollution de l'espace. Des dizaines de milliers de nouveaux objets accroîtraient énormément les risques de collision et la destruction accidentelle de satellites ajouterait à la ferraille déjà présente là-haut.

**Les systèmes anti-satellites (ASAT) – Les cousins de province**

Dans son dernier rapport au Congrès, le secrétaire d'État sortant à la Défense, M. Frank Carlucci, fait grés, le secrétaire d'Etat sortant à la Défense, M. Frank Carlucci, fait l'apologie des armes anti-satellites. «... une gamme complète de moyens ASAT est essentielle, a-t-il déclaré, si nous voulons empêcher les Soviétiques d'employer au détriment de nos forces des systèmes spatiaux hostiles. » Les armes anti-satellites paieraient rapidement de retour les recherches menées dans le cadre de l'IDS, puisque beaucoup d'armes actuellement mises au point

révolutionnaires à grand angle. Ces petites fusées pourraient fonctionner sans l'aide de capteurs et des systèmes de communications montés sur satellite qui ajoutent au coût et à la complexité de systèmes spatiaux actuellement à l'étude. En outre, elles seraient moins à la merci des contre-mesures. Dès qu'elles reprennent un tir de missiles ennemis, les fusées se mettraient sur leurs cibles pour les détruire pendant la phase lente du vol, à savoir celle de la propulsion. Selon le chet sortant du programme IDS, M. James Abrahamson, le programme «*brillant* *Fehibles*» coûterait environ 25 milliards de dollars US, soit l'équivalent de tout autre système importé tant ayant été mentionné jusqu'ici dans le cadre de l'IDS.

Cependant, hormis les objections familières, les critiques ont présenté un argument nouveau. Il se peut que ces fusées «*au QI élevé*» soient assez rapides pour intercepter les missiles soviétiques actuels pendant la phase de propulsion, mais selon certains scientifiques, elles seraient

95,6 millions de dollars, ou 0,9 p. 100, par rapport aux prévisions de dépenses de 1988. Cela représente une réduction de 575 millions par rapport au budget attendu pour 1989-1990, lequel devait, aux termes du Livre blanc, accorder une augmentation de 3,3 p. 100 pour compenser l'inflation, en plus des 2 p. 100 annuels. Le gouvernement a déclaré que le budget de défense baserait de 2,74 milliards de dollars au cours des cinq ans à venir, mais que pour l'exercice 1993-1994, soit à la fin de la période de réduction du déficit, il retrouvera le niveau de financement auquel il serait parvenu en vertu de la formule énoncée dans le Livre blanc (taux de croissance réelle de 2 p. 100 par an).

Ce revirement politique bouleverse la plupart des principaux programmes d'armement. Le programme des sous-marins nucléaires a été abandonné, ce qui met en suspens le programme de remplacement des trois sous-marins de la classe *Oberon* qui arrivent à la fin de leur vie utile. L'achat d'avions supplémentaires de patrouille maritime à grande autonomie. Le nombre des nouveaux chars pour les Forces canadiennes en Europe est réduit de moitié, et leur acquisition reportée au-delà de la date où, selon le Livre blanc, il faudrait rapatrier nos troupes, l'acte d'équipement approprié. L'achat de 820 véhicules tous terrains pour la Milice est coupé de moitié au moins, ce qui laisse supposer que les renforcements importants qu'il était prévu de fournir à cette dernière seront probablement moindres eux aussi, de 1 174 personnes, conformément à la promesse que le gouvernement avait faite de les augmenter, les nouvelles mesures préconisent une réduction de 2 500 personnes. Enfin, quatre bases militaires seront fermées ou ramenées à des tailles moins considérables au Canada.

Dans les prévisions budgétaires de la Défense, on peut lire que, malgré les baisses du financement à court terme, le Livre blanc reste un exposé précis de la politique de défense canadienne et de l'objectif que le gouvernement compte atteindre. Il n'y aura donc pas de révision officielle du Livre blanc, même si les réductions budgétaires en ont miné les principales propositions.









# A L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



## La Namibie

L'accord portant sur la mise en application de la résolution 435 du Conseil de sécurité, qui prépare l'accession de la Namibie à l'indépendance, a été unanimement salué comme témoignage de l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre mondial et d'un renforcement du rôle des Nations-Unies. Mais la résolution, qui est le fruit de près d'un quart de siècle d'efforts diplomatiques, s'est révélée plus difficile et plus embarrassante à mettre en oeuvre que ne l'avait d'abord prévu le Conseil. À peine la résolution 435 était-elle entrée en vigueur le 1<sup>er</sup> avril dernier que plus de 1 500 guérilleros de la SWAPO (*South West Africa People's Organization*) faisaient une incursion en territoire namibien, commettant ainsi ce qui semblait être une violation de l'entente négociée entre l'Afrique du Sud, Cuba et l'Angola, par l'intermédiaire des Etats-Unis. Par la suite, lorsque les troupes sud-africaines ont lancé leur attaque et abattu près de 200 guérilleros, on a bien cru que c'en était fini du plan d'indépendance. Pendant que les membres du Conseil de sécurité tenaient une série de consultations officieuses, le rôle des Nations-Unies faisait l'objet de critiques de plus en plus vives. Incapable pour ainsi dire de faire quoi que ce soit pour empêcher les forces sud-africaines de s'en prendre à la SWAPO, le Secrétaire général n'a eu d'autre choix que d'entériner, à contrecoeur, le geste d'apartheid que l'ONU a déclaré de l'application de la résolution 435 jusqu'à la fin des préparatifs, mais les diplomates redoutaient que le moindre report menaçât l'intégrité du plan d'indépendance et donne à certains l'idée d'exiger d'autres changements. «Tout le monde savait que l'installation du GANUPT ne serait pas achevée le 1<sup>er</sup> avril; nous savions aussi, qu'au fil des mois, il y aurait des violations, mais personne ne les

prévoyait. C'est pourquoi nous sommes tous conscients du fait que l'ONU a été critiquée, que la réputation de l'Organisation a été ternie», a fait remarquer à l'époque un diplomate canadien. «Mais la question est de savoir ce que nous allons faire à présent et comment nous allons rétablir sa crédibilité». Pendant ce temps, aux Nations-Unies comme dans les capitales indépendantes, des pressions étaient exercées dans les coulisses sur les différentes parties au différend, notamment sur la SWAPO et l'Afrique du Sud, en vue de permettre le retour des rebelles en Angola. Parallèlement, les diplomates se sont mis à réfléchir et à s'interroger sur ce qui avait bien pu se passer. La résolution 435 prévoyait à l'origine le déploiement de 7 500 militaires suisses, mais ce nombre a par la suite été ramené à 4 650, à la demande pressante des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS, qui jugeaient inutile d'envoyer un contingent aussi important et y voyaient une dépense superflue. Après les querelles dans lesquelles s'est embourbé le processus d'autorisation budgétaire, il ne restait plus grand temps pour ex-pédier des militaires onusiens. Au 1<sup>er</sup> avril, il n'y avait en Namibie que 900 membres du Groupe d'assistance des Nations-Unies pour ce

période de transition (GANUPT), et pratiquement aucun dans le nord du pays, à l'endroit où les rebelles de la SWAPO avaient franchi la frontière. «J'ai répété à maintes reprises qu'il fallait au minimum six à huit semaines pour garantir le succès absolu de l'opération, or, ce délai a été ramené à quatre semaines», a déclaré le Secrétaire général Javier Pérez de Cuéllar devant le Conseil. En théorie, le Conseil aurait pu différer l'application de la résolution 435 jusqu'à la fin des préparatifs, mais les diplomates redoutaient que le moindre report menaçât l'intégrité du plan d'indépendance et donne à certains l'idée d'exiger d'autres changements. «Tout le monde savait que l'installation du GANUPT ne serait pas achevée le 1<sup>er</sup> avril; nous savions aussi, qu'au fil des mois, il y aurait des violations, mais personne ne les

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## L'Afghanistan

Si au cours des derniers mois, le Conseil a porté l'essentiel de son attention sur la situation en Namibie, il s'est aussi penché sur d'autres questions. Vers la mi-avril, il s'est réuni à la demande de l'Afghanistan, qui accusait le Pakistan d'ingérence dans sa politique et d'agression militaire. L'Afghanistan a en outre reproché aux Etats-Unis d'avoir été l'instrument de l'expansionnisme pakistanais. Les accusations d'ingérence ont été prononcées au moment où l'on rapportait que les Etats-Unis venaient en aide aux moudjahidins afghans et que des avions chargés de matériel de guerre soviétique arrivaient presque quotidiennement à Kaboul. Le Pakistan a rejeté les imputations, accusant à son tour l'Afghanistan de ne pas vouloir admettre la réalité politique ni reconnaître le régime de Kaboul était inacceptable pour le peuple afghan. Le Pakistan a ajouté qu'il n'y aurait ni paix ni stabilité en Afghanistan tant que le régime en place ne céderait pas le pouvoir à un gouvernement élu démocratiquement. L'ambassadeur du Canada auprès des Nations-Unies, M. Yves Fortier, a déclaré dans une allocution que, sans une requête émanant de l'ensemble du peuple afghan, le Conseil ne pourrait pas faire grand-chose pour aider l'Afghanistan à se doter d'un gouvernement représentatif et à répartir ses millions de réfugiés. «Mon gouvernement est persuadé que c'est au peuple afghan qu'il appartient de décider de son avenir collectif, sans intervenants de l'extérieur», a déclaré M. Fortier devant le Conseil. Interrogé ensuite sur la question de savoir s'il entendait par «intervenant» l'Union soviétique, non seulement le Pakistan a refusé de reconnaître l'existence de la situation, mais il a déclaré que le Pakistan n'avait aucune mesure immédiate relativement à la plainte du Panama; si une résolution ou autre avait été présentée, il est presque certain, de toute façon, que les Etats-Unis y auraient opposé leur veto. □

## Autres questions

Le Conseil a également abordé la question de la guerre civile qui continue de faire rage au Liban. Une fois de plus, il a lancé un appel au cessez-le-feu. Après une courte accalmie, les combats ont repris entre les troupes syriennes et leurs alliés, d'une part, et les forces chrétiennes, d'autre part. Dans sa déclaration, le Conseil a par ailleurs souscrit aux efforts de la Ligue arabe pour tenter de résoudre le conflit. Le 28 avril, le Conseil a été saisi d'une plainte déposée par le Panama, qui accusait les Etats-Unis d'ingérence flagrante dans son économie et dans son système politique. Il avait été rapporté que le gouvernement américain avait autorisé la constitution d'un fonds secret pour acheter 10 millions de dollars aux candidats de l'opposition panaméenne aux élections du 7 mai. Au cours d'un débat, les Etats-Unis ont nié l'existence d'un quelconque complot contre Panama. Ils se sont défendus en affirmant que l'homme fort du régime, le général Manuel Antonio Noriega, était librement résolu à fausser les élections dans son pays. Le Conseil n'a pris aucune mesure immédiate relativement à la plainte du Panama; si une résolution ou autre avait été présentée, il est presque certain, de toute façon, que les Etats-Unis y auraient opposé leur veto. □

## Le Moyen-Orient

En février, le Conseil s'est réuni officieusement pour débattre de la situation dans les territoires oc-

ORS D'UNE RÉCENTE CONFÉRENCE TENUE À

Nakhodka, en Sibirie extrême-orientale, un certain nombre d'universitaires et de de-

clureurs soviétiques ont exprimé la crainte que la politique étrangère de leur pays échoue. Ils

sont en effet persuadés que l'Occident risque de

laisser passer une occasion unique de redéfinir

entièrement ses relations avec leur pays. En fait, à

l'Occident risquerait fort d'entraîner un renver-

sement de la politique qu'accueille de

batchev au pouvoir. Néanmoins, une approche

occidentale écartée pourrait en même temps faire

avancer les intérêts occidentaux et renforcer les

tendances saines de la politique du Kremlin.

Si M. Gorbatchev maintient le même cap, nous

assisterons probablement à une succession de

désengagements au tiers-monde. Les dirigeants

occidentaux, qui ne peuvent que se rejouer de tels

événements, ont, de fait, manifesté un optimisme

puident face au retrait d'Afghanistan et aux inter-

ventions soviétiques pour que les Cubains quit-

tent l'Angola, et les Vietnamiens, le Kampuchéa.

Cependant, la question cruciale est de savoir com-

bien de temps encore Moscou endurera cette série

de retraites unilatérales et les coups qu'ils portent

au prestige de l'Union soviétique dans le monde.

Washington s'est trouvé confronté à un pro-

blème similaire après la chute de Saïgon. Les

Etats-Unis s'agitaient qu'une défaite au Vietnam conduise l'URSS à douter de la résolution et de la capacité américaines à résister dans l'avenir à l'expansionnisme soviétique. Partant du principe que leurs alliés de l'OTAN et le Japon doute- raient des garanties de sécurité qu'ils offraient, ils avaient prédit que leurs alliés autour du globe, sentant l'impuissance américaine, s'accommoder- raient de la menace soviétique au lieu de s'y opposer aux côtés de Washington.

IL N'EST QUE RAISONNABLE DE SUPPOSER QUE Moscou éprouve les mêmes inquiétudes à mesure que ses alliances se défont dans le monde. Les pressions que le Kremlin exerce sur le Vietnam au sujet du Kampuchéa n'accroîtront pas ses chances de maintenir une présence militaire dans la baie de Cam Ranh. Ses efforts pour favoriser un règlement du conflit entre la Namibie et l'An- gola n'apparaîtront pas comme une preuve de fer- meté aux yeux du gouvernement mozambicain luttant contre les insurgés de la RENAMO (mou- vement de résistance du Mozambique) appuyés par l'Afrique du Sud, pas plus qu'ils ne convain- cront les combattants de l'ANC (African National Congress) en Afrique du Sud que l'URSS sou- tient leur cause. Quand les Etats-Unis ont connu ce problème d'image, ils ont choisi une approche unilatérale. Leur méthode la plus efficace a été de soutenir des pays naturellement enclins à résister à l'URSS, comme la Chine, par exemple (cette alliance a aidé à détruire chez les Soviétiques toute illusion que les Américains renouaient à leur position en Asie).

Dans d'autres parties du monde, la Maison-Blanche a trouvé des puissances régionales, comme l'Iran, disposées à contre tout empiète- ment soviétique. Bien que la politique des «places fortes» régionales se soit finalement révé- lée inefficace, à l'époque où ces alliances se sont

# L'OUEST EST-IL EN TRAIN DE

## RATER

### LE COCHE ?

En affaiblissant trop de réserve face

à la nouvelle politique étrangère

de M. Gorbatchev, les pays

occidentaux n'aideront la cause

de personne.

PAR TED HOPF

Formées, l'URSS y a vu la preuve que les Etats-

Unis souhaitaient réaffirmer leur engagement

après avoir été humiliés dans le Sud-Est asiatique.

Enfin, et c'est un point trop souvent écarté à la

légère, les dirigeants américains n'ont pas cessé

de répéter que le retrait du Vietnam n'avait mar-

qué aucune perte de puissance ni aucune diminu-

tion de la détermination à utiliser cette dernière.

À en juger par les déclarations de M. Gor-

batchev et Chevardnadze et d'autres décideurs

soviétiques en matière de politique étrangère,

celle-ci a opté pour un antidote différent pour ré-

gler son problème de crédibilité, ce qui a des con-

séquences heureuses pour l'Occident, à condition

encore que ce dernier réponde d'une manière

autorisant les Soviétiques à abandonner leurs po- sitions sans trop avoir à perdre la face. M. Gor- batchev affirme que les jours de l'unilatéralisme en politique internationale sont révolus et que les conflits régionaux ne se résoudront qu'à la table

parellel affirmation en la taxant de simple bla-bla dans un soudain accès d'activité diplomatique. Les Etats-Unis avaient tenté de rétablir leur crédibilité en envoyant des armes à leurs amis, mais l'Union soviétique, dans certains cas du moins, a laissé ses alliés se débrouiller seuls. Le Mozambique est resté virtuellement sans défen- ses face aux attaques répétées des guérilleros de la RENAMO. Moscou a refusé à la Syrie des missiles perfectionnés capables d'atteindre Israël. Dans les deux cas, Moscou n'a pas tenu compte des obligations militaires que lui imposaient les traités d'amitié et de coopération.

Sur le plan diplomatique, l'URSS préconise, pour régler les conflits régionaux une démarche

gocitations avec l'Afrique du Sud. M. Chevard-

nadze et M. Igor Ligatchev, membre du Politburo

et principal rival de M. Gorbatchev, ont tous deux

pressé les dirigeants vietnamiens de modérer

leurs positions dans leurs pourparlers avec les

guérillas opposées au gouvernement kampou-

chéen. La décision de l'Organisation de la libéra-

tion de la Palestine (OLP) de reconnaître Israël

tient probablement, en partie, au fait que M. Gor-

batchev a personnellement reproché à Yassor

Arafat d'avoir fait obstacle, par la position an-

tiérieure de l'Organisation, à un juste règlement

du conflit au Moyen-Orient.

Comment l'Occident, et les Etats-Unis en par-

ticulier, peut-il accroître les chances pour que

cette tendance bienvenue se poursuive ? L'Occi-

dent devrait tout mettre en oeuvre pour amener

l'URSS à participer à des négociations sur le

Moyen-Orient, l'Afrique australe, le Golfe per-

sique, l'Asie du Sud-Est et l'Amérique centrale.

Dans ce dernier cas, la future politique du Krem-

lin en ce qui concerne l'aide militaire au Nicara-

gua servira de test révélateur pour juger de la

volonté de M. Gorbatchev de favoriser le régle-

ment négocié de ces conflits.

L'Occident devrait encourager la préférence

de M. Gorbatchev pour les solutions multi-  
latérales au problème de crédibilité de son pays,  
et ce, pour trois raisons. D'abord, une attitude oc-  
cidentale bienveillante incitera les Soviétiques à  
consacrer leur énergie à autre chose qu'à chercher  
dans de nouvelles équipes à l'étranger un moyen  
de redorer leur blason. Ainsi, les Occidentaux  
libéreront gracieusement M. Gorbatchev de ses  
apportées préserver leurs intérêts.  
Ensuite, le règlement de ces conflits supprimera  
un obstacle de taille au renforcement de la dé-  
fense. Il se peut fort bien que le soul de M. Gor-  
batchev de limiter les dépenses militaires via la  
limitation des armements soit précisément ce qui  
dicte la modération de l'URSS dans le tiers-  
monde. L'Occident devrait utiliser à son propre  
avantage l'ordre des priorités du premier secré-  
taire soviétique.  
Enfin, si l'on croit que les réformes intérieures  
en URSS (*perestroïka, glasnost, et démocratiza-*  
*stiya*) s'opèrent dans l'intérêt des Occidentaux,  
alors il est essentiel que l'Ouest aide M. Gor-  
batchev à parer les attaques de ses propres col-  
lègues plus orthodoxes. Les conservateurs du  
Politburo soulignent à n'en pas douter de  
sérieuses réserves à propos d'une politique  
étrangère qui ne semble rien faire d'autre que  
passer de concession unilatérale en concession  
unilatérale. Ces conservateurs proposeraient  
volontiers un durcissement des positions sovié-  
tiques non seulement au Moyen-Orient ou en  
Afrique australe, mais aussi sur des questions es-  
sentielles comme la limitation des armements ou  
les droits de la personne. Une réaction occiden-  
tale constructive à la politique étrangère de  
M. Gorbatchev peut non seulement réduire l'ac-  
tivismisme soviétique dans des domaines importants  
pour l'Occident, mais également aider à protéger  
M. Gorbatchev contre les attaques de ceux qui  
aimeraient retourner aux jours de la stagnation  
brejnevienne, à l'intérieur des frontières, et de  
l'aventurisme, à l'extérieur. □



# J. KING

**6861-0061**

*J. King Gordon, éminent  
journaliste, éducateur*

est décédé le 24 février

*quatre-vingt-neuf ans.*



Clyde Sanger était un ami et collègue de King Gordon.

UN HOWMAGE DE  
CLYDE SANGER


UNAD DISPARAIT UN PERSONNAGE EXTRAORDI-  
d'Hamlet (à son ami Horatio au sujet de son  
père) : « C'était un homme, un vrai; prenne-le  
quel comme ça. Jamais je ne reverrai son père »  
Mais quand on lit le Canada de ne jamais  
revoir de gens comme King Gordon, Frank Scott et  
d'autres de la même génération! Nous avons un tel be-  
soin d'hommes et de femmes de ce calibre!  
Qu'est-ce qui rendait King Gordon si cher à tant de  
gens ? Quelques bonnes pensées ont été émises à la  
messe commémorative célébrée à Ottawa en son hon-  
neur. Le député David MacDonald a choisi de parler de  
«déclaration dans la vérité» pour qualifier la vie que  
Gordon consacra à explorer la vérité, à l'affronter et à la  
révéler. Pointilleux sans être jamais pdaant, King avait  
d'abord été professeur d'éthique et ministre de l'Église  
Unité avant de se lancer dans le journalisme. Il éprouvait  
de toute évidence un sentiment de joie et de délectation  
à exprimer clairement des idées nouvelles et impor-  
tantes. Il évoquait un nouffant de Jimmy des anecdotes sur  
de grands hommes comme le père Jimmy Tompkins  
d'Antigonish, Cookie Lavagetto ou encore Dag Ham-  
marskjöld (en particulier sur celui-ci, sur Tommy Burns  
et sur tous ceux qui avaient participé aux opérations de  
maintien de la paix des Nations-Unies). De tous les gens  
que j'ai connus, King Gordon était le seul à toujours  
avoir sur lui un exemplaire de la Charte de l'ONU. Ap-  
paremment, ce document était pour lui aussi important  
que le Nouveau Testament avait dû l'être pour son  
célèbre père.

et il y avait aussi ce sentiment d'appartenir à une  
 Gordon, qui parlait gaélique, avait quitté les hautes  
 terres d'Ecosse pour devenir pasteur presbytérien à  
 Gengarry, dans l'est de l'Ontario. King avait écrit en  
 1984 qu'il avait toujours plus ou moins considéré cette  
 région comme sa terre natale. Mais en fait, son cœur  
 l'Ontario, dans son île baptiste Birkmead, c'était là  
 que son père, un président presbytérien qui avait mené  
 son église à l'Union en 1925, avait écrit une grande par-  
 tie de ses sermons sous le pseudonyme de Ralph Connor.  
 et c'est dans cette région que King lui-même avait en ce  
 qu'il avait qualifié de «léger accrochage avec la GRC». Pendant l'été 1960 (alors que tout le monde s'inquiétait  
 demandant à King d'entrer en contact avec les Nations-  
 Unies. Et trois jours plus tard, celui-ci ne payait plus  
 retrouver sur la rivière Congo, à bord d'un traversier  
 qui l'amenait vivre bien des aventures en qualité  
 d'agent d'information pour les Nations-Unies. Ne dirait-on pas que King a vécu une vie passion-  
 nante, dans un cadre privilégié et sécurisant ? Tel a ef-  
 fectivement été le cas, dans une certaine mesure, et nul  
 doute que ses contacts lui ont souvent été utiles. Mais  
 moniques que King s'en est en fait servi pour semer des  
 idées progressistes et influencer la façon de penser des  
 décideurs, et non pour essayer de se hisser au pinacle de

présentation d'un modeste journaliste. King était un homme d'État, un diplomate, un homme d'État. Il n'était pas un journaliste. Sa modestie nous a tous fait sourire.

DANS LES ANNÉES 1920, ALORS QU'IL ÉTAIT TITULAIRE d'une bourse Rhodes, il ne faisait pas partie du Club d'athlétisme de l'Université. Avec Graham Spry, George Ferguson et d'autres, il a préféré former le groupe «Oh Canada!», dont les idées étaient plus conformes au futur Statut de Westminster. Dans un mémoire intitulé «Fifty Years On» (*Saturday Night*, juillet 1983), Eugene Forsey a évoqué de façon désopilante le rôle que Gordon joua aux côtés de Frank Underhill dans l'élaboration du projet de manifeste de Regina pour la première convention du CCF (*Co-operative Commonwealth Federation*). Et King était bien entendu de la partie à la naissance des Nations-Unies, en qualité de directeur-général en chef de la Nation, puis à titre de premier correspondant de Radio-Canada, jusqu'à son entrée en 1950 au Secrétariat de l'ONU. Il a participé, à plus d'un titre, à des événements comme la signature de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme, le rapatriement de 60 000 prisonniers de guerre de retour d'Union soviétique, le rétablissement de la Corée après une guerre désastreuse, l'envoi de forces de maintien de la paix dans le Sinaï et les opérations civiles au Congo. Au-delà de son indéniable foi dans les mérites des Nations-Unies, King Gordon était intimement convaincu que, si seulement les puissances moyennes unissaient leurs efforts, elles feraient beaucoup pour rendre le monde à la raison. Elles s'étaient réunies à San Francisco pour modifier la version provisoire d'une Charte internationale des puissances avait été conçue à Dumbarton Oaks – et King les avait déjà vues à l'œuvre dans le Sinaï et au Congo. Il avait fait de Mike Pearson et de Dag Hammarskjöld ses héros, deux personnages indispensables mais téméraires, tous deux originaires de puissances moyennes. La Conférence sur le droit de la guerre avait été pilotée par des avocats qui venaient, eux aussi, de tels pays. King avait souvent écrit sur le rôle du Canada en tant que puissance moyenne et, tel un Ulysse des temps modernes, il avait parcouru les mers du monde pour ajouter à plusieurs conférences *Pace in Maribus* ses paroles de sagesse. «Venez, mes amis. Il est encore temps de chercher un monde plus neut.»

EN 1985, LORS D'UNE ASSEMBLÉE DU GROUPE DES 78 à Stonely Lake, il avait évoqué ce matin où, pendant la guerre, dans une maison d'édition de New York, son collègue le poète Stephen Vincent Benet avait fait irruption en s'écriant : « Il faut déchirer toutes ces mappemondes. » Il avait aussi repris la remarque de Sonny Rikhy sur la première photographie de la terre prise depuis l'espace : «Le monde est non seulement rond, mais il forme aussi un tout.» King ne se lassait pas de parler de «biens» : Nord et Sud, opérations de maintien de la paix, Nouvel Ordre international, et droits de la personne. Mais pour lui, il ne s'agissait pas simplement de «biens»; le monde formait un tout. Tout comme on sent du terme, un véritable tout. □



avant la pauvreté endémique se vivant dans tous ces pays, devant le chômage et la faim, l'édifice apparaît bien fragile, et le défi à relever, de taille. □

Pour les dirigeants maghrébins, l'UMA non avec l'UMA.

Elle pourra sans doute bénéficier d'autres économiques viables.

A cet égard, peu après la signature du traité d'association L/U.M.A., les États du Conseil de coopération arabe, organisation constituée cette année à Bagdad et regroupant l'Irak, l'Égypte, leur intention d'établir des relations de coopération

Troisième question : qu'advient-il si l'UMA n'arrive pas, selon l'expression de la revue *The Economist*, à apporter du « consensus sur toutes les tables » ? Si les problèmes que vivent quotidiennement les Maghrébins ne sont pas réglés, si l'UMA ne contribue pas au mieux à être des familles, elle sera perçue comme un échec. Le marché européen unique, dont la mise en oeuvre doit avoir lieu en 1992, est une menace économique qui a poussé les chefs d'Etat du Maghreb à s'unir ; il faudra que l'UMA démontre effectivement qu'elle peut être un partenaire

Aucune autre rencontre entre Hassan II et le Front Polisario n'a suivi celle de janvier 1989, aucune négociation ne s'est poursuivie entre les deux camps et la date du référendum n'a pas été fixée.

Deuxièmement, si les membres de l'UMA ne réussissent pas à maintenir la stabilité sociale à l'intérieur de leurs frontières, ils seront peut-être obligés de se concentrer sur leurs problèmes in-

de nous ce que vous voulez». Si les premiers pas sont faits, la partie est loin d'être terminée au Sahara occidental. Le bon déroulement du référendum est un condition sine qua non pour que le Front Polisario accepte les

avaient proposé pour la première fois en 1976 que l'Algérie permette au peuple saharoui de décider lui-même de son sort. Lorsque l'hebdomadaire français *Le Point* (30 janvier 1989) lui a demandé si l'Algérie ne perdait le référendum, le président de la République a répondu au cours d'une conférence : « Si le vote s'est déroulé en toute liberté, nous nous présentons aux autorités marocaines et leur disons : Nous sommes Marocains, faites

Ce n'est que tout récemment que le roi Hassan II a accepté de rencontrer les dirigeants de l'organisation saharouie. Il a donné son aval à la tenue d'un référendum que les Nations-Unies avec le Front Polisario depuis lors.

D'abord, un conflit persiste qui, lui, pourrait trop de questions demeurent en suspens. L'Organisation : le conflit au Sahara occidental. Le Maroc revendique l'ancienne colonie espagnole depuis 1976 et il mène un conflit armé

LENTHOUSISME DES DIRIGEANTS MAGHRÉBINS NE  
suffit pas pour que l'on applaudisse à leurs initia-  
tives. Il existe plusieurs ombres au tableau, et

Par ailleurs, on a confié à l'Union le mandat d'engager une politique commune dans divers domaines afin de veiller à la réalisation du développement industriel, agricole, commercial et social des États membres. Il faut comprendre que l'U.M.A. est une véritable organisation ayant ses propres structures, ses comités, ses conseils. Le président de l'État des pays membres occupe et les chefs d'État des pays membres occupent le poste à tour de rôle; le président est actuellement

de rapprochement des dirigeants maghrébins et pour cela, il est vrai que le traité concrétise les énormes efforts diplomatiques déployés depuis des mois. Le texte de la déclaration officielle affirme que l'Union est un « ensemble solide » qui contribue à l'« enrichissement du dialogue international ». L'UMA veillera de plus à renforcer « l'indépendance des pays du Maghreb arabe unitaire et à sauvegarder leurs acquis ». Elle devra en outre « agir de concert avec la collectivité internationale, en faveur de l'instauration d'un ordre mondial où prédomine la justice, la dignité, la liberté les droits de l'Homme, et marqué par la

Le U.M.A., ce qu'il faut, bien sûr, rester à voir. Samedi 18 février, la Presse de Tunis jubile. A une, en lettres bleues, un immense titre le confirme : « Le Maghreb uni ». Pour le président. Ben Ali, « l'agit d'un choix politique fondamental. Mais qu'on lui signe, au fait, ces chets d'Eia ? L'Union vient d'abord consolider les intentions

socialisme, on a mis un an au régime absolu du P.L.N. en intégrant le multipartisme, et l'on a réduit le rôle de l'armée.

De nombreux observateurs ont soutenu que le gouvernement algérien, trop préoccupé qu'il est à résoudre ses problèmes internes, délaissera

Le président Chadli a choisi la voie la plus sage : il a promis d'être à l'écoute de son peuple. Ce dernier a du reste réélu massivement en décembre 1988 à la tête du pays. Pour accéder véritablement aux demandes des Algériens, le gouvernement devait également élaborer une nouvelle constitution : elle fut adoptée au cours d'un référendum en février 1989. Elle répond ainsi aux desirs de changement et de renouveau : on y a rayé le terme

En réalité, les émeutes étaient prévisibles; le parti-Etat, avec sa structure vieillotte modelée à l'image soviétique, tournait en rond. En privatisant l'industrie lourde basée sur les hydrocarbures, en faisant de ce secteur la principale source de recettes (95 p. 100 de l'Erat, le FLN a causé plus de tort que de bien au pays; lorsque le prix du brut a chuté en 1986, le chaos économique était inévitable. Les quelques réformes apportées par le gouvernement n'ont aidé en rien : les Algériens, dont les deux tiers sont nés après 1962, année de la proclamation de l'indépendance, avaient faim, ils étaient avides de renouveau et de liberté, et ils manifestèrent leur colère contre la profonde dont les sources vomi bien

Si LA L'UNION A REUSSI A MODIFIER SES STRUCTURES politiques-sociales sans effusion de sang, il en est tout autrement pour l'Algérie. Certes, le 22 février dernier, les Algériens se sont dotés d'une nouvelle constitution, mais à quel prix ? Ils ont tous près d'un milliard les couteux qui marquent le mois d'octobre 1988; en tous cas ils n'ont pas oublié la violence avec laquelle le régime a tenu de les réprimer : arrestations arbitraires, coups et tortures. Une réaction qui a semé la stupeur tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur du pays : comment le FLN (Front de la libération nationale) le parti qui avait pourtant mené son peuple à l'indépendance, a-t-il pu agir de la sorte et

pour la première fois de leur histoire. Le président Ben Ali, seul candidat en lice, a recu plus de 99 p. 100 des suffrages. L'Assemblée législative tunisienne n'a pas été modifiée : les 141 sièges sont allés au parti au pouvoir, le Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD). Les partis d'opposition ont critiqué le déroulement des élections : si le multipartisme est désormais permis en Tunisie, il faudra attendre encore pour que les diverses formations politiques participent de plain-pied aux rouages de la démocratie et aient des représentants élus à la Chambre.

Les Tunisiens ont été appelés à élire leur président



# LE GRAND MAGHREB, UN MYTHE DEVENU REALITE ?

*L'Union du Maghreb arabe réussira-t-elle à mettre du couscous*

*sur toutes les tables ?*

PAR JULIE MORIN

des jeunes a peine sortis des institutions scolaires, voilà, Ben Ali n'est pas Bourguiba : les querelles entre Kaddafi et l'ancien président tunisien sont motorisées et on se souvient que leurs relations se sont refroidies à maintes reprises, jusqu'à la rupture des relations diplomatiques en septembre 1985. Le nouveau régime, obliant les querelles passées, entend donc entretenir de bonnes relations avec la Libye, malgré certaines divergences qui séparent les deux gouvernements. À Tunis, comme ailleurs, on se méfie des élans excessifs

de Kaddafi.

« Ils ont fait, après de nombreuses années de désaccord sur la question du Sahara occidental : le 6 mars 1976, le Front Polisario, organisation

Après toutes ces années de querelle, les pré-  
sentes relations diplomatiques avec l'Algérie.  
main de cette déclaration, le Maroc a mis fin à  
l'Algérie n'a pas du tout pu au Maroc. Le lende-  
immédiatement; or, ce geste de la part de l'Etat  
hammed Abdelaziz, que l'Algérie a reconnue  
blique arabe saharouie, sous la présidence de Mo-  
saharienne qui revenait à l'indépendance de cette  
colonie espagnole, à proclamer la Répu-

Un an plus tard, soit le 16 mai 1988, l'Algérie

et le Maroc ont repris leurs relations diplomatiques. En février dernier, tout juste avant le sommet, Hassan II a reçu le président Chadi!

Bendjedid, puis le 3 mars dernier, les deux chefs d'Etat ont réglé un litige frontalier en ratifiant la Convention de 1972 qui délimitait des centaines

de kilomètres de frontière entre les deux pays. Ce tournant décisif dans les relations entre l'Algérie et le Maroc a eu tout de même une conséquence

fâcheuse : l'isolement du Front Polisario. L'Al-gérie a signé l'article 15 de la constitution de l'UMA qui stipule que « les États membres s'en-

gagent à ne tolérer sur leur territoire aucune activité ou mouvement pouvant porter atteinte à la sécurité ou à l'intégrité territoriale d'un Etat

compte sur l'aide algérienne.

Quant à la méditerranée, a qui l'Espagne avait cédé la partie sud du Sahara occidental, elle a signé un traité de paix avec le Front Polisario en

BN KHALDOUN, CÉLÈBRE HISTORIEN ET SOCIO-  
logue tunisien du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, dans sa magis-  
trale *Histoire des Berbères*, rappelle que les  
Arabes avaient nommé «Maghreb» (Occi-  
dent) tout le territoire situé à l'ouest du golfe de  
Syrie, et «Machreb» (Orient), les terres situées à  
l'est. Le Grand Maghreb regroupe aujourd'hui  
cinq pays : la Libye, la Tunisie, l'Algérie, le  
Maroc et la Mauritanie. Leurs chefs d'Etat sont,  
respectivement, le colonel Mouammar Kaddafi,  
le président Ben Ali, le président Chadli Benja-  
bid, le roi Hassan II et le colonel Ould Taye.  
Le récit d'Ibn Khaldoun tend compte d'un

passés riches et tumultueux, un passé qui a laissé de profondes empreintes similaires çà et là au Maghreb : les dialectes près, la même langue, soit l'arabe. Ce sont les contours profondément musulmans, leurs minarets, insérés au cœur des villes, appellent les fidèles à la prière, de la Méditerranée jusqu'aux confins du désert. Ce sont des pays riches, qui malgré leurs luttes, querelles et différends, rêvent longtemps d'une union. Il a fallu attendre le Sommet de Marrakech, qu'on eût les dirigeants maghrébins en février 1989, pour que l'idée d'une union, d'un Grand Maghreb qui réunirait les cinq pays, vint finalement au jour. La concrétisation de l'Union du Maghreb arabe (UMA) a toutefois suivi une route sinueuse et

En décembre 1988, un an après la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre Tunis et Tripoli, la capitale de l'Etat tunisien accueillait le leader de la révolution libyenne. C'était la première visite officielle de Kadhafi en Tunisie depuis la déchéance de Bourguiba et l'accession de Ben Ali au pouvoir, en

novembre 1987.

Le chef d'Etat libyen est reparti trois jours plus tard après avoir tenu des propos qui ont choqué quelque peu : il s'en est pris aux pays occidentaux, en particulier aux Etats-Unis, et a commandé à Yasser Arafat qui avait reconnu l'Etat d'Israël. Sa visite a toutefois été des plus fructueuses : le colonel a accordé à la Tunisie des subventions importantes. Les deux chefs d'Etat ont conclu un accord pour la réalisation de projets que les deux pays voisins avaient laissés en suspens, comme par exemple la construction

La Tunisie ne pouvait demander mieux. Le pays, comme du reste tous les pays du Maghreb, est rattrapé par une dure crise économique. Le taux de chômage est élevé, et la Tunisie se retrouve avec un trop-plein de cadres, dont beaucoup sont

**Mario Proulx (Radio-Canada) :** On a eu l'impression, quand la nouvelle a été annoncée, que l'abandon des sous-marins nucléaires était en quelque sorte politique mais symbolique dans le sens où c'est impossible de couper l'aide moyen de rationaliser la mission confiée aux Forces canadiennes. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous qu'elles soient déjà trop peu nombreuses pour rapport au travail à effectuer ? Et que pourrions-nous faire pour remédier à cela ?

**Fen Hampson :** Je suis d'accord avec vous pour dire que nous n'avons plus beaucoup de marge de manœuvre et que nous allons en avoir encore moins dans les années à venir. Je ne suis pas d'accord avec M. Ross, je ne pense pas que l'influence d'un pays dans la coopération internationale soit fonction de sa contribution financière, que ce soit à la défense de l'OTAN, au maintien de la paix ou à autre chose. Voilà une conception de l'influence qui ressemble à celle d'un comptable ...

Je pense que la plus grave menace qui pèse actuellement sur la sécurité internationale ne réside pas dans le conflit Est-Ouest. Certes, il y aurait là des possibilités de menaces, mais en réalité, ce qui met vraiment la sécurité internationale en péril, ce sont les conflits régionaux, à savoir les conflits qui éclatent pour la plupart dans le tiers-monde ... Un grand nombre d'entre eux portent que nous ne réduisons pas notre aide au développement, au moment justement où beaucoup de ces problèmes s'aggravent au lieu de se résorber.

**Mark Clark (Modèle 5) :** Je suis frappé de constater que les militaires canadiens se sont toujours efforcés d'inter à plus petite échelle les grandes puissances militaires en gardant une armée, une marine et une aviation raisonnablement complètes ... Seulement, je me demande s'il ne serait pas temps de renoncer à cette fiction et, peut-être, d'en jeter un peu par-dessus bord, de reconnaître que nous ne pouvons pas tout faire et conserver cette miniature des grandes puissances militaires du monde.



**Douglas Ross :** Je pense que vous avez tout à fait raison — il faut se délester de quelques sacs, si je puis dire, et peut-être que les forces terrestres ne vont plus servir désormais qu'à assurer le maintien de la paix à l'échelle internationale. Mais est-ce qu'on va nous donner les moyens de transport dont nous avons besoin pour emmener nos forces en Europe ? Non, certainement pas, du moins pas d'ici les quelques prochains budgets de ce gouvernement. L'Amérique du Nord est-elle plus menacée qu'apparaît sur le plan militaire ? Je le crois. En fait, la défense aérienne va se révéler être un véritable trou noir, qui va très probablement engloutir la totalité du budget de défense d'ici la fin du siècle. D'autant plus que le projet de mise au point des missiles de croisière avancée à grands pas ... Alors, nous allons avoir impérativement besoin d'un minimum de défense aérienne ... Sinon, nous pourrions toujours demander aux Américains de renforcer considérablement leur présence sur notre territoire pour nous fournir cette défense minimale.

**Kenneth Calder :** Je ne pense pas que nous soyons en position de jeter quoi que ce soit par-dessus bord. Je crois que nous allons probablement devoir faire les choses à une échelle un peu moins grande que prévu. Comment un pays borde de trois océans, qui a le littoral le plus long du monde, peut-il se passer de marine par exemple ? Comme Doug le faisait remarquer tout à l'heure, nous sommes effectivement menacés par les bombardiers et les missiles de croisière soviétiques. Comment le Canada peut-il se passer de défense aérospatiale et d'une forme ou d'une autre de forces aériennes ... ? Si nous n'avions rien d'autre au monde, nous voudrions probablement avoir une aviation, ne serait-ce que pour savoir ce qui se passe à l'intérieur du pays ... Comment pouvons-nous réduire nos effectifs en Europe alors que nous appartenons à une alliance collective sur laquelle pèse une menace conventionnelle d'envergure venant surtout du théâtre européen ... et plus particulièrement dans le contexte des négociations de la limitation des armements qui se déroulent actuellement en Europe ? Même au Canada, les participants de la limitation des armements reconnaissent qu'il est important de laisser nos forces en Europe et de continuer à faire partie de l'équation européenne.

**Kenneth Calder :** Ce que le gouvernement a dit, c'est que les paramètres du Livre blanc restent inchangés, qu'ils correspondent encore à sa politique. Vous vous êtes surtout attachés aux programmes qui ont été exposés dans le Livre blanc précité pour nous permettre d'atteindre ces objectifs. Le gouvernement dit la chose suivante : les objectifs restent valables. Je m'explique : en dépit de ces compressions budgétaires, la politique canadienne en matière de sécurité va continuer de reposer sur les trois piliers que sont la défense et la sécurité collective, la limitation des armements et le désarmement, et le règlement pacifique des différends ... Les programmes qui ont été reportés et suspendus ne l'ont pas été pour des raisons politiques, nous parce que les objectifs ont changé, mais parce qu'il n'y a pas d'argent. Si la situation mondiale avait suffisamment changé depuis 1987 pour justifier une analyse stratégique entièrement nouvelle alors, nous pourrions peut-être envisager d'écrire un nouveau Livre blanc. Or, nous estimons que cela n'est pas encore le cas. Contrairement à ce que disent un grand nombre de ses critiques, le ministère de la Défense nationale admet que les choses ont changé depuis 1987, qu'elles ne sont plus ce qu'elles étaient dans les relations Est-Ouest, en Union soviétique, etc ... Mais à notre avis, elles n'ont pas changé au point de justifier pour l'instant un nouveau Livre blanc.



HAROLD KLEPAK

D'APRÈS LES PLANS DE DÉPENSES, QUE PEUT-ON DÉDUIRE DES PRIORITÉS DU GOUVERNEMENT POUR

les années 1990 en matière de politique étrangère ? Je partage un peu avec M. Ross ce qu'il vient de dire. L'impact du budget va être limité. Ce qu'on voit ici n'est pas un changement de priorités extraordinaire, le budget est la priorité et je pense qu'on voit que les grandes lignes de la politique étrangère canadienne n'ont pas changé.

Dans ces grandes lignes, on veut nous donner la possibilité de « multiplier » nos rapports avec les États-Unis. En ce qui concerne l'Europe, les avancées sont assez évidentes depuis les années 1970 et les expériences que nous avons eues. Il est beaucoup plus facile, cette année, de parler de coupures de budget parce qu'on peut le faire sans être de haut profil dans les relations internationales quand on les regarde globalement. L'Australie en 1987 publiait un Livre blanc de la défense qui promettait une politique beaucoup plus poussée et de l'argent supplémentaire pour la défense. Deux ans plus tard, pour des raisons budgétaires, on voit qu'il y a quand même un retranchement. La Nouvelle-Zélande, un peu la même chose mais même plus frappant évidemment la cause de la presque sortie de ce pays de l'Alliance avec les États-Unis. Alors pour Washington, il y a des pays qui font beaucoup plus de tort à la situation globale que le Canada et c'est beaucoup plus facile pour nous de faire des coupures et de se maintenir comme bon allié des États-Unis.

L'ONU et le maintien de la paix, cette question de

viens de plus en plus importante. On voit des opérations arriver un peu partout ... ce n'est pas une exagération ... on parle de plusieurs autres possibilités ... on est à peu près partout et on a été toujours partout lorsqu'on nous demande de faire quelque chose. Évidemment nous avons des règles là-dessus mais si on nous demande de participer et si nous pouvons participer de façon correcte, on le fait. Alors des coupures dans la défense qui seraient ... qui sont comme celles que nous connaissons maintenant, pourraient avoir un impact là-dessus.

J'aimerais terminer en disant que, à mon avis, les questions de maintien de la paix et le lien avec l'aide internationale, notre engagement vers l'extérieur, vers le tiers-monde me préoccupent le plus de toutes ces questions traitées. Je pense que nous sommes dans une situation assez spéciale : le Canada est très actif au sein du Commonwealth, de la Francophonie, à l'ONU, dans les opérations de maintien de la paix, à l'OTAN, au sein du NORAD, etc. ... C'est un pays très lié au système international, c'est un pays engagé. Alors je pense que les opérations de maintien de la paix sont la sauvegarde de la capacité des forces armées d'agir, non seulement comme force logistique dans ces opérations, mais aussi avec l'infanterie. Évidemment la question du Nord et de la souveraineté est pour beaucoup liée à la question des sous-marins nucléaires. Je pense que c'est une des grandes questions pour nous : comment procéder maintenant pour remplir nos engagements et pour maintenir une vraie souveraineté dans le Nord.

TEN HAMPSON

LES ÉVÉNEMENTS DES QUELQUES DERNIERS JOURS SONT VÉRITABLEMENT REMARQUABLES. LA RÉDUCTION DES PROGRAMMES D'ACQUISITION DE MATÉRIEL DE DÉFENSE ET LA MISE EN VIGILANCE DES OBJECTIFS ÉNONCÉS PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DANS SON LIVRE BLANC

mais les engagements que le gouvernement a pris à l'égard des paramètres fondamentaux du Livre blanc étaient de pure théorie, rien de plus : il ne s'agissait en effet que d'un ensemble de promesses sur papier, sans aucune explication sur les moyens dont on disposait pour les tenir. L'objet du Livre blanc était de prévoir les besoins du Canada en matière de défense d'ici le début du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle et d'élaborer des programmes solides et prévisibles de financement. Tout juste deux ans plus tard, les Ca-

« Si la situation mondiale

avait suffisamment changé

depuis 1987 pour justifier une

analyse stratégique entière-

ment nouvelle alors, nous

pourrions peut-être envisager

d'écrire un nouveau Livre

blanc. »

« Ce que je vois se dessiner

d'une façon générale, c'est

une marginalisation de plus

en plus nette de la politique


de défense du Canada et, par

conséquence, de sa politique

étrangère. »

internationale ? Y a-t-il certains types de missions qui sont plus en accord

avec les objectifs et les buts de notre politique étrangère ? ... Certains prétendent qu'à l'avenir, notre sécurité sera essentiellement menacée par les trafiquants de drogue, les immigrants qui franchissent illégalement nos frontières et nos côtes, les déversements de pétrole et la pollution, et le pillage des ressources naturelles dans nos eaux littorales. Y a-t-il un volet militaire dans ce genre d'opérations de sécurité non traditionnelles, ou devons-nous mettre sur pied des forces spéciales qui vont s'occuper de ces menaces nouvelles et de plus en plus fortes qui pèsent sur notre sécurité ? ... Il y a d'importantes leçons à tirer des événements de la semaine dernière, des leçons qui se rapportent au mode de planification de nos ne soient pas apprises et que la bureaucratie continue de dire qu'il n'y a pas de problèmes.



allons aussi nous procurer de nouveaux hélicoptères pour la marine ... et des dragueurs de mines pour la Réserve navale ... À court terme, toutefois, le Ministère va envisager des solutions de rechange pour se doter d'une ma-

rine modernisée et efficace. Les forces canadiennes vont demeurer en Europe, et les effectifs vont rester à leurs niveaux actuels. Mais nous n'augmenterons pas nos effectifs militaires en Europe comme prévu dans le Livre blanc. À courte échéance, nous allons suspendre le renforcement de nos forces sur le continent eu-

ropéen, ce qui signifie non seulement que le projet relatif au char de combat sera interrompu pour l'instant, mais aussi que nous n'achèterons pas d'autres pièces d'équipement importantes pour nos forces aériennes et terrestres en Europe. En ce qui concerne la région septentrionale de l'OTAN, nous allons nous en tenir à notre engagement et laisser un bataillon d'infanterie dans le

nord de la Norvège. Pour ce qui est du maintien de la paix, nous allons veiller à nous doter des ressources nécessaires afin de répondre aux demandes raisonnables qui vont nous être faites à ce chapitre, où que ce soit dans le monde.

J'en viens maintenant aux effectifs de la Première réserve au Canada. Nous n'allons pas pouvoir atteindre l'objectif de 65 000 hommes fixé dans le Livre blanc. Nous allons construire moins de centres d'instruction de la Milice et annuler certains projets d'acquisition d'équipement pour les réserves. Nous allons toutefois continuer de développer et de mettre en œu-

vre le concept de la «force totale». Malgré tout cela, nous prévoyons en fait une expansion des réserves. Étant donné les restrictions financières, qui sont notre contribution à la réduction du déficit, nous allons devoir limiter les frais de personnel du Ministère pour régler nos autres lacunes et poursuivre certains de nos programmes de ré-équipement. Il va donc nous falloir renoncer à porter l'effectif de la force régulière à 90 000 hommes. Nous nous dirigeons en fait vers des effectifs un peu plus modestes que ceux que nous avons aujourd'hui.

Enfin, et il s'agit là d'un sujet auquel le public s'intéresse tout particulièrement, nous allons fermer plusieurs bases et stations des Forces canadiennes et réorganiser les fonctions de certaines autres ... Le gouvernement reste néanmoins déterminé à relever, à plus long terme, le taux de croissance réelle des bud-

gets militaires, ce qui devrait permettre au Ministère de se rapprocher des objectifs énoncés dans le Livre blanc.

## LOIS WILSON

J'AIMERAIS COMMENCER en disant que l'aide ex-

tréture accordée par le Canada diminue tous les ans depuis 1984. Pas de façon très marquée, je l'admets, puisque nous avons tout de même enregistré des résultats relativement satisfaisants; mais en 1984, l'aide extérieure représentait 0,5 p. 100 du PNB, alors qu'en 1988, ce ratio était tombé à 0,46 p. 100 et que cette année, le budget prévoit un taux de 0,43 p. 100. Notre premier ministre avait promis que d'ici 1995, l'aide aux pays étrangers aurait atteint 0,6 p. 100 du PNB. Reste à savoir si le gouvernement pourra tenir cette promesse.

Hommes les États-Unis, le Canada est le seul pays dont l'aide extérieure ait ainsi diminué entre 1984 et 1989. Ce qui est plus inquiétant, c'est de constater que l'essentiel des compressions à ce chapitre va se faire au détriment de l'aide alimentaire. Par exemple, on va réduire l'aide alimentaire de 66 millions de dollars, tandis que 67 millions vont être affectés au dément-

Deuxièmement, j'aimerais préciser que sept ministères sont visés par les réductions de dépenses, mais que l'aide extérieure est le seul poste pour lequel on va enregistrer une réelle diminution de crédits.

Troisièmement ... on pourrait dans un sens dire du Canada qu'il abandonne les «deux tiers-mondes» [les deux tiers du monde les plus peuplés et les moins riches en ressources], juste au moment où ils atteignent à leur

propre crise d'endettement et essaient de rembourser leurs emprunts. Avec la hausse des taux d'intérêt, je pense que les pays en développement vont avoir de plus en plus de difficultés à remonter la pente. On peut se demander quelle est la responsabilité du Canada dans ce problème ...

## L'imaginer.

«... le demi-million de personnes dépossédées de leur maison par la tornade qui a balayé le Bangladesh ... ne peuvent pas dire leur mot ... mais vont ressentir les effets des coupures d'une manière plus aiguë que la plupart d'entre nous ne peut l'imaginer.»

«Il est tout simplement ridicule de ne revoir sérieusement notre position de défense que tous les quinze ans ...»

Quatrièmement ... je pense que la réduction de l'aide extérieure est moralement choquante si on la replace dans le contexte de l'affluence relative du Canada. Mais comme l'a dit M. Wood, les victimes sont malheureusement très loin d'ici. Les Indonésiens n'ont pas le droit de vote, et ce sont eux qui vont ressentir l'effet des compressions. Je vois donc que le débat est essentiellement axé sur la scène nationale, et non pas tant sur le contexte international des responsabilités du Canada.

## DOUGLAS ROSS

Je PENSE QU'ON A BEAUCOUP TROP ACCORDÉ d'attention au rôle de provocations soulevé par l'incidence des augmentations d'impôts. Tous ces discours sur le sup-posé «raz-de-marée fiscal» et sur notre énorme dette qui fait du Canada, comme l'a dit Peter Newman, un Zaire peuple d'ours polaires, me paraissent vraiment exagérés ... Il y a beaucoup de moyens pour combler le déficit que nous n'avons pas utilisés ... D'une façon générale, le gouvernement ne s'en est pas pris aux profits des sociétés, il n'a pas cherché à réquisitionner les ressources financières des plus nantis pour assurer une contribution raisonnable à l'ordre international et préserver notre capacité de mettre en œuvre des politiques extérieures et de défense efficaces. J'estime que ces compressions budgétaires sont mal indiquées et qu'elles arrivent à un mauvais moment. Je n'hésiterais certainement pas à reprendre les remarques de Lois Wilson, qui a qualifié de «grave erreur» ces coupures dans le bud-

Passons maintenant à notre capacité générale de payer et de contribuer. Quand on regarde la contribution canadienne au cours des vingt dernières années, nous voyons qu'elle a diminué régulièrement, tant au plan de la politique de défense qu'à celui de l'aide internationale au développement. À la fin des années 1960, ces deux postes représentaient largement plus de 3 p. 100 du PNB; nous en sommes maintenant à près de 2,7 p. 100 ...

... Si nous comparons notre cas à celui des Pays-Bas, de la Norvège ou du Danemark, nous nous en tirons très mal. Prenons l'exemple des Pays-Bas qui, entre 1967 et 1987, ont systématiquement consacré ces deux postes un total d'environ 4,3 à 4,4 p. 100 de leur PNB à l'ordre international. En vingt ans, il y a cependant eu une redistribution : les dépenses militaires sont tombées de 3,8 à 3 p. 100 du PNB, la part de l'aide internationale au développement ayant augmenté en proportion. Même chose pour la Norvège. Ses dépenses en matière de défense ont chuté de 3,5 à 3,1 p. 100 du PNB, tandis que l'aide au développement est passée de 0,17 à 1,09 p. 100 du PNB. Il y a même des membres de l'OTAN qui consacrent plus de 1 p. 100 de leur produit national brut à l'aide au développement !

Quelle est l'incidence des réductions de dépenses sur la défense ? Ce que je vois se dessiner d'une façon générale, c'est une marginalisation de plus en plus nette de la politique de défense du Canada et, par ricochet, de sa politique étrangère. Nous ne nous exprimons pas sur les grandes questions d'actualité internationale, et ce n'est pas une coïncidence. On ne prend pas le genre d'initiatives dynamiques qu'un pays jouissant d'une sécurité aussi affirmée que la nôtre devrait prendre.

Nous n'avons rien à craindre ? Avec la technologie moderne, les techniques de plus en plus perfectionnées des systèmes d'armes stratégiques, je pense que nous sommes effectivement de plus en plus menacés. Si nous participons à la modernisation du NORAD, si nous avons initié à envisager de plus en plus sérieusement un renforcement massif de nos moyens de défense côtière, c'est précisément à cause de l'avènement de nouveaux missiles de croisière perfectionnés et des SLBM (missiles balistiques lancés de sous-marins), capables de détruire des cibles renforcées ...

À très juste titre, nous avons accepté de faire notre part pour essayer de stabiliser la dissuasion. Est-ce que ce nous nous acquittons de cette obligation avec ce budget ? Non, nous avons au contraire choisi de nous dérober, nous disons simplement aux États-Unis : «Désolés, vous allez devoir le faire pour nous ...»



# LE BUDGET FÉDÉRAL : ET LA POLITIQUE DE DÉFENSE

## UNE TABLE RONDE EN PRÉSENCE DES MÉDIAS

Le 2 mai 1989, l'ICPSI a commandité une table ronde sur les répercussions qu'auront les fortes

compressions financières annoncées dans le budget du 27 avril sur la politique de défense et la politique étrangère. Un groupe de spécialistes réuni par l'ICPSI a fait de brefs exposés, pour répondre ensuite aux questions des représentants de la presse écrite et électronique. Aux quatre coins du Canada, les journalistes intéressés ont pu participer à l'événement par un relais audio. Voici des extraits du débat.

### LES MEMBRES DU GROUPE

KENNETH CALDER

Directeur général - Planification des politiques,

ministère de la Défense nationale

FENN OSLER HAMPTON

Chargé de recherche à l'ICPSI, Professeur agrégé à

l'Université Carleton

HAROLD KLEPAK

Professeur d'études stratégiques,

Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean

DOUGLAS ROSS

Professeur de relations internationales,

Université Simon Fraser

LOIS WILSON

Présidente du Conseil économique des églises; ancien

membre du conseil d'administration de l'ICPSI

BERNARD WOOD

Directeur général de l'ICPSI

EN PLANIFIANT CETTE

BERNARD WOOD

des liens entre le budget, la politique de défense et la politique étrangère, nous n'avons pas la moindre idée des répercussions qu'aurait le budget dans ce secteur de la politique nationale. Nous avons voulu savoir ce que celui-ci révélait au sujet des priorités du gouvernement pour les années à venir. En fait, nous voyons à présent que l'aide extérieure et la défense, deux postes comptant pour 14 p. 100 des dépenses fédérales, ont subi 60 p. 100 de toutes les coupures budgétaires prévues pour l'an prochain et près de 50 p. 100 de celle de l'année suivante.

Si j'ai parlé en premier de l'aide extérieure, c'est parce que c'est de loin le poste de dépenses qui a subi les réductions les plus sévères, toutes proportions gardées. Les dépenses à ce titre vont en effet être réduites de 12 p. 100. Quant aux dépenses de la Défense, elles vont continuer de croître légèrement en termes absolus, même si le gouvernement a de toute évidence renoncé, comme il s'y était engagé, à faire en sorte que l'augmentation du budget soit toujours supérieure de 2 p. 100 au taux d'inflation.

Les bénéficiaires de l'aide extérieure ne pourront pas se faire entendre comme les Canadiens et Canadiennes touchés par le budget. Je crains que le demi-million de personnes dépossédées la semaine dernière ne voient pas vos reportages et ne puissent pas dire leur mot. Mais nul doute que ces gens vont ressentir les effets des coupures d'une manière plus aiguë que la plupart d'entre nous ne peut l'imaginer.

Du côté de la défense, les réductions budgétaires n'ont profité à personne. Il me semble assez évident que le déficit est le grand gagnant, mais nous allons tous y perdre si nous n'obtenons pas l'occasion de ce changement radical pour procéder à une réévaluation sérieuse et approfondie de nos engagements et de nos moyens en matière de défense, d'une part, et de toute notre politique de sécurité dans le contexte international de l'heure, d'autre part. Au Canada, l'essentiel du débat politique tournera probablement autour de la fermeture des bases militaires. Si l'aide aux collectivités et aux travailleurs touchés doit à juste titre rester pour nous tous une priorité légitime, ce n'est pas cela qui, dans les années 1990, va nous permettre de définir nos politiques en matière de défense.

Quelles sont les répercussions sur le plan international? Nos commissions budgétaires ne passeront certainement pas inaperçues, mais d'après les chiffres de l'Institut, le Canada reste au sixième rang des pays de l'OTAN pour ce qui est de l'importance des dépenses militaires et au sixième rang mondial pour l'aide extérieure. Vu notre position, nous n'avons pas à rougir face à nos alliés de l'OTAN. Exception faite des États-Unis qui, après tout,

sont une puissance mondiale, nous sommes le seul pays de l'OTAN à laisser des milliers de soldats à des milliers de kilomètres de ses côtes. Nous nous sommes engagés à ne pas rapatrier ces soldats tant qu'il dureraient les négociations de désarmement... Le Canada s'étant distingué comme nul autre dans le domaine du maintien de la paix et ayant mis sur pied un programme d'aide extérieure très respecté, désormais supérieur à celui de la Grande-Bretagne, les «casques bleus» et les pacificateurs canadiens vont être de plus en plus demandés dans de nombreuses régions du monde où de nouvelles voies menant à la paix sont peut-être en train de s'ouvrir. Tel est, à mon avis, le contexte actuel de notre politique de sécurité et de notre politique étrangère; comment pouvons-nous tirer le meilleur parti possible des ressources dont nous disposons, dans l'intérêt des objectifs auxquels la population canadienne souscrit?

KENNETH CALDER

IL A ÉTÉ DÉCIDÉ DANS

le budget que le ministère de la Défense nationale recevrait, au cours des cinq prochaines années, 2,74 milliards de dollars de moins que prévu. Le budget de la Défense va tout de même connaître une croissance réelle pendant cette période. Toutefois, cette croissance ne sera pas suffisante pour que nous puissions mettre en œuvre les programmes décrits dans le Livre blanc aussi intégralement qu'aussi rapidement que nous l'avions espéré. Il va nous falloir retarder la réalisation de certains objectifs de défense, annuler des programmes et en réduire d'autres, tandis que plusieurs projets vont être mis en attente...

Nous savons tous maintenant que le gouvernement n'a pas l'intention de donner suite au programme des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. En outre, nos projets d'acquisition d'avions de patrouille à grande autonomie, de dispositifs d'observation nocturne, de nouveaux CF-18 et du système de repérage de cibles et de surveillance aérienne par véhicule téléguide vont être annulés. Les programmes d'acquisition concernant les véhicules tout-terrain pour le Nord, l'équipement des avions-écoles pour la guerre électronique, les radios pour les forces terrestres et les appareils d'avionique pour les CF-5 vont être réduits. L'acquisition de véhicules blindés légers pour la Milice est remise à plus tard, et notre projet relatif au char de combat est mis de côté pour l'instant. Nous allons cependant continuer la mise en œuvre au Canada du programme de modernisation du système de défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord, tel qu'il a été prévu de le faire et de le financer.

Les deux phases du programme de remplacement des frégates et de modernisation des destroyers de la classe *Tribal* vont se poursuivre. Nous

OR, LA CONSTITUTION D'UN MARCHÉ LIBRE ET ouvert n'est probablement pas la meilleure solution. Il ne ferait que permettre aux principales sociétés aérospatiales américaines de récupérer la majorité ou la totalité des travaux de pointe effectués au Canada, en laissant pour compte les sociétés de moindre importance. Le gouvernement canadien doit veiller à ce que les entreprises obtiennent une part équitable des contrats les plus importants signés dans les domaines clés.

Pour ce qui est de la défense continentale dans son ensemble, le Canada doit toujours se soucier de protéger sa propre souveraineté en signant de réels contrats de société avec les États-Unis. Il doit pour le moins en faire suffisamment pour que les Américains ne se sentent pas obligés d'assumer toutes les responsabilités, ou du moins un grand nombre d'entre elles, en vue d'assurer leur propre protection. C'est un concept depuis longtemps

signer des accords de compensation dans d'autres secteurs industriels. Les compagnies canadiennes ne devraient pas se contenter de fournir des pièces détachées ou de chercher sur les satellites et autres systèmes canadiens devant participer aux travaux de recherche sur les satellites et autres systèmes con-

Le Canada devra se tenir informé sur les progrès technologiques réalisés dans le domaine de la surveillance aérienne, sinon, il risque d'être soupçonné de ne pas s'intéresser sérieusement à un secteur qui est pour lui si crucial. L'industrie canadienne devra participer aux travaux de recherche sur les satellites et autres systèmes con-

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Le Rapport final du Groupe de travail soutenait qu'une planification intégrée de l'état de préparation des industries de défense, avec le ministère américain de la Défense, était pour le Canada la méthode la plus viable d'augmenter l'endurance de ses forces. « Dans la mesure du possible, l'approvisionnement en vue de la période d'intensification coordonnée en offre des sources garanties

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
Le problème se pose de façon passablement différente pour ce qui est des engagements à l'égard de l'OTAN. Ici, l'objectif consiste à renforcer l'état de préparation et l'endurance des défenses de l'Alliance en consolidant l'infrastructure industrielle nord-américaine de défense et en veillant à ce qu'elle puisse servir à assurer un approvisionnement régulier de forces et de fournitures en cas de conflit grave. C'est là un élément jugé indispensable à la dissuasion, plus particulièrement dans l'éventualité d'une guerre prolongée entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

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1 Voir Peter Calamai, « Report urges closer defence ties with US », *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 juillet 1988. Le groupe mentionné était le Groupe de travail sur l'état de la préparation de l'industrie de la défense, formé en 1985 par le Comité de gestion de la Défense, au ministère de la Défense nationale.

2 Le rapport en question était intitulé : « The Environment for Expanding the North American Industrial Base », MDN (juin 1987).

3 Le Rapport final s'intitule : L'état de préparation de l'industrie de la défense : une assise de la défense, MDN (novembre 1987).

4 Voir Peter Calamai, « Report urges closer defence ties with US », *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 juillet 1988. Le groupe mentionné était le Groupe de travail sur l'état de la préparation de l'industrie de la défense, formé en 1985 par le Comité de gestion de la Défense, au ministère de la Défense nationale.

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7 Le rapport en question était intitulé : « The Environment for Expanding the North American Industrial Base », MDN (juin 1987).



# LES PÉRILS DE L'INTÉGRATION DE LA DÉFENSE

*La formation avec les E.-U. d'un marché commun des produits de  
défense ne doit pas porter atteinte à la capacité du Canada de  
mener sa propre politique de défense.*

PAR ROGER HILL

QUELQUES MOIS À PEINE APRÈS AVOIR TERMINÉ SON  
premier rapport, en juin 1987, le Groupe de travail  
avait quelque peu changé de ton. Dans son Rap-  
port final, publié en novembre 1987, on ne parlait  
plus d'un «marché commun» des produits de la  
défense, ni de suppression des barrières dans le  
domaine de la défense nationale, mais on préco-  
nisait plutôt une démarche progressive, qui com-  
mencerait par des mesures concrètes telles que  
la réduction des obstacles législatifs et adminis-  
tratifs au commerce et le lancement d'un pro-  
gramme d'éducation pour faire connaître et  
mieux comprendre les procédures, les accords et  
les pratiques en vigueur dans le secteur de la  
production de défense.<sup>3</sup>

Ce Rapport final maintenait cependant l'éven-  
tualité d'une intégration totale des infrastructures  
industrielles canadienne et américaine de défense.  
Cet objectif, pouvait-on lire dans le texte, devrait  
être atteint progressivement, par une réduction  
graduelle de toutes les barrières et de tous les  
obstacles à la libre circulation entre les deux pays  
des produits et services reliés à la production de  
défense.

D'un point de vue économique, cette évolution  
n'aurait probablement que des répercussions  
limitées sur le Canada dans son ensemble (sauf  
pour les industries de défense ou certaines en-  
treprises ou collectivités qui risquaient d'en  
profiter ou, au contraire, d'en pâtir considéra-  
blement). La collaboration canado-américaine dans  
le domaine de la production de défense remonte  
au moins à la Déclaration  
d'Ogdensburg, en vertu de laquelle les deux pays  
ont admis qu'ils devaient envisager au sens  
large la défense de la moitié nord de l'hémisphère  
occidental; ils ont alors mis sur pied une Com-  
mission permanente canado-américaine de la  
défense, chargée d'étudier les problèmes mari-  
times, terrestres et aériens, aux chapitres notam-  
ment du personnel et de l'équipement. Depuis la  
Seconde Guerre mondiale, on a vu proliférer  
entre les deux nations toute une série de liens et  
d'ententes regroupés dans les Accords sur le  
partage du développement industriel pour la  
défense et de la production de la défense. La ma-  
jeure partie des échanges bilatéraux, dont la

et une planification conjointe des industries de  
défense renforcerait de façon spectaculaire la  
sécurité de l'Amérique du Nord, consoliderait  
l'infrastructure de l'industrie de défense dans les  
deux pays et, aux yeux de l'OTAN, rendraient  
plus crédible la contribution nord-américaine à la  
dissuasion. Le rapport recommandait en particu-  
lier une augmentation du nombre des études con-  
jointes sur les nouveaux systèmes d'armes; la  
mise en oeuvre d'une politique «Achèter nord-  
américain» pour les produits militaires; la créa-  
tion d'une infrastructure nord-américaine de  
soutien pour fournir au Canada et aux États-Unis  
des dispositifs communs de réparation et d'appro-  
visionnement en pièces détachées, ainsi que des  
mécanismes conjoints d'approvisionnement et de  
transports, un renforcement des liens institution-  
nels entre le ministère de la Défense nationale et  
les organismes des États-Unis oeuvrant dans le  
domaine de la production de défense; et une ré-  
duction des obstacles commerciaux susceptibles  
d'influer sur l'état de préparation de l'industrie  
de défense. Le texte soulignait par ailleurs l'im-  
portance de l'infrastructure industrielle nord-  
américaine de défense (NADIB) et insistait  
sur le fait qu'il était à la fois indispensable et  
souhaitable de poursuivre l'intégration.

De la même façon, les répercussions de l'inté-  
gration sur les systèmes canadiens de défense  
étaient assez clairement exposées. «Si nous  
voulons préserver les acquis de l'intégration et  
même en tirer à l'avantage des avantages plus nets  
encore», avançait le Groupe de travail, «les deux  
nations doivent chercher de nouvelles possibilités  
de défense, les parités nationales.»

Le Groupe de travail prétendait qu'un ren-  
forcement de l'intégration s'inscrivait en fait dans  
le droit fil de l'engagement pris à Québec en  
1985 par le premier ministre Brian Mulroney et le  
président Reagan lors du Sommet de Shamrock,  
quand les deux hommes avaient convenu de  
resserrer les liens de coopération entre leurs deux  
pays. Nul doute que le Groupe avait aussi estimé  
d'une section du Livre blanc de la défense de juin  
1987, passée pour ainsi dire inaperçue, qui se  
lisait comme suit :

« Dans le cadre des Accords sur le partage du  
développement industriel pour la défense et de  
la production de la défense, le Canada colla-  
borer avec les États-Unis pour mettre au point  
et produire du matériel de défense.... Nous

AN DENNIER, PENDANT LA PÉRIODE QUI A  
précédé les élections fédérales, les journaux  
du pays ont publié brièvement un inter-  
sant reportage sur la production de défense.

Un groupe de travail composé de hauts fonction-  
naires de la Défense nationale, des Affaires ex-  
trangères et d'autres ministères (le Groupe de  
travail sur l'état de la préparation de l'industrie  
de la défense, formé en 1985 par le Comité de  
gestion de la Défense, au ministère de la Défense  
nationale) avait recommandé, d'une part, que le  
Canada et les États-Unis forment un marché  
économique commun dans le domaine de la  
défense, en renforçant l'intégration continentale  
des productions dans ce domaine et, d'autre part,  
qu'ils renforcent les liens de coopération exist-  
ants pour faire une planification industrielle con-  
jointe entre le ministère de la Défense nationale  
et le Pentagone. Le groupe avait, semble-t-il, for-  
mulé vingt recommandations précises en vue de  
favoriser plus d'intégration et d'institutionna-  
lisation, et il avait en outre exhorté les décideurs  
des deux pays à adopter une perspective «conti-  
nental» que «nationale». L'

En plein coeur d'une élection axée sur le libre-  
échange et l'avènement de la nation canadienne, ce  
rapportage avait de toute évidence une «couleur»  
politique. Mais est-ce qu'il signifiait vraiment  
qu'un groupe de puissants hauts fonctionnaires  
préparerait déjà les prochaines étapes sur la voie de  
l'intégration, avant même que l'accord sur le  
libre-échange ne soit devenu loi ? Selon un jour-  
naliste, le rapport du groupe de travail avait été  
gardé secret; en d'autres termes, il avait été jugé  
trop «brillant». Or, il n'en était rien. Le ministre  
associé de la Défense nationale, M. Paul Dick,  
avait déclaré devant la Chambre des Communes  
que le résumé du rapport avait été rendu public  
environ six mois auparavant, soit en juin 1988.<sup>2</sup>


En fait, le ton fortement intégrationniste du  
rapport aurait pu être égrené sur le plan politique  
si le contenu du document avait été largement  
diffusé. Le texte avait été terminé en juin 1987,  
alors que le Canada se trouvait en plein dans les  
négociations sur le libre-échange. Les auteurs y  
critiquaient l'orientation très nettement nationa-  
liste, protectionniste et politique du gouverne-  
ment qui, selon eux, avait restreint la libre  
circulation des biens de défense entre le Canada  
et les États-Unis. Ils soulignaient que la formation  
d'un marché économique commun de la défense

portent sur la répartition des terres, mais aussi sur les impôts fonciers, les crédits agricoles, le contrôle des prix des pesticides ou des engrais, les types de cultures ou d'apports (comme les subventions accordées pour divers primes à l'exportation, la construction et l'entretien des routes, et la coordination et le financement des organismes publics chargés d'appliquer ces décisions.

Au Guatemala, par exemple, le gouvernement civil, nouveau et encore fragile, prépare une enquête détaillée afin de révéler la quantité et la valeur des biens fonciers et les noms de leurs propriétaires. À ce jour, ces informations ne sont tout simplement pas connues. Le gouvernement cherche même à inclure dans cette enquête le Peñon, cette vaste zone frontalière du nord qui a été pendant des années sous la botte de l'armée répressive guatémaltèque. La région est hachurée sur certaines cartes du pays, comme si l'on voulait signifier par là, consciemment ou non, que quelque esprit malveillant plane sur cette partie du territoire national. Une enquête de ce type promet d'être politiquement explosive dans un pays doté de systèmes de répartition des terres et d'imposition régressive comptant parmi les plus inéquitables d'Amérique latine.

L'IDÉOLOGIE NE SEMBLE PAS ÊTRE UN facteur aussi décisif qu'on pourrait le penser lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer l'utilisation des ressources. Le Nicaragua révolutionnaire, qui a été plus près de résoudre le problème de la répartition des terres que n'importe lequel de ses voisins, s'apprête à décimer ses régions orientales, limitrophes après la guerre, pour défricher de nouvelles terres cultivables et réaliser des rêves d'exportation de viande bovine et de coton qui rivalisent avec toutes les ambitions que le Honduras ou le Guatemala ont innocentes, en ce qui concerne les conséquences à long terme. La destruction de ressources naturelles n'est pas la cause première des troubles politiques en Amérique centrale. La réalité est bien plus obscure et complexe : il y a beaucoup de causes que seules les politiques mettant l'accent sur le développement viable de ces ressources ont des chances de favoriser une croissance économique et une

Malheureusement, dans la région, rien ou presque ne porte à croire que les dirigeants ont saisi l'idée qu'il existe des liens entre les décisions d'ordre macro-économique et l'utilisation des ressources, sans parler de leur rapport avec la sécurité à long terme. Les donateurs internationaux ne font pas plus preuve de discernement : tant les institutions multilatérales, comme la Banque mondiale, que les organismes d'assistance de la plupart des pays industrialisés ont eu tendance à investir énormément dans de grandes entreprises agricoles, mais ils ont négligé les 10 millions de petits fermiers d'Amérique centrale, malgré la perversion des plans d'utilisation des terres. C'est à peine surprenant, puisque les milieux politiques et les décideurs en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord commencent seulement à entrevoir les mêmes liens étroits qui existent entre l'économie et l'environnement. Les problèmes sont partout les mêmes. Mais leur virtuellement en Amérique centrale ajoute à l'urgence des changements nécessaires. La triade d'espoir (paix, démocratie et développement) proposée par les cinq présidents centraïntracains à Esquipulas sera viable seulement quand on aura compris tous ces liens et que l'on agira en conséquence. □



IL EN RÉSULTE, POUR LES GOUVERNEMENTS SALVADORIENS ET AMÉRICAINS, UNE préoccupation croissante quant à la sécurité à court terme, et des coûts de 211 millions de dollars américains. Le personnel militaire du pays est passé de 10 000 soldats en 1978 à 47 000 en 1987, sans compter les troupes paramilitaires de sécurité fortes de 12 000 hommes.

La tendance est la même ailleurs. L'armée guatémaltèque, qui comptait 14 270 hommes en 1978, en comptait maintenant 38 000. Les forces armées nicaraguayennes, avec leurs 77 000 hommes, ont augmenté de 50 p. 100 en valeur réelle entre 1979 et 1983.

Ces chiffres ne tiennent pas compte des sommes colossales que les États-Unis et le bloc de l'Est ont investies pour soutenir les régimes qui leur agréent. La sécurité était l'obsession américaine de l'ère Reagan. L'ancien secrétaire d'État Henry Kissinger, il nous sera impossible de convaincre les pays menacés dans le Golfe persique et ailleurs que nous savons comment maintenir l'équilibre planétaire. » Pourtant, en 1984, la Commission bipartitionale concernant l'Amérique centrale, que présidait M. Kissinger, a reconnu dans la pauvreté et les inégalités deux des grandes causes de la dés-

tabilisation dans la région, mais elle a à peine fait allusion à l'environnement.

S'IL EST ÉVIDENT QUE LES COÛTS HUMAINS ET FINANCIERS DES CRISES IMBRIQUÉES EN AMÉRIQUE CENTRALE SONT ÉNORMES, EN REVANCHE, AUCUNE COMPTABILITÉ ne saurait estimer dans quelle mesure la peur pour leur sécurité a modifié la psychologie et les priorités des gouvernements. Les gouvernements

démocratiques sont réduits pour leur obsession du court terme. Leurs horizons dépassent rarement l'année de l'élection suivante. Dans des pays où les crises prédominent, qu'elles soient militaires ou économiques, la réaction du pouvoir politique risque d'être encore plus « myope ». Il appliquera une gestion de crise aux pires cas, et les ressources naturelles n'entrent pas dans la catégorie des pires cas jusqu'au jour où les désastres inhérents à une plantation à très court terme surviennent. Alors seulement, et parce qu'ils font la

une des journées, on leur cherchera un remède immédiat.

Cependant, ces questions sont essentielles à la viabilité des économies de tous les pays de l'isthme. L'environnement n'est pas quelque chose dont on peut s'occuper une fois la paix à portée de la main, pas plus qu'il ne s'agit simplement de la parcs et d'un sujet de conversation. Sa portée plénière et essentielle est à la fois vaste et profonde, car il embrasse la question fondamentale de savoir quelle terre est utilisée, par qui et pour quoi. Vu les pressions démographiques et la diminution des terres et des ressources naturelles, ces questions prennent encore plus d'importance. Par rapport aux terres arabes disponibles, la densité de population des autres pays centraïntracains est proche de celle du Salvador.

La manière dont les ressources locales sont utilisées ou mal employées dépend en grande partie de décisions prises dans les capitales. Ces décisions



écologique en Amérique centrale abandonner : les forêts decimées, l'érosion des sols, les cultures sans arbrus, les ristes pldonvilles qui cement les villes, la puanteur des eaux usées non traitées, la brûlure des pesticides que le vent apporte des champs de coton, toute une litanie de désastres qui menacent l'isthme assiéé autant que la tourmente politique

La terre, la population et les ressources sont si étroitement liées qu'il est

[illegible]

Cependant, il est plus facile de décrire un cercle vicieux que de donner la solution pour le rompre.

LE PLAN DE PAIX POUR L'AMÉRIQUE

tion, a vu le jour à Esquipulas, dans le Guatemala le 7 août 1987, marquée. Ce jour-là, les présidents de cinq pays (Cerezo, du Guatemala, Duarte, du Salvador, Azcona, du Honduras, Ortega, du Nicaragua et Arias, du Costa Rica) sont convenus d'un série de procédures interdépendantes pour instaurer «une paix ferme et durable»

Américain, mais parvenue à donner un nombre de rencontres entre représentants et ministres des Affaires étrangères, rencontres qui, après des mois de manoeuvres diplomatiques, ont débouché sur un nouveau sommet entre les cinq présidents en février de cette année, à Costa del Sol, au Salvador. Cette coopération a survécu à bien des revers. Ce qui a incité les prestidents ne fut-ce qu'à aller jusqu'à ce

président Daniel Ortega du Nicaragua a déclaré devant une commission parlementaire canadienne : « Un point nous unit : nos problèmes économiques

« C'est une bonne chose, car les économies ploient sous le poids d'une dette extérieure plus forte par rapport au produit intérieur brut (PIB) que celle de la plupart de leurs voisins d'Amérique latine, car le prix de leurs principales exportations baisse, un chômage et un sous-emploi endémiques sévissent, et les infrastructures (routes, installations de traitement des eaux usées, réseaux électriques, par exemple) qui, au Nicaragua et au Salvador, se détériorent peu à peu avec la guerre civile, sont extrêmement malades. L'effet négatif de tous ces facteurs est encore exagéré par une forte croissance démographique, une fonction publique sous-payée et mal formée, et une

des ressources renouvelables : forêts, sols, eau et pêcheries. Les ressources naturelles représentent plus de la moitié de la production économique de la région, la moitié de ses emplois et la plupart de ses exportations. La crise économique est donc, essentiellement, une crise écologique (la dégradation des ressources naturelles) qui, elle, se résume à une question de jeux politiques et de rapports de puissance.

LES PROBLÈMES FONDAMENTAUX SONT AU NOMBRE DE TROIS. TROP DE GENS, trop peu de terre, et des schémas d'utilisation de celle-ci catégoriquement mauvais. La répartition des terres a commencé à se fausser au siècle dernier avec l'introduction progressive des cultures d'exportation. Pour planter des cafés,

# ENVIRONNEMENT ET SÉCURITÉ

Comment la terre est utilisée, quelle terre, par qui et pour qui ? Les questions politiques essentielles pour cet isthme déchiré par la guerre correspondent aussi à des problèmes fondamentaux en matière d'environnement.

*matière d'environnement.*

dément. Partout dans l'isthme, les fermiers démunis sont amenés soit à cultiver à flanc de coteau, soit à défricher la forêt vierge, dont l'orée recule rapidement. D'après les statistiques de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies pour l'Agriculture et l'Alimentation (FAO), en 1960, 61 p. 100 environ de la région était boisée ou couverte de forêt, alors qu'un quart environ était cultivée. En 1980, il ne restait que 40 p. 100 en forêt, mais la surface agricole était passée à 53 p. 100, dont les deux tiers en pâturages. Ces mêmes tendances continuent, bien que l'industrie bovine contribue peu aux recettes d'exportation, en comparaison des vastes étendues livrées au bétail. En 1980, par exemple, les recettes d'exportation variaient entre 18 \$ et 47 \$ par kilomètre carré de pâturage, comparativement aux 1 500 \$ à 1 800 \$ que rapportait le café, toujours au kilomètre carré. Malheureusement, pour les fermiers sans terres, les coteaux comme les terres défrichées sont rarement viables : les premières s'effondrent en quelques années par des cultures intensives, sont enlevées au bout de deux ou trois saisons, et les lopins qui leur permettraient de

et rend la quête encore plus aléatoire. L'Amérique latine, service des Nations-Amérique centrale dépasse aujourd'hui le qu'elle a plus que doublé en vingt-croissance démographique étaient de pour le Guatemala, le Honduras et le semble de la région. Si l'on se fie au me aura encore doublé d'ici un quart de

pression implacable sur des ressources  
Le Salvador a été particulièrement as-  
simplé des Amériques continentales, est  
la façade sur l'Atlantique, vers laquelle  
intérieures. Pendant de nombreuses an-  
indurées voisin, où il y avait plus de tra-  
« soupape de sécurité ». Mais en 1966

Les ressentiments suscités par cette immigration ont dégénéré entre les deux pays en ce qu'il s'est appelé la « guerre du soccra » et ont provoqué une dégradation des relations diplomatiques entre le Maroc et l'Algérie. Le Maroc a tenté de faire passer des tentatives d'intégration régionale les plus prometteuses des années 1960. Au cours de la décennie suivante, malgré une émigration continue, une guerre civile meurtrière a éclaté au Salvador. Jorge Villacorta, qui a brève-

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Gregory Wirick était conseiller auprès du Comité spécial de la Chambre des communes concernant le processus de paix en Amérique centrale, et il a récemment effectué une visite là-bas pour aider l'Agence canadienne de développement international à élaborer une stratégie environnementale pour la région. Roger Hill est Directeur de la recherche à l'ICPSI et il était autrefois Directeur du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur. Julie Morin est rédactrice pigiste. Elle a vécu en Tunisie pendant plusieurs années. Ted Hopf est chargé de recherche (Fondation Olin) au Centre des affaires internationales de l'Université Harvard. Clyde Sanger est rédacteur pigiste. Leonard Zamor est rédacteur pigiste et il était autrefois rédacteur en chef de la revue *Perspectives internationales*.







# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

## LA TERRE, LA PAUVRETÉ, L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET LA GUERRE:

Les questions d'environnement  
sont au cœur du débat  
politique en Amérique  
centrale.

PAR GREGORY WIRICK



Dans le présent numéro :

Roger Hill  
Un marché commun  
avec les E.-U. pour  
les produits de  
défense risque de  
miner l'indépen-  
dance du Canada.

Table ronde - ICPSI  
Réflexions sur les  
coupures budgé-  
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le domaine de la poli-  
tique étrangère.

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ralentir le coche.  
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Hommage à J. King  
Gordon  
Léonard Zamor  
Lecture de Chine



# PEACE & SECURITY

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## NAMIBIA RITES OF PASSAGE

*With a UN-supervised election,  
Namibians finally get their chance  
to end a century of colonial rule.*

BY PATRICK NAGLE



**Selig Harrison**

Military victory in Afghanistan carries too high a cost for the Afghan people.

**David Runnalls**

The prospect of global environmental collapse has begun to scare even governments.

**Jocelyn Coulon**

In search of a space policy for Canada.

**Paul Marantz**

Words, not deeds, are the best indicator of change in Soviet foreign policy.

**Madeleine Poulin**

Argentine political culture and the new Peronism.

Also in this issue:

## Institute Publications 1988-1989

### OCCASIONAL PAPERS

4. **From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations**, by Paul Marantz, May 1988, 89 pages.
5. **The Debate About Nuclear Weapon Tests**, by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, August 1988, 86 pages.
6. **The Return of Vietnam to the International System**, by Gérard Hervouet, December 1988.
7. **Non-nuclear Powers and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament: A Study in Multilateral Arms Control**, by Michael Tucker, March 1989, 62 pages.


### ANNUAL GUIDE

**A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1988-1989.**

### BACKGROUND PAPERS

16. **Accidental Nuclear War: Reducing the Risks**, by Dianne DeMille, January 1988.
17. **Chemical Disarmament: From the Ban on Use to a Ban on Possession**, by Jozef Goldblat, February 1988.
18. **Has the ABM Treaty a Future?** by Ronald G. Purver, February 1988.
19. **The War in the Gulf**, by Francine Lecours, May 1988.
20. **Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987**, by Dan O'Meara, June 1988.
21. **The Conventional Military Balance in Europe**, by Roger Hill, July 1988.
22. **The NATO Nuclear Planning Group**, by Jocelyn Coulon, August 1988.
23. **Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus**, by Robert Mitchell, October 1988.
24. **Cruise Missiles and Strategic Arms Control**, by Jane Boulden, January 1989.
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26. **Canadian Approaches to the United Nations Security Council**, by Harald von Riekhoff, February 1989.
27. **A Review of the Geneva Negotiations 1987-1988**, by David Cox, March 1989.
28. **The International Trade in Arms**, by Keith Krause, March 1989.
29. **Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Status and Prospects**, by Jozef Goldblat, June 1989.

## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



Our cover story this issue deals with the tension and conflict brought on by the transition of Namibia from colony to nation. In addition to a story filed by **Patrick Nagle** – in which he makes clear why a successful outcome is important not only to Namibians, but to everyone else in Southern Africa – we present some of the conclusions about the election process reached during a two-day international conference held in Ottawa in July.

Since that conference, some of the independent observers who participated have gone to Namibia and returned with their assess-

ments. While most were guardedly optimistic, they reserved some of their strongest criticisms for the cumbersome (one newspaper account of the observers' press conference used the words "grotesque" and "ludicrous") vote tabulation machinery set up by the South Africans for use in the November vote. The Canadian observers warned that if the centralized vote-counting process was not changed, the delay of up to several weeks before results are made public would be "almost certain to raise impatience and suspicions to the boiling point" – a central concern raised at the Institute's July conference.

Any doubts that the danger of violence is high, or that peacekeeping is dangerous work, are dispelled by numerous incidents reported from UNTAG headquarters in Windhoek. One of the most serious came on 11 August, just as *Peace & Security* was going to press:

Yesterday evening, at approximately 9:20 pm, the UNTAG regional office at Outjo [northern Namibia] was attacked and subsequently damaged by what appear to have been gunfire and explosives – possibly hand grenades. A private security guard ... assigned to the UNTAG premises, was killed.

The same evening, a similar attack was carried out against a drill hall in a military compound in Outjo where weapons are stored. Members of the UNTAG Kenyan Battalion [Kenya's contribution to the UNTAG force] are also housed within the compound. Light damage and no injuries are reported in connection with this second incident.

It was not immediately clear who had attacked the UNTAG posts or why.

A new and continuing feature in *Peace & Security* is a column by Institute CEO, **Bernard Wood**. In this first column, he charts some new directions and initiatives for the Institute, now entering its sixth year of activity since its creation by Parliament in 1984.

The editors also want to note the departure from our editorial board of **Hilary Mackenzie**, formerly of *Maclean's* Ottawa bureau and recently named to the magazine's bureau in Washington, DC. Ms Mackenzie has been an enthusiastic supporter of *Peace & Security*. We wish her well in her new position.

– Michael Bryans

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## PEACE & SECURITY

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7  
(613) 990-1593

### Editorial Board:

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**Patrick Nagle** was Southam News Southern Africa correspondent based in Harare until August of this year and is currently Southam's Atlantic correspondent based in Halifax; **Selig Harrison** is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and is former South Asia Bureau Chief for the *Washington Post*; **David Runnalls** is Associate Director of the Sustainable Development Programme at the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Ottawa; **Jocelyn Coulon** is international affairs editor for *Le Devoir* in Montreal; **Paul Marantz** teaches Soviet foreign policy at the University of British Columbia and is the author of the Institute Occasional Paper *From Lenin to Gorbachev*; **Madeleine Poulin** is co-host of Radio-Canada's public affairs television programme *Le Point*.

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IN THE SPEAR STRAIGHT highway to Owamboland the roadside is clotted with tin shacks – the she-beens, the brothels, the *cuca* shops and the homes of the thousands of Namibians whose lives were financed by the South African military presence. This is where the future of Namibia will be decided.

If the incoming independence government cannot reconcile with the people who worked for years to assist Pretoria's illegal occupation of their country, there will be nothing but more strife for the former German colony of South West Africa. One of the many writers who has tried to fathom the conflict-ridden existence of a massive desert with a minute population, concluded: "When the Lord made Namibia he intended it for obscurity."

Alas, this has not been so and the country will not achieve such a deistic designation for years to come. The principal contribution to this sorry state is a tale of unalloyed colonial exploitation, quarrelsome internal politics and ineffectual world attempts to put things right.

South West Africa came into being as part of the European dissection of the African continent in the 19th century. It was Germany's first colony and they ran it with an iron fist. "I know these African tribes," wrote the Prussian general in charge of suppressing a 1904 rebellion,

they are all the same; they respect nothing but force.... To exercise this force with brute terror and even with ferocity was and is my policy. I wipe out rebellious tribes with streams of blood and streams of money. Only by sowing in this way can anything new be grown, anything that is stable.

With Germany's loss of the First World War the territory became a League of Nations responsibility. The British Empire, using its neighbouring South African colony, occupied the land until 1920 when the League of Nations mandate initiated the tortuous modern history of Namibia. South Africa continued to administer the protectorate at such a cost as to have the responsibility described in parliament as a "white elephant" that would be best returned to Germany. Among other things, the South Africans tried to collect a dog ownership tax which the natives resisted as a persecution. "If they are too poor to pay for dogs, why should they keep dogs," was the reasoning of a Pretoria representative.

A series of bush rebellions, inflamed by the callousness of the South African administration, plagued the countryside until the collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World War put the protectorate back in limbo. After the war and emergence of the United Nations, the incorporation of Namibia into South Africa was rejected by the world powers.

A FAMOUS DECLARATION WAS WRITTEN INTO THE UN CHARTER (WHICH would not be fulfilled, in Namibia's case, for twenty-four years) which set out the operating principles for those UN members responsible for the administration of "non-self governing territories": these countries accepted as a "sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost ... the well-being of the inhabitants ... to ensure with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses." Instead, in 1949, the South African government challenged the UN's authority on the legal grounds that the mandate had lapsed with the demise of the League of Nations.

Despite an International Court of Justice ruling that the UN still held final control, South Africa unilaterally abrogated its responsibility to the

# NAMIBIA

## rites of passage

*With a UN-supervised election,  
Namibians finally get their chance to end a  
century of colonial rule.*

BY PATRICK NAGLE

Organization (SWAPO) rose up against this oppression and prosecuted a twenty-three year armed struggle culminating in the planned early November elections for a constituent assembly. This makes Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO leader, another key to the future of Namibia. Despite his years in exile as a spokesman for Namibian independence he is not well-known or clearly-assessed by Western governments. He does have a reputation for being erratic and ill-tempered but his consistency in the Namibian independence cause has never been questioned.

THE UNHAPPY ATTEMPT OF ARMED SWAPO GUERRILLAS TO INFILTRATE Namibia after the commencement of the 1 April UN transition process has never been laid directly at Nujoma's doorstep because he was not at the Angola take-off point when the penetration started. But the damage done to SWAPO's image by a successful South African counter-attack and propaganda campaign can only be measured after voting day.

Few doubt that the SWAPO political party will win the most seats in the November poll, intended to create a broad-based assembly charged with writing a constitution for a national election next spring. The question is whether SWAPO can win two-thirds of the seats in the first vote. If they do, they plan to rewrite the rules of the assembly – which they could do according to the rules of the game – and take over immediately as a de facto government.

Their opposition, which is mainly backed by the residual white population of Namibia, is campaigning strenuously to avoid this eventuality. Now that it is finally up to strength and functioning throughout the country, the UN transition team (UNTAG) is specifically assigned to ensure that this is a "free and fair" election. The whites, backed by the remnants of the South African territorial administration, claim SWAPO is being helped by the UN to rig the vote, while the blacks, including SWAPO, claim that the territorial authorities are intimidating them.

The enabling UN Resolution 435 is not drafted precisely enough to prevent these accusations flying back and forth. Thus an assumption of goodwill on the part of all those involved has not been forthcoming; rather, the political leadership on both sides seem to be competing for the cheap-shot-of-the-year award to be scored off UNTAG.

By comparison, the Lancaster House agreement that turned Rhodesia into Zimbabwe contained a considerable number of checks and balances of both sides. And although Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe has never been happy with some elements of Lancaster House, he has scrupulously adhered to the letter of its provisions, to the benefit of his country through continued international economic and military assistance.

IF THE NAMIBIAN PROTAGONISTS CANNOT OVERCOME THEIR GHASTLY HISTORY and present a united country to the world, their only future is as a questionable charity case. For a start, South Africa is withdrawing the subsidies that have propped up Namibia for more than a decade. The

mandate and started governing Namibia as a territory of its own. The growth of the *apartheid* society in South Africa and its extension into Namibia led to Pretoria's estrangement from world opinion. In 1966, the UN declared South Africa had disavowed its mandate making its presence an illegal occupation. In response, Pretoria created white economic areas and black homelands that divided the country along racial lines and enforced the division with police and military garrisons.


The South West Africa Peoples



existing economy of mining and farming is not strong enough to take up the slack even though diamonds, uranium and copper make up a third of gross domestic product, eighty-five percent of export earnings and about half of government revenue. There is an unknown potential for a fishing industry but the existing infrastructure is located in the South African enclave of Walvis Bay, Namibia's best ocean port and still the subject of dispute between South Africa, which wants to keep it after independence, and the UN.

The SWAPO economic position paper released with the election platform promises a mixed economy with a strong emphasis on government participation. "The state will have ownership of a significant part of the country's economic resources," the document states. "No wholesale nationalization of the mines, land and other productive sectors is, however, envisaged in the foreseeable future."

The principal short-term positive effect of the transition to Namibian independence has been a measurable reduction in the regional conflicts that have beggared southern Africa in recent years. How long this can



John White

last is only speculation, given the volatile state of South African politics.

Pretoria is reported to have nuclear weapons capability and has now embarked on a ballistic missile development programme. The country's white leaders have stated many times that they intend to retain their security apparatus as the mainstay of their position as the region's dominant power. The evident and most troublesome indication of this resolve is the upgrading and hardening of army and air force bases along South

Africa's northern border with Botswana and Zimbabwe. Included in this buildup are some of the battle-tempered black units from the Namibian border war.

For its part Zimbabwe has escalated its defences against South Africa with the purchase of new MiG fighters from the USSR. It would be the penultimate tragedy for southern Africa if the final settlement of the Namibian question led only to ruinous confrontations along the Limpopo River similar to those that have blasted the Namibia-Angola border for the past ten years. □

## Transition in Namibia

### An Institute International Roundtable

■ On 6 and 7 July 1989, the Institute for Peace and Security held an international roundtable in Ottawa on the subject of the upcoming election in Namibia. Chaired by the Institute's Director, **Bernard Wood**, the roundtable was designed as an intensive briefing session, drawing on the training and experience of a number of participants. Video briefings sent from Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, lent a sense of immediacy to the proceedings. Among those making presentations either in person or by television were:

**Martti Ahtisaari**, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Namibia; **William Barton**, former Canadian ambassador to the UN; **Pierre Beaudet**, researcher with the Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe, Montreal; **Lord Chitnis**, of the Southern Africa Advanced Education Project, Oxford; **Michael Clough**, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York; **Joseph Diescho**, a scholar from Namibia, at Columbia

University, New York; **Colonel Don Ethell**, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of National Defence, Ottawa; **Stephen Fanning**, head of the UNTAG civilian police monitoring unit, Windhoek; **Gordon Fairweather**, Chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Board and veteran election observer; **Marrack Goulding**, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs; **Neil Haffey**, head of the Canadian Observer Mission, Windhoek; **Gwen Lister**, editor of *The Namibian*, Windhoek; and **James Mutambirwa**, of the World Council of Churches.

The following is excerpted from the Institute summary report, *The Election Process in Namibia: An International Roundtable*. The full document (16 pages) is available from the Institute. The section presented here deals specifically with Namibia's and the UN's most immediate problem in the coming months: the complex business of carrying out free and fair elections.

### Election Day and Immediately After

■ During the transition period to independence, Namibia is being governed by South Africa through an Administrator-General (AG), Louis Pienaar. The UN Secretary-General appointed his Special Representative (SR), Martti Ahtisaari, to ensure that each stage of the electoral process in Namibia was free and fair. These two officials are called upon to work together to implement Resolution 435. The details of each stage in the electoral process must be satisfactory to both officials. The process is cumbersome.

There will be two UNTAG election officials and two UNTAG police personnel supervising each polling station. The ballots will probably carry the symbol of each political party so that both literate and illiterate voters can participate without difficulty. After casting a ballot, each voter will dip a finger into indelible ink so that he or she cannot vote more than once.

Having international observers present on election day is an important part of ensuring free and fair elections. One speaker had a detailed checklist of practical requirements for a proper vote. For example: Is there sufficient freedom of movement? Are uniform guidelines being followed by all election officials? Are the polling stations easy to find, even for illiterate voters? Is there an effective method for resolving disputes on the spot?

Other concerns were expressed: after the polls are closed, international observers must pronounce judgement on the fairness of the election before the votes are tallied so that their reports will be seen to be impartial. Participants were concerned with some of the proposals for tallying the ballots. Would not the comparison of the ballots with fingerprints on registration forms breach the secrecy of the vote? Would not the transport of all ballot boxes to Windhoek for counting increase the possibility of tampering?

It was suggested that the ballots should be quickly counted on the spot, and then moved in sealed boxes to the capital for a second count. Furthermore, the period between the time that the polls are closed and the time that the results are announced should be kept as short as possible. Most participants supported these suggestions as ways to reduce the chance for fraud.

One recommendation arising out of the Roundtable discussion was the creation of an Election Council comprising representatives of the AG, the SR, and each of the participating political parties. According to the Commonwealth Observers Group commenting on a similar body created for the elections in Zimbabwe, "it provided a vehicle through which complaints could be made" and difficulties resolved. Many participants supported a similar Election Council for Namibia, especially since the proposal of an independent electoral commission now seemed impractical. □

# WORDS AND DEEDS: TRANSFORMING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

*By studying the words of Soviet leaders we can understand not only what has changed in the USSR but also why.*

BY PAUL MARANTZ

**T**HUS FAR, THE WESTERN REACTION TO Mikhail Gorbachev has been somewhat schizophrenic. He has clearly captured the imagination of the man and woman in the street. "Gorby-fever" and "Gorbymania" have swept much of the Western world. Yet along the corridors of power, most policy-makers are far more cautious and skeptical. Western skeptics are fond of the adage that deeds speak louder than words, and they argue that neither the deeds nor the words of Soviet foreign policy convincingly demonstrate that Gorbachev has broken with the Soviet past. Other less skeptical Westerners argue that while the process is still in its early stages and is dependent upon the continued survival of Gorbachev's reformist approach, it nonetheless has vast significance for the future course of Soviet foreign policy and East-West relations.

It is vivid testimony to the speed with which people adapt to new circumstances and the rapidity with which the extraordinary is accepted as commonplace that there is not a wider appreciation of the degree to which Gorbachev has already transformed the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Let us imagine for a moment that back in February 1986, at the time that Gorbachev first unfurled his call for "new thinking" in international politics, a skeptical Western observer had advanced a test of Soviet intentions. Suppose he had declared that he would not be convinced that a genuine change had taken place until the Soviet Union had met these conditions:

Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan; the Soviet Union accepted the American zero-option for the elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe; the Kremlin agreed to highly intrusive international inspection of its military facilities; the Soviet Union initiated unilateral reductions in its armed forces amounting to ten percent of all its troops and twenty percent of its tanks; Moscow permitted the legalization of Solidarity and allowed it to function as a freely-elected opposition party within the Polish parliament; the Soviet Union exerted its influence on behalf of a political settlement to the con-

flicts in Cambodia and Angola; the jamming of Western radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union was ended; Andrei Sakharov and hundreds of other political prisoners were freed; articles by Western scholars and policy-makers began to appear with some frequency in the Soviet press; and Soviet scholars and journalists were allowed to criticize openly the foreign policies of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Had someone proposed such a sweeping test of Soviet intentions in 1986, Western experts on the Soviet Union would have been virtually unanimous in objecting that the proposed criteria for judging Soviet policy were far too stringent and had little likelihood of being met in the foreseeable future. The experts would have argued that at best a few of these measures might be instituted in the next several years. Yet in the space of less than four years, all of these changes have occurred or are in the process of occurring. Gorbachev has moved far more quickly and comprehensively than virtually anyone thought possible just a few years ago. The concrete deeds have been delivered; they are not just being promised.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT DEEDS ARE more important than words in assessing the nature of Soviet foreign policy, but in some ways the reverse is true. After all, specific deeds (such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan), can take place for a variety of reasons. A reversal of past policy may be motivated by nothing more than temporary weakness and a desire to mislead the enemy or, alternatively, it may reflect a fundamental reassessment of previous assumptions and a genuine belief that new, more cooperative forms of international interaction are now both possible and necessary. By studying the words of Soviet policy-makers, we can get a better idea of how they conceptualize the foreign policy issues confronting them.

If Soviet thinking about the nature of international politics has really changed, then the policy initiatives of the past four years are far

more likely to be long lasting. Conversely, if the way in which the Soviet leadership conceptualizes international politics has not been altered, then these policy shifts are more likely to be based upon temporary tactical considerations, and many of them might be reversed once the Soviet Union's current difficulties are overcome. Thus, we have to look both at deeds and words so as to be able to ascertain not just *what* has changed, but *why* these changes have taken place.

Four major trends are currently reshaping Soviet perspectives on international politics. First, there is now a far greater appreciation than ever before in Soviet policy-making circles of what has been termed "the action-reaction phenomena" in East-West relations. The traditional Soviet view had been that the foreign policy of the West was dictated by the class nature of the capitalist system. Capitalist states were said to be implacably hostile to the Soviet Union not because of the particular foreign policies adopted by the Soviet Union but because of what the Soviet Union was – a socialist state whose existence demonstrated to the workers of the world that there was a real alternative to capitalist oppression. In stark contrast to this traditional view, Soviet spokesmen now acknowledge that much of Western policy has in fact been a reaction to Soviet actions and that the West is motivated by a real, and not feigned, fear of Soviet aggression.

As a corollary of this, Gorbachev and his associates have recognized that if the Soviet Union wishes to dampen the arms race and to promote cooperative endeavors between East and West, it must first alter those policies which the West finds so threatening. As a recent article in the Soviet press pointedly observed:

We have gotten used to phrases like: "We are mankind's vanguard"; "The future belongs to us"; "We will be victorious on a world historical scale." But have you tried to put yourself in the position of those who, in our opinion, are in the rear guard, to whom the future does not belong, and who, according to our viewpoint, are doomed to depart from the historical arena, doomed to perish? What must their attitude toward us be?... It is no accident that people in the West have



formed an impression of the U.S.S.R. as being a country that seeks to conquer the world.... In order to change people's opinion about us we must change ourselves.

In the same vein, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, bluntly advised his colleagues: "We should not pretend, Comrades, that norms and notions of what is proper, of what is called civilized conduct in the world community do not concern us. If you want to be accepted in it you must observe them."

A SECOND IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IS THE unprecedented nature of the self-criticism concerning the errors and mistakes of past Soviet foreign policy that is now being publicly aired. Prior to Gorbachev, Soviet foreign policy was virtually immune to criticism. Even at the height of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaigns in 1956, 1961 and 1962 virtually nothing of a critical nature was published concerning Stalin's conduct of East-West relations.

Since the latter part of 1987, Soviet foreign policy has been subjected to a searching re-examination totally unlike anything seen in the past sixty years. Stalin has been condemned not just for his hostile stance toward the German Social Democrats in the 1930s, his handling of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, and his later rejection of Soviet participation in the Marshall Plan, but also for following a "hegemonic, great power" policy of expansionism into Eastern Europe which was perceived in the West as a grave threat to the existing international balance of power.

Khrushchev has been publicly criticized for his mishandling of the Cuban missile crisis, his exaggerated optimism about Soviet economic prospects compared to those of the West, and his propagandistic championing of "General and Complete Disarmament" instead of a more realistic policy of gradual arms control coupled with international inspection and verification.

Brezhnev's foreign policy has been condemned for its exaggerated preoccupation with military strength, its fueling of the arms race, and the blunder of Afghanistan. In a particularly noteworthy reassessment of Soviet foreign policy, an influential scholar, Vyacheslav Dashichev, sharply criticized Brezhnev's neglect of the inter-connection between the Soviet Union's single-minded pursuit of gains in the Third World in the 1970s and the ensuing decline of East-West detente:

Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisers), and diplomatically involved in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West and on their entire system of relationships. There were no clear ideas of the Soviet Union's true national state interests. These interests lay by no means in chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries.

A third important development is the waning of the sense of mission. Past Soviet leaders all believed that capitalism was doomed, that time was on the side of the Soviet Union, and that the international balance of power was steadily and inevitably tipping in Moscow's favour. Khrushchev and Brezhnev were particularly active in attempting to promote this process by probing for weak spots in the Western alliance. While there were occasionally brief periods of retrenchment under past leaders, these were viewed as just a temporary pause in the ongoing class struggle. It was firmly believed that a quick fix of the Soviet Union's temporary economic or political difficulties would allow the speedy resumption of the onward march of Soviet world power.

UNDER GORBACHEV, THIS OPTIMISM IS vanishing. The strength and resilience of the capitalist system are recognized. Increasingly it is acknowledged that there is no quick fix for the Soviet economy and that it will take decades for the Soviet Union to get its house in order. The Soviet sense of international mission is declining. Moscow's perception of itself as the centre of world revolution is diminishing. Increasingly, Soviet policy-makers define their goal not as promoting the demise of capitalism, but as avoiding nuclear war, lowering international tension, and creating a


benign international climate so that the Soviet Union can peacefully pursue the urgent task of domestic restructuring.

A fourth and final development of major significance in reshaping Soviet foreign policy is the process of change affecting some of the basic attitudes that have long influenced Moscow's approach to the West. The combined impact of the authoritarian Tsarist legacy, the conspiratorial origins of the Bolshevik Party, and the long nightmare of Stalinism produced a political climate which bred deep feelings of insecurity and vulnerability, a fear of foreign penetration, dogmatic self-righteousness, and the intolerance of diversity and different points of view.

ALL THIS IS BEGINNING TO CHANGE. THE reformers associated with Gorbachev are aiming at nothing less than the creation of a new political culture, a political culture which accepts the legitimacy of diversity, rejects any notion of infallibility, is less dogmatic, and does not feel threatened by controversy and debate. While the creation of a fundamentally new political culture is a daunting task, the past few years have seen remarkable progress. If this process continues, it will have a major impact on the way in which Soviet foreign policy is debated, formulated, and executed. A greater toleration for diversity at home goes hand in hand with the acceptance of different economic and political systems abroad.

What are the policy implications of this analysis? Paradoxically, it appears that the West needs to be both cautious and bold in framing an appropriate response. Caution is necessary because the process of liberalization and reform is only beginning; it remains vulnerable to disruption. Such potential developments as the continued stagnation of the Soviet economy, the intensification of nationalism within the Soviet republics, a popular uprising in Eastern Europe, or a conservative revolt against Gorbachev within the Communist Party all threaten the current trend toward moderation. The recent tragic events in China are a vivid reminder of just how quickly an authoritarian regime can intensify repression if the ruling elite fears that disorder is undermining its power.

Nonetheless, the opportunities are too great, the stakes are too high, and public opinion in the West is too impatient for us to be able to adopt a cautious wait-and-see attitude. Only by recognizing that the Soviet Union's overtures to the West are the product of a far-reaching and revolutionary process of change – not just another replay of past peace campaigns – will Western policy-makers be able to formulate an appropriate response to the historic opportunities that loom before us. [



# THE GRAND BARGAIN

*The tangible prospect of global environmental collapse has elicited some new approaches to international cooperation.*

BY DAVID RUNNALLS

**A**S AN ILLUSTRATION THAT 1988 WAS definitely the year of the environment, that bible of middle class American propriety, *Time* magazine, nominated Earth as planet of the year (one wonders which one is in the running for next year's award) and devoted almost an entire issue not only to environmental matters but to international environmental matters. *Time's* more affluent stablemate, *Fortune*, capped things off by describing 1988 as "The year the earth spoke back."

To put this development in perspective, let us remember that Margaret Thatcher was elected for the first time as Prime Minister only ten years ago on a platform that could generously be described as being contemptuous of the natural environment and those who cared about it; Ronald Reagan believed fervently when he was elected in 1980 that many of the so-called pollution problems were caused by trees; and the Conservative government assumed office in Canada in 1984, confident that it could substantially cut the budget and staff of Environment Canada with impunity. At one point, the Nielsen Commission seriously considered abolishing the department completely. On the other side of the political spectrum, the Soviet Union had always maintained that environmental problems were fundamentally caused by the structure and operation of capitalism and were largely absent from the Soviet system.

These perspectives were all changed during one extraordinary week in October of last year when the following cast of characters each made an environmental speech: George Bush (remember the "I have always been an environmentalist" address?); Michael Wilson (to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund of all people); Edouard Shevardnadze (who told the UN General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed global environmental change as the single greatest threat to its national security) and even the redoubtable Margaret Thatcher – the Iron Lady told the Royal Society that atmospheric change was the single greatest challenge facing the scientific community for the remainder of the century.

Not only had a number of these people been converted along the road to environmental Damascus, but some of the conversions seem to have been truly miraculous. George Bush and Michael Dukakis had not become born-again environmentalists; they had become, through some miracle of alchemy, life-long environmentalists.

WHY ARE ALL THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE Western (and increasingly the Eastern) world looking to don cloaks of various shades of green? The answer is perhaps best found in the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development – the Brundtland Commission. The Commission points out that no matter what we do, during the next decade the planet's population will double and that feeding, housing and clothing both ourselves and our five billion new neighbours will require an expansion of five to ten times our present economic production. An expansion of anything like this size will place such enormous strain on natural systems that the Commission concluded that the natural environment would become a significant constraint on economic growth.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the earth's natural systems speaking back is the increasing evidence that we are changing the world's climate. As the participants in last summer's Toronto Climate Conference pointed out: "... the rates and magnitude of climate change in the next century may substantially exceed those experienced over the last 5,000 years. Such high rates of change would be sufficiently disruptive that no country would likely benefit in toto from climate change."

The participants were speaking of the changes resulting from further destruction of the earth's layer of protective ozone caused by CFCs commonly used to blow foam, run cooling devices, and by the electronics industry. They were also referring to the "greenhouse effect" in which the build-up of carbon dioxide and other gases leads to an overall warming of the earth's climate, with accompanying major rises in sea levels within the next thirty to forty years.

Negotiations on ozone have proceeded rapidly since the discovery of the first ozone hole over Antarctica in 1986. In September 1987, Canada hosted a meeting which produced the Montreal protocol – an agreement to cut consumption of CFCs in half by the turn of the century. Before the protocol had fully entered into force, a flurry of diplomatic activity, culminating in meetings in London and Helsinki earlier this year, called for a halt to production of the substances by the year 2000.

Canada also opened the batting on global warming with the 1988 Toronto Conference. It set a goal of reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by at least twenty percent by the year 2005. It was followed by a meeting of legal experts in Ottawa in February of this year and by meetings of the preparatory groups for the next World Climate Conference to be held sometime in 1990. It is hoped that drafts of legal instruments for regulating at least some of the greenhouse gases will be ready by the time of that meeting.

There is a growing realization, however, that none of this is enough. Atmospheric change is a genuinely global problem, demanding global solutions and some sort of burden sharing. When countries had agreed on the need to eliminate ozone destroying chemicals, the problem arose of how to help developing countries to achieve the new standards. Countries such as China and India have ambitious plans to provide refrigerators on a large scale to their massive populations – a goal which it would be difficult to fault. Why should they, they reason, have to cut back on these plans or replace the cheap freon now used in refrigerators with more expensive substitutes?

This problem of equity is even more pronounced in the case of global warming. The US and the USSR between them produce almost forty percent of the CO<sub>2</sub> released by the burning fossil fuels. China and the other developing countries produce a small fraction of that amount. Chinese development plans call for the construction of some two-hundred new coal-fired generating stations in the medium-term future. Any gains from major cutbacks in energy production by the superpowers, Japan



and Western Europe, could easily be wiped out by this kind of expansion.

Tropical deforestation not only contributes to the production of CO<sub>2</sub>, thereby worsening the problem of global warming, but the growth of new forests can act as a "carbon sink," locking up some of the CO<sub>2</sub> produced by combustion. The politicization of the rainforest issue by the Western environmental groups, and overtones of threats to national sovereignty, ensure that little action will be taken by the governments of Brazil and other tropical forest producers without some quid pro quo which is saleable to their own constituencies.

ALL OF THIS IS LEADING TO CALLS FOR UNPRECEDENTED changes in the international system, leading up to what many have described as the "Grand Bargain." It is not yet clear what form such a bargain would take or under whose auspices it would be constructed, but the general lines seem to be as follows: standards would be set for emissions of greenhouse gases (including CFCs). These standards would call for drastic reductions for the industrialized countries and allow for some expansion of emissions in the Third World. Major changes in the terms of technology transfer would be necessary in order to give developing countries access to the latest non-polluting energy technologies as soon as they become available. Last, but not least, there would be major new transfers of resources from North to South.

The Toronto Conference called for the establishment of a World Atmosphere Fund. Such a fund would be used to assist developing countries to limit and adapt to climate change by pursuing sustainable development strategies. Various proposals have been put forward to build the fund. Prime Minister Brundtland of Norway has proposed a straight percentage of GNP (0.1 %). Others have suggested a "carbon tax" under which various types of fuels are taxed according to their tendency to produce carbon dioxide. In general, coal produces 1.7 to 2.0 times as much CO<sub>2</sub> as natural gas; oil emits about 1.4 times as much as natural gas.

Recent meetings on ozone depletion also recognized the need to provide funding for the developing countries to ease the transition away from the damaging types of CFCs. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is considering a system similar to that proposed by President Bush to combat acid rain. This would involve auctioning off the declining US CFC allotment to the highest bidders.

Some observers have also stressed the need for a link between actions taken to deal with climate change and debt relief. The developing world is now paying US \$43 billion more to the North than it is receiving in foreign assistance and private capital flows. It is unrealistic to expect these countries to inflict further hard-

ships on their citizens to combat climate change. Various schemes have been put forward including a sizeable expansion of the so-called "debt-for-nature" swaps, or an adaptation of the Brady plan (US Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady) to permit countries to redeem some of their debt in exchange for changes in policies and projects to promote more efficient use of energy, better forestry practices, greater access to family planning services and the like.

Any of these proposals, or a combination, could generate very large sums of money or debt relief – on the order of at least \$20 to \$30 billion per year – and they have now



Nicholas Vitaro

reached the talking stage. The Dutch Government has commissioned its former Minister of the Environment to produce a firm set of proposals for the next preparatory climate meeting to be held in the Netherlands in October.

These financing proposals have been accompanied by calls for institutional reform of the international system to enable it to deal with the cross-cutting nature of the threat. There is a feeling among many that none of the existing UN agencies has a sufficiently broad mandate to encompass all of the issues. The calls for institutional change range in scope from the strengthening the Secretary General's Office to enable it to genuinely coordinate UN system activities and the provision of a new and broader mandate for the United Nations Environment Programme, to Maurice Strong's proposal to revise the UN Charter to enable the now moribund Trusteeship Council to be re-invigorated with a mandate to be the Trustees of the Earth. Other suggestions have involved redefining the word "security" to encompass environmental security, thus expanding the role of the Security Council.

This feeling of urgency led the French, Norwegian and Dutch Governments in the preparation for the recent summit in The Hague to propose the creation of a supranational agency to preserve the earth's atmosphere. This agency would be able to act on majority vote in some cases (no automatic veto by the five

great powers, in other words), and would have the power to impose mandatory economic sanctions recommended by the International Court of Justice on "goods produced under conditions with negative impact on the atmosphere." The authority would also have the power to raise money to compensate those countries for whom compliance would be an unfair burden. Although this proposal was not fully accepted, it is indicative of the real possibility of movement which many now sense.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF "NEW THINKING" ON THE part of governments on the link between the environment and economics can be found in the results of the G-7 economic summit in July in Paris. Fully one-third of the final communiqué was taken up with the topic, with particular attention paid to the acute dilemmas facing poor countries – and therefore all the rest of us – in finding ways to increase living standards without adding further to global ecological stress. The G-7 leaders, while mostly avoiding specific cases, allowed as how economic incentives could be used to encourage developing countries to take "environmentally desirable action," and that in certain instances "debt forgiveness and debt-for-nature swaps" could be useful.

What role in all of this for Canada? If the Prime Minister wants to be statesmanlike in his second term, then the 1990s version of Pearsonian internationalism must lie in the reconciliation of the need to both postpone and mitigate the effects of climatic change, and to satisfy the basic needs of the poor through a global programme of sustainable development. Canada has already been at or near the front on these issues. For once, it might genuinely be one of those times when, as a middle power, we could take the lead, with our credibility as both a member of the Group of Seven and as a friend of the Third World (Mr. Wilson's recent budget notwithstanding).

These are immensely complicated issues, and the ground is shifting very rapidly. They will be discussed in a whole range of fora under different conditions. They will require new mechanisms for arriving at national positions for negotiations because of their tendency to cut across departmental jurisdictions. Once the dialogue begins, it will be difficult to resist the temptation to add other issues to the list – arms control, new definitions of national security, and so on. A repeat of the ill-fated North-South dialogue, which dragged on through the late 70s and early 80s until it petered out in a series of inconclusive meetings, is regrettably all too possible. Yet this time, surely we have more going for us: a shared sense of the clock ticking, the opportunities provided by the existence of *glasnost* and the recent opening of Eastern Europe, and an uneasy but easily mobilized public opinion.

# IN SEARCH OF A SPACE POLICY FOR CANADA

*The government will soon have some important decisions to make on the future of our civilian and military space programmes.*

BY JOCELYN COULON

CANADA IS CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING ITS second space age revolution which, thanks to an array of space programmes – military and civilian, on-going or at the development stage – will propel it into the twenty-first century. This revolution will enhance civilian and military communications, remote sensing and surveillance of Canadian territory, as well as advancing space sciences in the economic, technological and medical fields.

Ranking eighth among the space powers of the world, Canada will have to make important choices at the beginning of the next century. Civilian space activities in this country will reach a plateau a few years from now, while a growing part of the country's space budget could well be allocated to military activities. The militarization of the space programme remains a possibility, albeit a remote one, and is subject to the vagaries of international politics.

By the year 2000, the government will have allocated some three billion dollars to the civilian programme. Last March, it created the Canadian Space Agency to coordinate all civilian space activities, which until then had been scattered among a half-dozen departments and research institutes. The Department of National Defence (DND) runs a small military space programme, whose projects are nevertheless extremely ambitious; this programme will grow considerably if the military gets what it wants.

Since the launching of Alouette in 1962, Canada's contribution to space activities has mostly been of a civilian nature. The prosperous 1960s and 1970s, when eight satellites were put into orbit and the space industry was growing at a rate of fifty percent a year, was followed by a period of stagnation. The Canadian civilian programme regained some vitality in the late 1980s with the launching of three major projects and a handful of others of lesser importance. According to a major plan developed by the Mulroney government in 1986, Ottawa will spend more than \$3 billion between now and the year 2000 to take part in the US space station programme, in a mobile telecommunications system (M-SAT) and in a remote sensing satellite using a synthetic aperture radar (RADARSAT) which will allow

transmission and reception of signals all over the planet, in cloudy conditions or in the dark. The government's plan includes several other projects to be implemented with the participation of Europe, Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union.

During the 1980s, Canada has spent on average some \$160 million a year on civilian space activities; this amount should reach \$230 million in the 1990s. (We trail far behind France, \$1 billion; Japan, \$900 million; and the United States, \$10 billion.) According to the Ministry of State for Science and Technology, thirty-seven percent of the civilian programme budget will be allocated to the space station, thirty-five percent to RADARSAT, ten percent to M-SAT, and eighteen percent to the other projects.

CENTRAL TO THE CIVILIAN PROGRAMME IS Canada's participation in the US space station, a project begun by President Reagan in 1984. Canada, Japan and the European Space Agency's members were all invited to take part in this endeavour which will culminate, between 1995 and 1998, with the deployment in space of a permanent base that will be managed by eight astronauts. After three years of negotiation, Ottawa agreed, in April 1988, to allocate \$1.2 billion over a fifteen-year period to a programme whose total costs should reach \$40 billion; we will build the station's mobile maintenance and repair centre. This centre will be equipped with a new Canadarm, previously installed on American space shuttles, which will be used to handle the satellites. Moreover, a Canadian astronaut will work for six months every second year on board the station.

Last year, all the partners in the space station signed a memorandum of understanding spelling out the terms of their participation; an agreement whose negotiations were hindered by conditions specified by the Americans regarding the military elements of the stations's functions. We will come back to this later.

While the civilian space programme is well known and widely accepted by the Canadian population, the military space activities of the country remain obscure. In fact, they are still very much in their infancy. All that should change in a few years when DND completes

its numerous studies in the fields of communications, surveillance and early warning. The government will then have to free up significant amounts of money to give the country a true military space programme.

Long neglected in favour of civilian activities, the military use of space became a concern to the government at the beginning of the 1980s. Yet, the Canadian military is not discovering space: it is rediscovering it. John Kirton, of the University of Toronto, has written that at the end of the 1950s, the military played a key role in the creation of the Canadian space programme. The Alouette satellite was built at the Defence Communications Research Centre. And until 1966, according to Kirton, Canadian space projects administered by the military represented forty-one percent of total Canadian expenditures in the field.

After a period where, for political and commercial reasons, the space programme was "demilitarized," interest in the military side has resurfaced. Taking up ideas expressed by the Defence Management Committee in 1974, the Senate Special Committee on National Defence (1985) and the authors of the White Paper on Defence (1987) revived the concept of an independent military space effort.

After long hearings on the air defence of Canadian territory, the Senate Committee recommended in 1985 that the government establish its own military space programme to concentrate on early warning, surveillance and communications tasks necessary to protect national security. Based on the evidence gathered at the hearings, the Committee concluded that DND would need eight to twelve satellites to do the work and that this programme should be allocated at least \$150 million per year for five years, and \$350 million each year during the 1990s.

THE SENATE REPORT DID NOT GO UNHEEDED: DND took up its main elements two years later in the 1987 White Paper. Here, Perrin Beatty, then minister of National Defence, announced an ambitious programme of rearmament and strategic repositioning. The new defence policy rested on the acquisition of a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines. While in



April Ottawa announced the cancellation of the submarine programme and a cut of almost three billion dollars in the Defence budget, resources allocated to space research remained untouched.

The White Paper stated that research programmes had been authorized for investigating radar or infrared space systems which would allow the detection and tracking of aircraft and cruise missiles. These space systems would replace, some fifteen years in the future, the land-based radar stations of the North Warning System, which will become obsolete by the end of the century.

But the substantial policy statement regarding the military space programme is to be found in an internal document made public by DND in July 1987, a few weeks after the tabling of the White Paper. Here the military spells out specifically its technical and strategic requirements. It highlights the three main objectives of the programme:

- to allow Canada to meet its defence commitments, by using space technology when it is cost-efficient and appropriate to do so;
- to promote the use of space for peaceful purposes;
- to contribute to the Canadian economy.

The authors wrote that, "DND should realize that insufficient Canadian involvement in space activity might impose severe constraints on the range of future military options, to the possible detriment of Canadian security and sovereignty interests."

DND wants to go beyond its commitments to NATO and NORAD; by acquiring a space infrastructure, it could make the Canadian armed forces totally or partially independent. It is not a matter of having a Canadian armed presence in space, but rather of using space passively. In addition, the research and development branch at DND puts a lot of stock in the government policy which aims at providing Canadian business with economic spin-offs.

DND PLANS ARE VERY AMBITIOUS AND COVER A number of fields: surveillance, communications, navigation, search and rescue, meteorology, oceanography and mapping, and finally, manned space flights. In 1986-1987, the Department of National Defence released \$46 and \$48 million respectively for research related to space radar technology and millimetric rapid circuit technology. Those two research programmes, which will span five to seven years, will provide enough information to make possible a decision on the need to get involved in the areas on a long-term basis.

The purpose of the space radar programme is to develop an air, land, sea and underwater surveillance system. Its principal function will be to detect, track and identify aircraft and cruise missiles approaching North America. It will be linked to a combat management system for the interception and destruction of such intruders - activities which would take place

within the structure of NORAD. The radars will also be used for Arctic surveillance.

DND knows that it will be impossible to develop an independent space radar network, because of the high costs involved. According to the Pentagon, a world network could cost between six and ten billion US dollars. The Canadian military is hoping, therefore, to contribute to the deployment of the segment that will cover North America, by providing ten to fifteen percent of the costs of a US programme.

The millimetric wave communications programme is also of great importance to the military. From DND's point of view, a reliable, efficient and independent communications network is vital, in order to ensure contact between Canadian Forces units around the world, notably in Cyprus, Europe and the Middle East. At present, DND must lease lines going via satellites such as the ANIK C (and soon, E) series. Unlike the US military, it does not have satellites of its own. Finally, the military are involved in many other programmes, such as the complete modernization of the entire Canadian Forces communications network, access to the US network NAVSTAR/GPS (Global Positioning System), the search and rescue SRSAT system, the development of security measures for ANIK E satellites, and so on.

Also unlike its US counterpart, DND does not have a unified space command. The Directorate of Space Doctrine and Operations was disbanded last summer, and there is no equivalent to the civilian Space Agency to coordinate military space policy. DND will no doubt have to adopt such a structure within a few years.

MOST EXPERTS AGREE THAT AT THE PRESENT rate, the military space budget could soon exceed \$150 million per year, even taking into account the fact that Canada does not build its own surveillance, communications, and navigation satellites. If DND gets the go-ahead for its projects, that budget could easily reach \$400 million a year by the turn of the century.

Except for ongoing discussions at the Inter-ministerial Space Committee, where all government participants in space activities get together, there are few links between the civilian programme and its military counterpart. However, two questions come to mind when looking to the future: will we see a militariza-


tion of the civilian programme, as is the case in the United States? Will our cooperation with our powerful neighbour carry us along in that direction? The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA - the US civilian space agency) budget is limited to US \$10 billion, while that for military space activities approaches \$15 billion. The same cannot be said yet for Canada, but ten years or so from now, the slowing down of the civilian programme and the launching of a strong military programme could lead to a Canadian space policy with a similar bias in favour of the military.

The US and Canada are collaborating on both government and private levels. In the first instance, Canada is bound to the US by a number of military and technical agreements related to NORAD, military communications and navigation systems, and the space station. During the negotiations on the station, which led to last year's agreement; it was decided that the station would be built for peaceful purposes, despite objections from the Pentagon that it did not want to exclude any military option. The agreement, however, does not specify which military activities are forbidden. Moreover, the American can do as they please in a large part of the station, since they own seventy

percent of it. Some experts maintain that the America's partners could well be presented with a *fait accompli* once the station becomes fully operational and is being used for significant military activities.

As for the private sector, Canada's space industry exports seventy percent of its production which ends up being integrated in a myriad of American products, both civil and military. If Canada launches its military space programme, or, more simply, if cooperation between the United States and Canada intensifies, our country's industries could well find themselves more and more associated with military ventures.

There are still a few years left before Canada is confronted with vital choices related to its space policy. The new Space Agency will, within the next year, define its objectives for the beginning of the next century. This would seem to indicate that an energetic civilian programme will be pursued. The country, however, will not be able to neglect its military requirements for long, and apportioning resources between the two programmes will involve some difficult choices. The time for making decisions is almost at hand. □



# FIGHTING TO THE LAST AFGHAN

*There is no shortage of Afghans who could form a popular government – if only the outsiders would get out of the way.*

BY SELIG S. HARRISON

**T**HE COMPLETION OF THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL from Afghanistan in February set the stage for a new and bloodier phase of the civil war that led to the invasion a decade ago. After six months of inconclusive fighting, however, the Afghan adversaries and their superpower mentors are cautiously edging toward negotiations on a political compromise.

Moscow is eager for a settlement. Mikhail Gorbachev recognizes the limitations of the Afghan Communist Party and wants to escape from the futile commitment made by his predecessors. This was unambiguously spelled out to me in a series of high-level meetings with officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry and the Communist Party Central Committee during a recent three-week visit to Moscow.

To be sure, the Kabul Communist regime has displayed much greater motivation, discipline and staying power than most observers anticipated. But Soviet leaders – and Afghan President Najibullah – are keenly aware that the regime could not survive on its own without the continuous airlifts and supply convoys provided by Moscow.

In my view, Gorbachev is prepared to support a peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan in which President Najibullah's regime would step down coincident with the conclusion of negotiations to establish a broad-based transitional government. Moscow's minimum conditions for such a political settlement are that the Communists not be excluded from the process of establishing a transitional regime; that the process be conducted under independent auspices, free from the control of Pakistani and American intelligence agencies; and that the Communist Party be recognized as a legitimate participant in any future elections to be conducted by a transitional government. Representation of the Communist Party, as such, in a transitional government is an expendable bargaining demand.

While giving up its effort to ensure Communist dominance, in short, Moscow wants to be able to say that it has preserved an opportunity for the Communists to compete in the power struggles ahead. Indeed, it is important to recognize that the Geneva accords were accept-

able to the Soviet Union as a face-saving compromise precisely because they did not require Moscow to abandon its Afghan clients.

THE BASIC DILEMMA NOW CONFRONTING MOSCOW and Washington alike is that neither the Kabul regime nor the Peshawar government-in-exile established by Pakistan and the United States, represents the majority of Afghans. Neither can serve as the nucleus of a broad-based transitional regime because both have alienated the Afghan nationalist majority. The Afghan Communist Party has been indelibly tainted by its collaboration with a foreign occupation force. But the Pakistan-based government-in-exile is also widely rejected as the creation of Islamabad's Directorate of Interservices Intelligence (ISI).

The ISI played a conspicuous, heavy-handed role in arranging and manipulating the Islamabad *shura*, or council, that set up the exile government in February, 1989. Protégés of the late President Zia Ul-Haq are still in control of the ISI despite Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's continuing efforts to tame the powerful military intelligence organization. Zia had made no secret of his desire to install a Pakistani satellite regime in Kabul dominated by Islamic fundamentalist Afghan splinter groups that have been artificially built up with Pakistani support. Despite the installation of a moderate, Sibghatullah Mojadidi, as its figurehead president, the narrowly-based exile government is firmly controlled by fundamentalist factions, and has thus been discredited from the start in the eyes of most Afghans.

In order to understand the political isolation of the government-in-exile, it is necessary to recognize the nature of Islam in Afghanistan, where the established clergy has long been identified with the Hanafi school of Islamic law and various Sufi sects. The power of the local mullah in traditional Afghan society has been reinforced by a symbiotic relationship with chieftains of the Pushtun tribes, Afghanistan's dominant ethnic group. By contrast, the fundamentalist groups, preaching more purist Islamic doctrines, are seeking to destroy the Pushtun tribal system as incompatible with

their concept of a centralized Islamic state linked to a pan-Islamic revival. They oppose most of the modernization measures initiated by previous regimes, especially those liberalizing the status of women.

Numbering at most 1,100 in the early 1970s, the Afghan fundamentalists faced severe repression under former King Zahir Shah, a Pushtun, and his successor, Mohammed Daud. In 1975, most of them fled to Pakistan. There they linked up with the Intelligence Directorate, staging raids against the Daud regime then at odds with Pakistan. This link made them Pakistan's favoured Afghan protégés after the 1978 Communist takeover. Nurtured by massive aid from the US as well as by fundamentalists in the Middle East and Pakistan, the fundamentalist factions have grown to number some 15,000 hard-core activists.

FOR MANY AFGHANS, ZAHIR SHAH SYMBOLIZES a period of relative stability when Afghanistan enjoyed friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But fundamentalist leaders, remembering the former king's repression, bitterly oppose any role for him in organizing or leading a new regime. Pakistan has actively obstructed efforts by Zahir Shah's supporters to organize broad-based negotiations among Afghan factions that would pave the way for the peaceful replacement of the Communist regime. Instead, Pakistan has treated the seven-party resistance alliance as the sole voice of non-communist Afghans.

The roots of Pakistan's hostility go back to the early nineteenth century, when the original Afghan state created in 1747 by the Pushtun tribes under Ahmad Shah Durrani embraced the Pushtun areas of what is now northwest Pakistan. Later, as part of the "Great Game," the British Raj annexed 40,000 square miles of Afghan territory between the Indus River and the Khyber Pass. They then proceeded to hand over their ill-gotten territorial gains and half the Pushtun population to the new Pakistani government in 1947. By dividing the Pushtuns, the British bequeathed an issue that has preoccupied Pushtun-dominated Afghan regimes ever since and has poisoned the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.



Zia channelled the lion's share of American weapons aid to the fundamentalists, consciously downgrading Pushtun resistance groups. Since becoming Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto has attempted to reverse his anti-Pushtun policy, calling for a broad-based Afghan government dominated neither by the Communists nor the fundamentalists. Pakistan's interests require such a government, she told me in June 1988, since "continued civil war means the continued presence of three million refugees." In a subsequent interview with *The Nation* of Lahore, she warned more explicitly that efforts to establish a Pakistani satellite state in Kabul might stir up a Pushtun backlash.

When Bhutto visited Washington in June, she urged the US to pursue a political solution of the Afghan war through negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Bush administration stalled for time, arguing that the resistance should be given another chance to overthrow Kabul militarily this summer and fall. But administration officials express increasing impatience with the poor military performance of the resistance and the inability of the government-in-exile to broaden its base. If the Kabul regime is still intact by the end of the fighting season in October, these officials foresee an intensified search for a political solution.

WHAT EXPLAINS THE STAYING POWER OF THE Communist forces demonstrated in the Jalalabad fighting? To be sure, the Kabul regime has airpower, while the resistance forces do not. Another military factor responsible for the poor showing of the resistance forces in the Jalalabad assault so far has been their lack of experience in conventional warfare. But an important and often overlooked part of the answer lies in the fact that the Communist Party has a hard core of forty thousand highly-motivated activists who see themselves as nationalists and modernizers carrying forward the abortive reform effort launched by King Amanullah from 1919 to 1929. On a visit to Kabul in 1984 and in continuing contacts with Communist leaders, I have been reminded that dedication and a patriotic self-image are not a monopoly of the resistance fighters.

The taint of Pakistani sponsorship now attaching to the Peshawar exile regime has reinforced this patriotic self-image and enabled the Communists to rationalize their own record of a decade of collaboration with Soviet occupation forces. Many party activists are drawn from previously-submerged social groups, including women. They will not easily give up their new status and are likely to continue to fight rather than abandon the field to the resistance.

Conceivably, with a large-scale expansion of Pakistani technical and logistical support now being provided, the resistance forces would be able to use armored vehicles and improve their showing. However, the deep-seated divisions

in the resistance would make a definitive victory unlikely in the absence of years of training in conventional warfare and a massive escalation of American military aid extending not only to armored vehicles but also to aircraft. More important, even in the event that the Communists are dislodged from Kabul, they would not necessarily stop fighting. Afghanistan would in all probability remain locked in a continuing civil war involving the Communists; Islamic fundamentalist factions backed by Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia; Shia groups backed by Iran; and many of the resistance field commanders, especially those linked to the Pushtun groups who look to Zahir Shah as their spokesman.

Among the possible topics of Soviet-American discussions on Afghanistan is an agreement to terminate military aid to the Afghan combatants. Originally proposed by the United States in March, 1988, "negative symmetry" was rejected at that time by Moscow. Since Gorbachev's reversal of the Soviet position in November 1988, however, it is Washington that has rejected the concept.

If an aid cutoff could be agreed upon, the Afghan combatants would be compelled, for the first time, to focus seriously on possible political compromises. Secretary General Pérez De Cuellar would then have an opportunity to pursue the 3 November 1988, General Assembly resolution calling on him to promote a broad-based government embracing "all segments" of the Afghan people.

One of Zahir Shah's close advisers, Sultan M. Ghazi, has urged the Secretary General to convene a series of national unity conferences, or mini-*shuras* as a prelude to a larger *shura*.



Neither Kabul nor the Peshawar government-in-exile would be represented as such. However, the invitation list would be designed to provide for representation of all significant political and social forces. The mini-*shuras* could choose an interim government directly, composed of independent, non-partisan figures, as proposed by former UN mediator Diego Cordovez in July 1988, or they could call a larger gathering for this purpose.

CONTRARY TO THE WIDESPREAD IMAGE OF A hopelessly polarized society, there is no shortage of respected, centrist Afghans who could form a government capable of commanding popular support. Former Deputy Prime Minis-

ter Abdul Samad Hamed, former Justice Minister Abdul Sitar Sirat, former Agriculture Minister Abdul Wakil and former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Ahmad Popal are examples of the many experienced Afghan leaders who are not tainted by fundamentalist extremism, past links with the Communists, or the corruption charges that have discredited most of the alliance leaders.

While the Communist Party cannot be wished away in a postwar Afghanistan, it clearly cannot have a significant role in an interim regime and is not likely to win major representation in any future elections. Just as the US should not seek to exclude all Communist participation in the process leading to an interim regime, so the Soviet Union should be prepared to support representative processes that would, by their nature, consign the Communists to clear minority status.

Many Bush administration officials are skeptical of all formulas for replacing the Communist regime peacefully. Such scenarios, it is argued, implicitly assume that the existing Kabul governmental infrastructure would be left in place, at least initially. In this view, the armed forces, police and intelligence services of the Communist regime must be militarily destroyed and uprooted or they will subvert any new government. It is necessary to "start from scratch," as President Reagan put it in a press conference in November 1988.

The task of reshaping the armed forces, police and intelligence services inherited from the Najibullah regime would clearly not be an easy one. But the leadership of a successor regime would be fortified by its control of Western, UN and Soviet aid resources. Communist

discipline is not likely to survive for long within the security services in the midst of the political realignments that would accompany a broad-based regime. As the memory of the Soviet occupation fades, Afghan nationalism is likely to reassert itself, gradually diluting and domesticating Afghan Communism.

In my view, a policy designed to start from scratch in Afghanistan carries unacceptable moral as well as political costs. Such a policy is, in effect, a policy of fighting to the last Afghan, in the misguided pursuit of perceived American geopolitical objectives that can be achieved more effectively through political and diplomatic means.

## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE INSTITUTE

THE MIDDLE OF 1989 marked a natural crossroads for the Institute for Peace and Security. It was the five-year point in the Institute's life; the steady growth in the funding base (as provided in our founding legislation) had reached a plateau, and the Board of Directors agreed that it was a logical time to draw on the lessons of the initial building phase and to set clear directions for the future.

As the new Director, I seized every opportunity to consult my colleagues on the Board and staff about our past experience, and undertook a programme of external consultations, to seek the most balanced perspective possible. The result was an extraordinarily useful series of speaking and media engagements, small-group discussions and "accountability sessions," in every region of the country, meeting a cross-section of Canadians who follow the Institute's work and use its services – not excluding parliamentarians, federal, provincial and territorial officials and national and local journalists.

After further internal consultation – in which all Institute staff participated – our Board considered and agreed upon a set of medium-term directions for the Institute at our two-day meeting in mid-June. These discussions allowed for a bridging between past experience and future plans, since this was the last opportunity for our founding Chairman, and for several other distinguished directors who were retiring, to sum up their impressions and suggestions. What follows is an outline of our main conclusions.

FIRST, THE "REAL WORLD" ENVIRONMENT in which the Institute pursues its mandate of increasing knowledge and understanding of issues of international peace and security is today extremely challenging, and likely to remain so for years to come. The dramatic improvement in East-West relations, and the possibilities for progress in arms control and conflict resolution, creates *more* work, not less, for our Institute and its collaborators. None of the traditional issues has gone away – working out sensible options for defence policy and concrete arms control is tougher than ever – but we must also confront the huge and exhilarating tasks of contributing to new institutions, initiatives to resolve and reduce conflicts around the world, and responses to new kinds of international security threats, such as global

climatic change. Such an agenda could easily lead to overload, or to a diffused and diluted effort, so the Institute has identified a number of areas for concentrated work, along with its general and responsive coverage, in a flexible five-year strategy.

The Board also agreed that the pre-eminent mandate and resources entrusted to us by Parliament call for a clear stamp of excellence and relevance in all the Institute's activities, especially if it is to discharge credibly its responsibility to "study and propose ideas and policies." Another basic principle is that the Institute will continue to work in partnership with a wide range of other institutions, groups and individuals in the achievement of the central goals, by fostering and funding the appropriate research, information and educational activities. In addition to working with such specialized partners, however, the Institute accepts a central responsibility for making analyses of international peace and security accessible and interesting to a much wider public, to policy-makers and opinion leaders, both in Canada and abroad. This objective requires an energetic and professional working relationship with the information media which play a vital role in shaping understanding on these questions.

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR LEGISLATIVE mandate, our programme will continue to deal with the full range of peace and security issues, with particular attention to arms control, disarmament, defence, conflict resolution as well as some of the "frontier" questions in the field. We will maintain general monitoring, response, and referral capabilities in these areas, with our senior researchers each covering designated fields. This general issue coverage will also be maintained through the widest possible accessibility of such vehicles as our annual Guide, our streamlined publications programme, and vigorous outreach of our information services, through libraries, schools and other institutions. Six project-areas or clusters for *intensive* concentration over the next two to five years are as follows:

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

Canadian defence and security policy;

Measures for strengthening international systems of peacekeeping, peace-making and peace-building;

Developing, maintaining and calling upon networks of experts concerned with particular regions of conflict or potential conflict;

Enhancing international cooperation and security in the Arctic region;

Exploration of new threats and new approaches to international security.

A number of these project-areas build on well-established activities undertaken or supported by the Institute, and others have already been the subject of new initiatives. For example, work on the review of defence and security policy is being launched against the background of a completed study on the future of Canadian land-forces, and the media round-table on defence, foreign policy and the federal budget held in early May. The project-area on international mechanisms for strengthening peace proceeds from a number of projects on peacekeeping, mediation and conflict resolution. Our "network" coverage of regions of conflict will draw on the lessons of the large-scale project on Cyprus conducted over the past year, and take such forms as the current programme on the transition to peace and elections in Namibia. The Arctic cooperation and security focus will bring together a large number of studies, and intensify a range of national and international contacts in these fields. New approaches to international security are already the subject of a commissioned project by a multi-university team.

THE INSTITUTE'S MANDATE TO APPROACH THE field of international peace and security "from a Canadian perspective" is not justification for any narrow nationalism. In fact, the global range of Canada's interests and potential contributions, as well as the strengths and curiosities of Canadians, mean that our agenda must be broad and innovative. By this same token, we have concluded that it is a responsibility of key Canadian institutions to concentrate resources primarily in areas of world importance where they can actually make the most difference. Thus the Institute's own analytical and educational work, and some of the work it undertakes with others, will be guided more explicitly by a sense of where Canada's strengths in enhancing international peace and security are most likely to be found over the medium-term. Our Board and staff are convinced that in the process of specializing in this way we will not only be the most effective resource for the Canadian community, but also build appropriate recognition and influence for this work world-wide. □

— BERNARD WOOD

*Bernard Wood is the Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Institute.*



## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Cyprus

There is growing optimism that the two sides in the Cyprus dispute may be inching towards a settlement of what has become one of the longest and most frustrating issues before the Security Council. After years of fitful efforts, hopes are now pinned to negotiations between Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş and George Vassiliou, the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

In a bid to advance the talks, the Council issued a terse statement on 9 June, during a routine meeting to renew the mandate of UN forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP): "The members note that 25 years have elapsed since the establishment of UNFICYP.... They regret that, in that time, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem."

Canada was particularly active in drafting the statement. It argued for the strong language in order to make clear that nations contributing troops were growing weary of the stalemated negotiations. "The prime purpose was to register a sense of impatience that there has been twenty-five years of peace-keeping and we don't want there to be twenty-five more," a Canadian diplomat explained. "The problem is that as long as both sides rely on the UN force, they don't do anything [to advance negotiations]."

The diplomat said the latest negotiations are "the most hopeful in years." The two sides are scheduled to come up with a broad outline for an agreement sometime in September. They are then to meet with the Secretary-General to work out the details.

"If it doesn't work out, there won't be a return to the status quo of UNFICYP. The Security Council is frustrated. If the two sides don't give it their best shot then they'll suffer the consequences," the diplomat said. He did not spell out the specific consequences but the implication was that troop contributors would consider cut-backs. Frustration led Sweden to withdraw all of its troops last year.

Canada is also concerned that UNFICYP's financing is voluntary and at present, \$165 million in the red. During Council consultations, Canada sought relief in a proposal for a mandatory assessment of all UN members, but the Soviet Union and France are said to have opposed the move.

### Middle East

As in the past, events in Israel continued to be a major concern. In the space of a month, the Council voted on two resolutions critical of Israeli treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The first resolution, which "strongly deplored" Israeli policies and practices "which violate the rights of Palestinian people" was vetoed on 9 June by the US. The remaining fourteen members, including Canada, supported it. Canada's backing of the document was grounded in the belief that Israel was not doing enough to respect the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians under military occupation. The criticism of Israel was tempered by praise for the authorities in standing up to West Bank vigilantes.

The debate on the resolution was preceded by delicate negotiations. Initially, the document's sponsors had sought to use the strongest language available and "condemn" Israel. But Canada and others successfully lobbied for slightly softer language that instead "strongly deplored" Israel.

"We tried to get the language to be as acceptable as possible, then you have a resolution with moral weight," said a Canadian diplomat. "You don't want to show a divided Security Council."

Nonetheless, the US found the language unacceptable. It rejected the document for being "unbalanced," in that it failed to address the violence committed by Palestinians. As was the case with many previous resolutions critical of Israel, the US was left diplomatically isolated by its veto. The US, however, refrained from using its veto on 6 July, during a vote on a resolution expressing "deep regret" over the continuing deportation of Palestinian civilians. It chose instead to abstain, and the resolution was adopted.

In other Middle East matters, the Council, in one of its shortest meetings ever, renewed on 30 May the mandate for the UN buffer force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF) which stands between Syrian and Israeli troops. On 31 July, the Council renewed the mandate of UN forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

### Other Issues Before The Council

The Council also continued to monitor events in Namibia. Despite the problems of the initial phase of the operation, diplomats seem confident that the overall process is on track for elections in November. Nevertheless, they are conscious of the potential for what one diplomat termed, a few "hiccups."

One such problem arose on 28 June, when Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar warned the Council of an atmosphere of "fear and intimidation" in northern Namibia that jeopardized conditions for fair elections. He blamed the activities of a counter-insurgency unit of the South-West Africa Police Force for what he called "unacceptable" conduct.

The issue of terrorism was also the focus of Council deliberations. In a unanimous resolution the fifteen members called for an inter-

national regime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives to make them more detectable. It urged all states to intensify research in order to prevent acts of terrorism against civil aviation.

On 31 July, the Council also adopted a resolution sponsored by Canada and Finland which condemned all hostage taking and called for the worldwide release of hostages and abducted persons. The resolution, although not directly related to the kidnapping of a Lebanese religious leader by Israel, was adopted on the same day the cleric's followers claimed they had executed Lt. Col. William Higgins, an American officer serving with UN forces in Lebanon. On learning of his death, the Council expressed its "outrage" and demanded that all hostages and abducted persons be released.

On 27 July the Council turned its attention to events in Central America. In a policy shift, the US went along with a resolution that called for the disbanding of the Nicaraguan Contras as part of the Central American peace plan. For the past few years, the US has prevented consideration of the issue. Its shift was balanced by the resolution's appeal to all countries to halt military aid to guerrillas in the region, an allusion to the conflict in El Salvador. The resolution also permits continued humanitarian aid to the Contras.

The vote was followed eleven days later by the surprise decision of the five Central American presidents to support the demobilization of the Contras. UN troops would be required to oversee this, as well as to guard the Honduras-Nicaragua border against infiltration and illicit arms shipments. Any such operation will require the approval of the Security Council, where the US has a veto. □

— TREVOR ROWE

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### Fiscal Restraint

The impact of the 27 April budget is still being felt throughout the public service. For National Defence, the cuts meant a complete review of maritime capabilities following the cancellation of the plan to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. Other options are currently under exploration. Defence Minister McKnight also intimated on 7 June, at the end of a visit to CFB Lahr in West Germany, that Canada would maintain its 7,500 troops in Europe "in the near term," but that the government would be assessing the wide range of roles to which Canada is currently committed.

There were questions in the House concerning the delay in plans to build the Polar 8 icebreaker in the light of soaring cost estimates. On 8 May NDP MP Audrey McLaughlin (Yukon) asked Transport Minister Benoit Bouchard when the building would begin. Although the Minister confirmed the government's commitment to the project, he and other senior ministers refused to reaffirm commitments about price, capability, contractor or sailing date. The project had first been announced as a means of protecting Canadian sovereignty in the furor following the 1985 voyage by a US Coast Guard icebreaker through the Northwest Passage. Yet despite an initial cost estimate of half a billion dollars, only \$1.6 million is earmarked for the programme this year.

Margaret Catley-Carlson, the President of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) which had also borne substantial cuts in the budget, discussed the effects of the cuts as

well as aid policies in general in an appearance before the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) on 1 June. She reviewed her six years as president, noting that in 1983 CIDA had 1,082 person-years and a budget of \$1.35 billion; in the interim, person-years have increased by about fifty, the budget has grown to \$2.2 billion – \$2 billion after the cuts – presenting, in her words, "a very real management challenge." To this is added the process of decentralization: a far greater percentage of CIDA staff will be transferred to the field, in response to a key recommendation of SCEAIT in its 1987 report, "For Whose Benefit?"

### Turmoil in China

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark rose in the Commons almost daily in the weeks beginning 5 June, following the crackdown by the Chinese government on protesters in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. He answered a torrent of opposition questions and gradually announced a series of measures in response to the official repression that had been unleashed. Specifically: Canada recalled its ambassador and was the first Western nation to do so. Mr. Clark twice called in the Chinese ambassador to register the government's "profound disapproval" and its expectation that the Chinese official actions would be brought to an end, (the ambassador told reporters that Canada should not be meddling in China's internal affairs). The government airlifted Canadians out of China. Defectors from China's Canadian missions were assured by the Minister that their cases would be treated "in a most sympathetic way." Canada withdrew from three aid projects; kept on hold four of five agreements, the signing of which had been postponed in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen incident; and indefinitely suspended activity associated

with the massive Three Gorges dam project on the Yangtze river – a project which has already received considerable criticism for environmental reasons.

On 30 June the Minister made a detailed statement outlining the new realities of the Canada-China relationship, following a series of consultations the government had held with a wide variety of interested parties. A \$1.5 million assistance program for Chinese students in Canada was also announced, along with the creation of a panel to advise the government on their predicament.

The opposition called for a number of additional measures such as strong international action from the World Bank and other international institutions. The Minister indicated that the government would seriously consider Liberal leader John Turner's suggestion in the House on 26 June, that the issue of Hong Kong's future be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government (in Kuala Lumpur in October).

### Parliamentary Committees

Parliament recessed for the summer on 27 June, to resume on 25 September. The House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) began work on a major, year-long study of Canada's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which will recommence when Parliament resumes. The Committee will also undertake a study on international debt questions with a particular focus on Africa. These specific references do not prevent SCEAIT from exploring other issues as circumstances warrant.

The House Standing Committee on National Defence will be investigating questions of maritime sovereignty in the fall.

The Special Senate Committee on National Defence is nearing completion of a study on Canada's

land forces; after a further extension their report is expected in October 1989.

### Short Notes from the Hill

The Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister attended the Francophone Summit in Dakar, Senegal, on 24 May. They then went on to the NATO Summit in Brussels 29 and 30 May, while Mr. Clark was joined by the Finance and Trade Ministers to attend the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial meeting 31 May and 1 June in Paris. The Prime Minister also attended the Economic Summit of the seven industrialized countries in Paris 14 to 16 July. Both the OECD meeting of twenty-four industrialized nations and the Economic Summit were notable in the stress they placed on environmental issues.

Canada was the only one of the world's major industrialized democracies to send a senior observer – Joe Clark – to the meeting of the Group of 77 (representing 127 developing countries) to discuss economic development, particularly debt questions, in Caracas, Venezuela on 19 and 20 June.

On 6 June, Joe Clark announced the departure of Doug Roche as Ambassador for Disarmament, a position he had held since October 1984.

On 28 June, Mr. Clark announced that Canada will provide technical assistance to the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua to help organize its general elections, scheduled to be held in February 1990.

On 25 July the Prime Minister named Margaret Catley-Carlson as deputy minister of Health and Welfare. She will be succeeded as CIDA president by Marcel Massé, who was CIDA president from 1980–1982. He most recently served as Canada's executive director to the International Monetary Fund in Washington. □

– GREGORY WIRICK



## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Conventional Arms Control

Remarkable progress was made during the second round of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, from 5 May to 13 July. First, on 18 May, the Warsaw Pact responded to NATO complaints about the vagueness of its earlier proposals by suggesting precise ceilings on various kinds of equipment, to be achieved through reductions by 1997. The proposed limits included 20,000 tanks and 28,000 armoured troop carriers for each side (identical to the NATO proposal of 9 March), and 24,000 artillery pieces (compared to NATO's proposed 16,500). The East would thus have to withdraw from Europe or retire, by its own estimates, a total of about 40,000 tanks, 47,000 artillery pieces, and 42,000 armoured troop carriers over the next eight years. It also called for each side to be limited to 1,350,000 troops, 1,500 "strike aircraft," and 1,700 helicopters.

Late May saw additional Eastern moves toward the Western position, including acceptance of the principles of sublimits on the forces of any one nation, on forces stationed outside their own countries, and on forces within regional "subzones" (to prevent their concentration). Thus, for example, the USSR would be permitted a total of 14,000 tanks, 17,000 artillery pieces, and 18,000 armoured troop carriers, only slightly above the number that would be allowed them under NATO's proposal. This, in turn, would amount to reductions of 17,580 tanks, 24,775 artillery pieces, and 27,000 armoured troop carriers beyond those announced as unilateral cuts by President Gorbachev at the UN last December.

In response, NATO at its summit meeting on 29 and 30 May for

the first time accepted the idea of limits on aircraft and personnel numbers, as demanded by the Warsaw Pact. US President Bush called for reductions to 15 percent below the current NATO levels in both helicopters and land-based combat aircraft, and a ceiling on US and Soviet ground and air force personnel in Europe of approximately 275,000 each. The latter would require the withdrawal of some 325,000 Soviet troops, compared to 30,000 Americans. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze welcomed the new proposals as "serious and constructive, and meeting our stand halfway in many respects." Bush also called for agreement to be reached within six months to a year, and the reductions to be completed by 1992 or 1993.

Further movement was recorded before the end of the round. On 29 June the Warsaw Pact proposed a new, larger "sub-zone," including the Baltic and other military districts of the western USSR, in an attempt to assuage Western concerns about the possible concentration of Soviet forces in areas close to central Europe. And on 13 July, two months ahead of schedule, NATO tabled details of its proposed limits on aircraft and helicopters, setting alliance ceilings of 5,700 and 1,900, and national ceilings of 3,420 and 1,140, respectively. Such limits would require NATO to destroy about 1,000 aircraft and the Warsaw Pact, 3,900 (by NATO's count). Major differences remained, however, over which types of aircraft would be subject to cuts, NATO wanting to include all combat aircraft and the Pact wishing to exclude fighter interceptors and medium bombers.

Other areas of continued disagreement included: the Pact's insistence on personnel limitations applying to the alliances as a whole, as well as to the forces of non-US NATO members stationed outside their own territory; whether or not stored equipment should be included in the limits on foreign-

stationed forces and on the forces within subzones (the Pact in favour, NATO opposed); the geographic parameters of the subzones, as well as the ceilings to take effect within them; the definition of certain types of equipment, such as tanks and artillery pieces; and each side's estimates of its own and the other side's current holdings. Finally, neither side had yet formulated comprehensive verification provisions. Although both sides pledged to attempt to reach an agreement within the time frame proposed by President Bush, most independent observers doubted that this would be possible.

### Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) resumed for their eleventh round on 19 June, after a seven-month recess during which the new Bush administration reviewed the US position. Many observers were disappointed with the results of Washington's review, which mainly reconfirmed old positions and made no headway on such outstanding issues as constraints on ballistic missile defences, mobile ICBMs, and sea-launched cruise missiles. However, the Soviets were evidently pleased that previous understandings embodied in the 400-page draft treaty had been preserved. The Bush administration rejected Congressional recommendations that a US-proposed ban on mobile ICBMs be made to apply only to missiles with multiple warheads. Many arms control advocates have been urging the US to drop its proposed ban entirely, contending that mobile missiles are less vulnerable to attack and hence more stabilizing. However, the administration has been reluctant to drop the ban until Congress agrees to fund its own two new mobile ICBM programmes, since the Soviets have already deployed such missiles.

One new US initiative, introduced at the beginning of the new round, was a proposal to put into

effect agreed verification measures even before a final treaty text is completed. Although some critics perceived the move as a delaying tactic, Soviet negotiators were reported to have responded favourably.

### Brief Notes

The controversy within NATO over talks on short-range nuclear forces (SNF) was resolved at the 29 and 30 May summit by US agreement to begin negotiations on a "partial" reduction of such weapons once implementation of a conventional forces agreement was "underway." In support of his call for immediate negotiations to ban SNF, Soviet President Gorbachev on 11 May had announced that he would unilaterally reduce his arsenal of SNF warheads by 500. American officials retorted that this would have little impact on the estimated Warsaw Pact total of 10,000 such weapons, while noting that NATO had unilaterally reduced its own stocks by more than 2,400 since 1979.

The US and USSR on 12 June signed an "Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities," covering unintentional incursions of military aircraft into the territory of another country; the hazardous use of lasers; the disrupting of operations in "special caution areas" (such as the Persian Gulf); and interference with command-and-control networks. The agreement also establishes a Joint Commission to improve communications and handle disputes.

On 17 July it was reported that the US and USSR had reached agreement on key elements of a global Chemical Weapons Convention, including a timetable for the destruction of such weapons and detailed procedures for challenge inspections. The recommendations will be submitted to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the Convention is being negotiated. □

— RON PURVER

## DEFENCE NOTES



### B-2 Flies into Modernization Debate

On 17 July the B-2 Stealth bomber flew for the first time, however, at a cost of US \$530 million per airplane (\$70 billion for the proposed purchases of 132), the maiden flight ran into severe turbulence in Washington, where legislators debated the 1990 budget, and, more broadly, the future of US strategic forces.

In July the House Armed Services Committee voted to reduce the 1990 stealth bomber budget by \$1 billion, and to reduce the 1990 purchase from three aircraft to two. Even these planes cannot be bought, according to the House resolution, until the Air Force produces a plan to reduce the cost of the programme. The Senate resolution was considerably less restrictive, requiring that the Pentagon certify the B-2's airworthiness, and ability to penetrate Soviet bomber defences, but leaving the budget largely intact. A conference committee of the two houses is expected to reconcile these differences before the fall, but the statement of performance requirements imposed on the Air Force may take considerably longer to produce.

The debate over the B-2 is part of a broader debate between the Bush administration and Congress over the future structure of US strategic nuclear forces. In January President Bush announced a review of force modernization plans prior to the resumption of arms control negotiations with the Soviets. The review is now long overdue, but the shape of the US force structure is in any case emerging from the continued tug-of-war in Congress.

In an April compromise between the Pentagon and the

Congress, the single warhead Midgetman, which has few supporters in the Pentagon, was restored to the 1990 budget in exchange for the continued funding of the road-mobile version of the ten-warhead MX missile. In late July the House of Representatives voted first to halve funding for the deployment of the MX missile, and later, to kill the Midgetman. The double blow was a product of Congressional politics, not strategic analysis. When the Democrats voted to limit MX funding, Republicans retaliated by voting with liberal Democrats against Midgetman.

Led by New York Congressmen determined to save Grumman Aircraft's Long Island factory, the House further shredded the administration's defence budget by restoring funding to the F-14 fighter aircraft – one of only two major procurement programmes which Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney had been able to cut in his original budget proposal.

In testimony to Congress, Pentagon Chiefs have argued that without the B-2, US negotiators in Geneva would need to revise their negotiating position or even withdraw from the talks. President Bush, still without the conclusions of his strategic review, has claimed that he has established a "solid strategic program" which depends on the package of the B-2, Midgetman, MX, and the continuation of SDI. Adding his voice to the fray, on a July visit to Washington which included an appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, Marshal Akhromeyev, Special Adviser to Gorbachev, told reporters that, if the B-2 is deployed, "there will be a reaction on the part of the Soviet Union."

### Picking Up the Pieces in Ottawa

Although the Mulroney government has not undertaken a formal review of defence policy following this year's budget cuts, various official statements indi-

cate the course of the painful reassessment now taking place in Ottawa.

Under the programme envisaged by the White paper, the Navy would have built towards a fleet of 28 combat ships, to include 12 frigates, 4 destroyers, and 12 nuclear-powered submarines. The acquisition of the nuclear submarines was partly at the cost of a third batch of six new frigates projected for the late 1990s. With the cancellation of the nuclear submarines, Canadian navy officers held out the lingering hope that the third batch of frigates would be restored. Speaking before a Commons committee in June, Defence Minister William McKnight dashed such hopes with the announcement that there would be no third batch of frigates. No decision has yet been made on a replacement for the three conventional submarines due for retirement.

Without the third batch of frigates, Canada will have 16 combat surface ships at the turn of the century, 4 of which will be 25 years old. If the conventional submarines are replaced only on a one-to-one basis, the Canadian Navy may end the century with fewer than twenty combatant vessels.

Also in June, McKnight told reporters in Europe that a decision on a small number of replacement tanks for Canadian forces in Europe will be made at the end of the year. Meanwhile, the government has scrapped White Paper plans to expand Canadian armed forces in Europe to divisional strength. The expansion to divisional strength was promised to NATO as compensation for the withdrawal of the Canadian commitment to reinforce Northern Norway.

Finally, DND has moved to augment the number of Aurora long-range patrol aircraft by purchasing three additional aircraft frames from Lockheed. Operating without the sophisticated electronic monitoring equipment of the Aurora, the new aircraft (to be called Arcturus) will take over Arctic sovereignty patrols, thereby

freeing the Auroras for operations in an anti-submarine warfare role.

### Defecting Mig

In July, a Soviet Mig-23 operating from Poland lost engine power. The pilot turned the plane towards the Baltic, and bailed out, whereupon the plane recovered power, turned West, and flew across NATO airspace until it crashed in Belgium. The Soviets have admitted that they were unable to follow the aircraft on radar, and were unaware of its fate until informed by Western authorities. Unofficial sources have suggested that NATO aircraft might have been unwilling to shoot it down for fear that it might have carried nuclear-tipped missiles.

The incident may reinforce the Polish claim that there is a need for a European risk reduction centre which would permit rapid communication to avoid misunderstanding in such situations.

### Lake Concrete

In July Western reporters were allowed to visit Kyshtym Industrial complex east of the Urals. Kyshtym has been the site of the main Soviet military reactor complex, although its ancient reactors are now being phased out. Among the horrendous errors in the handling of nuclear materials at Kyshtym, Soviet officials admitted to the existence of a radioactive lake, which they propose to fill with concrete.

The growing list of Soviet accidents and mismanagement of nuclear materials, now made known to the Soviet public for the first time, appears to have brought the nuclear allergy to the Soviet Union. At the People's Congress in June, representatives called for an end to all Soviet nuclear testing. After almost five months without testing, however, the Soviet programme resumed on 8 July with an underground explosion at Semipalatinsk. □

— DAVID COX



## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Ever Elusive Defence Debate

Professor K.R. Nossal's explanation in "All in Favour, Say Aye," (*Peace&Security*, Spring 1989) for the lack of defence debate in last November's federal election – "we have no debate because there is nothing to debate" – must surely have come as a surprise to the tens of thousands of peace activists who lined the city streets in the early 1980s, and to the DND officials who sought equal airtime for the military perspective in the heat of the cruise missile testing debates.

I accept his view that the circle of ardent advocates who vigorously debate Canadian defence issues is a small one. What he fails to ask is whether the defence decision-making process itself – one which is secluded from public scrutiny, highly technical and which carries dreadful implications most citizens would not care to confront on a daily basis – isn't also something which hinders public involvement.

The preoccupation with "concrete interests" is rather selective. Frankly, I would have thought that an interest in survival was fairly "concrete." To support his belief that "most Canadians have made a careful calculation about the consequences of embracing an alternative defence policy," he cites public opinion polls showing overwhelming public support for Canadian involvement in NATO and NORAD, [as well as] election results.

The problem with this reasoning is that making a "careful calculation" about your interests implies a detailed knowledge of them. But how many Canadians can honestly be expected to have an intimate understanding of al-

liance policies and their security implications? These statistics may tell us that Canadians support alliance participation, but not why.

The second argument that, "if Canadians wanted an alternative defence policy, they would have voted in the NDP by now," is equally weak. Professor Nossal ought to know that in Canada, as in many Western democracies, elections are not won or lost on foreign policy issues – so elections make poor indicators of public foreign policy preferences.

*Tony Rogers, Hong Kong*

### Export or Die

Roger Hill rightly warns of the hazards of Canada-US defence production integration ("Unified Canada-US Defence Production," *Peace&Security*, Summer 1989). Leaving aside the fact that such integration is already well advanced, with serious implications for independence in Canadian security policy, it is worth considering whether the implied solution, a better developed (perhaps specialized) national defence industrial base in Canada, isn't in fact at the root of the problem.

The DND Task Force report which Hill quotes, promotes integration, in part, on the grounds that Canadian security requires a well-developed defence industry base in Canada that can be mobilized in times of crisis and that can assure the supply of military equipment during periods of intense demand. But that leads to the sixty-four thousand (more like billion) dollar question – how can Canada sustain a commercially viable military industry during periods of reduced demand (i.e. during peace time)? The problem is acknowledged in another defence industry report, the Department of Supply and Services Defence Industrial Base Review 1987: "The Canadian defence market is insufficient in size and scope to support a wholly Canadian defence industrial base." A commercial military industry cannot survive

on Canadian military purchases, so both the DND Task Force and the Supply and Services reports look to exports as the basis for economic viability in the industry.

That begs another question. Where is the industry to find those exports? The biggest export market available to Canada is the US, but access to that market is still under threat (despite thirty years of formal defence production sharing) from US protectionism. And as American procurement is inevitably cut back – the combined effect of detente and budget restraint – that protectionism is certain to increase in an effort to preserve the shrinking market for American firms. Thus, the argument goes, Canada needs a way around American protectionism to gain unrestricted Canadian access to the American market – namely, full integration of the Canada-US market and industry so that Canadian firms are essentially defined as American for purposes of defence procurement in the US. In other words, the perceived need for a more developed Canadian defence industrial base is precisely what is creating the pressure (from Canadians) for an integrated North American defence industrial base.

Those who want increased military production in Canada need to understand that this will be possible only through increased exports. And if the Americans won't buy more than they already do (over fifty percent of Canadian military production) Canada will have to rely more on Europe and the Third World to support its military industry ambitions. But Europe has plenty of surplus military production capacity of its own, and the Third World is a highly competitive market in which a willingness to sell to human rights violators and war zones is rapidly becoming a prerequisite to success.

If Canada wants to establish some measure of military production independence from the Americans and wants to avoid relying


on military sales to zones of repression and war, a commercially viable, enlarged Canadian military industrial base is a non-starter. A truly independent Canadian defence industrial base will have to depend entirely on public subsidy, not on commercial sales, and will have to accept the higher per unit costs of shorter production runs – that might be the best incentive yet for Canada to reassess its security and military equipment needs.

*Ernie Regehr,  
Project Ploughshares, Waterloo*

### Much Ado About Nothing

Ted Hopf's article ("Is the West Missing the Soviet Boat?" *Peace&Security*, Summer 1989) seems to be an effort to say something while bending over backwards to say nothing. Hopf gives three reasons why the West should be encouraging. First, it channels Soviet energies away from new adventures – so the West must give Gorbachev "a graceful way out of commitments" (that is, a graceful way to abandon his interests) "while ensuring that any settlement preserves Western interests." Is that not what the West is doing already, and how does it differ from "a chilly response"? Secondly, it promotes detente – so the West should use Gorbachev's priority for disarmament, which dictates his moderation in the Third World, "to its [the West's] advantage." Is that not what the West is doing already and how does it differ from "a chilly response"? Thirdly, to help him against his conservative colleagues who are concerned that Gorbachev's foreign policy "seems to do nothing but make one unilateral concession after another," the West should give Gorbachev "a constructive response." What constructive response? The earlier two suggestions to give Gorbachev a face-saving way to retreat still more for Western advantage or something unspecified which Hopf can't bring himself to write about? *B. Wallis, Ottawa* □

## REVIEWS



### Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs H. Basil Robinson

Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  
1989, 352 pp., \$29.95 cloth

This absorbing book broadly tours the foreign policy horizons – 1957 through 1963 – largely from the vantage point of the Prime Minister's Office, where the author, then a rising foreign service officer, served as John Diefenbaker's liaison to the Department of External Affairs. Robinson wisely emphasizes at the outset that his account concentrates on the issues he was personally involved in and therefore "does not pretend to be an all-embracing history of Diefenbaker's decisions and activities in the foreign policy field."

So while this is not the definitive work on Canadian foreign policy in the Diefenbaker years and perhaps will not be the last word on Diefenbaker as foreign policy-maker, it accomplishes exactly what its author sets out to do. Drawing upon his own firsthand experiences backed up with some archival work, Robinson vividly, often compellingly, and sometimes colorfully portrays John G. Diefenbaker in power, reacting to a world in which the Americans want Canadian forces equipped with nuclear arms and the US president confronts the Soviets over the Cuban missiles; Britain wants into the European Economic Community and out of the encumbrances of its imperial past; and the presence of racist South Africa becomes intolerable in the increasingly multiracial Commonwealth.

Ever-loyal Diefenbaker partisans will either dislike the book or take it as confirmation of what they have long believed about

what Diefenbaker himself used to call the "Pearsonalities" who worked for the Department of External Affairs. For while Robinson carefully underlines the complexities of the international situations in which Diefenbaker found himself, and scrupulously identifies the prime minister's virtues and foreign policy successes, the portrait that emerges is far from flattering. Diefenbaker, he says – and demonstrates – was "a difficult, egocentric man," who suffered from "a collision of impulses." Inconsistent, quick to take insult, ever distrustful of advisers, lacking a coherent approach to foreign policy, and with his eyes always on short-term political gain and immediate tactics, Diefenbaker in the end "simply defeated himself."

That final defeat on the floor of the House of Commons and in the general election of 1963 was precipitated by the nuclear weapons issue, to which a substantial portion of the book is devoted. Robinson's account of the deliberations within the East Block and of the discussions between the Canadian and US governments (including the famous Kennedy-Diefenbaker discussions of May 1961 in which Robinson was a participant) rounds out what has been known from other sources, and in many respects can be taken as authoritative. Diefenbaker obfuscated to the end about the Canadian commitment to acquire the weapons. Robinson shows "that in its first two years the Diefenbaker government was consciously heading in the direction of acquiring nuclear weapons for its own forces, both in Canada and Europe."

Still, because the nuclear weapons stories and the Kennedy-Diefenbaker tales have been told so often by others, the details themselves can no longer surprise. In addition to the portrayal of Diefenbaker himself, the real gems in this book lie elsewhere.

Because of his role as liaison between the PMO and External Affairs, Robinson is able to masterfully outline the relationship between Diefenbaker and his second secretary of state for external affairs, Howard Green. The relationship between Diefenbaker and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, at a time when Anglo-Canadian relations were still not quite clearly "foreign" also stands out.

Finally, buried deep within the book, almost as an aside, Robinson suggests a useful term which deserves broader consideration and can especially be applied to Canadian defence policy. Diefenbaker's approach toward the US, he says, was characterized by "a kind of push-resistant nationalism, aimed at whatever the source might be." In this, was Diefenbaker not typically Canadian?

– Joseph T. Jockel

*Mr. Jockel is an associate professor in the Canadian Studies Program at St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York.*

### Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years McGeorge Bundy

New York: Random House, 1988,  
735 pp., US \$24.95 cloth,  
US \$12.95 paper

No serious student of international affairs can afford to pass up McGeorge Bundy's highly important book. A former professor of foreign policy who was also Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, McGeorge Bundy was one of the Charles River "whiz kids" conscripted by John Kennedy to work in the White House. He served as special assistant for national security affairs and like so many stayed on to work for Lyndon Johnson after Kennedy's assassination. He later headed the Ford Foundation and is now professor of history at New York University.

Bundy examines the critical choices and decisive turning points in the history of nuclear

weapons: the decision to build the bomb and the early history of the Manhattan Project; the decision to drop the bomb on Japan; the failure of the Baruch plan to place atomic weapons under international control; the decision to build the H-bomb; and major crises in the nuclear age such as those over Berlin and Cuba. His new book is a tour de force which will surely stand as the definitive account of the political history of nuclear weapons.

This is no ordinary account of the nuclear age, intent on reciting what is now a familiar tale. Instead Bundy has delved deep into the archives to challenge much of the prevailing conventional wisdom about the development of nuclear weapons and their role in US foreign policy while also raising some of the deeper moral and ethical dilemmas which were occasionally confronted – or as often as not, ignored – by top American scientists or their political masters. For instance he argues that Truman's decision to proceed with research on the H-bomb was a failed opportunity to halt the arms race. Had the United States pledged not to proceed in the development and construction of the H-bomb (as some of the President's advisers had suggested) it might well have exacted a similar pledge from the Russians. Instead Truman gave the go-ahead for research and development and the nuclear arms race took another major upward turn.

Bundy argues convincingly that it was not Kennedy or his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who shaped America's current strategic force posture as is commonly argued, but former President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower's legacy, Bundy suggests, was profound but also marked by extraordinary excess:

The decisions he made and allowed others to make were so broad and so deep that even in the middle of the 1980s the underlying structure of the



nuclear armaments of the United States retains a shape that the Eisenhower of 1960 would recognize: three major classes of strategic weapons based on aircraft, land-based missiles, and submarines, and a large variety of less-than-strategic weapons with shorter ranges and uncertain missions.

Students of the Cuban missile crisis will also find Bundy's chapter on this episode, which is also the longest in the book, revealing and insightful. Bundy concludes that "[t]he risk of nuclear war in the thirteen days was real, and the most important single consequence of the missile crisis may be that neither side wants to run such risk again." He goes on to suggest however that "the risk was small, given the prudence and the unchallenged final control of the two leaders."

Recent revelations by Soviet and Cuban officials at a Harvard-sponsored conference in Moscow that the Soviet Union had actually placed nuclear warheads in Cuba and that Fidel Castro was urging that the missiles be fired in the event of a US invasion of the island (which seemed imminent, from his point of view) would suggest that the risks were greater than Bundy believes. Nevertheless, Bundy has provided us with a highly probing and informative first-hand account into President Kennedy's thinking and the thoughts of those who sat around the table of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during those fateful days in October 1963.

In the final chapter of the book Bundy provides us with his own views of the lessons and hopes of the nuclear age. He argues that survival in the nuclear age will require "candour and caution and imagination and effort." But the harsh reality is that nuclear weapons cannot be wished away and "[r]eduction of the risk, decade by decade, is our best hope for long-run survival." Let us hope that McGeorge Bundy's sound advice will not be lost on those responsible for current and future arms control. — *Fen Osler Hampson*

*Mr. Hampson is a research associate at the Institute and teaches international affairs at Carleton University*

### Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age

Modris Eksteins

*Lester and Orpen Dennys: Toronto, 1989, 396 pp., \$26.95 cloth*

We are now well into the season of fiftieth and seventy-fifth war anniversaries. Each week for the next five years will contain at least one public reminder of a battle or a heroic death or a mass slaughter. What we won't get much of is historical and cultural perspective: why was the Great War a unique event; how did the West deliver itself twice inside twenty years into a holocaust; what was in the cultural baggage the soldiers carried off to war with them; and why are we — citizens of the last decade of the twentieth century — shaped by these events and by the attitudes, and assumptions of those who participated in them.

Eksteins is a professor of history at the University of Toronto; however, I suspect there are lots of historians who will object to his method here. The author is writing cultural history and he has a thesis: that the sensibilities of both *modernism* and the *avant-garde* spring from the same roots as fascism and Nazism. Furthermore, Eksteins believes that the calamitous period from 1914 to 1945 is not only the story of war in a narrow sense of violent conflict organized for political ends, but also the working through of a cultural upheaval which was driven forward mostly by the new, and in 1914, uniquely dynamic German nation. While all of Europe was suffering the physical and cultural dislocation of industrialization, it was Germany, Eksteins asserts, that experienced the profound social and psychological effects most intensely — "The German experience lies at the heart of the 'modern experience.'"

It is not just Eksteins' thesis, but also the way he goes about his work that is audacious and refreshing. He sets up the book as a three-act play with an incongruous succession of calamities, cultural gurus and audiences that meet in and around and through the Great War: Serge Diaghilev almost, but not quite, meets Thomas Mann in turn-of-the-century Venice; there is an immensely influential and

intentionally scandalous debut performance of the ballet, *Le Sacre du printemps*, in Paris the year before war breaks out; deliriously happy crowds all over Europe take to the streets during the unusually balmy summer of 1914 to celebrate the coming of war; and even in the German General Staff's plan for victory in Europe, the Schlieffen plan, Eksteins finds the German "modernist" preoccupation with fantasy, rebellion and the big event — "a grand scheme, a Wagnerian script, that elevated limited tactical adventure to a total vision."

As the Great War grinds on through 1917, the grisly realities of a war of attrition serve to affirm the modernist preoccupation with myth and violence and death. When it finally ends, Germany has lost but the ethos has seized all of Europe. The spectacle of Lindbergh's flight from the new world to the old provides a popular hero for a continent disillusioned and exhausted by its present, and alienated from its past.

The book ends in Hitler's bunker in Berlin: while he plans his suicide his faithful officers dance in the cafeteria. From the experience of the Great War the Nazis had coaxed some meaning — however perverse and corrupt — where none could be found before. "The Great War was the psychological turning point ... for modernism as a whole. The urge to create and the urge to destroy had changed places." For Eksteins, fascism and Nazism were the embodiment of mass alienation brought about by the First World War, "Nazism was not just a political movement, it was a cultural eruption."

Eksteins' construction is not fully satisfying in that it stops too early. After accounting for the birth of the modernist sensibility, Eksteins touches only fleetingly on what he refers to as our present "post-modernist age." We are left to ourselves to make sense of this double-edged "modernism" amidst the chaos of our own time; where the political order of Europe, frozen for forty years after Berlin's fall, is shifting too rapidly for the alleged experts to explain or even understand. — *Michael Bryans*

*Mr. Bryans is editor of Peace & Security.*

### BRIEFLY NOTED

#### The US-Canada Security Relationship

David G. Haglund and  
Joel J. Sokolsky, editors

*Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989, 306 pp., US \$28.00 paper*

Sub-titled "The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defence," this compendium contains a dozen essays on issues central to the US-Canada relationship in the military and security arenas. The chapters originated as papers for a June 1988 Queen's University conference marking the fiftieth anniversary of President Roosevelt's 1938 speech at Queen's in which he explicitly recognized the US interest in the security and defence of Canada. Among contributors to the volume are: John Anderson, a former Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence, on the modernization of North American air defence; Lt. Col. Douglas Bland, on the military consequences of neutrality; and Joel Sokolsky of the Royal Military College, on the strategy and politics of the original decision (since reversed) to purchase nuclear-powered submarines.

#### Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy

Robert O. Matthews and  
Cranford Pratt, editors

*Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, 375 pp., \$37.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper*

This edited volume contains chapters by some fifteen authors with varying kinds of expertise in the field of human rights. The book examines Canada's human rights behaviour in five different international forums, in two policy areas and in three bilateral relationships. The editors conclude that while Canada has shown a genuine interest in promoting human rights throughout the world, "this interest has not been without limits."

(The two titles noted above were published with financial assistance from the Institute for Peace and Security.) □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

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BP – Background Paper  
WP – Working Paper  
FS – Factsheet

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**Conference on Militarization in the Third World**, by Paul Rogers, Michael Klare and Dan O'Meara presented at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January 1987, 83 pages. (WP 5)

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**Negotiations for Peace in Central America, Proceedings of the Round-table on Negotiations in Central America**, Ottawa, 27–28 September 1985, by Liisa North, 59 pages. (WP-CR 1)

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
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**Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-Party Mediators (#2)**, Proceedings of a Workshop held in Ottawa on 6–7 May 1988, by Kenneth D. Bush and Richard Price, August 1988, 64 pages. (WP 12)

**Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-Party Mediators**, Proceedings of a Workshop held in Ottawa on 19–20 November 1987, by Robert Miller, May 1988, 59 pages. (WP 8)

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#### MISCELLANEOUS

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**Canadian Press Coverage of Arms Control and Disarmament Issues**, by John R. Walker, March 1987. (BP–PoV 3)

**Origins of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security**, by Gilles Grondin, August 1986. (BP 6)

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#### REFERENCE WORKS (PUBLISHED ANNUALLY)

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
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## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



**William Barton**, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute since its founding in August 1984, retired from the Board after five years of service. After its June meeting, the Board of Directors decided that in recognition of his work with the Institute, awards and scholarships would henceforth be named the *Barton Awards*. Other members leaving the Board after three-year terms are **Ann Gertler**, **Kal Holsti**, **Richard Mercier**, **Brian Urquhart** and **Jean-Guy Vaillancourt**.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable **Joe Clark** recently announced the appointment of new Board members. They are **Beatrice Bazar** from Montreal, a former national president of the United Nations Association in Canada, and current director of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation; **Lincoln Bloomfield** of Boston, who has been associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for many years and whose field of interest is international institutions and organizations; **Francine Fournier** of Ottawa, the secretary-general of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO; **Reginald Lane**, a retired Lieutenant-General who now lives in Victoria and is active in the Royal United Services Institute; and **Elinor Powell** of British Columbia, a former president of the Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Mr. Clark also announced that, after consultation with the Board of Directors and the opposition parties, the government has appointed **David Braide** as Chairman of the Board for a three-year term.

On 8 June the Institute's Director and senior managers appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. MPs of all parties engaged in a lively and wide ranging discussion with the Institute's Director about a number of international issues and the Institute's own projects and analyses. This was the first appearance the Institute has made as a crown corporation to discuss estimates before the Committee.

"Cyprus: Visions For the Future" was the title of the fourth and final seminar in a year-long Institute project which explored the roots of the conflict in Cyprus and the possibilities for its resolution. In the final seminar, participants focussed their discussions on possible future developments rather than on past problems, and reached consensus on the need for the two communities to work together in order to build a common Cypriot political identity. The two municipal leaders of divided Nicosia, **Mustafa Akinci** and **Lellos Demetriades**, spoke about their experiences cooperating on practical problems in their city, such as water and sewage systems. It was agreed that confidence-building measures between the two communities should be encouraged and broadened. Participants also discussed the role of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the UN Secretary-General's efforts to promote a settlement. They recommended that contributions to UNFICYP might be made conditional on progress towards a settlement, that negotiations for a

renewal of the mandate begin earlier, and that the force become more of an observer force with a quick reaction capability.

During the autumn two new research assistants will join the Institute staff: they are **Marie-France Desjardins** and **Robin Hay**. Ms. Desjardins is a graduate of the Paterson School at Carleton and the Université du Québec à Montréal in history and international affairs, and has published a number of articles on non-proliferation and nuclear-powered submarines. Mr. Hay also graduated from the Paterson School, and did his undergraduate work at the University of Ottawa, specializing in international relations and history. His publications have focussed on arms control issues. Research assistants **Peter Gizewski** and **François Lafrenière** left the Institute; **Doug Hamlin**, a Fellow for the past year returned to the Department of External Affairs; and **Bruno Munier's** term as a Fellow also expired at the end of August.

The Institute welcomed two new Fellows in the fall: **Ron Fisher** from the University of Saskatchewan and **Gordon Sharpe** from the Department of National Defence. Lt. Col. Sharpe, an air navigator, will study questions of aerial surveillance. Professor Fisher will concentrate on social psychology and international conflict resolution.

**Fauzya Moore**, a grants officer, left the Institute in June to work with the Centre for International Cooperation and Develop-

ment at the University of Ottawa. **Rychard Brûlé**, senior grants officer, returned from the National Defence College where he had spent the last year; his replacement at the Institute, **Marie-Andrée Lalonde-Morisset** will act as media relations officer from September until December. **Michel Proulx**, material manager, and **Suzanne Payant**, receptionist, have both left the Institute to return to university.

The Institute hosted a number of seminars during the late spring and summer: **Louis Kriesberg** of Syracuse University spoke on the current state of studies in conflict resolution; **K.M. de Silva**, professor of history at the University of Peradeniya and director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Colombo, Sri Lanka, led a discussion on "Ethnicity, Conflict and Development: A Comparative Perspective;" **Rashid Khalidi** of the University of Chicago, led a seminar on the *Intifada* and current developments in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza; **Edy Kaufman**, executive director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute, and senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, spoke on "Israeli and Palestinian Attitudes towards the Peace Process;" **Boris Alekhin**, an economist, and exchange visitor from the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, gave a seminar which focussed on his month in Canada, during which time he visited the Royal Bank of Canada, and Dominion Securities in Toronto; **Gerald Steinberg**, a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and specialist on arms control issues, led a discussion on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and emphasized the need for confidence-building measures between Israel and its Arab neighbours; and **Mark Sakitt**, a

### Grants Procedures and Deadlines

■ *The Institute allocates grants twice a year. Contact the Institute for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:*

30 June for an October decision

31 December for a March decision



physicist at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, spoke on submarine warfare in the Arctic.

“The Challenges of Security and Cooperation in the North Pacific: A Canadian Perspective” was the title of a paper delivered by **Bernard Wood** at the Fletcher Hokkaido North Pacific Forum in Sapporo, Japan at the end of July. Mr. Wood put forward the view that the Pacific region has the opportunity to build a regime for security and cooperation which can avoid some of the dangers and burdens of excessive military competition that have historically plagued other regions as they came to prominence in world affairs. He also said that the Pacific region is in a position to pioneer new methods for dealing with some of the underlying causes of international conflict and for responding to the new, shared challenges to international security in areas such as environmental degradation, mass poverty and population growth. The meetings, which were sponsored by the National Institute for Research Advancement, drew participants from Asia, North America and Europe. In late June, Mr. Wood gave the closing lecture to the National Defence College in Kingston on the future of the international system.

**Ron Purver** gave presentations on Arctic arms control at a *Pacem in Maribus* conference in Moscow in June, and a workshop on Arctic security at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland. He also delivered a paper on undersea warfare and arms control at a conference in Halifax sponsored by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie and the Department of History at the University of New Brunswick. In July, Mr. Purver attended the fifth general assembly of the Inuit Cir-

cumpolar Conference in Sisimiut, Greenland.

**Michael Bryans** was elected to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Periodical Publishers' Association at its recent annual meeting in Toronto.

**Katherine Laundy** and **Susan Connell** organized, and spoke at mini-conferences in Calgary and Yellowknife on peace and security information resources.

### Scholarships Awarded

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security recently awarded twelve (\$14,000) scholarships to Canadians who wish to further their studies in the subject areas of international peace and security. The scholarships are awarded annually as part of the Institute's Awards Programme. The award holders come from different disciplines and will pursue a variety of studies.

**Jean-François Bergeron**, Québec City, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at Laval University in cooperation with the Centre for Intergroup Studies in South Africa concentrating on Political Change in South Africa.

**David Ross Black**, Toronto, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at Dalhousie University concentrating on Middle Power Foreign Policies Towards Southern Africa: Australia, Canada, and Sweden.

**Walter Henry Dorn**, Toronto, will be completing a Ph.D. in Chemistry from the University of Toronto in cooperation with the Linköping Institute of Technology (Sweden) concentrating on Chemical Sensing for Arms Control Verification.

**Laurent Frappé**, Québec City, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in International Relations at Université Laval concentrating on Conflicts and International Relations in Latin America.

**Frank E. Harvey**, Montréal, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in International Relations at McGill University concentrating on Conflict, Crisis and War.

**Robert Neil Huebert**, Winnipeg, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at Dalhousie University concentrating on Defence and Canadian Arctic Policies.

**Howard Peter Langille**, Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, is completing his studies at Bradford University in England toward a Ph.D. in Philosophy, concentrating on Peace Studies. He will examine the question of Canadian Defence Policy: Options for Common Security.

**Laure E. Paquette**, Montréal, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at Queen's University concentrating on Strategies and Civilizations.

**Leigh Edward Sarty**, Toronto, is completing a Ph.D. in Political Science at Columbia University in New York City concentrating on a Comprehensive Study of the Soviet Union's Postwar Relations with Canada, 1966-1980.

**Larry Anthony Swatuk**, Windsor, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Economy and Foreign Policy at Dalhousie University concentrating on The Political Economy of Small State Survival: Foreign Policy Making in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, 1966-1988.

**Puay-Khoon Tang**, Toronto, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in International Relations at the John Hopkins University in Washington D.C. concentrating on Canada-Japan Technology Transfer in Telecommunications: Implications for International Peace and Security.

**Michael Charles Williams**, Victoria, will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at York University concentrating on The Dialectic of Deterrence.

Ms. Laundy chaired a workshop at the Canadian Library Association meeting in Edmonton on the role of libraries in the dissemination of information on peace and security issues.

“Lest We Forget” is the title of a retrospective of war art, opening at the London Regional Art Gallery in early September. The Institute worked with the gallery to develop a series of public programmes for students and the gen-

eral public on the theme. **Bernard Wood** and **Margaret Bourgeault** attended and spoke at the opening.

**Bruno Munier**, a Fellow at the Institute spoke at Carleton University in June on the international impact of the repression in China. Mr. Munier was in China in May during the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, but before the military action; since his return he has shared his impressions with a number of groups.

During **July Garfield Newman**, a teacher with the York Regional Board of Education at the Dr. G.W. Williams Secondary School in Aurora, and **Geoff Irvine**, who teaches at Sir Wilfrid Laurier High School in the Carleton Board of Education, were at the Institute working on revisions to the “Teachers Handbook on Peace and Security.” The book, which was written by Mr. Irvine and **Brad Feasey** of the Institute staff, was field-tested during the 1988-1989 academic year by a number of teachers. Their reports played a crucial role in the revisions.

**Anthony Figgis**, director of research at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, was the guest at a briefing session at the Institute on research activities in Canada on international issues.

The Institute was host to a roundtable discussion on varying perspectives on defence policy with representatives from the Canadian organization, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, and two of their guests from the Soviet Union and one from the United States. Members of several other peace and defence interest groups also participated in the discussions.

Members of the National Defence College of Thailand visited the Institute in late August; **John Toogood** spoke to them on Canada's security interests. □

## LETTER FROM BUENOS AIRES BY MADELEINE POULIN



**On the road into Buenos Aires from the airport, wisps of fog trail along the ground. True to Sunday tradition, residents of the capital, *porteños*, dot the semi-rural scenery preparing *parillada*, the gaucho's barbecue, next to their locally assembled Renaults and Fiats....**

Nostalgia for the pampas persists in this city which faces the Atlantic, a city that is simultaneously reminiscent of Paris, Madrid and Italy, and is home to one-third of all Argentines.

"A city that consumes what the rest of the country produces," observes a woman who knows what she is talking about. Amalia Delacroze Fortabat owns huge estates in the hinterlands, and lives in sumptuous style in Buenos Aires. "Amalita is Peronist," our driver announces before dropping us at her prestigious address.

"But," he adds, "she was a radical with the radicals, and a militarist under the military." Our cynical driver, like eighty percent of Argentines, is of Italian descent.

Male servants, with the bearing of a head-of-state's security guards, take us in tow and lead us to a sitting room where a white-gloved butler offers us coffee. As soon as she enters the room, and without waiting for questions, Mrs. Fortabat launches into a tirade on the foreign debt, the dollar's rise against the *austral*, and the resulting runaway inflation. She is not suffering personally of course, since the products she exports earn dollars, but she knows that others, outside the privileged dollar economy, must cope with prices that rise by the day or even by the hour. Crisis reigns.

"In times of crisis," she explains, "the people need someone who speaks their language." This heiress to an "old money" Argentine fortune, who generations later still clings to her French passport, then proceeds to sing the praises of the provincial *caciques* (political bosses), especially Peronist Carlos Menem. He is a product of

the other Argentina – the fertile hinterland – which does not look to Europe, like Buenos Aires, but toward the South American continent. "I know Carlos Menem personally, and I'm not afraid," she says. A country boy, the son of Syrian immigrants, "Peron's heir" has the blessing of the Argentine oligarchy.

### **It is certainly not a revolution; it is even insurance against revolution. But it evokes the corporatism so dear to Franco and Mussolini ...**

"Of course, these people fear nothing!" explodes an Argentine friend, less well off, but just as Europeanized as Mrs. Fortabat. He gives me to understand that thirty or forty of "these people" with their enormous reserves of dollars can easily sow economic chaos, discredit one government, and have another elected that better serves their interests.

Paranoia? Perhaps, but there are many who fear Peronism and Menem, and they certainly form the majority of Argentines that visitors from the North are likely to meet. They work in the universities, the press and the publishing houses. Their view of Peronism differs little from that of many diplomats posted to Buenos Aires: "Democracy under siege."

"But what democracy?" A European-educated businessman who has opted for Peronism notes with irony: "The problem with Argentines, the ones who live in Buenos Aires, is that we think we're Europeans. And we hide from the fact that behind a demo-

cratic facade, an old system of domestic colonialism persists." "Belgium in Ethiopia," he adds by way of illustration. So much for the democracy regained six years ago under Raul Alfonsín – a period that ended in economic disaster.

What will democracy be like under the Peronist Menem? "We are entering into a social contract that will reconcile the interests of the various groups," says the businessman. The state as referee. The Peronists have an initial advantage in this role, since they have traditionally enjoyed the support of the unions. It is certainly not a revolution; it is even insurance against revolution. But it evokes the cor-

poratism so dear to Franco and Mussolini, and practised to some extent by Peron from 1946 to 1955, and yet again briefly in the mid-1970s. On both occasions, Peron had been democratically elected. And each time, the experiment ended in a military coup.

General Lanusse lives in a small apartment strewn with mementoes of his glorious career. Before retiring on a modest pension, he was President of the Republic. In 1973, he headed the transition between a military regime and the election of Peron. His entire career has been haunted by Peronism, an ideology he abhors and for which he still has "no clear definition." What he now fears, given the past record, is abuse of power and disorder. He is not alone in predicting chaos, but unlike others, he does not believe the army will want to seize power again: "A military coup is not the answer. It does not produce the desired results and it seriously harms the army." He does admit, however, that some elements of the military might be tempted. After all, how can one overlook the chronic militarism that afflicts Argentina?

Escorting us back to the elevator, he recalls with sadness the Argentina of the 1930s; it was just as prosperous as Canada and Australia. "But we are unstable. There is no consensus in this country, only narrow self-interest."

Appropriately enough, it was in the countryside where we met the person who claims to reconcile all of these interests – first, in the midst of a frenzied crowd in a village, then at home, in the Governor of Rioja's residence, and finally, in the hamlet of his birth, in the same poor, remote province where his family still tends a vineyard. Behind the facade of provincial playboy, tennis ace and bush pilot, I found a rather diminutive, introverted and fairly reasonable man. Is he the Andean demagogue portrayed by his critics? Andean, definitely. Carlos Menem has no nostalgia for Europe. His loyalty is to South America and his goal is Latin-American unity to counter the North American and European economic blocs. "We live in a world committed to universalism, but first we must create continental unity."

But isn't the real first job to create today's Argentina; letting the nostalgia for Europe and for the golden years of the pampas fade away so that the Argentine people can start referring to "our" country, rather than "this" country – *este país* – as they do now? And does today's answer lie in the wizardry of a Peronist-style contract?

I watch Carlos Menem's Cessna take off from the country road improvised as a landing strip. As it weaves against the backdrop of mountains, the small plane looks very fragile, and I wonder how the man behind the controls will be able to put his country back on the road to progress, and keep it there. □

Madeleine Poulin is co-host of Radio-Canada's public affairs television programme *Le Point*.





## Le long de la route entre l'aéroport et la ville de Buenos Aires, des lambeaux de brouillard traînent au ras du sol.

# LETTRE DE BUENOS AIRES

PAR MADELEINE POULIN

Voilà pour la démocratie retournée il y a six ans avec Raul Alfonsín, époque qui s'est soldée par un désastre économique. Que sera la démocratie sous le péroniste Menem ?

«Nous concluons un pacte social

qui garantira les intérêts des différents groupes» répond l'homme d'affaires péroniste. L'Etat-arbitre.

Dans ce rôle, les péronistes ont déjà

un atout, puisque les syndicats leur

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ce n'est pas la révolution. C'est

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Fidèles au rendez-vous du dimanche, les porteños, les habitants de la capitale, sont là, dans cette demi-campagne, à côté de leur Renault ou de leur Fiat de fabrication locale, préparant la *parillada*, la grillade du gauchito. Nostalgie de la pampa, dans une ville tournée vers l'Atlantique, qui rappelle à la fois le tiers de toute la population argentine. «Une ville qui consomme ce que produit le reste du pays.»

La formule est d'une femme qui

sait de quoi elle parle, Amalia Deiacroze Fortabat possédée d'im-

vincées, et elle vit somptueusement à

Buenos Aires. «Amalia est péro-

niste», nous avait annoncé pérem-

toirement notre chauffeur avant de

nous déposer devant la prestigieuse

adresse. «Mais, avait-il ajouté, elle

était radicale avec les radicaux, et

militariste sous les militaires.»

Notre chauffeur cynique est d'ori-

gine italienne, comme 80 p. 100 des

Argentins. Un personnel masculin,

aux allures d'agents de sécurité

dignes d'un chef d'Etat, nous prend

en charge et nous achemine vers un

salon où un domestique gentilé de

colton bien blanc nous offre le café.

Dès son entrée, Madame Fortabat

moment.

Paratonia ? En tout cas, ceux qui

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Nord. Ils sont dans les universités,

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en poste à Buenos Aires : «La

démocratie est menacée.»

«Mais quelle démocratie ?» Un

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mais qui a choisi le péronisme,

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Européens. Et nous nous cachons le

fait que, derrière une façade de

Belgique en Ethiopie», ajoute-t-il

pour faire image.

24 AUTOMNE 1989

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que ces «gens-là», qui disposent

d'énormes sommes de dollars, peu-

vent très bien se mettre à trenaie ou à

cinquante pour semer la pagaille

moment.

Paratonia ? En tout cas, ceux qui

ont peur du péronisme et de Menem

sont nombreux. Et ils forment sans

doute la majorité des Argentins que

rencontrera un visiteur venu du

Nord. Ils sont dans les universités,

dans la presse, dans les maisons

d'édition. Leur regard sur le pétro-

lisme ne diffère pas beaucoup

de celui de beaucoup de diplomates

en poste à Buenos Aires : «La

démocratie est menacée.»

«Mais quelle démocratie ?» Un

homme d'affaires formé en Europe,

mais qui a choisi le péronisme,

ironise : «Notre problème à nous,

Argentins de Buenos Aires, c'est

que nous nous prenons pour des

Européens. Et nous nous cachons le

fait que, derrière une façade de

Belgique en Ethiopie», ajoute-t-il

pour faire image.

24 AUTOMNE 1989

«Nous concluons un pacte social

qui garantira les intérêts des différents groupes» répond l'homme

d'affaires péroniste. L'Etat-arbitre.

Dans ce rôle, les péronistes ont déjà

un atout, puisque les syndicats leur

sont traditionnellement acquis. Non,

ce n'est pas la révolution. C'est

même un vaccin contre la révolution.

Et l'on sent les relents du corporatisme qui lui cher à Franco et à

Mussolini, avant d'être plus ou

moins pratiqué par Peron de 1946 à

Orient, et il a insisté sur la nécessité d'adopter des mesures propres à accroître la confiance entre Israël et ses voisins arabes; et Mark Sakiti, physicien au *Brockhouse National Laboratory*, a fait un exposé sur la guerre sous-marine dans l'Arctique.

«Une perspective canadienne sur les défis que représentent la sécurité et la coopération dans le Pacifique-Nord», tel était le titre d'un exposé que **Bernard Wood** a prononcé au Fletcher Hokkaido North Pacific Forum, à Sapporo (Japon), à la fin de juillet. M. Wood a fait valoir que les pays du Pacifique ont au jourd'hui l'occasion d'instaurer un régime de sécurité et de coopération qui peut leur permettre d'éviter certains des écueils et entraves alliant de pair avec une concurrence miltitaire excessive et ayant, au cours de l'histoire, affligé d'autres régions à mesure qu'elles acquéraient un certain statut sur la scène internationale. Il a également déclaré que la région du Pacifique est à même d'adopter de nouvelles méthodes pour enrayer certaines causes sous-jacentes des conflits internationaux et affronter les nouveaux dangers, tels que la dégradation de l'environnement, la pauvreté généralisée et la croissance démographique, qui menacent la sécurité internationale à l'échelle planétaire.

Des participants venus d'Asie, d'Amérique du Nord et d'Europe ont assisté aux réunions, qui étaient parrainées par le *National Institute for Research Advancement*. À la fin de juin, M. Wood a prononcé l'allocution de clôture sur l'avenir du système international, au Collège de la Défense nationale, à Kingston.

**Ron Purver** a fait des exposés sur la limitation des armements dans l'Arctique, à une conférence «Pacem in Maribus» à Moscou, en juin, et dans le cadre d'un atelier sur la sécurité dans l'Arctique, à l'Université d'Abertdeen, en Ecosse. Il a également prononcé une allocution sur la guerre sous-marine et la limitation des armements, pendant une conférence parrainée à Halifax par le *Centre for Foreign Policy Studies* (Université Dalhousie) et le département d'histoire de l'Université du Nouveau-Brunswick. En juillet, M. Purver a assisté à la cinquième assemblée générale de la Conférence inuit circumpolaire, à Sisimiut (Groënland).

**Michael Bryans** a été élu membre du conseil d'administration du *Canadian Periodical Publishers' Association*, à la dernière assemblée annuelle de cet organisme à Toronto.

**Katherine Laundy** et **Susan Connell** ont organisé des mini-conférences à Calgary et Yellowknife sur les moyens d'information ouverts à la paix et de la dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Les mini-conférences ont été organisées dans le cadre du Programme d'aide financière de l'ICPSI. Les titulaires des bourses poursuivront des études dans diverses disciplines.

L'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales vient de décerner douze bourses d'études (14 000 \$) à des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui souhaitent poursuivre des études dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Les bourses sont attribuées chaque année dans le cadre du Programme d'aide financière de l'ICPSI. Les titulaires des bourses poursuivront des études dans diverses disciplines.

**David Ross Black**, de Toronto, entreprendra un doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Dalhousie et mettra l'accent sur les politiques étrangères de trois puissances moyennes, à savoir l'Australie, le Canada et la Suède, à l'égard de l'Afrique australe.

**Walter Henry Dorn**, de Toronto, terminera un doctorat en chimie à l'Université de Toronto, en coopération avec l'Institut de technologie de Linköping (Suède). Ses travaux porteront principalement sur la détection par des moyens chimiques aux fins de la vérification de l'observance des accords sur la limitation des armements.

**Laurenti Frappé**, de Québec, fera un doctorat en relations internationales à l'Université Laval. Ses travaux traiteront surtout des conflits et des relations internationales en Amérique latine.

**Frank E. Harvey**, de Montréal, entreprendra un doctorat en relations internationales à l'Université McGill; l'essentiel de ses études portera sur les conflits, les crises et la guerre.

**Robert Neil Huebert**, de Winnipeg, fera un doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Dalhousie et il se penchera particulièrement sur la défense et les politiques du Canada au sujet de l'Arctique.

**Howard Peter Langille**, de Annapolis Royal (Nouvelle-Écosse), terminera un doctorat en relations internationales à l'Université Bradford, en Angleterre, ses études de philosophie au niveau du doctorat; il s'intéressera principalement aux études sur la paix. Le thème de ses travaux sera : La politique canadienne de défense : les options en vue de la sécurité commune.

**Laure C. Paquette**, de Montréal, poursuivra des études doctorales en sciences politiques à l'Université Queen's, en mettant l'accent sur les stratégies et les civilisations.

**Leigh Edward Saffy**, de Toronto, terminera un doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Columbia, en mettant l'accent sur les relations canado-soviétiques entre 1966 et 1980.

**Larry Anthony Swalik**, de Windsor, fera un doctorat en économie politique et en politique étrangère, à l'Université Dalhousie. Le thème de ses études sera : L'économie politique des petits États lutant pour survivre : l'élaboration de la politique étrangère au Botswana, au Lesotho et au Swaziland, de 1966 à 1988.

**Puy-Khoon Tan**, de Toronto, entreprendra un doctorat en relations internationales à l'Université John Hopkins de Washington (D.C.). Sa thèse aura pour thème : Les transferts de technologie entre le Canada et le Japon dans le domaine des télécommunications : incidences sur la paix et la sécurité internationales.

**Michael Charles Williams**, de Victoria, fera un doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université York et se concentrera sur la dialectique de la dissuasion.


En juillet, **Garfield Newman**, professeur à l'école secondaire Dr. G. W. Williams (Commission régionale de York) à Aurora, et **Geoff Irvine**, qui enseignent à l'école secondaire Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Commission scolaire de Carleton), ont travaillé à l'Institut à réviser le «Manuel de l'enseignant sur la paix et la sécurité». L'ouvrage, qui a été écrit par M. Irvine et **Brad Peasey**, membre de l'Institut, a été mis à l'essai par divers enseignants et enseignantes pendant l'année scolaire 1988-1989. Les observations de ces personnes ont été essentielles au stade de la révision.

**Anthony Figgins**, Directeur de la recherche au *Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom*, était l'invité à une séance d'information organisée par l'Institut au sujet des activités de recherche menées au Canada sur les questions internationales.

L'Institut a accueilli les participants à une table ronde sur divers points de vue intéressant la politique de défense; étaient présents des membres de l'organisme canadien Anciens combattants contre les armes nucléaires ainsi que deux de États-Unis. Des membres de plusieurs autres groupes de pression s'intéressant à la paix et à la défense ont également pris part aux discussions.

Des membres du Collège de la Défense nationale de la Trinité ont visité l'Institut à la fin août. **John Toogood** les a entretenus sur les intérêts du Canada en matière de sécurité. □





**William Barton**, président du conseil d'administration depuis la fondation de l'Institut en août 1984, a quitté son poste après cinq ans de service. Après sa réunion de juin, le conseil a décidé, pour souligner la valeur du travail accompli à l'Institut par M. Barton, de donner le nom de ce dernier à son programme de bourses. Les autres membres du conseil qui terminaient alors leur mandat de trois ans étaient **Ann Gertler**, **Karl Holsti**, **Richard Mercier**, **Brian Ungerhant** et **Jean-Guy Vaillancourt**.

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, le très honorable **Joe Clark**, a récemment annoncé les noms des nouveaux membres du conseil. Ce sont **Beatrice Bazar**, de Montréal, autrefois présidente nationale de l'Association canadienne pour les Nations-Unies et présente-ment directrice de la Fondation canadienne des droits de la personne; **Lincoln Bloomfield**, de Boston, dont le nom est associé au *Massachusetts Institute of Technology* depuis de nombreuses années et qui s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux institutions et organismes internationaux; **Francine Fournier**, d'Ottawa, secrétaire générale de la Commission canadienne pour l'UNESCO; **Reginald Lane**, lieutenant-général à la retraite qui vit maintenant à Victoria et qui est actif au sein du *Koyal United Services Institute*; et **Ellenor Powell**, de la Colombie-Britannique, autrefois présidente des Médecins canadiens pour la prévention de la guerre nucléaire. M. Clark a également annoncé qu'après avoir consulté le conseil d'administration et les partis d'opposition, le gouvernement avait nommé **David Braide** à la tête du conseil pour une période de trois ans.

Le 8 juin, le Directeur général et les cadres supérieurs de l'Institut ont témoigné devant le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur (Chambre des communes). Des députés de tous les partis ont eu une discussion animée avec le Directeur général sur un certain nombre de questions internationales et sur les projets et les analyses de l'Institut même. C'était la première fois que celui-ci déposait ainsi devant le Comité en tant que société de la Couronne pour discuter de ses plans.

«Chypre : visions d'avenir», tel était le titre du quatrième et dernier colloque faisant partie d'un projet que l'Institut mène depuis un an sur les origines du conflit chypriote et ses perspectives de règlement. Les participants ont alors mis l'accent sur les développements possibles plutôt que sur les problèmes du passé, et ils en sont venus à un consensus sur la nécessité pour les deux communautés de travailler ensemble afin de définir une seule et unique identité politique chypriote. Les deux chefs municipaux de la ville divisée de Nicosie, **M.M. Mustapha Akinci** et **Lellos Demetriades**, ont parlé de leurs efforts coopératifs pour régler des problèmes pratiques dans leur ville (par exemple, les réseaux d'aqueduc et d'égout). On a convenu qu'il fallait encourager l'application de mesures propres à accroître la confiance entre les deux communautés, et en élargir la portée. Les participants ont aussi discuté du rôle de la Force des Nations-Unies à Chypre (FNUC) et des efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général de l'ONU pour promouvoir le règlement de la situation. Ils ont recommandé que les contributions versées pour la FNUC soient uniquement sur le règlement, que les négociations sur le renou-

vellement du mandat de la Force de maintien de la paix de l'ONU deviennent des délais, et que la FNUC devienne plutôt une force d'observation capable de réagir rapidement au besoin.

À l'automne, deux nouveaux auxiliaires de recherche se joindront au personnel de l'Institut; ce sont **Marie-France Desjardins** et **Robin Hay**. Mme Desjardins est diplômée de l'école Norman Paterson (Université Carleton) et de l'Université de Québec à Montréal en histoire et en affaires internationales, et elle a publié divers articles sur la non-prolifération et les sous-marins à

aussi diplômé de la même école et il a fait ses études de premier cycle à l'Université d'Ottawa, en se spécialisant en histoire et en relations internationales. Ses publications ont trait principalement porté sur la limitation des armements. Les auxiliaires de recherche **Peter Gizewski** et **François Lafranière** ont quitté l'Institut. **Doug Hamlin**, membre associé au cours de la dernière année, est retourné au ministère des Affaires extérieures, et le mandat d'un autre membre associé, à savoir **Bruno Munier**, s'est également terminé à la fin d'août.

L'Institut a accueilli deux nouveaux membres associés à l'automne; il s'agit de **Ron Fisher**, de l'Université de la Saskatchewan, et de **Gordon Sharpe**, du ministère de la Défense nationale. Le lieutenant-colonel Sharpe est navigateur aérien et il étudiera des questions intéressant la surveillance aérienne. Quant à lui, le professeur Fisher se concentrera sur la socio-psychologie et le règlement des conflits internationaux.

**Fauzaya Moore**, qui était agent des subventions, a quitté l'Institut en juin pour aller travailler à l'Ins-

## Procédure relative aux subventions et échancier

■ L'Institut attribue des subventions deux fois par année. On est prié de communiquer avec lui pour obtenir des formulaires de demande et le texte à jour énonçant les critères à respecter. Veuillez prendre note des échéances suivantes :

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

le 31 décembre, pour la sélection de mars

## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT

l'Institut de coopération internationale et de développement, à l'Université d'Ottawa. **Rycharad Brulé** est rentre du Collège de la Défense nationale, où il a passé un an; la personne qui l'avait remplacé à l'Institut, **Marie-Andrée Lallonde-Morisset**, servira d'agent de relations avec les médias de septembre à décembre. **Michel Proulx**, gestionnaire du matériel, et **Suzanne Payant**, réceptionniste, retourneront à l'Université.

L'Institut a présenté divers colloques à la fin du printemps et pendant l'été : **Louis Krifberg**, de l'Université de Syracuse, a parlé de l'état actuel des études sur le règlement des conflits; **K.M. de Silva**, professeur d'histoire à l'Université de Colombo (Sri Lanka), a dirigé une discussion qui avait pour thème «L'éthnolittérature : les conflits et le développement : une perspective comparative»; **Rashid Khadiji**, de l'Université de Chicago, a dirigé un colloque sur l'*Intifada* et les développements actuels en Israël, dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie; **Edy Kaufman**, Directeur général du *Harry S. Truman Research Institute* et chargé de cours à l'Institut des études canado-américaines à Moscou, qui était au Canada dans le cadre d'un programme d'échanges, a tenu un colloque sur le mois qu'il venait de passer au Canada, mois où il a visité la Banque royale du Canada et la *Dominion Securities* à Toronto; **Gerald Steinberg**, professeur à l'Université hébraïque de Jérusalem et spécialiste de la limitation des armements, a dirigé une discussion sur la prolifération des armes de destruction massive au Moyen-

**Programme de bourses Barton**

■ L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à faire leur demande dans le cadre de son programme de bourses, désigné par «Bourses Barton» en l'honneur de son premier président, M. William Barton, ancien ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU. Le programme est accessible aux universitaires et aux autres personnes qui veulent entreprendre ou poursuivre des études sur la paix et la sécurité internationales. Le programme vise à favoriser l'accroissement des compétences et des connaissances de haut niveau dans ce domaine et en appuyant des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui souhaitent poursuivre des études dans des institutions au Canada ou à l'étranger.

L'Institut compte choisir dix récipiendaires et remettre ainsi deux bourses de chercheur de 30 000 \$ chacune au maximum et huit bourses d'étude valant 14 000 \$ au plus chacune. Un comité de sélection indépendant évaluera les candidatures et rendra ses décisions en mai 1990.

Les candidat(e)s doivent être des citoyen(ne)s canadien(ne)s dont l'expérience ou les compétences universitaires leur permettent de poursuivre des études supérieures.

Les candidatures pour l'année universitaire 1990-1991 doivent parvenir à l'Institut le 1<sup>er</sup> février 1990 au plus tard. Pour obtenir plus de détails et des formulaires de demande, prière d'écrire à l'adresse suivante :

Programme de bourses Barton  
Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales  
360, rue Albert, bureau 900  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
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**LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS NON NUCLÉAIRES**

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
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sion. De plus, on critique désormais plus ouvertement les privatisages accordés aux militaires ou les erreurs commises par ces derniers, surtout depuis le début du désengagement en Afghanistan. On peut même affirmer aujourd'hui que les militaires soviétiques se trouvent sur la défensive et qu'ils doivent tenir compte en question la place qu'ils occupent en URSS.

Le contrôle du parti sur les militaires s'est accentué à notre avis depuis la fin de l'ère brejnevienne. L'équipe de Gorbatchev semble exercer un contrôle plus complet. Ceci n'est pas seulement évident dans la politique de maîtrise des armements du gouvernement mais aussi dans les initiatives unilatérales ajoutant que la nomination du ministre de la Défense, Dmitri Yazov, en 1987, et plus encore celle du nouveau chef d'état-major Moïseïev, en janvier 1989, constituent autant de démonstrations de ce contrôle, puisqu'il y avait plus grade et plus âge que ces deux généraux dans la hiérarchie militaire.

À ce chapitre, nous devons aussi préciser que l'ancien ministre de la Défense, Dmitri Oustinov, était en fait considéré par les militaires comme un civil chargé de les contrôler au nom du parti et que son intervention dans la lutte de succession en 1982 ne peut être comparée à celle de l'armée en faveur de Khrouchchev en 1957 comme le laisse entendre Duhamel. De plus, à la différence de l'autenr, nous d'affirmer que les militaires perdent complètement le monopole quasi graduellement le long de la mesure croissante de la maîtrise stratégique qu'ici en matière d'analyse stratégique ou de politique de maîtrise de l'explosion démographique des pays du tiers-monde. La deuxième partie doit composer avec la montée en importance des spécialistes civils en matières stratégiques. Gorbatchev consulte ces derniers plus qu'aucun autre secrétaire général avant lui, reprenant ainsi une pratique familière aux présidents américains depuis plusieurs décennies.

Cet ouvrage a le mérite de souligner le lien étroit qui existe entre nous est présente de façon fort convaincante comme un légitime, un matériau qui propose un retour aux valeurs fondamentales qui ont

*Paul Léonouveau est professeur d'études internationales et stratégiques au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean.*

# Un monde intolérable : le libéralisme en question

René Dumont  
*Éditions Le Seuil, Paris, 1988.*  
281 pages, 29,95 \$.

Un autre Dumont ; Peut-être le trentième, le premier ayant été publié au début des années 1930. Des répétitions ? Oui, bien sûr, c'est inévitable. Les allusions à des ouvrages antérieurs ne manquent pas mais leur pertinence ne fait jamais défaut. Autant de rappels, toujours aussi utiles, de la part de celui qui est le premier à regretter d'avoir eu raison dans ses mises en garde antérieures. «L'agronome de la faim», ainsi appelé depuis quelques années, n'avait-il pas prévu la sècheheresse dans les pays du Sahel dès la fin des années 1960 ? En 1974, à titre de candidat des Verts lors des présidentielles françaises, il souligna le danger grandissant des pluies acides. On ne le prit pas au sérieux... Son plus récent ouvrage commente grandement les effets pervers de la croissance économique des pays industrialisés et, encore une fois, de la prise de conscience de la première

«cathédrales dans le désert» que sont devenus les mégaprojets susceptibles d'accélérer l'industrialisation. Quant au continent indien, s'il a connu sa révolution verte, l'accroissement démographique risque fort de compromettre l'essentiel de ses retombées. Pas surprenant que Dumont se réjouisse du chapitre remporté par la Chine à ce chapitre et des progrès accomplis dans le secteur agricole. Comment ne peut-il pas faire de l'agriculture une priorité ? Pourquoi ne pas tenir compte de la stratégie économique qui a fait le succès de l'Angleterre du siècle dernier ? Une troisième partie, sûrement trop brève, souligne que «le libéralisme a fait son temps».

Chaque pays étudie dans ce livre sert à vérifier les sombres prévisions que le révérend Robert T. Malthus avait esquissées au tout début du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle en relation avec les conséquences du déséquilibre entre les moyens de subsistance. Nul penseur de cette époque n'a été plus injustement critiqué. À regret, Dumont lui-même donne raison. La situation est grave. Elle l'était il y a vingt ans, elle l'était il y a dix ans. Elle l'est encore davantage aujourd'hui.

La démonstration repose sur des chiffres très récents, la plupart rapportant aux deux ou trois dernières années. Elle se veut un cri de coeur d'un autenr qui se présente, certes, sous une triple étiquette : pacifiste, tiers-mondiste et écologiste. Si le sous-titre annonce, on le devine bien, une analyse très sévère d'un système encore porté aux nues par les disciples d'Adam Smith, il ne faut pas s'attendre à une apologie prononcée à la fin des années 1960 dans son livre «Développement et socialisme». Inutile pour lui d'y revenir même à l'heure de la pers-troika. L'allusion, hélas trop brève, à une social-démocratie à l'échelle mondiale termine son plaidoyer.

L'ouvrage se présente sous la forme empruntée par l'autenr il y a plus de vingt-cinq ans, et qui l'a fait connaître dans toute la Francophonie. On ne change pas une formule gagnante. Les données numériques abondent et ne sont pas toujours accompagnées de leurs sources mais l'argumentation et la réputation de l'autenr ne sont pas de nature à soulever les doutes. Les références bibliographiques sont suffisamment abondantes pour nous

convaincre de la solidité des informations fournies. Les recours à d'autres contributions servent surtout à mettre en évidence des situations que l'autenr est en mesure de commenter. Combien de fois est-il allé dans chacun des pays décrits ? Qui peut contester les connaissances techniques aussi nombreuses que variées que Dumont sait très bien agencer parmi ses connaissances générales ?

René Dumont a pu, encore une fois, bénéficier de la collaboration de la québécoise Charlotte Paquet. Le lecteur de la «belle province» trouvera donc sans surprise familiarité avec une description des moulins à papier en train d'épuiser les stocks de résineux.

Les hommes devraient très bien-tôt faire preuve d'imagination et surtout de détermination à la faveur d'actions concertées afin de donner un sérieux coup de barre à la marche périlleuse de la terre. Ici, un sérieux coup de barre à la lecture de son fameux livre «L'Afrique noire est mal partie» dénonce l'intolérable. Aux différents acteurs de mesure de l'avant-garde de la stratégie économique susceptibles de répondre aux besoins actuels ; La mise en valeur des ressources locales qui donne lieu à la création de petites entreprises affectées par le sous-emploi, partout en Occident, n'est pas sans enseignement utile pour le tiers-monde. Dumont espère toujours. Mais il est urgent d'agir. Il nous aura prévenu.


— André Joyal

*André Joyal est professeur d'économie à l'Université du Québec Trois-Rivières.*

*Revue de la Paix et de la Sécurité.*  
*Publiée en anglais dans la rubrique*



LIVRES



Fronts et frontières.  
Un tour du monde géopolitique

Michel Foucher  
Éditions Fayard, Paris, 1988.  
527 pages, 35 \$.

La notion de frontière n'est pas une idée neuve bien que sa généralisation à travers le monde soit récente. En effet, la moitié des 226 000 kilomètres des frontières terrestres du monde contemporain a été fixée à la fin du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle. L'ouvrage de Foucher est conçu comme un tour du monde géopolitique des frontières et s'attache à élucider les raisons, les acteurs et les effets des traces.

Quatre l'introduction et la conclusion, le volume se compose de quinze chapitres regroupés en quatre parties. La première partie explore l'invention des frontières dans le monde, analyse la mise en place du modèle géopolitique français, mesure le rôle des Européens dans le découpage du monde, et décrit le processus de formation des frontières et les tendances issues des représentations géopolitiques de l'Amérique latine. La deuxième partie est consacrée aux problèmes géopolitiques de l'Afrique : les conceptions frontalières héritées de la période coloniale, l'érosion du mailage territorial lié à l'organisation des régions en tant qu'unités politiques et la création de frontières en Afrique du Sud. Dans la troisième partie, l'auteur s'attache à décrire la diversité et la complexité des frontières asiatiques, marquées à l'Est par la rencontre entre la Chine, l'Inde et l'URSS, et à l'Ouest par un état de crise perpétuelle, tant les frontières paraissent ni sûres, ni reconnues. Cela permet à Foucher de s'interroger sur l'interaction qui existe entre les peuples, les territoires et les frontières. La quatrième partie de l'ouvrage étudie la dynamique de l'ouvrage étudie la dynamique de l'ouvrage étudie la

Amérique du Nord et les intérêts évolutifs des États-Unis sur le continent, le paysagisme géométrique et la péripétie de l'Union soviétique et les risques d'éclatement interne liés au monopole russe du pouvoir, et la nécessité de choix en matière de frontières suite au dessain géopolitique en cours en Europe de l'Ouest. L'ouvrage se termine par une réflexion sur le jeu des frontières et le jeu des représentations de l'espace. Il est important de souligner que le livre de Foucher est accompagné de neuf annexes, d'une bibliographie exhaustive, de deux index complets et d'un atlas comprenant deux tableaux et quarante-six cartes remarquables par la qualité de l'information véhiculée.

Ce boudin représente une contribution originale à la compréhension de l'histoire inscrite dans l'espace géographique et se compare très favorablement à des études géopolitiques, tant par son approche historique que par sa qualité de synthèse.

Ce n'est pas peu dire que de reconnaître que cette tâche, d'abord matérielle, (l'étude de 226 000 kilomètres de frontières terrestres et de 265 limites communes à deux États contigus du monde contemporain) a été réalisée avec méthode. Il importe aussi de souligner que l'auteur a su tirer une foule de résultats de son analyse.

Parmi ces observations, l'auteur démontre que : 1) 87 p. 100 de l'actuel découpage politique du monde était déjà réalisé avant 1945 et de ce fait n'a pas été fixé à Yalta, 2) les litiges et conflits frontaliers majeurs se localisent presque tous dans les États du tiers-monde, 3) le Néo-apartheid cherche à faire des Noirs urbains une nouvelle ethnie capable de s'opposer aux autres des radicaux en Afrique du Sud, 4) l'on assiste à la formation d'un anglo-latine issue d'une intersection nord de Panama, d'une Amérique centrale et les États-Unis, 5) la notion d'Eurasie créée par Mackinder en fonction de la sauvegarde de l'Empire britannique est inopérante.

Le système politique de l'Union soviétique

Luc Duhamel  
Éditions Québec-Amérique, Montréal, 1988.  
316 pages, 29,95 \$.


Depuis le début de l'ère soviétique, l'intérêt pour l'Union Soviétique n'a cessé de croître en Occident. En effet, depuis 1985, les grands projets ambitieux de restauration et de mobilisation d'une société nouvelle jusqu'à la signation d'un traité ou révéillé notre curiosité.

Luc Duhamel, auteur québécois bien connu pour ses nombreuses publications sur l'URSS, nous propose de combler un vide dans la documentation en langue française en nous offrant un ouvrage de référence sur le système politique de l'URSS. Son objectif est non seulement de nous présenter les changements qui ont cours présentement, mais aussi de nous faire comprendre «comment fonctionne ce régime communiste».

Dans un style accessible à un large public, l'auteur parvient à nous faire saisir les fonctions que nous fait le Parti communiste dans le système politique, à nous faire comprendre les grandes fonctions politiques, économiques et sociales dans leur perspective historique. Cette approche à l'avantage de bien faire ressortir les éléments de continuité et de discontinuité entre, par exemple, la période des tsars et celle de Lénine et l'époque contemporaine de la perestroïka.

La seule réserve que nous ayons, et elle est mineure, concerne le statut de l'armée dans le système politique. Ce statut est en train de se modifier et à même déjà changé sensiblement depuis la publication de ce livre, ce que l'auteur ne pouvait prévoir au moment de la rédaction. Il faut donc ici tempérer les constatations qui nous sont présentées. En effet, depuis l'automne 1988, la glasnost n'épargne plus tout à fait les militaires qui réagissent avec un certain décalage par rapport aux autres groupes de pression.

Claude Contois est professeur au département de géographie de l'Université de Montréal.  
— Claude Contois  
l'actualité internationale, à tous ceux qui s'intéressent à la politique contemporaine et s'adressent à la recherche sur la géopolitique. Néanmoins, cet ouvrage demeure un outil précieux pour faciliter la discussion et la recherche sur la géopolitique internationale.



Le débat sur la défense : une réalité insaisissable

Dans «Tous pour un, un pour tous !» (*Paix et Sécurité*, printemps 1989), l'angle sous lequel le professeur K.R. Nossal explique l'absence de débats sur la défense aux élections fédérales de novembre dernier («Il n'y a aucune discussion sur les questions de sécurité nationale au Canada, parce qu'il n'y a rien à débattre») a dû surprendre les dizaines de milliers de militants pacifistes qui sont descendus dans la rue au début des années 1980, ainsi ont voulu obtenir autant de minutes d'antenne que les pacifistes pour faire valoir la perspective militaire, au milieu du débat sur les essais de missiles de croisière.

Je veux bien croire que le cercle des apôtres ardents qui débattent vigoureusement de la défense canadienne est restreint. Mais M. Nossal oublie de se demander si le processus décisionnel en matière de défense (processus qui se fait à l'abri de l'examen public, qui est très technique et qui aborde certains aspects désolants que la plupart des citoyens et citoyens préfèrent ne pas avoir à envier au quotidien) n'est pas en soi quelque chose qui empêche le débat public. L'argument de M. Nossal au sujet des «intérêts concrets» est plutôt restreint. (Franchement, j'aurais pensé que le souci de survie est quelque chose de relativement commun pour justifier sa conviction que «la plupart des Canadiens et Canadiennes ont en fait mesuré avec soin les conséquences qu'aurait une politique de défense de recherche», il n'est pas trompé peut-être !)

Le deuxième argument selon lequel, «si l'électorat canadien avait suffisamment voulu une politique de défense différente, il n'aurait pas permis que le NPD... languisse si longtemps dans les coulisses de la scène politique nationale», est également faible. En sa qualité d'auteur d'un ouvrage d'envergure sur la politique étrangère du Canada, le professeur Nossal devrait savoir qu'au Canada, comme dans de nombreuses autres démocraties occidentales, les questions de politique étrangère ne sont jamais des éléments déterminants dans les campagnes électorales; c'est pourquoi les résultats de celles-ci ne disent pas grand-chose sur les préférences du public en matière de politique étrangère.

Roger Hill nous met à juste titre en garde contre les dangers d'une intégration canado-américaine de la production de défense («Les périls de l'intégration de la défense», *Paix et Sécurité*, été 1989). Mis à part le fait qu'une telle intégration est déjà très avancée, ce qui a de sérieuses incidences sur l'autonomie de la politique canadienne en matière de sécurité, il convient de se demander si le pays d'une industrie nationale de défense plus développée (voire, plus spécialisée), n'est pas effectivement à l'origine du problème.

Le rapport du Groupe de travail du MDN, que M. Hill cite, est favorable à l'intégration et il fait

notamment valoir que, pour assurer sa sécurité, le Canada a besoin d'un solide industrie de défense qui l'aurait mobiliser en cas de crise et qui garantirait son approvisionnement en matériel militaire pendant les périodes de forte demande. Mais cela nous amène à la difficile question de savoir comment le Canada pourrait conserver une industrie militaire commercialement viable pendant les périodes de faible demande (c.-à-d. en temps de paix).


On reconnaît l'existence du problème dans un autre rapport sur l'industrie de défense préparé en 1987 par le ministère des Approvisionnements et Services et intitulé *Étude de l'industrie du matériel de défense*, ce document précise que le marché assez grand ni assez diversifié pour assurer la prospérité d'une industrie canadienne de la défense n'est pas un tel problème. Une telle industrie ne pourrait survivre grâce aux seuls achats militaires canadiens; c'est pourquoi les auteurs des deux rapports susmentionnés (MDN et ASC) insistent sur les exportations pour garantir la viabilité économique de l'industrie.

Voilà qui appelle une autre question : Où l'industrie trouvera-t-elle ses marchés d'exportation ? Le plus vaste marché ouvert au Canada demeure celui des États-Unis, mais l'accès en est encore menacé (malgré trente ans de partage officiel de la production de défenses) par le protectionnisme pratiqué au sud de la frontière. Et comme les commandes américaines vont inévitablement diminuer (à cause de la décade et des restrictions budgétaires), ce protectionnisme s'accroîtra sûrement, car les sociétés américaines voudront protéger leur marché, désormais moins mince. Le Canada doit donc trouver un moyen de conjurer le spectre du protectionnisme afin de maintenir un accès illimité au marché américain : et ce moyen, ce serait une intégration complète des industries et des marchés des deux

Si le Canada veut acquérir une certaine indépendance par rapport aux Américains, au chapitre de la production militaire, il ne peut avoir à compter sur des ventes de matériel militaire à des pays situés dans des zones de répression et de guerre, il lui faudra de l'aide pour établir une industrie militaire plus diversifiée et commercialement viable. Pour être véritablement autonome, une telle industrie devrait dépendre entièrement de ventes commerciales, et il lui faudrait accepter les coûts unitaires plus élevés allant de pair avec des cycles de fabrication plus courts. Voilà qui pourrait bien être pour le Canada la meilleure raison jamais vue pour réévaluer ses besoins en matière de sécurité et de matériel militaire !

*Ernie Regehr*  
*Projet Ploughshares, Waterloo*





## Le B-2 au milieu des controverses

Le 17 juillet, le bombardier indectable B-2 a pris son envol pour la première fois. Chaque exemplaire devant coûter 530 millions de dollars US (la facture totale, pour les 32 appareils que l'on voudrait acheter s'élèverait à 70 milliards), ce premier vol a suscité de fortes turbulences à Washington, où les législateurs discutaient du budget de 1990 et, plus généralement, de l'avenir des forces stratégiques américaines. En juillet, le House Armed Services Committee a décidé de réduire

discussions plus vastes menées entre le gouvernement Bush et le Congrès au sujet de la structure à venir des forces nucléaires stratégiques des Etats-Unis. En janvier, le président Bush a annoncé que les plans de modernisation des forces armées seraient réexaminés avant la reprise des négociations sur la limitation de ces armements avec les Soviétiques. Cet examen se fait attendu depuis déjà trop longtemps, mais la structure qu'auront les forces américaines au commencement de toute la fin se dessine à la faveur de la lutte acharnée qui se livre sans répit au Congrès.

En avril, le Pentagone et le Congrès en sont arrivés à un compromis selon lequel le missile *Midgetman* à charge simple, qui compte peu d'adeptes au Pentagone, serait réinscrit au budget de 1990, à condition que se poursuive le financement de la version mobile sur route du missile *MX* à dix ogives. À la fin de juillet, la Chambre des représentants a d'abord décidé de réduire de moitié les fonds affectés au déploiement du *MX*, puis d'annuler le programme du *Midgetman*. Ce double coup de poignard résultait des tractations politiques au Congrès, et non d'analyses stratégiques. Quand les démocrates ont décidé de limiter le budget du *MX*, les républicains ont proposé en votant avec les démocrates libéraux contre le programme *Midgetman*. Dirigée par les membres du Congrès représentant l'Etat de New York, lesquels sont résolus à sauver

usine Gramman archivé de long  
Island, la Chambre a cisaillé encore  
davantage le budget de défense du  
gouvernement en réservant de nou-  
veau des fonds pour le chasseur  
F-14 (un des seuls grands pro-  
grammes d'acquisition que le Secré-  
taire à la Défense, M. Richard  
Cheney, avait réussi à réduire dans  
son premier budget).  
Témoignant devant le Congrès,

les chefs du Pentagone ont fait valoir que, sans le B-2, les négociateurs américains à Genève devraient revoir leur position, voire se retirer complètement des pourparlers. Le président Bush, le disposant tout-à-fait pas des conclusions de son réexamen stratégique, a précédé qu'il avait élaboré un solide programme stratégique fondé sur le B-2, le *Midgeman* et le MX ainsi que sur la continuation de l'IDS. Ajoutant sa voix à tout ce hoch-

au cours d'une visite à Washington en juillet, où il a notamment moigné devant le House Armed Services Committee, le marchand Akhromeyev, conseiller spécial de M. Gorbatchev, a déclaré aux reporters que, si le B-2 était déployé, l'Union soviétique réagirait.

Ramasser les pots cassés à Ottawa

## Ramasser les pots cassés à Ottawa

En vertu du programme envisagé dans le Livre blanc, la Marine aurait

navires de combat, dont douze frégates, quatre destroyers et deux sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. L'achat de ces derniers aurait notamment supposé l'annulation du plan portant sur l'acquisition d'une troisième série de six nouvelles frégates, lesquelles devaient entrer en service à la fin des années 1990. Avec l'abandon du programme des sous-marins nucléaires, les officiers de la Marine canadienne espèrent que la troisième série de frégates figurerait de nouveau dans les plans. Prenant la parole devant un comité des Communes en juin, le ministre de la Défense, M. William McKinnight, a annoncé ces espoirs en annonçant que ces frégates ne seraient pas construites. Aucune décision n'a encore été prise quant au remplacement des trois vieux sous-marins classiques. Sans la troisième série de frégates, le Canada disposera de seize navires de combat de surface à la fin du siècle, dont quatre auront alors vingt-cinq ans. Si l'on se contente de remplacer les trois sous-marins classiques, sans plus, la Marine canadienne pourrait bien voir arriver l'an 2000 avec moins de vingt bâtiments de combat.

Toujours en juin, M. McKinnight a déclaré à des reporters en Europe que le gouvernement prendrait à la fin de l'année une décision sur le remplacement d'un petit nombre de chars de combat pour les Forces canadiennes déployées là-bas. Entre-temps, Ottawa a abandonné les plans qui, dans le Livre blanc, concernaient l'expansion de nos forces armées en Europe, dont les effectifs seraient ainsi passés au niveau d'une division. Le Canada avait promis à l'OTAN de réaliser cette expansion, pour compenser l'annulation de l'engagement qu'il avait pris de renforcer le nord de la Norvège.

Enfin, le ministre de la Défense nationale (MDN) a décidé d'accroître sa flotte d'avions de patrouille à grande autonomie (les *Aurora*) en achetant trois autres cellules de Lockheed. Le nouveau avion (qui s'appellerait *Arctus*) ne sera pas muni du matériel perfectionné

## Un Mig s'écrase en Belgique

En juillet, les moteurs d'un Mig-23 soviétique ayant décollé d'une base en Pologne sont tombés en panne. Le pilote orienta son parapluie vers la Baïlique et actionna le système d'éjection; mais à ce moment-là, les moteurs se remettaient à fonctionner. L'avion tourna vers l'Otan et s'écrasa finalement en Belgique. Les Soviétiques ont insisté sur le fait que l'appareil n'avait pas de radar et qu'il était sans armes.

Un lac de béton

En juillet, des reporters occidentaux ont été autorisés à visiter l'immense complexe industriel de Kyshtym, l'est de l'Oural. C'est là que se trouve le principal complexe nucléaire de l'Union soviétique, où on y est d'ailleurs en train de construire de nouveaux réacteurs nucléaires soviétiques. Les Soviétiques ont commis de terribles erreurs pendant la manipulation de matières nucléaires à Kyshtym, et ils ont même tenté d'en cacher l'existence à l'extérieur du pays. Mais les Soviétiques ont rempli le lac de béton, et la liste des accidents nucléaires est des plus inquiétantes. Les matières nucléaires ont été mal gérées pendant longtemps, on vient de rendre public que pour la première fois, de sorte que le sentiment de confiance dans l'Union soviétique, répandu en Union soviétique, au Congrès des représentants du parti en juin, ceux-ci ont réclamé la poursuite des essais nucléaires en URSS. Après une interruption de presque cinq mois, le programme des essais nucléaires a repris le 8 juillet, quand les Soviétiques ont provoqué une explosion sous-marine à Semipalatinsk. □

— DAVID COX

## CONDENSE SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS

de négociations : ils ont proposé de mettre en oeuvre des mesures de vérification convenues, même avant que le texte final du traité soit achevé. Certains critiques ont vu là une manœuvre de retardement, mais les négociateurs soviétiques auraient, semble-t-il, réagi favorablement.

En bref...

La controverse qui sévissait au sein de l'OTAN au sujet des forces nucléaires à courte portée a connu son dénouement au cours du sommet des 29 et 30 mai, quand les Etats-Unis ont accepté d'amorcer des négociations sur une réduction «partielle» de ces armes, une fois que la mise en oeuvre d'un accord sur les forces conventionnelles «na-rait littéralement commencé». Le président Gorbachev a réclame des négociations

Il a donné du poids à son appel et il a montré que l'URSS représentait unilatéralement de 500 ogives l'arsenal qu'elle possède sur ce plan. Les porte-parole ont retourné que cela pesait très peu dans la balance, vu que le Pacte de Varsovie possède en tout environ 10 000 ogives de cette catégorie; ils ont souligné par ailleurs que l'OTAN avait unilatéralement réduit de plus de 2 400 ogives son propre arsenal depuis 1979.

L'URSS ont signé un accord sur la prévention des activités militaires dangereuses. Le document concerne les incursions involontaires d'aéronefs militaires dans le territoire d'un autre pays; l'usage dangereux des lasers; les opérations étant sources de perturbations dans les «zones spéciales où la prudence s'impose» (le golf Persique, par exemple); et l'interférence dans les réseaux de commandement et de contrôle.

Le 17 juillet, on a appris que les

Etats-Unis et l'URSS avaient réussi d'une Convention sur les armes chimiques, y compris sur un calendrier pour la destruction de ces engins et sur la procédure détaillée devant régir les inspections sur demande. Les recommandations seront présentées aux quarante pays membres de la Conférence du désarmement, à Genève. □

forces nationales stationnées à l'étranger et les forces présentes dans les sous-zones (le Pacte est en faveur, l'OTAN est contre); les paramètres géographiques des sous-zones et les plateaux qui s'y appliqueraient; la définition de certains équipements; et les chars et les pièces d'artillerie; et les calculs de chaque

Le 19 juin a commencé la onzième

nucléaires et spatiales (A.N.), après une interruption de sept mois pendant lesquels le nouveau gouvernement Bush a révisé la position américaine. Les résultats de cet examen ont dû de nombreux observateurs, car ce dernier a essentiellement confirmé d'anciennes positions et n'a favorisé aucune évolution sur des questions classiques telles que la limitation des défenses contre les missiles balistiques, les ICBM mobiles, et les missiles de croisière mer-sol. Néan-

très heureux que les arrangements antérieurs définis dans le projet de traité (document de 400 pages) aient été conservés. Le gouvernement Bush a rejeté des recommandations du Congrès qui aurait voulu qu'une interdiction des ICBM mobiles proposée par les États-Unis s'applique seulement aux missiles à ogives multiples. De nombreux avocats de la limitation des armements ont exhorté les États-Unis à renoncer entièrement à cette interdiction, en

aléguant que les missiles mobiles sont moins vulnérables et que, par conséquent, ils favorisent davantage la stabilité. Cependant, le gouvernement hésite à abandonner son projet d'accepter de financer ses deux programmes de déploiement d'ICBM mobiles, étant donné que les Soviétiques disposent déjà de tels engins. Les Etats-Unis ont introuvé un


Warsawie avait exigés. Le président Bush a demandé des réductions qui ramèneraient le nombre des avions de combat non embarqués et des hélicoptères à un plafond correspondant à 85 p. 100 du niveau actuel de l'OTAN, et il a aussi proposé de limiter à environ 275 000 membres

l'armée et de l'aviation. Pour arriver à ce niveau, les Soviétiques devraient retirer 325 000 soldats, comparativement à 30 000 du côté des Américains. Le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Chevardnadze, a dit des nouvelles propositions qu'elles étaient saines et constructives et qu'elles rejoignaient celles de son pays à bien des égards. M. Bush a dit s'espérer qu'un accord interviendrait d'ici six à douze mois et que les réductions seraient

Produits à tarifs nouveaux se sont produits avant la fin de la ronde. Le 29 juin, le Pacte de Varsovie a proposé de délimiter une nouvelle «zone», plus vaste, qui comprenait la Balgique et d'autres districts militaires de l'URSS occidentale, afin de dissiper les doutes de l'Ouest qui craint une accumulation de forces soviétiques dans des régions voisines de l'Europe centrale. Le 13 juillet, deux mois avant la date fixée, l'OTAN a présenté en détail les limites qu'elle propose d'im-

ères et qui se situeraient à 5 700 et à 1 900 respectivement, les plafonds nationaux étant quant à eux fixés à 4 200 et à 1 140 respectivement. L'Alliance occidentale devrait dès lors devoir envoir 1 000 aéronets, et le Pacte de Varsovie, 3 900 (d'après les calculs de l'O.N.A.). Des différends importants subsistent cependant quant aux types d'appareils qui seraient assujettis aux révisions. L'O.N.A. voudrait inclure tous les avions de combat, tandis

Parmi les autres points suscitant encore des désaccords citons les suivants : le Pacte insiste pour que les limitations visant le personnel s'appliquent à toute l'Alliance et aux forces des membres de l'OTAN, ce que les États-Unis qui sont habituellement en dehors de leur propre zone d'application ne souhaitent pas.



Armedements conventions

accomplis pendant la deuxième ronde des négociations sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe (FCE), du 5 mai au 13 juillet. Tout d'abord, le 18 mai, le Pacte de Varsovie a répondu à l'OTAN qui se plaignait du manque de ses propositions antérieures; il a en effet fixé des plafonds précis pour diverses catégories de matériels, plafonds qui seraient atteints d'ici 1997 grâce à des réductions successives. Les limites proposées sont les suivantes : 20 000 chars et

port de trouques (V.B.I.) de part et d'autre (chiffres identiques à ceux mentionnés) par l'OTAN dans sa proposition du 9 mars), et 24 000 pièces d'artillerie (l'OTAN avait proposé un seuil de 16 500). Ainsi, selon ses propres calculs, l'Est devrait retirer d'Europe ou mettre au rencart environ 40 000 chars, 47 000 pièces d'artillerie et 42 000 VBT au cours des huit prochaines années. Le Pacte préconisait aussi que chaque alliance limite ses effectifs à 1 350 000 hommes, 1 500 avions

A la fin de mai, le bloc de l'Est s'est rapproché encore davantage de la position occidentale, en acceptant notamment le principe des plafonds secondaires pour les forces d'un pays donné, les forces de tel ou tel pays postées en dehors de ses propres frontières, et les forces stationnées dans les « sous-zones » régionales (pour empêcher toute concentration). Par exemple, l'URSS pourrait posséder en tout 14 000 chars, 17 000 pièces d'artillerie et 18 000

BRIT, ce qui est à peine supérieur aux seuls qu'autoriserait l'OTAN. Sauvons cette ligne de conduite. L'URSS devrait retirer 17 500 chars, 24 775 pièces d'artillerie et 27 000 VBTT, toutes qu'elle devrait effectuer les réductions unilatérales annoncées par le président Gorbatchev en décembre dernier à l'ONU. Pendant le sommet qu'elle a tenu les 29 et 30 mai, l'OTAN a réagi en





## EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE

### Restrictions financières

Tout au long de la fonction publique, le budget du 27 avril, du côté de la Défense nationale, on a dû, à cause des coupures, réviser de fond en comble le volet maritime des Forces canadiennes, après l'annulation du plan concernant l'acquisition d'une flotte de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. D'autres options sont actuellement à l'étude. Le ministre de la Défense, M. McMillan, a par ailleurs donné à entendre le 7 juin, à la fin d'une visite qu'il faisait à la BFC Labrador en Allemagne de l'Ouest, que le Canada laisserait «pour le moment» ses 7 500 soldats actuellement déployés en Europe, mais que le gouvernement examinait les multiples rôles que le Canada assumait aujourd'hui.

En Chambre, constatant la montée en flèche des coûts estimatifs du projet de construction du brise-glaces *Polar 8*, des députés ont posé des questions sur le retard qu'accuse la mise à exécution des plans à cet égard. Le 8 mai, la députée néo-démocrate Audrey McLaughlin (Yukon) a demandé au ministre des Transports, M. Benoît Bouchard, ce qu'il avait fait pour accélérer la construction de ce brise-glaces. Le ministre a répondu qu'il avait fait tout ce qu'il pouvait pour accélérer la construction de ce brise-glaces. Il a ajouté qu'il avait fait tout ce qu'il pouvait pour accélérer la construction de ce brise-glaces.

### Des bouleversements en Chine

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a pris la parole en Chambre presque chaque jour à partir du 5 juin, après que le gouvernement chinois ait commencé à servir contre les protestataires de la place Tian'anmen, à Beijing. Il a répondu à une multitude de questions de l'opposition et a annoncé peu à peu une série de mesures pour contrer les effets de la vague de répression défiant sur la Chine. Plus précisément, le Canada a rappelé son ambassadeur et a fait le premier pays occidental à ce que deux fois l'ambassadeur de Chine pour exprimer le profond désaccord de son gouvernement et de l'Esri, l'étude reprendra cet automne quand le Parlement siégera de nouveau. Le Comité communautaire international, en insistant tout particulièrement sur le cas de l'Afrique. Ces travaux n'empêcheront pas le CPACB de se pencher sur d'autres questions, selon les circonstances.

### Comités parlementaires

Le parlement a interrompu ses travaux pour l'être le 27 juin, et il les reprendra le 25 septembre. Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur (CPACB) a entrepris une étude d'envergure qui doit durer un an et porter sur les relations du Canada avec l'Union soviétique et l'Europe de l'Est; l'étude reprendra cet automne quand le Parlement siégera de nouveau. Le Comité communautaire international, en insistant tout particulièrement sur le cas de l'Afrique. Ces travaux n'empêcheront pas le CPACB de se pencher sur d'autres questions, selon les circonstances.

### En bref

Le premier ministre et le ministre des Affaires extérieures ont assisté au sommet de la Francophonie à Dakar (Sénégal) le 24 mai. Puis, ils se sont rendus au sommet de l'OAN à Bruxelles, les 29 et 30 mai; le ministre des Finances et son collègue du Commerce se sont joints à M. Clark pour assister, les 31 mai et 1<sup>er</sup> juin à Paris, à la réunion ministérielle de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE). Le premier ministre a participé au sommet économique des sept pays industrialisés, à Paris, du 14 au 16 juillet. Tant les vingt-quatre pays industrialisés de l'OCDE que le

gouvernement du Commonwealth (à Kuala Lumpur, en octobre).

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# À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



Cyprine

De plus en plus, on croit que les deux adversaires dans le conflit chypriote progressent lentement vers le règlement de ce qui est devenu le différend le plus long et le plus désespérant dont le Conseil de sécurité ait jamais été saisi. Après des années d'efforts intermittents, on mise maintenant beaucoup sur les négociations amorcées entre le chef chypriote turc, Rauf Denktash, et le président de la République de Chypre, George Vasilou.

Dans l'espoir d'accélérer les pourparlers, le Conseil a émis une déclaration laconique le 9 juin, pendant une réunion ordinaire sur le renouvellement du mandat des forces de l'ONU à Chypre (FNUC) : « Les membres constatent que vingt-cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis la création de la FNUC... Ils regrettent qu'il ait été impossible, pendant tout ce temps, d'en arriver à une règle-cadre négociable de tous les aspects du problème chypriote. »

Le Canada a participé avec une intensité particulière à la rédaction de la déclaration. Il a insisté pour que l'on emploie des termes énergiques afin de bien faire comprendre que les pays fournissant les troupes commencent à s'impacienter devant des négociations qui n'aboutissent jamais. « Il s'agit de traduire notre sentiment de lassitude, la mission de maintien de la paix à bas dure depuis vingt-cinq ans, et nous ne voulons pas qu'elle se poursuive pendant un autre quart de siècle », a expliqué un diplomate canadien.

Le diplomate a ajouté que la dernière étape des pourparlers avait été la plus encourageante à avoir eu lieu depuis des années. Les deux adversaires sont censés définir le cadre d'un accord en septembre. Ils se réuniront ensuite avec le Secrétaire général de l'ONU pour régler les détails.

« Si les pourparlers échouent, on ne reviendra pas au statu quo axé

sur la FNUC, de dire le diplomate. Le Conseil de sécurité se dit frustré. Si les deux adversaires ne font pas de leur mieux, alors ils en subiront les conséquences. » Le diplomate n'a pas précisé ce que celles-ci pourraient être, mais il a donné à entendre que les pays fournissant des troupes envisageraient de réduire leurs contingents. Le désenchantement a conduit la Suède à retirer toutes ses troupes l'an dernier.

Les cotisations versées pour la FNUC le sont à titre volontaire, et cela inquiète le Canada, car le compte est actuellement à découvert de 165 millions de dollars. Pendant les consultations menées par le Conseil, le Canada a cherché une solution à ce problème en proposant d'instaurer une contribution obligatoire pour tous les membres de l'ONU, mais l'Union soviétique et la France s'y seraient opposées.

## Le Moyen-Orient

Comme dans le passé, la jonction israélienne a continué d'inquiéter profondément. En un mois, le Conseil a voté sur deux résolutions critiquant la façon dont Israël traite les Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés.

Le 9 juin, les États-Unis ont opposé leur veto à la première résolution qui « déplorait avec vigueur » les politiques et les pratiques israéliennes « qui violent les droits du peuple palestinien ». Les quatorze autres membres, dont le Canada, ont appuyé la résolution. Pour expliquer sa position, notre pays a déclaré qu'à son avis, Israël ne s'efforce pas suffisamment de respecter les dispositions de la Convention de Genève concernant la protection des civils dans les zones occupées par des militaires. En revanche, les autorités israéliennes ont mérité des éloges pour avoir tenu tête aux « justiciers » en Cisjordanie.

Dès négociations délicates ont précédé le débat sur la résolution. À l'origine, les auteurs du document avaient voulu employer des termes extrêmement incisifs et « conda-Canada et d'autres pays ont réussi à faire adopter un texte moins intrusif » la conduite d'Israël. Mais le sigeant qui « déplorait avec vigueur » l'attitude de Tel Aviv. « Nous avons essayé de trouver les mots les plus acceptables possible, de manière à donner un poids moral à la résolu-

tion, a précisé un diplomate canadien. Il ne faut pas donner l'impression que le Conseil de sécurité est divisé. » Les États-Unis ont malgré tout rejeté le document en faisant valoir qu'il manquait d'objectivité, car il ne mentionnait pas les actes de violence commis par les Palestiniens. Tout comme dans le cas de nombreuses résolutions antérieures qui critiquaient Israël, le veto opposé par les États-Unis a isolé ces derniers sur le plan diplomatique.

Le 6 juillet, cependant, Washington s'est abstenue d'utiliser son veto lors d'un vote sur une résolution qui exprimait une vive déception devant la conduite d'Israël qui continuait à déporter des civils palestiniens. Les États-Unis ont plutôt choisi de s'abstenir dans ce cas, de sorte que la résolution a été adoptée.

Dans d'autres dossiers intéressants du Moyen-Orient, le Conseil, au cours de l'un de ses plus courtes réunions jamais vues, a renouvelé le 30 mai le mandat de la force tampon de l'ONU (FNUOD). Le 31 juillet, le Conseil a renouvelé le mandat de la Force des Nations-Unies au Liban (FINUL).

## Autres questions à l'ordre du jour du Conseil

Le Conseil a continué de surveiller la scène namibienne. En dépit des difficultés ayant surgi au tout début de l'opération, les diplomates semblent croire que le processus est sur la bonne voie et que les élections auront lieu en novembre. Ils savent par ailleurs très bien que des « sous-entendus » risquent de se produire, pour reprendre les mots d'un diplomate.

Un incident s'est effectivement produit le 28 juin, quand le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, M. Javier Pérez de Cuellar, a attiré l'attention du Conseil sur un climat de peur et d'intimidation qui existait dans le nord de la Namibie et qui risquait d'empêcher la tenue d'élections équitables. Il a blâmé une unité contre-insurrectionnelle de la *South-West Africa Police Force*, en l'accusant d'avoir adoptée une conduite « inacceptable ».

Le Conseil s'est également penché sur la question du terrorisme. Dans une résolution adoptée à l'unanimité, les quinze membres du Conseil ont réclamé l'instauration d'un

régime international en vertu duquel les expositifs au plastique et en feuille porteraient des marques qui en faciliteraient la détection. Le Conseil a exhorté tous les États à intensifier la recherche pour prévenir les actes de terrorisme contre l'aviation civile.

Le 31 juillet, le Conseil a adopté une résolution présentée par le Canada et la Finlande; le texte condamnait quiconque prend des personnes en otage et il exhortait tous ceux et celles qui, dans le monde entier, détenaient des otages à les libérer. Bien qu'elle ne fût pas directement reliée à l'enlèvement d'un chercheur religieux libanais par Israël, la résolution a été adoptée le jour même où les fidèles de cet ecclésiastique ont affirmé avoir exécuté le lieutenant-colonel William Higgins, un officier américain servant dans les forces américaines au Liban. En apprenant la mort du militaire américain, le Conseil s'est dit profondément courbé et a exigé la libération de tous les otages et de toutes les personnes ayant été enlevées.

Le 27 juillet, le Conseil a tourné son attention vers l'Amérique centrale. Changement leur politique, les États-Unis ont appuyé une résolution qui demandait la dissolution des forces *contras* au Nicaragua, en tant qu'élément du plan de paix en Amérique centrale. Au cours des dernières années, les États-Unis avaient empêché tout débat sur cette question. Ils ont changé de cap parce que la résolution exhortait tous les pays à interrompre toute aide militaire aux forces de guérilla dans la région, ce qui faisait indirectement allusion au conflit salvadorien. La pays a continué d'accorder une aide humanitaire aux *contras*.

Onze jours après le vote, les cinq présidents centrafricains ont décidé, à la surprise de tous, d'appuyer la démobilisation des *contras*. Dès lors, des troupes onusiennes devaient surveiller le processus et protéger la frontière honduricaïne et les expéditions illégales d'armes. Toute opération de ce genre nécessitera la sanction du Conseil de sécurité, organe au sein duquel les États-Unis ont un droit de veto. □

— TREVOR ROWE



## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

L'INSTITUT  
SE DONNE  
UN NOUVEAU  
CAP

À la fin du premier trimestre 1989, nous sommes en train de définir une orientation claire pour l'avenir.

En tant que nouveau Directeur général, j'ai profité de chaque occasion possible pour consulter mes collègues du conseil et les membres du personnel au sujet de l'expérience acquise avant mon arrivée, et j'ai entrepris un programme de consultations extérieures pour découvrir la perspective la plus équilibrée possible. Ainsi, je me suis entretenu avec les médias et d'autres interlocuteurs, j'ai tenu des discussions avec de petits groupes, et j'ai assisté à des séances de compte rendu, dans toutes les régions du pays, rencontrant de cette manière des Canadiens et Canadiennes de divers milieux qui suivent le travail de l'Institut et utilisent ses services.

Après d'autres consultations internes (auxquelles tout le personnel de l'Institut a participé), le conseil a examiné et adopté un ensemble d'orientations à moyen terme pour l'Institut, à sa réunion de deux jours à la mi-juin. Ces orientations ont permis de faire le pont entre le passé et l'avenir, car ce fut la dernière occasion pour le président fondateur et plusieurs autres distingués directeurs quittant le conseil de résumer leurs impressions et leurs idées. Les paragraphes qui suivent présentent sommairement nos principales conclusions.

### OUT D'ABORD, LE «CONTEXTE RÉEL» DANS

lequel l'Institut continue d'exercer son mandat d'abord, LE «CONTEXTE RÉEL» DANS lequel l'Institut continue d'exercer son mandat, à savoir «accroître la connaissance et la compréhension des questions relatives à la paix et à la sécurité internationales», est aujourd'hui rempli de défis, et la situation ne risque pas de changer de sitôt. L'extraordinaire amplification des relations Est-Ouest et les perspectives de progrès aux chapitres de la limitation des armements et du règlement des conflits engendrent *plus* de travail pour l'Institut et ses collaborateurs, et non moins. Toutes les questions «classiques» sont encore à l'ordre du jour, mais il nous faut aussi nous attacher à la tâche énorme et envahissante qui consistera à contribuer au travail de nouvelles institutions, à participer à des initiatives visant à résoudre les conflits et à en réduire le nombre partout dans le monde, et à faire face à de nouvelles menaces pesant sur la sécurité internationale — les changements climatiques d'envergure planétaire, par exemple. Pareil programme d'action pourrait facilement entraîner une surcharge

de travail, ou une diffusion et une dilution des efforts, c'est pourquoi l'Institut a cerné un certain nombre de domaines où il concentrera ses efforts dans le cadre d'une stratégie quinquennale souplée, tout en continuant l'analyse de thèmes plus généraux et en répondant aux questions soulevées à leur égard.

Le conseil a également convenu que, vu le mandat précédemment et les ressources que le Parlement et de faire des choix judicieux dans toutes ses entreprises, surtout s'il veut assurer de la «faire des études et proposer des idées et politiques». Autre principe de base, l'Institut continuera de collaborer avec toute une gamme d'autres institutions, de groupes et de particuliers pour réaliser ses objectifs clés, en stimulant et en finançant des activités appropriées de recherche, d'information et d'éducation. L'Institut se charge aussi de rendre les analyses sur la paix et la sécurité internationales accessibles à un public intéressé beaucoup plus vaste, aux décideurs et aux intervenants façonnant l'opinion, tant au Canada qu'à l'étranger. Afin d'atteindre cet objectif, il faut entretenir des relations de travail énergiques et professionnelles avec les médias qui jouent un rôle clé lorsqu'il s'agit de diffuser les connaissances et de favoriser la compréhension de ces thèmes avant-gardistes. Nous continuerons de surveiller l'évolution de la conjoncture dans tous ces domaines, de répondre aux questions soulevées à leur égard et de conserver un réseau de référence, chacun de nos chercheurs principaux s'occupant d'un secteur en particulier. L'Institut se souciera aussi de rester en communication avec le plus grand public possible grâce, notamment, à des instruments tels que le *Guide annuel*, le programme rationalisé de publications et les efforts dynamiques de diffusion déployés par les services d'information, par l'entremise des bibliothèques, des écoles et d'autres institutions. Au cours des deux à cinq prochaines années, l'Institut se concentrera *intensément* sur six grands thèmes-cadres :

la non-prolifération des armes de destruction massive;

la politique du Canada en matière de défense et de sécurité;

les mesures à prendre pour renforcer les systèmes internationaux d'établissement, de maintien et d'édification de la paix;

la création, le maintien et l'utilisation de réseaux d'experts s'intéressant à des conflits régionaux, particuliers, ou à des conflits potentiels;

### — BERNARD WOOD

□ influence mondiale.

Le renforcement de la coopération et de la sécurité internationales dans l'Arctique; l'étude de nouvelles menaces et de nouvelles formes pour promouvoir la sécurité internationale.


À bien des égards, les travaux qui concernent ces questions se fonderont sur des activités déjà bien lancées ou soutenues par l'Institut, tandis que d'autres thèmes ont déjà fait l'objet de nouvelles initiatives. Ainsi, l'examen de la politique canadienne en matière de défense et de sécurité s'amorce avec pour joie de fond une étude commune sur l'avenir des forces terrestres de notre pays et la table ronde qui s'est tenue à l'intention des médias au début de mai sur la défense. Quant à la politique étrangère et le budget fédéral. Quant aux mécanismes internationaux pour renforcer la paix, il s'agit d'un thème découlant de divers projets sur le maintien de la paix, la médiation et le règlement des conflits. En ce qui concerne l'analyse des conflits régionaux, nous tirerons des leçons du grand projet mené sur Chypre au cours de l'an dernier. L'Institut adoptera ainsi des formules telles que celle ayant permis de réaliser le programme actuel relatif aux élections et à la transition à un régime de paix en Namibie. L'approfondissement du thème de la coopération et de la sécurité dans l'Arctique supposera le regroupement de nombreuses études et l'établissement d'un vaste réseau national et international d'experts sur la question. De nouvelles voies vers la sécurité internationale font déjà l'objet d'un projet réalisé sous contrat par une équipe multi-universitaire.

En vertu de son mandat, l'Institut est censé étudier les questions relatives à la paix et la sécurité internationales «d'un point de vue canadien», mais il ne faut pas voir là un motif pour justifier un nationalisme étroit. En fait, notre programme doit plutôt être vaste et novateur, vu l'envergure mondiale des intérêts et des contributions potentielles du Canada, ainsi que ses ressources et les domaines qui excitent la curiosité de sa population. Par conséquent, pour décider de l'orientation de ses propres travaux analytiques et éducatifs, et de certains travaux qu'il entreprend avec d'autres, l'Institut cherchera plus explicitement à savoir comment le Canada pourra mieux renforcer la paix et la sécurité internationales à moyen terme. Le conseil et le personnel de l'Institut sont convaincus que ce sera en se spécialisant de la sorte que celui-ci pourra le mieux servir la communauté canadienne et acquiescer, grâce à ses travaux, une réputation et une

Bernard Wood est le Directeur général de l'Institut.

Parti sont issus de groupes sociaux aux attitudes silencieuses, y compris les femmes. Ils ne sont absolument pas disposés à renoncer à leur nouveau statut et ils continueront sans doute de lutter contre la résistance plutôt que de capituler devant elle. Avec un accroissement d'envergure de l'appui du communisme par le Pakistan sur la ligne de front, les forces de résistance de l'Union soviétique doivent être disposées à appuyer les processus représentatifs qui, de par leur nature même, conforteront clairement les communistes au statut d'une minorité. Moscou doit se tenir prête à insister pour que le régime Najibullah remette le pouvoir à un gouvernement provisoire si celui-ci est choisi à la faveur de processus fondés sur une représentation équitable. De la même manière, Washington manquera-t-il énormément de réalisme en attendant de Najibullah qu'il cède le pouvoir avant qu'un gouvernement d'unité nationale ait été choisi pour lui succéder. Beaucoup de représentants du gouvernement Bush doutent que les formules préconisées pour remédier pacifiquement à la situation communiste réussissent. Tous ces scénarios, font-ils valoir, supposent l'implication que l'infrastructure gouvernementale existant à Kaboul resterait en place, tout au moins au début. Il faudrait donc dissoudre toutes les forces armées, les corps de police et les services de renseignement, sans quoi ils renverseraient tout nouveau gouvernement. Il faut «repartir à zéro», comme le président Reagan le déclarait à une conférence de presse en novembre 1988.

De toute évidence, ce ne serait pas chose facile que de réorganiser les forces armées, la police et les services de renseignement ayant servi le régime Najibullah. Mais les dirigeants du nouveau régime auraient la force que leur conférerait la maîtrise de l'aide américaine, occidentale, onusienne et soviétique. Il est douteux que la discipline communiste subsiste très longtemps dans les services de sécurité, au milieu des réalignements politiques qui traitent de paix avec l'instauration d'un régime d'occupation



soviétique s'estompent, le nationalisme afghan se reflète sans doute, diluant et domestiquant peu à peu le communisme afghan.

À mon avis, une politique qui consisterait à «repartir à zéro» en Afghanistan comporterait des inconvénients moraux et politiques insupportables. Elle équivaudrait en effet à une lutte à mort, jusqu'au dernier Afghan, dans la poursuite peu judicieuse des objectifs géopolitiques attribués aux États-Unis, objectifs que ces derniers pourraient bien mieux atteindre par des moyens politiques et diplomatiques. □

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respectés qui pourraient former un gouvernement capable de se valoir l'appui populaire. L'ancien vice-premier ministre Abdul Samad Hamed, l'ancien ministre de la Justice Abdul Sitar Sitar, l'ancien ministre de l'Agriculture Abdoul Wakil et l'ancien vice-premier ministre Ali Ahmad Popal comptent parmi les nombreux dirigeants expérimentés qui n'ont pas versé dans l'extrémisme intégriste, n'ont eu aucun rapport avec l'accusation de corruption, contrairement à la plupart des chefs de l'Alliance.

On ne peut pas simplement souhaiter que le Parti communiste disparaisse comme par magie dans l'Afghanistan de l'après-guerre, mais ce

hané les régimes successifs à Kaboul, à dominer la politique anti-pachoune de son prédécesseur, en préconisant l'instauration d'un gouvernement afghan d'unité nationale qui ne serait dominé ni par les communistes, ni par les fondamentalistes. Les intérêts du Pakistan exigent un tel gouvernement, à-t-elle précisé en juin 1988, car «la continuation de la guerre civile signifie la présence permanente de 3 millions de réfugiés chez nous». Dans un entretien accordé à un journal *The Nation* de Lahore, elle a fait une mise en garde plus explicite au sujet de tout effort qui viserait à installer à Kaboul un gouvernement satellite; ce serait la risquer d'aliéner les Pachounes : «Il est dangereux d'avancer sur la voie d'un grand Pakistan, car cela encourageait la revendication d'un grand Afghanistan» chez les Pachounes des deux côtés de la frontière.

Quand Mme Bhutto s'est rendue à Washington en juin, elle a exhorté les États-Unis à rechercher une solution politique à la guerre civile afghane en menant des négociations avec l'Union soviétique. Le gouvernement Bush a essayé de gagner la résistance une autre chance de renverser militairement le régime de Kaboul cet été et cet automne. Cependant, les porte-parole de Washington s'impénitent de plus en plus face aux piètres résultats militaires obtenus par la résistance jusqu'ici et à l'incapacité du gouvernement en exil d'élargir ses appuis. Si le régime de Kaboul est toujours en place à la fin des combats en octobre, ces porte-parole s'attendent à des démarcations plus poussées des divers intervenants pour trouver une solution politique.

Comment expliquer l'endurance manifestée par les forces communistes dans la bataille de Jalalabad ? Certes, le régime de Kaboul dispose de forces actives, contrairement à la résistance. Autre facteur militaire auquel on peut attribuer les pitoyables résultats obtenus jusqu'ici par la résistance dans les combats de Jalalabad : les rebelles n'ont pas l'expérience de la guerre classique. Mais un autre élément important et souvent oublié réside dans le fait que le Parti communiste compte dans ses rangs 40 000 militants endurcis et très motivés qui se perçoivent comme des nationalistes et des «modernisateurs» représentant la réforme que le roi Amanullah avait en vain tenté d'opérer entre 1919 et 1929. À l'occasion d'une visite à Kaboul en 1984 et pendant des réunions avec des dirigeants communistes par la suite, je me suis fait rappeler que le dévouement et le sentiment patriotique ne sont pas l'apanage des combattants de la résistance.

La rareté que représentait le soutien pakistanais et qui colle désormais au régime en exil de Peshawar a renforcé ce sentiment patriotique à Kaboul et permis aux communistes de rationner leurs états de service des dix dernières années où ils ont collaboré avec les forces d'occupation soviétiques. De nombreux militants du





les ressources allouées aux recherches spatiales

n'ont pas été touchées.

Dans son énoncé de politique, M. Beatty

reconnaissait l'importance de l'espace «qui sera

exploité sans cesse davantage à l'apogée d'objec-

tifs de défense nationale». Il annonçait que le

gouvernement avait autorisé des programmes de

recherche pour étudier des systèmes spatiaux

radars ou à infrarouge qui permettraient de dé-

tecker et de poursuivre les avions et les missiles

de croisière. Ces dispositifs spatiaux remplaceraient

radars terrestres du Système d'alerte du Nord, qui

deviendrait donc vétuste vers la fin du siècle.

MAIS LE VÉRIFIABLE ÉNONCÉ DE POLITIQUE CONCER-

nant le programme spatial militaire se retrouve

dans un document interne rendu public par le minis-

tère de la Défense nationale en juillet 1987, quel-

ques semaines après le dépôt du Livre blanc. C'est

dans ce document que les militaires précisent

leurs besoins techniques et stratégiques. Ils souli-

gent les trois principaux objectifs du programme :

■ permettre au Canada de respecter ses engage-

ments en matière de défense en utilisant la

technologie spatiale lorsque cette mesure est

appropriée et rentable;

■ favoriser l'utilisation de l'espace à des fins

pacifiques;

■ contribuer à l'économie canadienne.

Les militaires estiment que «si le Canada ne

s'engage pas suffisamment dans le domaine spa-

tial, il s'imposera des limites qui seront domi-

nables pour sa sécurité» et que «la gamme

de options militaires qui s'offriront dans l'avenir

pourrait être considérablement réduite, ce qui

risque de nuire aux intérêts canadiens en matière

de sécurité et de souveraineté».

La Défense nationale veut aller plus loin que le

respect des engagements envers l'OTAN et le

NORAD; en se dotant d'une infrastructure

spatiale, elle pourra rendre les forces armées

canadiennes totalement ou partiellement indépen-

dantes. Il n'est pas question d'une présence

armée mais d'une utilisation passive de l'espace.

Enfin, le secteur de la recherche et du développe-

ment (R et D) à la Défense nationale accorde

beaucoup d'importance à la politique gouver-

nementale qui veut offrir des retombées

économiques aux entreprises canadiennes.

Pour établir la présence canadienne dans l'espace

est très ambitieux. Les domaines d'intérêt des

militaires sont les suivants : la surveillance, les

communications, la navigation, la recherche et le

carottage et enfin, les vols spatiaux habités.

En 1986-1987, le ministère de la Défense na-

tionale a débouqué 46 millions pour la technolo-

gie du radar spatial et 48 millions pour celle des

circuitus rapides à ondes millimétriques. Ces deux

programmes de recherche, qui dureront cinq à

sept ans, fourniront suffisamment d'informa-

tion pour que les autorités compétentes puissent pren-

dre une décision quant à la nécessité de s'engager

à plus long terme dans ces deux domaines.

Le programme des radars spatiaux vise à mettre

en œuvre un système de surveillance des activités

aériennes, terrestres, maritimes et sous-marines.

Quant au programme

de communications à

ondes millimétriques, il

est d'une grande impor-

tance pour les forces ar-

mées. Pour les Forces

canadiennes, il est capital

de déployer un réseau de

communications sûr,

efficace et indépendant

afin d'assurer la liaison

entre leurs unités dans le

monde entier, notamment

à Chypre, en Europe et

au Moyen-Orient. Ac-

tuellement, le MDN doit

louer des lignes passant

par des satellites comme

ceux de la série ANIK C

et bientôt E, et il ne dis-

pose d'aucun satellite

militaire, contrairement

aux États-Unis.

Enfin, les militaires

sont engagés dans une

multitude de programmes tels que la moderni-

sation complète de tout le système de communi-

cation des forces armées, l'accès au réseau

américain NAVSTAR/GPS, le système SRSAT

de recherche et de sauvetage, la mise au point de

mesures de sécurité pour les satellites ANIK E, etc.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale ne dis-

pose pas d'un commandement unifié de l'espace

comme c'est le cas aux États-Unis. Sa Direction

été dissoute l'été dernier. Il n'y a aucun bureau

qui coordonne la politique militaire spatiale

comme le fait maintenant l'Agence spatiale dans

le secteur civil. Toutefois, il ne fait aucun doute

que la Défense nationale devra d'ici quelques

années se doter d'une pareille structure.

La part des spécialistes sont cependant

d'avis qu'au rythme où vont les choses, le budget

militaire spatial pourrait dépasser 150 millions de

dollars par an d'ici peu, même si l'on tient compte

du fait que le Canada ne fabrique pas ses propres

technologies de surveillance, de communication et de

navigation. Si, au contraire, le MDN reçoit le feu

vert pour ses ambitieux projets, ce budget pour-

rait facilement atteindre les 400 millions par an

d'ici la fin du siècle.

Il y a PRÉSENTEMENT PEU DE LIENS ENTRE LE PRO-

gramme civil et le programme militaire, sinon

les discussions qui se déroulent au Comité Inter-

ministériel de l'espace qui regroupe tous les inter-

venants gouvernementaux dans le domaine spa-

tial. Toutefois, deux questions viennent à l'esprit

lorsque l'on pense au futur. Va-t-on assister à une

libéralisation du programme civil comme c'est le

cas aux États-Unis ? Notre collaboration avec

notre puissant voisin du Sud va-t-elle nous en-

traîner dans cette direction ? Aux États-Unis, le

budget de la NASA est limité à 10 milliards de

dollars US par an tandis que celui concernant les

activités militaires spatiales frise les 15 milliards.

La comparaison ne peut pas encore être faite

au Canada, mais d'ici une dizaine d'années,

l'essorlement du

programme civil et le

lancement d'un vigo-

reux programme

militaire pourraient

deboucher sur une

politique spatiale «à

l'américaine».

La collaboration entre

les États-Unis et le Ca-

nada se retrouve à deux

niveaux : institutionnel et

privé. Dans le premier cas, le

Canada est lié aux États-Unis par

de nombreux accords militaires

et techniques intéressants le

NORAD, les systèmes de com-

munications et de navigation mili-

taires et la station orbitale. Lors

des négociations tenues à la signa-

ture d'une entente l'an dernier entre

les États-Unis et ses par-

tenaires européens, japonais

et canadiens, il a été con-

venu de construire cette

station pour des utilisations

pacifiques malgré les

objections du Pentagone qui ne voulait exclure

aucune option militaire. Toutefois, l'entente

ne spécifie pas quelles sont les activités

militaires interdites. De plus, les Américains

peuvent faire ce qu'ils veulent dans une très

grande partie de la station puisqu'ils en

possèdent 70 p. 100.

Du côté privé, l'industrie spatiale canadienne

exporte 70 p. 100 de sa production qui est

intégrée à toute une gamme de produits améri-

cains, tant civils que militaires. Advenant le

lancement du programme spatial militaire cana-

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Mise en orbite

La mise en orbite d'un satellite

est une opération complexe

qui nécessite une grande

précision et une grande

coordination entre les

différents services

impliqués. Le diagramme

illustre le processus de

lancement et de mise en

orbite d'un satellite

militaire. Le satellite est

lancé par un lanceur

et se dirige vers l'orbite

prévue. Le diagramme

montre également la

position du satellite une

fois qu'il est en orbite

autour de la Terre.

Le diagramme est une

représentation simplifiée

du processus réel.

Il est destiné à illustrer

le principe de la mise en

orbite d'un satellite

militaire.

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Le diagramme



# À LA RECHERCHE D'UNE POLITIQUE DE L'ESPACE

Le gouvernement canadien devra faire un choix entre le programme spatial civil et le programme spatial militaire. *Qu'il emportera ?*

PAR JOCELYN COULON

La révolution spatiale qui le propulsera au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, grâce à une foule de programmes spatiaux, civils et militaires, actuellement en marche on sur les planches à dessins des scientifiques canadiens. Cela rendra possible le développement des communications civiles et militaires, la télédétection, la surveillance du territoire et l'avancement des sciences spatiales liées au développement économique, technologique et médical.

Huitième puissance spatiale du monde, le Canada devra toutefois faire des choix importants au début du siècle prochain. Ses activités spatiales civiles vont plafonner d'ici quelques années alors que les activités militaires pourraient bien prendre une part grandissante du budget spatial canadien. Le risque d'une militarisation du programme spatial n'est pas écarté, même si l'acte demeure assez lointain et sujet aux aléas de la politique internationale.

Le gouvernement consacrera quelque 3 milliards de dollars au programme civil d'ici l'an 2000. En mars dernier, il a créé l'Agence spatiale canadienne pour coordonner toutes les activités spatiales civiles qui était dispersées dans une demi-douzaine de ministères et d'instituts de recherche. Sur le plan militaire, c'est le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) qui s'occupe d'un minuscule programme spatial. Dans l'enfance de l'âge, ce programme est appelé à se développer considérablement si les militaires obtiennent ce qu'ils veulent.

Depuis le lancement du satellite *Alouette* en 1962, le Canada a surtout exercé des activités civiles en matière spatiale. La période faste des années 1960 et 1970, où huit satellites ont été mis en orbite et où l'industrie spatiale se développait au taux de 50 p. 100 par an, a été suivie d'un déclin pendant plusieurs années. Toutefois, le programme civil canadien a repris son envol à la fin des années 1980 avec le lancement de trois grands projets et d'une demi-douzaine d'autres de moindre importance. Selon un vaste plan élaboré par le gouvernement Mulroney en 1986, l'Ontario dépensera plus de 3 milliards de dollars d'ici l'an 2000 pour sa participation à la station orbitale américaine, à un système mobile de télécommunications (M-SAT) et à un satellite de télédétection avec un radar à antenne synthétique (RADARSAT) qui permettra de transmettre et de recevoir des signaux sur toute la planète, par temps nuageux ou dans l'obscurité. Le plan du

gouvernement fédéral inclut plusieurs autres projets à réaliser en collaboration avec l'Europe, le Japon, les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Dans les années 1980, le Canada a dépensé en moyenne quelque 160 millions de dollars par an pour ses activités spatiales civiles. Cette somme devrait atteindre 230 millions de dollars dans les années 1990. Le Canada reste loin derrière la France (1 milliard), le Japon (900 millions) et les États-Unis (10 milliards). Selon les données du ministère d'État chargé des Sciences et de la Technologie, 37 p. 100 du budget du programme civil sera consacrée à la station orbitale, 35 p. 100 à RADARSAT, 10 p. 100 à M-SAT et 18 p. 100 aux autres programmes.

L'ÉLEMENT CENTRAL DU PROGRAMME CIVIL EST LA participation canadienne à la station orbitale américaine, projet lancé par le président Reagan en 1984. Les Américains ont invité le Canada, le Japon et les pays membres de l'Agence spatiale européenne à participer à cette entreprise qui verra l'installation, entre 1995 et 1998, d'une base permanente dans l'espace, gérée par huit astronautes. Après trois ans de négociations, l'Ontario s'est engagé, en avril 1988, à investir 1,2 milliard de dollars pour une période de quinze ans dans un programme qui devrait coûter au total 40 milliards. Les États-Unis assumeront 69 p. 100 des coûts, l'Europe 18 p. 100, le Japon 10 p. 100 et le Canada 3 p. 100. Le Canada construira un centre d'entretien et de réparation mobile pour la station orbitale. Le centre sera équipé d'un nouveau bras *Canadarm*, déjà installé sur les nouvelles américaines, qui manipulera les satellites. En plus, un astronaute canadien travaillera six mois à tous les deux ans à bord de la station. Après plusieurs années de négociations, tous les partenaires liés à la station orbitale ont signé l'an dernier une entente définissant leur participation. La conclusion d'un accord bûit sur les conditions apposées par les Américains sur les aspects militaires des travaux à bord de la station. Nous y reviendrons plus loin.

Si le programme spatial civil est bien connu et largement accepté par la population canadienne, les activités militaires spatiales du pays restent obscures. En fait, elles sont encore très embryonnaires. Tout cela devrait changer dans quelques années lorsque le ministère de la Défense nationale aura terminé les multiples études qu'il mène dans les domaines des communications, de

la surveillance et de l'alerte. Le gouvernement devra ensuite prendre une décision pour libérer des fonds importants afin de doter le pays d'un véritable programme spatial militaire. Longtemps négligée au profit des activités civiles, l'utilisation militaire de l'espace est devenue une nouvelle préoccupation du gouvernement depuis le début des années 1980. Pourtant, les militaires canadiens ne découvrent pas l'espace; ils le redécouvrent. John Kirton, de l'Université de Toronto, écrit qu'à la fin des années 1950, la mise en place du programme spatial canadien était d'inspiration militaire. Le satellite *Alouette* a été construit au Centre de recherches sur les télécommunications de défense. L'universitaire canadien souligne que «jusqu'en 1966, les programmes spatiaux canadiens organisés sous l'égide des militaires représentaient 41 p. 100 du total des dépenses canadiennes dans ce domaine». Après une période où, pour des raisons politiques et commerciales, le programme spatial a été «démilitarisé», l'intérêt pour l'aspect militaire a refait surface. Représentant les réflexions exprimées par le Comité de gestion de la Défense en mai 1974, le Comité spécial du Sénat sur la défense nationale (1985) et le Livre blanc sur la défense (1987) ont relancé l'idée d'un programme militaire spatial indépendant. Après avoir tenu de longues audiences sur la défense (1987) ont relancé l'idée d'un programme militaire spatial indépendant.

Après avoir tenu de longues audiences sur la défense aérieenne du territoire canadien en 1985, les sénateurs ont recommandé au gouvernement de «créer son propre programme militaire spatial, de consacrer aux fonctions de surveillance et de communications nécessaires, la sécurité nationale». Les sénateurs ont établi, à partir de témoignages recueillis, que la Défense nationale aurait besoin de huit à douze satellites pour effectuer le travail requies et que le gouvernement devrait consacrer à ce programme au moins 150 millions de dollars par an pendant cinq ans, et 350 millions au cours des années 1990. Le rapport du Sénat canadien n'est pas resté lettre morte, puisque le ministère de la Défense nationale en a repris l'essentiel dans son Livre blanc sur la défense publié il y a deux ans. En juin 1987, un ambitieux programme de réarmement et de réalignement stratégique était annoncé par le Ministre, M. Perrin Beatty. La nouvelle politique de défense reposait sur l'acquisition d'une flotte de dix à douze sous-marins nucléaires. En avril dernier, le gouvernement a annoncé l'annulation du programme des sous-marins et une réduction de près de 3 milliards de dollars dans les dépenses de défense. Toutefois,

phère terrestre. Cet organisme pourrait, dans certains cas, prendre des décisions à la majorité (en cinq grandes puissances) et serait habilité à imposer les sanctions économiques obligatoires recommandées par la Cour internationale de justice sur «... les biens produits dans des conditions néfastes pour l'environnement». Cette autorité aurait également le pouvoir de recueillir des fonds afin de dédommager les pays pour lesquels l'observation des normes représenterait un fardeau injuste.

Ce nouveau «mode de pensée» de la part des gouvernements au sujet de la relation entre l'environnement et l'économie trouve des échos dans les résultats du sommet que le Groupe des sept vient de tenir à Paris en juillet. Les tiers du comité notamment l'accent sur les dilemmes transmutiques final est consacré à ce thème, et l'on y reste du monde) font face lorsque l'il s'agit de trouver des moyens d'améliorer la qualité de vie sans pour autant ajouter aux pressions s'exerçant déjà sur l'écologie planétaire. Les chefs du Groupe des sept, tout en évitant de citer des cas particuliers sur tous ces plans. Peut-être avons-nous, pour une fois, affiché à une de ces questions qui donneront à une puissance moyenne l'occasion de prendre les devants, d'autant plus que le Canada bénéficie d'une bonne crédibilité en tant que membre du Groupe des Sept et en tant qu'ami du tiers-monde (en dépit du récent budget de M. Wilson).

Mais il s'agit là de problèmes extrêmement complexes, et la conjoncture évolue très rapidement. Il va falloir mettre au point de nouveaux mécanismes pour que chaque pays puisse adopter, à la table des négociations, une position nationale, étant donné que les questions tendent à relever de la compétence de plusieurs ministères. Une fois le dialogue engagé, il va être difficile de résister à la tentation de rallonger l'ordre du jour, nous assisterons alors à une réédition du dialogue Nord-Sud qui a traîné en longueur pendant 1980, avant d'aboutir à une série de réunions peu concluantes. Mais cette fois, il est certain que nous avons plus d'atouts en main : une conscience du temps qui passe, les occasions que nous offrent la *glasnost* et l'ouverture récente de l'Europe de l'Est et, enfin, une opinion publique inquiète, mais qui se mobilise facilement. □



Nicholas Winton

déjà été mis de l'avant, dont une augmentation non négligeable de ce que l'on appelle les «trans-formations de la dette en remises en nature», ou encore une version adaptée du plan Brady pour permettre aux débiteurs de rembourser une partie de leur dette aux taux du marché s'ils acceptent de modifier leurs politiques et d'adopter des procédures pour favoriser une utilisation plus rationnelle de l'énergie, l'adoption de meilleures méthodes d'exploitation forestière, un accès élargi aux services de planification familiale, etc.

L'une ou l'autre de ces propositions, ou une combinaison de plusieurs d'entre elles, pourrait générer de très importantes sommes d'argent ou l'ordre d'au moins 20 à 30 milliards de dollars par année). Les projets ont maintenant atteint le stade de la discussion. L'ancien ministre néerlandais de l'Environnement a été chargé par son gouvernement de rédiger un ensemble définitif de propositions en prévision de la prochaine réunion préparatoire sur le climat, qui doit se tenir en octobre aux Pays-Bas.

PARALLÈLEMENT À CES PROPOSITIONS DE FINANCE-ment, certains ont réclamé une réforme des institutions du système international, laquelle mettrait à ce dernier de faire face à la nature transdisciplinaire de la menace. Nombreux sont ceux qui ont le sentiment qu'aucun des organismes des Nations-Unies n'a de mandat suffisamment vaste pour pouvoir s'attaquer à tous les problèmes. Les changements demandés vont d'un renforcement du rôle du Bureau du Secrétaire général (pour que ce dernier puisse réellement coordonner les activités du système des Nations-Unies), à un renouvellement ou un élargissement (pour l'environnement, en passant par des propositions comme celle de Maurice Strong, qui préconise de revoir la Charte des Nations-Unies pour faire renaître de ses cendres le Conseil de tutelle, désormais moribond, en l'investissant d'une nouvelle mission : surveiller la Terre. D'autres voudraient redéfinir la notion de «sécurité» pour renforcer les attributions du Conseil de sécurité. Ce sentiment d'urgence a conduit les gouvernements français, norvégien et néerlandais, lors des préparatifs du récent sommet de La Haye, à envisager la création d'une agence supranationale qui serait chargée de préserver l'atmos-

La déforestation dans les régions tropicales contribue à la production de CO<sub>2</sub>, ce qui aggrave le problème du réchauffement planétaire; de plus, la croissance de nouvelles forêts pourrait jouer le rôle de «trappe» emprisonnant une partie du gaz carbonique produit par la combustion. Depuis que les groupes écologistes occidentaux ont posé la question de la forêt tropicale humide, il est certain que les gouvernements du Brésil et d'autres pays abritent ce type de végétation ne feront pas grand-chose sans une contrepartie quelconque, qu'ils puissent «vendre» à leurs propres électeurs.

IL RÉSULTE DE TOUT CELA QUE LES GENS RÉCLAMENT plus que jamais une réforme du système international, et l'on en vient à ce que beaucoup ont qualifié de «compromis planétaire». Personne ne sait encore vraiment quelle forme prendrait ce compromis ou sous quelle égide il serait mis au point, mais voici quels en seraient apparemment les grands traits : les émissions de gaz provoquant l'effet de serre (dont les CFC) feraient l'objet de normes, qui imposeraient aux pays industrialisés des réductions dracونيennes et permettraient aux pays du tiers-monde certaines augmentations. Il faudrait modifier en profondeur les conditions des transferts de technologie pour que les pays en développement puissent utiliser, des leur commercialisation, les techniques non polluantes les plus récentes mises au point pour produire de l'énergie. Et dernière caractéristique de ce «compromis», il y aurait d'importants nouveaux transferts de ressources du Nord au Sud.

La conférence de Toronto a préconisé la création d'un «Fonds mondial de l'atmosphère terrestre», pour aider les pays en développement à limiter les répercussions des changements climatiques et à s'y adapter part des stratégies de développement viable. Diverses propositions ont été formulées relativement à l'édification de ce Fonds. Le premier ministre de la Norvège, Mme Brundtland, a proposé de fixer pour tous un pourcentage de 1,1 p. 100 du PNB. D'autres ont émis l'idée d'un «impôt sur le gaz carbonique» : différentes sortes de combustibles seraient alors taxées selon leur tendance à produire du gaz carbonique.

Lors de réunions récentes sur la dégradation de la couche d'ozone, les participants ont également reconnu la nécessité de fournir aux pays en développement les moyens financiers voulus pour renoncer plus facilement aux catégories nocives de CFC. La *US Environmental Protection Agency* (EPA) envisage de mettre en place un système comparable à celui proposé par le président Bush pour lutter contre les pluies acides. Le système consisterait, pour les États-Unis, à vendre aux Certains observateurs ont également souligné la nécessité de lier les mesures prises pour faire face au changement climatique avec les plans d'ajustement de la dette. À l'heure qu'il est, le monde en développement verse au Nord 43 milliards de dollars de plus qu'il n'en reçoit sous forme d'aide extérieure et d'apport de capitaux privés. Comment, dans ces conditions, s'attendre à ce que ces pays puissent infliger d'autres privations à leurs habitants au nom de la lutte contre les modifications du climat ? Divers plans ont



# LE MARCHÉ DU SIÈCLE

Face au risque très réel d'un effondrement du système environnemental mondial, même les plus entêtés des chefs de gouvernement s'affairent maintenant à trouver une solution.

PAR DAVID RUNNALLS

**P**L'année de l'environnement, la revue géoscientifique américaine, a fait de la Terre la planète de l'année (à se demander laquelle est sur presqu'un an prochain), et a consacré

questions d'environnement, mais aussi à la dimension internationale de l'environnement. Pour couronner le tout, *Fortune*, le concurrent plus huppé de *Time*, a dit de 1988 que c'était «l'année choisie par la Terre pour riposter».

Replaçons les choses dans leur contexte. On se souviendra que dix ans à peine ont passé depuis que Mme Thatcher a été élue premier ministre pour la première fois, avec une plate-forme électorale dont on pouvait dire qu'elle faisait large-

ment fi de l'environnement naturel et de ceux qui pour la première fois, avec une plate-forme électorale dont on pouvait dire qu'elle faisait large-ment fi de l'environnement naturel et de ceux qui s'en souciaient; au moment de son élection en 1980, Ronald Reagan était persuadé que les problèmes de pollution étaient dus aux arbres; et en 1984, au Canada, le gouvernement a pris le pouvoir avec la certitude de pouvoir réduire considérablement le budget et le personnel du ministère fédéral de l'Environnement, et cela en toute impunité. La Commission Nielsen a même envisagé sérieusement la suppression pure et simple du Ministère. À l'autre extrémité de l'échiquier politique, l'URSS continuait de prétendre que les problèmes environnementaux étaient essentiellement attribuables à la structure et au fonctionnement du capitalisme, et qu'ils étaient pour ainsi dire inexistant dans le système soviétique.

Tout a changé en l'espace d'une extraordinaire semaine du mois d'octobre, l'an dernier, avec le petit laïus sur l'environnement prononcé tout à tour par chacun des «acteurs» de la distribution suivante : George Bush (rappelez-vous quand il a déclaré «avoir toujours été un défenseur de l'environnement»); Michael Wilson (devant nul autre instance que la Banque mondiale et le Fonds monétaire international); Édouard Charbonneau (qui a dit, devant l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies, que l'Union soviétique considérait l'évolution de l'environnement mondial comme étant de loin la menace la plus grave pesant sur sa sécurité nationale); jusqu'à la redoutable Margaret Thatcher, dite la Dame de fer, qui a déclaré devant la *Royal Society* que les changements atmosphériques constituaient sans aucun doute le plus grand défi que les milieux scientifiques aient à relever en cette fin de siècle.

Pourquoi les dirigeants politiques des pays occidentaux (et de plus en plus des pays de la Commission souligne en effet que, dans les dix prochaines années, quoi que nous fassions, la population du globe va doubler et que, pour nous, vêtir et loger les habitants actuels et les 5 milliards qui nous auront rejoints, il faudra une production économique de cinq à dix fois supérieure à celle d'aujourd'hui. Une expansion de cet ordre exercerait une telle pression sur les écosystèmes qu'aux dires de la Commission, l'environnement naturel serait en train de devenir un facteur susceptible de limiter sérieusement la croissance économique.

L'exemple le plus frappant de la «tristesse» des écosystèmes planétaires réside dans les modifications que nous provoquons de façon de plus en plus évidente dans les climats du monde. L'année dernière, à Toronto, les participants à la conférence sur le climat ont fait remarquer, avec un ton de gravité, la chose suivante : «... Nous pourrions connaître, au cours du siècle prochain, des modifications climatiques nettement plus rapides et plus importantes que dans les 5 000 dernières années; une évolution aussi accélérée provoquerait tant de perturbations que, tout compte fait, aucun pays ne pourrait probablement en tirer parti.»

Les participants étaient allusion aux changements qui se produiraient si la couche d'ozone protégeant la Terre continue de s'amincir; cette détérioration est causée par les fluorocarbures chlorés (CFC), couramment utilisés dans les aérosols, les dispositifs de réfrigération et l'industrie électronique. Ils pensaient également à l'«effet de serre», c'est-à-dire le fait que l'accumulation de bioxyde de carbone (ou gaz carbonique) et d'autres gaz provoquerait un réchauffement climatique planétaire et, parallèlement, d'importantes hausses du niveau des océans au cours des quarante prochaines années.

LES NÉGOCIATIONS SUR L'ZONE VONT BON TRAIN depuis qu'on a découvert en 1986, que la couche protectrice était percée au-dessus de l'Antarctique. En septembre 1987, une conférence sur ce thème a eu lieu au Canada et elle a débouché sur

La Chine et les autres pays en développement ne produisent qu'une petite partie de ce gaz. Les plans de développement choisis prévoient, à moyen terme, la construction de quelque 200 nouvelles centrales électriques alimentées au charbon. Rares projets d'expansion pourraient facilement neutraliser le moindre progrès qui dé-

dentale au chapitre de la production énergétique. les superpuissances, le Japon et l'Europe occi-

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La rédaction du protocole de Montréal, qui prévoit une réduction de 50 p. 100 de la consommation de CFC d'ici la fin du siècle. Alors que le protocole n'était même pas encore complètement en vigueur, les États se sont livrés à un véritable ballet diplomatique dont les faits saillants ont été les réunions de Londres et d'Helsinki, plus tôt cette année; ils ont préconisé l'arrêt de la production des substances incriminées d'ici l'an 2000.

Le Canada a également ouvert le débat sur le réchauffement de la planète, en accueillant à Toronto, les participants à la conférence de 1988 sur le climat. L'objectif fixé à cette occasion a été une réduction d'au moins 20 p. 100 des émissions de CO<sub>2</sub> d'ici 2005. La conférence a été suivie, en février dernier, d'une rencontre de juristes à Ottawa, et de réunions préparatoires en prévision de la prochaine grande conférence mondiale sur le climat, prévue pour 1990 (la date exacte n'a pas encore été fixée). On espère d'ici là disposer

Il devient de plus en plus évident, toutefois, que rien de tout cela n'est suffisant. La modification climatique est véritablement un problème mondial, qui appelle des solutions mondiales et, admettant la nécessité de supprimer les produits chimiques qui détruisent la couche d'ozone, les pays sont confrontés à un autre problème : comment aider les pays en développement à respecter les nouvelles normes ? Des pays comme la Chine et l'Inde nourrissent l'ambitieux projet de «démocratiser» le réfrigérateur dans leurs très nombreuses populations; c'est là un objectif difficilement concevable. Pourquoi devraient-ils, argument-t-ils, réduire ces plans ou remplacer par des substituts plus coûteux le frêlon non marché utilisé à l'heure actuelle dans les réfrigérateurs ?

Il se pose là un problème d'équité, d'autant plus aigu dans le contexte du réchauffement planétaire. À eux deux, les États-Unis et l'URSS produisent près de 40 p. 100 du gaz carbonique dégagé par les matières fossiles en combustion. La Chine et les autres pays en développement ne produisent qu'une petite partie de ce gaz. Les plans de développement choisis prévoient, à moyen terme, la construction de quelque 200 nouvelles centrales électriques alimentées au charbon. Rares projets d'expansion pourraient facilement neutraliser le moindre progrès qui dé-

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# L'ART DE TRANSFORMER LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DE L'URSS

En étudiant le discours des dirigeants soviétiques, on peut comprendre non seulement ce qui a changé mais aussi les motifs

des changements.

PAR PAUL MARANTZ

**J**à Mikhail Gorbatchev a tenu quelque peu de la schizophrénie. Il a de toute évidence séduit l'«imagination populaire. L'engouement pour «Gorby» et la «gorbatchévomanie» ont

balayé la majeure partie du monde occidental. Mais dans les corridors du pouvoir, la plupart des décideurs sont beaucoup plus prudents et sceptiques. Les sceptiques occidentaux aiment bien l'adage disant qu'un acte vaut mille belles paroles, et ils soutiennent que ni les actes ni les mois attribués à la politique étrangère soviétique ne prouvent hors de tout doute que M. Gorbatchev a rompu avec le passé de son pays.

D'autres sceptiques occidentaux déclarent que, même si le processus n'en est encore qu'à ses débuts et qu'il dépend de la survie de l'approche réformatrice de M. Gorbatchev, il revêt malgré tout une énorme importance pour l'orientation à venir de la politique étrangère soviétique et des relations Est-Ouest.

Que l'on ne comprime pas davantage à quel point M. Gorbatchev a déjà transformé la conduite de la politique étrangère de son pays atteste nettement de la rapidité avec laquelle les gens s'adaptent à de nouvelles circonstances et cessent d'être étonnés par l'extraordinaire. Imaginons un instant qu'en février 1986, quand M. Gorbatchev a pour la première fois préconisé l'adoption d'un «nouveau mode de pensée» en matière de politique internationale, qu'un observateur occidental sceptique ait voulu sonder le sérieux des intentions soviétiques. Supposons que cet observateur ait déclaré qu'il ne serait convaincu de l'authenticité des changements en Union soviétique qu'au moment où celle-ci aurait subi toute une série d'épreuves avec succès.

Les troupes soviétiques ont quitté l'Afghanistan; l'URSS a souscrit à l'option double-zéro proposée par les Américains pour l'élimination des forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire en Europe; le Kremlin a accepté que des inspections dans ses installations militaires; l'Union soviétique a commencé d'elle-même à réduire ses troupes et retirant 20 p. 100 de ses chars; Moscou a autorisé la légalisation de Solidarité et lui a permis de constituer un parti d'opposition librement élu au parlement polonois; l'URSS a exercé des pressions pour faire observer un règlement politique des conflits qui sévissaient au Cameroun et en Angola; le brouillage des stations de radio occidentales qui diffusaient jusqu'en URSS

a pris fin. Andreï Sakharov et des centaines d'autres prisonniers politiques ont été libérés; des articles rédigés par des experts et des décideurs occidentaux ont commencé à paraître assez régulièrement dans la presse soviétique; et les tentatives à critiquer ouvertement les politiques étrangères de Staline, Khrouchchev et Brejnev. Si quelque un avait voulu soumettre les intentions soviétiques à un examen aussi poussé en 1986, les soviétologues occidentaux auraient presque tous objecté que les critères proposés pour évaluer la politique soviétique étaient beaucoup trop rigoureux et qu'il y avait peu de chances pour que Moscou y satisfaisait dans l'avenir.

De plus, la nature de la politique étrangère soviétique, mais à certains égards, l'inverse est vrai. Après tout, certaines actions (par exemple, le retrait des troupes soviétiques de l'Afghanistan) peuvent résulter de raisons fort diverses. Un renversement de la politique antérieure peut, somme toute, n'être motivé que par une faiblesse temporaire et un désir de dupier l'ennemi, ou, à l'inverse, il peut traduire une réévaluation fondamentale d'hy-po-thèses antérieures et une authentique conviction que des formes nouvelles et plus coopératives d'interaction internationale sont désormais possibles et nécessaires. En étudiant le discours des chefs soviétiques, nous pouvons arriver à mieux saisir comment ils envisagent les questions de politique étrangère se posant à eux.

Si la pensée soviétique au sujet de la nature des rouages politiques internationaux a vraiment changé, alors les initiatives fondamentales des quatre dernières années ont beaucoup plus de chances d'avoir un effet durable. En revanche, si les dirigeants de l'URSS n'ont pas modifié leur

perception de la politique internationale, il est plus probable que l'évolution dont nous avons été témoin repose sur des considérations tactiques temporaires, de sorte qu'un retour en arrière pourrait se produire sur bien des plans dès que l'URSS aura surmonté ses difficultés actuelles.

Voilà pourquoi il faut prendre en compte les actes et les paroles pour discerner non seulement ce qui a changé, mais aussi pourquoi les changements se sont produits.

QUATRE GRANDES TENDANCES SONT EN TRAIN DE modifier les points de vue de l'URSS sur la politique internationale. Tout d'abord, les décideurs soviétiques comprennent maintenant beaucoup mieux à quoi correspond ce qu'on a appelé le «phénomène d'action-réaction» dans les relations Est-Ouest. Depuis toujours, les Soviétiques pensaient que la politique étrangère de l'Occident était dictée par la société de classes caractérisant le régime capitaliste. À leurs yeux, les États capitalistes nourrissaient une hostilité implacable à l'égard de l'URSS non pas à cause des politiques étrangères adoptées par cette dernière, mais en raison de ce qu'elle était, c'est-à-dire un État


socialiste dont l'existence même montrait aux travailleurs du monde qu'il y avait une solution de rechange à l'oppression capitaliste. Se détournant carrément de ce point de vue traditionnel, les porte-parole soviétiques reconnaissent maintenant qu'en grande partie, les actions soviétiques ont déterminé la politique occidentale et que, dans sa conduite, l'Ouest est motivé par une crainte réelle, et non simulée, de l'agression soviétique.

En corollaire, M. Gorbatchev et ses collègues ont reconnu que, si l'URSS veut ralentir la course aux armements et promouvoir des entreprises coopératives entre l'Est et l'Ouest, elle doit tout d'abord modifier les politiques que l'Occident estime menaçantes. Un article paru récemment dans la presse soviétique fait à cet égard une observation significative :

Nous sommes habitués à des motivations telles que «Nous sommes l'avant-garde du monde», «L'avenir nous appartient», ou «Nous serons victorieux à l'échelle de la planète, et ce sera un fait historique». Mais avons-nous songé à nous mettre à la place de ceux qui, selon nous, forment l'arrière-garde, à qui l'avenir n'appartient pas et qui, toujours d'après nous, sont condamnés à être oubliés par l'histoire et à périr? Que doivent-ils penser de nous?... Ce n'est pas par hasard que les peuples de l'Ouest pensent maintenant que l'URSS est un pays qui cherche à conquérir le

# La transition en Namibie

## Une table ronde internationale organisée par l'Institut



Tom Mbo

exactement combien de temps cela durera, vu le caractère explosif de la conjoncture politique en Afrique du Sud !

Pretoria aurait, dit-on, les moyens de fabriquer des armes nucléaires, et elle a maintenant amorcé un programme de mise au point de missiles balistiques. Les dirigeants blancs du pays ont déclaré à maintes reprises qu'ils comptent bien conserver leur position de fondamentalisme dominant dans la région. Le signe le plus évident et le plus inquiétant de cette détermination se manifeste dans la modernisation et la renforcement des bases des armées de terre et de l'air situées dans le nord, le long de la frontière séparant l'Afrique du Sud du Botswana et du Zimbabwe. Et certaines des unités noires expérimentées qui ont participé à la guerre sur la frontière namibienne ont été dépêchées dans cette région.

Quant à lui, le Zimbabwe a étoffé ses défenses contre l'Afrique du Sud en achetant de nouveaux chasseurs MIG de l'URSS. Ce serait vraiment tragique pour l'Afrique australe si le règlement final de la question namibienne devait déboucher, le long de la rivière Limpopo, sur des affrontements désastreux semblables à ceux qui, depuis dix ans, déchirent la frontière anglo-namibienne. □

Défense nationale, à Ottawa; Stephen Fanning, chef de l'unité de surveillance de la police civile du GANUP, à Windhoek; Gordon Fairweather, président de la Commission de l'immigration et du statut d'officiers politiques spéciales; Neil Haffey, chef de la mission d'observation du Canada, à Windhoek; Gwen Lister, rédactrice de la publication The Namibian, à Windhoek; et James Mutambirwa, du World Council of Churches.

Les paragraphes qui suivent sont extraits d'un compte rendu de l'Institut intitulé Le processus électoral en Namibie : une table ronde internationale. On peut se procurer tout le document de dix-neuf pages en s'adressant à l'Institut. Les passages présentés ici portent exclusivement sur le problème le plus pressant auquel la Namibie et l'ONU devront faire face au cours des prochains mois : voir à la tâche complexe consistant à organiser et à tenir des élections libres et équitables.

Un a proposé de compléter rapidement les bulletins de vote sur place, puis de les transporter sous bonne garde jusqu'à la capitale pour un deuxième décompte. Par ailleurs, il faudrait réduire le plus possible le délai qui s'écoulerait entre l'heure de fermeture des bureaux de vote et celle où les résultats seront annoncés. La plupart des participants ont dit croire que toutes ces mesures réduiraient effectivement les risques de fraude.

Les discussions menées pendant la table ronde ont permis de formuler une recommandation : créer un Conseil des élections qui comprendrait des représentants de l'AG, du RS et de chaque parti politique briguant les suffrages. Selon le groupe des observateurs du Commonwealth qui pointait d'un doigt un organisme semblable mis sur pied lors des élections au Zimbabwe, le Conseil constituerait une tribune où l'on pourrait formuler des plaintes et résoudre les difficultés. De nombreux participants se sont dits favorables à la mise sur pied d'un tel conseil en Namibie, surtout que l'idée de constituer une commission électoriale indépendante paraissait désormais peu probable. □

## Le jour des élections et immédiatement après

■ Pendant la période de transition vers l'indépendance, la Namibie est gouvernée par l'Afrique du Sud, par l'intermédiaire de l'Administrateur général (AG), normalement M. Louis Riegan. Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU a nommé son représentant spécial (RS), M. Moritz Ahlstrom, pour s'assurer qu'à chaque étape, le processus électoral en Namibie serait libre et équitable. Ces deux dignitaires ont pour mission de collaborer ensemble pour mettre en œuvre la résolution 435. Les détails de chaque étape du processus électoral doivent convenir d'un et à l'autre. Il s'agit là d'un processus nouveau.

Il y aura deux membres du personnel électoral du GANUP et deux politiques de ce dernier dans chaque bureau de vote. Sur les bulletins de scrutin figurent également les symboles de tous les partis politiques, de manière que tous les électeurs, y compris les analphabètes, puissent voter sans difficulté. Après avoir voté, chaque électeur se trempera une encree indélébile, de façon qu'il ne puisse pas voter de nouveau.

La présence d'observateurs étrangers le jour des élections constitue un élément important du système visant à garantir des élections équitables et libres. Un ordre de dressé une liste détaillée des conditions proches de remplir pour que le vote se déroule comme il se doit. Par exemple : Y a-t-il une liberté de mouvement suffisante ? Tous les membres du personnel électoral suivent-ils des lignes directrices uniformes ? Les bureaux de vote sont-ils faciles à trouver, même pour les électeurs analphabètes ? Existe-t-il une bonne méthode à suivre pour résoudre tout différend qui surgirait sur place ?

Les participants ont exprimé d'autres inquiétudes : une fois les bureaux de vote fermés, les observateurs étrangers devront se prêter à la tâche de transporter toutes les urnes électrices jusqu'à Windhoek pour le décompte n'accroître-t-il pas les risques de falsification ?

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E LONG DE L'AUTOROUTE droite comme une flèche qui mène à l'Owamboland, part-tout on aperçoit des landis de ciennes colonie allemande du Sud-Ouest africain. Un des nombreux auteurs qui ont essayé de définir l'existence troublée de cet immense désert habité par une minuscule population a écrit les mots suivants : «Quand Dieu a créé Hélas ! Il n'en a pas été ainsi, et le pays ne parviendra pas de sitôt à un tel anonymat. La principale cause de cette triste situation est une histoire mar-

temes, et des tentatives infructueuses de la part de la collectivité mondiale pour mettre de l'ordre dans tout cela. Le Sud-Ouest africain a été formé par suite de la dissection du continent noir par l'Europe au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Ce fut la première colonie de l'Allemagne, et celle-ci l'a dirigée d'une main de fer. «Je connais ces tribus africaines», écrivait le général prussien chargé de réprimer une rébellion en 1904, elles sont toutes les mêmes; elles ne respectent rien d'autre que la force ... Mon intention était et est toujours de recourir à la force avec une terreur brutale, voire avec férocité. Je balais les tribus rebelles dans un torrent de sang et d'argent. C'est seulement en semant de la sorte que nous pourrions faire grandir quelque chose de nouveau, quelque chose de stable.

L'Allemagne ayant perdu la Première Guerre mondiale, le territoire passa sous la coupe de la Société des Nations. L'Empire britannique, parlant de sa colonie voisine d'Afrique du Sud, occupa le territoire jusqu'en 1920, année où le mandat attribué par la Société des Nations marqua le début de l'histoire tortueuse de la Namibie. L'Afrique du Sud continua d'administrer le protectorat, mais c'était pour elle un tel fardeau qu'elle déclara au parlement qu'il s'agissait en fait d'un «éléphant blanc» que l'on ferait mieux de rendre à l'Allemagne. Entre autres choses, les Sud-Africains tentèrent de percevoir une taxe auprès des propriétaires de chiens, mais les autochtones virent là un acte de persécution. «S'il y a des chiens, pourquoi ne pas payer une taxe à l'égard de leurs chiens, pourquoi en garder-ils ?», raisonna un représentant de Pretoria. Une série de rébellions, attisées par l'insensibilité de l'administration sud-africaine, enflamma le pays jusqu'à ce que l'effondrement de la Société des Nations et l'éclatement de la Seconde Guerre mondiale plongent de nouveau des Nations-Unies, les puissances mondiales refusèrent de laisser l'Afrique du Sud annexer la Namibie.

Une déclaration célèbre (qui ne se réalisa que vingt-quatre ans plus tard, dans le cas de la Namibie) a été intégrée à la Charte de l'ONU. Elle énonce les principes régissant les Membres des Nations-Unies qui assument la responsabilité d'administrer «des territoires non autonomes» : ces pays «accèptent comme une mission sacrée l'obligation de favoriser dans toute la mesure du possible [la] prospérité [des habitants] ... et ... d'assurer, en respectant la culture des populations en question, leur progrès politique, économique et social, ainsi que le développement de leur instruction, de les traiter avec équité et de les protéger contre les abus». Agissant *a contrario*, le gouvernement sud-africain contesta en 1949 l'autorité de l'ONU en invoquant l'argument juridique selon lequel le mandat avait expiré avec l'effondrement de la Société des Nations. Un dépit d'une décision rendue par la Cour internationale de Justice et l'établissement qu'en dernière analyse, l'ONU exerçait encore le contrôle sur la Namibie, l'Afrique du Sud passa unilatéralement outre aux dispositions du mandat et commença à gouverner la Namibie comme si c'était un de ses

# NAMIBIE

## LA RENAISSANCE D'UNE NATION

PAR PATRICK NAGLE

*Avec des élections à l'automne, la collectivité internationale essaie de rectifier les abus commis dans le passé.*

La progression des territoires, la progression de l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud, puis en Namibie, amena l'opinion mondiale à se détourner de Pretoria. En 1966, l'ONU déclara que l'Afrique du Sud avait foulé son mandat au pied, ce qui rendait illégitime sa présence en Namibie. Pretoria réagit en créant des zones économiques blanches et des «homelands» noirs qui divisèrent le pays en fonction de la race, et elle fit respecter ce régime en installant des garnisons policières et militaires. La South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) se dressa contre cette oppression et entreprit une lutte armée de vingt-trois ans qui aboutira au début de novembre prochain avec la tenue d'élections pour la formation d'une assemblée constituante. Voilà qui fait de Sam Nujoma, chef de la SWAPO, un autre élément clef de l'avenir de la Namibie ! Pendant des années passées en exil, il a été le champion de la cause de l'indépendance namibienne, mais en dépit de cela, il n'est pas bien connu des gouvernements occidentaux, qui n'ont pas d'opinion précise à son sujet. On a jamais associé directement à Nujoma la tentative infructueuse que des guerilleros armés de la SWAPO ont faite pour s'infiltrer en Namibie après le début de la période de transition décrite par l'ONU le 1<sup>er</sup> avril, car il ne se trouvait pas à la base de départ en Angola quand la manœuvre de pénétration a commencé. On ne pourra mesurer qu'au lendemain des élections l'ampleur du dommage causé à la réputation de la SWAPO par la contre-attaque réussie de l'Afrique du Sud et par la campagne de propagande qui a suivi.

IL N'Y A PAS À DOUBTER QUE L'ALÉA POLITIQUE DE LA SWAPO REMPORTERA plus de sièges au scrutin de novembre, lequel a pour but de créer une assemblée d'unité nationale qui sera chargée de rédiger une constitution en vue d'une élection nationale devant avoir lieu le printemps prochain. Les questions est de savoir si la SWAPO pourra remporter les deux tiers des sièges au premier tour. Si tel est le cas, elle compte réécrire le code de l'assemblée (ce qu'elle peut faire selon les règles du jeu) et assumer immédiatement le pouvoir comme gouvernement *de facto*.

Les partis d'opposition, appuyés essentiellement par la population blanche de Namibie, font des pichs et des mains pour éviter une telle éventualité. Maintenant qu'il a tous ses effectifs et qu'il fonctionne dans tout le pays, le Groupe d'assistance de l'ONU pour la période de transition (GANPT) doit expressément veiller à ce que l'élection soit effectivement «libre et équitable». Les Blancs, soutenus par les vestiges de l'administration territoriale sud-africaine, prétendent que l'ONU aide la SWAPO à fausser le scrutin, tandis que les Noirs, y compris la SWAPO, soutiennent que les autorités territoriales cherchent à les intimider.

Le texte de la résolution habituelle (résolution 435 de l'ONU) n'est pas assez précis pour empêcher les adversaires de s'accuser ainsi mutuellement. Personne ne fait confiance à qui que ce soit dans le camp de l'autre. Au contraire, les dirigeants politiques des divers partis semblent se faire concurrence quant à savoir lequel s'abaissera à la plus vile mesquinerie aux dépens du GANPT.

Comparativement, l'accord de Lancaster House qui fit de la Rhodésie le Zimbabwe contenait de nombreux mécanismes d'équilibre proposés par les deux camps. Et même si le président de ce dernier pays, M. Robert Mugabe, n'a jamais vraiment aimé certains éléments de l'accord, il en a toujours respecté à la lettre les dispositions, pour le plus grand bien de son pays qui, ainsi, a pu continuer de bénéficier de l'aide économique et militaire de la collectivité internationale.

Si les adversaires namibiens ne peuvent s'élever au-dessus de leurs affreux passe historiques et présenter un pays uni au monde, la Namibie sera toujours une mendicante à la table des nations. Pour commencer, l'Afrique

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Patrick Nagle était le correspondant de *Southam News* en Afrique australe jusqu'en août 1989; il était alors basé à Harare et il est actuellement correspondant de la même agence dans les Maldives (il est basé à Halifax). Paul Marantz enseigne dans le domaine de la politique étrangère à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique et il est l'auteur du Cahier de l'Institut intitulé *De Lénine à Gorbatchev*. David Runnalls est directeur associé du Programme sur le développement viable à l'Institut de recherches politiques, à Ottawa. Jocelyn Coulon est rédacteur de la chronique des affaires internationales au journal *Le Devoir*. Selig Harrison est associé principal à la *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, à Washington; il était autrefois rédacteur en chef du journal *The New Republic* et chef de bureau pour le *Washington Post* en Asie du Sud. Madeleine Poulin est co-animatrice de l'émission d'actualité *Le Point* diffusée à la télévision de Radio-Canada.

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# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

## NAMIBIE

### LA RENAISSANCE D'UNE NATION

*La collectivité internationale  
essaie de rectifier les abus  
commis dans le passé.*

PAR PATRICK NAGLE



Dans le présent numéro :

**Selig Harrison**  
Une victoire mili-  
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serait trop coûteuse  
pour la population.

**David Runnalls**  
La santé de l'environ-  
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**Paul Marantz**  
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**Madeleine Poulin**  
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## THE 1989 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

What worries Canadians  
about the world?

AN ANALYSIS  
BY DON MUNTON

Also in this issue:

**Vincent Jacquot**  
The aftermath of  
the Paris peace  
conference on  
Cambodia.

**Thomas  
Risse-Kappen**  
Reflections on the  
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unified Germany.

**Fen  
Osler Hampson**  
Will the future be  
boring?... it  
depends on where  
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**G. Landau**  
Canada could have  
the central role in  
revitalizing the  
OAS.

**Bernard Wood**  
A framework  
for East-West  
economic  
cooperation.



## New Publications from the Institute

### ARMS CONTROL – NUCLEAR

**Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**, Factsheet 10, October 1989.

### CONFLICT RESOLUTION – THEORY AND PRACTICE

**The Reduction of the Risk of War Through Multi-lateral Means: A Summary of Conference Proceedings**, by David Cox, Steve Lee, and James Sutterlin, September 1989, Working Paper 18, 32 pages.

### DISARMAMENT

**Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament: Canada's Record at the UN**, by Bernard F. Grebenc, September 1989, Working Paper 19, 67 pages.

### DEFENCE

**Military Uses of Space**, Factsheet 11, November 1989.

### MISCELLANEOUS

**The Election Process in Namibia: An International Roundtable**, 6-7 July 1989. A Summary Report Prepared by the Institute.

### REFERENCE WORKS (Published annually)

**The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution**, October 1989, 280 pages. The Guide provides a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify major policy issues to which Canada responded in the year, place them in context, and, where appropriate, cite a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

**Annual Report**, July 1989. The Annual Report sets out for the Parliament and the people of Canada the record of activities and financial statements of the Institute for each fiscal year.

**The Institute's Public Opinion Survey of Canadian Views on Peace and Security**, December 1989. The third in a series of surveys on Canadian opinions on international affairs.

## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



On Monday November 13, two communiqués arrived by fax – one from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the other from the General Command of the El Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). On the surface their messages could not have been more different: Helmut Kohl spoke of the “utter joy” of German reaction to events at the Berlin wall; the FMLN listed the casualties it had inflicted that very weekend upon the military forces of the “genocidal” government of El Salvador.

In fact, the communiqués address the same predicament: when

is military power useful in achieving political ends? The two messages manifest different conclusions reached by different peoples. And while one method is clearly preferable, it is difficult for privileged, secure, people from rich northern countries – whose own histories are replete with massacres – to tell those who live in relative misery that they are wrong to kill and die for what they believe.

The Berlin Wall was the most tangible symbol of the potential for armed conflict in Europe – and both military alliances shamelessly touted it as such. With the Wall breached in such a deliriously cheerful way, the notion that the Soviets in their tanks might “come West” seems more remote than ever. If we’re lucky, a peaceable reorientation of Europe over the next decade will prove that the forty-five years of peace is not a fluke, not the product of nuclear terror, but rather represents a fundamental change in the way we manage our problems, in this part of the world at least. The nasty war being fought through the streets of San Salvador in November serves to remind us that we have a long way to go before all peoples feel secure enough to waive the right to use violence to

get what they want or keep themselves safe.

Our cover story this winter is an analysis by **Don Munton** of the Institute’s third annual public opinion survey on issues of international peace and security. The survey clearly reflects Canadians’ hopes and anxieties about a very uncertain world.

Also in this issue: an assessment by French journalist **Vincent Jacquot** of Cambodia’s future in the wake of August’s abortive peace conference in Paris; a West German specialist in international affairs, **Thomas Risse-Kappen**, looks at how Germany might be reunified and what its neighbours in Europe will make of such an eventuality; **Fen Hampson** jumps into a loud debate among American observers of international politics over whether or not life after the Cold War is worth living; and **G. Landau** presents a modest programme of action for Canada now that we are full members of the Organization of American States.

The Editors of are pleased to announce that **Charlotte Gray** has joined our editorial board. Ms. Gray is Ottawa Editor for *Saturday Night* magazine and has written on Canadian foreign policy.

– Michael Bryans

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360 Albert Street  
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(613) 990-1593

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**Don Munton** is professor of political science at the University of British Columbia; **Vincent Jacquot** is a freelance writer based in Paris and lived for many years in Cambodia; **Thomas Risse-Kappen**, a West German, is a member of the faculty of the department of government at Cornell University and is author of *The Zero Option: INF, West Germany and Arms Control*; **Fen Osler Hampson** is a research associate with the Institute, teaches international relations at Carleton University and is the author of the recently published book *Unguided Missiles: How America Buys Its Weapons*; **G. Landau** is a senior international civil servant from Brazil and former specialist in Canada-OAS affairs.

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CIIPS  
PUBLIC OPINION  
SURVEY

1989

# UNCOMMON THREATS AND COMMON SECURITY

*Canadians are worried about many things  
in the world; dying in World War Three  
is only one of them.*

AN ANALYSIS  
BY DON MUNTON

**F**IVE DECADES AFTER WORLD WAR II, AND moving into the last decade of the twentieth century, Canadians are redefining their perceptions of global threats and security. The major international trends are clear: East-West relations are improving rapidly; arms control, both nuclear and non-nuclear, is progressing; many, though not all, local and regional conflicts – in Central America, in southern Africa, in southeast Asia – are ending or at least winding down. The focus of international politics is shifting from concern about armed aggression and military security, to more prosaic problems: trade protectionism, Third

World debt, refugees, the international drug traffic, and the deteriorating ozone layer – to cite some examples.

These trends and shifts have been discussed in meetings as disparate as those of the Economic Summit and the Commonwealth, and reflected in the front and business pages of the world's press. They have been discussed and advocated in various international reports by expert panels including the Brandt Commission report on international development prospects, the Palme Report on common security, and, more recently, the World Com-

mission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland report). What is less clear, is the manner in which, and extent to which, the broader public's perceptions of threats and security are also changing.

A new public opinion survey provides some of the first evidence that international security has come to mean something quite different to the present generation of Canadians, a set of concerns at once broader and more fundamental than physical security from military attack. The evidence suggests a declining concern with such conventional threats.

Previous surveys done for the Institute have shown that concerns about the Soviet threat have almost disappeared. Asked in each of the last three years, what is the greatest threat to world peace? Canadians have provided strikingly consistent responses (see Figure 1). A few see Soviet actions as the greatest threat; as many or more point to US actions. Most regard regional conflicts or nuclear proliferation as the primary threats. The only discernible trends over

the three Institute polls have been a steady, though not steep, decline in the numbers citing the super-power arms race as the greatest threat to world peace, and a steady rise in those citing nuclear proliferation.

In a similar vein, few perceive the USSR to be a growing military threat and a "real, immediate danger" to North America. Over 80% say it is not. A solid majority (57%) find the Soviet Union less of a threat than it was a few years ago. And the vast majority (79%) believe the Cold War is lessening.

The trend toward improved East-West relations evident in the now numerous Gorbachev summits with Western leaders (Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand and, most recently, Mulroney) is also evident in the view of most Canadians (66%) that there will be increased cooperation among major countries in the future.

GIVEN THIS BACKGROUND, A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE 1989 Institute survey was to explore what Canadians now perceive to be the chief threats to international peace and security if the conventionally defined threats have diminished. The new evidence is still patchy but seems clear enough in general, and portrays a public looking to a fundamentally changed international system.

The respondents were asked to evaluate a list of specific international problems by ranking their importance as threats to Canada's security (see Figure 2). Major wars were afforded relatively low importance, perhaps because they are regarded as unlikely. Ranked more highly are trade conflicts, terrorism, and international financial and monetary instability. At the top of the list are global pollution, international crime and the spread of diseases.

There is ample evidence here for the observation of the 1980 Brandt Report that while "war is often thought of in terms of military conflict, or even annihilation,... there is a growing awareness that an equal danger might be chaos – as a result of mass hunger, economic disaster, environmental catastrophes, and terrorism."

These results are striking in a strictly Canadian context as well. In the aftermath of a raucous and deeply divisive election campaign dominated by the foreign policy issue of free trade – an election fought on both sides with arguments about the economic perils in which Canada finds itself – and amidst an on-going debate concerning the benefits and costs of the Free Trade Agreement, Canadians place trade matters and other economic concerns well down the list of international priorities.

Notably, the only problems on the list which, overall, ranked lower than major wars were human rights abuses, and poverty and hunger. Many Canadians may agree with the argument of the Brandt

*This is the third in an annual series of Institute for Peace and Security public opinion surveys. Designed by Don Munton in conjunction with Institute staff, the survey was conducted in September–October 1989 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. The survey was conducted by mail and comprised 890 respondents in all, with a response rate of 50%. The margin of error with a sample of this size is approximately +/- 3.5%, 95 times out of 100. The full descriptive results from the survey are available in an Institute Working Paper by Michael Driedger and Don Munton released concurrently with this article.*



Commission that mankind's survival raises not only "the traditional questions of peace and war, but also of how to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor." At the same time, many do not see these problems as vital security threats to Canada.

When the evaluations of individuals are disaggregated and compared, four groupings of issues emerge. These groupings mean that people who regard one problem in a set as serious, tend also to regard the others as serious. The four categories are: military threats (ie. wars, but also to a lesser extent, terrorism); economic threats (financial and monetary instability, trade conflicts and protectionism); what might be called unconventional "deprivation-derived" threats (poverty, human rights abuses and terrorism); and what seem most appropriately termed common or "systemic" threats (global pollution, crime and disease).

These groupings describe one way in which these problems are interrelated in the public mind. It should be emphasized, however, that Canadians tend to regard them together, either as generally important or as generally not important, rather than regarding some as important and others as unimportant. (To put this in statistical terms, the ratings, given any two individual problems, were almost always positively and never negatively correlated.)

To force the question of relative seriousness, the respondents were also asked to rank three types of threat facing Canada internationally – military, economic and environmental (see Figure 3). The results were unambiguous. Economic and environmental challenges are generally rated as being more serious than military threats. Perhaps surprisingly, most Canadians, fully eight in ten (83%), rank military threats as the least serious of the three. Only a small minority, fewer than 10%, regard them as the most serious. On the other hand, most Canadians, not just a small band of environmentalists, give the highest priority to environmental issues. Slightly fewer give top rank to economic threats than to environmental ones (43% versus 51%).

When the relative importance of these three types of threat in ten years time is gauged, environmental problems emerge even more strongly. Almost two-thirds of the respondents to the survey rank these first, while fewer than one-third so ranked economic threats. Only a handful pointed to conventional military threats as being the most serious, in a decade from now. Moreover, the vast majority of Canadians believe that economic capabilities are now more important than military capabilities, in determining influence in today's international system. Both of these patterns are also evident in recent US polls.

THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT FROM POLLS OR ANY OTHER indicator that most Canadians are conscious of such familiar "Canadian" pollution problems as acid rain and toxic chemicals in the Great Lakes. It would appear as well, that they both recognize and accept the seriousness of a range of global environmental problems. Canadians appear to accept a key theme in the Brundtland Report, that "the whole notion of security

as traditionally understood – in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty – must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress." Indeed, most probably agreed with John Fraser, a former environment minister and now Speaker of the House of Commons, when he said recently: "We are looking down the coming decades with the certain reality that if we do not change our ways we are not going to survive."

Canadians have not always ranked environmental issues so highly. By way of comparison, a 1984 poll carried out for the Department of External Affairs placed environmental protection a distant third in importance for Canada's foreign policy, behind world peace and economic growth.

Despite these changing perceptions of threat, fears of a nuclear disaster have not entirely dissipated. They no longer commonly arise, however, from the spectre of a Soviet nuclear attack. When the respondents were asked about the ways in which nuclear weapons might be used, three distinct scenarios emerged. One, the "unconventional" scenario, foresees their use by terrorists or by a non-great power involved in a regional conflict. This is regarded by most Canadians as the best (or worst) bet, with about three in four judging it likely or very likely to happen within their lifetimes. A second – the "accidental nuclear war" scenario – is the possibility of nuclear missiles being fired by mistake or as a result of a nuclear equipment failure. The third, or "super-

Figure 1: **Greatest Threat to World Peace**

	1987 %	1988 %	1989 %
Soviet actions	5	5	5
US actions	8	11	9
Arms race	27	23	21
Nuclear proliferation	29	32	40
Regional conflict	31	28	25

power" scenario, includes the Cold War possibilities – a surprise attack on Europe or the United States, and that of a regional conflict escalating into a super-power nuclear exchange. This is perceived to be the least likely chain of events, with fewer than one in three expecting it.

Consistent also with a changing definition of security, has been a growing confidence in the ability of both superpowers to deal with world problems. Whereas only about one in three expressed this level of confidence in the United States' ability in 1987, two in three now do so. And whereas only about one in four expressed considerable or great confidence in the Soviet Union in 1987, more than one in every [

two Canadians now does so. Most indicate that their confidence in the Soviet Union has increased lately.

The respondents were provided a series of characteristics and asked whether each applied more to the Soviet Union or to the United States, to both, or to neither. These were as follows: "wants to dominate the world;" "is willing to negotiate most disputes;" "is trustworthy in negotiations;" "and uses military force to achieve its goals." In each case, the largest group, one representing over 40%, believed that the statement applied equally to both.

The shift in Canadians' perceptions of the superpowers is strikingly evident here. The same set of questions was included in a 1984 poll conducted in

where these actions and motives are concerned. Many more think that the USSR uses military force and seeks domination than so characterize the US, and many more find the US willing to negotiate and trustworthy in negotiations than so find the USSR.

Canadians are yet to be convinced that the USSR is just an ordinary and peaceable power. More than two in every three respondents disagree or disagree strongly with the statement that "the Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation, willing to fight only if it thinks it has to defend itself." Nor is a European conflict unimaginable. Most (60%) disagree that a conventional war in Europe is now impossible. The rest (40%) agree it is impossible, but only a handful (5%) agree strongly.

Despite Gorbachev and despite the fact that in over forty years they have not attacked the West, the Soviets, to use the colloquial, are not entirely out of the Cold War woods yet. As a result, Canadians still support the traditional policies designed to meet this conventional military threat. Only a small minority (16%) do not regard Canada's participation in NATO as important. (Fully 90% claim to have heard of the alliance organization.) More significantly, support for maintaining Canadian forces in Europe is high, and there has been no decline in this support since 1987 when this question was last asked on the Institute for Peace and Security poll. About one in every four respondents argues that Canadian forces should be reduced or withdrawn; three in four support their being kept at present levels, or increased.

When asked whether these troops ought to be reduced in the event of an East-West agreement to reduce, significantly, conventional military forces in Europe, fully 40% say the Canadian force levels ought still to be maintained. (The wording noted but did not emphasize the point, argued by military experts, that substantial reductions in the numbers of Canadian soldiers might leave these units ineffective militarily.) About one-third (35%) favour reducing Canadian troops by the same proportion as the overall reductions, while one-quarter (24%) opted for complete withdrawal.

Moreover, Canadians are still willing to defend Europe if necessary. Almost six in ten (58%) say that the use of Canadian troops would be justified in the event of an invasion of Western Europe. Canadians seem to be defence policy traditionalists in another sense. They are skeptical about some of the newer ideas regarding defence policy such as "non-provocative" defence or "defensive-defence." These ideas, now very much debated in Europe, were described to respondents as aiming "to get rid of weapons that could be used to attack the other side and rely only on non-threatening weapons." About one in three (33%) thought the idea made sense; the rest (67%) thought it impossible to have weapons for defensive purposes only.

Figure 2: **Importance of International Problems** Index (Max 100)





Figure 3: **Three Types of Threat**



Canada by the United States Information Agency. At that time, only half as many respondents, fewer than one in four, thought that both the US and USSR were equally willing to negotiate or were trustworthy in negotiations. And significantly fewer similarly evaluated them as seeking world domination or using military force.

DESPITE THE TREND AWAY FROM BLACK-WHITE COLD War images of the two superpowers, documented in previous Institute polls, Canadians do not regard the two superpowers as completely equivalent, at least



Reductions in nuclear weaponry, on the other hand, are clearly favoured. Previous Institute polls, as well as the present one, show strong support for a comprehensive test ban treaty, to control or eliminate all testing of these weapons, and for the elimination of at least some of the existing stockpiles.

THE MULRONEY GOVERNMENT'S PLAN ANNOUNCED last spring to reduce future federal spending levels on both foreign aid and defence, met with little public outcry at the time, and the Institute poll suggests a very divided public with few strongly opposing the cuts. One question on the survey noted Ottawa's budget announcement and then asked whether the government should have reduced foreign aid expenditures rather than defence, reduced defence rather than aid, reduced both more, reduced both less, or made other cuts instead (see Figure 4). About one in four Canadians favours reducing defence rather than aid and about as many favour reducing aid rather than defence. Since a slightly higher proportion (29%) also favour greater reductions in both defence and aid, there is thus a slim majority agreeable to at least the announced cuts (if not greater cuts) in both the defence and aid budgets. Slightly more than one-quarter also prefer either lower reductions in both areas or other budget cutting measures instead; this group might be called the "internationalists," given their support for maintaining international activities of both a military and development assistance nature.

Canadians generally are consistent in these preferences. That is to say, those approving cuts in Canada's defence expenditures tend also to favour East-West disarmament, to reject the pursuit of military superiority, to believe that the Cold War is lessening, that "the Soviet threat" has declined, and that economic factors are more important than military factors in determining international influence. On the other hand, those supporting cuts in the aid budget rather than in the defence budget, generally take the opposite views.

Interestingly, the split between these two groups and two perspectives, though real enough, is a secondary one. More fundamental is the cleavage between those who strongly support both types of international activity and those who do not. (The latter group seems to include both those whose concerns are largely budgetary and fiscal, and those who prefer domestic expenditures over external ones.) The depth of this cleavage is shown by the fact that the correlation between supporting (or not) reductions in aid, and supporting reductions in defence, is overall a positive one; that is, more Canadians favour both or neither, than favour either one or the other. Thus a more pervasive debate in Canada than that between a "defence" community and an "aid" community, exists between the "internationalists" and what might be called the "fiscal nationalists."

Another reflection of the broad security perspective of Canadians now, is the extent to which attitudes on continued defence expenditures are related to concerns about the range of international problems discussed earlier. It might be expected, for example,

that those who are "pro-defence" regard the threat of war as serious, but not Third World poverty, abuses of human rights, or trade conflicts. Interestingly enough, it is not so. Those opposing the defence cuts (who tend also to oppose the aid cuts) generally attributed more importance to almost all of the international problems than those who favoured these cuts. The striking differences between Canadians are thus not so much ones between groups with competing international agendas, as between the many who believe there is a broad range of serious external challenges requiring action, and the few who do not.

THE EMERGING ERA, ONE OF EAST-WEST CONCORD rather than merely détente, has already given rise to broader, more encompassing, conceptions of security. While it is difficult to compare directly Canadians' present conceptions of security with those of a generation ago, for lack of data, there is little doubt that these conceptions are very different from those of, say, the 1960s.

Certainly today's conceptions are not fixed in any narrow definition of military security; they comprise

Figure 4: Reductions to Federal Spending

	%	
Reduce foreign aid rather than defence	24	
Reduce defence rather than foreign aid	21	
Reduce both more	29	
Reduce both less	10	
Other	16	

not only concerns, generally diminishing, about conventional military threats, but also concerns about the frailty of nuclear deterrence, about economic challenges, and about environmental dangers. They feature perceptions of new, as well as some traditional, threats and recognize the need for common, rather than just national, security in an interdependent world.

Canadians' "new thinking," however, does not abandon traditional policies; instead it incorporates those existing policies that address threats which, while in decline, have not entirely disappeared and probably will not disappear in the foreseeable future. Canadians may not share the "nostalgia for the Cold War" of which the Bush administration was recently accused, but neither have they merely adopted a new set of post-Cold War blinders. □

# CAMBODIA: ONCE AGAIN AT ZERO?

*In the wake of Vietnam's withdrawal and the collapse of the Paris peace conference, Cambodians fear for their future.*

BY VINCENT JACQUOT

IN AN IMPERIOUS NEWS RELEASE ISSUED IN Peking on 2 May, China and the USSR – who had agreed to settle their boundary disputes, in addition to the Afghan and Cambodian issues, as a first step toward full restoration of relations – reminded us in thinly veiled terms that any overall settlement in Asia would have to include them. The existence of a potentially very important market and an eventual rival to Japanese economic power are matters of no small importance to the other two countries with key roles in Asian politics. The Cambodian matter was but an opportunity for China, the USSR and the United States to come to a mutual understanding about and to accept, with certain conditions, Chinese leadership in this part of the world.

In his masterly book on China, Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out that for the Chinese government it was essential that the international community acknowledge this situation. The Paris international conference on Cambodia in August, provided an unexpected opportunity. Although the conference ended in failure, China's goal had been to stake its claim as an essential player, (certainly not what those who convened the international conference had had in mind). And the supposedly unanimous condemnation by the international community of the events in Tienanmen Square in June in no way affected this intention.

Internationally there has been a general consensus, shared even by the occupying power, concerning the withdrawal of Vietnam's troops from Cambodia, and conditions seemed to be most favourable for the continued smooth progress of the peace process. Unfortunately, the terms of departure of the Vietnamese troops had not been negotiated in advance with the United Nations, which had made such a prior negotiation an absolute precondition to any re-examination of its position on Vietnam and Cambodia. As a number of observers noted, the proceedings of the commissions responsible for promoting the establishment of a provisional government, and the ways and means of bringing about a general reconciliation, soon came down to the issue of whether or not to replace the pro-Vietnamese government with a pro-Chinese one. It seems that the

Phnom Penh government, at the end of its tether, would have been ready to accept the Chinese solution, if the sharing of power four ways had not seemed to have underlying it a desire to paralyze the whole administration, thereby creating an explosive situation – easily exploited by anyone with a takeover in mind.

How could anyone envisage the return to power of the executioners and torturers, with no guarantees, but once again wearing the cloak of governmental legitimacy behind which they committed their murders? If Phnom Penh's delegation (the Hun Sen government) still entertained doubts about the possible conversion of the Khmer Rouge, the malevolent performance of Khieu Samphan at the Paris conference sufficed to dispel them. He may on a very few occasions have acknowledged some "errors," but at no time did he express any regret or remorse about his crimes. Proportionately speaking, the Cambodian holocaust would have claimed 65 million victims if it had occurred in the United States. Perhaps not all holocausts are worthy of the same consideration. They were only Cambodians, after all.

COULD THE OUTRIGHT, SYSTEMATIC MASSACRE of all Cambodian officials, intellectuals, specialists, students, and their mothers, spouses and children, and the murder of city-dwellers – solely because they had been corrupted by the city – really have been part of a struggle against all forms of foreign influence? In 1970 Lon Nol, even with American aid, could get rid of that ubiquitous figure in Cambodian politics, Norodom Sihanouk, only by urging the Khmers in Phnom Penh to massacre the Vietnamese population of Cambodia, who were at the time supported by Sihanouk. Today, this same Sihanouk seeks to get rid of Hun Sen and his government by calling for the "continuation of the struggle against the Vietnamese."

■ *Vietnamese in Cambodia.* Prior to 1970 there were about 400,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia and they enjoyed considerable influence. Prominent in the professions and the university, they comprised the majority of the officials in the bureaucracy. Most of the self-employed

craftspeople were Vietnamese. Some had been awarded concessions and were involved in forestry or fisheries operations on the Tonlé Sap. They lived in their own communities, seldom marrying Cambodians – religion was an additional factor separating the two profoundly hostile communities.

Many of the Vietnamese left Cambodia after the Lon Nol-directed massacres, but returned in large numbers with the Vietnamese army in 1979. The first to return were those whose roots in Cambodia go back several generations; others did not resume the same positions they had held before. These people were to be found primarily in the small trades and crafts, but also among the seasonal migrant communities of rice farmers and fishermen.

The recent departure of Vietnamese troops and administrative personnel has certainly not encouraged the Vietnamese nationals, now deprived of protection, to prolong their stay in Cambodia. If the figure of 90,000 Vietnamese nationals put forward at the Paris Conference seems to be on the low side, the one million or more cited by Sihanouk is obviously exaggerated. It is very likely that Heng Samrin's army does contain some Vietnamese officers, just as there are Chinese "advisers" and military "technicians" trained in China among the Khmer Rouge.

*Chinese in Cambodia.* Before 1970 there were probably fewer Chinese nationals than Vietnamese in Cambodia, but as there were many Chinese-Cambodians, the total number of people of Chinese origin was much larger. They were to be found in the civil service and the small manufacturing and food industries, and primarily in local trade and the import-export sector, as well as in banking and credit institutions. Since 1970 the Chinese have not suffered the same persecution as the Vietnamese; they are wealthy and it is because of this, not their ethnic origin, that they are worried. They are once again as numerous as before 1970 and that they have resumed all of their traditional activities.

Until 1970 Cambodians, as a group, achieved political power only if they had money. While there were many foreigners in the senior civil service and even more in trade,



industry and handicrafts, Cambodians were relegated to a quasi-servile status as rice farmers and stock breeders, and largely confined to the small trades and low-paying jobs. The departing Vietnamese leave a void; the military protection they provided until recently, and the important roles they played in most aspects of life in Cambodia, will be gone. They will be replaced, but by whom? Pol Pot said in 1977: "...even if only a million Cambodians are left, the Chinese will provide me with the population I need...." The regime in Cambodia has changed again and again, but the "invaders" always remain – and they are not necessarily Vietnamese.

Even if there is success in the efforts to get Cambodia's neighbours – both the closest ones and those further removed – to leave this unfortunate country in peace, the issues not only of political independence but also of economic and cultural dependence, will remain. These factors will be determined by the amount and quality of the aid provided to Cambodia to help it reconstruct its economy and educate its youth, but above all by the degree to which the aid comes with few or no strings attached.

For ten years the government installed by Vietnam in Phnom Penh has been carrying out what is at once the most difficult and the easiest of tasks: starting from zero, to ensure the rebirth of the country at all levels by whatever meagre means it can contrive. But these means are now beyond reach. Material and economic gains are promptly absorbed by a runaway population explosion, the war effort and the need to replace equipment and an infrastructure that were themselves salvaged from debris. Apart from a mass return of the unfortunate refugees from the camps in Thailand, it is unlikely that the Cambodian diaspora is contemplating a return to the country in significant numbers. On the whole, the Cambodian emigrants have settled once and for all in the countries that, for the most part, warmly welcomed them. They have prospered; only rarely do their children speak Cambodian, and it would be difficult for them to return to the country even if peace were to be reestablished. Besides, Cambodians know only too well that they have never been masters in their own house.

*The Military Stalemate.* Recent military activity by the anti-government Coalition (CGDK) confirms that the Vietnamese

troops have indeed left Cambodia. In the past, their presence in the region was, of course, the major obstacle to the wider deployment of the anti-Hun Sen "resistance" forces. The current fighting is occurring because of the rainy season when conditions favour guerrilla operations. Is the purpose of these operations to provide the CGDK, at last, with a politically and militarily indispensable national territorial base?

Two objectives are being pursued simultaneously. The seizure of Battambang or Angkor in the west, which would allow the Coalition to set up a government to rival the one in Phnom Penh, would have considerable international repercussions. Already, the occupation of a few villages in the Thai border zone, and the disappointing and well-publicized reimposition of the curfew in the capital, have given the impression abroad that the situation of the Hun Sen government has suddenly deteriorated. However, given the nature of the terrain in particular, it is hard to imagine that a sizeable military operation is imminent and that the current engagements could soon result in a decisive advantage for any of the forces. Each side denies it is firing on the villages, but then what about the landmines? The population is mobilized against its will, and the refugees from the

camps are being used as porters for crossing the minefields.

Up to now the tactic used by the Phnom Penh government has been to protect the most important positions with very dense minefields. If these positions are overrun, an effort is made to re-take them with the use of long-range artillery bombardments. However, the enemy is generally able to withdraw, taking with it the prisoners and equipment it has seized. Mobilization and recruitment are generally conducted by coercion. Soldiers fight with great courage but without particular aggressiveness. They are quick to abandon their positions. This is typical of the game of war in this part of Asia – a war between combatants of the same race. It was Mao Tse-tung who wrote that the art of winning a battle is to always leave intact a bridge across which the enemy can flee when hard pressed, and to avoid leaving him no alternative but desperate resistance, which risks the outcome of the battle.

THE OVERALL IMPRESSION IS ONE OF ABSURDITY: refugees and the civilian population are once again paying the cost and, with the exception of the Khmer Rouge and foreign-trained professionals, the combatants are unwilling participants. The fighting will continue, primarily because of its media impact on international public opinion. At issue in this struggle is the control of territory, with each party seeking to keep, obtain or balance its claims to legitimacy. It is unlikely that the conflict can be definitively settled on the battlefield and despite appearances, all sides seem convinced of this.

The parties are said to be sounding each other out over a possible resumption of negotiations. A "balanced" future for Cambodia, buried as it is between Thailand and Vietnam, can only be guaranteed by the dominant regional power – China. While the international community, lost in the Cambodian impasse, has neither the will nor the capacity to initiate a settlement, it would be hypocritical to pretend that there is any way other than by relying on China's magnanimity as the major force in the region. Paying the appropriate homage could, moreover, have a calming influence. It would be a disaster if the parties to the settlement of the Cambodian problem, at least those which have paid the costs so far, were to meet only on the battlefields – even if they are only Cambodians. □



## CAMBODIA – CHANGES AT THE TOP SINCE 1975

IN APRIL 1975 THE KHMER ROUGE captured the capital Phnom Penh, routed the Lon Nol government and established Democratic Kampuchea. Under Pol Pot's leadership, more than one million Cambodians were executed, or died of disease and starvation. In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, pushed out the Khmer Rouge, created the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), and installed Heng Samrin as president and Hun Sen as prime minister.

Between 1975 and 1982, the Khmer Rouge represented Cambodia in the UN. While loath to support the Khmer Rouge because of their flagrant human rights abuses, many UN members were also reluctant to approve Vietnam's overthrow of Kampuchea's government. In 1982, with the encouragement of China and the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Khmer Rouge joined with other non-communist opposition and guerilla groups active against the Vietnamese-backed regime – the Armée nationale sihanoukiste (Prince Norodom Sihanouk's guerilla force, ANS) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front of Son Sann (KPNLF) – to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The UN now recognizes the CGDK as the legitimate government of Cambodia even though occupying the UN seat is about the only governmental action it carries out.

# REFLECTIONS ON THE GERMAN PUZZLE

*The prospect of a reunified Germany in the centre of Europe is supposed to scare everyone; but who really cares?*

BY THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN

THE "GERMAN QUESTION" HAD SEEMED settled. After all, a unified Germany in the middle of Europe failed twice in this century; it was deeply involved in causing World War I and it brought about World War II. There would be no third chance. Even in the midst of widespread political instability in Eastern Europe, the division of Germany, at least, appeared solid. Furthermore, there seemed to be no reason to believe that Germans – East or West – had a hidden agenda regarding reunification. The famous West German *Ostpolitik* – the policy improving the relationship with Eastern Europe, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and the Soviet Union, was possible only on the basis of the territorial and political status quo in Europe. Moreover, one could argue that the generation with personal experience of a unified German state was about to lose control over the two Germanies and that younger Germans, in both East and West, lacked any emotional attachment to a greater Germany.

The events of this fall, however, challenged the conventional wisdom. All of the sudden, the German question was back on the international agenda. First, there was the mass exodus from East Germany accompanied by unprecedented scenes on television: refugees in the Prague West German embassy crying "freedom" when Foreign Minister Genscher announced the deal he had cut with the GDR to allow them to leave for the West; thousands crying "Deutschland" (Germany) when finally arriving in West Germany, just having left East Germany; and in the midst of it all, the East German "Socialist Unity Party" (SED), celebrating forty years of "victorious socialism" over the capitalist West, lining up with the China's leadership against the "imperialist campaign to eradicate socialism."

Second and even more important, those who decided to stay in the country, spoke out. Supported and protected by the Protestant church, the political opposition got organized and staged the largest (spontaneous and unofficial) mass demonstrations East Germany has ever seen (including the events of 1953

when much smaller protests were violently suppressed). Hundreds of thousands gathered in East Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig.


The political opposition – which had existed prior to these recent events, but could for the first time attract open, mass support – sees democratic socialism, not capitalism, as the answer to the GDR's problems. In short, these East Germans do not want to remain the leftovers of Stalinism in an era of reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They want the German Democratic Republic to live up to its name.

Whatever the communist party's real intentions are, a strategy of mere rhetoric and buying time will not work. There is a democratic revolution underway, and only genuine political reforms will relieve the pressure on the East German system and prevent a further mass exodus.

WHAT DO THESE EVENTS MEAN FOR THE TWO Germanies in a post-Cold War European order? The following considerations are tentative, for if anything is certain these days, it is uncertainty about the future. To begin with, the argument that a reformed GDR would lose its *raison d'être* as an independent state is seriously flawed. This proposition is put forward by hard-liners in East Berlin who resist reforms and, ironically, by some Westerners who cannot imagine that a democratized East Germany might choose an alternative to Stalinism other than Western-style capitalism. It is argued that if the Germanies become indistinguishable in their political, economic, and social systems, the trend towards reunification would be irresistible. According to this logic there should, therefore, be a strong tendency for Austria and the Federal Republic to unify. Austrians and West Germans speak the same language, have similar political and economic systems, and there are lots of cultural bonds between the two countries. Yet, nobody talks about an Austrian-German unification.

Moreover, one should not forget that in all of German history since the middle ages, a unitary German state existed for only seventy-four years – between 1871 and 1945.

Indeed, it is conceivable that the GDR would in fact gain in identity as it embarks on a process of political reform. Right now, the East German state has only a borrowed legitimacy as Eastern Europe's Stalinist front-line, which has constantly to distance itself from the Federal Republic. If there is any East German self-identification at all, it is defined in contrast to West Germany. For the past forty years, the presence of Soviet troops in the country has had to substitute for this lack of legitimacy. When Gorbachev told Honecker during his visit to East Berlin that decisions about the



*J. K. Olson*

GDR have to be made in East Berlin and not in Moscow, he was making clear that those days are over. The regime can no longer count on the USSR to back it against its own people.

Democratizing the system might be the only way – and the last chance for the current leadership – to gain support from East Germans. Here it should be noted that unlike



Poland and the Soviet Union, East Germany is still in relatively good economic shape, with the per capita income roughly comparable to Italy's. The recent exodus was apparently triggered as much by political frustration as economic factors.

IF IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT A REVAMPED East Germany would disappear as an independent state, what about its Western cousin? The cacophony of voices rising from the Federal Republic these days might suggest that West Germans are taking advantage of a long-awaited opportunity to promote reunification. There have been press reports, for example, that the Federal government wants to put the German question back on the East-West agenda. Some conservatives have even reopened the issue of the Poland's Western frontier, the Oder-Neisse line, which was supposedly settled once and for all with the West German-Polish treaty of 1970.

A good deal of the noise is an understandable reaction to the surprising events in East Germany. A lot of the rest originates in West German domestic politics. The emergence of a reactionary right-wing party, the *Republikaner*, seriously threatens the power base of the governing Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU). If the present trend continues, the CDU might be out of power as a result of next year's federal elections. Thus, Chancellor Kohl has obviously

on the other hand, which used to maintain close contacts with the East German SED, does not want to be perceived as "soft" on East Berlin these days.

Behind these dissonant voices, however, is a fairly broad consensus in Bonn ranging from the centre-right to the centre-left: first, that democracy and freedom are more important than German unity – hence the urging for reforms in the GDR; and second, that the German question cannot be separated from the larger issue of the future of Europe and the two alliance blocs. Thus, there is overwhelming agreement among the FRG's foreign policy elite – and obviously among the opposition groups in East Germany, too, not to mention the current regime – that the idea of the two Germanies leaving their respective alliances and gaining a neutralist, reunified status is neither desirable nor feasible. It follows, then, that Germany will remain divided as long as NATO and the Warsaw Pact continue to exist, and that both German states accept this.

WHERE DOES ALL THIS LEAVE THE GERMAN question? More important still, what precisely is the German question? For forty years the issue has had both internal and external dimensions. The internal part concerned human rights, democracy, and self-determination for people in both Germanies. Political reforms in the GDR would take care of this aspect of the question. After all, if the Cold War was about democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, then the German question is about the same for East Germany.

By comparison, the external feature of the question – the nature of the relationship between the two states – is of secondary importance. Possible solutions are to be found between two extremes. On the one hand, the two countries could deal with each other as fully sovereign and independent states. For the Federal Republic, this would require formal recognition of the GDR and a change of its constitution which still commits the country to German unity. Both are unlikely.

Moreover, there has always been a special relationship between West and East Germany. Even at the height of the Cold War, certain contacts between the two states were maintained, especially in the areas of trade and of access to West Berlin. To treat inter-German relations like any other state-to-state relationship is to ignore the political, economic, social, and cultural ties between the two countries which are still strong, even after forty years of division.

On the other hand, the creation of a unitary German state is not necessarily a solution for overcoming the division, and certainly not the most desirable one. Even the West German constitution does not require it. And there are the legitimate worries of Poland, France, the

Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and other countries about a unified Germany, which have to be taken into account.

WHAT THIS BOILS DOWN TO IS THAT THE German issue should be dealt with in the context of the larger post-Cold War European order. Assuming things work smoothly (hardly guaranteed), a new European order which unites the continent is conceivable within the next ten to twenty years. It should be built upon the process started in Helsinki in 1975 (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – CSCE). The advantages of the CSCE, as compared to other European institutions, are that it is multilateral and not bloc-to-bloc, that both superpowers and Canada are part of it, and that the European non-aligned and neutral countries participate. These features would have to be preserved in any new European order which provided security for its members primarily by non-military, cooperative arrangements, and mutual guarantees, and which reduced military forces to very low levels. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be needed to manage the transition, and as they subsequently lose their significance as the organizing factors in the European order, might wither away.

In such a context, German unity would appear less threatening to the rest of the world. National sovereignty in the traditional sense would be largely obsolete anyway, since many issues which used to be decided on national levels, would be transferred to international institutions like the European Community or CSCE. It would then be almost irrelevant whether the two Germanies continued to exist as independent states or decided to form a confederation of some kind.

CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE, GIVEN THE present turmoil in the Eastern bloc? It is the economic condition of these countries that is the crucial factor. While it is mainly up to the East Europeans and the Soviets to prevent the situation from reaching catastrophic dimensions, the West has its responsibilities too. Why not embark upon Marshall Plan-type aid for Eastern Europe in order to help stabilize their economies? Why not strike comprehensive arms control deals achieving deep cuts in the conventional and nuclear arsenals? Deep cuts are an essential precondition for achieving a European peace order in which the German question can be settled in a satisfactory way for Germans and for their neighbors. And should the situation become acutely unstable, substantially lower levels of military forces would make any crisis less dangerous for everyone. □



Jerry Kobacz

decided to step up the rhetoric on reunification in order to appeal to conservative voters. Moreover, his party's right wing has its own agenda. The Social Democratic Party (the SPD, the Federal Republic's left opposition),

# THE END OF HISTORY? NYET!

*While American pundits argue about whether the future will be boring or not, events in Eastern Europe promise interesting times. Perhaps the right people aren't paying attention.*

BY FEN OSLER HAMPSON

**T**HE FOREIGN POLICIES OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS are in disarray as officials wrestle with the thorny implications of developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Barely a day passes without news of economic reform, political change, ethnic unrest, demands for autonomy, or refugees fleeing repressive governments. History is again on the march at a dizzying pace. So dramatic are these developments that most knowledgeable observers and pundits have been caught off guard.

Into this vacuum recently stepped Francis Fukuyama, deputy-director of policy planning in the US Department of State (and former analyst at the Rand Corporation), with an article entitled "The End of History?", published in *The National Interest* last summer. Fukuyama's article has generated widespread debate – a debate which is long overdue as the West grapples with the momentous changes taking place in the Eastern bloc. But Fukuyama's answers are less than satisfactory and he displays a surprising lack of concern about the implications of these changes for Western security interests. His views can be summarized as follows.

The 20th Century is ending with the "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism." This "triumph" of Western thinking manifests itself in the "total exhaustion" of communism and socialism.

Recent events in China and the Soviet Union "have put the final nail in the coffin of the Marxist-Leninist alternative to liberal democracy.... What has happened in the four years since Gorbachev's coming to power is a revolutionary assault on the most fundamental institutions and principles of Stalinism."

The possibility of "large-scale conflict" between "large states still caught in the grip of history" is diminishing as the members of the communist world embrace Western liberal economic and political values.

The "worldwide ideological struggle" which has gripped humanity for most of this century and that "called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism" will be replaced by "centuries of boredom" – a future governed by

"economic calculations, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands."

ACCORDING TO *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, FUKUYAMA crystallized what many would like to believe, but ignored the rise (and challenge) of Japan. *Time* magazine's Strobe Talbott called the article "The Beginning of Nonsense," and accused Fukuyama of "arrogance" and "short-sightedness." Yes, all of this is true. Just as troubling, however, are the policy implications of Fukuyama's "history is inevitable" thesis.

Fukuyama sees political change as ineluctable and irreversible thereby substituting one kind of historical determinism (neo-Hegelianism?) for another (Marxism-Leninism). This is dangerous thinking and a poor substitute for the inaction of most Western governments in the face of the changes that are occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. There is nothing automatic about recent developments. The modest political and economic reforms achieved by some Eastern bloc countries have been hard won. Still, there is a long way to go and the risk of failure runs high. In the Soviet Union, the depth of political resistance to Gorbachev's reforms suggests, if anything, that he is floundering.

The potential reversibility of recent events urges upon the West the need to formulate an effective political strategy to help consolidate and reinforce liberalizing trends and reforms. The place to begin is not with theories about history but with the right questions:

What will the future of socialism look like – that is to say, what kinds of scenarios can we draw to get some idea of the evolutionary change that may occur in the economies and political systems of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China?

What can the West do to facilitate the reform process? What are the implications of these domestic political and economic reforms for the future of the Warsaw Pact?

What kinds of political and economic reforms in the German Democratic Republic

(GDR) would set in motion irresistible pressures for reunification and how should the West and the Eastern bloc deal with this issue?

What are the implications of current developments and future scenarios for Western security interests and NATO? Is the prospect of military confrontation between the two blocs diminishing as many believe? What factors or forces might derail détente and raise tensions, and how can this be prevented? Where do arms control and defence fit into this broader political picture?

THIS IS A TALL ORDER AND THERE ARE SURELY other issues which should be addressed as well. Unless the West begins to tackle these questions soon it will find itself riding history much like the "headless horseman." Or as Mark Twain once warned, "if you don't know where you are going any road will take you there." Here is a rough guide to the questions just posed.

Future prospects. There are a number of different possible scenarios for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as we look towards the future.

*Westernization and democratization.* Hungary is closest to this development with the recent decision to dissolve the communist party and move to a competitive party system. *Latin Americanization.* Here, politics oscillate between repression, democracy, and modernization within an authoritarian tradition. The Soviet Union might follow this path. *Sinification or the China model* – characterized by a strong communist state with a liberal, market-oriented economy. This was communist party leader Jaruzelski's initial vision for Poland. *Ottomanization or Balkanization.* This is sometimes called the Soviet empire's "decomposition scenario" – the result of liberalization, and resurgent ethnicity and nationalism within the Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe. *Africanization.* This describes the situation prevalent in some African countries where we see the destruction of the economy and the state, and an inability of key socio-economic groups to take collective action. Indeed, this describes the situation in Poland today.



These scenarios suggest that political change is likely to be neither linear nor uniform; that the potential for continuing political upheaval and protest in some countries is considerable; and that things are likely to get worse in some countries – Poland for example – before they get better. The worst-case scenarios are Balkanization and Africanization. While a return to the pre-1914 situation in Europe is unlikely, a sudden and rapid breakup of the Soviet empire would be enormously destabilizing for all concerned.


Implications for the Warsaw Pact. The Iron Curtain is rusty. As Warsaw Pact countries liberalize their economies and seek stronger ties with the West, pressures within the Pact for reductions in military spending and weaker security ties with Moscow will grow. There is some danger that major conventional arms cuts will weaken the Pact system. The use of force to keep the socialist bloc together is probably out as an option for now, but the Soviet Union (with or without Gorbachev) is unlikely to relinquish control completely or permit changes which undermine security linkages with Eastern Europe.

The future of the two Germanies. The West's support for German reunification (a no-cost policy during the Cold War since the chance of its actually happening was nil) will be tested by political developments in the East. The spectre of German reunification, raised by refugees from, and recent protest movements in, the GDR, is already making people nervous on both sides of the East-West divide. Pressures for democratic reform and liberalization in the GDR will grow, and if successful they will accelerate political pressures for further reconciliation perhaps leading to an eventual German reunification.

The West must begin to develop a policy in anticipation of these events, no matter how difficult this may be politically. Otherwise we will be led willy nilly by centripetal forces already at work in the two Germanies. Soviet interests, and those of other Eastern European countries, will also have to be taken into account in addressing the German question. The allergy to a reunified Germany, given the legacy of Barbarossa and the Second World War, is perhaps greater in the East than in the West.

The future of NATO and Western security interests. Predictable, orderly change that can be accommodated within (and by reform of) existing political and institutional structures is clearly in Western interests. Whatever happens, stability is necessary to assure the West's own economic and political future. There is a real danger that change in the Eastern bloc will occur much faster and more unpredictably than

anticipated. This makes it all the more important that the West seriously ponder the future and assess the long-term implications of recent developments for Western security. NATO and other Western economic and political institutions like the European Community, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the International Monetary Fund have a major role to play in promoting orderly change through the provision and re-scheduling of loans and a general reduction in barriers to trade, commerce and the flow of capital. So do the arms control and confidence-building measures currently under negotiation in various European fora.



The possibility of a totally integrated Europe with a united Germany at its centre is remote. What is more likely is a continuation of the current system of alliances – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – but there will be a variety of different systems of government, and perhaps growing rivalries within Eastern Europe as a result.

Major uncertainties. The impact of resurgent ethnicity and nationalism will affect potential stability throughout the Eastern bloc, and in the Soviet Union where this problem is linked to Gorbachev's own political fortunes. If the Baltic states achieved independence this would seal Gorbachev's fate since the Ukraine could well follow next. He would then be presiding over the breakup of the Soviet empire and there are lots of Russians who don't want to see this happen.

Market reforms in Eastern Europe will have asymmetrical costs and benefits and will result in clear "winners" and "losers." Unemployment will increase before economies get better, which will in turn fuel political discontent and jeopardize the reform process. The *ancien régime* will resist change because its members will lose their privileges in the conversion to a market economy.

Arms control and defence. There is a clear need to locate Western arms control and defence policies and interests within the broader purview of these political and economic developments, including the 1992 creation of a free-trade zone within the European Community.

East-West relations are too important to be left to the arms controllers and strategists. Arms control and defence policies must be linked to a political and economic strategy which promotes political reform and an orderly transition in Eastern Europe. Western governments also need to have a better understanding of the forces behind the changes now taking place.

IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO OVERSTATE the role the West can play in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; our margin of influence is limited. There are obvious dangers if the West is seen to be too active in promoting political change or undermining Soviet influence. Nevertheless, there is an even greater danger that failure to take effective action and provide assistance, will impede the reformers who have acquired power in countries like Poland and Hungary.

The West obviously can and should do more to help: food aid, debt re-scheduling, and the provision of technical and development assistance are all possibilities. Assistance with technical

matters such as financial management and control, and the legal complexities of private ownership, is especially important if these countries are to transform their economies. This sort of help is also cheap. The decisions of Canada and other Western governments to provide additional loans and credits to Poland and Hungary are a good start and there are further encouraging signs from Washington that it sees a new "window of opportunity" to forge a new relationship with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, a larger and more coordinated response is called for.

We are not at the end of history. We stand on the threshold of a new world marked by the ending of the Cold War – a world in which the opportunities and benefits to be gained from change are just as great as the risks, uncertainties, and potential costs of failure. There is a great deal left to do.

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

After a relatively unproductive eleventh round of Nuclear and Space Arms Talks ended in Geneva on 7 August, the prospects for a Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty improved significantly the following month. Just prior to a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Wyoming on 22 and 23 September, US Secretary of State Baker announced that Washington would drop its proposed ban on mobile ICBMs, provided that Congress approved funding for US missiles of this type. Upon his arrival in the US, Shevardnadze transmitted a letter from President Gorbachev to President Bush outlining a number of significant new Soviet proposals intended to break the logjam in the negotiations. These included Soviet willingness to sign and implement a START Treaty even without an agreement on Defence and Space Arms (restricting the US Strategic Defence Initiative), and agreement to a long-standing US demand for the dismantling of a large radar at Krasnoyarsk (which Shevardnadze later admitted had been an "open violation" of the ABM Treaty).

All of these points were embodied in a joint statement issued at the end of the Wyoming meeting, which also included agreement on a number of other strategic arms issues. Perhaps the most important of the latter was a rather vague and little-noticed reference to a Soviet suggestion that sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) "could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations." Some observers took this to mean that the Soviets might be willing to defer final agreement on the troublesome SLCM issue until after a START Treaty had been signed. Other points of

agreement at Wyoming included Soviet acceptance in principle of US-proposed trial inspections prior to the Treaty's signature; an agreement to provide advance notice of strategic exercises; and some progress on definitional and verification issues.

Soviet and American officials in Wyoming refused to predict that a START agreement would be fully completed in time for the major Bush-Gorbachev summit planned for late spring or early summer 1990. However, a few days later President Bush told reporters that there was "a good likelihood" of a START Treaty being signed in 1990.

### Conventional Arms Control

Progress continues to be made at the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna, although President Bush's goal of an agreement by mid-1990 remains in some doubt. During the third round, lasting from 7 September to 19 October, both sides presented further details of their verification and "stabilization" proposals. NATO's "stabilization" package, tabled 21 September, would allow just one military activity involving more than 40,000 troops or 800 main battle tanks every two years (and then only with twelve months advance notice). The Warsaw Pact's package, presented 19 October, provides for the stationing of permanent monitors at European "entry and exit" points. NATO members have been unable to agree among themselves on this matter, with some West European states fearful of revealing sensitive information about their arms exports.

Some movement occurred on the key issue of aircraft limits. The Pact agreed for the first time to restrict aircraft other than ground-attack planes, including some types of fighter, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft. It proposed a ceiling for each alliance of 4,700 such aircraft (compared to NATO's proposed ceiling of 5,700), but would

exempt 1,800 interceptors that it insists are necessary to defend against US strategic bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, as well as planes based on aircraft carriers. The Pact would also not limit training aircraft, which NATO wants included as combat-capable. Its proposed ceiling of 1,900 helicopters is identical to NATO's proposal, however.

On other issues, the two sides are reported to have agreed on a definition of artillery (as including cannons, howitzers, mortars and rocket launchers of over 100 mm, but not anti-tank weapons). However, they had failed to achieve agreed definitions of tanks and armoured troop carriers. New proposals introduced by the Warsaw Pact included a ban on the construction of foreign bases in Europe, a restructuring of front-line units to reduce their offensive potential, and a summit meeting of the heads of state of the twenty-three participating states in the latter half of 1990, to finalize a treaty.

### Open Skies

Among other agreements reached at the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming was endorsement "in principle" of President Bush's May 1989 proposal for "Open Skies." Prime Minister Mulroney subsequently offered to host a conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers to lay the groundwork for such an agreement, which would allow unarmed aircraft from participating states to fly over each other's territory to assure each that no surprise attack is being planned. As of the end of October, it was intended that an initial meeting be held in Ottawa early in 1990, to be followed shortly after by a second meeting in a Warsaw Pact capital, probably Budapest. At the UN in September, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze accepted the Canadian offer to hold the first meeting, and assured Secretary of State for External Affairs Clark that the USSR would "work actively for its success." It was reported a few days

later that Canada had notified Moscow informally of its willingness to provide logistical facilities for Soviet aircraft as part of an "Open Skies" arrangement.

### Chemical Weapons

President Bush unveiled a much-heralded initiative on chemical weapons in a speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September. He proposed that the US and USSR reduce their CW stocks to a level eighty percent below that currently held by the US, even before signature of a global Convention. American critics of the offer described it as an empty gesture, since Congressional legislation already required the US administration to destroy all of its old CW stocks by 1997. Bush also pledged to destroy ninety-eight percent of the US stockpile in the first eight years of a CW Convention, if the USSR did likewise, but indicated that a complete ban would require the signature of all states capable of building chemical weapons.

The next day, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze welcomed Bush's announcement, but urged the US to go further. He proposed that the superpowers destroy all of their stocks prior to conclusion of the Convention, if Washington would join Moscow in ceasing its current production (in 1987 the US resumed CW production after an eighteen-year moratorium, while the USSR announced suspension of its production). The Soviet proposal was rejected the following day by President Bush, citing a US need for deterrence of, and leverage over, other chemical weapons-capable states. Finally, in mid-October, US officials confirmed reports that President Bush had decided to retain the option to continue producing CW even after a Convention takes effect, contrary to the current negotiating text in Geneva. The US had earlier agreed to prohibit such production. □

— RON PURVER



IN ONE OF HIS FIRST FOREIGN policy speeches since becoming president, George Bush proposed on 12 May 1989, that the US and the Soviet Union – along with their respective allies – enter into discussions on a system of “Open Skies.” Open Skies envisages an arrangement in which those countries involved have the right to carry out mutual, unarmed aerial reconnaissance of each others’ territory. The system gives those countries the opportunity to monitor the military activities and installations of other member countries. Unlike satellite surveillance, aerial reconnaissance can be carried out whenever necessary over a given area, thus providing greater flexibility and openness.

Open Skies was first proposed by President Eisenhower at a summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, and was at the time seen as a way of testing the seriousness of the Soviet Union on disarmament, and an attempt to get around the heavy secrecy that surrounded Soviet military activities. The new Bush proposal is a confidence-building measure which aims to consolidate the new openness in Soviet society and new Soviet willingness to accept intrusive verification. It would also monitor the political and military changes in Europe that are occurring as a result of that openness.

The Canadian government provided very early support to the Bush proposal. At a meeting in Washington prior to the Bush speech, Prime Minister Mulroney encouraged President Bush to put forward the idea. Afterwards, Prime Minister Mulroney publicly announced his support for Open Skies and stated that Canada would be willing to open up its territory to such surveillance.

At the meeting between US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Wyoming in September, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiations on the proposal. Multilateral negotiations involving the twenty-three member

states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are due to be held in Ottawa in February 1990.

### Historical Background

In preparation for a summit meeting in July 1955 involving France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US, a group of American experts, known as the Quantico Panel, suggested that the US propose a system of unlimited aerial reconnaissance of US and Soviet territory as a way of testing whether the Soviet Union was serious enough about disarmament to implement the intrusive measures that would be needed for verification. The proposal received little support within the administration but was embraced by Nelson Rockefeller, a special advisor to the president, who made an effort to get the president and other officials on side.

The proposal was not approved until the night before Eisenhower was to make his speech. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, had been a final holdout but was won over by the “drama and substance” of the proposal in a situation in which it was highly unlikely the Soviet Union would agree to the idea. Indeed, Soviet officials quickly labelled Open Skies as a one-sided US attempt to spy on the Soviet Union and questioned the rationale for implementing inspection measures without any accompanying measures of disarmament.

The Soviet negative position remained firm until November 1956 when Khrushchev sent a letter to Eisenhower picking up on an earlier US idea to implement the system in a limited geographical zone and suggesting Europe as that zone. The Arctic was proposed by

the US as an alternative – an attractive area to begin because it contained relatively few sensitive military installations. With this shift in emphasis there was also a shift in goals. Open Skies was now being treated as a confidence-building measure whose main purpose was to ease fears of surprise attack, rather than testing verification methods and Soviet willingness to permit intrusive inspection.

However, there was tremendous difficulty in reaching agreement on the zone’s boundaries, and the negotiations, along with other issues at the UN Disarmament subcommittee, slid increasingly into stalemate. Open Skies enjoyed a resurgence of interest in the UN Security Council in 1958 when the US proposed an aerial inspection system to cover all of the Arctic (including Canada and the other Nordic countries). In spite of support from all other members of the Security Council, and an unusual intervention by the UN Secretary-General, the proposal was defeated by a Soviet veto.

Given Canada’s geographical location between the two superpowers, Canadian territory would be important to whatever arrangement might be made. Canada offered the Arctic and all of Canadian territory as part of an Open Skies system. The Canadian government also offered to help with training and equipment. After Open Skies faded from the superpower agenda in the late 1950s, Canada continued its interest in the idea. In private correspondence with Khrushchev at the time, Prime Minister Diefenbaker offered to undertake a reciprocal

inspection arrangement with the Soviet Union. However, this was never taken up by the Soviet Union.

### Current Considerations

Several important issues relating to the details of the system to be established will need to be addressed before it will be clear how far the proposal will advance. A full Open Skies system involving all the territory of all twenty-three countries would mark a major change in thinking for both alliances. A less comprehensive system – with restricted areas or time frames – still offers the advantage of giving Canada and the US a chance to support their Western European allies in the kind of intrusiveness that would be required for verifying conventional force reductions in Europe.

At present the proposal suggests that the system will work on an alliance-to-alliance basis rather than bilaterally only between the US and USSR or in a twenty-three nation free for all. It is not yet clear what types of overflight arrangements individual countries might enjoy. The use and flow of information gathered will also be important: will information be available to all members of the alliance carrying out the inspection? How will the data be shared? What sort of restrictions will there be on its use? And of particular interest to Canada – will the Soviet Union require bases in North America in order to carry out its reconnaissance of the US?

Although the US is advocating an unrestricted Open Skies system, during the negotiations for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty the US backed away from its own intrusive verification proposals once they had been accepted by the Soviet Union. Elements within the US administration, especially the intelligence services, were reluctant to accept the implications of Soviet inspectors at sensitive military installations. The type of intrusiveness involved in Open Skies may prove equally difficult to swallow. L

– JANE BOULDEN

## DEFENCE NOTES



### Peacekeeping Developments

The 1987 Defence White Paper appeared to play down the role of peacekeeping in Canadian defence policy. Since then, however, there have been growing demands for peacekeeping operations. Following the deployment of Canadian troops to monitor the Iran-Iraq cease fire, both Canadian troops and police have participated in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. While these operations have stretched the UN Secretariat thinly, they have not apparently discouraged Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar from embarking on another bold initiative.

On 11 October 1989 the Secretary-General submitted a recommendation to the Security Council for the establishment of a United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The rugged terrain and long borders in Central America pose difficult challenges to a UN observer force. ONUCA is envisaged as a small force (some 260 military personnel with civilian support) but with considerable mobility. This would be provided by cross-terrain vehicles, and helicopters. In addition, the Secretary-General proposed that ONUCA have eight fast patrol boats for use in the Gulf of Fonseca, and light speedboats for navigable rivers.

The five Central American Governments have expressed the wish that the member states of ONUCA should include West Germany, Spain and Canada. Since the Organization of American States (OAS) has cooperated

closely with the United Nations in developing ONUCA, Canadian participation seems likely.

### The US Defence Budget

At the end of October, after several months of negotiation, the Congressional Conference Committee negotiating to settle the differences between the Senate and House versions of the 1990 military programmes bill, appeared to have reached a mutually acceptable compromise. At issue are virtually all the central strategic military programmes of the Bush administration.

On Star Wars, the conferees agreed on a budget of US \$3.5 billion – considerably less than the Senate figure of \$4.3 billion, which was close to the actual request from the Bush administration, but more than the \$2.8 billion proposed by the House. The lack of protest from the White House, particularly the absence of any threat to veto the agreement, appeared to confirm that the Bush administration, while determined to press ahead with Star Wars research, is less enthusiastic than its predecessor about early deployment, and not likely to make it the centrepiece of its strategic plans.

The future of the B-2 Stealth bomber also remains unresolved. The US Air Force has vigorously defended the B-2 against criticisms that it was inferior in range to the existing B-1B. Declassifying information previously regarded as top secret, in October the Air Force released comparative data for the B-1B and the B-2 on weapons load, fuel capacity and range which appear to confirm the advantages of the B-2. Congress, however, remains skeptical. The Conference Committee proposed to slow the pace of the B-2 programme, while indi-

vidual Congressmen continue to query the exact missions of the stealthy bomber and the cost (US \$530 million) of each aircraft.

Finally, the Committee appeared to have turned the problem of choosing between the MX missile and the Midgetman back to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. By not specifying the allocation of funds between the two missiles, Congress appears willing to allow Cheney to proceed with both. Such discretion may come as a surprise to the Secretary. Congress has resolutely refused to cancel the two tactical aircraft programmes which Cheney himself wants to scrap: additional F-14s and the V-22 Osprey helicopter/aircraft. Both have survived the Congressional compromise.

### Soviet Military Doctrines

During the past year Soviet military spokesmen have de-

scribed in principle the changes in military doctrines and structures that would accompany conventional force reductions in Europe. The general concept of “defensive sufficiency” is said to entail the restructuring of Soviet armed forces in such a way that they could not be used to undertake large-scale offensive operations, but only the defence of national territory and that of allies.

In October in Ottawa, Major-General Anatoli Bolyatko told a Canadian meeting that revised manuals were now in use in Soviet military academies instructing Soviet tank officers in the primacy of defensive tactics. The force structure that would follow from these changes, however, is still not clear. Bolyatko emphasized the Soviet view that the best offensive weapon is the tank, and the best defensive weapon is the tank. In comments some months earlier to the US House Armed Services

### ACQUIRING BALLISTIC MISSILES

In late October Bush administration officials confirmed that there is evidence of cooperation between Israel and South Africa in ballistic missile technology. On 5 July, South Africa tested the booster of a medium-range ballistic missile which, Western experts believe, could be used either to boost a satellite into orbit, or as a missile carrying a nuclear warhead.

The comments on 26 October by administration spokesmen indicated that the United States had identified the booster plume from the South African test as closely resembling that from the Israeli-built Jericho II rocket. The Israeli government reaffirmed its policy not to conclude new defence contracts with South Africa, but did not deny that ballistic missile technology might be transferred under existing contracts signed before March 1987.

The debate about Israeli-South African cooperation drew attention once again to the lengthening list of countries seeking to add ballistic missiles to their defence forces. According to recent reports from the Congressional Research Service and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), at least thirteen “non-major military powers” have acquired or are seeking to build ballistic missiles. The military value of these missiles lies primarily in their ability to deliver nuclear warheads. Most of the states involved are believed to be capable of building nuclear weapons.

In the Middle East, the Israeli Jericho II is thought to have a range of up to 1,400 km and can deliver a nuclear warhead. Egypt and Iraq have cooperated with Argentina in the development of the Condor II, which



Committee, Marshal Akhromeyov stated that the Soviets produce 1,700 tanks each year, but that production would be reduced by forty percent by the end of 1990.

### NATO's Future Force Structure

In an October interview at the Pentagon, General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, defined NATO defence priorities in the event that deep cuts in conventional forces are negotiated at Vienna.

Galvin reaffirmed the NATO doctrine of flexible response, and indicated that force modernization would be required to maintain flexible response if there are major reductions in conventional forces. His top priority is a short-range nuclear missile to succeed the Lance, and an air-to-surface missile which would be nuclear capable. (The Lance has a range of only 130 kilometres, whereas the INF Treaty leaves it open to both sides to deploy short-range missiles with ranges up to five hundred kilometres.)

Galvin also suggested that future NATO forces would emphasize flexibility and mobility in

order to compensate for reduced numbers. This would include long-range air forces and mobile ground forces capable of disrupting enemy attempts to concentrate and move forces quickly. It would also require greater ability to mobilize reserves promptly, and, therefore, a willingness on the part of NATO governments to make early decisions about mobilization. For this reason, Galvin suggested that high priority should go to improved reconnaissance capabilities able to give early and unambiguous warning of troop build-ups.

While all of these developments would be expensive, aircraft reductions now under discussion in Vienna will provide NATO with an opportunity to modernize its forces by transferring late-model aircraft. Since all member countries would be required to reduce their European-based aircraft, there will be opportunities to phase out older aircraft such as the Alpha jet and the F-4 Phantom, and replace them with more capable F-15s and F-16s. Discussions are underway to ensure that, within NATO as a whole,

the least capable aircraft are eliminated first.

The prospect of significant reductions in numbers of aircraft and tanks is also reviving discussions about specialized roles and missions within NATO. In Washington, influential commentators have suggested, for example, that at some future point the US might specialize in the air defence of Europe, implying that most if not all ground forces would be provided by the Europeans.

### The Senate Special Committee Report

Such discussions, although tentative, could have a strong influence on the future structure of Canadian defence forces. In October, the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence released its report on Canada's Land Forces.

The Report recognizes that, in reality, the commitments made in the 1987 White Paper have been dropped. The White Paper determined that Canada would abandon its commitment to send a brigade to Northern Norway, and consolidate its ground forces in southern Germany at the existing Canadian base at Lahr. The new Canadian commitment was to be an armoured division, of which one brigade and division-strength equipment would be based in Germany, with one brigade in Canada prepared for rapid deployment to Germany. This commitment would have involved an increase of about 2,000 personnel in Germany, and, among other equipment requirements, the purchase of some two hundred and fifty main battle tanks.

Recognizing that these changes will not take place, the Senate Report investigates alternative force commitments for Canada. It begins by emphasizing the importance of the current conventional force negotiations, and the need, therefore, not to create difficulties through unilateral withdrawal from Europe. At the same time, the conjunction of Canada's search for a credible defence policy and the changes imminent in Europe offer an opportunity to re-

duce "the disparity between stated land force commitments in Europe and actual capabilities."

The Report explores two possibilities. The first is to restructure for "defensive defence." In this approach Canada would provide a front-line, light-armoured division based on six flexible "manoeuvre elements." Only two of these elements would have tanks in Europe. The other elements would emphasize battlefield mobility and anti-tank defensive operations. The Report suggests that such a force would require only about 3,500 troops permanently deployed in Europe, with the other elements air transportable from Canada.

The second force commitment considered is an air-mobile reserve force which might continue to be based at Lahr. Although such a force would be compatible with current NATO thinking, the Report recognizes that the helicopters and other equipment required would involve an awkward transition from the present structure and require initially large commitments to purchase new equipment. By contrast, the light division concept would require relatively few new weapon systems.

The mandate of the Senate Committee did not lead it to review the broader question of specialization which might, for example, suggest that either the land commitment or the air commitment to Europe be abandoned. The Report is nevertheless timely in contributing to the review of Canadian defence policy. It seems evident that major decisions about the future of Canadian defence forces will depend in part on the broader debate within NATO. On the other hand, changing force commitments within the alliance may soon offer the Canadian government a second opportunity to define a credible defence policy. □

— DAVID COX

is estimated to have a range of up to 1,000 km and will be deployed in the mid-1990s. Missiles with shorter ranges have been supplied to a number of Middle East countries by the Soviet Union, China, and (in the case of the Lance missile to Israel) the United States.

In South America the Argentinean development of the Condor has been matched by Brazil, which, in April 1989, successfully tested the Sonda IV with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometres. In South Asia, India successfully tested the Agni medium-range missile (potential range of 2,500 km) in the Bay of Bengal, in May 1989. Pakistan announced earlier in the year that it had developed a rocket booster with a range of 600 kilometres.

The apparently inexorable spread of ballistic missile technology and production has taken place despite an agreement among seven leading Western countries (including Canada) to limit exports and prevent the transfer of technology. The Missile Technology Control Regime established in April 1987 was applicable to missiles able to carry a payload in excess of 500 kg (the smallest payload for a nuclear weapon) over 500 kilometres. All of the missiles described above are in this category. Over the past two years the United States and the Soviet Union have held discussions on further steps that might be taken to curb the spread of ballistic missiles, including the possible participation of the Soviet Union in the Control Regime. The United States began a strategic review of missile proliferation in mid-1989, the results of which have not yet been disclosed.

## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



During the month of October, Canada assumed the presidency of the Security Council. While there were no major crises, Ambassador Yves Fortier did have to contend with a number of complex issues – Namibia being the most notable.

### Namibia

The problems of implementing the Namibian independence plan percolated throughout the late summer. On 16 August the Council met at the request of the African Group and the Non-aligned States to discuss "South Africa's non-compliance with the requirements of Security Council Resolution 435" – the resolution that laid the groundwork for Namibia's transition to independence.

The key complaint concerned the activities of the South African-trained paramilitary force known as *Koevoet*, which had been "integrated" into the ranks of the South West Africa Police. African diplomats charged that *Koevoet* was intimidating rural inhabitants thereby threatening the prospects for free and fair elections in November. On 29 August, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 640 which demanded strict compliance with the terms of the Namibian peace plan, especially by South Africa, and the disbandment of all paramilitary forces, "in particular, *Koevoet*."

But even before Resolution 640 was adopted, South Africa, in an effort to deflect the criticism, announced it would remove *Koevoet* from the ranks of the territorial police and demobilize the force. In a speech to the Council, Ambassador Fortier welcomed the announcement. At the same time, he was critical of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) forces in Angola: "Canada remains concerned that less than fully reli-

able information on SWAPO combatants remaining in Angola has contributed to instability more than once. The recent reduction of tension in northern Namibia, which we welcome, should be complemented by a corresponding increase in transparency in Angola," Fortier told the Council.

The criticism of SWAPO reflected the desire by Canada to be perceived as fair and balanced. As an architect of the Namibian independence plan, Canada has striven to remain credible to both South Africa and the Namibian combatants.

It has been a complicated task, given the impatience of African states combined with the erratic and aggressive behaviour of South Africa. For months the African states complained that there were not enough UN forces in Namibia to ensure a fair election. Anger increased on 6 October when Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar reported to the Council that the South African-trained Namibian police force had withheld information and denied UN officials the right to visit people in detention. He also charged that the police were delaying investigations.

On 18 October African states asked for an urgent Council meeting. They accused South Africa of failing to disband *Koevoet* and other ethnic forces and commando units. Initially, they demanded that sanctions be imposed on South Africa. It was up to ambassador Fortier to try and find a compromise between African states and those members (mainly Western countries) opposed to such harsh language and measures. Fortier said his main task as president was "trying to ensure a consensus and to have the Council speak with one voice."

The underlying concern was that if a resolution was introduced that was perceived to be unbalanced in its criticism of South Africa, it might be voted against by a number of countries. This would make the Council appear divided at a

time when it was felt that the Council would be most effective speaking with a single, impartial voice, so as not to threaten the impending elections.

The Council agreed on 31 October to adopt a mild resolution that demanded "full and strict compliance by all parties concerned, particularly South Africa," and called for the complete disbandment of *Koevoet* and the South West Africa Territorial Force.

### Central America

The Secretary-General submitted a report to the Council on 11 October outlining the creation of a United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). Its function would be to conduct on-site verification of the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the area, and the "non-use of the territory of one state for attacks on other states."

The report was the outgrowth of the 1987 Esquipulas agreement signed in Guatemala by the five Central American presidents. But ONUCA, which would be made up of troops from various countries including Canada, initially faced a number of hurdles. One was uncertainty over immediate US backing. As well, the Secretary-General noted that the ability of ONUCA to carry out its mandate would depend "to a large extent" on the cooperation of the irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the area.

On 11 August the Council heard a complaint by Panama that US military manoeuvres had violated established procedures. The US responded by saying that its military activities were in complete accord with the Panama Canal treaties. It added that it was the regime of General Antonio Noriega that had violated the treaties on almost 900 occasions. The Council agreed to continue discussion of the complaint at a later, undetermined, date.

### Middle East

On 15 August the Council "urgently" appealed for an immediate

cease fire by all parties in the Lebanese conflict and expressed its support for the efforts of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab Heads of State to settle the Lebanese crisis. As fighting in Lebanon continued, the Council issued a similar statement of support on 20 September.

On the issue of the Israeli Occupied Territories, the Council on 20 August adopted a somewhat sterner resolution than the one it had voted for nearly a month before. The latest document "deplores" the continuing deportation of Palestinian civilians from the territories. Fourteen countries including Canada voted in favour of the resolution; the US abstained.

Diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran and Iraq to agree to a comprehensive settlement of their dispute continued to bear no fruit. On 29 September, the Council called on them to implement Resolution 598, which forms the basis of the UN sponsored peace plan; and extended the mandate of the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group for a further six months.

### Other Issues Before the Council

In October, five new rotating members joined the Council. They include Cuba, elected for the first time since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959.

In its recent bid to make greater use of the UN, the USSR proposed that the world body be given a greater role in preventing conflicts. On 4 October Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky urged that the Security Council become more active in safeguarding peace. During a news conference, he proposed authorizing the president of the Council to mediate between countries heading toward a dispute, as well as creating a chain of "war risk reduction centres" around the world. Mr. Petrovsky's proposals were submitted to the Secretary-General. So far, the Council has not formally addressed them. □

— TREVOR ROWE



## REPORT FROM THE HILL



The 34th Session of Parliament resumed on 25 September, after its summer recess. There was no major discussion of foreign or defence policy in the House of Commons in the fall, but the main themes of official international security policy were laid out by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark when he addressed the 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September.

### Clark at the United Nations

In that speech, Clark welcomed the changes in East-West relations, stressing "the turning towards democracy and the expansion of the market place" in Eastern bloc countries. Noting the remarkable progress in many regional conflicts, he described himself as encouraged by the situation in South Africa and welcomed Egyptian President Mubarak's ten-point plan for peace in the Middle East. He also indicated that the International Conference on Cambodia (see below) had served a positive purpose for identifying "international control mechanisms and reconstruction processes which can be brought into play once a settlement is reached."

### Policy on Cambodia

After a month of meetings, the Paris Conference ended in failure on 31 August. With India, Canada had co-chaired a special committee charged with developing a framework for the establishment of an International Control Mechanism. Mr. Clark, who attended the opening, as well as the Ministerial Session from 28 to 30 August, indicated in response to a question in the House on 3 October as to why the government refused to recognize the Hun Sen government in Cambodia, that both

throughout the proceedings and afterwards, Canada has searched for a means "by which there could be a coalition government or an interim authority that could speak for all of the Cambodian people" and which would "minimize the role of the Khmer Rouge." He also indicated Canada's willingness to consider participating in a peacekeeping force once a settlement was reached.

### Southern Africa

Mr. Clark chaired the fourth meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, which met in Canberra, Australia, 7 to 9 August. The Committee had been created at the October 1987 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver to provide high level impetus and guidance of further Commonwealth objectives on Southern Africa. At the end of the meeting, Clark sent a letter to South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, which contained a defence of continuing sanctions, and which addressed aspects of the situation in neighbouring Namibia during its transition period to independence.

In early September, a five-member, all-party group of parliamentarians visited Namibia to observe the pre-election process, led by Walter McLean, MP, who is also Special Representative of the Government for Southern Africa and Commonwealth Affairs. At the end of their visit, the MPs issued a brief report indicating their general reassurance that the election itself would be "free and fair," but stressing the longer-term — both the process of transition between the election and actual independence, as well as the need for generous development aid to Namibia after independence in 1990.

From 17 to 24 October both the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Malaysia. Following the general conference statement of 22 October in which

all the leaders agreed that, although there were signs of change, sanctions should not yet be relaxed, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, in a surprise move, issued a separate declaration in which she called for a more positive outlook towards Pretoria. On 23 October Prime Minister Mulroney told the press that he was angered by British procedures, which could, in his view, undermine future Commonwealth cooperation.

### Parliamentary Committees

The Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence tabled its fifth report, *Canada's Land Forces*, on 31 October. The Committee had begun work on the report in 1987, but was delayed by the dissolution of the 33rd Parliament, as well as by the rapid changes in East-West relations and the cutbacks in defence spending announced by the government in the 27 April budget. The report rejected both withdrawal from Europe and continuation of the status quo for Canadian Forces in Europe. The latter would involve, according to the report, substantial expenditures on equipment that is unusable elsewhere.

Instead, without laying out a precise alternative, the Committee suggested a couple of options that would involve a substantial restructuring of forces in Europe. One was an air mobile brigade, which could be deployed if need be in locales other than Europe, and the other was for "defensive defence," as a response to the less offensive force structures envisaged for Europe by the Soviet Union.

The Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) began hearings on its major study of the year, Canada's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The committee plans to visit the region in the spring of 1990 and issue its report later in the year.

In the meantime, the Committee held a hearing on 2 November on the \$42 million economic as-

sistance package for Poland and Hungary that the government had announced on 12 October. It also heard in early November from officials and outside experts concerning a positive agenda for Canada to adopt in the Organization of American States (OAS) following the government's decision to join. Also in November, the Committee struck a sub-committee on international debt under the chairmanship of Walter McLean.

The House of Commons Defence Committee visited bases on both the east and west coasts during October in its on-going study of maritime sovereignty.

### Short Notes from the Hill


Margaret Mason was appointed Ambassador for Disarmament in August, succeeding Douglas Roche. Ms. Mason, a lawyer by training, was legal advisor to the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1980-1981), Policy Adviser to Joe Clark and Eric Nielsen when they were in the opposition (1981-1984) and Policy Adviser to Mr. Clark as Secretary of State for External Affairs since 1984 with responsibility for security issues, East-West relations, and export controls policy, among other items.

de Montigny Marchand, was named Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on 18 October, succeeding James H. Taylor who will become Ambassador to Japan. Most recently Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Mr. Marchand has also served as Deputy Minister of Communications and as Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.

On 27 October at a meeting of leaders in Costa Rica honouring the country's one hundred years of democracy, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would be joining the Organization of American States (OAS). Canada has restricted itself to observer status in the organization since 1972. □

— GREG WIRICK

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



**Bernard Wood** spent three weeks during September and October in Namibia as part of a high-level observer team appointed by the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers to report to the Heads of Government Meeting about the election and the transition to independence in that country.

In mid-September the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable **Joe Clark** announced the appointment of **Claude Julien** as a member of the Institute's board of directors. Mr. Julien, who lives in Paris, France, is currently Editor and Director of *Le Monde Diplomatique* and president of the Centre d'études et de recherches sur l'Amérique latine. He has pursued an extensive career in journalism, primarily with *Le Monde* and *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and is the author of nine books which deal largely with international affairs and politics, including *Le Canada, dernière chance de l'Europe* in 1965.

In late September **David Braide** spoke to the founding meeting of the Defence Associations Network in Ottawa on the subject of the Institute and its role in the peace and security debate, especially given the changing contexts of East-West relations in the past five years.

**Vladimir Petrovsky**, Deputy Foreign Minister in the Soviet Union, visited the Institute during October to discuss Soviet views of international organizations and multilateral approaches to foreign policy questions. Mr. Petrovsky spoke about Soviet initiatives at the UN in regard to the notion of comprehensive security, the development of those ideas and the

reactions of other states to them. Prospects for multilateral actions in several fields are much improved in recent years, and Mr. Petrovsky urged further academic study on approaches, ways and means.

"East-West Economic Cooperation and the Prospects for Security" was the subject of a keynote address given by **Bernard Wood** to an international seminar at the NATO Defence College in Rome in late October. The Director's Report on page 21 covers some of the major themes he raised there, central as they are to the current global debate.

At the end of September the US Mission to NATO and the War College of the National Defense University in Washington sponsored a conference in Brussels on the changes in Eastern Europe and their implications for Western security. **Fen Hampson** was a participant, along with other academics and policy makers from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Later in the fall, Dr. Hampson gave a paper on "A New Role for the United Nations" at a conference in Lisbon sponsored by the Portuguese Institute for Strategic and International Studies on the subject of European security in a multi-polar world.

**Keith Krause** of York University was sponsored by and reported to the Institute at a conference organized by the Quaker Office at the United Nations on the subject of arms transfers. Professor Krause, who wrote a conference report for the Institute on the same subject, gave a paper to academics and senior diplomats from states sponsoring resolutions on the subject at the UN.

There were several seminars in the Current Issues series organized by the Research section of the Institute during the fall. **Peter**

**Beck** from the Kingston Polytechnic in Surrey, England, spoke on "The Relevance of the Antarctic Treaty System to Canada and the Arctic." **Itamar Rabinovitch** of Tel Aviv University led a discussion on "The Israeli-Syrian Relationship as Part of a Regional Settlement." **Fred Axelgard** of Georgetown University spoke on the "Arab Israeli Peace Process and the US Involvement." **Kamel Abu Jaber** of the University of Jordan led a discussion on "The Concept of State in the Middle East."

In late October **Heribert Adam** of Simon Fraser University and **Kogila Moodley** of the University of British Columbia, organized and led a seminar at the Institute on Canadian policy towards Southern Africa. The seminar was part of a major research project the two professors are undertaking for the Institute. **Alex Boraine**, Executive Director of the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa, began the discussion with an overview of the recent socio-political developments in South Africa. Participants turned their attention to the various analyses of the constitutional and economic alternatives, and compromise formulas. The seminar concluded with an examination of the implications for Canadian policy, including the impact of trade sanctions, disinvestment, loans, diplomatic isolation, academic and cultural boycotts, and the role of non-governmental organizations.

At the end of October **Gail Osherenko** and **Anne Fikkan** addressed a research seminar at the Institute on Arctic Environmental Challenges. Ms. Osherenko is a research fellow in the Environmental Studies Programme and a project director at the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth College. Ms. Fikkan was

a special adviser on environmental research in the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment and visiting research scholar at Dartmouth. The Arctic environment is threatened by pollution originating in the mid-latitudes and carried by air and ocean currents as well as by hydrocarbon development in the Arctic region. In addition, increased military activity in the Arctic, mineral extraction, hydroelectric development, and even tourism, increasingly damage Arctic ecosystems, wildlife and habitat. Ms. Osherenko and Ms. Fikkan discussed the extent to which international cooperation is necessary to prevent and cope with these threats, whether such cooperation should be confined to the ice states or whether the issues should be handled in broader international fora, if cooperation among Arctic nations on environmental matters will affect issues of military security, and whether regional cooperation on Arctic environmental issues threatens the Western Alliance.

**Nancy Gordon** participated in a meeting of experts in New York in September organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the UN Centre for Science and Technology for Development. The purpose of the meeting was to address crucial problems faced by the global community in the areas of environment, economic development, and disarmament, in order to formulate and suggest initiatives to the Secretary-General of the United Nations which will complement his efforts on the political front. Specifically, the meetings addressed issues of climate, information technology and economic conversion, focussing on the following questions: what are the core scientific and technical facts and questions of concern to policy makers around the world, and what are the political consequences and problems of translating scientific insight into specific political action? What are some



practical first steps toward political resolutions of current impasses? The group drafted recommendations for presentation to the Secretary-General.

On Friday 13 October, the Institute launched the 1989 edition of *The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution*. Members of the Board, staff, officials and journalists celebrated the publication of "this essential reference work," and paid tribute to the writers, editors and staff members who produce the book each year.

In early November **Bernard Wood** gave the Gerald Savory Memorial lecture at the University of British Columbia. He spoke on "The International System of the 1990s: Canadian Opportunities and Risks." Prior to that Mr. Wood gave a lecture at Queen's University entitled "Rethinking North American Relationships." And following his appearance at UBC he spoke in Whitehorse, Yukon, on the programmes of the Institute and their evolution.

**Brad Feasey** gave presentations to high school teachers at a professional development day in Brandon, Manitoba in mid-October. Later in the month he participated in the Ontario History and Social Sciences Teachers Association in Toronto. On both occasions he gave workshops on teaching issues of peace and security at the high school level, drawing from the *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*, the revised edition of which the Institute will publish in the spring.

**Roger Hill** gave a presentation on "Le rôle de l'Institut et des groupes de pression," at the colloquium on "Le processus de démocratisation en matière de défense et de contrôle des armements," at the Centre québécois de relations internationales, 25 to 26 October 1989, in Québec.

**Ron Purver** attended a Nordic Peace Conference at Concordia University in Montreal in September, and a conference on

"Strengthening Canada-USSR Relations: Cooperation in the Arctic" in Ottawa in late October. He also addressed a group of senior US Naval leaders on "Restricting

University Service of Canada (WUSC). **Norma Salem** chaired a session of the conference of the Middle East Studies Association in Toronto in November 1989.

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### Barton Awards Programme

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The Institute invites applications for its Awards Programme, now designated the Barton Awards in honour of the first Chairman, former UN Ambassador William Barton. The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue studies in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in that area by supporting Canadians who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad or in Canada.

The Institute expects to make ten awards, two senior fellowships valued at up to \$30,000 and eight scholarships at up to \$14,000. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1990.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens whose experience or academic qualification enable them to pursue advanced study.

The deadline for applications for the 1990-1991 academic year is 1 February 1990.

For further information and application forms please write to:

The Barton Awards Programme  
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

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### Grants Procedures and Deadlines

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*The Institute allocates grants twice a year. Contact the Institute for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:*

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30 June for an October decision

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31 December for a March decision

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Naval Operations," at a workshop at the Center for Naval Analysis, in Alexandria, Virginia, on 8 November. **Roger Hill** and **Michael Bryans** attended the annual meeting of the Centre québécois des relations internationales in Quebec City. The subject of the conference this year was the changes within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and their implications for foreign policy. **Margaret Bourgeault** participated in the Group of 78 meeting in Ottawa which also discussed developments in the Soviet Union.

**Brad Feasey** and **Nancy Gordon** attended a roundtable discussion on the election and future developments in Namibia, sponsored by Oxfam-Canada and World

**Bernard Wood** attended, in mid-November, a meeting at Wilton Park, UK, for the heads of research institutes, organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London. The Institute for Research on Public Policy, along with Chatham House and a number of British groups organized a colloquium in the UK on Canadian-British relations in light of the changing relationships within Europe and North America. Mr. Wood gave a paper on North-South relations.

**Sergei Danilov**, a member of the Institute for the USA and Canada in Moscow, was a guest of the Institute during November as part of the exchange arrangement between the two Institutes.

Dr. Danilov, whose field of study is Canadian political parties and elections, interviewed a number of academics, officials and politicians in Ottawa and spent some time at the National Library and Archives. He also met Canadian specialists in Kingston, Toronto and Montreal. Dr. Danilov is the author, along with Dr. Alexei Cherkasov, of "12 Faces of Canada: Canadian Provinces and Territories", published in Moscow in 1987. His next book, a biography of Pierre Trudeau, will be published in Moscow in the near future.

Visitors to the Institute during the fall included **Walter Stock** of the Institute for International Relations in Potsdam, GDR, and **Humberto Avaria**, the representative in Canada of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. **Gary O'Dwyer**, a high school teacher in Coburg, brought a group of veterans from Vietnam and Afghanistan to the Institute for an exchange of views with staff members. The group had spent some time earlier with Mr. O'Dwyer's history students in Coburg. **Gwynne Dyer**, who visited the Soviet Union as part of the exchange agreement between the Institute for Peace and Security and the Institute for the USA and Canada in Moscow, led a discussion with Institute staff on his research in the USSR.

Members of the Eurogroup panel, an organization of the twelve European members of NATO, visited the Institute in mid-October. **Lt. General Huttel** of West Germany, **Dr. R. Veremis**, a Professor of International Relations at the University of Athens, and **Dr. J. Bartes**, Director-General of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Defence in the Netherlands, met with Institute staff to discuss security and defence in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, as well as questions of burden-sharing amongst NATO members.

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RESOURCES

The primary focus of this new page from Information Services will be a bibliography covering the four areas of the Institute's mandate — arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution. Items selected are from the Institute library's in-house database of its holdings, and will have been received within the last quarter.

The selection emphasizes materials that are unique and not always found readily in standard readings. Items will be chosen for their strength of analysis, for their uniqueness of perspective (geographical or ideological), or for their unpublished origins. Non-academic items, or items advocating different points of view will also be included if their substance adds to a fuller understanding of an issue. In addition, this page will keep readers informed of Information Services' resources and activities, and include items on various aspects of information resources.

Profile of the Institute Library

■ The Institute library was set up in 1985. It contains a specialized collection of materials, including government, embassy and international organizations documents; ephemeral and unpublished items; and publications from organizations worldwide. An in-house computerized database covers the library's holdings, plus a variety of other bibliographies related to the areas of the mandate. Computer searches are done on request. There is no charge.

The library is located at 360 Albert Street, 9th Floor, in Ottawa; and is open to the public from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The collection is only available on the premises, although photocopies can be mailed, and books can be borrowed through interlibrary loan. Requests are taken in person, by telephone, mail and electronic mail (Envoy: CIIPS, Web: CIIPS, Inet: C.I.I.P.S.).

The Peace and Security Thesaurus was developed to provide a subject terminology to use in classifying materials in the collection. It is freely available to groups wishing to use it to catalogue their own peace and security collections. Please address inquiries to: Thesaurus, Information Services, c/o the Institute.

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## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### A FRAMEWORK FOR EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION

*In late October, Bernard Wood gave the keynote address to an international seminar for opinion leaders on "East-West Economic Cooperation: Opportunities and Limitations" at the NATO De-*

*fence College in Rome. The following article carries forward some of the main points of that presentation especially relevant in the light of current Canadian interest in East-West relations.*

IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE changes that Mr. Gorbachev has wrought in his country's international behaviour and domestic practices now calls for wholehearted recognition by Western leaders, and whatever tangible encouragement it is possible and wise to give. While he still has a very long way to go in Soviet domestic affairs, there is surely no responsible outsider who would dare to prescribe an alternative strategy for him to follow, or to suggest that any conceivable alternative leadership would be preferable.

What we need to do as a minimum is to repeal any measures, beyond the most essential strategic protections, having the character of economic sanctions or discrimination against the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries undertaking such basic reform. Most of our countries have already done much of this, but to open up a well-publicized return to normal economic relations would be symbolically and materially helpful.

Two of the Soviet Union's most important legal changes in the domestic economy which have an impact on East-West economic cooperation are the 1987 Law on the State Enterprise, which set out to give enterprises full economic independence from central authorities; and the 1988 Law on Cooperation, which allows essentially private partnerships – able to employ full-time, unlimited numbers of contract employees – to operate in any sphere of the economy. By the beginning of October 1988, some 770,000 people were estimated to be working in cooperatives.

CHANGES HAVE ALSO OCCURRED IN THE WAY foreign trade is administered. The state no longer has direct control over a large proportion of foreign commerce. Not only can enterprises decide what type of products they will sell on the world market, as of last April, they are allowed to compete on the foreign market on their own. This eliminates the previous structure whereby all foreign trade was conducted through a state foreign trade intermediary.

Enterprises are now allowed to keep a share of hard-currency earnings. Foreign exchange auctions are also envisioned, giving enterprises greater control over their import decisions. A new exchange rate system has been adopted which will allow for the devaluation of the ruble. The 1986 decision to allow joint ventures in the Soviet Union, and the subsequent revision to the law in 1988, has radically altered the possibilities for direct foreign investment. Joint ventures have brought quintessentially capitalist enterprises into the heart of the socialist economies.

Soviet interest in international economic organizations has never been higher. In 1986, the Soviet Union applied to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) secretariat to participate in the upcoming "Uruguay Round." While its application was rejected, the USSR continues to express interest in joining GATT and is making preparations for formal negotiations. Ivan Ivanov, Vice Chairman of the State Commission for Foreign Economic Relations, expects that reforms currently underway in the foreign trade sector will make the Soviet Union's trade policy compatible with GATT. He admits, however, that it will take at least two years before Soviet price and tariff reforms will be advanced enough for formal talks.

OR ALL OF THE POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN East-West economic cooperation there also exist some very real limitations. Gorbachev faces a massively complex task in trying to pull the Soviet economy out of its state of stagnation. Not the least of the problems are the major dislocations which occur as the economy takes on more of the attributes of a free market.

Among these are the resistance of bureaucrats to relinquishing their authority to interfere in the economy; confusion caused by changing guidelines as the reform struggles to find the correct course; problems of insufficient foreign exchange and lack of convertibility of the ruble; and a fundamental change of social norms, as citizens who have been used to full employment and equality face up to the prospect of unemployment and growing wage differentials.

Not only does inertia in the system limit the speed with which the reform process as a whole can proceed, it also inhibits the potential for the expansion of East-West economic cooperation. Numerous anecdotes attest to the frustration of Western entrepreneurs trying to do business with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including problems of bureaucratic attitudes, constantly changing rules, inexperienced Eastern partners and antiquated or non-existent infrastructure.

East and West also have different priorities for cooperation. A major goal of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is for their economies to produce internationally competitive exports. This requires technologically up-to-date equipment and know-how from the West. Western businesses, on the other hand, hope mainly to exploit the large Eastern market and are limited in their ability to sell advanced technology to the East. But there is possible common ground in joint venture production

ALL OF THESE LINKAGES ARE THE REFLECTION of normal market responses to opportunities being opened up by reform and regulatory change. There is immense potential for Western traders and investors every time an Eastern European government makes a sensible policy modification. However, I believe that the West will have to exercise great caution in undertaking any special measures of economic cooperation that go beyond the logic of the market, which is, after all, one of the key benefits that we seek to share. This is no pretext for inaction and no insensitive ideological prescription; it is the course suggested by pragmatism and realism.

While there is a compelling ring to the recent suggestion that Eastern Europe "must have a Marshall Plan or it will have martial law," I believe it is badly misleading. The challenge faced by these countries is not of digging themselves out and rebuilding from the rubble of war, but of disentangling themselves from decades of red tape. The need is not for an infusion of capital goods, money, or raw materials, but for the political will, capacity and know-how to dismantle the myriad obstacles to productive economic activity. This obviously cannot be accomplished overnight nor can it be deferred until a more stable time. Stability itself can come only from successful change.

As one who has spent a large part of his career working on issues of development aid, I am persuaded that no Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe would be desirable or even possible. Although a great deal of good can be done with substantial amounts of "bridging" aid, until the basic changes are in place, the bureaucratized economies of Eastern Europe could quite literally be a bottomless pit for Western aid. It would be disastrous for the West to create a relationship of dependency, and equally disastrous to create expectations which we cannot possibly fulfill.

– BERNARD WOOD

*This article was prepared with the assistance of Emily Brown*

## REVIEWS



### Breaking with History The Gorbachev Revolution: An Eyewitness Account Lawrence Martin

Doubleday Canada Limited, Toronto,  
1989, 356 pp., \$26.95 cloth

The eyewitness to the Gorbachev "revolution" is the *Globe and Mail's* first correspondent in Moscow, Lawrence Martin. He was fortunate to be able to watch as the Soviet Union transformed itself from Brezhnevian stagnation into Gorbachevian activism.

Those first three or four years of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership have probably been the most exciting times in Soviet history since the Second World War and Martin brings out clearly and vividly the stimulating atmosphere and the stunning changes he witnessed. That these changes are revolutionary, as radical as anything that has happened in that vast country since the October revolution, is the principal point of "Breaking with History."

Since Gorbachev's appearance on the Soviet scene there have been so many outside observers and American Kremlinologists who have doubted his intentions, pooh-poohed his reforms, and predicted his imminent demise, that it is refreshing to have a Canadian eyewitness who believes what he sees and reports it as honestly as he can. Martin is obviously not a naive Gorby fan and he reports how difficult it is, and will be, to turn around a society where three or four generations have been brought up under the deadening constraints and fears of a totalitarian system.

Gorbachev, he writes, though a product of that system, that establishment, was set apart "by his exposure to the West, his education, his youth, his openness, his perspective." His insistence on open-

ing up a secretive society, his *glasnost* policy, was essential for revolutionizing Soviet political institutions, for changing attitudes to human rights, for supporting his new foreign and defence policies, and for attempting to make his essential *perestroika* policy for restructuring the economy, work.

Martin describes the difficulties Gorbachev has had, the unexpected concessions he has made, to persuade that other superpower, the United States, to halt the arms race, to seek nuclear disarmament, and conventional force reductions – an opportunity still not fully grasped by a suspicious US administration. Aside from his pertinent vignettes of life in Gorbachev's Soviet Union, his encounters with earnest activists and *lumpen* disbelievers, Martin outlines the great obstacles.

The USSR is a superpower, in its 70th year of the Great Revolution and the second year of the Gorbachev reformation, that can produce the world's biggest nuclear missiles and its best tanks, but can't produce enough toothpaste, sugar, meat, potatoes, porridge oats, wallpaper and writing paper, ball bearings or hearing aids to meet its peoples' needs. The necessities of life still come second to the sinews of war, despite Gorbachev's serious efforts to curb the arms buildup and divert its industries to peaceful pursuits. It has been his least successful revolution.

It is little wonder that he has unleashed a volcano of unrest – economic, social, and ethnic – and why so many wonder whether this Russian Martin calls "a man of moral vision" can survive. Yet can they put his revolutionary genie back in the bottle now? Martin seems to think not, and his informative book is a most useful introduction to the biggest story of the nineties. – John R. Walker

Mr. Walker is a freelance columnist and former foreign affairs analyst for *Southam News*.

### A Nation Forged in Fire: Canadians in the Second World War 1939–1945

J.L. Granatstein and  
Desmond Morton

Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys,  
320 pp., \$35.00 cloth

J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton have inherited the C.P. Stacey mantle; by now one expects a book a year from them on some aspect of Canadian military history. Unlike Stacey they have become popularizers, on the whole a good thing. However, both Granatstein and Morton have written far more thought provoking works on Canada and war than *A Nation Forged in Fire*. Professor Granatstein's *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* should be required reading in a country that suffers from split-brain memory – neither English nor French Canadians have a complete and accurate memory of the war.

This book is the Canadian "book of lists" about the Second World War. It begins to make sense, after a fashion, when you remember that this is an anniversary book, rather like a high school yearbook for the alumni of 1939–1945 – there are lots of pictures and snappy quotes.

The first lists are about the woeful inadequacy of the armed forces, and since this is early in the book, it takes three or four more before you recognize the pattern:

Before the war, Canadian shipbuilding had been insignificant, but between 1939 and 1945, 391 cargo vessels, 487 escorts and minesweepers, and 3,600 specialized craft came down the ways. The story was the same for military vehicles: at the peak of production in 1944, 4,000 trucks and 450 armoured vehicles a week were built. In the aircraft industry....

Employment statistics for women, records of what women collected in salvage campaigns, and inventories of food parcels follow, as well as long lists of casualties. But somehow a sense

of horror at all the destruction and death is lacking. The language used to describe battles in reminiscent of the Boy's Own Annual: "the assault at Puys saw the Royal Regiment and the Black Watch destroyed by withering fire ..." "there was much heroism at the charnel-house of Dieppe." And Canadian corvettes "eventually packed a wallop" (a very small one).

In spite of the authors' awareness that the country went to war because of "ties of sentiment, blood and culture" on the part of English Canadians – and despite a great deal of attention to the issue of conscription – this is essentially another book written about English Canada's war. Of course French Canadians play a role, but the voice is from Toronto, fifty years ago.

This book is strongest as a visual reminder of the transmuting effects of war. A picture really is worth a thousand words, particularly Alex Colville's drawing of bodies in a concentration camp, Miller Brittain's "Night Target, Germany" and Lawren P. Harris's paintings of Ortona. The large number of photographs and paintings give this book its emotional depth, but they cannot make up for the sketchy treatment of a number of subjects – from the Enigma codes to the treatment of the Hong Kong prisoners of war. This is a book for the initiated and for the war buffs; for the uninitiated there is both too much and too little. – Tina Viljoen

Ms. Viljoen is the co-author with Gwynne Dyer of a book forthcoming from McClelland and Stewart, *The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the Empire*.

### Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geo- politics of the Northern Front Ola Tunander

London: Sage, 1989,  
194 pp., £22.50 cloth

This is a difficult book, not suitable for the general reader, but



ultimately rewarding for those with a special interest in Nordic security, maritime strategy, geopolitics, or the international politics of "signalling" (what Tunander refers to as the "body language of the superpowers"). The heart of the book concerns the US Maritime Strategy and its impact on northern Europe, but it also touches on Nordic security policies more generally, Swedish defence doctrine in particular, and the well-publicized incidents of Soviet submarine intrusions into Swedish waters.

The author – a young Swede at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo – demonstrates a deep knowledge of all of these matters, as well as some of the more arcane fields of international relations theory, geopolitics, and semiotics. The book itself suffers somewhat from a rather heavy academic style, sometimes opaque language, repetition, and cluttered, computer-generated graphics that are less than pleasing to the eye. But none of this should deter serious readers from perusing it to their benefit.

Mr. Tunander is no great fan of the Maritime Strategy, but his examination of it is balanced and fair. He identifies three main functions of the strategy's emphasis on threatening Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs): altering the nuclear balance, protecting the Atlantic sea lanes (by forcing the Soviets to devote all of their energies to defending their home waters), and deterring Soviet attack in areas vital to the West, such as the Persian Gulf. Of these, he rejects the "technical credibility" of the first two but accepts that of the third. In his view, uncertainty about the US threat to Soviet SSBNs should "underline the importance of Soviet restraint in other parts of the world."

What makes the book unique, however, is its extended discussion of the Maritime Strategy from a European – particularly a North European – perspective. The Norwegians, he points out, have been ambivalent about the strategy, on the one hand welcom-

ing an increased US presence off their coasts, while on the other hand fearing the export of a super-power conflict in the Third World to Northern Europe.

According to Tunander, Moscow will do all it can to avoid a conflict in such a strategically sensitive (and vulnerable) area, but if it believes a US attack is imminent, as a result of its action somewhere else in the world, it is likely to strike hard at Scandinavia. Furthermore, he interprets more provocative Soviet submarine activity in Swedish waters in recent years as a signal, aimed primarily at Washington, of its ability and willingness to do so.

Tunander shows how the North Europeans, who once sought to insulate themselves from the rivalries and tensions of Central Europe, now seek to link themselves more closely to what they consider to be a comparative oasis of stability and detente there. They are also, as he points out, increasingly seeking to extend the arms control measures being implemented on the European continent to the less clearly-defined Northern sea areas.

In this respect, he is remarkably optimistic, given his account of the deep-rootedness of the Maritime Strategy. Despite the latter, he foresees the extension of arms control measures to the sea as inevitable, driven by such factors as fiscal constraints, an increasing unwillingness on the part of the superpowers to jeopardize the survivability of key naval assets in forward areas, and gradual US awareness of the counterproductive impact of the Maritime Strategy on ally and foe alike.

– Ron Purver

*Mr. Purver is a research associate at the Institute*

### **Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War** Paul Fussell

*New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 330 pp., \$24.95 cloth*

Two books written during the last decade have permanently altered the standards for acceptable writing in the English language on the subject of large-scale combat:

*The Face of Battle* by John Keegan and the first book on warfare by Mr. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Between them, the effect has been to render shallow and foolish any writer about war who resorts to words like "the fallen" and "sacrifice," or who does not attempt to enter into the combat experience with a complete and sympathetic understanding of the soldier's physical and emotional world.

Unlike his earlier work which was scholarly in approach (Fussell is a professor of English literature), *Wartime* is an angry and often bitter assault on what he sees as a widespread public complacency, as well as a wholly sanitized "and Norman Rockwellized, not to mention Disneyfied" view of the soldiers' experience – especially in the last great war. And Fussell minces no words about what he set out to do: "For almost the past fifty years the Allied war has been sanitized and romanticized almost beyond recognition by the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant and the bloodthirsty. I have tried to balance the scales." For his ammunition he draws upon his own grim experience as a junior officer in the US army in Europe, and his formidable talents and knowledge as social critic and cultural historian. It is a potent and wrenching combination.

The book proceeds methodically to explore every crevice and crack in the yawning gap between what a combat soldier in WWII was told he would find before arriving at the front, what he actually experienced when he got there and what the public at home was told about it all. Through high culture and low, in film, in newspapers and on the radio, the home front was fed sheer nonsense about the unfolding horror on the battlefields. The aim, of course, was to keep up morale, but Fussell contends that the endless "boy scoutism" of official and unofficial propaganda only made the soldiers' lives more miserable and it made them angry – they had to live with the daily idiocy and terror of military life on the front lines.

He reserves particular venom for the *Time-Life* book series on WWII which, in his view, has done "more than perhaps any other popular account of the war to ascribe clear, and usually noble, cause and purpose to accidental and demeaning events." Fussell devotes a whole chapter to accidental killings and foolish blunders that made one's own army as dangerous to life and limb as the enemy's.

Much of Fussell's account is darkly funny. Chapters on "chickenshit" – "behaviour that makes military life worse than it need be" and which can be "recognized instantly because it never has anything to do with winning the war"; and the suffering caused by constant deprivation and danger, "Drinking Far Too Much, Copulating Too Little," will cause open laughter.

Indignation runs throughout, but surfaces as barely controlled fury in the final chapter "The Real War Will Never Get in the Books." Fussell tries to convey the real war here, complete with graphic description by himself and others of what even today remains unsaid and unseen in mass media treatment of combat – modern war conducted with explosives kills people by dismembering them. It is what every soldier fears, and should he escape being wounded himself, must watch and smell and touch.

Combat is, of course, madness and so it drives people crazy. Even armies have learned this, which is why in Vietnam soldiers were not sent for the duration, as in WWII, but for a fixed term of a year – "the American military learned ... that men will inevitably go mad in battle and that no appeal to patriotism, manliness, or loyalty to the group will ultimately matter."

– Michael Bryans

*Mr. Bryans is editor of Peace & Security and co-creator of the NFB film series War.* □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) is an institution in quest of a purpose. It is definitely not the effective instrument for hemispheric cooperation it purports to be. Its importance as a forum is marginal. For the US it is of residual value – more of a hindrance to unilateral action than a willing tool of US foreign policy towards Latin America. For the countries of the region, it has been superseded by the Latin American Economic System (SELA) as a caucus for collective action vis-à-vis the North on economic issues, and is less than effective in the solution of regional conflict. Therefore, from Canada's viewpoint as a new member of this body, the question is: what needs to be done to give the OAS a new lease on life?

The Organization's activities are grouped into three areas: legal, political and security; developmental; and cultural. Progress has been very uneven on these various fronts. In the face of a dwindling budget and mounting deficits, the deliberative bodies of the OAS have continued to add functions and assign programmes to a harassed and technically insufficient staff. The result is wholesale internal demoralization and a growing irrelevance of the institution for most member countries, despite the strenuous efforts of the current Secretary-General, Baena Soares.

The principle of one country, one vote, with the presence of an array of micro-States, has led to an often irresponsible voting pattern, reminiscent of the UN General Assembly but without the safeguards provided by the Security Council. Multilateralism in international affairs has receded under the onslaught of unbridled unilateralism: the institutions that have survived are those able to display a technical proficiency that cannot be matched by the member states, or those blessed with charters enabling them to adapt without trauma to the evolving requirements of their members.

In the case of the OAS, neither condition was fulfilled. A charter reform is therefore necessary to meet the challenge, and tactically this can only be achieved if one member country – in this case the newest member, Canada – lobbies diplomatically for the adoption of the broad parameters of a new design, and succeeds in obtaining a consensus. The following attempts to shed some light on a basic outline for reform.

THE FUNCTION OF THE OAS AS A FORUM FOR negotiations on political and economic development issues between the US and Latin

# CANADA INSIDE THE OAS

*We've taken the plunge, so now what?  
At least one Latin American who ought to know  
believes we could be essential to reviving  
a moribund institution.*

BY G. LANDAU

America-the Caribbean has been overtaken by events: it has failed to prevent unilateral action by the US (for example in Grenada), it has not been able to resolve festering regional conflicts (Central America, Panama), it has not resulted in new policy directions for the most profound economic crisis in the hemisphere (debt and its corollary of social disintegration, drugs). Despite the ponderous machinery for policy-making, the OAS has failed to come to grips with the most relevant issues facing the regional community.

There is in the Americas a centrifugal tendency, with countries divided on many issues – the treatment of external debt for example – on which logically there should be convergent positions. Rather than a gradual expansion of sub-regional integration arrangements, we are witnessing their disintegration. For the Caribbean nations associated with the European Community through the Lomé Convention, the magnet of economic aid from Brussels pulls them ever farther away from their Latin American brothers.

To sum up, there is a need for a genuinely regional institution that, without evoking the danger (and taboo) of political interference in the internal affairs of the hemisphere's republics, would provide a forum and the attendant technical infrastructure to achieve closer cooperation – a sort of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for the Americas.

THIS IDEA IS NOT QUITE ORIGINAL. IT WAS PUT forward in 1971 by the then Chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), Carlos Sanz de Santamaria. At the time, the disarray within the OAS was already such that the proposal was not acted upon at all. The essential concept is that the OAS be converted into an organization where the supreme body would be a Council of Ministers representing all the member states, and where the Ministers, sitting ex officio, would be rotated according to the portfolio being dis-

cussed; thus, there would be a Council consisting of foreign ministers, or ministers of agriculture, or transport, or whatever other subject might come under scrutiny.

LIKE THE OECD AND ITS DEVELOPMENT Centre, the OAS should devote itself primarily to policy formulation on hemispheric cooperation and the research function underpinning it. A careful evaluation should be made of the continued need for some of the specialized agencies, such as the Inter-American Defense Board, the Children's Institute and analogous

bodies. The powers of the Secretary-General should be strengthened, notably as regards the right of initiative.

The Organization should be streamlined, made tighter, more productive, and above all, more relevant to its membership. In this context, certain functions could be added. The old Pan American Union, until 1948, filled an important role as the drafter and trustee of a large number of technical covenants among its member states. In Europe, a similar function has been performed for the last forty years by the Council of Europe, whose seminal role in the development of both human rights and a network of technical conventions, is widely recognized. There is a pressing need for legal harmonization in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the OAS could be entrusted with this responsibility.

I have attempted here to chart a course for the OAS that would restore its legitimate and important role in the Inter-American system – loosely patterned after the OECD, with some ideas based on the past performance of the Council of Europe. There is no substitute for creativity and imagination, but sober realism must preside, lest the exercise succumb (as have so many other attempts at the management of hemispheric relations), to an overdose of fantasy and unfounded expectations.

Canada has a pragmatic, self-interest in making a significant intellectual contribution to a revised structure for the regional system. In the event Canada succeeds in developing a consensus for such a blueprint, at the end of the exercise we may be able to say – like Balboa in his letter to the King of Spain upon reaching the shores of the Pacific Ocean – “Hasta que en fin, Señor, hemos descubierto algo nuevo!” Finally, sir, we have discovered something new! □

*Mr. Landau, a Brazilian, is a senior international civil servant and formerly worked in Canadian-OAS affairs. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of any organization.*



# LE CANADA

PAR G. LANDAU

*Au moins un Latino-américain, qui parle en connaissance de cause, croit que le Canada pourrait bien avoir un rôle essentiel à jouer dans la revitalisation d'une institution moribonde.*

Etats membres; les ministres y siègeraient d'office, et la composition du conseil changerait en fonction de la nature des questions débattues. Ainsi, il y aurait un conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères, ou de l'Agriculture, ou des Transports, et ainsi de suite, selon le thème qui serait à l'étude.

Tout comme l'OCDE ET SON CEN- tre du développement, l'OEA devrait surtout se consacrer à l'élaboration des politiques intéressant la coopération hémisphérique et aux recherches que cela supposerait. Il conviendrait aussi de s'interroger à fond pour savoir si certains organismes spécialisés sont toujours nécessaires; citons ici la Commission interaméricaine de défense, l'Institut interaméricain de l'enfance, et d'autres éléments analogues. Il faudrait renforcer les pouvoirs du Secrétaire général, notamment en ce qui concerne le droit d'initiative.

Il importe de rationaliser et d'affiner les structures de l'Organisation, il faut la rendre plus productive et, par-dessus tout, plus utile à ses membres. Dans un tel contexte, d'autres fonctions pourraient lui être confiées. L'ancienne Union panaméricaine (1910-1948) a joué un rôle important en tant que rédactrice et depositaire de nombreuses ententes techniques entre ses membres. Outre-Atlantique, le Conseil de l'Europe remplit une fonction semblable depuis quarante ans, lui qui a, on le reconnaît largement, monté la voie pour l'avancement des droits de la personne et l'élaboration de nombreuses conventions techniques. L'import d'harmoniser de toute urgence les régimes juridiques en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes, et ce pourrait être la tâche à confier à l'OEA.

J'ai tenté ici de tracer pour l'OEA un plan qui lui rendrait son rôle légitime et important au sein du système interaméricain, et qui reprend en gros la structure de l'OCDE, certaines idées s'inspirent de la fiche de route du Conseil de l'Europe. Rien ne saurait remplacer la créativité ni l'imagination dans des exercices de ce genre; un réalisme réfléchi doit l'emporter, fût-ce au quel un excès d'utopie et de trop nombreuses attentes non fondées risqueraient de faire échouer toute la démarche (comme ce fut le cas de tant d'autres tentatives faites pour gérer les relations hémisphériques).

D'un point de vue pragmatique, le Canada a tout intérêt à apporter une contribution intellectuelle importante à la révision structurelle du système régional. S'il réussit à susciter un consensus au sujet d'une telle réforme, on pourra peut-être dire à la fin de l'exercice, tout comme Balboa dans la lettre qu'il adressait au roi d'Espagne après avoir atteint les côtes de l'océan Pacifique : « Hastia que en fin, señor, hemos descubierto algo nuevo! » Enfin, sûr, nous avons découvert quelque chose de nouveau! □

M. Landau, qui est Brésilien, occupe un poste supérieur dans la fonction publique internationale, et il a déjà travaillé dans le domaine des affaires intéressant à la fois le Canada et l'OEA. Il exprime ici ses opinions personnelles et il ne parle au nom d'aucun organisme en particulier.

ORGANISATION DES ETATS

américains est une institution qui se cherche une raison d'être. Chose certaine, elle n'est pas dans l'hémisphère l'insuffisamment efficace de coopération qu'elle prétend être. En tant que tribune, elle n'a qu'une importance secondaire. Pour les Etats-Unis, elle ne sert pas à grand-chose; c'est plus un obstacle à l'action unilatérale qu'un exécutant bien disposé de la politique étrangère américaine à l'endroit de l'Amérique latine. Pour les pays de la région, elle a été supplantée par le Système économique latino-américain (SELA), en tant que centre de coordination de l'action collective face au Nord au sujet des questions économiques, et elle ne contribue pas beaucoup au règlement des conflits dans la région. Aux yeux du Canada qui vient de se joindre à l'Organisation, la question est donc de savoir ce qu'il faut faire pour lui redonner vie.

L'Organisation a trois grands champs d'activité : la sécurité et les questions juridiques et politiques; le développement; et la culture. Les progrès accomplis dans ces trois domaines ont été très inégaux. Avec un budget en baisse et des déficits croissants, les organes délibérants de l'OEA ont confié des fonctions et des programmes toujours plus nombreux à un personnel somme toute ne possédant pas toutes les compétences techniques voulues. Il en résulte un découragement interne généralisé et la perception, chez la plupart des pays membres, que l'institution ne sert plus vraiment à grand-chose, en dépit des efforts continus du Secrétaire général actuel, M. Baena Soares.

Vu la présence de toute une gamme de petits Etats, le principe « à chaque pays une voix » a donné lieu, au moment de voter, à des habitudes irresponsables qui rappellent le cas de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, sauf qu'il n'y pas à l'OEA les garanties offertes par le Conseil de sécurité. Dans les affaires internationales, le multilatéralisme a reculé devant les assauts répétés de l'unilatéralisme; les institutions qui ont survécu sont celles qui ont pu afficher une compétence technique dépassant les capacités des Etats membres, ou celles qui ont su se doter d'une charte leur permettant de s'adapter sans heurt aux exigences changeantes de leurs membres. L'OEA ne fait partie ni de l'une ni de l'autre catégorie. Une réforme de la charte s'impose donc et, du point de vue tactique, cela n'est possible qu'à un pays membre (dans le cas qui nous occupe, le membre le plus récent, soit le Canada) exerce des pressions diplomatiques pour faire admettre les grands paramètres d'une nouvelle structure et s'il réussit à obtenir un consensus. Nous essaierons donc ici d'expliquer en gros en quoi la réforme devrait consister.

EN TANT QUE TRIBUNE POUR LA NÉCESSAIRE DES questions affectées à la politique et au développement économique entre les Etats-Unis, l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, l'OEA n'a pas été à la hauteur des événements : elle n'a pas pu

offerts, des statistiques, des cartes, des cartouches et des bibliographies, offrent un produit de qualité que le lecteur peut consulter aisément. Les auteurs ont rédigé une centaine d'articles qui touchent à presque tous les aspects de la vie dans le tiers-monde. L'accent est cependant été mis sur les problèmes sociaux et économiques, en faveur des Etats du tiers-monde. Un dossier spécial est consacré au travail des Etats du tiers-monde, au travail des organisations non gouvernementales. Dans la section, «Le tiers-monde tel qu'il est», Michel Clément souligne qu'aucune religion, qu'aucune idéologie ne constitue automatiquement un moteur pour le progrès, alors que Thierry Paquot constate que la modernité occidentale rend à s'imposer partout, tant bien que mal. On lira avec intérêt un article sur l'éducation où, en dépit des efforts réalisés, l'univers des non-scolarisés a tendance à s'accroître. Même constatation inquiétante en ce qui a trait aux problèmes du logement, de la santé et de l'environnement. Grâce à cette nouvelle édition de *L'état du tiers-monde*, les auteurs nous font prendre conscience de l'ampleur des défis qu'on relève les Etats du Sud depuis trente ans et du travail qu'il reste à faire. A lire et à relire. — Jocelyn Coulton

**PARU RÉCEMENT**

**Regards sur la guerre et la paix**  
Annie Bourret et Erik Poole

*Les Presses de l'Université Laval,  
Québec, 1989.  
100 pages, 20 \$*

Les auteurs, membres du Groupe de recherche sur la paix de l'Université Laeal, ont réuni et commenté dans cette filmographie, 143 documents audio-visuels, parmi lesquels on trouve des films d'animation, des documentaires et des témoignages. Ces documents couvrent une vaste gamme de sujets, de la sécurité nationale et internationale au désarmement, des questions d'arrière-cour au conflit nucléaire, sans oublier les causes et les conséquences des guerres.

(Ouvrage publié avec l'aide financière de l'Institut). □

*Voir l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages  
publiés en anglais dans la rubrique  
Reviews de Peace&Security.*

Enfin, ce livre ne passe pas sous silence les dangers qui guettent l'Etat hébreu aux prises depuis toujours avec une obsession pour le secret. *Israel ultra-secre* devrait être abordé pour ce qu'il a de mieux à offrir, à savoir une multitude de détails et de révélations sur les acteurs et les pratiques des différents services de renseignement israéliens. Pour ce, le boudin présente un intérêt particulier, car on peut douter que la version officielle des histoires secrètes d'Israël soit sous peine libérale.

Marie-France Desjardins

Marie-France Desjardins est assistante de recherche à l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.

L'état du tiers-monde  
Collectif  
Éditions La Découverte, Paris, 1989.  
320 pages, 24,95 \$

Le verser-monde n'a jamais été facile à définir et encore moins à expliciter. Il fut un temps, certes, où une certaine mode imposa un vision homogène de cet ensemble de notions. Mais, aujourd'hui, on ne peut plus d'ailleurs invoquer la similitude des problèmes comparables et, de ce point de vue, les solutions

ant la réalité. La Chine n'était pas le Burkina Faso et le Costa Rica ne partageait pas les mêmes problèmes que la Birmanie.

On sait maintenant que le tiers-monde n'est pas uniforme et que son entrée dans la modernité se fait à des vitesses et par des moyens différents, tant politiques qu'économiques. Le collectif d'auteurs qu'a réuni Serge Corbellier présente, dans cette deuxième édition de *L'état du tiers-monde*, la diversité et la complexité des sociétés du Sud. Il a choisi pour ce faire un véhicule qui connaît un succès retentissant dans le monde francophone : la série d'ouvrages intitulée « L'état », en plus de la publication annuelle de *L'état du monde*, les Editions La Découverte ont déjà publié *L'état de la France*, *du Japon*, *de la Chine*, *des sciences et de la religion*. La formule, qui rassemble des articles

devoilà encore plus.  
Fort en rebondissement, *Israël ultra-secrète*, nous présente les plus grands coups et les plus grandes bavures enregistrés par les services secrets israéliens au cours des onze années précédant le début de *l'infidélité* dans les territoires occupés. Il nous présente les hommes politiques, diplomates, généraux et traîtres de toutes sortes qui se côtoient dans des cercles fermés où un seul mot d'ordre est de rigueur : la fin justifie les moyens. Comme toute bonne enquête journalistique, le récit de Derogy et Carmel est d'apprendra qu'en dépit de ses très mauvaises réputation, la communauté d'investissement israélien n'avait

Si ce genre d'ouvrage peut trouver un auditoire assez large, il faut insister pour souligner qu'il ne

S'agit-il d'une étude approximative des services secrets israéliens et, en core moins, d'une analyse détaillée des problèmes de sécurité auxquels est confronté Israël. Ainsi, sans nier le rôle important que joue la communauté du renseignement pour la sécurité de l'Etat hébreu, on aura de la difficulté à parager la conclusion des auteurs voulant que quelles que

tiennne, « les clés de la paix ou de la guerre restoront finalement entre les mains de ces diplomates de l'ombre... ». De la même façon, il faudra se méfier de pouvoir déchiffrer l'aventur de ce pays à travers la simple lecture des exploits et de fail-lances de ses services secrets. À cet égard, les auteurs ont pris un parti qu'ils ne pouvaient tenir.

Ceci dit, l'ouvrage a tout de même le mérite de bien présenter la multiplicité des missions des ser-vices secrets israéliens. Par le choix d'un aspect unique de l'espionnage israélien qui consiste, comme nous le rapporte les auteurs « à conduire des opérations de renseignements sur des intentions belliqueuses des États arabes entourant Israël et, simultané-ment, y rechercher des parre-naires pour amorcer le processus de la paix ». Notons aussi que certains

depuis 1979, notamment, l'ONU reconnaît une Convention des droits de l'enfant, laquelle varie énormément selon les pays. Si cette convention était conclue, les pays signataires seraient liés par traité, mais on ne sait pas grand-chose des mécanismes d'application prévus. Seul conflit pour lequel l'auteur ne se contente pas de camper les accents, la révolution iranienne est présentée de façon simpliste et réductrice. D'autres reproches peuvent aussi être adressés à ce livre :

plusieurs points : son volume

ce, de façon étonnante, avec de nombreuses photographies. Enfin, l'auteur a parsemé son texte de nombreux exemples historiques concernant l'utilisation des enfants dans la guerre, de l'Antiquité aux Croisades, des guerres napoléoniennes à la *Holier Jugend*, montrant ainsi que le phénomène n'est guère récent — Annie Bourel

«Le sceau du secret ne cesse de marquer la vie d'Israël. En une seule décennie, le long bras de l'Etat hébreu l'a vengé du massacre de ses athlètes aux Jeux olympiques de Munich, a anéanti la première centrale nucléaire arabe à Bagdad, détruit les fusées soviétiques au Liban, sauvé les juifs d'Éthiopie, pris contact avec le service égyptien au Maroc, prévenu un attentat aérien au Grande-Bretagne, vendu des missiles à l'Iran de Khomeiny, exécuté le numéro 2 de l'OLP à Tunis...» et ce n'est que le début, car Jacques



## LIVRES



### De la balkanisation : histoire d'une modernité incomplète

Georges La Décroix  
Éditions La Découverte, Paris, 1989.  
381 pages, 39,95 \$

Ce nouveau livre de Georges

Corn condense et met à jour une pensée politique déjà amorcée dans *La Proche-Orient éclairé* (1983) et *Géopolitique du conflit libanais* (1986). Cette pensée prend la forme d'une enquête scientifique sur les rapports entre l'Occident et l'Orient, un sujet qui a déjà fait couler beaucoup d'encre et de sang ! Mais, de l'avis de l'auteur, la plupart des solutions déjà proposées pour désamorcer la poudre du Proche-Orient n'ont débouché que sur un dialogue de sourds. C'est que les intervenants abordaient souvent la problématique avec des partis pris, des préjugés, voire en utilisant un discours enflammé.

Consentent des traquenards qui le gâtent, l'auteur, économiste et sociologue libanais, s'abstient donc, dès le départ, de culpabiliser l'Europe en lui imputant tous les torts, comme l'avait fait plusieurs de ses contemporains. Il récusé du même coup l'incompréhension de certains orientalistes qui appliquent des grilles européennes dans les analyses portant sur le Proche-Orient ou qui occultent des faits historiques. Corn a cherché à comprendre les causes de la violence au Proche-Orient en élargissant son analyse. Il souligne la parallèle entre la violence en Europe centrale au début du siècle qui conduisit à la balkanisation de la région et, maintenant, la «libanisation» du Machrek. Pour lui, ces deux processus ont une origine

commune : l'effondrement des empires austro-hongrois et ottoman. «Ces événements sont à l'origine des situations du Proche-Orient que la culture européenne vit si mal aujourd'hui», écrit-il.

Le narcissisme européen, sa complaisance dans l'exotisme de bas étage et ses blocages de perception ont contribué à déchirer les peuples du Proche-Orient arabe après avoir au préalable démembré l'empire austro-hongrois. Par la suite, la balkanisation n'a pas tardé à s'étendre à l'est du bassin méditerranéen pour s'attaquer au plus petit État de la région, le Liban. Comment peut-on espérer dès lors, se demande l'auteur, que ces mêmes forces de désintégration changent leur fusil d'épaule et se mettent à corriger l'imbricolage dont elles sont les premières responsables ?

Tout d'abord, soutient l'auteur, il faut leur montrer qu'il y a de leurs intérêts. Une guerre régionale peut facilement dégénérer en conflats mondiaux apocalyptiques. Ensuite, il faut leur rappeler que la création de l'État d'Israël, produit de la victoire européenne aux conférences de la paix, a pas fluents de l'antisémitisme, n'a réglé le problème des juifs. Et, en dernier lieu, il faut dénoncer le concept d'État-nation avec tout ce qu'il comporte de contradictions et d'ambiguïtés. À preuve, le Liban, qui remette la clé du salut du Liban exclusivement entre les mains des Libanais. Une telle affirmation a besoin d'être nuancée du fait que l'auteur souligne l'interdépendance de facteurs endogènes et du contexte international. L'intervention syrienne y est présente comme l'aboutissement logique de la création du Grand Liban par la force mandataire en 1920.

*L'Europe et l'Orient* est une vaste enquête menée par un politologue averti, qui s'appuie sur une documentation considérable et qui fait preuve d'une réflexion lucide et objective. S'il est vrai qu'il agit par-

fois des sonnettes d'alarme, c'est qu'il cherche à sensibiliser l'opinion à l'urgence de trouver une solution à la crise au Proche-Orient.

— Adnan Moussally  
Adnan Moussally est professeur au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean.

### Gosses de guerre

Alain Louyot  
Éditions Robert Laffont, Paris, 1989.  
252 pages, 23,65 \$

Dans un style journalistique,

Alain Louyot traite du pénible sort des enfants soldats. En vingt-deux courts chapitres, il arrive à couvrir toutes les dimensions du phénomène, soient : l'entraînement en traitement, les missions sur le champ de bataille, le traitement des prisonniers, les séquelles de l'expérience du combat et la réinsertion sociale, ainsi que les lacunes en matière de droit international.

Le plus souvent, le recrutement des garçons s'effectue par des rafles dans les écoles ou les villages, et Louyot accuse, entre autres, le gouvernement éthiopien, la guérilla du RENAMO au Mozambique et les Soviétiques en Afghanistan d'avoir pratiqué ces exactions. Les cas d'entraînement volontaire semblent avoir pour origine les pressions exercées par des prêtres, comme en Iran, ou une scolarisation orientée. À l'emploi, l'exercice d'analyse

exposera tous les juifs des pays arabes, qu'on propose aux enfants syriens de l'école primaire. Quant aux filles, on les retrouve plutôt dans les armées régulières (Syrie et Inde) que dans la guérilla.

Lors de la guerre du Golfe, les officiers français envoyaient leurs soldats adultes, gardiens de la révolution, Louyot affirme que plus de 100 000 enfants de moins de treize ans ont participé aux combats entre l'Irak et l'Afghanistan, des enfants qui avaient suivi un entraînement de deux mois espionnaient les rebelles

pour le compte des Soviétiques. En Colombie, les enfants sont utilisés pour perpétrer des assassinats politiques et au Guatemala, les «patrouilles sociales» permettent aux soldats de l'armée de savourer le repos du guerrier.

L'entraînement vise souvent à aiguiser la cruauté et le sadisme des jeunes soldats, souligne l'auteur avec des exemples comme les enfants khmers rouges et les recrues de la RENAMO, torturés lors de leur stage de formation.

Brûlés vifs en Afghanistan, les jeunes prisonniers connaissent, dans quelques-uns, la torture. Louyot signale des cas isolés en Turquie, au Chili, aux Philippines et en Ouganda. En Afrique du Sud, plus d'un millier d'adolescents ont été emprisonnés en 1986, et de nombreux khmers rouges ont fait de mauvais traitements et de tortures, notamment par décharges électriques. En Irak, on réserve aux petits prisonniers un traitement plus doux, en se contentant de les ex-

hiber devant la presse occidentale pour discréditer l'Iran. Quel avenir est réservé à ces anciens combattants de seize ans ? A cause de leur expérience militaire, la réinsertion civile s'avère très difficile. Ces adolescents présentent des réactions antisociales très fortes, par exemple, celle de tuer une autre personne pour régler une dispute. Moins spectaculaires, les autres séquences de cette militarisation pré-

sentent des enfants civils en temps de guerre depuis longtemps, la notion d'enfant soldat n'apparaît qu'en 1978 dans les Protocoles additionnels de la Convention de Genève.

se penchent sur ces cas. Louyot souligne aussi les nombreuses lacunes du droit international à propos des enfants soldats. Alors qu'on s'est préoccupé du sort des enfants civils en temps de guerre depuis longtemps, la notion d'enfant soldat n'apparaît qu'en 1978 dans les Protocoles addition-

nels de la Convention de Genève.

## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

UN CANEVAS

POUR FAVORISER

LA COOPÉRATION

EST-OUEST

À la fin d'octobre,  
M. Bernard Wood a  
prononcé l'allocation  
d'ouverture à un col-  
loque international de  
leaders d'opinion, au  
Collège de la défense de  
l'O.T.A.N., à Rome, le  
thème était «La

coopération économique entre l'Est et l'Ouest :  
perspectives et limitations». Le présent article en  
représume certains des principaux points offrant le  
plus de pertinence, vu l'intérêt que le Canada  
porte aux relations Est-Ouest.

MON POINT DE VUE, LES DIRIGEANTS OCCIDENTAUX se doivent maintenant de reconnaître sans réserves l'ampleur des changements que M. Gorbatchev a provoqués en l'URSS même et dans le comportement de ce pays sur la scène internationale, et il leur incombe aussi de statuer sur les mesures concrètes d'encouragement qu'il est possible et sage de prendre.

À tout le moins, nous devons rejeter toute mesure (hormis celles qu'exige absolument la protection stratégique) qui s'apparenterait à des sanctions économiques ou à de la discrimination contre l'Union soviétique et les pays d'Europe de l'Est ayant entrepris une telle réforme fondamentale. La plupart de nos pays ont déjà sensiblement progressé dans la bonne direction, mais en attendant davantage ce retour à des relations économiques normales, nous ferions un geste symbolique fort utile.

Deux des plus importants changements d'ordre légal survenus dans l'économie nationale de l'URSS et ayant une incidence sur la coopération économique entre l'Est et l'Ouest prennent la forme de lois : la Loi de 1987 sur les entreprises d'Etat, qui vise à libérer complètement les entreprises de l'emprise économique des autorités centrales; et la Loi de 1988 sur la coopération, qui autorise les sociétés essentiellement privées (après à embaucher des employés en nombre illimité) à fonctionner dans n'importe quel secteur de l'économie.

AR ALLÉURS, LE COMMERCE EXTÉRIEUR N'EST plus administré comme avant. L'Etat n'exerce désormais plus de contrôle direct sur une bonne part du commerce extérieur. Non seulement les entreprises peuvent décider de genres de produits qu'elles vendront sur le marché mondial, mais depuis avril dernier, elles ont le droit d'aller elles-mêmes soutenir la concurrence à l'étranger. Voilà qui élimine la structure antérieure, en vertu de laquelle tout le commerce extérieur se faisait par l'intermédiaire d'un agent de l'Etat.

Les entreprises peuvent maintenant garder une partie de leurs revenus en monnaies fortes. On songe aussi à procéder à des ventes aux enchères de devises pour permettre aux entreprises de se rendre d'importation. Un nouveau système des échanges a été adopté qui rendra possible la déval-

luation du rouble. La décision prise en 1986 d'autoriser les coentreprises en Union soviétique et sa révision ultérieure en 1988 ont profondément changé les conditions régissant les investissements directs en provenance de l'étranger. De telles entreprises conjuguées ont favorisé l'implantation de sociétés essentiellement capitalistes au coeur même des économies socialistes.

Jamais les Soviétiques ne se sont autant intéressés aux organisations économiques internationales. En 1986, l'URSS a demandé au secrétaire général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce) la permission de participer à la ronde de négociations qui allait avoir lieu en Uruguay. Le GATT a rejeté sa demande, mais Moscou continue à manifester son désir d'adhérer à cet organisme, et le pays se prépare à amorcer des négociations officielles à cet égard. M. Ivan Iva-

nov, vice-président de la Commission nationale pour les relations économiques extérieures, croit que les réformes s'opèrent actuellement dans le secteur du commerce extérieur rendront la politique que commercialise de son pays comparable avec les exigences du GATT. Il précise, cependant, qu'il faudra au moins deux ans avant que les réformes visent les prix et les tarifs techniques soient suffisamment avancées pour que des pourparlers officiels puissent commencer.

OUTES SORTES DE PERSPECTIVES DE COOPÉRATION économique s'ouvrent maintenant entre les deux blocs, mais il existe aussi des limitations très concrètes. Une tâche d'une énorme complexité attend M. Gorbatchev, lui qui veut arracher l'économie soviétique à la stagnation. Les grands bouleversements qui surviennent à mesure que l'économie adopte de plus en plus les structures d'un marché libre comptent parmi les problèmes les plus ardu.

Citons à cet égard la résistance des bureaucrates peu enclins à renoncer à leur pouvoir d'intervention dans les affaires économiques; la confusion créée par les nouvelles lignes directrices, tandis que la réforme cherche la bonne orientation à suivre; le manque de devises étrangères et la non-convertisibilité du rouble; et l'avènement de normes sociales radicalement différentes, alors que les citoyens habitués au plein emploi et à l'égalité font connaissance avec le chômage et des disparités salariales de plus en plus grandes. Non seulement l'inertie du système ralentit l'expansion de la coopération économique entre l'Est et l'Ouest. De nombreuses anecdotes attestent la frustration des entrepreneurs occidentaux cherchant à transiger avec l'Union soviétique et l'Europe de l'Est; il y a notamment les attitudes qui ne sont jamais les mêmes d'une fois à l'autre, des associations sans expérience et une infrastructure vétuste, voire non existante.

Par ailleurs, les motifs de coopération sont très différents selon qu'il s'agit de l'Est ou de l'Ouest. L'URSS et l'Europe de l'Est veulent que leurs

économies produisent des biens concurrentiels sur les marchés étrangers. Mais pour cela, il leur faut obtenir de l'Ouest du matériel moderne et le savoir-faire. Quant aux entreprises occidentales, elles souhaitent exploiter le vaste marché des pays de l'Est, mais elles ne peuvent vendre, comme elles le voudraient, la technologie de pointe à ces derniers. Mais les coentreprises de production offrent peut-être une solution de compromis.

OUS CES PHÉNOMÈNES TRADUISENT DES RÉACTIONS normales du marché face à de nouveaux horizons qu'ouvrent la réforme et la modification des règlements. D'immenses possibilités s'offrent aux entrepreneurs et aux investisseurs occidentaux chaque fois qu'un gouvernement est européen modifie rationnellement sa politique. Toutefois, je crois que l'Occident devra faire preuve d'une grande prudence s'il veut prendre des mesures de coopération économique spéciales alliant au-delà de la logique du marché, laquelle est, après tout, un des principaux avantages que nous cherchons à partager. Ce n'est pas à un préfixe d'inaction, ni une froide prescription idéologique; c'est l'orientation que proposons le pragmatisme et le réalisme.

D'aucuns ont récemment déclaré que l'Europe de l'Est devait bénéficier d'un plan Marshall. Faute de quoi elle tomberait sous le coup de la loi martiale, et c'est certes là une observation percutante, mais je crois qu'elle est fort trompeuse. Pour ces pays, le défi ne consiste pas à sortir de sous les ruines de la guerre ni à reconstruire sur des cendres, mais plutôt à s'extirper des dédales bureaucratiques mis en place au cours de nombreuses décennies. Ce n'est pas de capitaux, d'argent, ni de matières premières qu'ils ont besoin, mais bien de la volonté voulus pour démanteler une myriade d'obstacles à une activité économique productive. Voilà qui, de toute évidence, ne peut se faire du jour au lendemain, mais le processus ne peut attendre non plus une époque plus stable. La stabilité en soi ne peut découler que d'une

évolution réussie.

J'ai consacré une bonne partie de ma carrière au dossier de l'aide extérieure et, en cette qualité, je suis persuadé qu'il n'est pas souhaitable ni même possible de dresser un quelconque plan Marshall pour l'Europe de l'Est. On peut certes établir beaucoup de bien avec des sommes considérables d'aide «de relais», mais tant que les formes fondamentalistes n'auront pas eu lieu, les économistes bureaucratiques des pays de l'Est risquent de devenir des abîmes qu'aucune quant-

ité d'aide occidentale ne pourra combler. Il serait de dépendance, et tout aussi réfractaire de susciter des attentes auxquelles il n'est tout simplement pas à même de répondre. □

— BERNARD WOOD



Dans cette nouvelle rubrique, les Services d'information visent à fournir une bibliographie sur les quatre volets du mandat de l'Institut, à savoir la limitation des armements, le désarmement, la défense et le règlement des conflits. Les titres mentionnés dans chaque numéro proviennent de la base de données Nous chercherons surtout à indiquer des documents uniques, qu'on ne trouverait pas facilement dans des bibliographies ordinaires. Les critères de sélection seront la rigueur de l'analyse, l'unicité de la perspective (géographique ou théologique) adoptée par les auteurs, ou le caractère inédit. Des ouvrages non produits par des experts, ou des documents présentant des points de vue différents figureront aussi dans la rubrique si leur contenu nous semble une meilleure compréhension d'une question donnée. En outre, la rubrique renseignera les lecteurs sur les ressources et activités des Services d'information, et elle traitera de divers aspects des ressources informationnelles.

## Profil de la bibliothèque de l'Institut

La bibliothèque a été créée en 1985. Elle contient une collection d'ouvrages spécialisés, y compris des documents émanant de gouvernements, d'ambassades et d'organismes internationaux; des ouvrages d'intérêt passagers et non publiés; et des données produites par des organismes du monde entier. Une base de données informatisée contient le fonds documentaire de la bibliothèque ainsi que diverses autres bibliographies afférentes aux volets du mandat. Des recherches par ordinateur sont faites sur demande et sans frais. Orwa, et elle est ouverte au public de 8 h 30 à 17 h, du lundi au vendredi. On doit consulter les ouvrages sur place, mais on peut se faire envoyer des photocopies par courrier; il est également possible de commander des ouvrages grâce aux prêts inter-bibliothèques. On peut faire une demande en personne, ou encore par téléphone, par courrier ordinaire ou par courrier électronique (Envoy: CHIPS, Web: CHIPS, Inet: C.I.I.P.S.).

Le Thésaurus sur la paix et la sécurité a été dressé pour offrir une terminologie thématique à employer afin de classer les ouvrages de la collection. Il est librement accessible aux groupes qui voudraient s'en servir pour cataloguer leurs propres collections sur la paix et la sécurité. Prière d'adresser ses demandes à : Thésaurus, Services

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actuelles ? Le groupe a rédigé des recommandations en vue de les présenter au Secrétaire général. Le vendredi 13 octobre, l'Institut a lancé l'édition 1989 du *Guide sur les politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à la solution des conflits*. Les membres du conseil, le personnel, des dignitaires et des journalistes ont célébré la parution de cet «ouvrage de référence essentiel» et ils ont félicité les rédacteurs, révisés et membres du personnel qui le produisent chaque année.

Au début de novembre, **Bernard Wood** a prononcé, lors de la remise du prix Gerald-Savory, un exposé à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique. Il a choisi pour thème «Le système international des années 1990 : les perspectives du Canada et les risques qu'il court». Aparavani, il avait présenté à l'Université Québécoise une allocution intitulée «Repenser les rapports nord-américains». Après son passage en Colombie-Britannique, il s'est rendu à Whitehorse (Yukon) l'Institut et de leur évolution.

**Brad Feasey** a fait des exposés devant des professeurs du niveau secondaire, pendant une journée pédagogique à Brandon (Manitoba), à la mi-octobre. Plus tard au cours du même mois, il a participé à une assemblée de l'Ontario *History and Social Sciences Teachers Association* à Toronto. Dans les deux cas, il a dirigé des ateliers sur l'enseignement des questions de paix et de sécurité au niveau secondaire, et il s'est pour cela inspiré du *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*, américain, parlé de la limitation des opérations navales, pendant un atelier qui s'est tenu le 8 novembre au *Centre for Naval Analysis*, à Alexandria (Virginie). **Roger Hill** et **Michael Bryan** ont assisté à l'assemblée annuelle du Centre québécois de relations internationales, à Québec. Cette année, la conférence a porté sur les changements survenus en Union soviétique et en Europe de l'Est et sur leurs conséquences pour la politique étrangère. **Margaret Bourgeault** a participé à Ottawa à la réunion du Groupe des 78 qui s'est aussi intéressé à l'évolution de la conjoncture soviétique. **Brad Feasey** et **Nancy Gordon** ont assisté à une table ronde sur les élections nationales et l'avènement de ce pays; cette activité avait été organisée par Oxfam-Canada et l'Entraide univers-

itaire mondiale Canada (EUMC). **Norma Saleem** a présidé une séance de la conférence de la *Middle East Studies Association*, à Toronto, en novembre 1989.

**Programme de bourses Barton**

L'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à faire leur demande dans le cadre de son programme de bourses, désormais appelé «Bourses Barton» en l'honneur de son premier président, M. William Barton, ancien ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU. Le programme est accessible aux universitaires et aux autres personnes qui veulent entreprendre ou poursuivre des études sur la paix et la sécurité internationales. Le programme vise à favoriser l'accroissement des compétences et des connaissances de haut niveau dans ce domaine, en appuyant des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui souhaitent poursuivre des études dans des institutions au Canada ou à l'étranger.

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le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre  
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L'*Institute of Strategic Studies* de Londres a organisé à Wilton Park (R.-U.) une réunion à l'intention des chefs d'Institut de recherche; **Bernard Wood** y a assisté à la mi-novembre. L'Institut de recherches politiques, la *Chatham House* et divers groupes britanniques ont mis sur pied au Royaume-Uni un colloque sur les relations canado-britanniques dans le contexte de l'évolution des rapports en Europe et en Amérique du Nord. M. Wood a fait un exposé sur les relations Nord-Sud.

**Sergei Danilov**, membre de l'Institut des études canado-américaines à Moscou, a été reçu par l'Institut en novembre, dans le cadre du programme d'échanges entre les deux organismes. M. Danilov, qui étudie

en particulier les partis politiques canadiens et le processus électoral, a interrogé des universitaires, des fonctionnaires et des hommes et femmes politiques à Ottawa, et il a passé un certain temps à la Bibliothèque nationale et aux Archives. Il s'est par ailleurs réuni avec des experts canadiens à Kingston, à Toronto et à Montréal. M. Alexei Cherkasov, de l'ouvrage intitulé *12 Faces of Canada: Canadian Provinces and Territories*, qui a paru à Moscou en 1987. Son prochain ouvrage, qui est une biographie de M. Pierre Trudeau, sera bientôt publié à Moscou.

Au cours de l'automne, diverses personnalités ont visité l'Institut, dont **Walter Stock**, de l'Institut des relations internationales de Potsdam (RDA), et **Humberto Avaria**, représentant au Canada du Front Farabundo Martí de Libération (FMLN). Salvador O'Dwyer, professeur dans une école secondaire de Coburg (Ontario), a amené un groupe d'anciens combattants des guerres du Vietnam et d'Afghanistan à l'Institut, pour qu'ils échangent des idées avec les membres du personnel. Un peu plus tôt, le groupe avait passé un certain temps avec les étudiants d'histoire de la Défense, se sont entretenus avec des membres de

l'Institut et de leur évolution. **Brad Feasey** a fait des exposés devant des professeurs du niveau secondaire, pendant une journée pédagogique à Brandon (Manitoba), à la mi-octobre. Plus tard au cours du même mois, il a participé à une assemblée de l'Ontario *History and Social Sciences Teachers Association* à Toronto. Dans les deux cas, il a dirigé des ateliers sur l'enseignement des questions de paix et de sécurité au niveau secondaire, et il s'est pour cela inspiré du *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*, américain, parlé de la limitation des opérations navales, pendant un atelier qui s'est tenu le 8 novembre au *Centre for Naval Analysis*, à Alexandria (Virginie). **Roger Hill** et **Michael Bryan** ont assisté à l'assemblée annuelle du Centre québécois de relations internationales, à Québec. Cette année, la conférence a porté sur les changements survenus en Union soviétique et en Europe de l'Est et sur leurs conséquences pour la politique étrangère. **Margaret Bourgeault** a participé à Ottawa à la réunion du Groupe des 78 qui s'est aussi intéressé à l'évolution de la conjoncture soviétique. **Brad Feasey** et **Nancy Gordon** ont assisté à une table ronde sur les élections nationales et l'avènement de ce pays; cette activité avait été organisée par Oxfam-Canada et l'Entraide univers-

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
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# NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



**Bernard Wood** a passé trois

semaines en Namibie, en septembre et octobre, en tant que membre d'un groupe d'observateurs de haut niveau. Ces derniers étaient chargés, par les ministres des Affaires étrangères du Commonwealth, de faire alliance un compte rendu sur les élections dans ce pays et sur le passage de ce dernier à l'indépendance.

À la mi-septembre, le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, le très honorable **Joe Clark**, a annoncé la nomination de **Claude Julien**

au conseil d'administration de l'Institut. M. Julien, qui vit à Paris (France), est actuellement rédacteur en chef et directeur du périodique *Le Monde Diplomatique*, ainsi que président du Centre d'études et de recherches sur l'Amérique latine. Il a poursuivi une longue carrière de journaliste, surtout avec les équipes des journaux *Le Monde* et *Le Monde Diplomatique*; il a publié neuf livres qui traitent surtout des affaires internationales et de politique. Citons notamment l'ouvrage intitulé *Le Canada, dernière chance de l'Europe* (1965).

À la fin de septembre, **David Brada** a pris la parole pendant l'assemblée de fondation du Réseau des associations de défense à Ottawa: il a alors parlé de l'Institut et de son rôle dans le débat sur la paix et la sécurité, notamment à la lumière de l'évolution que les relations Est-Ouest ont connue au cours des cinq dernières années.

**Vladimir Petrovsky**, sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères en URSS, a rendu visite à l'Institut en octobre pour discuter des points de vue soviétiques sur les organismes internationaux et sur le multilatéralisme dans l'étude des questions de politique étrangère. M. Petrovsky a parlé des initiatives de son pays à l'ONU relativement à la notion de sécurité globale; il s'est penché sur le développement des idées exportées dans cette tribune et sur les réactions qu'elles ont provoquées

dans d'autres pays. Les perspectives d'actions multilatérales dans plusieurs domaines se sont considérablement améliorées au cours des dernières années, et M. Petrovsky a exhorté les spécialistes à prendre pour renforcer cette tendance.

«La coopération économique Est-Ouest et les perspectives de sécurité», tel était le titre d'une allocution-thème que **Bernard Wood** a prononcée pendant un colloque international, au Collège de la défense de l'OTAN, à Rome à la fin d'octobre. Le rapport du Directeur général, à la page 21, aborde certains des principales questions qu'il a alors traitées et qui constituent des éléments essentiels du débat mondial actuel.

À la fin de septembre, la Mission américaine auprès de l'OTAN et le *War College of the National Defense University* à Washington ont parrainé à Bruxelles une conférence sur les changements qui s'opèrent en Europe de l'Est et sur leurs conséquences pour la sécurité occidentale. **Fen Hampson** y a participé avec d'autres experts et décideurs des deux grandes alliances multinationales. Plus tard au cours de l'automne, M. Hampson a présenté un exposé sur le nouveau rôle des Nations-Unies, dans le cadre d'une conférence qui se tenait à Lisbonne sous les auspices de l'Institut portugais d'études stratégiques et internationales, et qui avait pour thème la sécurité européenne dans un monde multipolaire.

**Keith Krause**, de l'Université York, a représenté l'Institut à une conférence sur les transferts d'armes organisée par le Bureau des «Quakers» aux Nations-Unies. Le professeur Krause, qui a rédigé un compte rendu de conférence pour l'Institut sur le même sujet, a fait un exposé devant des spécialistes et des diplomates de niveau supérieur qui représentaient des États participant à l'ONU des résolutions sur cette question.

Pendant l'autonomie, la direction de la Recherche a organisé plusieurs colloques dans le cadre de sa série «Actualité». **Peter Beck**, du *Kingston Polytechnic Institute*, à Surrey

(Angleterre), a parlé de l'intérêt que le Traité sur l'Antarctique présente pour le Canada et l'Arctique. **Imar Rabimovitch**, de l'Université de Tel Aviv, a dirigé une discussion sur les rapports israélo-syriens dans le cadre d'un règlement du conflit au Moyen-Orient. **Fred Axelgard**, de l'Université de Georgetown, s'est penché sur le processus de paix arabo-israélien et sur le rôle des États-Unis dans ce contexte. **Kamel Abu Jaber**, de l'Université de Jordanie, a dirigé un débat sur le concept d'État au Moyen-Orient.

À la fin d'octobre, **Herbert Adam**, de l'Université Simon Fraser, et **Kogila Moodley**, de l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique, ont organisé et dirigé à l'Institut un colloque sur la politique du Canada à l'égard de l'Afrique australe. Le colloque faisait partie d'un grand projet de recherche que les deux universitaires ont entrepris pour le compte de l'Institut. **Alex Boraine**, Directeur général de l'Institut for *Democratic Alternatives in South Africa*, a amorcé la discussion en brochant un tableau des récents survenus en Afrique du Sud. Les participants se sont penchés sur les diverses analyses des options constitutionnelles et économiques et des formules de compromis. Le colloque s'est terminé par un examen de ce que la conjoncture sud-africaine suppose pour la politique canadienne, y compris l'incidence des sanctions commerciales, le désinvestissement, les boycotts universitaires et culturels, et le rôle des organismes non gouvernementaux.

À la fin d'octobre, **Gail Osherenko** et **Anne Fikkan** ont pris la parole devant des chercheurs réunis en colloque à l'Institut on *Arctic Environmental Challenges*. Mme Osherenko est chargée de recherche dans le cadre du Programme des études environnementales et de recitric de projet à l'Institut des études archiques au Collège de Dartmouth. Mme Fikkan est conseillère spéciale en matière de recherche environnementale auprès du ministre norvégien de l'Environnement, et elle est actuellement chercheur invité à Dartmouth. Le milieu arctique est menacé par les exploitations pétrolières dans l'Arctique

même et par la pollution issue des latitudes moyennes et transportée par les courants aériens et océaniques. En outre, la militarisation de l'Arctique, la construction de barrages hydroélectriques et même leournisme mettent de plus en plus en péril les écosystèmes, la faune et l'habitat de cette région du globe. Mme Osherenko et Fikkan ont abordé diverses questions: dans quelle mesure la coopération internationale est-elle nécessaire pour prévenir de telles menaces et y faire face? Pareille coopération doit-elle être limitée aux États circum-polaire, ou faut-il, au contraire, traiter des questions pertinentes dans des tribunes internationales plus vastes? La coopération entre les pays arctiques sur des questions environnementales aura-t-elle une incidence sur la sécurité militaire? Et enfin, la coopération régionale relative-représente-t-elle une menace pour l'Alliance occidentale?

**Nancy Gordon** a participé, en septembre, à une réunion d'experts organisée à New York par la *Friedrich Ebert Foundation* et le Centre des Nations-Unies pour la science et la technique au service du développement. Les intervenants des domaines de l'environnement, du développement économique et de développement, afin de formuler et de proposer des initiatives au Secrétaire général des Nations-Unies, lesquelles complèteront les efforts plus précisément, le groupe s'est intéressé au climat, à la technologie et à la conversion de l'information et à la technologie

économique, en mettant l'accent sur les questions suivantes: en matière scientifique et technique, quels sont les faits et les sujets de préoccupation fondamentaux pour les décideurs du monde entier, et à quels problèmes et conséquences politiques s'expose-t-on en essayant de traduire des connaissances scientifiques en actions politiques bien concrètes? Quelles pourraient être certaines des premières étapes pratiques à franchir pour sortir, politiquement parlant, des impasses

# EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



La 34<sup>e</sup> session du Parlement a repris le 25 septembre, après le congé d'été. Aucune discussion d'importance n'a porté sur la politique étrangère ou la politique de défense à la Chambre des communes et l'autonomie, mais le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, a énoncé les grands thèmes de la politique officielle intéressant la sécurité internationale, quand il a pris la parole à la 44<sup>e</sup> session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies le 26 septembre dernier.

## M. Clark à l'ONU

Dans son allocution, M. Clark s'est réjoui des changements survenus dans les relations Est-Ouest, et il a notamment cité le cas des pays de l'Est qui se tournent peu à peu vers la démocratie et qui ouvrent leurs marchés au reste du monde. Evoquant les progrès remarquables accomplis dans de nombreuses conflits régionaux, il s'est dit encouragé par la conjonction sud-africaine et il a accueilli favorablement le plan de paix en dix points que le président Mubarak d'Egypte a proposé pour régler le conflit au Moyen-Orient. M. Clark a aussi souligné que la Conférence internationale sur le Cambodge (voir plus bas) avait contribué à définir les mécanismes internationaux de contrôle et les processus de reconstruction que l'on pourra faire intervenir une fois le conflit réglé.

## La politique sur le Cambodge

Après un mois de pourparlers, la Conférence de Paris a échoué le 31 août. Le Canada a présidé, avec l'Inde, un comité spécial chargé d'élaborer un cadre pour l'établissement d'un mécanisme international de contrôle. M. Clark, qui avait assisté à l'ouverture de la Conférence, ainsi qu'à la séance ministérielle du 28 au 30 août, a indiqué, en répondant en Chambre le 3 octobre à la question de savoir pourquoi le gouvernement refusait de reconnaître le Canada avait cherché une façon de constituer un gouvernement de coalition ou un régime provisoire qui pourrait parler au nom de tout le peuple cambodgien et dans lequel le rôle des Khmers rouges serait réduit au minimum. M. Clark a aussi fait savoir que le Canada envisagerait de participer à une force de maintien de la paix desquels un règlement interviendrait.

## L'Afrique australe

M. Clark a présidé la quatrième réunion du Comité des ministres des Affaires étrangères du Commonwealth pour l'Afrique australe, qui a eu lieu du 7 au 9 août à Canberra (Australie). Le Comité avait été créé à la réunion des chefs de gouvernement, à Vancouver, en octobre 1987, afin de fournir des conseils et un élan susceptibles d'aider le Commonwealth à atteindre ses objectifs à l'égard de l'Afrique australe. À la fin de la réunion, M. Clark a envoyé à M. P. Botha, ministre sud-africain des Affaires étrangères, une lettre qui expliquait les motifs du maintien des sanctions et qui abordait certains aspects de la conjoncture namibienne pendant la période de transition à l'indépendance.

Au début de septembre, un groupe multipartite de cinq parlements, dirigé par le député Walter McLean qui est aussi représenté dans le processus pré-électoral. À la fin du processus, les députés ont émis un bref rapport dans lequel ils disaient en général croire que l'élection en soi serait effectivement «libre et équitable», mais où ils insistaient aussi sur la conjoncture à plus long terme (le processus de transition entre les élections mêmes et l'accession à l'indépendance, ainsi qu'à la nécessité d'accorder une aide généreuse à la Namibie, après l'indépendance en 1990). M. Clark a aussi fait savoir que le Canada avait cherché une façon de constituer un gouvernement de coalition ou un régime provisoire qui pourrait parler au nom de tout le peuple cambodgien et dans lequel le rôle des Khmers rouges serait réduit au minimum. M. Clark a aussi fait savoir que le Canada envisagerait de participer à une force de maintien de la paix desquels un règlement interviendrait.

## Les comités parlementaires

Le 31 octobre, le Comité spécial du Sénat sur la défense nationale a déposé son cinquième rapport, qui s'intitule *Les forces terrestres du Canada*. Il avait amorcé ses travaux à cet égard en 1987, mais ceux-ci avaient été retardés par la dissolution de la 33<sup>e</sup> législature, par les changements rapides survenus dans les relations Est-Ouest, et par la réduction des dépenses de la Défense annoncée par le gouvernement dans le budget du 27 avril. Le rapport rejette tant le retrait des troupes canadiennes d'Europe que le maintien de celles-ci. Cette dernière option supposerait, d'après le rapport, des dépenses importantes pour l'achat d'équipement qui ne pourrait servir nulle part ailleurs. Sans enoncer une solution de rechange précise, le Comité a proposé quelques options qui entraîneraient une restriction profonde des forces en Europe; c'est, par exemple, la constitution d'une brigade aéroportable qui pourrait être déployée au besoin ailleurs qu'en Europe, ou encore l'adoption d'un régime de «défense défensive» que l'URSS envisage de donner à ses forces en Europe.

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur (CPAEC) a commencé à tenir des audiences sur son principal thème de l'étude de l'année, à savoir les relations du Canada avec l'Union

soviétique et l'Europe de la déclaration commune du 22 octobre, dans laquelle tous les chefs d'Etat convenaient que, même s'il existait des signes de changement, il ne fallait pas encore assouplir les sanctions. Mme Margaret Thatcher, à la suite de sa déclaration distincte dans laquelle elle recommandait l'adoption d'une attitude plus positive à l'égard de Pretoria. Le 23 octobre, le premier ministre Mulroney s'est publiquement dit outre du comportement de la Grande-Bretagne, et il a ajouté qu'une telle attitude risquerait dans l'avenir de miner la coopération au sein du Commonwealth.

Malaysia. Après la diffusion de la déclaration commune du 22 octobre, dans laquelle tous les chefs d'Etat convenaient que, même s'il existait des signes de changement, il ne fallait pas encore assouplir les sanctions. Mme Margaret Thatcher, à la suite de sa déclaration distincte dans laquelle elle recommandait l'adoption d'une attitude plus positive à l'égard de Pretoria. Le 23 octobre, le premier ministre Mulroney s'est publiquement dit outre du comportement de la Grande-Bretagne, et il a ajouté qu'une telle attitude risquerait dans l'avenir de miner la coopération au sein du Commonwealth.

## En bref

Mme Margaret Mason a été nommée ambassadrice du Canada au désarmement, en août, et elle a ainsi succédé à M. Douglas Roche. Mme Mason est avocate et elle a été conseillère juridique auprès du Conseil canadien de la situation de la femme (1980-1981) et conseillère en politiques auprès du secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures, et elle s'occupait, entre autres, des questions de sécurité, des relations Est-Ouest et de la politique concernant le contrôle à l'exportation.

M. de Montigny Marchand a été nommé sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures le 18 octobre; il succédera à M. James H. Taylor, qui deviendra ambassadeur du Canada au Japon. M. Marchand, qui était tout récemment ambassadeur de notre pays aux Nations-Unies, à Genève, a par ailleurs déjà été sous-ministre des Communications et sous-ministre au ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources.


Le 27 octobre, à une réunion de chefs d'Etat qui avait lieu au Costa Rica pour célébrer le centième anniversaire de l'instauration de la démocratie dans le pays, le premier ministre Mulroney a annoncé que le Canada adhérerait à l'Organisation des Etats américains (OEA). Notre pays se contentait du statut d'observateur depuis 1972, au sein de cette tribune.











## Les efforts de maintien de la paix

Le Livre blanc sur la défense (1987) semblait minimiser le rôle du maintien de la paix dans la politique

de garnisons au Canada. Depuis lors, cependant, les contingents de maintien de la paix sont de plus en plus de soldats canadiens sur la ligne de cessez-le-feu entre l'Iran et l'Iraq, des troupes et forces de police canadiennes se sont jointes au Groupe d'assistance des Nations-Unies pour

en Namibie. Toutes ces opérations ont surchargé le Secrétariat de l'ONU, mais cela ne semble pas avoir empêché le Secrétaire général,

M. Pérez de Cuellar, de se lancer dans une autre entreprise hardie.

de sécurité de créer un Groupe

personnel civil de soutien) qui

grande mobilité, grâce à des véhicules tous terrains et à des hélicoptères. En outre, le Secrétaire général a proposé de doter le Groupe de huit vedettes de patrouille, pour les opérations dans le golfe de Fonseca et de hors-bord rapides pour circuler sur les rivières navigables.

Les cinq gouvernements centraux ont dit souhaiter que les contingents du GONVAC proviennent de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, d'Espagne et du Canada. Comme l'Organisation des États américains (OEA) a collaboré étroitement avec

les Nations-Unies pour constituer le Groupe, il est probable que le Canada en fera partie.

## Le budget de la Défense

A la fin d'octobre, après

plusieurs mois de pourparlers, le *Conférence* *Comité* *le*, qui a mené des négociations pour résoudre les différends opposant le Sénat et la Chambre relativement au projet de loi sur les programmes militaires de 1990, semblait être parvenu à un compromis acceptable aux yeux des deux parties. Presque tous les programmes militaires stratégiques clés du gouvernement Bush sont remis en question.

étolies, les intervenants se sont entendus sur un budget de 3,5 milliards de dollars US (ce qui est sensiblement moins que le chiffre de 4,3 milliards préconisé par le Sénat), somme qui se rapprochait de celle effectivement demandée par le gouvernement Bush, mais qui

proposé par la Chambre. La Maison-Blanche n'ayant pas protesté ni même menacé d'opposer son veto, les événements ont semblé confirmer que le gouvernement actuel, tout résolu qu'il soit à faire progresser la recherche sur la guerre des étoiles, tient moins que l'administration précédente à réaliser tel un déploiement qui ne sera sans doute pas le dernier.

plans stratégiques.

L'avenir du bombardier «furtif» B-2 demeure lui aussi incertain. L'Aviation militaire américaine a vigoureusement réjoui les critiques voulant que le B-2 ait une autonomie inférieure à celle du B-1B. Après avoir déclassifié de l'informa-

tion jusqu'à la considérée comme très secrète, la USAF a divulgué en octobre des données comparatives sur les deux appareils, données qui portaient notamment sur l'armement, la capacité des réservoirs et l'autonomie et qui semblaient

confirmer la supériorité du B-2. Le Congrès demeure toutefois sceptique. Le *Conference Committee* a proposé de ralentir le rythme d'extension du programme du B-2, tandis que des membres du Congrès con-

## LA PROLIFÉRATION DES MISSILES BALISTIQUES

Celui des pays allies. Pendant une réunion qui se tenait à Ottawa en octobre, le major-général Anatoli Bolyaiko a déclaré que des manuels révisés étaient désormais en usage dans les académies militaires soviétiques et que les officiers tankistes y étaient sensibilisés à la prépondérance de la défensive. Cependant, on ne sait pas encore précisément quelle structure de forces résulterait de ces changements. Le général Bolyaiko a réitéré le point de vue de l'URSS que le char est à la fois la meilleure arme offensive et la meilleure arme défensive. Devant le Comité des forces armées de la Chambre des représentants, le maréchal

## Les doctrines militaires soviétiques

Le Congrès parait disposé à laisser M. Cheney les poursuivre tous les deux. Voilà qui suspendra peut-être le Secrétaire ! Le Congrès a carté-  
général Anatoli Bolyarko a déclaré que des manuels révisés étaient désormais en usage dans les académies militaires soviétiques et que M. Cheney lui-même veut abandon-  
ner l'achat d'autres F-14 et l'élit-  
copère-avion V-22 Osprey. Les deux programmes ont survécu, en dépit du compromis adopté par le Congrès.

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À la fin d'octobre, des porte-parole du gouvernement Bush ont confirmé qu'il n'existait entre Israël et l'Afrique du Sud une coopération en matière de technologies des missiles balistiques. Le 5 juillet, l'Afrique du Sud a mis à l'essai le lancement d'un missile balistique à moyenne portée qui pourrait, selon des experts occidentaux, mettre un satellite en orbite ou transporter une ogive nucléaire.

Le 26 octobre, des porte-parole américains ont attesté par leurs propos que la traînée du lanceur sud-africain ressemblait beaucoup à celle de la fusée *Jericho II* de conception israélienne. Israël a réaffirmé sa volonté de passer à d'autres contrats de défense avec Pretoria, mais il n'a pas précisé que des connaissances technologiques sur les missiles balistiques pourraient être transmises à l'Afrique du Sud, en vertu de contrats conclus avant mars 1987.

Le débat au sujet de la coopération entre Tel Aviv et Pretoria a de nou-

Le nouveau rapport attire l'attention sur la liste des pays cherchant à ajouter des missiles balistiques à leurs arsenaux, liste qui continue de s'allonger. Selon des rapports récents émanant du Congressional Research Service et de l'Institut international de recherches pour la paix de Stockholm (SIPRI), au moins quatre puissances militaires secondaires ont acquis des missiles balistiques, pour chercher à en construire. L'importance militaire de ces engins réside principalement dans le fait qu'ils peuvent emporter des ogives nucléaires. La plupart des pays en question auraient déjà les moyens voulus pour fabriquer des armes nucléaires.

Au Moyen-Orient, le missile israélien *Jericho II* aurait une portée maximale de 1 400 km; il peut emporter une ogive nucléaire. L'Égypte et

## CONFÉRENCE SUR L'OUVERTURE DES ESPACES AÉRIENS –

CANADA, 1990

Au début de 1990, le Canada accueillera les ministres des Affaires étrangères des vingt-trois pays de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie pour discuter d'une nouvelle version d'une mesure de limitation des armements qui a été proposée pour la première fois il y a plus de trente ans.

Commission Quantico, a proposé que les États-Unis présentent un régime en vertu duquel les territoires américains et soviétiques seraient assujettis à une surveillance aérienne illimitée. Le gouvernement de la zone, de sorte que les négociations, tout comme les pourparlers sur d'autres questions étudiées par le sous-comité du désarmement (ONU), glisseraient peu à peu dans l'impasse. L'idée d'ouvrir les espaces aériens reprit de la vigueur au Conseil de sécurité, en 1958, quand les États-Unis proposèrent d'instaurer un système d'inspections aériennes au-dessus de tout l'Arctique (y compris le Canada et les autres pays nordiques). En dépit de l'appui accordé par tous les autres membres du Conseil de sécurité, et d'une intervention inhabituelle du Secrétaire général de l'ONU, l'URSS opposa son veto, et la proposition fut rejetée.

Nu que, géographiquement parlant, le Canada est situé entre les deux superpuissances, son territoire représenterait une considération importante dans tout accord qui pourrait intervenir. Notre pays a offert d'ajuster tout son territoire et des espaces aériens, et de fournir de l'aide en matière de formation et d'équipement. Quand, vers la fin des années 1950, les superpuissances relâchèrent plus ou moins aux oubliettes l'idée d'ouvrir les espaces aériens, le Canada continua de s'y intéresser. À la faveur d'une correspondance privée échangée avec Khrouchtchev pendant cette période, le premier ministre Diefenbaker a offert d'instaurer un régime d'inspections réciproques avec l'URSS, mais celle-ci n'a jamais donné suite à la proposition canadienne.

### Considérations actuelles

Avant de savoir exactement jusqu'où ira le débat sur la proposition

de l'ouverture des espaces aériens, il faudra se pencher sur plusieurs aspects importants afférents aux détails du régime à établir. L'instauration d'un régime complet d'ouverture des espaces aériens des vingt-trois pays marquerait un changement fondamental dans le mode de pensée des deux alliances. Un régime moins global (qui comporterait des zones ou des périodes restreintes) présenterait malgré tout un avantage pour le Canada et les États-Unis, car ils auraient la chance d'épauler leurs alliés européens dans l'application des méthodes indisciplinées de vérification qui s'imposeraient pour confirmer que les réductions des forces conventionnelles en Europe s'opèrent effectivement.

À l'heure actuelle, la proposition donne à penser qu'il s'agira d'un régime inter-allié, plutôt que d'un dispositif bilatéral américano-soviétique, ou encore d'ententes libres entre les vingt-trois pays touchés. On ne sait pas encore exactement de quelles modalités de survol chaque pays bénéficierait. L'utilisation et la circulation de l'information recueillie importeront elles aussi : les renseignements seront-ils accessibles à tous les membres de l'alliance effectuant l'inspection ? Comment le partage des données se fera-t-il ? À quel genre de restrictions l'usage de ces dernières sera-t-il assujéti ? Et, d'ailleurs, les renseignements recueillis par les États-Unis proposèrent d'instaurer un système d'inspections aériennes au-dessus de tout l'Arctique (y compris le Canada et les autres pays nordiques). En dépit de l'appui accordé par tous les autres membres du Conseil de sécurité, et d'une intervention inhabituelle du Secrétaire général de l'ONU, l'URSS opposa son veto, et la proposition fut rejetée.

Quant à la surveillance, le territoire serait disposé à assujettir son espace aérien et que son pays appuyait le régime d'ouverture des espaces aériens, le premier ministre Mulroney l'a encouragé à faire valoir son idée. Plus tard, le chef d'État canadien a déclaré qu'il appuierait le régime d'ouverture des espaces aériens et que son pays serait disposé à assujettir son territoire à la surveillance qui en découlerait.

Quand le secrétaire d'État américain James Baker et le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, Eïssenhov pour reprendre une idée de la négative jusqu'en novembre 1956, quand Khrouchtchev écrivit à Eisenhower pour reprendre une idée que les Américains avaient formulée auparavant relativement à l'application d'un régime dans une zone géographique limitée, et pour demander que l'Europe fut choisie à cette fin, que Washington proposa plutôt l'Arctique comme zone d'essai, surtout parce que cette région renfermait relativement peu d'installations militaires stratégiques. Les buts changèrent en même temps que l'intention de la proposition. On considérait dès lors le régime d'ouverture des espaces aériens comme une mesure de confiance dont l'objectif principal était de calmer la crainte d'une attaque surprise, plutôt que comme un moyen de mettre à l'épreuve les méthodes de


M. George Bush a proposé, le 12 mai 1989, que son pays et l'URSS, de concert avec leurs alliés respectifs, amorcent des pourparlers sur l'ouverture des espaces aériens. Il s'agit d'une politique en vertu de laquelle les avions de reconnaissance non armés de chaque pays concerné pourraient librement survoler le territoire des autres. Parallèlement, les activités et les installations militaires des autres nations visées. Contrairement à ce qui est le cas de la surveillance par satellite, les vols de reconnaissance pour garantir l'efficacité des mesures de confiance ne font pas partie de la confiance. La démarche de M. Bush est vaine à renforcer la nouvelle ouverture qui se manifeste dans la société soviétique et la volonté nouvelle, chez l'URSS, d'accepter des méthodes indisciplinées de vérification. Le gouvernement canadien a très rapidement entériné la proposition de M. Bush. À une réunion qui avait lieu à Washington avant le discours du président américain, le premier ministre Mulroney l'a encouragé à faire valoir son idée. Plus tard, le chef d'État canadien a déclaré qu'il appuierait le régime d'ouverture des espaces aériens et que son pays serait disposé à assujettir son territoire à la surveillance qui en découlerait.

### Contexte historique

Outawa, en février 1990. Les membres de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie sont censés se tenir à

Tandis qu'il se préparait à une réunion au sommet prévue pour juillet 1955 entre les États-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Union soviétique, un groupe d'experts américains, connu sous le nom de





## Pourparlers sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales

Après une ronde d'entretiens relativement peu productifs dans le cadre des Pourparlers sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales, ronde qui s'est terminée à Genève le 7 août, les chances d'en arriver à un Traité stratégiques (START) se sont considérablement améliorées le mois suivant. Juste avant une réunion à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Egorov, a déclaré, au Wyoming les 22 et 23 septembre, le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Baker, a annoncé que Washington renouvellerait son soutien à la poursuite des négociations relatives à la réduction des missiles ICBM, à condition que le Congrès approuve le financement du programme relatif à ces missiles. A son arrivée aux Etats-Unis, M. Chevardnadze a remis au président Bush une lettre du président Gorbatchev, dans laquelle celui-ci décrivait un certain nombre de nouvelles propositions visant à faire sortir les négociations de l'impasse: l'URSS s'y disait prête à signer et à mettre en œuvre un Traité START même si aucun accord n'intervenait sur les armes défensives et spatiales (accord qui restreindrait l'initiative de défenses stratégiques des Etats-Unis), et à céder devant Washington tout ce qui réclamait depuis longtemps le démantèlement du gros radar de Krasnoyarsk (M. Chevardnadze a dit dans un discours qu'il s'agit d'une « violation flagrante » du Traité ABM).

Tous ces points ont été consignés dans une déclaration conjointe diffusée à l'issue de la réunion du Wyoming, déclaration qui faisait état d'ententes sur diverses autres questions intéressantes: armes stratégiques. Le plus important élément de cette déclaration était sans doute une allusion, plutôt vague et peu remarquable, à une idée soviétique, à savoir que les missiles de croisière mer-sol (SLCM) pourraient faire l'objet de limitations en dehors d'un traité START moyen

Certains observateurs en ont déduit que l'URSS accepterait peut-être de reporter un accord final sur l'épineuse question des SLCM. Jusqu'après la signature d'un traité START. Au Wyoming, l'URSS a également accepté en principe l'exécution d'inspections qui auraient lieu à titre d'essai avant la signature du Traité, comme l'avait proposé les États-Unis. Les dignitaires soviétiques et américains réunis au Wyoming n'ont pas voulu dire si la rédaction du texte complet d'un accord START serait complètement terminée d'ici le sommet Bush-Gorbachev prévu pour la fin du printemps ou le début de l'été 1990.

## La limitation des armements conventionnels en Europe

A Vienne, les pourparlers sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe (CFCE) continuent de progresser, bien que la conclusion d'un accord à cet égard n'est pas à l'ordre du jour. J'avais souhaité le président Bush, soit quelque peu douteux. Pendant la troisième ronde qu'il s'est tenue du 7 septembre au 19 octobre, les deux camps ont détaillé les dommages et les propositions sur la vérification et la «stabilité». Le plan de l'OTAN, déposé le 21 septembre, n'a tout-

Les deux alliances à exécuter une manœuvre militaire faisant intervenir plus de 40 000 soldats ou 800 chars de combat (et encore, après un avis de douze mois). La proposition du Pacte de Varsovie, présentée le 19 octobre, prévoit la mise aux points d'entrée et de sortie de l'Europe. Les membres de l'OTAN ont été incapables de s'entendre sur cette question, certains États ouest-européens craignant de révéler de l'information secrète sur leurs exportations d'armements. Un certain déboilage s'est pro-

duit sur la question de la limitation du nombre d'avions. Le Pacte accéptait pour la première fois d'assujettir à des limites des avions autres que les appareils d'attaque au sol, y compris certains types de chasseurs et d'avions de reconnaissance et de guerre électronique. Il a proposé que chaque alliance se limite à 4 700 appareils (l'OTAN avait fixé le plafond à 5 700), mais il exempterait

I 800 intercepteurs qui, souligne-t-il, sont nécessaires pour assurer la défense contre les bombardiers

Par ailleurs, les deux camps se partageraient l'OTAN, devraient figurer dans la catégorie des avions de combat. Au chapitre des hélicoptères, les deux alliances s'entendent sur un nombre maximum de 1 060.

nonnelles de plus de 100 mm, mais non ni ne convenir d'une définition des armes anti-chars), mais il s'agit de ce qui constitue un char et un véhicule blindé de transport de troupes. De nouvelles propositions déposées par le Pacte de Varsovie abordraient notamment les aspects suivants : une interdiction de construire des bases étrangères en Europe; une restructuration des unités de la ligne de front, pour en réduire le potentiel offensif; et la tenue d'un sommet auquel participeraient les chefs des vingt-trois pays participants, dans la deuxième moitié de 1990, pour mettre la dernière main à un traité.

## L'ouverture des espaces aériens

Parmi les diverses ententes conclues au sommet Baker-

Chévaradze au Wyoming, citons l'accord «de principe» intervenu sur la proposition dite de l'ouverture des espaces aériens formulée par le président Bush en mai 1989. Le premier ministre Mulroney a par la suite offert de recevoir au Canada des membres des Affaires étrangères des ministres des deux alliances pour jeter les bases d'un accord en ce sens, lequel permettrait aux astronautes non armés d'un Etat participant de surveiller le territoire de l'importateur des autres, de manière à s'assurer qu'aucune attaque surprise ne se prépare. À la fin d'octobre, on comptait organiser une première réunion à Ottawa au début de 1990, et une autre aurait lieu peu après, dans une des capitales du bloc de l'Est, probablement Budapest. On a appris que le Canada avait fait officiellement savoir à Moscou qu'il était disposé à fournir des installations logistiques

## Les armes chimiques

Le président Bush a dévoilé une initiative très annoncée sur les

armes chimiques, dans un discours prononcé devant l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU le 25 septembre. M. Bush a proposé que les deux superpuissances réduisent leurs arsenaux chimiques à un niveau inférieur de 80 p. 100 à celui atteint aujourd'hui par les États-Unis, et même avant la signature d'une convention mondiale. Les critiques américains ont dit qu'il s'agissait là

du Congrès obligeant déjà le gouvernement américain à déjouer d'ici 1997 tous ses vieux stocks d'armes chimiques. M. Bush s'est aussi engagé à détruire 98 p. 100 de l'arsenal américain dans les huit ans qui suiviront immédiatement l'adoption d'une convention sur les armes chimiques, si l'URSS faisait de même, mais il a précisé que la signature de tous les États à même de fabriquer de tels engins serait nécessaire pour qu'une interdiction totale puisse être instaurée.

Le lendemain, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères a accueilli favorablement l'annonce de

Bush, mais il a exhorté Washington à aller plus loin. Il a proposé que les superpuissances dénucléarisent leurs arsenaux avant l'adoption de la Convention, Washington devant cependant se joindre à Moscou et cesser toute production (en 1987, les Etats-Unis ont recommencé à fabriquer des armes chimiques après une interruption de dix-huit ans, tandis que l'URSS a annoncé qu'elle suspendait la production). Le président Bush a rejeté la proposition soviétique le lendemain, en alléguant la nécessité pour son pays de disposer d'une influence et d'un élément de dissuasion face aux autres Etats dotés d'engins chimiques. Enfin, à la mi-octobre, des porte-parole américains ont confirmé des rapports voulant que le président Bush ait décidé de conserver l'option de continuer à fabriquer de telles armes, même après l'entrée en vigueur d'une convention, ce qui est contraire au texte actuellement négocié à Genève. □

par exemple, avant de s'améliorer. Les pires scénarios sont la balkanisation et l'africanisation. Si un retour à la situation d'avant 1914 en Europe est improbable, un brusque morcellement de l'empire soviétique serait extrêmement désastrieux pour tous ceux qu'il concernerait.

Les conséquences pour le Pacte de Varsovie. Le rideau de fer est noué. A mesure que les pays du Pacte de Varsovie libéraliseront leurs économies et chercheront à renforcer leurs liens avec l'Occident, les pressions grandiront au sein du Pacte pour que les dépenses militaires soient réduites et que les liens avec Moscou en matière de sécurité se relâchent. Diminuer la quantité des principales armes classiques risque d'affaiblir le système du Pacte. Le recours à la force pour empêcher une scission du bloc socialiste est probablement hors de question aujourd'hui, mais on imagine mal l'Union soviétique (avec ou sans Gorbachev) renoncer totalement à son autorité ou permettre des changements qui saperaient les liens de sécurité avec l'Europe orientale.

L'avenir des deux Allemagnes. Les événements politiques de RDA vont mettre à l'épreuve la position favorable de l'Occident face à la réunification de l'Allemagne (politique qui ne coûtait rien pendant la Guerre froide, car la réunification était utopique). Le spectre de la réunification allemande, brandi par les réfugiés et pendant les récents mouvements contestataires en RDA, rend déjà des gens nerveux à l'Est comme à l'Ouest. Les pressions pour une libéralisation et une réforme démocratique vont en s'accroissant en RDA, et si elles réussissent, elles activeront des pressions politiques pour une réconciliation plus poussée, qui pourrait conduire à une réunification. L'Occident doit commencer à élaborer une politique en prévision de ces événements, si difficile que ce soit politiquement. Autrement, nous serons dirigés, bon gré mal gré, par les deux Allemagnes. Quand l'heure de régler la question allemande viendra, il faudra aussi tenir compte des intérêts soviétiques et de ceux d'autres pays de l'Est.

L'aversion que suscite l'idée d'une Allemagne réunifiée, étant donné les suites de l'opération Barrouse et de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, pourrait être plus profonde à l'Est qu'en Occident.

L'avenir de l'OTAN et la sécurité occidentale. Il est évidemment dans l'intérêt occidental que les changements qui se produiront soient prévus et méthodiques et qu'ils puissent s'intégrer dans des structures politiques et institutionnelles existantes (qu'ils réformeront). Quoiqu'il arrive, la stabilité est nécessaire pour assurer le propre avenir économique et politique de l'Occident. Les changements risquent de survenir beaucoup plus vite et de manière bien plus imprévisible qu'on ne le pense. D'où l'importance primordiale pour l'Occident de réfléchir sérieusement à l'avenir et d'évaluer les conséquences à

long terme des événements de ces derniers temps pour la sécurité occidentale. L'OTAN et d'autres organisations politiques et économiques occidentales, comme la Communauté européenne, le GATT et le Fonds monétaire international (FMI), ont, tout comme la limitation des armements et les mesures propres à accroître la confiance qui se négocient actuellement dans différentes instances européennes, un rôle à jouer pour favoriser des changements méthodiques grâce à des prêts, au réaménagement de la dette et à une réduction générale des barrières aux échanges, au commerce et à la libre circulation des capitaux.

Si il y a peu de chances de voir une Europe entièrement intégrée avec une Allemagne unifiée en son centre, il est plus probable que le système d'alliances actuel – l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varso-



Les grandes incertitudes. L'impact des révoltes ethniques et nationalistes se répandra sur la stabilité potentielle de l'Europe de l'Est tout entière, et sur celle de l'Union soviétique, où ce problème est lié aux fortunes politiques de Mikhail Gorbachev. Si les républiques baltes obtiennent leur indépendance, le destin de ce dernier sera scellé, car l'Ukraine pourrait bien présider alors au démantèlement de l'empire soviétique, et nombreux sont les Russes carrément opposés à cette perspective.

Les réformes économiques en Europe de l'Est auront des coûts et des avantages asymétriques, et il en ressortira indiscutablement des « vainqueurs » et des « vaincus ». Le chômage s'aggravera avant que les économies se ressaisissent, ce qui alimentera le mécontentement politique

L'an-cien régime résistera au changement parce que ses membres perdront leurs privilèges dans la transition à une économie de marché.

La limitation des armements et la défense. Il est manifestement nécessaire de situer les politiques occidentales de limitation des armements et de défense dans le champ plus vaste de ces évolutions politiques et économiques, y compris la création, en 1992, d'une zone de libre-échange à l'intérieur de la Communauté européenne. La limitation des armements et les politiques de défense doivent se rattacher à une stratégie politique et économique qui encourage des réformes politiques et une transition méthodique en Europe de l'Est. Il faudrait aussi que les gouvernements occidentaux comprennent mieux les forces qui motivent les changements se produisant actuellement derrière le rideau de fer.

IL IMPORTE DE NE PAS EXAGÉRER LE RÔLE que l'Occident peut jouer en Europe de l'Est et en Union soviétique. Notre marge d'influence est limitée. Il y a certes des dangers évidents à ce que l'Occident paraisse encourager trop activement les changements politiques ou mette trop de zèle à saper l'influence soviétique. Mais il y a un risque plus grand encore à ne pas agir efficacement et à ne pas prêter assistance : celui de nuire aux réformateurs qui ont pris du pouvoir dans des pays comme la Pologne et la Hongrie.

De toute évidence, l'Occident peut et doit aider davantage ; or, l'aide alimentaire, le rééchelonnement de la dette et l'apport d'une assistance technique et d'une aide au développement sont autant de moyens de le faire. Pour que ces pays puissent transformer leur économie, il est particulièrement important qu'ils reçoivent une assistance technique en ce qui concerne, par exemple, la gestion et le contrôle financier ainsi que les complexités juridiques alliant de pair avec le droit à la propriété privée. De plus, elle n'est pas onéreuse. La décision du Canada et d'autres gouvernements occidentaux d'accorder des prêts et des crédits supplémentaires à la Pologne et à la Hongrie est un bon début. D'autres signes encourageants du côté de Washington sont que le gouvernement américain est conscient de la nouvelle occasion s'offrant à lui pour nouer de nouveaux liens avec l'URSS. Mais c'est une réponse politique et s'impose.

Nous ne sommes pas arrivés au terme de l'Histoire. Avec la fin de la Guerre froide, nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui à l'aube d'un monde meilleur, d'un monde où les horizons et les avantages que les changements apporteront seront tout aussi grands que les risques, les incertitudes et le coût potentiel d'un échec. Il y a encore beaucoup à faire ! □



# LA FIN DE L'HISTOIRE ? NIET !

Tandis que les pontifes américains se demandent si l'avenir sera ou non ennuyeux, les événements en Europe de l'Est annoncent une époque intéressante. Si seulement les responsables accordaient à ce phénomène toute l'attention qu'il mérite !

PAR FEN OSLER HAMPTON

« une suscité audace, courage, imagination et idéalisme » sera remplacée par « des siècles d'ennui » — la résolution constante de problèmes techniques, par des préoccupations environnementales et par la satisfaction d'exigences subtiles des consommateurs ».

Les implications politiques de la thèse de M. Fukuyama, à savoir que « l'Histoire est inépuisable », sont troublantes. Considérant que le changement politique est inévitable et irréversible, M. Fukuyama remplace une forme de déterminisme historique (le néo-légalisme) par une autre forme (le marxisme-léninisme). C'est une idée dangereuse et une piètre façon de pallier l'inaction de la plupart des gouvernements occidentaux face aux changements qui se produisent en Union soviétique et dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Est.

Il n'y a rien d'automatique dans les événements récents. Les modestes réformes politiques et économiques russes par certains pays de l'Est un long chemin à parcourir, et le risque d'échec est grand. En Union soviétique, la résistance politique intense aux réformes politiques et économiques de M. Gorbatchev laisse entendre que ce dernier a, en tout cas, du mal à les imposer.

LE RISQUE DE RENVERSEMENT DES RÉCENTS événements oblige l'Occident à formuler une stratégie politique efficace qui aide à consolider et à renforcer les tendances et les réformes libérales. Il faut commencer non pas par honorer des théories de type historique, mais plutôt par poser les bonnes questions :

Quel avenir attend le socialisme — c'est-à-dire quels types de scénarios pouvons-nous imaginer pour avoir une idée du genre d'évolution que connaîtront peut-être les économies et les systèmes politiques de l'Europe de l'Est, de l'Union soviétique et de la Chine ?

Que peut faire l'Occident pour faciliter le processus de réforme ? Quelles sont les incidences de ces réformes politiques et économiques intérieures pour l'avenir du Pacte de Varsovie ? Quels types de réformes politiques

irrésistibles pour une réunification, et comment allemande (RDA) déclencherait des pressions économiques en République démocratique

actuels en Europe de l'Est et en Union soviétique pour les intérêts de leurs pays. Il se passe à peine un jour sans que les journaux annoncent une réforme économique, un changement politique, une forme économique, un changement politique, une réforme démocratique, des troubles ethniques ou des demandes d'autonomie dans les pays de l'Est, ou l'arrivée de réfugiés qui fuient des gouvernements répressifs de cette partie du monde. L'Histoire s'est remise en marche à un rythme vertigineux. Ce qui arrive est tellement spectaculaire que la plupart des observateurs et des pontifes bien informés ont été pris au dépourvu. Récemment, avec un article intitulé *The End of History* [la fin de l'Histoire], qui a paru l'été dernier dans *The National Interest*, M. Francis Fukuyama, directeur adjoint de la planification politique au Département d'Etat américain (et ancien analyste de la *Kand Corporation*), a mis en évidence ce manque de perspicacité occidentale.

Son article a suscité un très large débat — un débat qui aurait dû avoir lieu depuis longtemps, puisque l'Occident essaie maintenant de comprendre les changements considérables qui interviennent dans le bloc communiste. Mais les réponses de M. Fukuyama sont moins que satisfaisantes, et il se préoccupe étonnamment peu, semble-t-il, des conséquences de ces changements pour les intérêts de la sécurité occidentale. Sa pensée peut se résumer comme suit.

Le 20<sup>e</sup> siècle se termine sur la « victoire indiscutable du libéralisme économique et politique. » Ce « triomphe » de l'idéologie occidentale se manifeste dans l'« épuisement complet » du communisme et du socialisme.

Les récents événements en Chine et en Union soviétique « ont signé l'arrêt de mort de l'alternatif marxiste-léniniste à la démocratie libérale. » Depuis l'arrivée de M. Gorbatchev au pouvoir il y a quatre ans, les institutions et les principes les plus fondamentaux du stalinisme ont subi un assaut révolutionnaire.

Le risque d'un « conflit sur une grande échelle » entre de « grands États encore aux prises avec l'Histoire » diminue à mesure que les membres du monde communiste embrassent les valeurs de l'Histoire libérale de l'Occident.

La « lutte idéologique mondiale » qui a tenu l'humanité pendant presque tout le siècle et qui

l'Occident et le bloc de l'Est devraient-ils abandonner la question de la réunification allemande ? Quelles sont les conséquences des événements actuels et des scénarios d'avenir pour la sécurité occidentale et pour l'OTAN ? Les risques d'une confrontation militaire entre les deux blocs diminuent-ils, comme beaucoup le croient ? Quels facteurs ou quelles forces pourraient troubler la détente et provoquer des tensions, et comment empêcher que cela arrive ? Où se situent la limitation des armements et la défense dans le vaste paysage politique ?

Il y a là amplement matière à réflexion et il reste certainement d'autres questions à poser. Si l'Occident tarde trop à s'attaquer aux premières, il se laissera emporter par l'Histoire tel le « cavalier sans tête ». Voici quelques précisions sur les questions que nous venons de formuler.

Scénarios d'avenir. Si nous regardons l'avenir, il existe un certain nombre de scénarios différents possibles pour l'Europe de l'Est et pour l'Union soviétique. *L'occidentalisation et la démocratisation*. C'est la Hongrie qui se rapproche le plus de ce genre d'évolution, la décision ayant été prise récemment de dissoudre le Parti communiste et d'adopter un régime multipartite. *La latino-américanisation*. Ici, le processus politique socialiste entre la répression, la démocratie et la modernisation à l'intérieur d'une tradition autoritaire. Il se peut que l'Union soviétique choisisse cette voie. *La « sinification »*, ou le modèle chinois, qui se caractérise par un Etat communiste fort, doté d'une économie de marché de type libéral. C'est ainsi que le général Jaruzelski, chef du Parti communiste polonais, voyait son pays au départ. *L'ottomanisation ou balkanisation*, qu'on appelle parfois « scénario du démembrement de l'empire soviétique » et qui découle d'une hybridation et d'un réveil ethnique et nationaliste en Union soviétique et dans certaines parties de l'Europe de l'Est. *L'africanisation*. Ce scénario décrit la situation qui existe dans certains pays africains où l'on assiste à la destruction de l'économie et de l'Etat et où des groupes socio-économiques importants se révèlent incapables d'agir collectivement. En fait, c'est ce qui se

Ces scénarios montrent que le CHANGEMENT politique ne sera probablement ni linéaire ni uniforme; que le risque de troubles et l'agitation politiques se poursuivra dans certains pays est considérable; et que les choses empireront probablement dans quelques pays, en Pologne,

passé en Pologne aujourd'hui.

en France, aux Pays-Bas, en URSS et dans d'autres pays, la perspective d'une Allemagne

unitée.

Ce qui revient à dire que la question allemande devienne l'élément central de la coopération en Europe ou du moins un des éléments centraux. Les avantages de la CSCE, par comparaison avec d'autres institutions européennes, sont qu'elle est multilatérale et non pas bloc à bloc, et que les deux superpuissances et le Canada y participent, ainsi que les pays européens non alignés et neutres. Il faudrait, dans tout nouvel ordre européen, préserver ces éléments qui ont assuré la sécurité des membres principalement par des accords de coopération non militaires et par des garanties mutuelles, et qui ont permis de réduire les forces militaires à des niveaux très bas. La participation de l'OTAN et celle du Pacte de Varsovie seraient nécessaires au bon déroulement de la transition, après quoi les deux alliances perdant peu à peu leur raison d'exister en tant que facteurs d'organisation dans l'ordre européen, pourraient se dissoudre.

Dans un tel contexte, l'unité allemande semblerait être traitée dans le contexte plus vaste de l'ordre européen d'après la Guerre froide. Si les choses se passent bien (ce que rien ne garantit vraiment), un nouveau ordre européen s'établissant est envisageable d'ici dix à vingt ans. Il devrait se constituer à partir du processus entamé à Helsinki en 1975 (la Conférence CSCE). Les avantages de la CSCE, par comparaison avec d'autres institutions européennes, sont qu'elle est multilatérale et non pas bloc à bloc, et que les deux superpuissances et le Canada y participent, ainsi que les pays européens non alignés et neutres. Il faudrait, dans tout nouvel ordre européen, préserver ces éléments qui ont assuré la sécurité des membres principalement par des accords de coopération non militaires et par des garanties mutuelles, et qui ont permis de réduire les forces militaires à des niveaux très bas. La participation de l'OTAN et celle du Pacte de Varsovie seraient nécessaires au bon déroulement de la transition, après quoi les deux alliances perdant peu à peu leur raison d'exister en tant que facteurs d'organisation dans l'ordre européen, pourraient se dissoudre.

La souveraineté nationale au sens traditionnel du terme serait largement dépassée de toute façon, puisqu'il y a beaucoup de questions que l'on régalait au niveau national seraient confiées à des instances internationales comme la Communauté européenne ou la CSCG. Peu important alors que les deux Allemands continuent d'exister en tant qu'Etats indépendants, ou qu'ils décident de former une confédération quelconque. Peut-on en arriver là, vu les bouleversements actuels dans le bloc de l'Est ? C'est la situation économique de ces pays qui est le facteur décisif. Si l'est principalement du ressort des Européens de l'Est et des Soviétiques d'empêcher qu'elle se dégrade de manière catastrophique, les Occidentaux ont aussi leur part de responsabilité. Pourquoi ne pas lancer un plan Marshall d'aide à l'Europe de l'Est pour en favoriser la stabilisation économique ? Pourquoi ne pas conclure des accords généraux de limitation des armements qui réduiraient de beaucoup les arsenaux classiques et nucléaires ? Des réductions considérables sont un préalable à la création d'un ordre européen pacifique au sein duquel la question allemande pourrait être réglée de manière satisfaisante pour les Allemands et pour leurs voisins. Par ailleurs, si la situation devenait extrêmement instable, le monde aurait moins à craindre en cas de crise si les forces militaires avaient été nettement réduites au préalable. □

«revanche, le parti socio-démocrate (le SPD, l'opposition de gauche en RFA), qui gardait des liens étroits avec le SED est-allemand, ne veut pas égarer de Berlin-Est. Derrière ces voix dissonantes, cependant, un

centré droit au centre gauche, d'abord sur le fait que la démocratie et la liberté importent plus que l'unité allemande (d'où l'exportation à des réformes en RDA), puis sur l'idée que la question allemande ne peut être séparée de la question plus vaste de l'avenir de l'Europe et des deux alliances. Ainsi, la grande majorité des spécialistes de la politique étrangère en RFA (et, de toute évidence, des groupes d'opposition est-allemands aussi, sans parler du régime actuel) s'accordent à penser que l'idée des deux Allemands quittant leurs alliances respectives pour adopter un statut neutre en tant que nation unifiée n'est ni souhaitable ni réalisable. L'Allemagne restera donc divisée aussi longtemps que l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varsovie continueront d'exister, et que les deux États allemands accepteront cette réalité.

Avec tout cela, où en est la question allemande ? Plus important encore, qu'est-ce au sujet que la question allemande ? Pendant quarante ans, le sujet a eu des dimensions à la fois intérieures et extérieures. La partie intérieure : l'autodétermination pour les populations des régions allemandes. Des réformes politiques en RFA devaient régler cet aspect du problème. Après tout, si en Europe de l'Est et en URSS, la Guerre froide avait la démocratie et la liberté pour objets, la question allemande a les mêmes racines en Allemagne de l'Est.

En comparaison, l'aspect extérieur de la ques-

« Les États, est secondaire. C'est entre deux extrêmes qu'il faut rechercher des solutions possibles. D'un côté, les deux pays pourraient se considérer mutuellement comme des États pleinement souverains et indépendants. Pour Bonn, cela signifie la reconnaissance officielle de la RDA et l'abolition de l'unité allemande comme condition préalable à la réunification. Ce sont là deux perspectives peu

En outre, les deux Allemagnes ont toujours entretenu des rapports particuliers. Même en pleine Guerre froide, Bonn et Berlin-Est maintenaient certains contacts, notamment en ce qui concerne le commerce et l'accès à Berlin-Ouest. Traiter les relations interallemandes comme l'importe quelles relations internationales revient à ne pas tenir compte des liens politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels toujours forts qui unissent les deux pays, même après quarante années de partition. D'un autre côté, créer un Etat allemand unique

division, et ce n'est certainement pas la solution la plus souhaitable. Même la constitution fédérale l'exige pas. De plus, il faut prendre en compte les inquiétudes légitimes que suscite en Pologne

dirigeants actuels) de gagner le soutien des Allemands de l'Est. Il faudrait d'ailleurs noter que, contrairement à celle de la Pologne et de l'Union soviétique, l'économie de l'Allemagne de l'Est est encore en relativement bon état, avec un revenu par habitant comparable, en gros, à celui de l'Italie. Il semblerait que le récent exode ait été déclenché autant par la frustration politique que par des facteurs économiques.

S'il est très douteux qu'un Allemand de l'Est réorganise et disparaisse en tant qu'État indépendant, que dire de sa cousine occidentale ? L'acrophonie de voix qui s'élève en RFA ces jours-ci donnerait à penser que les Allemands d'Ouest prolifrent d'une occasion longtemps attendue pour promouvoir l'idée d'une réunification. Ainsi, la presse a fait savoir que le gouvernement fédéral venait de rinscrirc la question allemande à l'ordre du jour des pourparlers Est-Ouest. Certains conservateurs ont même réouvert la question de la frontière polonaise occidentale (la ligne Oder-Neisse), que le traité de 1970 entre la RFA et la Pologne était censé avoir réglé une fois pour toutes.

infinuable à une réaction compréhensible face aux événements étonnants qui ont lieu en Allemagne. Les mécanismes de la politique nationale ouest-allemande expliquent le reste en grande partie. L'émergence d'un parti de droite réformateur, le *Republikaner*, menace sérieusement la base politique des chrétiens démocrates (CDU et CSU) au pouvoir. Si la tendance actuelle



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se maintenant, le CDU risque de perdre le pouvoir aux élections fédérales de l'an prochain. Le chancelier Kohl a donc décidé, manifestement, d'évoquer de plus en plus la réunification pour attirer les électeurs conservateurs. En plus, l'alle droite de son parti a son propre programme. En



# UNE ALLEMAGNE, OU DEUX ?

La perspective d'une Allemagne réunifiée au centre de l'Europe est supposée effrayer tout le monde, mais cela importe-t-il encore vraiment ?

PAR THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN

1 « QUESTION ALLEMANDE » PARAISSAIT régie. Après tout, deux fois au cours de ce siècle, une Allemagne unifiée au milieu de l'Europe avait abouti au désastre; elle avait été en grande partie responsable de la Première Guerre mondiale et elle avait déclenché la Seconde. Même en pleine instabilité politique

l'Allemagne, elle au moins, semblait solide. Du reste, il n'y avait apparemment aucune raison de croire que les Allemands, de l'Est ou de l'Ouest, tenaient un calendrier secret concernant une réunification éventuelle. La célèbre *Ospolnik* ouest-allemande (politique visant à améliorer les rapports avec l'Europe de l'Est, la République démocratique allemande [RDA] et l'Union soviétique) n'a été possible que moyennant un statu quo territorial et politique en Europe. Par ailleurs, on pourrait affirmer que la génération ayant connu un Etat allemand unifié est sur le point de perdre la maîtrise des deux Allemagne et que les Allemands plus jeunes, tant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest, ne sont pas attachés sentimentalement au concept d'une grande Allemagne.

Cependant, les événements de cet automne ont remis en question la sagesse conventionnelle. Tout à coup, la question allemande revient à l'ordre du jour international. D'abord, il y a eu l'exode massif des Allemands de l'Est, accompagné de scènes télévisées sans précédent : des réfugiés qui, dans l'ambassade d'Allemagne de l'Ouest à Prague, craient « libérés » au moment où le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la RFA, M. Genscher, révélait l'accord qu'il venait de conclure avec la RDA pour les laisser passer à l'Ouest; des milliers qui, les larmes aux yeux, criaient « Deutschland » (Allemagne) en arrivant enfin en Allemagne de l'Ouest, à peine avaient-ils franchi la frontière de l'Allemagne de l'Est; et au milieu de tout cela, le « Parti socialiste unifié » est-allemand (SED) qui était quarante années l'Occident capitaliste et qui prenait fait et cause pour les dirigeants chinois contre « la campagne impérialiste visant à faire disparaître le socialisme ».

Ensuite, événement plus important encore, ceux qui ont décidé de rester dans le pays se sont exprimés haut et fort. Souvenez-vous que l'Eglise protestante, l'opposition politique s'est organisée et a déclenché les plus grandes manifestations

festations (spontanées et non officielles) jamais vues en Allemagne de l'Est (y compris pendant les événements de 1953 au cours desquels des manifestations de bien moindre ampleur avaient été réprimées dans la violence). Des centaines de milliers de personnes se sont rassemblées dans Berlin-Est, à Dresde et à Leipzig. L'opposition politique, qui existait avant ces récents événements, mais qui est pour la première fois à même d'attirer un soutien franc et massif, voit la réponse aux problèmes de la RDA dans le socialisme démocratique et non dans le capitalisme. Bref, ces Allemands de l'Est ne veulent pas rester les oubliés du stalinisme dans une ère de réforme en Europe de l'Est et en Union soviétique. Ils veulent que la République démocratique allemande se montre digne de son nom. Quelles que soient les véritables intentions du parti communiste, il ne lui suffira pas de faire de beaux discours et de gagner du temps. Une révolution démocratique a été déclenchée et seules de vraies réformes politiques soulageront le système est-allemand des pressions s'exerçant sur lui et empêcheront que l'exode massif se poursuive.

QUE SIGNIFIENT CES ÉVÉNEMENTS POUR LES DEUX Allemagnes, dans l'ordre européen d'après la Guerre froide ? Les considérations suivantes ne sont que des suppositions, car s'il y a quelque chose de certain ces temps-ci, c'est l'incertitude de l'avenir. Pour commencer, l'argument selon lequel une RDA reformée perdrait sa raison d'être en tant qu'Etat indépendant présente de sérieuses failles. Ce sont des intransigeants opposés aux réformes à Berlin-Est et, ironiquement, quelques Occidentaux incapables d'imaginer une Allemagne de l'Est démocratisée choisissant de remplacer le stalinisme par autre chose qu'un

idé. Ils soutiennent que, si les Allemands deviennent impossibles à différencier dans leurs systèmes politiques, économiques et sociaux, on ne pourra résister à la tendance favorable à la réunification. Selon cette logique, l'Autriche et l'Allemagne fédérale devraient être fortement tentées par l'unification. Les Autrichiens et les Allemands de l'Ouest parlent la même langue,

troupes soviétiques dans le pays a servi à palier ce manque de légitimité. Quand, au cours de son récent passage à Berlin-Est, M. Gorbatchev a déclaré à M. Honecker que les décisions concernant la RDA doivent se prendre à Berlin-Est et non à Moscou, il disait clairement qu'une époque était révolue. Le régime ne peut plus compter sur l'appui de l'URSS pour se justifier face aux habitants du pays.

Il se peut que la démocratisation du système soit la seule façon (et la dernière chance pour les




ont des systèmes politiques et économiques similaires, et de nombreux liens culturels unissent leurs pays. Pourtant, personne ne parle d'une unification germano-autrichienne. En outre, il ne faudrait pas oublier que, dans toute l'histoire allemande depuis le Moyen-Âge, il n'a existé d'Etat allemand unitaire que pendant soixante-quatorze ans, soit entre 1871 et 1945. À dire vrai, on peut concevoir que la RDA renforcera, de fait, son identité en se lançant dans un processus de réforme politique. Pour l'instant, l'Etat est-allemand ne possède qu'une légitimité d'emprunt en tant que fer de lance du stalinisme en Europe de l'Est, elle qui doit constamment se démarquer de la République fédérale. L'identité de l'Allemagne de l'Est se définit par opposition à celle de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest. Ces quarante dernières années, la présence de

leur flux

seule fonction officielle.  
du Cambodge à l'ONU représente, à toutes fins utiles, légitime du Cambodge, même si occuper le siège maintenant ce dernier comme étant le gouvernement du Kampuchéa démocratique (GCKD), l'ONU reconnaît Samn, pour former le Gouvernement de coalition nationale du peuple khmer (FLNPK), dirigé par Son Sihanouk, appelée ANS, et le Front de libération nationale sihanoukiste (guérilla du prince Norodom contre le régime soutenu par Hanoi l'Armée nationale communistes et à des guerillas luttant activement rouges se sont joints à d'autres groupes d'opposition nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN), les Khmers ment de la Chine et des pays de l'Association des nations pour le Vietnam. En 1982, avec l'encouragement sanctionner le renversement du gouvernement kam- de nombreux membres de l'ONU hésitent aussi à droits de la personne dont il s'était rendu coupable, khmer rouge à cause des violations flagrantes des fussent vraiment peu disposés à appuyer le régime présente le Cambodge aux Nations-Unies. Bien qu'ils Entre 1975 et 1982, les Khmers rouges ont re-président et premier ministre du pays.  
et nommé Heng Samrin et Hun Sen respectivement la République populaire du Kampuchéa (RPK), a envahi le Cambodge, chassé les Khmers rouges, ins-die et à la famine. En décembre 1978, le Vietnam-giennes ont été exécutés, ou ont succombé à la mala-Pol Pot, plus d'un million de Cambodgiens et Cambod-en déroute et crée le Kampuchéa démocratique. Sous Phnom Penh, ils ont mis le gouvernement de Lon Nol-rouges se sont emparés de la capitale cambodgienne,

# NOTES SUR LE CAMBODGE



EN AVRIL 1975, LES KHMERS

C'est surtout en raison de leur im-portance médiatique auprès de l'opinion internationale que les combats vont se poursuivre. L'enjeu de la lutte est la maîtrise du terri-toire, chaque partie voulant garder, obtenir ou qu'il briser ses prétentions à la légitimité. Il est peu vraisem-blable que le conflit puisse se régler définitivement par les armes. En dépit des apparences, nous les belligérants paraissent en cours Des tractations seraient en cours pour une reprise des négociations. L'aventurisme «guérillero» du Cambodge, perdu entre la Thaïlande et le Viet-nam, ne peut être garanti que par la puissance régionale dominante. Si la collectivité internationale, perdue dans l'impasse cambodgienne, n'a ni la volonté, ni la capacité d'amorcer un règlement, il serait hypocrite de prétendre qu'il existe une autre voie que celle de s'en-suera. L'hommage convenable-ment rendu pourait du reste calmer le jeu. Il serait désastreux que les parties au règlement du problème cambodgien, tout au moins celles qui en ont fait les frais jusqu'ici, ne se rencontrent que sur les champs de bataille, même s'il ne s'agit que de Cambodgiens ... □

À TOUTS EGARDS, L'IMPRESSION D'ENSEMBLE EST donc celle d'une situation absurde où les réfugiés et les populations civiles font une fois de plus les frais, et où, à l'ex-ception des Khmers rouges et des professionnels formés à l'étranger, les combattants cambodgiens n'interviennent qu'à leur corps défen-dant. C'est surtout en raison de leur im-portance médiatique auprès de l'opinion internationale que les combats vont se poursuivre. L'enjeu de la lutte est la maîtrise du terri-toire, chaque partie voulant garder, obtenir ou qu'il briser ses prétentions à la légitimité. Il est peu vraisem-blable que le conflit puisse se régler définitivement par les armes. En dépit des apparences, nous les belligérants paraissent en cours Des tractations seraient en cours pour une reprise des négociations. L'aventurisme «guérillero» du Cambodge, perdu entre la Thaïlande et le Viet-nam, ne peut être garanti que par la puissance régionale dominante. Si la collectivité internationale, perdue dans l'impasse cambodgienne, n'a ni la volonté, ni la capacité d'amorcer un règlement, il serait hypocrite de prétendre qu'il existe une autre voie que celle de s'en-suera. L'hommage convenable-ment rendu pourait du reste calmer le jeu. Il serait désastreux que les parties au règlement du problème cambodgien, tout au moins celles qui en ont fait les frais jusqu'ici, ne se rencontrent que sur les champs de bataille, même s'il ne s'agit que de Cambodgiens ... □

laisse au moment de leur départ, une place qui ne se mesure pas seulement à la protection mili-taire qu'ils assurent encore récemment, mais à l'importance des activités qu'ils exerçaient dans la plupart des domaines et dans lesquels ils seront rattachés, mais pas qui ? Pol Pot disait en 1977 : «... même si je ne reste qu'un million de Cam-bodgiens, les Chinois me fourniront la population dont j'aurai besoin ...». Le Cambodge a changé plusieurs fois de régime, mais «l'envahisseur» (ce n'est pas forcément le Vietnam) est resté. Même si l'on parvient à obtenir des voisins rapprochés ou plus lointains qu'ils laissent enfin en paix ce malheureux pays, ce n'est pas seule-ment son indépendance politique mais aussi sa dépendance économique et culturelle qui seront en cause. Elle sera fonction de l'importance et de la qualité, mais surtout du degré de désintéresse-ment de l'aide et de la coopération qui seront apportées au Cambodge pour lui permettre de re-construire son économie et de former sa jeunesse. Depuis dix ans, le gouvernement installé à Phnom Penh, remplit la plus difficile et la plus facile des tâches : assurer à partir de zéro, la renaissance du pays sur tous les plans en utilisant tous les moyens qu'il faut s'in-pauvres moyens qu'il faut s'in-génier à trouver ou à créer. Ceux-ci sont maintenant hors de portée. Les acquis matériels et économiques sont immédiatement absorbés par une démographie galopante, par l'effort de guerre et par la nécessité de pourvoir au remplacement d'un matériel récupéré jusque dans les décharges.

La situation militaire. L'activité militaire récente de la Coalition confirme bien que les troupes viet-namiennes ont effectivement quitté le Cambodge. Auparavant, leur présence dans la région était cer-tainement l'élément qui dissuadait le plus le déploiement des forces de la «résistance». L'activité actuelle la saison des pluies, qui favorise les opérations de la guérilla. S'agit-il d'opérations visant à donner enfin au gouvernement de Coalition une

base territoriale nationale, indispensable, sur les plans politique et militaire ? Deux objectifs sont poursuivis simultanément. La prise de Battambang ou d'Angkor qui permettrait à un autre gouvernement cambodgien de se poster en rival de celui de Phnom Penh aurait une répercussion internationale considérable. Déjà, l'occupation de quelques villes dans la zone frontalière et le relâchement, à contre-temps et à grands renforts de publicité, du courant-feu dans la capitale donnerait à l'étranger l'impression que la situation du gouvernement de Hun Sen s'est subitement détériorée. Par contre, comme tenu notamment de la nature du terrain, il est difficile d'imaginer actuellement qu'une opération d'en-vergure soit imminente et que les combats actuels puissent rapidement tourner à l'avantage décisif de l'une des parties. De chaque côté, on se défend de tirer sur les villages, mais que dire des mines ? La population est mobilisée contre son gré, et les réfugiés des camps sont utilisés comme porteurs pour la traversée des champs de mines. Jusqu'ici, la tactique utilisée par Phnom Penh, a consisté à protéger les positions les plus impor-



AU PLAN INTERNATIONAL, LE RETRAIT DES TROUPES vietnamiennes du Cambodge faisait l'objet d'un consensus général, y compris celui de l'occupant. Les conditions les plus favorables à l'enchaînement sans à-coups des mouvements d'une mécanique de paix déjà lancée paraissaient exister. Malheureusement, les conditions du départ des troupes vietnamiennes n'avaient pas été préalablement négociées à l'ONU, qui en avait fait la condition absolue d'un réexamen de sa position à l'égard du Vietnam et du Cambodge. Comme certains observateurs ont pu l'écrire, les travaux des commissions chargées de promouvoir la mise en place d'un gouvernement provisoire, ainsi que les voies et les moyens de la réconciliation générale, se seraient rapidement et finalement limités au remplacement ou non d'un gouvernement provisoirement par un autre. Il semble que, dans son immense lassitude et son grand dénuement, le

ment modifié cette volonté.

Dans son livre magistral sur la Chine, M. Z. Brzezinski soulignait que pour le gou-  
vernement chinois il était essentiel que la collec-  
tivité internationale reconnaisse cette situation. La  
fin d'une conférence internationale sur le  
Cambodge offrait une occasion inespérée. Bien  
que la conférence du mois d'août se fût soldée  
par un échec, l'objectif de la Chine avait été d'af-  
firmer que rien n'était possible sans elle (ce n'est  
certainement pas dans cette intention que la Con-  
férence internationale de Paris avait été convo-  
quée). La condamnation, précédemment unanime,  
survenue en Chine en juin 1989 n'avait aucune-

ANS UN ARROGANT COMMUNIQUE PUBLIE  
le 2 mai 1989 à Beijing, la Chine et  
l'URSS, dont on savait que, pour retenir  
complètement leurs relations, elles  
avaient convenu de régler préalablement les pro-  
blèmes de la délimitation de leurs frontières, la  
question algériane et le dossier cambodgien,  
avaient rappelé en des termes à peine voilés que  
leur régime en Asie devait passer par elles. Un  
marché économique potentiellement très impor-  
tant et un équilibrage éventuel de la puissance  
japonaise ne pouvaient laisser indifférents les  
deux pays qui jouent un rôle clef dans la politique  
asiatique. Le dossier cambodgien n'était que l'oc-  
casion pour la Chine, l'URSS et aussi les Etats-  
Unis de se donner mutuellement des gages en  
acceptant, à certaines conditions le leadership  
chinois dans cette partie du monde.

reprirent du pouvoir. Pouvait-on envisager le retour, au sein du gouvernement cambodgien des boureaux et des tortionnaires, sans autres garanties que celle de les trouver à nouveau rangés sous la bannière et la caution qu'il avait déjà utilisées en 1975 pour commettre leurs meurtres ? Si la délégation de Phnom Penh nourrissait encore quelques doutes sur une éventuelle « conversion » des Khmers rouges, les prestations haineuses de Khieu Samphan (représentant des Khmers rouges) à la Conférence de Paris aura suffi à les dissiper. Autrement, celui-ci a pu en rares occasions admettre quelques « erreurs », mais il n'a jamais exprimé ni regrets ni remords au sujet de ses crimes. Toutes proportions gardées, l'holocauste du Cambodge aurait fait 65 millions de victimes s'il avait eu lieu aux Etats-Unis. Tous les holocaustes ne sont-ils pas dignes de la même considération... ? Il ne s'agissait que de Cambodgiens ; Le massacre absolu, systématique de tous les cadres cambodgiens, de tous les intellectuels, de leurs mères, de leurs épouses et de leurs enfants, des étudiants, et seulement parce que la ville les avait corrompus entraînait-ils vraiment dans le cadre d'une lutte contre toute forme d'influence

gouvernement de Phnom Penh aurait finalement accepté la solution chinoise, si le partage du pouvoir entre les quatre parties n'avait paru procéder de la volonté de paralyser entièrement l'administration et de contribuer ainsi à créer une situation explosive, susceptible d'être utilisée en vue de la

chec de la Conférence de Paris et l'abandon des vietnamiennes, les Cambodgiens et les hommes de Pol Pot revien-

# UN APPARTIENT A BODGE ?

# A QUI APPARTIENT LE CAMBODGE ?

Après l'échec de la Conférence de Paris et le retrait des troupes vietnamiennes, les Cambodgiens et les Cambodgiennes ont peur que les hommes de Pol Pot reviennent.

PAR VINCENT JACQUOT

«internationnalistes» et ceux qu'on pourrait appeler les «nationalistes en matière fiscale». La perception que les Canadiens et Canadiennes ont généralement de la sécurité aujourd'hui se reflète également dans la mesure où les attitudes face aux budgets de défense maintenus sont liées aux préoccupations ex-primées au sujet de problèmes internationaux évoqués plus haut. On pourrait s'attendre, par exemple, que ceux qui sont partisans de la défense considèrent la menace de guerre comme étant grave, mais non la pauvreté dans le tiers-monde, ni les violations des droits de la personne, ni les conflits commerciaux. Pourtant, ce n'est pas le cas. Les opposants aux compressions des budgets de la défense (ceux qui ont aussi tendance à dénoncer les réductions de l'aide au développement) attribuent généralement plus d'importance à presque tous les problèmes internationaux que ceux qui appuieraient ces compressions. Les différences frappantes ne sont donc pas tant des différences entre des groupes aux priorités opposées qu'entre les nombreuses personnes selon qui il existe une vaste gamme de défis extérieurs sérieux réclamant une action, et les quelques-unes qui ne le croient pas.

L'ÉMERGENCE D'UNE CONCORDE ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST plus que d'une simple détente, suscite déjà des conceptions que l'aide extérieure pluri que

Reduire l'aide extérieure plutôt que les budgets de défense	24
Reduire les budgets de défense plutôt que l'aide extérieure	21
Reduire les deux davantage	29
Reduire les deux moins	10
Autre	16

%

Diagramme 4 La réduction des dépenses fédérales

À peu près une personne sur trois (33 p. 100) trouvent l'idée bonne; les autres (67 p. 100) pensent qu'il est impossible d'avoir des armes à des fins uniquement défensives.

Les réductions des arsenaux nucléaires, en revanche, sont très favorablement accueillies. Les sondages passés de l'Institut, et celui-ci aussi, révèlent que la population appuie fermement l'idée d'un traité d'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires qui limiterait ou éliminerait tout ou moins des arsenaux existants.

QUAND LE GOUVERNEMENT MURLONEY A ANNONCÉ, AU printemps dernier, son intention de réduire les dépenses fédérales en matière de défense et d'aide extérieure, le public a peu protesté sur le moment. Cependant, à en croire le sondage de l'Institut, la population est très divisée sur le sujet, et très peu de gens s'opposent fortement aux coupures budgétaires. Dans une de ses questions, le sondage évoquait le nouveau budget fédéral, puis demandait si le gouvernement aurait dû réduire l'aide extérieure plutôt que les budgets de défense, réduire les derniers plutôt que l'aide extérieure, réduire les deux davantage, réduire les deux moins, ou procéder à d'autres compressions à la place (voir le Diagramme 4). Environ un(e) Canadien(ne) sur quatre préfère une réduction qui toucherait la défense plutôt que l'aide extérieure, et à peu près autant favorisent le contraire. Puisqu'une proportion légèrement supérieure (29 p. 100) appuie également de plus grandes coupures dans les budgets de la défense et de l'aide extérieure, il y a donc une mince majorité qui se dit d'accord avec les compressions annoncées au moins (si ce n'est plus) dans les budgets de la défense et de l'aide extérieure. À peine plus d'un quart préfèrent soit des réductions moins dans les deux domaines, soit d'autres compressions budgétaires à la place; ce groupe pourrait être qualifié d'internationaliste, vu la façon dont il appuie le maintien d'activités internationales intéressantes aussi bien le domaine militaire que l'aide au développement.

En général, la population canadienne est conséquente dans ses préférences. En effet, les personnes qui approuvent les compressions des dépenses militaires canadiennes ont aussi tendance à soutenir le désarmement à l'Est et à l'Ouest, à rejeter la recherche d'une supériorité militaire, et à croire que la Guerre froide s'estompée, que la «menace soviétique» recule et que les facteurs économiques contribuent davantage à déterminer l'influence qu'un pays exerce sur la scène internationale que les facteurs militaires. En revanche, celles qui sont plus favorables à des compressions du budget de l'aide au développement qu'à des réductions du budget de la défense pensent généralement l'inverse.

Fait intéressant, la division entre ces deux groupes de perspectives, bien que très réelle, est seconde. Ce clivage apparaît dans le fait que la corrélation entre le soutien (ou l'opposition) à des réductions touchant la défense est positive dans l'ensemble; c'est-à-dire plus de Canadiens et de Canadiennes favorisent les deux types de réductions, ou n'en favorisent aucun, qu'il n'y en a à accorder préférence à l'un ou à l'autre. Il y a donc, au Canada, un débat plus généralisé que celui qui oppose les «partisans de la défense» et «partisans de l'aide au développement» : il s'agit de celui qui oppose les



Dans la logique d'une nouvelle définition de la sécurité, les gens croient de plus en plus les superpuissances capables de régler les problèmes mondiaux. D'une personne sur trois seulement qui, en 1987, croyait aux capacités des États-Unis en la matière, on passe aujourd'hui à deux personnes sur trois. Et, alors qu'une finace à l'Union soviétique en 1987, aujourd'hui, c'est plus d'un Canadien ou Canadienne sur deux qui le fait. La plupart des gens précisent que leur confiance en l'URSS s'est accrue dernièrement.

Dans le questionnaire, on a énuméré une série de caractéristiques et demandé aux personnes interrogées si chacune d'elles s'appliquait plus à l'URSS qu'aux États-Unis, aux deux pays, ou si elle ne valait pour

Diagramme 2 L'importance des problèmes mondiaux (indice (max. 100))





Diagramme 3 Trois types de menaces



aucun des deux. Ces caractéristiques étaient les suivantes : « veut dominer le monde ; est disposé à négocier sur la plupart des différends » ; et « utilise la force militaire pour atteindre ses objectifs ». Dans chaque cas, plus de 40 p. 100 pensaient que l'affirmation s'appliquait également aux deux pays.

Les changements dans la façon dont la population canadienne perçoit les superpuissances sont particulièrement frappants ici. Le même jeu de questions figurait dans un sondage réalisé en 1984 au Canada par la United States Information Agency. À l'époque, la moitié des gens, soit moins d'un sur quatre, pensaient que les États-Unis et l'URSS avaient la même volonté de négocier ou étaient aussi dignes de confiance l'un que l'autre dans des négociations. Et beaucoup moins encore estimaient qu'ils cherchaient à dominer le monde ou qu'ils étaient prêts à employer la force.

Bien que l'on s'éloigne des images catégoriques de la Guerre froide, les Canadiens et Canadiennes, comme l'on montre des sondages précédents de l'Institut, ne considèrent pas que les deux superpuissances se valent exactement, du moins dans leurs actions et dans leurs motivations. Beaucoup plus de gens pensent que c'est l'URSS, et non les États-Unis, qui emploie la force militaire et cherche à dominer le monde, et beaucoup plus aussi estiment que les États-Unis se montrent plus disposés à négocier que l'URSS et qu'ils sont plus dignes de confiance que cette dernière dans des négociations. Les Canadiens et Canadiennes ne sont pas encore convaincus que l'URSS n'est qu'une puissance ordinaire et pacifique. Plus de deux personnes interrogées sur trois ne sont pas d'accord ou pas du tout d'accord avec l'affirmation selon laquelle l'Union soviétique est une nation pacifique, qui ne souhaite se battre que si elle pense devoir se défendre. Elles ne trouvent pas non plus qu'un conflit européen soit inimaginable. La plupart des gens (60 p. 100) jugent qu'une guerre classique reste possible aujourd'hui en Europe. Le reste (40 p. 100) pense qu'elle est impossible, mais une poignée de gens seulement (5 p. 100) sont convaincus qu'elle l'est réellement.

Malgré M. Gorbatchev et en dépit du fait qu'en plus de quarante ans, ils n'ont pas attaqué l'Occident, les Soviétiques, pour parler familièrement, ont encore un pied dans la Guerre froide. Par conséquent, les Canadiens et Canadiennes soutiennent toujours les politiques traditionnelles conçues pour faire échec à cette menace militaire classique. Seule une petite minorité (16 p. 100) estime que la participation du Canada à l'OTAN n'est pas importante (90 p. 100 au moins affirment avoir entendu parler de l'Alliance atlantique). Fait plus révélateur encore, beaucoup de gens se disent favorables au maintien de forces canadiennes en Europe, et ce soutien n'a pas faibli depuis 1987, année où la question a été posée pour la dernière fois dans le sondage de l'Institut. Environ une personne interrogée sur quatre déclare que les forces canadiennes devraient être réduites ou retirées, trois sur quatre souhaitent leur maintien au niveau actuel, sinon leur accroissement.

À la question de savoir si ces troupes devraient être réduites au cas où l'Est et l'Ouest conviendraient de réduire sensiblement les forces militaires classiques stationnées en Europe, au moins 40 p. 100 des personnes interrogées ont déclaré que les effectifs canadiens devraient être maintenus à leur niveau actuel. (Le libellé précisait, mais sans assez insister au gré des experts militaires, que des réductions importantes du nombre des soldats canadiens risquaient de faire perdre aux unités visées leur efficacité militaire.) Un tiers environ (35 p. 100) des gens sont favorables à une réduction des troupes canadiennes dans une proportion égale à celles du reste des troupes stationnées en Europe, alors qu'un quart des gens (24 p. 100) préfèrent un retrait total. En outre, la population canadienne se dit toujours disposée à défendre l'Europe s'il le fallait. Les six dixièmes des Canadiens et Canadiennes ou presque (58 p. 100) affirment que l'emploi de troupes canadiennes se justifierait si l'Europe occidentale était envahie. En matière de politique de défense, les Canadiens et Canadiennes semblent traditionnalistes dans un autre sens. Ils sont sceptiques quant aux nouvelles idées, comme la défense « non provocatrice » ou la « défense défensive ». Les personnes interrogées pensent que ces idées, dont il est beaucoup question en Europe aujourd'hui, visent à « nous débarrasser d'armes qui pourraient servir à attaquer la partie adverse et seules des armes non menaçantes resteraient des lors en service ».

indicateurs, que la plupart des Canadiens et Canadiennes sont conscients des problèmes de pollution «canadiens» aussi familiers que les pluies acides et la présence de produits chimiques toxiques dans les Grands Lacs. Il semblerait aussi qu'ils recommandent la gravité, à l'échelle planétaire, d'une série de problèmes environnementaux. Apparemment, la population canadienne adhère à un thème clé du rapport Brundtland, à savoir qu'il faut élargir l'entière notion de sécurité dans son acception traditionnelle (axée sur les dangers politiques et militaires menaçant la souveraineté nationale) pour y englober les préoccupations croissantes des tensions environnementales. La plupart ont certainement été d'accord avec M. John Fraser, ancien ministre de l'Environnement et aujourd'hui président de la Chambre des communes, quand il a déclaré dernièrement que nous abordons les décennies à venir en sachant pertinemment que si nous ne changeons pas nos modes de vie, nous ne survivrons pas.

Les Canadiens et Canadiennes n'ont pas toujours accordé une telle priorité aux questions d'environnement. Ainsi, dans un sondage d'opinion réalisé en 1984 pour le ministère des Affaires extérieures, la protection de l'environnement arrivait nettement troisième par ordre d'importance comme thème de la politique étrangère du Canada, derrière la paix et la croissance économique mondiale.

Malgré ces changements dans la perception des menaces, la crainte d'un désastre nucléaire ne s'est pas entièrement dissipée. Cependant, ce n'est en général plus

Diagramme 1 La plus grande menace à la paix mondiale

	1989	1988	1987	%
Les actions soviétiques	5	5	5	%
Les actions des E.-U.	9	11	8	%
La course aux armements	21	23	27	%
La prolifération nucléaire	40	32	29	%
Les conflits régionaux	25	28	31	%

le spectre d'une attaque nucléaire soviétique qui l'alimente. Quant à la question de savoir dans quelles conditions des armes nucléaires pourraient être employées, trois scénarios différents se sont dégagés des réponses fournies. D'abord, dans un scénario «peu conventionnel», ce sont des terroristes ou une petite puissance engagée dans un conflit régional qui les utiliseraient. La plupart des personnes interrogées optent pour ce scénario, trois sur quatre estimant qu'il y a plus ou moins de chances, ou plutôt de risques pour que cela se produise de leur vivant. Ensuite, il y a le scénario de la «guerre nucléaire accidentelle», c'est-à-dire la possibilité que des missiles nucléaires soient lancés par erreur ou par suite d'une défaillance du matériel nucléaire. Enfin, le scénario des «superpuissances», qui reprend les possibilités de la Guerre froide : une attaque surprise contre l'Europe ou les Etats-Unis, ou un conflit régional dégénérant en un échange nucléaire entre les superpuissances. Ce dernier scénario apparaît comme le moins probable, moins d'une personne sur trois croyant à son éventualité.

cielles et les autres préoccupations économiques très bas

Fait remarquable, les seuls problèmes de la liste que dans la liste des priorités internationales.

Les gens ont en général classés après les grandes guerres sont les violations des droits de la personne, la pauvreté et la faim. Il se sent que beaucoup de Canadiens et Canadiennes approuvent l'argument du rapport Brandt selon lequel la survie de l'humanité évoque non seulement les questions traditionnelles de guerre et de paix, mais aussi les mesures à prendre pour résoudre les problèmes de la faim dans le monde, de la misère générale et des disparités alarmantes entre les conditions de vie des riches et celles des pauvres. Mais beaucoup aussi estiment que ces problèmes ne constituent pas des menaces essentielles pour la sécurité du Canada.

Si l'on décompose les classements individuels et qu'on les compare entre eux, les questions se regroupent en quatre catégories; cela signifie que des gens selon qui un des problèmes est sérieux ont tendance à considérer que les autres le sont également. Les quatre catégories sont les suivantes : les menaces militaires (c.-à-d. les guerres mais aussi, dans une moindre mesure, le terrorisme); les menaces économiques (l'instabilité financière et monétaire, les conflits commerciaux et le protectionnisme); ce qu'on pourrait appeler les menaces peu conventionnelles «issues de privations» (la pauvreté, les violations des droits de la personne et le terrorisme); et ce qu'on semble fort justement appeler les menaces courantes ou «systémiques» (la pollution de la planète, le crime et les maladies).

Ces ensembles décrivent donc une des façons dont ces problèmes sont intimement liés dans l'esprit du public. Il serait bon de souligner, toutefois, que les Canadiens et Canadiennes ont tendance à les voir collectivement, comme étant généralement importants, ou comme ne l'étant généralement pas, et non pas en accordant à chacun un degré d'importance. (D'un point de vue statistique, les classements, pour deux problèmes distincts quelconques, sont presque toujours liés positivement, jamais négativement.)

POUR APPROPRIER LA QUESTION DE LA GRAVITE relative, on a demandé aux personnes interrogées de classer trois types de menaces auxquelles le Canada est confronté à l'échelle internationale, à savoir des menaces militaires, économiques et environnementales (voir le Diagramme 3). Les résultats sont sans équivoque. Les défis économiques et environnementaux semblent généralement plus sérieux que les menaces militaires. Fait probablement étonnant, la plupart des Canadiens et Canadiennes, soit au moins huit sur dix (83 p. 100), plaçant les menaces militaires au dernier rang de trois. Seule une petite minorité, inférieure à 10 p. 100, estime que ce sont les plus graves. En revanche, la majorité des personnes (51 p. 100) et non pas seulement une petite bande d'écologistes, donnent la priorité aux questions environnementales. À peine moins classent en premier les menaces économiques (43 p. 100).

Si l'on évalue l'importance relative qu'autont ces trois types de menaces au cours des dix prochaines années, les problèmes environnementaux dominent incontestablement. Presque les deux tiers des personnes interrogées pour le sondage les placent en premier, alors qu'un tiers à peine citent les menaces économiques en tête. Seule une poignée de gens ont déclaré que les menaces militaires classiques seraient les plus graves dans dix ans. En outre, la grande majorité de la population canadienne pense qu'aujourd'hui, les capacités économiques déterminent davantage l'influence d'un pays dans le système international actuel que les capacités militaires. Ces deux schémas apparaissent aussi dans de récents sondages américains.



EN 1989

LE SONDAGE  
D'OPINION RÉALISÉ  
PAR L'INSTITUT

# DES MENACES PEU CÔMUNES ET UNE SÉCURITÉ COMMUNE

La majorité des Canadiens et Canadiennes ne partagent plus des points de vue typiques de la Guerre froide, mais ils sont malgré tout en faveur de l'Alliance occidentale et de la défense classique.

UNE ANALYSE DE  
DON MUNTON

Ces perceptions de la sécurité mondiale et des menaces qui pèsent sur la planète. Les principales tendances internationales sont claires : les relations Est-Ouest s'améliorent rapidement; on progresse dans la limitation des armements; tant nucléaires que non nucléaires; de nombreux, sinon tous les conflits régionaux et locaux (en Amérique centrale, en Afrique australe, en Asie du Sud-Est) se terminent ou, du moins, tirent à leur fin. Après s'être focalisé sur les risques d'agression armée et sur la sécurité militaire, la politique internationale se concentre sur des problèmes plus prosaïques : le protectionnisme commercial, la dette du tiers-monde, le trafic international de la drogue et la détérioration de la couche d'ozone, pour citer quelques exemples.

Ces tendances et ces changements de pôles d'intérêt ont été évoqués à des réunions aussi diverses que celles du Sommet économique et du Commonwealth, et ils ont occupé les premières pages de la presse du monde entier. Ils ont été discutés et défendus dans divers rapports internationaux rédigés par des groupes d'experts, comme le rapport de la Commission Brandt sur les perspectives de développement international, le rapport Palme sur la sécurité commune et, plus récemment, le rapport Brundtland de la Commission mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement. Ce qui est moins clair, c'est comment, et dans quelle mesure, la perception qu'ont les habitants de la planète des menaces et de la sécurité change elle aussi.

Un nouveau sondage d'opinion fournit les premiers éléments attestant que la sécurité internationale prend un sens assez différent pour les Canadiens et Canadiennes d'aujourd'hui et qu'elle représente à leurs yeux un ensemble de préoccupations à la fois plus vastes et plus fondamentales que la sécurité physique face à une attaque militaire. Les réponses laissent entendre, qu'on s'inquiète de moins en moins de ce genre de menaces classiques. Des sondages antérieurs réalisés pour l'Institut ont montré que la peur de la menace soviétique a pratiquement disparu. À la question, posée ces trois dernières années, de savoir quelle est la plus grande menace qui pèse sur la paix mondiale, la population canadienne a répondu de façon étonnamment uniforme (voir le Diagramme 1). Quelques-uns considèrent que ce sont les actions soviétiques qui constituent la plus grande menace; autant de personnes, sinon plus, estiment que ce

sont celles des États-Unis. La plupart pensent que les principales menaces viennent des conflits régionaux ou de la prolifération nucléaire. Les seules tendances discernables sur trois ans sont un déclin régulier, quoique peu marqué, du nombre de personnes citant la course aux armements entre les superpuissances comme étant la plus grande menace à la paix mondiale, et une augmentation régulière du nombre de celles qui mentionnent à cet égard la prolifération nucléaire.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, peu de gens pensent que l'URSS constitue une menace militaire croissante et un «danger réel et immédiat» pour l'Amérique du Nord. Plus de 80 p. 100 des personnes interrogées disent que non. Une bonne majorité (57 p. 100) trouve l'Union soviétique moins menaçante qu'elle ne l'était il y a quelques années. Quant à la grande majorité (79 p. 100), elle pense que la Guerre froide s'atténue.

L'amélioration des relations Est-Ouest, évidente dans les rencontres au sommet desomains nombreuses entre M. Gorbatchev et des dirigeants occidentaux (MM. Reagan, Kohl et Mitterrand, Mme Thatcher et, dernièrement, M. Mulroney) semble également évidente aux yeux de la plupart des Canadiens (66 p. 100) selon qui les grands pays coopéreront de plus en plus entre eux dans l'avenir.

DANS CE CONTEXTE, UN DES OBJECTIFS ESSENTIELS DU sondage de l'Institut en 1989 était d'étudier ce que la population canadienne considère maintenant comme étant les grands dangers menaçant la paix et la sécurité internationales, si les menaces dites classiques diminuent. Les nouveaux éléments d'information sont encore incomplets, mais ils semblent assez clairs en général et ils donnent l'image d'un public qui voit un système international fondamentalement modifié.

On a demandé aux personnes interrogées de classer une série de problèmes internationaux particuliers par ordre d'importance en tant que menace à la sécurité du Canada (voir le Diagramme 2). Elles ont accordé relativement peu d'importance à de grandes guerres, sûrement parce qu'elles semblent improbables. Les conflits commerciaux, le terrorisme et l'instabilité financière et monétaire internationale ont été classés plus haut dans la liste fournie, dont les premiers rangs sont occupés à la pollution planétaire, au crime international et à la propagation de maladies.

Le sondage de 1989 corrobore largement le rapport Brandt, en 1980, on affirmait dans ce document que, si dans l'esprit des gens, le mot «guerre» est souvent synonyme de conflit militaire, voire d'agrandissement, ils perçoivent de plus en plus comme un danger aussi grave le chaos qui naîtrait d'une grande famine, d'un désastre économique, de catastrophes écologiques et d'actes terroristes.

Les résultats sont tout aussi surprenants dans un contexte purement canadien. Au lendemain d'une campagne électorale bruyante et profondément divisée qui a été dominée par une question de politique extérieure, à savoir le libre-échange — une élection pendant laquelle on s'est servi des deux côtés d'arguments relatifs aux périls économiques qui guettent le Canada — et alors même que le débat continue quant aux avantages et aux inconvénients de l'Accord de libre-échange, les Canadiens et Canadiennes placent les questions commu-

Le présent article est le troisième d'une série annuelle de sondages d'opinion menés pour l'Institut pour la paix et la sécurité. Le sondage, conçu par Don Muntion en collaboration avec le personnel de l'Institut, a été réalisé aux mois de septembre et octobre 1989 par le Longwoods Research Group sur un échantillon sélectionné au hasard parmi un groupe de 30 000 foyers répertoriés par Market Facts Ltd. Il s'est fait par courrier auprès de 890 personnes en tout, représentant 50 p. 100 des individus à qui le questionnaire avait été envoyé. Avec un échantillon de cette taille, la marge d'erreur approximative est de plus ou moins 3 p. 100, 95 fois sur 100. Les résultats descriptifs complets du sondage figurent dans un document de l'Institut signé par Michael Driedger et Don Muntion et publié en même temps que le présent article.

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Don Muntton est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique; Vincent Jacquot est rédacteur pigiste à Paris et il se rend fréquemment au Cambodge; Thomas Risse-Kappen, un Allemand de l'Ouest, est membre du personnel enseignant au département des études gouvernementales de l'Université Cornell et il est l'auteur de *The Zero Option: INF, West Germany and Arms Control*; Fen Osler Hampson est chargé de recherche à l'Institut, il enseigne les relations internationales à l'Université Carleton, et il a récemment publié un ouvrage intitulé *Unguided Missiles: How America Buys its Weapons*; G. Landau, qui est Brésilien, occupe un poste supérieur dans la fonction publique internationale, et il a déjà travaillé dans le domaine des affaires intéressant à la fois le Canada et l'OEA.



Le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), Fiche d'information n° 10, octobre 1989.

RÈGLEMENT DES CONFLITS - THÉORIE ET PRATIQUE

La réduction des risques de guerre grâce à des efforts multilatéraux. Sommaire des délibérations d'une conférence par David Cox, Steve Lee et James Juchacz, septembre 1989. Document de travail n° 18, 36 pages.

DÉSARMEMENT

«Résolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament: Canada's Record at the UN», par Bernard F. Grebenic, Document de travail n° 19, septembre 1989, 74 pages.

AI ET DES ARMES

Le processus électoral en Namibie : une table ronde internationale, Ottawa, 6 et 7 juillet 1989. Un condensé préparé par l'Institut.

(C) VARIANTS DE RECHERCHE

(Guide sur les politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation des armements, l'ense et à la solution des conflits, octobre 1989, 320 pages. Le Guide est publié une fois par année, et il a pour objectif de fournir de l'information générale et aisément accessible sur les politiques canadiennes en matière de paix et de sécurité. Il vise à cerner les principales questions d'actualité auxquelles le Canada a réagi dans le courant de l'année, à les situer dans leur contexte et le cas échéant, à donner un certain nombre de commentaires for-

internationales

la sécurité

la paix et

canadien pour

l'Institut

Directeur général :

Membres du conseil d'administration :

Le rapport annuel exposé, à l'intention du Parlement et de la population canadienne, l'ensemble des réalisations de l'Institut au cours du précédent exercice.

Sondage mené par l'Institut sur l'opinion qu'on les Canadiens et Canadiennes de décembre 1989. Les résultats

maint les opinions de la population canadienne sur les affaires internationales.

Bernard Wood

May Simon

Elmor Powell

Harry A. Porter

Judith Padua

Reginald Laue

Claude Julien

John Halstead

Edward Greene

Francine Fournier

Grisèle Côté-Harper

Lise Bissonnette

Beatrice Bazar

David Braide, Président

NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION



À la question de savoir si vos préoccupations primordiales en matière de sécurité sont de nature militaire, économique ou environnementale, vous répondriez sans doute, comme le révèle un sondage mené par l'Institut sous la direction de Don Munton, dans la même

et Canadiennes qui placent les défis de l'environnement, mais il sem-

ble maintenant qu'elle soit prête à élargir la notion traditionnelle de

secrétisme (axée sur les dangers militaires et politiques menaçant le

qui restent à relever sont peu intéressants, car ils concernent

M. Fukuyama affirme que les défis

derrière à remporter la victoire,

terminée et que l'idéologie occidentale a remporté la victoire.

Maintenant que la Guerre froide est terminée et que l'idéologie occidentale a remporté la victoire.

dernier dans *The National Interest*.

de *History* paru au cours de l'été

auteur d'un article intitulé *The End*

la réplique à M. Francis Fukuyama,

Quant à lui, **Fen Hampson** donne

«question allemande».

impressions sur l'avenir de la

**Kappen**, nous fait part de ses

mande de l'Ouest. **Thomas Risse-**

possibilité à court terme ? Un Alle-

des deux Allemagne est-elle une

l'Est tout entière. La réunification

parallèle l'euphorie dans l'Europe de

l'ouverture du rideau de fer a ré-

d'amorcer un règlement.

ployer les efforts nécessaires en vue

collectivité internationale de dé-

Cambridge. En concluant, il pte la

ont marqué l'histoire récente du

lyser clairement les événements qui

venant existants lui permet d'ana-

pays, de son peuple et des inter-

Cambridge, et sa connaissance du

vécu de nombreuses années au

de ce pays ? **Vincent Jacquot** a

avenir peuvent aspirer les habitants

lieu Paris en août dernier, à quel

de paix sur le Cambodge, qui a eu

Après l'échec de la Conférence

environnementales.

plus en plus importante des tensions

uniquement l'économie et l'envi-

rounement. M. Hampson explique

pourquoi il ne partage pas ce point

de vue.

Depuis peu, le Canada est

membre actif de l'Organisation des

Etats américains. G. Landau, un

Brésilien qui est expert en affaires

internationales, décrit ce que le

Canada doit faire afin de revitaliser

l'OEA. C'est là une chance qu'il ne

nous faut pas manquer.

**Jean Boudien** a rédigé un com-

piément au *Condensé sur la limita-*

tion des armements, lequel concerne

la conférence qui se tiendra au

Canada, au début de 1990, sur l'ou-

verture des espaces aériens. Le

Canada a toujours été un partisan de

cette proposition depuis 1953, année

où le président Eisenhower l'a for-

mulée pour la première fois. Il s'agit

d'un régime en vertu duquel les

avions de reconnaissance non armés

de chaque pays concerné pourraient

survoler librement le territoire des

autres pays participants.

Enfin, les **Services d'informa-**

tion de l'Institut veulent renseigner

d'avantage les lecteurs et les cteurs de

chaque numéro, les titres d'ou-

vrages récemment reçus à la biblio-

thèque de l'Institut et se rapportant

aux quatre volets du mandat de ce

dernier.

— **Helène Samson**

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# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

## LE SONDAGE D'OPINION RÉALISÉ EN 1989

Que pensent les Canadiens et les  
Canadiennes des menaces qui pèsent  
sur la planète ?

JUNE ANALYSE  
DE DON MUNTON

Dans le présent numéro :

Vincent Jacquot  
Les suites de la  
Conférence de paix  
sur le Cambodge.

Thomas  
Risse-Kappen  
Réflexions sur la  
notion d'unification  
des deux Allemagnes.

Fen  
Osler-Hampson  
Scénarios d'avenir  
pour les pays de  
l'Est et de l'Ouest.

G. Landau  
Dans la revitalisa-  
tion de l'OEA, le  
Canada pourrait  
bien avoir le rôle  
principal.

Bernard Wood  
Un canevas pour  
favoriser la  
coopération  
Est-Ouest.





# PEACE & SECURITY


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## TIME TO CHANGE

CANADA'S PLACE IN  
A WORLD OF CRISIS

BY BOYCE RICHARDSON



**Heping**  
China's effort to  
make the fourth of  
June disappear.

**Thomas Weiss**  
America's hate-  
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with the UN.

**Heribert Adam**  
Where is  
de Klerk taking  
South Africa?

**Michael Bryans**  
USSR – the  
world's biggest  
economic  
laboratory.

**Věra Murray**  
Letter from Prague

**Bernard Wood**  
Canada's Defence  
Policy.

*Also in this issue:*

## New Publications from the Institute

### ARMS CONTROL — NON-NUCLEAR

**Compliance with Confidence-Building Measures: From Helsinki to Stockholm**, by Michael Holmes, Background Paper 30, February 1990, 8 pages.

**Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament in Europe: Canadian Objectives**, by Douglas Hamlin, Working Paper 20, January 1990, 50 pages.

**ARMS CONTROL — NUCLEAR**  
**The Implications of the INF Treaty**, by Jane Boulden, Background Paper 31, March, 1990, 8 pages.

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION — THEORY AND PRACTICE**  
**When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?** by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Occasional Paper 8, February 1990, 90 pages.

**DISARMAMENT**  
**Closing the Gap: Disarmament and Development, the International Debate**, by Steve Lee, Working Paper 22, February 1990, 35 pages.

**REFERENCE WORKS**  
**Director's Annual Statement 1989-1990 Peace in our Time? A Canadian Agenda for the 1990s**, by Bernard Wood. 50 pages. Once a year the director of the Institute takes stock of the major events and trends in the areas of peace and security, and their implications for Canadian policy.

## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



Momentous events are supposed to be few and far between — that's what makes them stand out. We need to locate them in our own lives: "I was at the dentist when I heard about..." These days momentous events between nations are like so much cheap jewelry and the experts, like everybody else, are left shaking their heads. In just the past two weeks (early February) the following modest list of unprecedented happenings is immediately relevant to the articles and regular departments in this issue of *Peace & Security*:

"Prisoners as Presidents" by **Heribert Adam** — as of 11 February and after some twenty-seven years, Nelson Mandela was no longer a prisoner and began immediately to demonstrate with masterful intelligence and dignity why the president's office seems an entirely natural place for him to be.

"Arms Control Digest" and "Defence Notes": researched and written by Institute Research Associate **Ron Purver**, and Queen's University professor **David Cox**, respectively, these columns are compiled late in the life of each issue in order to be as current as possible — generally three to four weeks before publication. In the international atmosphere that prevailed until not too long ago where, for example, the opposing European alliances took sixteen years around the negotiating table in Vienna to agree on how many soldiers the other side had or even agree on what the definition of a soldier was, this lag was not a problem.

However, in the few days since those columns were completed the superpowers decided to dispose of the major part of their chemical weapons, even before there is a multilateral treaty; a

serious obstacle in the way of a strategic nuclear weapons treaty was eliminated; in Ottawa the twenty-three members of both alliances committed themselves to signing an Open Skies agreement by the middle of May; and while in Ottawa, the Soviets, after thinking about it for a fortnight (a nano-second in military-diplomatic time) said "sure, that's fine" to an American proposition to reduce total troop levels in central Europe by several hundred thousand.

Our cover story, "Time for Change," is an excerpt from a soon-to-be published book of the same name by free-lance writer **Boyce Richardson**. The product of a two-year study conducted under the auspices of the Institute and organized by our Director of Public Programmes, **Nancy Gordon** and Research Associate, **Fen Hampson**, the book brings to bear the collective wisdom of half a dozen disciplines on the global problems that confront Canada.

The Editors are pleased to announce that beginning with this issue, articles in *Peace & Security* will be indexed by the *Canadian Periodical Index*.

— **Michael Bryans**

### Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7  
(613) 990-1593

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**Boyce Richardson** is a freelance writer and filmmaker based in Ottawa, and author of *Strangers Devour the Land*; **Heping** is the pseudonym of a close observer of Chinese politics; **Thomas G. Weiss** is visiting senior scholar at Brown University's Institute for International Studies and former executive director of the International Peace Academy in New York; **Heribert Adam** is professor of sociology at Simon Fraser University, and author, with Kogila Moodley, of *South Africa Without Apartheid*; **Michael Bryans** is editor of *Peace&Security*; **Věra Murray** is Moscow correspondent for *L'Actualité* magazine.

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# TIME TO CHANGE

## CANADA'S PLACE IN A WORLD OF CRISIS

*Drawing together the knowledge and expertise of a dozen research institutes, government departments and universities, the Institute for Peace and Security has produced a critical new book on how Canada might face the major emerging threats to international security.*

BY BOYCE RICHARDSON

IN THE LAST YEARS OF THE 1980s people everywhere have begun to understand the scale of the immense changes that lie ahead for human society. Of course we are always changing; but often these changes have crept up and overtaken us without most people realizing what was under way. The era of satellite communications has ended that. Nations that only ten years ago were closed off to the major intellectual and technological influences sweeping much of the globe now recognize that they can no longer hide behind guarded borders, while in more fortunate parts of the world, long-held, comforting notions of technical and economic superiority have been fatally undermined.

In the late eighties this has brought cataclysmic upheavals to some countries, such as the million-strong public demonstrations for change in Beijing 1989. In Eastern Europe old bonds have been shaken loose with a rapidity that people accustomed to the rigidities of the Cold War still find hard to believe. And in those nations that have long enjoyed the fruits of industry and technology – mostly North America and Europe – old certainties about the inevitability and permanence of progress have been eroded.

There are many reasons for this. Populations are more volatile than ever before. Our world is increasingly polarized between rich and poor. The evidence is accumulating that our globe cannot sustain the present headlong methods of economic development. Even the people who seem to have everything – Canadians among them – have become very uneasy about the future.

What was new in the eighties was that these perceptions of the need for big changes in the way the world was going penetrated to the mass of people – or, at least, became the common currency of political dialogue in nations with widely differing ideologies and systems of government.

Leaders almost everywhere now recognize the need for change, and those who do not – the aging leaders who have re-imposed their authority so ruthlessly on China are the perfect symbol – are recognized as social dinosaurs who are heading towards extinction.

Two major influences have produced these changed perceptions: first, the rapid easing of the East-West tensions that have dominated international relations since the end of the Second World War, and second, the growing understanding that our Earth's resources are finite, and human beings are plundering them at a rate and in a manner than cannot be continued without irrevocable damage to the processes on which all life depends.

Together these two influences have led people everywhere to rethink their very notion of what constitutes security. Security has always been a fundamental concern of human groups; and in the years since the Second World War we have poured immense resources into defending ourselves against perceived military threats to our security. In the last few years, however, people

*This article is excerpted from Time to Change: Canada's Place in a World of Crisis by Boyce Richardson, to be published in March 1990 by Summerhill Press. Available in paperback from bookstores for \$14.95.*





almost everywhere have begun to realize that long-term changes to the basic elements on which all life depends may prove to be as threatening to human security as the nuclear war and military aggression against which we have been so assiduously defending ourselves.

THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE NEW PERCEPTION HAS GATHERED MOMENTUM is a remarkable commentary on the power of our new systems of mass communications. The publication in 1987 of the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development to the United Nations General Assembly (known as the Brundtland report) dramatized fears and concerns that had been growing for several decades. Within two years tens of thousands of copies of this report had been sold in dozens of countries – more in Canada than anywhere else – and it quickly became necessary for political leaders to pay attention.

Since the environment became a matter of widespread concern in the late 1960s, most political leaders have acted as if environmental matters – clean water and air, fertile soil, vigorous forests – are peripheral to the real business of running their countries. And in fact, it was because of this lack of political urgency that the enterprise of writing this book was launched, late in 1987. We felt that Canadian governments were reacting too sluggishly to the challenges thrown out by these dramatic new developments. The federal government seemed reluctant to seize opportunities offered by these changes.

The contrast between the Brundtland vision of the future, and that of the Canadian government, as revealed in its 1987 Defence White Paper, was simply too great to be ignored. Brundtland suggested the need for a changed vision of the future, and a rapid reallocation of resources to meet entirely new challenges to our long-term security, both as Canadians and as citizens of the globe. But the Defence White Paper ignored this dimension entirely, confronting Canadians with a vast programme of proposed rearmament, based on what appeared (more and more with each passing day) to be the outmoded clichés of Cold War thinking.

We felt it important to try to stimulate public dialogue on these vital issues. But an interesting thing then happened: coincidentally, between the conception of this book and its publication eighteen months later, some sort of sea-change occurred in public perceptions. Perhaps the exceptionally hot summer of 1988 had something to do with it. As the world's climatologists gathered in Toronto to discuss the prospect of long-term, man-induced climate change that could potentially swamp dozens of major cities, decimate forests, diminish cropping lands – in short, revolutionize human life – the city sweltered under its highest temperatures for many years, and many people had difficulty breathing the smog-laden air.

One day it was revealed that all five of the hottest years experienced in this country since records began a century ago had occurred in the 1980s. It began to seem that climate change was no longer a prospect for the distant future, but was actually upon us.

In the six or nine months that followed that hot summer we were inundated by mass media accounts of dramatic and horrendous possibilities for the future: of dreadful environment-destroying incidents through Eastern Europe, South America and Africa. For a time it almost seemed there was a competition to discover the most irresponsible country: Ethiopia with its massive soil erosion; the Soviet Union with its

disastrous water diversions; Czechoslovakia, China, or Poland with their dreadful air pollution; Brazil, with its insensate destruction of the rainforest; the United States or Canada, spreading deadly poisons throughout the countryside and oceans in the name of industrial progress – these became the stuff of everyday stories in our mass media, which, having discovered the subject, appeared to delight in scaring us all to death.

NO SOONER HAD THIS OUTBURST OF SCARY INFORMATION BEGUN TO subside with the onset of winter than the biggest oil spill ever known in North America decimated the pristine ocean and beautiful shorelines of southern Alaska. This incident exposed in the most brutal way how worthless are the soothing assurances of environmental concern propagated by the world's biggest companies through television and magazine advertising. These companies are major decision-makers; but the spectacle of the oil-strewn Prince William Sound demonstrated that we cannot depend on these decision-makers unless they are subject to constant prodding and vigilance from an informed and concerned public. There is no doubt that millions of people got this message.

Within two years of the publication of the Brundtland report, a number of other things happened that testify to the remarkable influence of the report on public discourse around the world:

President George Bush recognized the existence of acid rain, and moved to do something, however inadequate, about it.

Margaret Thatcher actually sponsored an international conference on climate change.

The European Economic Community adopted an environmentally-conscious agricultural policy, to encourage organic methods and discourage industrial agriculture.


The Dutch government became the first in the world ever to be defeated on an environmental issue, when a governing coalition broke up over a far-reaching new plan to solve Holland's environmental crisis in one generation by doubling environmental spending in the next four years.

The Green Parties improved their position in the elections to the European Parliament, in England winning as much as fifteen percent of the vote.

In Canada the government dropped its rearmament programme, thus clearing the way for more attention to be paid to longer-term problems. Brian Mulroney was even given an environmental award by an American business group for his rousing speeches to international conferences.

That so many of our leaders should have jumped on the bandwagon after decades of indifference indicates the head of steam that is now driving the engine of environmental concern. To keep pace these leaders have had to pay at least lip-service to the idea that humans can have a secure future only if we manage to build an environmentally sustainable global economy. Lip-service, of course, is not enough: a group of Canadian activists followed Prime Minister Mulroney to a conference in Europe and denounced him before the world's press. They said that in spite of his vigorous speeches favouring sustainability, his government cut spending on alternative energy projects while investing enormously in climate-changing energy megaprojects. His actions, they said, spoke louder than his words.

From all of this we discovered that there is a considerable gap between getting political leaders to endorse sustainability and getting them to implement the measures needed. No doubt many years of ferocious political debate and struggle lie ahead in this effort to create a new international order.





Thus, though the underlying premise with which we began this work is more widely accepted than it was, we feel that the need to clarify facts and options is at least as great. Our leaders began to change their attitudes because in the late 1980s a consensus developed among scientists, forecasters, and the general public about the urgency of the growing environmental threat. Since the Club of Rome published its famous Limits to Growth study in the sixties, many analysts have been at work, and half a dozen points have emerged that are now agreed by all major forecasters and global modellers.<sup>1</sup>

1. Population and physical capital cannot continue to grow forever on a finite planet.
2. There is so far no reliable complete information about the degree to which the planet can absorb all the wastes created by human wants.
3. Unless changed, present policies will lead to an increasing gap between rich and poor, among nations as among individuals. Even vastly increased foreign aid cannot significantly redress these global inequities.
4. Whereas technology can help, by itself it is not the answer.
5. Interdependence among peoples and nations is much greater than has been commonly realized. In other words, actions taken in one part of the world can often have profound consequences elsewhere.
6. For this reason, policy changes made sooner are liable to be more beneficial than those made later.

THIS LIST IMPLIES THAT, IF WE ARE TO SURVIVE, big changes will have to be made in the way things are organized. It doesn't follow that governments will make those changes, because so far the people who bother themselves with such questions lack real influence with most governments. If the Canadian case is typical, they tend to be enthusiastic civil servants and researchers who beaver away at their studies in isolated offices, get together for seminars to discuss their troubling insights, and produce a rain-shower of far-sighted documents that seldom penetrate the protective shell behind which ministers shelter.

These general propositions agreed by futurists offer us little comfort when they are applied to the major global issues of the contemporary world. They posit a future of danger, shortages, and deteriorating standards. For example, here are the five issues that one futurist says will define the world in 1994 – a mere half decade away:<sup>2</sup> the potential for nuclear war, severe food shortages, the deterioration of the biosphere, the imbalance in the distribution of wealth, and shortages of material and energy.

Underlying these issues is the sense that economic development and environment are two sides of the same coin, both of crucial importance to our future; and that we must find a way to make all future development sustainable in environmental and resource terms.

This concept of sustainable development was launched into the global marketplace of ideas in 1981 with the publication of a ground-breaking report under the somewhat bureaucratic title of the World Conservation Strategy (WCS). This document was prepared by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the World Wildlife Fund. The document was an effort to meet the objections that citizens of Third World countries had made to the alarm expressed about the state of the globe at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.

At that time the predominant idea was that economic development was ruining much of the natural world, and this carried a strong implication that development was bad. Not unnaturally, people from countries desperate for development rejected the whole thesis, and even considered it something of a white man's plot to prevent the destitute people in the world from gaining their place in the sun.

The WCS came to grips with this problem for the first time. It recognized that the planet's capacity to support people is being reduced through poor land management, profligate use of resources, and the poverty that in many places forces people to destroy the resources they need if they are to survive. The document agreed with environmentalists that it is essential to maintain Earth's ecological processes and life-support systems, and to preserve genetic diversity. The WCS went further: it recognized that human activities will continue to depend on the use of other species and entire ecosystems, and it added that

Nature must be used on a basis that can be sustained into the distant future.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT BECAME THE ideology animating the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and it has since won rapid acceptance – as an idea. By treating both development and environment as essential to the continuance of human life on this planet, the document helped to take the curse off the environmental analysis of the human situation for the developing countries. Confronted by the WCS challenge, many governments formally took the pledge to put their affairs on a sustainable basis, promising to draw up and follow national conservation strategies to guide all their future development.

Unfortunately, so far it has been mostly talk. In one country after another finance ministers and their economic advisers have remained oblivious to environmental thinking. Warnings given by scientific advisers and global thinkers


have been ignored. Environment ministers have had low status and little influence in cabinets.<sup>3</sup>

Yet not all the prognosis is bad. The lip-service that leaders have begun to pay to environmental concerns has a firm and real cause, namely, the dramatic change that has occurred throughout the Western world in public attitudes. Many opinion polls suggest that electorates are changing their minds about the real threats to security. Canadians, as judged by such polls, appear to be ready for action to deal with the emerging, long-term threats (though they may not yet have accepted the need for higher taxes to pay for such action).

In the days of the Cold War the Soviet Union was regarded as the enemy and the number one world problem, in Canada as elsewhere in the Western world. This perception has greatly diminished. Indeed, a poll published in 1987 by the Ottawa-based North-South Institute, indicated that the fear of Soviet aggression is almost the last thing on the minds of Canadians when they think about the world.

CANADIANS DO SEE THE WORLD AS A TROUBLING PLACE, TO BE SURE, BUT the things that trouble them now are of a different kind, such as (in order of priority, according to this poll):

- pollution and the environment
- major world diseases
- poverty and hunger
- the possibility of nuclear war
- apartheid and human rights
- world economic collapse





All of these, as well as erratic United States foreign policy, world population growth, and Third World debt, rank higher in the concerns of Canadians than the fear of Soviet aggression. And this low ranking of the Soviet threat was confirmed a few months later by an in-depth study of Canadian opinion on peace and security issues conducted by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

From these polls it appears that the issues now concerning Canadians most deeply are difficult long-term problems that are beyond the control of any one nation or group of nations. They cannot be solved within the five-year (or even shorter) time-frame of any government, and tend to be overlooked when governments decide how to spend their money.

Environmental degradation, disastrous global climate change, growing poverty in the midst of increasing affluence, the rickety imbalances in the international economy, the rapid pace of population growth – these are the real security problems of the future, and more and more people have come to recognize it. These problems have the potential to threaten not merely the immediate security of many nations, but even the continuing viability of human society in the coming decades.

In fact they have already plunged some countries into crisis; for others, the crisis may be a decade or two ahead. But in all nations the warning signs are at hand of very severe future difficulties, tougher to handle than anything we have had to deal with in the past.

THE NEW CHALLENGES BEFORE US AS CITIZENS of this globe present Canada with great opportunities for constructive action and leadership. It would be foolish to suggest that we can save the world; but what we can do is to put our own house in order to meet these future challenges, and seek allies with whom we can move the world in a constructive direction that will hold out hope for the future of the human race.

The purpose of this book is to stimulate public interest in and debate about these important issues, leading on, we would hope, to action. Fundamentally the issues that we explore have to do with Canada's changing relationships with the rest of the world. We have not kept pace with many of these changes, and are scarcely prepared for their probable impact on us.

*First, the economy:* Though we are one of the richest and most fortunate nations on Earth, and a member of the club of the seven most powerful industrialized countries, our traditional dependence on the export of raw materials has not fitted us particularly well for the dramatic changes that are now occurring in the world. There is no doubt that everything else we might wish to do to create a decent and improved life for our own citizens (as well as those elsewhere) depends on our maintaining a viable and productive economy, but there are indications that the way ahead will be very much more difficult than the last forty years.

In spite of these problems, if we are to give a lead to halting man-made climate-change, we will have to give teeth to the now-accepted idea that our Canadian economy must become indefinitely sustainable in environmental and resource terms. First of all this means extremely difficult – one might almost say, revolutionary – decisions about energy use.

*Second, our own society:* We cannot remain indifferent to the changing demographic situation. Vast populations of people, excluded from their share of the world's goods, are ready to move, and it is not an option for us to turn away. We will continue to receive increasing num-

bers of Third World immigrants, and too little thought is being given to the likely implications of our changing population for our social relationships. But if it is (as some Canadians believe) a possibility that this fortunate country might provide an example of tolerant and decent living to the rest of the world, certainly we cannot expect that example to spring to life without immense effort, ingenuity, and the conscious building of bridges between different peoples.

*Third, the environment:* No one in the world can any longer avoid the environmental warning signs. We belong to that segment of the world's population that is making far too heavy demands on Earth's resources, and we are deeply responsible for trying to find a way to overcome the problems of air pollution, water, and soil degradation, ocean despoliation, and atmospheric changes that are leading to almost certain modifications in global climate. We have to start thinking about these matters.

As a nation we have to become more economical and less wasteful in our style of life, and we will soon have to start to divert resources into measures that will begin to solve these problems.


But that is only half of it: we must contribute more than we are doing now to helping the under-endowed majority in the world improve their lives, and to bring to a halt their destruction of the landscapes they depend on. To the extent that we are responsible for this, through our economic and trading policies, we have to take corrective measures by applying what the Brundtland commissioners called "a foreign policy for the environment."

For example, it is now accepted that the people of the world cannot afford to allow the tropical rain forests to be destroyed. Yet it is not enough simply to exhort tropical countries not to cut their forests. A considerable transfer of resources will be needed to make it possible for these impoverished countries to save these forests. And there is no sign yet that our governments are ready to make that necessary commitment. We have to find a way to look at

the world with a proper sense of our ecological interdependence, to set our sights on long-term survival rather than short-term prosperity.

*Fourth, the international sphere:* Canadians, placed on the globe midway between the United States and the Soviet Union, have a particular stake in helping the world maintain peace, reduce the threat of nuclear war, and bring new military technologies under international control. Many believe that Canada could get a bigger bang for its buck by spending whatever spare billions it has on reinforcing international organizations, strengthening international cooperation, and helping to keep the peace around the world, than by becoming fixated on the evidently impossible task of defending our huge coastlines from our largely imaginary adversaries.

Peace, order, and good government have always been Canadian ideals, and we should work to make them global. □



1. This list has been compiled by Eric Solem, of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, in his interesting monograph *Futures of the International System*, Project Report No. 143, May 1980, p. 49.

2. Theodore Gordon, quoted by Eric M. Roher, on page 2 of his monograph *Planning in the Modern State*, No. 139 in the series of Project Reports issued by the Operational Research Establishment of the Department of National Defence.

3. These conclusions were reached by 450 international experts who gathered in Ottawa in 1986 to examine the progress made towards sustainable development in the five years following the publication of the World Conservation Strategy report in 1981. Their overall conclusion was that there had been almost no discernible change in government attitudes.

# CHINA'S ORDEAL

*Decentralization may be China's last best hope, but in the current repressive atmosphere talking about it is a dangerous occupation.*

BY HEPING\*

UNABLE TO MAKE THE SPRING 1989 student movement disappear, the Chinese authorities are instead attempting to obscure and trivialize it. As usual, the methods used to minimize the scope of the social unrest hint at what they are actually trying to conceal. Turned into to a simple case of self-defence, the chronology of last June's events has been reduced to caricature; the government's version lacks all credibility. The only persons killed were "some blood-thirsty rioters...", there were no deaths among the students, including those who were forced to withdraw.<sup>1</sup>

This is the classic language of propaganda. It reflects a Confucian kind of benevolent paternalism aimed at co-opting the intellectuals – those who were at the head of the popular movement and did not understand that they were being exploited by "a handful of counter-revolutionaries," who were in turn being manipulated from abroad.

ONE COULD DEBATE FOREVER THE COMPETING versions of how the repression was unleashed on the night of 3 June. However, this would simply add more confusion to what is already an unendurable tragedy. Nevertheless, a precise reconstruction of the events will some day assist historians in answering the questions many Chinese are asking themselves. In the first place, to what degree was the pro-democracy movement planned? Who inspired the students of Beida University, back in April, to use the occasion of the death of the former General Secretary Hu Yaobang to take to Tiananmen Square in a noisy expression of their democratic aspirations? Why did the government systematically provoke the students by accusing them of being counter-revolutionaries?

Chen Yizhi, a close collaborator of Zhao Ziyang, the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, told *Le Monde*:

At first the students were calm ... but each time they wanted to evacuate Tiananmen Square, Li Peng [the present Premier] provoked them. For example, after Zhao's

speech on 4 May, almost everyone had returned to classes. Li Peng then summoned the university authorities to denounce the attacks on public order and the illegality of the demonstrations. Shortly after this, the students again went into the streets and began their hunger strike.

In China no one believes in the spontaneity of political movements, and the most Machiavellian theories crop up in conversations. This is to be expected in a closed society where "well informed" people get their information from rumors that can seldom be verified. It is hard, nonetheless, not to credit the theory that the government deliberately "planned" things to culminate in an exemplary punishment. Although inured to the supreme penalty, the Chinese people (above all the people of Beijing) did not anticipate this level of repression. Until the last hours, no one really believed it would happen, so when the first shots were fired, some students in the residences of Beida University refused to believe the news they had just received – "We had faith in the uprightness of our army."

"THE CHICKEN IS KILLED TO FRIGHTEEN THE MONKEY" is the Chinese expression used most often to explain how deliberate military intervention was designed to serve as an example. Of course, this fear on the part of the government was exacerbated by the international political climate as well as the upheavals in other socialist countries, but its underlying motives were and are essentially Chinese.

The regime felt endangered because it had not anticipated the scope of the movement. Easily persecuted and as well, readily "co-opted," intellectuals have been effectively marginalized since 1949. So in April, once again, the authorities underestimated the influence that might be wielded by a few thousand students in Tiananmen Square. While the strength of the movement surged back and forth, in denouncing the economic hardships, it won the support of the population of Beijing.

Testimony from various sources confirms the disarray of the government – the indecision among its ranks, and the secret political strug-

gles that ended with the rout of the more moderate elements, and the resignation of the communist party General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang. The line that won out is clearly the one that clings to the certainty that all can be reformed without being excessively transformed.

Since 1979 the government has carefully nurtured a host of paradoxes, asserting, for example, that it is possible to open up the country while closing it off, or that China can foster the development of a market economy within a Marxist-Leninist political structure. The maxim "one country, two systems" helps to reassure foreigners and, within China, legitimizes all of the most visible contradictions.

THIS MERGING OF CONTRADICTIONARY IDEAS FOLLOWS a traditionally Chinese logic; a logic that lives on in the minds of leaders who are the overconfident heirs of a successful revolution and a profoundly self-centered nationalism. Political discourse here always reverts to the assertion that China is a large country that has managed to secure for its one billion people a standard of living better than that of other Third World countries. And it is true that in China one does not queue for a bar of soap or a pair of shoes. China long practised a "primitive communism" that many Third World countries have sought to emulate. In Mao's day, the oft-repeated saying was: "Whatever food there is, everyone eats; whatever clothes there are, everyone wears; whatever work there is, everyone does."

To be sure, nationalism, or rather the chauvinism of the Chinese people – the Han majority in particular – is a basic factor relied on by the Party and the government to absolve their errors. It has always been relatively easy to resort to traditional Chinese xenophobia and lay the blame for internal problems on the outside world. There are repeated examples to show that even some of the harshest critics of the present regime remain vulnerable to talk of the external enemy.

All of these certainties the government has banked on have been shaken by the radical

\* Pseudonym of a close observer of Chinese politics.



change among a large section of Chinese youth. Some thirty-seven percent of the population is under twenty years old, and in the cities particularly, this generation of "only children" is demanding everything, and demanding it right now. Proud of being Chinese, they flamboyantly proclaim their love for the fatherland – sentiments expressed thousands of times over, in a multitude of ideogrammatic styles, in Tiananmen Square. As far as they are concerned, the Empire is humiliated by the affluence of Taiwan and Hong Kong. These young people want China to be respected for its economic prosperity and they are convinced that the recipe for success is to be found in the West. Faced with this wave of demands, the regime has retreated to the hard line, doing what it can to seal up the cracks.

But China is a more porous country today than it once was. Even the peasants listen to the Chinese-language short-wave broadcasts from abroad. The government has few effective means of parrying this invasion of messages, and by affirming over and over that its policy remains one of openness, the government is now caught in a crisis it can no longer manage.

THE CHINESE ARE WELL BEYOND BELIEVING IN the existence of a genuine socialist programme. Nor is the government promising anything other than gradual development requiring patience, hard work and sacrifice. But here again, the rejection of any substantial political reform condemns China to improvisation. "We are groping our way across the river step by step," Deng Xiaoping is quoted as saying, an expression which evokes the disorientation and genuine hardship involved in making one's way toward a shoreline that is not even in sight.

Lacking a convincing programme, and held back by inertia, the government falls back on old practices. The most common of these is the isolation of each social class and group within its own environment, institutions and structures. The greatest danger for the government lies in the cities; an alliance between intellectuals and workers must be avoided at all costs.

Throughout the events of the spring the workers' sympathy with the students was unflagging. On several occasions the author witnessed workers climbing down from construction scaffolds to applaud processions of students. Everywhere, there was factory slowdowns and absenteeism "on account of demonstrations" was widespread. On the other hand, the workers' support never had significant impact. Lacking trade unions organized as a genuine political force, the working class of Beijing was unable to translate its sympathy into action. A few days after the tragic night of 4 June, the first counter-revolutionaries to fall under the bullets of the execution squads were

workers in Shanghai – a fact that did not take long to sink in.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR CHINA NOW? In Beijing, as in the other cities, patience is the unspoken watchword. Desperate for news from the outside, the urban population attempts to stave off despair by concocting one scenario after another. The bolder ones await the return of Zhao Ziyang, while the more realistic watch the political maneuvering in the Central Committee and anticipate, for the short term, ever tighter control by the army. All the while, the President of the Republic, Yan Changkun, installs members of his family in key govern-



ment positions, convincing many Chinese observers that the military dictatorship will cease bothering to hide its real intentions once Deng Xiaoping is out of the way.

It is clear that the army has lost the confidence of a good part of the population. The "serve the people" mythology of the People's Liberation Army has taken some hard knocks. Chinese have regained their traditional fear of soldiers, and many soldiers are likewise having a hard time enduring the contempt with which they are now treated.

Although there are few hard facts known about the divisions that developed within the army in June, there is nevertheless considerable evidence that discontent runs deep. But the Romanian scenario of the army passing over completely to the side of the people does not seem plausible. Too many military units remain faithful to a regime that has granted them many privileges, and they would hold out a long time before throwing in their lot with a potential mass opposition movement. Many dissidents, however, are still convinced that a major part of the ranks would come over fairly rapidly to a movement that had sufficient strength, and the more radical among them hope for change even if it means civil war.

This kind of talk underscores a profound

despair, for of the vexing questions Chinese continually ask themselves about their future, the main one remains: what direction would a radical change in Chinese society take? Apart from a minority of intellectuals imbued with Western culture, no one foresees the establishment of a genuinely democratic system. Forty years of communism have scarcely shaken the profoundly feudal social and political structures. Many people I talked to are convinced that a new regime would have no choice but to resort to force once again in order to impose a more "liberal" design.

Quite apart from other considerations, any analysis of alternatives inevitably runs up against the overwhelming problem of demographics. The sheer weight of population is not just an economic impediment, it defines the nature of the discussion about political and economic options. Chinese analysts search in vain for useful models from outside the country; they are forced to recognize that no regime in history has had to provide political and democratic leadership to a country of a billion people. China's entire history has been an urge towards centralization, and the notion of reversing course creates rising panic.

THE POSSIBLE BREAK-UP OF THE EMPIRE RANKS very high on the list of forbidden topics. However, occasionally in conversation someone will admit that decentralization is the only solution. Only regional devolution of authority coupled with some form of confederal or federal system would create smaller areas of manageable size and facilitate the gradual acquisition of experience with civil liberties and civil society. But this vision of a dismembered China still seems largely irrelevant, and at any rate, is conceivable only as the end result of a slow and certainly painful process.

When he ended martial law, a symbolic action that carried more weight in the West than in China, Premier Li Peng accurately described the repressive order that has been reestablished: "Life and production are functioning in an orderly fashion, supplies are sufficient, the people are living and working in peace and contentment."<sup>2</sup>

This government-directed "people's happiness" conforms at one and the same time to the logic of dictatorship, and to a sort of self-proclaimed "enlightened" Confucian despotism. Western nations would, at any rate, be ill-advised to fall for it by continuing to over-indulge the current regime. It is necessary, on the other hand, to resist measures that would isolate China. Any such steps would inevitably end up penalizing the people of China and permit the government to carry on its brutal activities behind even thicker walls.

1. *Beijing Information*, 31 July 1989.

2. *Le Devoir*, 11 January 1990.

# LEADING THE HORSE TO WATER

*Now that the Soviets have embraced the UN and other international organizations, the only superpower left to be convinced is the USA.*

BY THOMAS G. WEISS

IN A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THEIR past words and actions, the Soviets have renounced previous doctrine and are now embracing multilateralism, especially United Nations mechanisms for preventing and limiting regional conflicts. In the revised Soviet lexicon for the Third World, "International peacekeeping and peacemaking" has replaced "support for national liberation struggles." While prominent in Western social sciences since the 1970s, "interdependence" has been anathema in Moscow until only recently.

The Kremlin's declared new policy is unequivocal. After decades of indifference or antagonism, the Soviets are now among the most vocal supporters of UN conflict management and resolution. Moreover, Soviet deeds are increasingly matching their rhetoric – acceptance of the UN in Afghanistan and Angola, pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, steps to repay UN hard-currency arrears, and a slow-down in arms shipments.

While Moscow was discovering the UN, however, the US was beginning to abandon the world body. This reversal of roles was striking, for the UN would hardly have existed without almost four decades of solid American financial and political support. In many ways, peacekeeping was a pragmatic American reaction when the Cold War meant that collective security had to be discarded as 1940s idealism. More particularly, the United States had traditionally paid for at least thirty percent of the peacekeeping bills, and sometimes much more. During Ronald Reagan's presidential tenure, however, official US support plummeted as Washington became the organization's leading foot-dragger and debtor. Multilateralism has not yet fully recovered from this period of American aloofness and hostility.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SEEMS TO VIEW THE UN as less inimical to US interests than did its predecessor. While it is too early to tell whether a page has been turned regarding renewed US support for the United Nations, developments over the last eighteen months give rise to guarded optimism. UN-bashing ceased to be Washington entertainment in 1988, when

even Ronald Reagan set aside his "doctrine" of unilateral intervention and support for anti-communist insurgents in favour of selected UN action in the Third World. Five new peacekeeping operations have been deployed since. All were backed fully by the US, and all were helpful to American foreign policy: extracting the Red Army from Afghanistan and Cuban combat troops from Angola, stopping the carnage between Iran and Iraq, ensuring the peaceful transition to Namibian independence, and helping to depoliticize Central America. Moreover, the recently proposed UN interim administration, and large peacekeeping force for Cambodia, will permit the US to abandon a policy that was neither moral nor sensible. Until now, the US was committed, in effect, to Khmer Rouge participation in a Cambodian government.

Canada, as a strong ally and pillar of peacekeeping, must do what it can to usher the US fully back into the multilateral fold. Having relinquished its leadership role on First Avenue, the United States must come to grips with the Kremlin's volte-face there, as well as with a number of its worthwhile initiatives. Soviet proposals can no longer be dismissed simply because of their provenance.

While they are hardly household terms in the United States or anywhere else, Canada should lose no opportunity to emphasize the extent to which UNGOMAP (UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan), ONUVEN (UN Observation Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua), UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group), UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group), and ONUCA (UN Observer Group Central America) serve and have served US interests. While the US is now responsible for over half of the approximately \$1 billion of UN debt and often resorts to financial intimidation, others are carrying large responsibilities. Some 80,000 Canadian soldiers (about the size of Canada's present armed force) have worn blue berets; of 14,000 UN troops world wide today, 1,200 of them are Canadians. Canada and other countries are putting their soldiers' lives at risk and

receiving only partial reimbursement for international service that ultimately serve US and Western interests.

CANADA SHOULD INJECT ITS OWN STRONG VIEWS about UN peacekeeping onto the bilateral US-Canada agenda and into NATO's discussions about appropriate military force structures and about the nature of burden sharing. Domestic politics in the United States – a strong pro-Israeli lobby and the right wing of the Republican party that occasionally needs to be pacified – could reverse the new-found and fledgling support for the UN in the Bush administration. In December for example, Washington once again cast into doubt UN financing and multilateralism, this time over a possible upgrading of the PLO's status at the United Nations. Vice-President Quayle immediately escalated the campaign with the politically mischievous suggestion that future American financing might well be linked to a repeal of the 1975 General Assembly resolution that defines Zionism as a "form of racism." This declaration is long forgotten as a mistake in most quarters, but the need to repeal it is viscerally appealing in Congress, which instead needs to understand how counterproductive and impossible such a reversal would be without a breakthrough in the Middle East.

This strangely-timed regression is hard to fathom for serious UN-watchers in New York or Washington, and from north of the border, US fickleness appears absolutely arcane. Not unreasonably, Canadians take seriously international treaty obligations that commit member states to paying their assessments. They ask their southern neighbour: why the double standard? Are you or are you not members of the UN? Do not peacekeepers serve US interests?

Canada should make clear that its firm support for peacekeeping and multilateralism emanates not only from middle-power instincts, but also from hard-headed calculations about Western interests and values. Canadian views on this matter count. Neither neutral nor woolly-headed, Canada is a bulwark of NATO and a crucial US ally. There is, for instance, widespread appreciation in Washington for Ot-



tawa's initiative in hosting the Open Skies Conference in February, as a follow-up to the Bush proposal to the Soviets about verification in the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

WITH DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS IN EAST-West relations, the regime for international security is indeed at a critical juncture. The UN has become more activist in the management of regional armed conflicts. Yet, the support of countries like Canada and the distinction for the UN attached to winning the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize are clearly not enough.

Non-superpowers might find it difficult to admit, but while it is insufficient for the United Nations to have only the backing of the superpowers, it can not realize its potential, or even function effectively, without their active collaboration. As former UN Under Secretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart has said, past UN successes have amounted to "tiptoeing around the Cold War." The waning of bipolar confrontation thus provides an unparalleled opportunity for the superpowers to join forces. Ottawa should not hesitate to stress that the UN may even be able to function more along the lines that its founders intended, a point that even some of the UN's most trenchant critics have recently realized. As Jeane Kirkpatrick has written, "One peace dividend of the Cold War's end may be a more effective UN."

Moscow's dizzying array of proposals about the UN system – over one thousand according to one tally – contains many naive ideas formulated with the zeal of a recent convert. Yet, among them are a wide variety of proposals to make the existing peacekeeping regime more financially solvent, politically active, and geared to preventive diplomacy: national earmarking of funds, equipment, and troops for rapid deployment; the stationing of UN soldiers in potential hot spots; improved training and management; a UN standing military reserve; more autonomy for the Secretary-General; war-risk reduction centres; and improved logistics and intelligence. Interestingly enough, many of these Soviet proposals had been previously floated by Western governments.

THE MOMENT IS PROPITIOUS. BEFORE THE recent backsliding over the status of the PLO, Washington had begun to react positively. Reversing previous policy, the US had joined the Soviet Union, Canada and all other members of the Security Council in authorizing military observers for Central America, the first such use of the UN in America's "back yard." While the so-called "Operation Just Cause" in Panama indicated that the US government in certain circumstances still regards unilateral armed intervention as beneficial to its interests – at least in the short run – there should be no



question about the critical significance of Washington's agreeing to the first truly international peacekeeping operation in the Western Hemisphere.

The Central American UN Observer Group's mission is initially to monitor the commitment by the region's governments to stop aiding insurgents; and subsequently there are plans to send armed UN forces to collect weapons from guerrillas. These UN soldiers (from Canada, Colombia, Spain, and Venezuela) are teaming-up with civilians from the UN and the Organization of American States (which Canada has just recently joined) to monitor Nicaragua's elections. The success of these undertakings is hardly guaranteed; it never is. Yet, the efforts to reduce violence and arms shipments and to foster national reconciliation through democratic elections are worthwhile endeavours – supposedly at the very foundation of the Western system of values.

A few days prior to the approval of the UN Observer Group in Central America, two other "firsts" took place in New York. After forty-four years of bickering, the superpowers co-sponsored a General Assembly resolution aimed at reinforcing the work of the organization, and also held a joint press conference to introduce their text. These symbolic actions were consistent with Moscow's increasing commitment to multilateralism and an encouraging sign of Washington's growing realization of the UN's contribution to international peace and security. In fact, at the conclusion of the 44th session, there was a rare meeting of minds. The Nigerian President of the General Assembly, Joseph Garba, agreed with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky and with US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering, that the world organization had benefitted immensely from the warming of superpower relations.

In the past, Canada has frequently been an effective "bridge" between East and West in

many fora. As a member of the Security Council, Ottawa's role should now be to convince Washington of the historic opportunity for multilateralism. The world organization is finally earning praise across the globe as a mechanism for mitigating violence rather than being disparaged as a hot-air platform for invectives, posturing, and oneupmanship.

THE KREMLIN HAS BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND the limits of its power. It has learned the hard way about the waning utility of force to settle Third World disputes. The alleged benefits of overseas bases and attendant arms shipments have been exposed as largely illusory. Domestic restructuring requires these resources, and its success is more important for Soviet security than an over-extended Third World empire. Most significantly, the Soviets have realized that competition with the US in the Third World has had negative consequences for the bilateral Soviet-American relationship.

If this logic applies in Moscow, should it not also in Washington? As power becomes more diffuse and difficult to exercise effectively in the Third World, Washington too must understand the potential of international institutions for attacking transnational problems. Even in the face of post-Panama invasion euphoria, it is beneficial to speculate about the UN's potential in a situation like this.

Is it not plausible that the Security Council could act when a suspected drug-dealer cum head-of-state's flagrant violations of human rights, and the use of force to nullify elections, eliminate virtually all diplomatic support in his own region? By the end of the 1990s a UN with more teeth could, for instance, help combat illicit drugs and terrorism, ensure the security of small states and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and verify arms control and elections. Moreover, consolidation of the peacekeeping regime might spill over into the economic, and environmental arenas.

This opportunity is too important for American and global interests, to be derailed by the dated prejudices of a few US domestic lobbies. The Bush administration should realize that peacekeeping is a relatively inexpensive means of protecting US interests in areas of strategic importance. The US contribution to the Namibian operation is US \$175 million, approximately four percent of the annual operating budget for the 82nd Airborne Division (on the ground, not in action), and one-third of the purchase price of one highly controversial B-2 Stealth bomber. The actual operating costs of multilateralism pale in comparison with the alternatives. Washington needs to be reminded of these facts by a trusted ally like Canada.

# PRISONERS AS PRESIDENTS

*South Africa's leaders display little vision of where their new willingness to negotiate will lead. As in Eastern Europe, the opposition may take the initiative away.*

BY HERIBERT ADAM

**D**RAMATICALLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY BY all accounts, "people's power" swept entrenched communist regimes aside in a matter of weeks in Eastern Europe. How have those events influenced the antagonists in South Africa? Why should racial minority rule be able to withstand even more widespread outrage and illegitimacy among its disenfranchised majority population? If a Vaclav Havel can move from a prison cell into a presidential palace, why can't Nelson Mandela?

Such a course of events would abolish overnight South Africa's pariah status, reverse the capital outflow and restore the country's prosperity as the most developed part of a declining African continent. Unlike Eastern Europe, South Africa would not even need special development assistance, given the abundance of human talent, natural resources and a sophisticated infrastructure. Presumably, most social forces, domestically and internationally, would welcome such a rational outcome of a seemingly intractable conflict. The South African stock market would boom as the Frankfurt bourse did in anticipation of democratic pluralism in place of authoritarian centralism. East and West, North and South would join South Africans to celebrate the abolition of the last vestige of formal colonial rule by White settlers. But since they would be urged to stay and play their part as indigenous Africans, only the minority racists among them would not be able to reconcile themselves to majority rule – neither would extremists on the left, mourning the sellout of the socialist revolution.

THE ANALOGY WITH EASTERN EUROPE MAY BE appropriate in its potential for an equally peaceful and negotiable solution, but it is far off in the timing. F.W. de Klerk's reformist agenda cannot be equated with the break in style and policies that Gorbachev symbolized for the Eastern bloc. The National Party may resemble its communist counterparts in power and influence over the life of the population, and the secret *Broederbond* may be compared with a wider politburo in shaping policies. But neither of these Afrikaner associations has experienced the erosion of morale that

Gorbachev's policies brought to the USSR's European client states.

In South Africa, ethnic rule has managed to modernize itself partially from within by jettisoning its uncompromising ideologies. Unlike in Eastern Europe, where Stalinist hardliners attempted to defend the indefensible, in South Africa the ultra-right exists in the political wilderness and reformers now try to adapt to new exigencies – de Klerk may indeed be as willing as Krenz was to open walls. The communist reformers had to contend with an enfranchised population and a disillusioned party membership, and therefore lost power to their non-communist opposition.

The South African government, on the other hand, still commands legitimacy among its ethnic constituency, and the army remains loyal to the ethnic state. Despite being half Black in composition, the Afrikaner police force itches to pounce on insurgent activists. A skeptical Black population is still deeply divided along ideological, class, ethnic and regional lines, despite a common political exclusion. The recent reformist posture of Pretoria has not deprived the rulers of other options.

THE OPPOSITION DECEIVES ITSELF WITH WISHFUL thinking that Pretoria is tacitly admitting defeat, that de Klerk is "desperate" and "panicking" in a deep crisis, due to the onslaught of a brave resistance. On the contrary, the more sophisticated strategy of negotiations instead of repression exudes confidence rather than weakness. Pretoria has learned the lessons of futile attempts at coercive pacification and now wants to reap the benefits of a political solution. Unlike the European Stalinists, the powerholders in Pretoria realize that politics cannot be made against major social forces. Instead, they try to steer them. By adopting a conciliatory stance, post-apartheid nationalists are praised as peacemakers by Western friends and African foes alike.

Whether de Klerk is "sincere" or not is therefore the wrong question. Psychologizing about changing policies overlooks the underlying interests. If staying in power and controlling opponents inside and outside the Volk can be pursued more effectively through new al-

liances and changing styles, the current rulers have shown remarkable skills of adaptation.

The more interesting question remains whether official powerholders can determine the outcome of their new approach. They themselves display little vision of where their ad hoc management should lead. Just as Gorbachev's *perestroika* developed its own dynamic of releasing ethno-nationalism in a disintegrating Soviet empire, so Pretoria's new soft co-optation may simultaneously strengthen as well as weaken the opposition. In the new interplay between previously implacably hostile sides, both antagonists change, and emerge with new strategies.

A concrete example illustrates this dialectic. Few organizations deserve more praise than F. van Zyl Slabbert's and Alex Boraine's Institute for Democratic Alternatives (IDASA).<sup>\*</sup> At the height of Botha's emergency when most dialogue had ceased and both antagonists criminalized each other, IDASA managed to pull off dozens of encounters outside and inside South Africa between opinion makers who would normally not speak to each other. The exiled African National Congress (ANC) seriously engaged for the first time with Whites who were not communists, and prominent figures of the Afrikaner establishment (though not from the government) discovered common ground with "terrorists." The mutual learning process clearly altered perceptions and subsequent policy statements.

IS THE CURRENT TREND TOWARDS NEGOTIATION rather than confrontation irreversible? Unlike the Eastern European regimes, whose fate was sealed when the Soviet Union abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine, Pretoria can fall back on coercion without needing the backup of outside allies. Although South Africa has lived with verbal condemnation from its Western friends for decades, it has nevertheless received various forms of economic, political

<sup>\*</sup> The IDASA's main activities are educational and information efforts to facilitate dialogue between the antagonists. Its leadership is made up of prominent academics and community leaders, and it receives most of its funding from West European governments, US philanthropic foundations and Canada's Department of External Affairs.



and clandestine military assistance from them. However, it is ultimately not dependent on such outside support.

The problem with South Africa is that no outside power has the leverage, short of military intervention, to force an intransigent regime into fundamental concessions. Even if comprehensive and mandatory sanctions were ever implemented – unlikely, given the global competition – Pretoria would still not collapse in the foreseeable future. Therefore, radical change in South Africa has to originate primarily from the inside.

How then does one explain the new pragmatism of the current Afrikaner oligarchy, compared with its ossified Eastern European equivalent? Above all, what accounts for the relative compliance of the South African population? Professed ideology is a poor guide to the reasons for such adaptability. According to the socialist canon of ascetic people's representation, the personal corruption of the leadership should be non-existent. Yet the revelations about exclusivist lifestyles and personal enrichment in the GDR or Romania still show a higher degree of elite remoteness and autocratic graft than the increasingly scandal-ridden Calvinist rule in Pretoria. Here an independent press and judiciary of a White democracy still hold the rulers accountable, despite emergency regulations and an insidious extension of executive power. To be sure, only a minority segment of the population in authoritarian South Africa, enjoys democratic participation. Nevertheless, even this makes an oligarchy more responsive than no democracy at all in Prague or Bucharest.

**DISENFRANCHISED SOUTH AFRICANS** HOLD NO illusions about their rulers. Racial rule clearly is for the benefit of the ruling race – a daily experience for Blacks that does not engender a feeling of betrayal. Many ordinary party members in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, felt cheated when the discrepancy between the ideology and reality was finally brought home. Hence, the temptation for revenge seems largely absent in the South African discourse. Resentment does simmer among the right, not the left. Does this force threaten the fragile attempts of reconciliation?

While the National Party is on the retreat ideologically, it firmly holds the reins of power, despite its decline to forty-eight percent of the White vote in the 1989 election. Its main challenge from the right (the Conservative Party with thirty percent) has been rebuffed. The ultra-right constitutes a grievance vote of a declining White lower stratum rather than an appealing new vision. Its Afrikaner nationalists, based on partition, promises not prosperity but further sacrifice in the name of Afrikaner purity. Ultra-right sentiments are strong in the lower echelons of the civil service and particularly in the police and security

establishment. Here nationalism and purity compensate for a low status that is further threatened by Black advancement.

The new government under de Klerk includes almost the same people as that of his predecessor. However, unlike P. W. Botha, who had a power base in the military, the new president did not belong to the so-called "securocrats." For the lawyer de Klerk, political and legal considerations so far carry more weight than repressive security arguments. In order to minimize his right-wing opposition in the police force he virtually scrapped the "National Security Management System" which had emerged as a parallel bureaucracy under police



control. He also curbed the powers of the State Security Control and restored the responsibility of cabinet in all security matters.

CONSERVATIVES EXPECT THAT THE POLITICAL earthquakes in Eastern Europe will also prove infectious elsewhere or at least moderate the socialist demands for radical transformation in South Africa. However, the situation in China, Vietnam, or Cuba, and potentially South Africa, differs from Eastern Europe insofar as communism in these places is associated with larger historical accomplishments, literacy, and improved living standards. In Eastern Europe, Stalinism was imposed by a victorious army in the wake of a devastating war.

South Africa stands at the crossroads between Western-style democracy and an authoritarian "liberation." Many knowledgeable observers do not discount the possibility of reversed repression. American sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, on a visit after a thirty-year absence, speculated wryly: "South Africa, which has already spawned the world's last

official racists, may also see its last Stalinist." Given the gross inequality, and the huge development needs in housing and education in the context of an almost complete coincidence of race and class, it is indeed hard to envisage how a more egalitarian, just, and therefore content, society can come about without massive redistribution of wealth and state regulation of the economy. No preaching about a free market and the benefits of competition can convince deprived masses that salvation will come from the five conglomerates that dominate the South African economy.

Yet most of the signs point away from the Stalinist path in South Africa towards an, as yet, undefined mixed economy and a genuine democracy. The currently dominant ANC-led opposition conceives of itself not as a socialist alternative but a broad-based, non-racial, all-class movement to abolish *apartheid*.

THE ECONOMIC FAILURES OF DECOLONIZATION elsewhere in Africa have undoubtedly left their mark on the strategic thinking of the far more sophisticated *apartheid* opposition. Because of their restraint, ultra-left critics in British and Canadian universities already accuse the ANC of putting socialism on ice for the second phase after national liberation has been achieved. However, the more the nonracial opposition enters into negotiation politics, the more it becomes vulnerable to being out-radicalized. In this predicament, stringent rhetoric is meant to counter potential outbidding. ANC literature is full of slogans such as: "We are committed to a strategy of revolutionary armed struggle to achieve our goal – the seizure of political power...."

With the widely respected Mandela as a symbol of unity and pragmatism, South Africa in 1990 has arrived at a unique historical opportunity to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable. Normally state presidents do not meet their prisoners, unless induced by promising gains. As Chester Crocker has noted: "The meeting between Mandela and de Klerk "was significant as a symbolic portrait of a prisoner and a president who may have recognized, in that moment, that they need each other." Yet the tantalizing speculation remains whether the one will ever succeed the other in South Africa.

It is surprising that the ANC opposition, in Walter Sisulu's words, does not mind whether the president is Black or White, as long as democracy is achieved. Since the South African struggle constitutes neither a communal conflict between two mutually exclusive nationalisms nor a religiously based civil war, political enfranchisement and equal privileges for all citizens are foremost on the agenda. National Party insistence on guaranteed groups rights and the ANC commitment to individual representation can be reconciled in various constitutional compromises only if the antagonists start negotiations in earnest. □

# MARKETS AND POLITICS IN THE USSR

*Without much of a road map, the Soviet leadership is groping towards building a new economy that combines "socialist markets" with Western prosperity.*

BY MICHAEL BRYANS

**I**F YOU HAVE MONEY IN THE SOVIET UNION there is almost nothing you can buy with it; a difficulty which while hardly trivial – if some other calamity doesn't overtake it first, consumer discontent might eventually bring down Mr. Gorbachev's government – has distracted both outside observers, and previous internal efforts at reform, from the real task at hand. The point about these shortages is that they are but shadows cast by the workings of a political-economic order that is fast coming undone.

Soviet leaders now know that the old remedies of patriotic and ideological exhortation will not work. From Khrushchev onwards (including Gorbachev's early reforms in 1985 and 1986) the watchwords were: "discipline," "efficiency," and "diligence." If the Soviet people worked harder and smarter and stopped boozing and goofing-off there would be nylons and butter on the shelves. So the planners planned more carefully and managers urged workers to greater effort, and it was just like honking the car horn from the back of an enormous traffic jam – it did not make the traffic move and it only annoyed the drivers.

To see how crippling the sixty-year old command system is for the Soviet economy, we only have to listen to today's generation of Soviet economists. Among the most vocal and articulate is Nikolai Shmelev. A true product of *glasnost*, Shmelev spent years writing novels and short stories since no one who mattered was interested in his economics. These days he is both a People's Deputy, and an analyst with the Institute for the Study of Canada and the USA. Shmelev places himself "at the extreme left" of the Gorbachevian reformers – a sort of loyal opposition to the Gorbachev-Abalkin-Aganbegyan group which is attempting to re-start the economic engines.

Unlike many of his contemporaries who at least nod politely in the direction of the planning departments before disparaging them, Shmelev gives no quarter. Writing with colleague Vladimir Popov in an acerbic and all-encompassing attack on the Soviet economic structure<sup>1</sup> they show how the economic disasters that are the grist of Soviet evening television are the inevitable result of a system

working as well as it's ever going to work. "No one is to blame," they write,

... the regularity with which shortages of everything occur – from children's soap to cartridges for soda water siphons to railway cars – suggests that there is one general law underlying all these specific cases ... this law is related to the system of planning ... In its present form ... it ensures constant shortages. It makes them chronic, unavoidable, and ineradicable ... an inherent feature of the economic system.

WHAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP DOES NOT and cannot know, is how to plan its way out of its current deep troubles. It is confronted by a problem no society has ever tried to solve on this scale: creating whole and in short order an industrialized "market" economy from the usable leftover bits of a "command-administered" one in which all but its most fervent believers have lost heart. The fact that Western economists do not really know how their own economies work has never been a grave impediment since the experts came along well after the economies were up and running. Economists have been mostly limited to explaining economies and fiddling with the results.

The theorists still grapple unsuccessfully with questions like how individuals choose between taking a week with Club Med, paying down the mortgage and getting braces for the kids' teeth; why Taiwan is wealthier than Ghana; and how the business cycle works or whether there even is one. Two centuries later, Adam Smith's resort to metaphor for the workings of the marketplace, the "invisible hand," remains as plausible an explanation as any. Mikhail Gorbachev's problem is that he cannot be content with describing markets. He and his associates have to actually build them, and they are running out of time.

Just back from a January meeting aimed at establishing a new school of business administration at Leningrad University, Richard Ericson of Columbia University's Harriman Institute characterized the feeling he encountered on the street and in meetings as "cataclysmic" – a sense, not entirely justified in his

view, that "they are poised on the brink." From Ericson's perspective – widely shared by Soviet and foreign observers – the immediate crisis has two interlocking parts: the shortage of consumer items and the enormous stock of paper rubles in the hands of Soviet citizens who have nothing to spend them on.

This notorious "ruble overhang" amounts to somewhere between 200 billion and 350 billion rubles, no one is sure, and promises price inflation on a stupendous scale once the government releases prices to find their own level – a step now contemplated for 1993. One widely advanced financial solution lies in soaking up all the paper rubles with consumer goods; a move that would improve living standards for average Soviets and perhaps buy for Gorbachev a period of political peace to give the deeper reforms a chance to take hold. But since the domestic production system cannot make these goods, they must be obtained from abroad with what few hard currency reserves are in the Soviet treasury.

A GREAT DEAL OF SOVIET PUBLIC COMMENTARY is taken up with this dilemma and it is a central point of debate between the government, whose staged five-year programme for reform aims to "stabilize" the monetary problem before moving on to fundamental changes in 1993, and "left-wing" critics like Shmelev who want the government to move now. What everyone agrees on is that very soon Soviet citizens are going to have to be able to create their own goods and services – by most accounts an activity that is proceeding not at all well.

As it stands, the government under Gorbachev, Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and a group of economic advisers, has proposed a comprehensive programme that would by 1995 move the Soviet economy sharply in the direction of Western-style economies. The debate is over whether this is sharp enough.

The centrepiece of the programme is a set of draft foundation laws on taxation, land ownership, property rights, and local self-government, that are now before the new parliament and are meant to be in place by the spring of this year. The proposed reforms would see the state considerably reduce its



presence on the playing field of productive enterprise. What this amounts to is a revolution in citizens' political and economic relations with the state and with each other. Government and party would no longer be the main organizing vehicles for the creation and exchange of goods and services. The foundation laws, especially those on ownership of property and farm land, are to be the legal and social framework for these changes.

It is necessary to resort to some comparative economic theory to help understand why this framework is so crucial. American political-economist Charles Lindblom has described<sup>2</sup> modern industrialized economies as having three kinds of markets: the labour market where energy and talent is exchanged for money, the consumer market where individuals exchange money for goods and services, and third, and usually larger than the first two combined, the intermediate market where enterprises (corporations, firms, farms, businesses large and small, and government departments) buy and exchange parts, raw materials, business services, energy, and the like.

LINDBLOM'S INSIGHT INTO THE SOVIET ADMINISTERED system is that it disestablished this third market. Since 1929, factories and collective farms and stores and newspapers and restaurants have traded with each other only at the quantities, prices and dates set in advance by the government plan. Such is the smothering effect of the planning system, that the Soviet Union has comparatively few production organizations – numbering in the tens of thousands compared to the millions of businesses, partnerships, not-for-profit companies in the US, an economy of comparable size.

Modern post-industrial life in the West is composed of millions of commercial transactions between all manner of businesses – some of these transactions are large products for great sums between big companies, but most are not. They are instead the "trifles" as Shmelev and Popov call them – buttons and packaging and wire and paperclips and sundry services – that make up a dense and prosperous economic existence. Since there are relatively few businesses in the USSR, write Shmelev and Popov, there is a constant shortage of indispensable "trifles."

Shmelev and Popov's account of the lunacies of the planning process shows why. Even if one firm wants to trade with another, say by purchasing paper clips from the factory down the road, there is no money outside the plan with which to pay for them. And the factory down the road cannot sell them (even if they do have some to spare) since the plan says they shouldn't have them (the plan is perfect) and the extra money earned from unplanned sales further distorts the plan. So instead

of counting it as a profit, the planning ministry fines the firm four times the value of the sale.

It is these weak and underused intermediate markets – the economic space left when the government retreats – that Soviet citizens will have to occupy with various kinds of producing entities. Which is where the proposed property and land laws come in. In the West, commercial activity is nested in an array of laws, customs and institutions which allow individuals to come together in groups, outside the direction of the state, for the purposes of making things and making money. Property law, commercial lending regulations, laws to limit corporate liability, anti-trust legislation, patent rules, to name only a few, are essential in one form or another to establish and regulate production outside a Soviet-style command system.

Little of this legal framework exists in the Soviet Union. Even the most fundamental notions of "rule of law," where individual rights and property are protected from arbitrary action by the state, remain to be firmly established and are essential if Soviet citizens are to start up companies of their own or work for others who do. The character of these laws and customs, and how they work in harmony with or against a culture that is already in great ferment, will determine the nature of the economy that emerges.

IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THE SOVIETS WANT their economy to end up. Shmelev and Popov point to that halcyon period of relatively restrained state participation in the economy between 1921 and 1927 – Lenin's New Economic Policy. Other economists and officials have made favourable references to the diverse experiences of Sweden or Hungary or Yugoslavia. Two clear themes emerge from all the commentary: first, the government does not

want, in Ericson's words, "freewheeling Western markets;" it seeks the egalitarian outcomes embodied in socialist ideals. And second, with the exception of those whom Ericson termed "conservative engineering types" who believe that with modern computers the current administered system can be salvaged, the Soviet leadership seems to understand that it cannot order up the results it wants – it's going to have to learn to tolerate a little market chaos.

According to Ericson, there is residual fear of the "anarchy of the market" so the government wants to ensure against undesirable consequences like too much reward for individuals. "Socialist markets" envisaged by Soviet economists would remain steerable and manipulable by the government, and there continues to be a strong antipathy to "capital-based value" which is regarded as "unearned" income or exploitation. He offers this example: under the new property and enterprise laws a minimum of three people will be able to own a factory and split the profits from its operation ("labour-based value"), but they will not be able to sell at a profit the factory and its equipment to someone else – capital accumulation. In short, there will be a market for goods produced by enterprises but no market for enterprises themselves.


ERICSON REGARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT programme as an untenable middle ground between Western-style capitalist markets and the existing system. He may be right in that once let off the leash the new markets may make their own rules. Or worse, if the legal mechanisms turn out to be at odds with traditions and cultural values, the economy might not get going at all.

It is not clear, for example, why three people should invest in an enterprise if, should they get bored or old, they cannot get back the money invested plus some reasonable amount for the capital they have had tied up. Presumably, the state could buy back enterprises at the cost of purchase plus some amount for interest, but the apparatus for administering such a system reinvents the very machinery the government claims it's trying to dismantle. A viable marketplace for goods seems to lead inexorably to a market for businesses – ideological predilections notwithstanding.


Economists everywhere will be watching the USSR (or Russia if it comes to that) with great attention. It is the largest experiment in applied economic theory ever attempted, and the well-being of 300 million people rides on the results. □

1. *The Turning Point: Revitalizing the Soviet Economy*, Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov, New York: Doubleday, 1989.

2. *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems*, Charles E. Lindblom, New York: Basic Books, 1977.



## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Malta Summit

At the Malta summit on 2 December, US President Bush proposed that the two sides attempt to resolve all the outstanding issues in the strategic arms reduction talks in time to sign a START Treaty at a summit meeting in the US in late June 1990. President Gorbachev, as well as senior American officials, later indicated that a more realistic timetable would be to seek to resolve all the major issues in time for the June summit, allowing for actual signature of the Treaty later in the year.

Reversing an earlier decision on chemical weapons (CW), Mr. Bush offered to end US production of binary CW after a global Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force, provided that Moscow accept the terms of the US proposal unveiled at the UN last September. It had called for the superpowers to destroy ninety-eight percent of their stockpiles in the first eight years of a CW Convention. Toward this end, Mr. Bush in Malta proposed signing an agreement at the June 1990 summit to destroy eighty percent of the stockpiles even before a global Convention is concluded. Without endorsing the American proposal, Mr. Gorbachev described it as "interesting," raising the possibility of "rapid movement."

An array of other arms control issues was also discussed in Malta. The two sides agreed to complete their work on verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties in time for signature at the June summit. The US accepted an earlier Soviet proposal to hold a European summit meeting to sign a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty before the

end of 1990. Bush invited the Soviets to join efforts to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology by observing the regulations of the Missile Technology Control Regime developed by the seven major Western industrialized nations. For his part, Gorbachev emphasized the need for separate negotiations on naval arms, and proposed the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons at sea. In response, Bush was said to have reiterated the US opposition to any such negotiations at this time.

### Open Skies

As this column was going to press, preparations were being made for the twenty-three nation Open Skies conference in Ottawa from 12 to 28 February. The Ottawa meeting is to be the first of two, aiming to produce a treaty allowing short-notice overflights of each other's territory by unarmed aircraft to ease the fear of surprise attack and aid in the verification of arms control agreements. In a speech in Berlin on 12 December, US Secretary of State Baker suggested that the NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers also take advantage of their Ottawa meeting "to review the status and give a further push to the Vienna talks on conventional forces."

In mid-December NATO agreed on the "Basic Elements" of its own Open Skies proposal, to be presented in Ottawa. These included: national quotas of overflights based on the geographic size of the participants (several flights per month for larger countries, at least one per quarter for smaller countries); host-country inspection of the aircraft prior to, and on-board observation during, the flight; permission to use a wide variety of sensors, but not signals-intelligence devices; and sixteen hours' advance notice, followed by a "preflight period" of at least twenty-four hours. Although

the Warsaw Pact countries had not similarly presented their own position as of press time, the USSR had indicated that it wanted all foreign military bases of the two alliances open to the plan, as well as a common pool of aircraft, joint crews, "passive" sensors only (such as cameras, rather than "active" radars), and a complete sharing of data.

### 44th Session of UN General Assembly

Of forty resolutions on arms control and international security brought to a vote at the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly in December, Canada voted in favour of twenty, against five, and abstained on fifteen. Canada co-sponsored a total of ten resolutions: on two it was the lead sponsor (one on chemical and bacteriological weapons, with Poland; and the other on prohibiting the production of fissionable materials). The most dramatic issue of the session was the question of amending the Partial Test Ban Treaty into a comprehensive ban. Canada joined twenty-one other states in abstaining on this resolution, which called for an amendment conference to be held in New York in two sessions, one in June 1990 and the other in January 1991. It passed by a vote of 127-2-22, with only the US and UK opposed. Canadian Disarmament Ambassador Margaret Mason had told the First Committee earlier that, although Canada "did not view the initiative for an amending conference as likely to be either helpful or productive," it would nevertheless "participate constructively."

### Short Notes

During Prime Minister Mulroney's Moscow visit in late November, External Affairs Minister Clark and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a bilateral "Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea" governing the behaviour of the two states' warships and military air-

craft when in close proximity to each other. The USSR had signed similar agreements with the US, UK, West Germany, and France, and subsequently signed one with Italy just before the Malta summit.

Under the US-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the two superpowers by 22 December had eliminated all 1,126 of their shorter-range INF missiles, and 737 of 1,566 longer-range versions. The remainder of the latter are to be destroyed by 1 June 1991.

In his Berlin speech on 12 December, US Secretary of State Baker proposed that NATO consider establishing an arms control verification staff of its own, to assist in monitoring compliance with European arms control agreements, to coordinate the implementation of inspections, and to provide a clearinghouse for information.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact each tabled a draft Treaty text at the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna on 14 December. Of significant import for these talks and for military force levels in Europe in general were two other political events:

The governments of both Hungary and Czechoslovakia have called for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territories, and talks with Moscow on this issue have begun. In addition, in his State of the Union address on 31 January, George Bush proposed sharp reductions in the number of US and Soviet forces deployed in Europe. The US proposal would see each side reduce the numbers of army and airforce personnel in Central Europe to 195,000 – with the US permitted to keep an additional 30,000 in Turkey, Italy and the UK. Before the speech, Bush made a phone call to Gorbachev who, it was reported, responded positively to the proposal. □

— RON PURVER



## DEFENCE NOTES



### The Warsaw Pact

In late 1989 and early 1990, developments in the Warsaw Pact dominated defence developments in both East and West. In mid-January the new government of Czechoslovakia began talks with the Soviet Union aimed at an agreement on the withdrawal of all Soviet troops by the end of 1990. Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia with those of other Warsaw Pact countries in 1968 to suppress the uprising in that year against communist rule.

At a Warsaw Pact meeting on 4 December 1989, the members, including the Soviet Union, condemned the 1968 invasion as an inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. During 1989 some 5,000 Soviet troops, 700 tanks and 200 aircraft were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia as part of Gorbachev's decision to reduce Soviet troops in Eastern Europe by 50,000. About 75,000 troops remain in Czechoslovakia.

On 24 January, Czech foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier announced informally that his country will end its international trade in arms. Czechoslovakia ranks seventh in the world in total weapons exports.

Some days later, at the Vienna seminar on military doctrine attended by military representatives from both the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances, Hungary called for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungarian territory by the end of 1991. Negotiations began shortly thereafter. Statements attributed to the new government in Poland also indicated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was seen as a prerequisite to a new relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union.

At the same time, all of the members of the Warsaw Pact have

indicated that they intend to remain members. In Vienna, Soviet spokesmen suggested that there would soon be changes in the political direction of the Pact. According to these sources, the present Political Consultative Committee will be scrapped and replaced by a council which will more strongly reflect the national governments and interests of the Pact members.

The effect of Soviet troop withdrawals on Soviet military doctrine is not yet clear. In his comments to the Vienna seminar, Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, stated that the Soviets were now guided by the principle of "reasonable sufficiency." In conventional forces, this means "a quantity and structure which will enable the sides to repel any aggression and yet have no capacities to launch an attack or wage large-scale offensive operations." By way of explanation, Moiseyev pointed to the Soviet unilateral force reductions of 500,000 troops, but he gave no explanation of the kind of force posture which would preclude offensive operations. Moiseyev also announced that the Soviet defence budget will be reduced by 8.2 percent in 1990, and by another fourteen percent in the following two years.

### Two NATO Reactions

As the pace of change in Eastern Europe accelerated, NATO planners, according to one unidentified spokesperson, have not so much managed the change as watched it. However, two implications have been noted. First, West German officials have expressed great doubt that an agreement will be reached to deploy a successor to the short-range Lance nuclear missile. "Do we really want to install new nuclear missiles," a senior West German official is quoted as saying, "that can only hit Lech Walesa's Poland, or Hungary?"

Second, the Warsaw Pact capability to launch a surprise attack

has been reassessed. In recent years, US intelligence sources have stated that NATO might have a fourteen day warning or less, of a full-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe. Revised national intelligence estimates claim that there would be at least one month's warning of such an attack, with other estimates suggesting at least two months. The length of reliable warning time is related to defence expenditures, particularly for the US which needs a large airlift capability to ensure rapid reinforcement of its troops in Europe.

### The US Defence Budget

After many weeks of debate in the media about the restructuring of US military forces, on 30 January, President Bush presented his fiscal year 1991 defence budget to Congress. The surprise in the budget was that there were no surprises. Bush called for defence spending of US \$303.3 billion, an increase from \$296.3 billion in FY 1990, but a reduction of about two percent after inflation is taken into account.

Despite widespread speculation that major strategic programmes would be abandoned or cut, Bush called for the continuation of the modernization programme of strategic nuclear forces. This programme includes the B-2 bomber, the advanced cruise missile, the new Seawolf attack submarine, the Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, the multiple warhead MX missile, and the single warhead Midgetman. The budget also called for an increase in spending on Star Wars research.

As presented by Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, the administration plans to reduce the budget by two percent annually over the next four years. The cuts seem most likely to fall on conventional forces as the US prepares to reduce the size of its army in response to changes in Europe. Indeed, on 31 January, the day after releasing his budget, George Bush proposed

that the US and USSR cut deployed forces in Central Europe each to 195,000.

While the strategic direction indicated in the budget will be subject to considerable criticism in Congressional hearings now in progress, Cheney's proposal to close sixty military bases may become the focus of considerable negotiation between Congress and the White House.

### Canadian Policy

Canadian Forces personnel took part in two historic events in January. First, a Canadian Hercules C-130 transport flew a "proof of concept" mission over Hungarian territory to test procedures proposed for use in an Open Skies regime.

Second, Chief of Defence Staff John de Chastelain led the Canadian delegation to the Vienna seminar on military doctrine. Gen. De Chastelain used the opportunity to restate an old Canadian theme with the NATO allies. Ever since Canada negotiated the NORAD agreement in 1958, spokesmen have pointed out that Canadian defence policy supports NATO insofar as it helps protect the US from surprise attack. In his Vienna speech, de Chastelain first emphasized his point: "I would reiterate that Canada's military role in NATO has just as much to do with the forces we deploy in North America, as it does with those we deploy in the Eastern Atlantic and in Europe."

On the future of Canada's forces in Europe, the speech was slightly less certain. De Chastelain noted that the size of the Canadian contribution is less important than the political message given by its presence. He immediately went on to comment, however, that "militarily our forces are far from being insignificant," and that, "for both alliance reasons and for purely selfish, national reasons, Canada has much to offer and to gain by its military presence in Europe."

- DAVID COX

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### Soviet Relations

The Prime Minister reported to the House of Commons on 27 November about his trip the week before to the Soviet Union where he met, among others, Soviet President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark met with his counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze. Fourteen bilateral agreements (including renewals) were completed during the visit, on subjects ranging from international affairs to Arctic cooperation to the environment. The Prime Minister proposed to Mr. Gorbachev that he would suggest to his six Economic Summit colleagues that each year's chairman discuss with the Soviet President the ideas and strategies that emerge from the meeting.

There were extended responses from Liberal Leader John Turner and NDP External Affairs critic Bill Blaikie in which they criticized the government for insufficient boldness in dealing with the Soviets, particularly with respect to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal in his October 1987 Murmansk speech for an Arctic zone of peace.

### Panama and the OAS

The Prime Minister came in for much sharper attack on 20 December in the Commons over his support, announced that morning, for US intervention in Panama. There was a heated exchange between Mr. Mulroney and the new NDP Leader Audrey McLaughlin. Ms. McLaughlin asked, "Is this the way for a civilized government to act in a civilized world? When is the Prime Minister going to communicate to the American government that Latin America is no longer the private backyard of the United States?" The Prime Minister stressed the special

circumstances of Panama and replied that the sentiments expressed by the NDP Leader were "so far removed from the mainstream fundamental values of Canadians, that she has just indicated why they [the NDP] will never, ever, be called upon to form a government in this country."

Other members were concerned about how the Canadian decision would affect relations with Latin American countries in the Organization of American States (OAS).

### Indochina Policy

On 25 January Joe Clark provided a progress report to the Commons on international efforts to resolve the conflict in Cambodia. He indicated that the government "is now in the process of re-establishing the eligibility of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, the three countries of Indochina, for official development assistance." Canada fully supports the Australian proposal for the establishment of a UN interim administration for Cambodia. Clark dispatched a diplomatic mission to Hanoi and Phnom Penh in October the purpose of which was to stress to those governments the importance of their accepting a major UN role in any settlement. The minister also commended the current Hun Sen regime in Cambodia for an improved record, especially in the field of human rights. He pointed out that Canada and other countries may be called upon to participate in UN-led peacekeeping and transitional arrangements and, to this end, Canada's recent experiences in Namibia and elsewhere were being reviewed.

### Open Skies

A major international conference opened in Ottawa on 12 February bringing together the foreign ministers of the sixteen member states of NATO and the seven member states of the Warsaw Pact for the first time since the political changes began in the

Soviet bloc. Under discussion was a proposal for regular exchange of unarmed surveillance flights which would throw open the air space over North America, Europe and the Soviet Union as a confidence-building measure. A second round of talks, to be held later this year in Budapest, is expected to lead to the signing of a treaty.

### Parliamentary Committees

The Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) continued to hold hearings on Canada's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These included sessions on the German question on 23 November and 6 December, on Soviet policy toward the Third World on 28 November, and on disarmament and Open Skies on 12 December.

The Committee also heard, on 23 November, from representatives of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Jesuits following their attendance at the funeral in El Salvador for six Jesuit priests and their two employees, murdered by members of the Salvadoran armed forces. The situation in El Salvador was the focus of discussion at additional meetings of SCEAIT on 13 and 14 December. The latter meeting also heard from the Director of Peacekeeping Operations in the Department of National Defence about Canada's contribution to ONUCA, the UN Observer Group in Central America.

On 7 December the Committee heard from a variety of experts, including the president of CIDA and the executive director of CUSO, on issues of structural adjustment – the economic stabilization policies imposed by international financial institutions with a view to reviving the economies of Third World debtor nations.

The Commons Standing Committee on National Defence is in the midst of hearings on maritime sovereignty. It has heard already from the Chief of Defence Staff as

well as officials from External Affairs, Environment, Fisheries and Oceans, the Canadian Coast Guard and the Solicitor-General, plus outside experts. In an interim report of 20 December, the Committee recommended the purchase of conventional submarines and maritime patrol aircraft.

### Short Notes

Former NDP Leader Ed Broadbent took up a new appointment late in January as the first president of the government-funded crown corporation, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, based in Montreal. Set up through legislation passed in September 1988, the Centre receives its funding from the CIDA budget and is intended to provide financial and technical resources to improve human rights and promote the development of democratic institutions and processes in Third World countries.

Doug Lindores, Senior Vice-President of CIDA, has been appointed special advisor on Ethiopia and bordering countries to the Minister of External Relations. These countries are again facing famine conditions.

During Question Period in the Commons on 23 January, Liberal MP Christine Stewart asked the government whether Canada had ignored human rights violations in the massive construction project of five Candu nuclear reactors in Romania. Joe Clark responded that Canadian diplomats were attempting to determine whether slave labour had in fact been used; which, if any, officials had been aware of it; and how long they had known. He rejected Ms. Stewart's suggestion that construction be suspended until details of the allegations could be checked, describing that as "an unfortunate way for Canada to proceed" at a critical time when Romania was struggling to build a democracy and restructure its economy. □

— GREG WIRICK



## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Invasion of Panama

■ On 23 December 1989 the Soviet Union denounced the US invasion of Panama as "a flagrant violation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states." In a heated debate, the USSR, its allies, and the non-aligned members of the Security Council backed a draft resolution that "strongly" deplored the intervention.

For its part, the US argued that it had been acting in self defence, protecting both the 35,000 Americans in the area as well as upholding the Panama Canal Treaty. Canada, while regretting the use of force, agreed that the US "relied on force as a last resort and only after the failure of numerous attempts to resolve the situation in Panama peacefully."

Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier pointed to the harassment of US citizens as justification for the US action. He added that General Manuel Antonio Noriega's statement that Panama was in a "state of war" left President Bush "with few options."

Britain and France sided with the US in vetoing the draft resolution; Canada also opposed it. Finland abstained, and the other ten countries voted in favour of the document.

The US invasion raised a ticklish diplomatic issue. During the debate, the Council was unable to decide who should represent Panama. The sitting Panamanian representative, named by Noriega, demanded to speak to the Council, as did the envoy of the newly installed government of President Guillermo Endara. The matter was finally settled on 29 December in the General Assembly, which also held a debate on the invasion. A

diplomat accredited to the UN under the Noriega regime, who switched his allegiance to Endara, was allowed to occupy his country's seat in the Assembly, but he was not allowed to vote on a resolution critical of the invasion. On 8 January, the Secretary-General accepted the credentials of a new envoy appointed by the Endara government.

One element of the invasion did force Canada to break ranks with the US. On 17 January, it voted in favour of a draft resolution that censured Washington for allowing its troops to break into the Nicaraguan ambassador's home in Panama. Canada noted that the action was a violation of international law, particularly with regard to the inviolability of diplomatic missions. The US vetoed the resolution; Great Britain abstained, and the remaining thirteen members voted in favour.

### Other Central American Issues

On 7 November, the Council decided unanimously to create a new peace force to monitor the borders of El Salvador and Nicaragua. The role of the 625-person Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) is to prevent the infiltration of insurgents and arms. One hundred and forty Canadians are involved, with the rest coming from Spain, West Germany, Ireland, Columbia and Venezuela.

On 30 November, the Council met at the request of El Salvador, following the crash on its territory of a plane carrying surface-to-air missiles. El Salvador charged that the missiles were destined for anti-government guerrillas and had been sent from Nicaragua. It accused Nicaragua of violating the Central America peace accord. Nicaragua did not deny the charges, instead responding that it was the US that had first introduced such missiles into the region when it gave them to the Nicaraguan Contras.

### The Middle East

■ On 7 November, the fifteen members debated a draft resolution that "strongly" deplored

Israeli practices "which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territory." The document singled out the "siege of towns, the ransacking of the homes of inhabitants, as has happened in Beit Sahur, and the confiscation of their property and valuables."

Canada voted in favour of the resolution which was vetoed by the US on the grounds that it was unbalanced and failed to address the violence committed by Palestinians. This marked the third American veto in one year of resolutions dealing with the Occupied Territories.

The Council also devoted time to the continuing instability in Lebanon. On 22 November, it condemned the assassination of René Moawad, the newly installed president of Lebanon. On 27 December, the Council called on the Lebanese people to support Elias Hrawi, the newly elected Lebanese president whose authority is challenged by Christian Gen. Michel Aoun.

### Cambodia

On 16 January, during a meeting in Paris, the five permanent members proposed "an enhanced UN role" in Cambodia. They called for a cease-fire, as well as for the dispatching of UN peacekeeping troops, the creation of an interim UN administration, and UN supervision of free elections.

### Friction on the Council

On 3 November, the United States and the Soviet Union held their first joint news conference to announce "an encouraging new trend" for cooperation within the UN. Proclaiming an end to their confrontation, the two superpowers announced their first joint draft (General Assembly) resolution. The document called on "all states to intensify their efforts to assure international peace and security."

The new harmony among the five permanent members, particularly between the two superpowers, has at least once led to friction with the other ten members of the Council. Last October the non-permanent members expressed their irritation when the five issued an appeal on Lebanon without consulting the entire Council.

"It wasn't just Canada, others spoke critically of that behaviour," Ambassador Fortier said during an interview. He added that communication between the five and the other members had returned to normal and he suggested that the incident was an aberration resulting from the permanent members adapting to the new climate.


However, there is a sense among some of the countries, that as the Cold War winds down the intimate relations they enjoyed with one or the other superpower are cooling. There is also wariness among some developing countries at the sight of the permanent members working so closely together. Last year, Third World countries opposed an effort by the permanent members to expand the authority of the Council to deal with issues like drug trafficking. There was concern that the move would merely put more power into the hands of the permanent members.

### Other Business

On 29 November, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force which monitors the cease fire between Israel and Syria. On 14 December, the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was renewed and on 11 January, it approved a two-month extension of the presence of forty military observers with the Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ■

— TREVOR ROWE

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



Prior to the meeting of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers and delegates in Ottawa in February to negotiate an Open Skies treaty and give political impetus to the conventional force reductions talks, the Institute organized a media roundtable for members of the working press. Addressing the journalists present, and those from outside Ottawa who joined the discussion via telephone hook-ups, were **David Cox** and **Jane Boulden** of Queen's University, **Fred Bild**, Secretary-General of the conference, **John Noble**, of the Department of External Affairs, **Col. Alain Pellerin** of the Department of National Defence, and **Lt. Col. Gordon Sharpe**, a Research Fellow at the Institute this year, also from the Department of National Defence. **Bernard Wood** chaired the discussion which focussed on the opportunities for confidence-building raised by the proposed treaty, as well as some of the opening national positions, and technical questions.

In late February, the Institute hosted a closing reception for delegates to the Open Skies negotiating meeting from participating countries. Budapest is the site of the next round of negotiations, at the end of which it is expected that a treaty will be ready to be signed.

"The Future of the United Nations System" is the title of a conference at the University of Ottawa in early January sponsored by the Institute and the Ford Foundation, and organized by a

group including **John Trent** of Ottawa University and **Gene Lyons** of Dartmouth College. A number of papers were prepared for the meetings: they focussed on the policies of a dozen or so different nations towards the United Nations. The papers will be edited and published in book form next year. **Roger Hill**, **Fen Hampson** and **Ron Fisher** of the Institute staff participated in the meetings. New opportunities for conflict resolution by the UN was one of the major themes, stressed especially by Northern developed states. However, representatives from developing nations pointed to the lack of progress in the area of economic development and said that in their view, solutions to those problems were still the most urgent.

**Alexander Ognev** of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in the Soviet Union, and **Gennady Vorontsov** of the United Nations Association of the USSR, were in Canada to attend the conference at the University of Ottawa. The next week they spoke at the Institute about the concept of the Common European House, and well as about the changing policies of the Soviet Union towards the United Nations.

"Peace in our Time? A Canadian Agenda into the 1990s" is the title of the Director's Annual

Statement released by **Bernard Wood** at a press conference in early January, and available in a published version at the end of the month. An excerpt from the statement on the subject of Canadian security and defence policy can be found in the Director's report on page 21.

**Bernard Wood**, and **Peter Roberts**, a former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, were the Canadian guests at a high-level conference organized by the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies in Moscow in late January to discuss The Human Dimension of Security and Co-operation in Europe. Participants came from all European states as well as from Canada and the United States. Soviet officials in attendance included the Ministers of Culture and Justice, as well as the Prosecutor-General. Discussions focussed on the idea of the common European home, as well as on the attempt to find a new meanings for the concepts of sovereignty and independence. While in Moscow, Mr. Wood had discussions with **Georgy Arbatov** and **Sergei Plehkanov**, Director and Deputy Director respectively of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and other members of the staff.

**Tom Weiss**, formerly executive director of the International Peace Academy in New York and

a member of the United Nations secretariat was a visiting Fellow at the Institute for a week during December. He held a number of meetings with Institute staff and others on questions of peacekeeping, as well as on research needs and opportunities for the UN in the new international climate. While at the Institute, Mr. Weiss wrote an op ed article, published in the *Christian Science Monitor* on 3 January. An article by Mr. Weiss on changing super-power attitudes to the UN can be found on page 8 of this issue of *Peace & Security*.

During the winter there were several seminars at the Institute. **Robert Jordan** of the University of New Orleans spoke on recent changes in US maritime strategy. He said that budgetary restraint in the US was likely to have a major effect on the forward maritime strategy of the US Navy. A significant factor limiting this strategy would be the likely reduction of the number of carrier task forces fifteen to twelve. He reiterated the fact that the US Navy still seems uninterested in any form of naval arms control. **Phoebe Marr**, a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Concepts Development Centre at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. led a discussion on post-Khomeini Iran. In mid-February **Peter Hakim**, staff Director of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, gave a seminar on the elections in Nicaragua.

**Bernard Wood** and **Marie-France Desjardins** participated in a meeting of the consultative group on disarmament and arms control, sponsored by the Department of External Affairs. The major subject for discussion was the nuclear non-proliferation

### IN MEMORIAM

Institute staff and friends were profoundly shocked and saddened by the death of Norma Salem on 22 January 1990 in Ottawa. Ms. Salem was a Research Associate at the Institute from September 1988 until the time of her death. She received a Ph.D from McGill University in Islamic Studies, and came to the Institute from the Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture in Montreal. While at CIIPS, Ms. Salem was in charge of a major study on Cyprus, the report of which will be available soon. She had recently begun work on a new project on Lebanon. We join her friends in offering our deep sympathy to her family, and particularly to her son, Omer.



regime. Later in January, Mr. Wood gave the closing remarks at a roundtable discussion on education and training skills for South Africans in a non-racial democracy. The Minister of External Affairs, the Rt. Hon. **Joe Clark**, delivered the key-note address at the day-long meeting, sponsored by the South Africa Education Trust Fund.

**Roger Hill** spoke at a workshop organized by the York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies on the implications for Canada of the Europeanization of European Defence. He also appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence which is reviewing Canada's Maritime Sovereignty.

In late January, **John Toogood** attended a conference entitled "Defence and Development: Insights from Southeast Asia" in Bangkok, Thailand. Earlier in the month he spoke to the Ottawa branch of Project Ploughshares on peace and security aspects of Canadian foreign and defence policy in the 1990s.

The interconnections between domestic dispute resolution and international conflict resolution were the subject of a seminar sponsored by the US Institute for Peace and Rutgers University in late January. **Ron Fisher** gave a paper entitled "Pacific, Impartial Third Party Intervention in International Conflict: The Potential for a Contingency Approach."

In early February **Ron Purver** attended an international seminar in Moscow on the naval arms race, and **Fen Hampson** participated in a meeting in Washington organized by the Brookings Institute on "Political Institutions and their Consequences." In mid-March Mr. Hampson gave a paper on "The Superpowers and Middle Powers and the Security of Third World States," at a

conference at the University of British Columbia entitled "Security Dilemma: National Security and Third World States."

**Brad Feasey** gave several workshops at a professional development day for high school teachers in February organized by the Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association in Belleville, Ontario.

**Nancy Gordon** spoke to a class at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto on arms control, peace and disarmament. Her fellow panelists were **General MacNamara** (ret.) and **Col. Alain Pellerin** of the Department of National Defence.

**Malcolm Bow**, formerly the Director of Arms Control Division in the Department of External Affairs, was a visiting Fellow at the Institute for a week in January.

Mr. Bow was working on issues in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In late January the Institute hosted a roundtable discussion on current directions in Soviet policies in Africa and the Middle East. Leading the seminar were **G. Tarasoff**, special assistant to Mr. Shevardnadze on the Middle East, and **U. Ukalov**, director-general of the African directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. They were visiting Ottawa for political consultations with Canadian officials, a process initiated during the Prime Minister's visit to the USSR in November. Mr. Ukalov said that Canada and the USSR shared the same general objective with regard to regional conflicts in Africa, and that the search for political solutions preoccupied both countries. He maintained that the only means of ensuring lasting solu-

tions was through the "table of negotiations": settlements which resulted from military actions or which were imposed from outside simply did not work in the long run. In Southern Africa, the withdrawal of ideological competition and superpower involvement provided opportunities for peaceful settlement. He did not underestimate these problems, but emphasized that many of them could be solved now that the superpowers were cooperating instead of competing. He said that in the Horn of Africa where famine threatened once again, war, more than drought, was responsible.

Mr. Tarasoff reviewed policy in the Middle East where the Soviets have been using their influence to moderate the policies of the PLO. He said that he hoped there would soon be more tangible expressions of support for the moderate PLO stance; if such is not forthcoming he fears a reversion to extremism. He expressed considerable concern about the production capabilities and flows of weapons to the countries in the Middle East, pointing to the fact that this unstable area is the second most highly armed in the world, after Europe. Mr. Tarasoff urged support for an international conference on the Middle East; he said that while bilateral talks might be productive as a first step, the number and complexity and interconnections among issues and parties were such that they could be addressed only in the context of an international conference. The Soviet Union hopes that the five permanent members of the Security Council will convene such a conference.

**Margaret Bourgeault**, a joint projects officer in the Public Programmes section of the Institute, resigned from her position in February. **Jill Tansley**, formerly executive assistant to Bernard Wood, took over the job in mid-February. □

### American-European Summer Academy

The Institute offers three scholarships for Canadians to attend the American European Summer Academy held every year in Austria on "The Relations Between Europe and North America." The programme covers themes such as history and institutions of trans-Atlantic relations; thematic issues and perspectives on foreign policy, trade and economic links, Third World development, and scenarios for the future. This year the summer school will take place between 1 and 21 July 1990.

The Academy brings together young people from Western Europe and North America. Candidates should have completed a first university degree. The three scholarships of up to \$2,500 each, will cover tuition, subsistence and travel costs for three Canadians to be selected by the Centre international de formation européenne.

Requests for further information and application forms should be addressed directly to:

Secretariat,  
Centre international de formation européenne,  
4 Boulevard Carabacel,  
F06000, Nice, France.

### Grants Procedures and Deadlines

*The Institute allocates grants twice a year. Contact the Institute for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:*

30 June for an October decision

31 December for a March decision

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## The Peace and Security Bookshelf Grant

The Institute is now holding its annual "Peace and Security Bookshelf" competition, offering a number of \$500 grants to public and secondary school libraries wishing to develop their collections in the areas of peace and security from a Canadian perspective.

This initiative fits into the Institute's mandate from the Parliament of Canada to collect and disseminate information on issues of international peace and security, and to encourage public discussion.

This is the third time that the grants are being offered. This year, secondary school libraries are included because of the growing attention of students to this field.

Interested libraries are asked to apply to the Institute with a letter indicating why they could use such a grant. If the application is accepted, they will receive a cheque, a bibliography, and suggestions for the promotion of the collection.

Two bibliographies have been compiled, one of French-language items and one of English-language items. These list the most up-to-date, in-print Canadian materials on peace and security, from a variety of viewpoints. Annotations are included, and there are sections on Reference Works, Magazines, Books for Adults and Books for Children.

The bibliographies are freely available to interested groups or individuals, regardless of whether or not they are applying for the grant.

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## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY – OPEN SEASON?

**D**URING 1989 IT BECAME clear that, however difficult and unpleasant the task, another comprehensive review and re-thinking of Canadian defence policy is now inescapable. One critical reason is that last year's Budget so dramatically reduced and postponed the spending commitments for re-equipping the Canadian forces, that the framework of the 1987 Defence White Paper no longer held any prospect of reconciling Canadian defence capabilities and commitments. The second, and even more important reason for a rethinking is found in the dramatic evolution of East-West relations.

So far, the global political changes underway do not appear to have reached the point of materially altering military planners' calculations of capabilities and potential threats. However, with the Conventional Forces negotiations proceeding rapidly in Vienna, with substantial reductions in tanks and other equipment expected to be agreed by summer 1990, it would be totally unrealistic for any government in the position of Canada's, to proceed with a major acquisition such as the promised new battle tanks for the Canadian Forces in Germany. Canadian participation, through our NATO contingent, has taken on heightened political importance by helping buffer European-US relations during the all-important process of East-West negotiations and the reductions that will follow. However, the outcome of those negotiations will soon have a major impact on the overall importance of a Canadian contingent. Either way, Canadian foreign and military policy must explore a range of highly unpredictable future options, in a field where decisions have long lead-times and very high price tags.

The challenge now, is to arrive at decisions that will provide Canada's defence planners, and Armed Forces personnel, with clear directions and credible assurance that they will be equipped to carry out the tasks assigned to them. For this challenge to be met, there is no alternative to an in-depth public debate of policy options.

#### Issues for Informed Debate

■ As the Defence White Paper acknowledged, the country's security comprises three inter-related components: defence policy and programmes; arms control and disarmament possibilities; and conflict resolution activities

including peacekeeping. Much more than was recognized in the White Paper, a positive environment for the latter two can ultimately reduce the need for defence and result in different sets of demands.

■ While Canadians are accustomed to thinking of our military expenditure as very modest, Canada actually ranks about twelfth in the world in its total military expenditure and sixth in NATO – enough resources for very substantial military capabilities. In the size of our armed forces, on the other hand, we rank about 48th, and it is well known that the Canadian forces consider much of their equipment to be inferior and outdated. Even allowing for the fact that many larger military forces rely on conscripts, and that the size of Canada's territory imposes additional costs, there is a clear need to examine how Canada's defence capability can achieve the highest cost-effectiveness. Should Canada try to maintain a fully balanced (and full-time professional) force capability, and a full-fledged national military infrastructure? Is it possible for a middle power to seek specialized "niches" of excellence in defence as we must in other areas?

For most potential strategic military threats Canadian territory and airspace are inseparably linked with those of the United States. This fact dictates the Canadian need to influence US policies where vital Canadian interests are different. Conversely, US vital interests will also need to be taken into account in Canadian policies – implying the continuing search for compromise in this distinctly asymmetrical relationship.

The North Atlantic Alliance is likely to remain an important umbrella framework for Western European-North American political, security and defence cooperation. While this cooperation has mainly taken the form of North American contingents and reinforcement capabilities for Europe, as well as joint naval operations, it is possible that the Western Europeans will take greater share of a reduced overall burden of European defence in future. This raises the possibility of a smaller direct North American contribution in Europe, and conceivably a strengthened European naval and air participation in NATO's North American area.

■ The Arctic represents a major frontier region in East-West relations, with Canada and the Soviet Union having the largest territorial stake. The possibilities for constructive coop-

eration and the reduction of security threats should be distinctive Canadian priorities for bilateral and circumpolar action.


■ We have been drawn into a number of demanding and expensive new tasks by the evolution of competing military technologies between East and West. The North Warning System, the emphasis on Forward Operating Locations, Forward Dispersal Bases, low-level flying exercises, and aerospace and submarine surveillance requirements are all developments with major implications for Canadian defence and for basic Canadian interests in our relations with the US. Wherever possible, Canada should seek the reductions of technological developments which could increase these demands.

For certain kinds of traditional and new international challenges to Canadian security, the appropriate response may not lie either in military defence capability or in cooperation with the US. These challenges include: the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty; enforcement of Canadian fisheries zones and regulations; environmental protection; coastal surveillance and enforcement capability against drug trafficking or illegal entry; services such as ice-breaking, and search and rescue operations. These "security" services may or may not prove possible to handle in tandem, or "multi-tasked," with more traditionally-defined naval and air operations. What is certain is that all of these requirements are intensifying while the available resources are not expanding. The public (as various opinion surveys attest) is primarily concerned with seeing these needs met.

Peacekeeping has been a substantial part of Canadian defence activity for decades and an unparalleled Canadian contribution to international security through the UN system. UN peacekeeping has suddenly undergone a huge expansion to respond to the new willingness of the major powers to see conflicts resolved under international supervision. No country's armed forces have a higher level of experience, capability and acceptability for these tasks than do Canada's. And Canada has been involved in all of these operations, to the point where it has become difficult to consider peacekeeping as a mere "auxiliary" role for our Armed Forces. How we will now rank these peacekeeping tasks among our security policy priorities will be a key question for the allocation of our defence resources. □

– BERNARD WOOD

## REVIEWS



### **Building Global Security** Douglas Roche

*Toronto: NC Press, 1989, 160 pp.,  
\$14.95 paper*

Douglas Roche's latest book marks his effort to rejoin the public policy debate and cast off the often troubling limitations imposed upon him during his tenure as Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament. As always, his views are visionary, and he re-enters the debate with positions that are difficult to disagree with.

This is an ambitious book, aiming to sketch no less than "a bold new plan – realistic and timely" to achieve "common security" in the face of the challenges facing humanity today. Roche provides a "tour d'horizon" of major challenges facing us at the close of the twentieth century, and singles out for special attention three issues: the continuing dangers of high levels of military spending, which translate into nuclear arms racing, reliance on nuclear deterrence, and the destructive (and expensive) arms trade with the Third World; the persistent economic, political and social underdevelopment in which the majority of the world's people live; and the accelerating environmental degradation at the global and local levels.

His grasp of the ground-level details and human costs of these problems is powerful. But although he is correct to highlight these issues, the link between the looming catastrophe, the change required to avoid it, and the specific action to take is weak. It would be unrealistic to expect "answers" to the challenges Roche poses, but readers are right to expect some analysis of the complex and contradictory choices facing

us from one of Canada's foremost speakers on these issues.

Perhaps the most poignant case is the conflict between developmental and environmental goals. Roche notes that "over the next two decades developing countries will need to create 700 million jobs – more jobs than currently exist in the entire industrialized world!" Yet three pages later he notes that a fifty percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions (the main source of which is the burning of fossil fuels) is needed to stop global warming. How the jobs created for these people (or the consumption demands their employment generates) will be consistent with reduced fossil fuel consumption is not addressed. Repeating the new mantra of "sustainable development" does not tell us how to avoid the terrible dilemma of this choice.

Roche also traces the outlines of recent positive and negative developments in the foreign policy positions of major states, including the Soviet Union, the United States, China, India and Canada. He singles out for praise President Gorbachev, and criticizes the conservative caution and lack of boldness that characterizes Canadian and American responses.

What is striking is the absence of an analysis of the deep historical, social and economic causes of the current crises he earlier identifies. These causes transcend the policy choices of individual states or leaders, and are rooted in the structure of the state system and nature of international economic forces. Solutions to problems of this magnitude are not to be found in the short-term machinations of the political process.

Roche seems to acknowledge this when he argues that the shift to a shared vision of "common security" will ultimately be based upon individual action and consciousness. Thus his conclusion

provides suggestions for actions Canadians can take, including: becoming environmentally responsible; lobbying politicians; joining local peace and environment group; planting trees; knitting quilts and eating ethnic foods. The reader is tempted to ask: "is this all?"

Most important, Roche's book must pass the test of advancing intelligent debate on the solutions to pressing world problems. If the goal is to increase public awareness of these issues as a basis for action, perhaps this book reaches it. But if the goal is to sketch a bold new plan to achieve common security, the book falls short.

– Keith Krause

*Keith Krause is deputy director of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies at York University in Toronto.*

### **Radical Mandarin:** **The Memoirs of Escott Reid** Escott Reid

*Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  
1989, 405 pp., \$35.00 cloth*

Escott Reid, who served with distinction for a quarter of a century as one of Canada's foremost diplomats, has had a full life since the mid-1960s as an author (of five other books), advisor, and educator. Now eighty-five years of age, he recalls here not only his own past but also important parts of the history of Canada's coming of age in the tumultuous world politics of the middle third of the century. *Radical Mandarin* is part autobiography, part interpretative history, and part advice on policy. It is also an informative, enjoyable, and satisfying piece of work. He remarks at one point that,

to try in old age to discern the useful accomplishments of one's public life is a puzzling task. So many achievements which seemed important at the time look trivial or evanescent from a distance of decades. What does encourage me is that I played a part in molding six institutions: the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Department of External

Affairs, The International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and Glendon College.

Reid's experiences with these institutions figure prominently in his memoirs, and what he has to say – and he writes lucidly – is instructive and often evocative in capturing the political moods of his times.

Reid was frequently at or near the centres of decision-making. He met a lot of major political actors; he was concerned with formulating Canadian policy on matters of importance; he represented Canada abroad at times when major changes were underway (India in the mid-1950s, Germany in the early 1960s); and he was often at odds with government policy and dismayed by the behaviour of Washington. His life and career were wrapped up with many of the central themes of world politics between the late 1920s and the early 1960s; and while he does not claim to have been always present at their creation, he was certainly in a position to witness and sometimes influence the making of foreign policies and the unfolding of world events.

He struggled to promote humane policies; and now, in retrospect, he tries to understand more fully what he was a part of. His testimony is especially valuable for the years from the climax of World War Two to the height of the Korean War, years when his official duties were exceptionally diverse and frequently intense and demanding.

Many of Reid's reflections are pertinent to current history. In the 1950s, membership in the Commonwealth, he suggests, countered "some of the misleading simplicities of much of the cold war propaganda of the time" and



"helped us realize ... that most of the crucial problems before the world are not ... aspects of a struggle against communism. It helped us to face these crucial problems: colonialism and its aftermath, racial discrimination, cultural imperialism, the misery of half the people of the world." Escott Reid thought more deeply and more sensitively about these and other international issues than most of his contemporaries. His memoir of thought and action deserves to be read with appreciation and respect.

— Robert Malcolmson

Robert Malcolmson is a professor of history at Queen's University in Kingston.

### The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon

Robert Jervis

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, 266 pp., US\$ 21.95 cloth

One might well ask, with the democratic revolution now sweeping across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, whether the United States did not overspend on a threat that was not nearly as great as some imagined. The implication behind Robert Jervis' new book is that the nuclear strategy developed to address that "threat" was just as flawed in both design and logic. Jervis is the dean of American security studies and well known for his earlier writings on nuclear strategy, crisis management and the psychology of decision making. His new book is unquestionably the most comprehensive and thorough critique of US nuclear policy available.

Jervis argues that US and Soviet nuclear strategies have been masked in a bundle of contradictions: on the one hand, the political leadership of the two superpowers has long since recognized that nuclear war is both unwinnable and unthinkable; on the other hand, they have encouraged a buildup of their respective nuclear arsenals and the pursuit of nuclear strategies which are based on the premise that victory in nu-

clear war is possible. He ridicules current notions about "countervailing" or "prevailing" responses, escalation dominance and control, or deterrence by denial.

At the same time he urges a return to what he refers to as the "major old, good ideas," namely, that nuclear weapons are not ordinary weapons, that the nuclear revolution has rendered the possibility of military victory obsolete, and that crisis stability is both a necessary and desirable objective of all strategy and policy.

Jervis also suggests that scholars and students of nuclear strategy have contributed a number of important "new, good ideas" to the strategic debate. These include the insight that any attempt by one side to "improve" its own security will only make its adversary feel more vulnerable (now referred to as the "security dilemma") and lead to a costly arms race, that arms control should concentrate on the characteristics of weapons not their numbers, and that it is difficult in practice to distinguish between a first-strike and a so-called "second-strike" weapon. Jervis also suggests that a growing appreciation of the security dilemma has facilitated possibilities for security cooperation between the superpowers and led to the development of common principles, norms, and rules of conflict management.

In other chapters, Jervis addresses such issues as the relationship between morality and nuclear strategy, the different meanings and policy understandings of MAD, and the psychological aspects of crisis stability. The book also includes a brilliant chapter on the symbolic nature of nuclear politics, his analysis of which yields five important conclusions:

many strategic policies create their own difficulties; there are opportunities for avoiding such pitfalls; a good deal of strategic planning operates autonomously on the basis of self-defined problems; many of the possibilities for and against arms control must be seen in psychological, not military terms; beliefs about whether war is inevitable are especially important in determining whether peace will be maintained.

Much of Jervis' analysis is at the level of strategic theory and psychology. Yet one is forced to ask whether, if US and Soviet nuclear policies have been so flawed, the root of the problem lies at this level (the level of ideas or strategic logic), at the level of institutions, or somewhere else. Unfortunately Jervis does not address this issue. Instead, he prefers to level his critique at the mind-numbing debates of nuclear theologians.

Although the implication of Jervis' argument is that fewer is better when it comes to nuclear weapons — what some call "existential deterrence" — his book is bereft of ideas about how this is to be achieved and how nuclear forces and strategies of the two superpowers should be changed to accommodate new political realities in the East-West relationship. Let us hope that Jervis will turn his formidable powers of analysis to these questions in his next book. — Fen Osler Hampson

Mr. Hampson teaches international affairs at Carleton University and is a research associate at the Institute.

### BRIEFLY NOTED

#### The Defence Industrial Base and the West

David G. Haglund, editor

London: Routledge, 1989, 288 pp., \$69.00 cloth

With a multi-national list of contributors this volume draws on recent cases of complex weapon systems development to show, first, the kinds of opportunities and challenges presented by multi-state participation in weapon development and second, the major themes of the debate "over the degree to which the goal of maintenance of the defence industrial base conditions and sometimes conflicts with other objectives of states." Among the chapters are: "The MRCA/Tornado: The Politics and Economics of Collaborative Procurement"; "The Swedish Defence Industrial Base: Implications for the Economy"; and "Israel and the Lavi Fighter-Aircraft."

### Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea

Donald McRae and Gordon Munro, editors

Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, 282 pp., \$39.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper

This book is concerned with the nature and adequacy of Canada's ocean management policies and practices in the light of the regime that emerged from the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The multidisciplinary perspective presented here by lawyers, political scientists, economists, fisheries scientists, and diplomats specializing in oceans matters, examines how ocean issues are managed by one of the world's most important coastal states and looks at the progressive development of an international oceans regime.

### The Arctic: Choices for Peace and Security

Thomas R. Berger, Harriet Critchley, Alexei Rodionov, Mary Simon and 20 others.

Vancouver: Gordon Soules, 1989, 282 pp., \$12.95 paper

This volume is drawn from the speeches and debates of the public inquiry by the same name held in Edmonton, 18 and 19 March 1989. The inquiry, attended by over fifteen hundred participants, examined the Arctic as a key element of international peace and security. The issues include: the environmental effects of Arctic industrial development and resource extraction; problems of pollution from the south; militarization of the Arctic and the threat of nuclear confrontation in the Arctic; the need for the superpowers and other Arctic countries to cooperate to reduce political and military tension; and the needs and aims of the native peoples of the Arctic.

(The conference on which this volume is based received financial assistance from the Institute for Peace and Security) □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## LETTER FROM PRAGUE BY VĚRA MURRAY



**On the Palace Square, gazing past the guards at the main building, I had the strangest feeling. I certainly had not been used to looking kindly on the place which houses the offices of the president.**

When I was young, and whenever I visited Czechoslovakia during the past twenty years, I would feel contempt, helplessness, even fear when I'd look at that palace. Now, for the first time there was not hatred, but admiration for the man in the president's home. I could scarcely believe it. With me on the square, dozens of people stared up at the building. Citizens of Prague, people from the countryside, foreign tourists speaking Czech, I'm sure we were all thinking the same thing: we have an awfully long way to go in this country of ours.

It's ironic, but human nature seems to have an easier time adapting to repression than learning about democracy from scratch. In the same way, nationalizing a free economy is a simple matter compared to privatizing all the industries and services of an economy that has been state run for decades. This is the kind of challenge that Czechs, like all Eastern Europeans, are beginning to encounter. The freedom which was so longed for and which has seemingly dropped from the sky, brings problems quite unimaginable to people who take it for granted that they can join any political party they choose, send their children to university, open a business, buy stocks or shares, or simply write a stiff letter of protest to the editor of their newspaper. It's hardly surprising, then, that two short weeks after the election of Vaclav Havel, and only two months after the beginning of Czechoslovakia's "quiet revolution," I was standing there in Prague feeling both satisfaction and extreme anxiety.

How to organize the first free elections, planned for next June? In a society, closed for forty years,

where any attempt to be different was nipped in the bud, the natural reaction has been to be as different and distinctive as possible – so thirty-six political parties have sprung up in the past two months. How to deal with such a range of opinion? How to encourage democracy without falling into a pattern of electing weak coalition governments that change every

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**... the greatest fear of the revolution's leaders has been the kind of chaos which would give the State Security forces an excuse to "re-establish order."**

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few months? All along, the greatest fear of the revolution's leaders has been the kind of chaos which would, before or after the elections, give the State Security forces an excuse to "re-establish order."

No one really knows the extent and structure of this repressive body, upon which the communist regime depended – not even the Minister of the Interior. In 1968, during the Prague Spring, Pavel, a communist reformer who headed the State Security apparatus for a few months, never was able to find out anything about the way it was run. Last November, the members of the State Security just vanished overnight – lock, stock and files. They have everything to lose and nothing to gain with the new regime.

How to deal with the communists? In a few factories and schools, "outraged citizens" have begun to get even. Calling themselves the Civic Forum – a movement gathering in all the opposition forces around Havel during the early days of the revolution – they get involved in the running of a factory on the grounds that the director is

an old Stalinist, and they decide which school teachers should stay or go. Although it's a far cry from the quick and nasty justice we saw in Romania, the people around Havel are horrified by it. On the whole this is a very pragmatic people, with little tendency to get carried away – not always an advantage, however, as the history of Czechoslovakia since World War II shows.

Those who were responsible for the bloody repression of 17 November must be brought to justice, of course, and the most corrupt members of the communist party apparatus must be punished. But the idea of a witch hunt is repul-

ing directed by the state, of all initiative being crushed by the state, people will not get back into the entrepreneurial spirit overnight, ready to take financial risks, or even prepared to work overtime.

At the moment nobody serious has the kind of money needed to purchase the country's medium-sized businesses, let alone the giant heavy industries. Nobody that is, except the sons of some communist *apparatchiks*, and maybe a few blackmarketeers and foreigners.

Will there be a lot of unemployment? And what about the standard of living? The people of Czechoslovakia are used to more comfortable lives than their Eastern Bloc neighbours, thanks to the huge subsidies paid to farmers, and retail prices kept artificially low – but it won't be possible to keep on cheating like this. As for the magnificent forests, once the pride of the country, most of them are dead or dying from acid rain, and half of the potable water is contaminated. Can this environmental catastrophe be reversed?

A sense of humour and a talent to improvise are two qualities which have survived in Czech society even after decades of communism, and despite widespread cynicism and disillusionment. However, the late-night discussions in Prague in which I took part were unusually serious. Making fun of Soviet occupiers or laughing at the stupidity of Jakes, the former communist party secretary, was not only easier, it was also a way of surviving. "We have this terrible feeling of responsibility," a close friend of Havel's told me, "for such a long time all we did was say how bad things were. Now in the middle of this economic gloom it's up to us to do better." □

*Věra Murray was born in Czechoslovakia, left the country in 1968 and is currently the Moscow correspondent for the Quebec magazine L'Actualité.*

*Translation by Eva Bild*





Je me suis retrouvée sur la Place du Château, et au-delà des sentinelles gardant l'entrée comme toujours, j'ai

regarde le premier bâtiment, envahie par un sentiment des plus absurdes.

sentiment des plus absurdes.

Dans le mois de juin prochain ?

Après la révolution, avant ou après les élections, c'est une situa-

de la révolution. Ils se méfient de la direction d'une usine, parce que le directeur est un vieux sarkhan et ils décident qui parmi les enseignants peut rester au non. On est loin de la justice sommaire exercée en Roumanie, mais les gens autour de Havel, sont tout de même horribles. Dans l'ensemble, ils sont peu portés au mélodrame; ce sont des pragmatiques jusqu'à la moëlle. Des caractéristiques qui ont leur avantages et leurs désavantages comme l'a prouvé l'histoire riche que depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Il faudrait sûrement traduire en justitice les responsables de la répression sanglante du 17 novembre, événement qui a mis en marche la révolution, et punir les membres les plus corrompus de l'appareil du parti communiste. Pour le reste, la chasse aux communistes répugne même à ceux qui ont payé leur liberté avec des années de prison, comme Václav Havel lui-même.

...Deux mois à peine après le début de la «révolution tranquille» tchécoslovaque, j'ai senti à Prague, au-delà d'une incroyable satisfaction, une anxiété presque palpable.

une anxiété presque palpable.

De plus, dans un pays où l'avaancement dépendait depuis quarante ans de l'appartenance au parti unique, beaucoup se sont joints à celui-ci pour pouvoir tout simplement faire leur travail. Deux fois, après 1948 et après 1968, le pays a été saigné de ses intellectuels, partis en exil, ou devenus préposés au chauffage ou gardiens de nuit. Il ne peut pas aujourd'hui se permettre le luxe de mettre à la porte des spécialistes dont le seul défaut est d'avoir été communiste. Dans la plupart des cas, on ne saurait leur trouver de remplaçants.

À la différence de celle de la Hongrie et même de l'Allemagne de l'Est, l'économie mûre de la Tchécoslovaquie a été nationalisée après 1948, des usines Skoda au plus petit cordonnier, des grands hôtels de la ville d'eau de Karlsbad au plus modestes bistros de village, sans oublier les activités du Nord de la Bohême. Le nouveau régime vise à rétablir l'économie de marché, et là-dessus, tout le monde est d'accord. Les communistes posséderont leur boutique, et des résistants de famille réforon-

tion chaotique dont pourrait profiter la Sécurité d'Etat (la force de répression sur laquelle reposait le régime communiste), pour «rétablir l'ordre». Personne ne connaît l'ampleur ni la structure exacte de cette organisation. Même pas le nouveau ministre de l'Intérieur. En 1968, pendant le printemps de Prague, le ministre Pavel, un communiste réformiste qui dirigea le ministère durant quelques mois, n'a jamais pu apprendre quoique ce soit sur le fonctionnement des services spéciaux. Des novembre dernier, du jour au lendemain, les membres de la Sécurité ont disparu, avec les armes et les archives. Ils n'ont rien à gagner mais tout à perdre avec le nouveau

regime.  
Comment traiter les commu-  
nités ? Dans certaines usines et dans  
certaines écoles, des « citoyens in-  
dignes » ont commencé à régler  
leurs comptes au nom du Forum  
civilique, mouvement rassemblant  
toutes les forces de l'opposition au-  
tour de Havel dès les premiers jours

« Il est donc peu surprenant que, deux semaines à peine après l'élection à la présidence de Václav Havel, deux mois à peine après le début de la « révolution tranquille » tchecoslovaque, j'aie senti à Prague, au-delà d'une incroyable satisfaction, une anxiété presque palpable. Comment organiser les premières élections législatives libres, prévues

l'homme, la nature humaine  
 semble plus facilement s'ajuster à  
 un régime dur qu'à l'apprentissage  
 de la démocratie à partir de zéro. De la  
 même façon, nationaliser une éco-  
 nomie libre paraît être une tâche  
 nettement moins compliquée que  
 celle de privatiser toutes les usines  
 et tous les services dans une écono-  
 mie gérée depuis des décennies par  
 l'Etat. Ces défis, les Tchécosto-  
 vaques, comme tous les Européens  
 de l'Est, sont en train de les décou-  
 vrir. La liberté, tant souhaitée, qui  
 soudain est presque tombée du ciel,  
 apporte avec elle des difficultés à  
 peine imaginables pour quelqu'un  
 qui vient tout d'un coup acquiescer  
 à être membre du parti politique de  
 son choix, d'envoyer son enfant à  
 l'université, d'acheter un commerce  
 ou d'acheter des actions à la bourse.

je n'étais pas habituée à regarder avec bienveillance ce lieu où se trouvent les bureaux du président de la République; dans ma jeunesse et pendant les visites que je fais en Tchécoslovaquie depuis vingt ans, j'avais plutôt fait avec du mépris, de l'impissance et de la peur. Maintenant, pour la première fois de ma vie, je n'éprouvais pas de haine mais beaucoup d'admiration pour celui qui occupe la fonction de président. Je n'arrivais pas à me rendre à l'évidence. Avec moi, des dizaines de Français en promenade, des provinciaux et une foule de touristes étrangers parlant le tchèque parlaient le babillement. J'aurais pu penser que nous pensions la même chose : en ce qui concerne notre pays natal, nous avions tous un

un racc. Mais après quarante ans de prise en charge par l'Etat, période où toute initiative a été écrasée, ce n'est pas du jour au lendemain que les gens reviennent l'esprit d'en-dehors, vont tout reprendre des risques financiers, ou même faire aux heures supplémentaires. Quant à eux compagnies de moyenne envergure, aucun particulier « sérieux » n'a pu le moment assez d'argent pour les acheter. Sans peut-être les fils d'*d'aparvichiks* communistes qui se sont enrichis au dépend de l'Etat, les individus qui font du marché noir, les étrangers... Y aura-t-il beaucoup de chômage ? Et le niveau de vie ? Les Tchecoslovaques vivaient mieux que les citoyens et citoyens des autres pays de l'Est à cause des subventions massives accordées à l'agriculture et des prix de détail tenus artificiellement bas. Il ne sera plus possible de continuer avec ce genre de tricheries. Et que dire des magnifiques forêts qui faisaient autrefois l'orgueil du pays et qui sont maintenant malades ou ont été détruites par les pluies acides, et de plus de la moitié de l'eau potable qui est contaminée ? Cette situation écologique catastrophique est-elle réversible ?

provisionnement sont deux qualités qui semblent toujours survivre dans la société tschèque, même après des décennies de communisme, et malgré le cynisme et le désagacement très généralisés. Les discussions aux-quelles j'ai assisté tard dans la nuit à Prague, étaient d'un sérieux inhabituel. Se moquer de l'occupant soviétique, ou de la bêtise de Jakes, secrétaire du Parti communiste jusqu'au début de la révolution, était non seulement plus facile, c'était aussi une façon de survivre. «Nous avons tous un terrible sentiment de responsabilité», me disait un ami très proche de Havel, «pendant si longtemps, nous ne faisons que dire combien tout était mauvais. Maintenant, au milieu du marasme économique général, c'est à nous de mieux faire.» □

iels que les Brigades rouges ou la mystérieuse Djihad islamique, mais d'y inclure l'IRA (en Irlande du Nord) et l'ETA (au Pays basque) qui recourent pourtant essentiellement à la même stratégie de lutte, à savoir le terrorisme.

La qualité de cet ouvrage ne réside toutefois pas dans ces distinctions fines et académiques, mais plutôt dans l'effort de synthèse et de classification qu'il nous propose, d'une certaine façon, correspond à une définition indirecte du phénomène. Gandolfi distingue ainsi les MLN en fonction des objectifs qu'ils poursuivent. On obtient alors des mouvements recherchant la sécession, d'autres la révolution. Les premiers correspondent à la vision traditionnelle que l'on a des MLN, c'est-à-dire des mouvements s'opposant à un colonialisme européen, ou aux «militarismes» issus du tiers-monde dont le couple Maroc-Sahara occidental est un excellent exemple.

Les MLN visant la révolution sont, quant à eux, orientés vers la destruction d'un régime en place et l'instauration d'un ordre politique nouveau. Cette catégorie inclut la plupart des mouvements révolutionnaires d'inspiration marxiste, mais aussi les «combattants de la liberté» anticomunistes si chers à la droite américaine (UNTA en Angola et Contra au Nicaragua).

Après avoir décrit les divers types d'objectifs que poursuivent les MLN, Gandolfi passe à une description des structures de ces mouvements selon le schéma suivant : dénomination, organes, membres, pluralité et regroupement au sein de l'étude est construite sur la prémisse suivante : «la structure est fonction de l'objectif de libération poursuivi. L'objectif commande la structure et non l'inverse». Cette proposition théorique originale n'est malheureusement pas justifiée au cours de l'étude. En fait, on pourrait facilement avancer l'argument inverse : la structure est avant tout fonction des caractéristiques du milieu au sein duquel il évolue. La présence de structures tribales, le gouvernement en place, la présence d'un sanctuaire sûr sont autant d'exemples à élaborer les éléments catholiques à amener l'Eglise occidentale à une prise de position des politiques de défense des pays du continent européen. La contestation probable d'un conflit armé sur le sur les dangers et les conséquences de la blâse l'opinion publique occidentale protestations antinucléaires ont montré.

Au début des années 1980, les

traditions nationales, émettaient des déclarations articulées associant la prévention de la guerre à la promotion de la paix. Les textes des Conférences épiscopales américaines, allemande et française de 1983 ont retenu l'attention de l'auteur pour plusieurs raisons. Il s'agit de pays démocratiques, dont le poids économique, politique et stratégique est la place au premier plan sur la scène internationale. Dans ces pays, l'Eglise catholique agit librement et contrairement à l'Eglise des pays de l'Est.

Dans l'introduction, l'auteur étudie les rapports de l'Eglise et de l'Etat dans la tradition catholique et expose la philosophie politique du pape Jean-Paul II. La première partie passe en revue les alternatives de la dissuasion nucléaire. La troisième expose les aspects éthiques, stratégiques, politiques et théologiques de la dissuasion nucléaire. La troisième partie passe en revue les alternatives de la loi naturelle.

Cette loi signifie, entre autres, la justice dans ses formes sociale et distributive. Le respect effectif des droits de l'homme devient alors un impératif catégorique. Saint-Augustin soulignait déjà avec insistance que sans la justice, l'entreprise des hommes peut devenir du brigandage. Les bases d'une éthique commune sont contenues dans la doctrine de l'Eglise catholique et explicitées, adaptées, suivant les époques et les circonstances historiques, par les encyclopes papales.

Dans leurs analyses des politiques de défense, les évêques français et allemands, en fonction des conflits européens du passé, insistent plutôt sur les valeurs tandis que leurs confrères américains mettent en relief les rapports de force. Les approches des évêques européens du «centre catholique» tiennent compte de

des exemples de facteurs qui échappent à la volonté des MLN et qui pourtant déterminent directement leurs forces et leurs stratégies de

La dernière partie du livre porte sur la place des MLN au sein de la communauté internationale. L'auteur apporte ici une contribution originale en mettant l'accent sur les dimensions légales, peu étudiées parce que souvent jugées, peut-être à tort, comme non pertinentes par la

considérer que la société internationale continue d'être dominée par des Etats et que les MLN échappent rarement à leurs influences et à leurs manipulations.

Au tableau des critiques portant sur la forme de l'ouvrage, il faut mentionner deux points importants. Premièrement, l'absence d'une table des matières complète, celle fournie ne rendant pas justice à l'approche détaillée adoptée par Gandolfi.

Deuxièmement, ce livre ne contient aucune référence et possède une bibliographie trop sommaire. Cette dernière, limitée à des livres écrits en français, ne contient que trois publications pour les années 1980 et n'inclut même pas l'anthologie classique «Stratégies de la guerrilla» de Gérard Chaliand. Bref, le néophyte trouvera dans ce livre bien peu de repères pour poursuivre plus à fond son étude des MLN.

— Thierry Gongora

Thierry Gongora est candidat au doctorat à l'Université Carleton, à Ottawa.

**L'Eglise catholique et la politique de défense au début des années 1980**

Gaëthanne Guichard

Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1988.

333 pages, 42,10 \$

En réunissant uniquement des titres en langue française, la présente bibliographie vient combler une lacune dans la famille des répertoires de documents sur la guerre et la paix. Les auteurs ont regroupé plus de 5 700 titres de monographies, d'articles de revues spécialisées, de cahiers de recherche, d'actes de colloque et de thèses universitaires des quatre coins du monde francophone.

(Ouvrage publié avec l'aide financière de l'Institut). □

Voir l'analyse sommaire d'ouvrages publiés en anglais dans la rubrique *Reviews de Peace&Security*.

**Guerre, paix et désarmement**

PARU RECEMMENT


Amnie Bourret et Erik Poole

Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Québec, 1989.

397 pages, 50 \$



## LIVRES



### L'or et le sang : les buts de guerre économiques de la Première

guerre mondiale

Georges-Henri Soutou

Éditions Fayard, Paris, 1989.

663 pages, 69,95 \$

Le livre de Georges-Henri

Soutou représente l'aboutissement

d'un itinéraire intellectuel qui a

commencé par une question simple :

pourquoi le blocus allié de l'Alle-

magne a-t-il été maintenu jusqu'en

1919, soit un an après l'armistice ?

Section l'auteur, «tous les appétits

et tous les projets économiques de

la Première Guerre mondiale, ont

marqué le conflit et que l'on re-

trouve, bien présents, dans le texte

même du Traité de Versailles».

Soutou s'oppose donc à l'historio-

graphie traditionnelle qui évacue les

buts de guerre économiques pour

se préoccuper uniquement du point

de vue politique et des ambitions

territoriales de style classique.

Après une étude approfondie des

politiques économiques nationales

des États européens et des États-

Unis, par exemple, Soutou en vient

à la conclusion que la Première

Grande Guerre a été la matrice du

XX<sup>e</sup> siècle parce que «celle-ci

marque une étape entre la longue et

lente évolution passée et l'accepta-

tion de l'évolution scientifique et

technique de notre société en lais-

sant de côté les bouleversements

moeurs». L'auteur se propose d'ana-

lyser le premier conflit mondial

sous tous les angles possibles.

Soutou démontre que l'affronte-

ment économique a dominé la

Grande Guerre mais, surtout, qu'il

s'est prolongé dans l'après-guerre,

alors qu'on assiste à la «mise au

point de véritables buts de guerre

économiques». Pour les Alliés, c'est

la victoire d'un libéralisme renou-

vel. Pour les puissances centrales,

l'objectif majeur deviendra la cons-

truction du *Mittelwopa*. Mais, au-

delà des buts de guerre strictement

économiques, L'or et le sang cons-

tinue aussi une histoire de la Grande

Guerre du côté civil. En effet, tout

comme Soutou refuse de réduire le

conflit de 1914-1918 à un exercice

militaire, il refuse une interprétation

basée sur un petit nombre de res-

ponsables principaux. Il mesure

l'influence et la responsabilité de

plusieurs autres personnalités

(ministres, dirigeants privés,

groupes de pression, intellectuels)

qui elles aussi élaboreront des pro-

grammes et essaieront de les faire

passer. C'est ainsi que la Grande

Guerre nous est effectivement

présentée sous ses multiples aspects.

Soutou rejette donc les notions de

«d'impérialisme économique»

mythique. Pour l'Allemagne, la

priorité devient le retour au marché

international et non pas, comme

le prônaient les militaires, l'aurar-

complète. L'Allemagne n'est

donc plus au centre ni à l'Est, elle

est à l'Ouest.

En plus de s'opposer à l'évacua-

tion des buts de guerre écono-

miques, Soutou rejette l'analyse

traditionnelle des avantages et des

instruments économiques fournis

aux Alliés par le Traité de Ver-

sailles. Selon lui, en s'attachant

uniquement au problème des répa-

rages économiques découlant du

traité, la majorité des historiens ont

eu tort de conclure que les Alliés

n'avaient pas atteint leurs objectifs

économiques. En effet, pour Soutou,

les Alliés ont réussi à réaliser, à Ver-

sailles, l'essentiel de leurs ambitions

économiques. La qualité et l'éten-

due de la recherche de l'auteur ren-

dent cette thèse tout à fait possible.

— Pierre Fournier

Pierre Fournier est professeur au département de science politique de l'Université du Québec à Montréal.

partie apaisée depuis Bismarck, elle est toujours présente au sein de la société allemande. En ce sens, un des thèmes majeurs de cette lutte devient le choix, pour l'après-guerre, entre «le maintien de l'ouverture sur le marché mondial libéral ou la fermeture autarcique d'une Europe centrale aristocratique et traditionaliste».

La «lisse de la Grande Guerre peut

être perçue, selon l'auteur, comme

un changement de régime politique,

qui consacre la victoire de la libre

la porte ouverte), ainsi que l'aban-

don des «méthodes allemandes

d'expansion économique», à base

étatique, au profit d'une concu-

rence commerciale ouverte. C'est

la, selon Soutou, que réside le pro-

blème, et non pas dans un processus

«d'impérialisme économique»

mythique. Pour l'Allemagne, la

priorité devient le retour au marché

international et non pas, comme

le prônaient les militaires, l'aurar-

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due de la recherche de l'auteur ren-

dent cette thèse tout à fait possible.

Les mouvements

de libération nationale

Alain Gandolfi

Presses universitaires de France,

Collection Que sais-je ? N° 2478.

Paris, 1989

125 pages, 8,25 \$

Alain Gandolfi propose, dans

cette brève étude, un survol des

mouvements de libération nationale

(MLN) selon le signe proposé par

l'auteur tout fait adapté au lecteur

qui recherche un ouvrage d'intro-

duction concis sur le sujet. Mal-

heureusement, comme c'est trop

souvent le cas avec ce type d'ou-

vrage, le lecteur a l'impression de

rester sur sa faim après avoir tourné

la dernière page.

Qu'est-ce qu'un MLN ? C'est la

une question à laquelle Alain Gan-

dolfi, qui enseigne à l'Université

d'Aix-Marseille III, se montre au

départ réticent à répondre. Comme

il le dit si bien, il faut «ratissier large

pour rester plus près de la réalité».

Par conséquent, son propos tend de

«véresser un inventaire de ces mou-

vements en tentant de cerner pro-

gressivement la notion à partir de

ses éléments constitutifs».

Il s'oppose ainsi à la conception

restrictive répandue par le droit inter-

national qui accorde le statut de

MLN seulement aux «organisations

représentatives de peuples luttant

pour leur indépendance contre une

metropole dont ils sont ethnique-

ment ou culturellement différents

et séparés par la mer». Mais cette

définition, issue de la réalité de

l'époque de la décolonisation (qui

prend, en gros, fin avec le retrait

portugais d'Afrique en 1975) ne

correspond plus nécessairement à la

diversité actuelle des MLN. Ce qui

amène l'auteur, en conclusion, à

appeler MLN «tout mouvement or-

ganisé, prétendant représenter une

communauté territoriale au nom de

laquelle il agit par des moyens

généralement extra-légaux, pour

changer l'ordre étatique dont il con-

teste la légitimité». Cette perspec-

tive lui permet ainsi d'exclure de

son étude des groupes terroristes

si en Allemagne cette lutte s'était en

Le conflit de 1914 porte aussi la

relations internationales.

mais qu'ils restent toujours subor-

guerre et les négociations de paix,

tifs économiques ont dominé la

pour les Alliés. Ainsi, Soutou en

vient à la conclusion que les objec-

le contrôle des matières premières

lèrent. Il s'agit, en effet, de s'assurer

de positions et les stratégies dif-

les deux camps, bien que les prises

économiques sont les mêmes dans

montrer qu'en somme les enjeux

camp opposés. Soutou tente de

l'intérieur de chaque camp qu'en

avec les projets des autres, tant à

ou les projets des uns interfèrent

leur de cerner les points stratégiques

aux Alliés par le Traité de Ver-

saillies. Selon lui, en s'attachant

uniquement au problème des répa-

rages économiques découlant du

traité, la majorité des historiens ont

eu tort de conclure que les Alliés

n'avaient pas atteint leurs objectifs

économiques. En effet, pour Soutou,

les Alliés ont réussi à réaliser, à Ver-

sailles, l'essentiel de leurs ambitions

économiques. La qualité et l'éten-

due de la recherche de l'auteur ren-

dent cette thèse tout à fait possible.

## LA POLITIQUE

**A** MESURE QUE SE DÉ-  
roulait l'année 1989,  
il est devenu clair que,

DE DEFENSE

il est devenu clair que,  
tout difficile et désagréa-

DU CANADA :

ble que ceci pût être, le Canada allait devoir iné-

## SONT PAS FAITS

fondamentalement sa politique de défense. En effet,

dernier a tellement réduit les ressources et différé les programmes de rééquipement des Forces canadiennes que le cadre défini dans le Livre blanc de 1987 sur la Défense ne permettait désormais plus de concilier les capacités de notre pays en matière de défense et ses engagements. Par ailleurs, et c'est là une raison encore plus importante de repenser la politique de défense, les relations Est-Ouest ont connu une évolution dramatique.

« L'existence d'un éventuel conflit n'est pas suffisante pour obliger les stratégies militaires à avoir lieu. L'évaluation sur les capacités des forces armées et les menaces potentielles. Cependant, avec la progression rapide des puissances conventionnelles à Vienne, avec les réductions sensibles du nombre de chars et d'autres »

matériels dont on pense qu'elles feront l'objet d'un accord d'ici l'été 1990, n'importe quel pays dans la position du Canada manqueraient totalement de réalisme s'il poursuivait la réalisation d'un projet d'envieusement tel que celui portant sur l'achat de nouveaux chars pour les Forces canadiennes déployées en Allemagne. La participation du Canada à l'OTAN a acquis une dimension politique

plus grande du fait qu'elle aidera à harmoniser les relations entre l'Europe et les États-Unis pendant et le processus capital des négociations Est-Ouest et des réductions qui suivront. Cependant, l'issue de ces négociations aura bientôt une incidence cruciale sur l'importance globale du contingent canadien d'acier en Europe. D'un autre côté, dans la politique étrangère et militaire du Canada, de

Le défi qui se pose désormais, consiste à prendre des décisions qui donneront aux stratèges de la Défense canadienne et au personnel de nos forces armées des orientations raisonnablement

...sur les options.

Comme le Livre blanc sur la Défense l'a souligné, la sécurité du Canada comporte trois volets connexes : la politique et les programmes de défense; les perspectives de désarmement et de limitation des armements; et les activités qui

visent à régler les conflits et qui comprennent les missions de maintien de la paix. Beaucoup plus

Le public canadien est habitué de penser que le budget militaire national est très modeste, mais le Canada se situe au douzième rang dans le monde.

pour ce qui est des dépenses militaires totales, et au sixième rang dans l'OTAN. Pour ce qui est de la taille de nos forces armées, nous nous classons au quatrième-huitième rang, par ailleurs, les Forces canadiennes estiment, cela est bien connu, qu'une grande partie de leur matériel est de qualité inférieure et vétuste. Même si l'on prend en compte bien des armées plus nombreuses mises sur pied

est le fait que l'origine des renseignements, il est clair que la taille du territoire canadien est telle que la collecte de renseignements de cette nature est une tâche considérable. Il est clair que la collecte de renseignements de cette nature est une tâche considérable. Il est clair que la collecte de renseignements de cette nature est une tâche considérable.

« Les infrastructures militaires d'envoyement véritablement nationale ? Est-il possible pour nous d'acquiescer à la moyenne de se chercher des « créneaux » spécialisés où elle excellerait en matière de défense, comme le Canada le fait dans d'autres domaines ? En ce qui concerne la plupart des menaces militaires stratégiques possibles, le territoire et

l'espace aérien du Canada forme un tout avec le Canada-États-Unis. Cette réalité nous oblige à rechercher à influer sur les politiques américaines lorsque les intérêts vixans du Canada sont différents. En revanche, les politiques canadiennes deviendront aussi prendre en compte les intérêts vixans des États-Unis, de sorte qu'il faudra continuer à rechercher des compromis dans cette

relation clairement asymétrique. L'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord demeurera sans doute un cadre important de coopération entre l'Europe occidentale et l'Amérique du Nord en matière politique et dans les domaines de la sécurité et de la défense. Jusqu'ici, cette coopération s'est principalement traduite par l'envoi de contingents nord-américains en Europe, la mise

en réserve de renforts qui seraient déployés à la-  
bas en cas d'urgence, et la participation à des opéra-  
tions navales conjointes, mais il est possible que,  
à l'avenir, les Européens de l'Ouest assument  
une part plus grande du fardeau moindre que sera  
la défense de leurs pays. La contribution nord-  
atlantique directe en Europe pourrait donc dimi-  
nuer, et il ne peut pas en être des activités

L'Arctique représente un grand domaine à nord-américains et européens s'accroîtront dans la zone d'influence des relations Est-Ouest, le Canada

et l'Union soviétique y aient les enjeux territoriaux les plus considérables. À la faveur de ses rapports bilatéraux et circumpolaires, le Canada devrait distinctement mettre l'accent sur les moyens possibles de renforcer la confiance dans ce contexte, d'établir une coopération constructive et de réduire les menaces pesant sur la sécurité.

Nous avons dû assumer un certain nombre de nouvelles tâches exigeantes et coûteuses à cause de la concurrence technologique militaire entre

L'Est et l'Ouest. Le Système d'alerte du Nord et l'accent mis sur les bases d'opérations avancées, sur les bases avancées de déploiement et les vols d'exercice à basse altitude, ainsi que sur les systèmes de surveillance aérospatiale et sous-marine sont autant d'éléments revêtant beaucoup d'importance pour la défense du Canada et la protection de ses intérêts fondamentaux dans ces

rapports avec les États-Unis. Chaque fois que cela est possible, le Canada est justifié de demander la réduction ou la limitation des développements technologiques susceptibles d'alourdir encore sa tâche. Pour faire face à d'autres types de défis traditionnels et de nouveaux défis internationaux, le Canada doit également faire face à d'autres types de défis internationaux.

entre chercher la solution ailleurs qu dans les moyens militaires de défense ou dans un collabo-  
ration canado-américaine. Au nombre de ces  
défis, citons les suivants : affirmer et protéger la  
souveraineté canadienne; protéger les zones de  
pêche du Canada et faire respecter les règlements  
pertinents; protéger l'environnement; surveiller

Les opérations de maintien de la paix, considérées comme des opérations de maintien de la paix, sont considérées comme des opérations de maintien de la paix.

[illegible]

mais des mesures de voir des conflits se régler sous surveillance internationale. Aucun pays ne possède autant d'expérience, de moyens et de crédibilité pour accomplir ces tâches que le Canada. Ce dernier a participé à toutes ces opérations, au point qu'il est devenu difficile de considérer le maintien de la paix simplement comme un rôle «auxiliaire» des Forces canadiennes. Quel dé-

— BERNARD WOOD



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
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# NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Avant la réunion qu'on tenue à Ottawa en février les ministres des Affaires étrangères et les délégués de l'O.N.U. et du Pacte de Varsovie, en vue de négocier un traité sur l'ouverture des espaces aériens et de donner un élan politique aux pour-parlers sur la réduction des forces conventionnelles, l'Institut a organisé une table ronde à l'intention des médias. Divers orateurs se sont adressés aux journalistes présents à ceux d'en dehors d'Ottawa.

par l'entremise de liaisons téléphoniques; mentionnons **David Cox** et **Jane Boulden**, de l'Université Queen's, **Fred Bild**, secrétaire général de la conférence, **John Noble**, du ministère des Affaires extérieures, le colonel **Alain Pelletier**, du ministère de la Défense nationale, et le colonel **Gordon Sharpe**, membre associé (Recherche) à l'Institut, qui représentait lui aussi la Défense nationale.

**Bernard Wood** a présidé la séance qui a surtout porté sur les chances d'accroître la confiance grâce au traité proposé, sur certaines des positions nationales initiales, et sur des questions techniques.

À la fin de février, l'Institut a offert, à l'intention des délégués de pays participants, une réception pour marquer la fin de la conférence sur l'ouverture des espaces aériens. La prochaine ronde de négociations se tiendra à Budapest, et l'on s'attend à ce qu'un traité soit prêt à être signé à l'issue de cette réunion.

«L'avenir du système des Nations-Unies», tel est le titre d'une conférence qui a eu lieu à l'Université d'Ottawa, au début de janvier, sous le patronage de la Fondation Ford et de l'Institut; le groupe organisé comprenait notamment **John Trent**, de l'Université d'Ottawa, et **Gene Lyons**, du Collège

Dartmouth. Un certain nombre d'exposés ont été préparés pour la circonstance; ils ont concerné les politiques de l'O.N.U. et ils seront révisés et publiés sous forme de livre l'an prochain. **Roger Hill**, **Fen Hampson** et **Ron Fisher** de l'Institut ont assisté aux séances. Les nouvelles occasions qui s'offrent à l'O.N.U. de régler des conflits ont constitué un des grands thèmes des discussions, et les pays industrialisés du Nord s'y sont principalement attachés. Des représentants de pays européens, du Canada et des États-Unis étaient présents. Au nombre des représentants soviétiques figuraient les ministres de la Culture et de la Justice ainsi que le Procureur général. Les centiens ont mis l'accent sur l'idée d'un Parlement européen commun et sur les efforts visant à donner une nouvelle signification aux concepts de souveraineté et d'indépendance. Pendant son séjour à Moscou, **M. Wood** s'est entretenu avec **Georgiy Arbatov** et **Sergei Plekhanov**, respectivement directeur et directeur adjoint de l'Institut des études canado-américaines, et avec d'autres membres de cet établissement.

**Tom Weiss**, ancien directeur général de l'*International Peace Academy* à New York et membre du secrétariat des Nations-Unies, a fait une visite d'une semaine à l'Institut en décembre. Il s'est réuni à maintes reprises avec des membres de ce dernier et avec d'autres personnes pour parler du maintien de la paix ainsi que d'autres besoins et perspectives de recherche intéressant l'ONU dans le nouveau climat international.

fin du même mois. Un extrait de la conférence de presse au début de janvier et offert en format relié à la recteur général, **M. Bernard Wood**; s'intitule la revue annuelle du Di-les années 1990», voilà comment le programme d'action canadien pour les années 1990, a été diffusé lors d'une conférence de presse au début de janvier et offert en format relié à la

Le personnel et les amis de l'Institut ont appris dans la stupeur et la tristesse le décès de **Norma Saleem** survenu le 22 janvier 1990 à Ottawa. Mme Saleem était chargée de recherche à l'Institut, au moment de son décès, elle occupait ce poste depuis septembre 1988. Elle détenait un doctorat en études islamiques de l'Université McGill, avait d'arriver à l'IPS, elle travaillait à l'Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, à Montréal. Pendant son séjour à l'IPS, Mme Saleem a été chargée d'une étude importante sur Chypre, et un rapport paraîtra bientôt à ce sujet. Elle venait d'entreprendre un nouveau projet sur le Liban. Nous nous joignons à ses amis pour offrir nos plus sincères condoléances à sa famille, et plus particulièrement à son fils, **Omer**.

## IN MEMORIAM

revue, qui porte sur la sécurité et la politique de défense du Canada apparaît dans la chronique «Note de la Direction», à la page 21.

**Bernard Wood** et **Peter Roberts**, ancien ambassadeur du Canada en URSS, ont assisté à une conférence de haut niveau organisée par l'Union des sociétés soviétiques d'amitié à Moscou, à la fin de janvier. Les discussions ont alors porté sur la dimension humaine de la sécurité et de la coopération en Europe. Des participants de tous les pays européens, du Canada et des États-Unis étaient présents. Au nombre des représentants soviétiques figuraient les ministres de la Culture et de la Justice ainsi que le Procureur général. Les centiens ont mis l'accent sur l'idée d'un Parlement européen commun et sur les efforts visant à donner une nouvelle signification aux concepts de souveraineté et d'indépendance. Pendant son séjour à Moscou, **M. Wood** s'est entretenu avec **Georgiy Arbatov** et **Sergei Plekhanov**, respectivement directeur et directeur adjoint de l'Institut des études canado-américaines, et avec d'autres membres de cet établissement.

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national. Pendant son séjour, **M. Weiss** a rédigé un article de fond qui a paru dans le *Christian Science Monitor* le 3 janvier. Nos lecteurs trouveront un article de **M. Weiss** à la page 8, sur l'évolution des attitudes des superpuissances face à l'ONU.

Plusieurs colloques ont eu lieu à l'Institut au cours de l'hiver. **Robert Jordan**, de l'Université de la Nouvelle-Orléans, s'est penché sur les récents changements apportés à la stratégie maritime des États-Unis. Selon lui, les restrictions budgétaires aux États-Unis influenceront sans doute beaucoup sur la stratégie maritime de déploiement avancé après la fin de la guerre froide. En effet, il est probable que le nombre de forces opérationnelles de porte-avions passera de quinze à douze, ce qui limiterait considérablement cette stratégie. **M. Jordan** a semblé toujours peu intéressée par la limitation des armements navals, laquelle qu'en soit la forme. **Phoebe Marr**, chargée de recherche principale au *Strategic Concepts Development Centre*, à l'Université de la Défense nationale, à Washington (D.C.), a dirigé un atelier sur l'après-Khoméini en Iran. À la mi-février, **Peter Hakim** de l'*Inter-American Dialogue*, à Washington, a présenté un colloque sur les élections au Nicaragua.

**Bernard Wood** et **Marie-France Desjardins** ont participé à une réunion du groupe consultatif sur le désarmement et la limitation des armements, qui était présentée par le ministère des Affaires extérieures. Les délibérations ont surtout porté sur le régime de la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires. Plus tard en janvier, **M. Wood** a prononcé l'alloucation de clôture. Plus tard en janvier, **M. Wood** a prononcé l'alloucation de clôture.

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## EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



relations du Canada avec les pays d'Amérique latine au sein de l'Organisation des États américains (OEA).

### Politique en Indochine

Le 25 janvier, M. Joe Clark a remis à la Chambre des communes un rapport intitulé sur les efforts déployés à l'échelle internationale en vue de résoudre le conflit au Cambodge. Il a précisé que le gouvernement «était actuellement en train de redonner au Cambodge, au Vietnam et au Laos, les trois pays formant l'ancienne Indochine, le droit à l'aide publique au développement». Le Canada est entièrement favorable à la proposition austérienne de créer au Cambodge une infrastructure administrative provisoire sous l'égide des Nations-Unies. Au mois d'octobre, M. Clark a déposé à Hanoï et à Phnom Penh une mission diplomatique que il a chargée de raporter aux gouvernements vietnamiens et cambodgiens l'importance pour eux d'accepter que l'ONU joue un rôle de premier plan dans tout règlement. Le ministre a également félicité le régime d'accepter de participer à des mécanismes de maintien de paix et de transition sous la gouverne des Nations-Unies et, qu'à cette fin, l'on était en train de passer en revue les récentes expériences vécues par le Canada en Namibie et ailleurs dans le monde à ce chapitre.

### Ciels ouverts

Une importante conférence internationale s'est ouverte le 12 février à Ottawa, y participant les ministres des Affaires étrangères des seize pays membres de l'OTAN et des sept pays membres du Pacte de Varsovie. Les participants ont abordé, entre autres questions, une proposition sur des vols de surveillance que des aéronefs non armés des deux alliances effectueraient régulièrement au-dessus des terres loires l'une de l'autre; un tel régime permettrait l'ouverture des espaces aériens au-dessus de l'Amérique du Nord, de l'Europe et de l'Union so-

Le 27 novembre dernier, le premier ministre a rendu compte à la Chambre des communes de son récent voyage en Union soviétique, à l'occasion duquel il s'est notamment entretenu avec le président et le premier ministre soviétiques, MM. Gorbatchev et Ryzhkov. Le ministre canadien des Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a discuté avec son homologue soviétique, M. Eouard Chevardnadze. Au cours de cette visite, les dirigeants ont conclu au total quatorze ententes bilatérales y compris les reconductions) portant, entre autres sujets, sur des questions de relations internationales, sur l'Arctique et sur l'environnement. Le premier ministre a déclaré à M. Gorbatchev qu'il proposerait à ses six collègues du Groupe des sept que, chaque année, le président en exercice se réunisse avec le chef d'État soviétique pour discuter avec lui des idées et des stratégies formées au cours de leur réunion.

M. John Turner, chef du Parti libéral, et M. Bill Blaikie, critique néo-démocratique pour les Affaires étrangères, ont longuement réagi au rapport du premier ministre, reprochant au gouvernement son manque d'audace dans ses relations avec les Soviétiques, particulièrement en ce qui trait à la proposition faite par M. Gorbatchev en octobre 1987 dans son discours de Mourmansk sur la création d'une zone de paix dans l'Arctique.

### Le Panama et l'OEA

Le 20 décembre, le premier ministre a dû affronter à la Chambre des communes des critiques beaucoup plus acerbes, après avoir annoncé l'intervention américaine au Panama. Les députés ont assisté à une altercation entre M. Mulroney et le nouveau chef du NPD, Mme Audrey McLaughlin.

D'autres députés se sont dits inquiets de l'effet possible de la décision du premier ministre sur les

vitique et constituerait une mesure propre à accroître la confiance. Une deuxième série de pourparlers doit se tenir à Budapest plus tard au cours de l'année et déboucher sur la signature d'un traité.

### Comités parlementaires

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur (CPAECB) a continué ses audiences sur les relations du Canada avec l'Union soviétique et l'Europe de l'Est; il a notamment tenu deux sessions le 23 novembre et le 6 décembre sur le problème allemand, une session le 28 novembre sur la politique soviétique dans le tiers-monde et une session le 12 décembre sur le désarmement et l'ouverture des espaces aériens.

Le Comité a également entendu le 23 novembre des représentants de la Conférence des évêques catholiques du Canada et des Jésuites qui venaient d'assister au Salvador aux funérailles de six prêtres jésuites et par des membres des forces armées salvadoriennes. La situation de ce pays a fait l'objet de deux autres séances de discussion au CPAECB les 13 et 14 décembre derniers. À l'occasion de cette dernière réunion, des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations-Unies en Amérique centrale.

Le 7 décembre, le Comité a entendu une série d'experts, dont le président de l'ACDI et le directeur exécutif du SUCO, qui ont abordé certains problèmes d'ajustement structurel — les politiques de stabilisation économique imposées par les institutions financières internationales en vue de relancer les économies des pays endettés du tiers-monde.

Le Comité de la défense (Chambre des communes) tient en ce moment ses audiences sur la souveraineté maritime. Il a déjà entendu le Chef de l'état-major de la Défense, ainsi que des fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures, de l'Environnement, des Pêches et de la Garde côtière canadienne et du Solliciteur général, sans compter des spécialistes venus de l'extérieur. Dans un rapport périodique daté du 20 décembre, le Comité a recom-

mandé l'achat de sous-marins à propulsion conventionnelle et d'aéronefs de reconnaissance maritime.

### En bref

L'ancien chef du NPD, M. Ed Broadbent, a accepté vers la fin du mois de janvier un nouvel emploi en tant que premier président du Centre international des droits de la personne et du développement des institutions et des procédures démocratiques.


Doug Lindores, vice-président principal de l'ACDI, a été nommé conseiller spécial de la ministre des Relations extérieures, relativement à l'Éthiopie et aux pays limitrophes. Tous ces pays sont de nouveau aux prises avec la famine.

Le 23 janvier dernier, pendant la période de questions à la Chambre des Communes, la députée libérale Christine Stewart a demandé au gouvernement si le Canada n'avait pas fermé les yeux sur certaines violations des droits de la personne survenues en Roumanie dans le cadre du vaste projet de construction de cinq réacteurs nucléaires Candu. M. Joe Clark a répondu que les diplomates canadiens cherchaient actuellement à savoir dans quelle mesure on avait vraiment eu recours à des esclaves, quels responsables, le cas échéant, avaient été informés de la situation et quand ils l'auraient été. M. Clark a rejeté l'allégation de Mme Stewart, qui demandait la suspension des travaux de construction jusqu'à ce que l'on en sache plus.

M. Clark a fait valoir qu'il serait «malheureux que le Canada agisse ainsi» au moment précisément où la Roumanie se débat pour instaurer la démocratie et le respect de son économie. □

— GREG WIRICK

## CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



### Le Pacte de Varsovie

Vers la fin de 1989 et au début

de 1990, ce sont les événements

survenus au sein du Pacte de Varso-

vie qui ont constitué l'essentiel de

l'actualité en matière de défense,

à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest. Vers la mi-

janvier, le nouveau gouvernement

tchécoslovaque a entrepris des pour-

parlers avec l'URSS pour parvenir à

un accord sur le retrait, d'ici la fin

de 1990, de toutes les troupes sovi-

liques stationnées sur son territoire.

Les forces de l'URSS sont entrées

en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968, en

même temps que celles des autres

pays du Pacte de Varsovie, pour

réprimer l'insurrection contre le

régime communiste.

Le 4 décembre 1989, les pays du

Pacte de Varsovie, dont l'Union

soviétique, ont profité d'une de leurs

réunions pour condamner l'invasion

de 1968, la qualifiant d'ingérence

indépassable dans les affaires in-

ternes de la Tchécoslovaquie. En

1989, quelque 5 000 soldats sovi-

tiques, 700 chars et 200 avions

ont été retirés de ce pays, lorsque

M. Gorbatchev a décidé de réduire

de 50 000 hommes les effectifs

soviétiques en Europe de l'Est. Il

reste environ 75 000 soldats en

Tchécoslovaquie.

Le 24 janvier, le ministre tchèque

des Affaires étrangères, M. Jiri

Dienstbier a officiellement annoncé

que son pays cesserait de se livrer

au trafic d'armes internationales. La

Tchécoslovaquie est actuellement le

septième exportateur mondial

d'armements.

Quelques jours plus tard, lors

d'un colloque organisé à Vienne par

des représentants militaires du Pacte

de Varsovie et de l'OTAN et con-

sauf, quant à lui, déclaré que le

retrait des troupes soviétiques cons-

tituait une condition *sine qua non*

de l'instauration d'une nouvelle

relation entre la Pologne et l'URSS.

Parallèlement, tous les membres

du Pacte de Varsovie ont indiqué

leur intention de demeurer dans l'al-

liance. À Vienne, des porte-parole

soviétiques ont annoncé que l'orien-

tation politique de l'organisation

militaire changerait bientôt. D'après

ces mêmes sources, l'actuel Comité

consultatif politique va être remplacé

par un conseil militaire plus fidèle-

ment à la nature et les intérêts des

gouvernements membres du Pacte.

Il est encore trop tôt pour savoir

quel sera exactement l'effet du re-

trait des troupes soviétiques sur la

doctrine militaire de Moscou. À

l'occasion du colloque de Vienne,

Mikhail Moïseïev, Chef de l'État-

major général soviétique, a précisé

que l'URSS s'inspirait désormais du

principe de la «suffisance

raisonnable». Sur le plan des forces

conventionnelles, il faut comprendre

par là «des effectifs et des structures

qui permettent aux deux camps de

donner les moyens de lancer une

attaque ou de mener une opération

offensive de grande envergure».

M. Moïseïev a illustré son propos

en citant la décision prise par son

pays de retirer 500 000 hommes,

mais il n'a donné aucune explica-

tion quant à la structure militaire qui

permettrait d'empêcher une opéra-

tion offensive. Par ailleurs, le Chef

de l'État-major général a annoncé

une réduction de 8,2 p. 100 du bud-

get s'agissant de la défense pour

1990, et de 14 p. 100 pour les deux

années suivantes.

### Les deux réactions de l'OTAN

Si l'on en croit un porte-parole,

les planificateurs de l'OTAN, face à

l'accélération du rythme des boule-

versements en Europe de l'Est, se

sont contentés d'observer le change-

ment, sans essayer d'y faire face.

Deux conséquences possibles ont

toutefois été soulignées. Première-

ment, des représentants du gou-

vernement ouest-allemand ont dit

douter fortement que l'on parvienne

à conclure un accord sur le dé-

ploiement d'un successeur au mis-

sile nucléaire à courte portée *Lance*.

Deuxièmement, la capacité des pays

du Pacte de Varsovie de lancer une

attaque surprise a été réévaluée. Au

cours des dernières années, des ser-

vices de renseignements américains

ont avancé que, dans l'hypothèse

d'une attaque soviétique de grande

envergure contre l'Europe occiden-

tale, l'OTAN disposerait d'un plus

quatorze jours pour se préparer.

D'après certaines estimations révi-

sées, ce délai passerait à au

moins un mois, alors que d'autres

sources parlent d'au moins deux

mois. La durée du délai d'avertisse-

ment faible est liée aux dépenses

militaires, surtout pour les États-

Unis, qui ont besoin d'une impor-

tante capacité d'emport instantanée

pour venir rapidement à la rescousse

de leurs troupes stationnées en

Europe.

Le 30 janvier, le président Bush

a finalement présenté au Congrès son

budget de la défense pour l'exercice

1991. Le président Bush veut con-

sacrer 303,3 milliards de dollars US

à la défense, soit une augmentation

par rapport aux 296,3 milliards

de l'exercice 1990, mais une réduc-

tion d'environ 2 p. 100 une fois

l'inflation prise en compte.

Même s'il avait été largement

question d'abandonner ou de réduire

certains grands programmes straté-

giques, Bush a demandé que l'on

poursuive le programme de mo-

dernisation des forces nucléaires

stratégiques. Ce dernier porte no-

tairement sur le bombardier B-2, le

missile de croisière perfectionné,

le nouveau sous-marin d'attaque

*Seawolf*, le missile balistique

*Trident D-5* lancé depuis un sous-

marin, le missile *MX* à têtes multi-

ples et le *Madigan* à tête unique.

Le budget prévoit également

une augmentation du budget de

la Guerre des étoiles.

Comme l'a indiqué le Secrétaire à

la Défense, M. Richard Cheney, le

gouvernement entend réduire le bud-

get de 2 p. 100 par an au cours des

quatre prochaines années. Ces com-

pressions devraient plutôt porter sur

les forces conventionnelles, étant

donné que les événements récents

— DAVID COX

militaire en Europe». □

à offrir et à gagner par sa présence

et nationales, le Canada a beaucoup

pour des raisons purement égoïstes

deux alliances elles-mêmes que

gigantesques et que, «tant pour les

canadiennes sont loin d'être né-

vue militaire toutefois, les forces

suit en disant que, «d'un point de

la-bas. Il a immédiatement pour-

par la simple présence des troupes

que le message politique véhiculé

canadienne était moins importante

que l'étendue de la contribution

nadiennes en Europe. Il a précisé

clair quant à l'avenir des forces ca-

Le général a été un peu moins

l'Atlantique et en Europe.»

ployés dans les secteurs est de

Nord qu'à celles que nous de-

que nous déployons en Amérique du

le rôle militaire du Canada dans

l'OTAN est tout aussi lié aux forces

l'OTAN : «J'aimerais rappeler que

canadien connu de ses alliés de

l'occasion pour évoquer un thème

général de Chastelain à Vienne. Le

doctrines militaires à Vienne. Le

canadienne lors du colloque sur les

de Chastelain, a dirigé la délégation

major de la Défense, le général John

Deuxièmement, le Chef de l'État-

régime des ciels ouverts.

cédés proposés dans le cadre du

pour mettre à l'essai certains pro-

au-dessus du territoire hongrois

effectuée une mission «légitime»

ment, un *Heracles C-130* canadien a

événements historiques. Première-

canadiens a vécu en janvier deux

Le personnel des Forces

### Politique canadienne

Congrès et la Maison-Blanche.

d'après négociations entre le

bases militaires pourrait faire l'objet

tion de Cheney de fermer soixante

commentés, tandis que la proposi-

du Congrès qui ont maintenant

critiques à l'occasion des audiences

risques de susciter énormément de

témoigne le budget de la défense

L'orientation stratégique dont

centrale à 195 000 hommes.

leurs forces respectives en Europe

États-Unis et l'URSS ramènerait

M. George Bush a proposé que les

de la publication de son budget.

fait, le 31 janvier, soit le lendemain

réduire leurs effectifs en Europe. En

ont amené les États-Unis à vouloir

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# À QUAND LES TABLETTES

Sans grande expérience en la matière, les dirigeants soviétiques s'efforcent d'édifier une nouvelle économie qui alliera à la fois les «marchés socialistes» et la prospérité occidentale.

PAR MICHAEL BRYANS

en sortie de la télévision soviétique constituent le résultat inévitable d'un système qui ne fonctionnera jamais mieux. «On ne peut blâmer personne», écrivent-ils, la réglementation avec laquelle les pénuries de toutes sortes se produisent (depuis le savon pour enfants jusqu'aux cartouches-soda, en passant par les wagons de train) montre qu'il existe une loi sous-jacente dans tous ces cas... cette loi se rapporte au système de planification. Dans sa forme actuelle, elle garantit des pénuries constantes.

L'ère Khrouchchevienne a celle des premières réformes de Gorbatchev, en 1985 et 1986, les «disciplines», «l'efficacité» et «l'efficacité» plus forte et mieux et s'ils cessaient de se saouler et de commettre gaffe sur gaffe, il y aurait des bas de nylon et du beurre sur les tablettes des magasins. Les planificateurs se sont donc attelés plus méticuleusement à leur tâche, et les gestionnaires ont exhorté les travailleurs à fournir un plus grand effort, mais ils n'ont pas eu plus de succès que le conducteur klaxonnant éperdument au beau milieu d'un embouteillage monstrueux : la circulation ne bouge pas pour autant, et il s'attire les investissements de autres conducteurs.

À fin de comprendre à quel point le système de planification hiérarchisée et vieux de soixante ans paralysait l'économie de l'URSS, il suffit d'écouter la génération actuelle d'économistes soviétiques. Mikolaï Shmelev compte parmi les plus militants et les plus réfléchis de ces derniers. Shmelev est en soi un véritable produit de la «glasnost», il a passé des années à écrire des romans, car personne d'important ne s'intéressait à multiplier les fonctions de député et d'analyste à l'Institut des études canado-américaines; il se situe à l'«extrême-gauche» des réformistes gorbatcheviens, lesquels forment une sorte d'opposition loyale au groupe des Gorbatchev, Abalkin et Aganbegyan qui essaient de faire redémarrer les moeurs économiques du pays.

Contrairement à bon nombre de ses contemporains, qui manifestent au moins certains égards à l'endroit des services de planification avant de les dénigrer, Shmelev ne fait pas de quartier. Écrivant avec son collègue Vladimir Popov une critique virulente et détaillée sur la structure économique soviétique, il s'explique comment les désastres économiques alimentaient les chroniques

en sortie de la télévision soviétique constituent le résultat inévitable d'un système qui ne fonctionnera jamais mieux. «On ne peut blâmer personne», écrivent-ils, la réglementation avec laquelle les pénuries de toutes sortes se produisent (depuis le savon pour enfants jusqu'aux cartouches-soda, en passant par les wagons de train) montre qu'il existe une loi sous-jacente dans tous ces cas... cette loi se rapporte au système de planification. Dans sa forme actuelle, elle garantit des pénuries constantes.

Le fait que les économistes occidentaux n'ont jamais vraiment su comment leurs propres économies fonctionnaient n'a jamais constitué un obstacle sérieux, étant donné que les experts se sont manifestés bien après que les régimes économiques se fussent mis à tourner. Les économistes se sont principalement contentés d'expliquer les économies et d'interpréter les résultats à leur guise. Les théoriciens se débattaient encore, sans succès, avec des questions telles que celles de savoir comment les consommateurs choisissent entre prendre une semaine de vacances au Club Méd, réduire leur hypochondrie, et faire poser une prophèse orthodoxe à leur enfant; pour tout dire, le cycle des affaires fonctionne, à supposer qu'il en existe un. Le problème de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev tient au fait qu'il ne peut se contenter de décrire les marchés; avec ses collègues, il doit les construire de toutes pièces, mais il ne leur reste plus beaucoup de temps pour accomplir ce tour de force.

Selon Richard Ericson de l'Université Columbia, la crise immédiate s'explique par deux facteurs interdépendants : la pénurie de biens de consommation, et l'énorme quantité de roubles dont les citoyens soviétiques disposent et qu'ils ne peuvent dépenser parce qu'il n'y a rien à acheter.

Les réserves monétaires se situeraient entre 200 et 350 milliards de roubles, mais personne n'en connaît précisément l'ampleur. Voilà qui annonce une inflation prodigieuse des que le gouvernement cessera de réglementer les prix, étape qui est maintenant prévue pour 1993. Une solution qui fait beaucoup d'adeptes consisterait à inonder le marché avec des biens de consommation de manière à absorber toutes ces réserves de roubles. Pareille mesure améliorerait la qualité de vie du citoyen soviétique moyen et procurerait peut-être à M. Gorbatchev une période de paix politique, ce qui permettrait aux réformes plus fondamentales de prendre racine. Mais comme le système national de production ne peut fabriquer ces biens, le pays doit les obtenir à l'étranger avec le peu de devises fortes que le gouvernement a dans ses coffres.

Le dilemme alimente énormément le débat en URSS, et c'est un thème central de discussion entre, d'une part, le gouvernement, dont le programme quinquennal de réformes grève les visages à «stabiliser» la question monétaire avant que le pays opère des changements fondamentaux en 1993, et, d'autre part, les critiques de «gauche» comme Shmelev, qui veulent que le gouvernement passe immédiatement à l'action.

Tous s'entendent pour dire que, très bientôt, les citoyens soviétiques devront pouvoir créer leurs propres biens et services; or, d'après la grande majorité des critères, on est loin de progresser avantagieusement vers un tel état de choses.

À l'heure actuelle, le gouvernement dirigé par M. Gorbatchev, le premier ministre Mikolaï Ryzhkov et un groupe de conseillers économiques, orienterait brutalement l'économie soviétique dans la direction que suivent les économies occidentales. Maintenant, il y a lieu de se demander si le coup de barre sera suffisant. Un ensemble de projets de loi cadres sur l'imposition, la propriété foncière, la propriété civile et l'autonomie locale constitue la clef de voûte du programme; ces documents sont actuellement devant le nouveau parlement et sont censés entrer en vigueur au printemps de 1990.

À l'issue des réformes proposées, la présence de l'État dans le secteur de la production diminue et sensiblement. Cela équivaut à révolutionner les relations politiques et économiques entre les citoyens et l'État et entre les citoyens eux-mêmes. Le gouvernement et le parti ne seraient désormais plus les principaux organisateurs aux fins de la création et de l'échange des biens et des







ment les missions de maintien de la paix et le multilatéralisme, mais aussi le souci réaliste des intérêts et des valeurs occidentales. L'opinion canadienne compte en la matière. Ni neutre ni docile, le Canada est un rempart de l'OTAN et un allié essentiel des États-Unis.

Avec l'amélioration sensible des relations Est-Ouest, les garants de la sécurité internationale se trouvent bel et bien à la croisée des chemins. Les Nations-Unies participent plus activement à la gestion des conflits armés régionaux. Cependant, le soutien de pays comme le Canada et l'aura apportée par le prix Nobel de la paix, en 1988, ne suffisent pas.

Les puissances autres que les États-Unis et l'URSS auront peut-être du mal à l'admettre, mais tout comme l'ONU ne peut se contenter de l'appui des seules superpuissances, elle ne peut plus agir pleinement, ni même fonctionner de manière efficace, sans leur collaboration active. Ainsi que l'a fait remarquer l'ancien Secrétaire général adjoint des Nations-Unies, M. Brian Urquhart, les succès passés de l'ONU se résument à des exercices de contournement discret de la Guerre froide. L'atténuation de la confrontation bipolaire fournit donc aux superpuissances une occasion sans précédent de unir leurs forces.

Ottawa ne devrait pas hésiter à soutenir que ses fondateurs ne l'espèrent, chose que même l'ONU pourrait même fonctionner mieux que ces ténants des détachements les plus féroces de l'Organisation ont comprise ces derniers temps. Comme l'a écrit Jeanne Kirkpatrick, autrefois ambassadrice des États-Unis à l'ONU, il se peut que, grâce à la paix apportée par la fin de la Guerre froide, les Nations-Unies deviennent plus efficaces.

Sur le nombre étouffant de propositions que Moscou a faites concernant le système onusien (plus d'un millier selon un décompte), il y a beaucoup d'idées nouvelles formulées avec le zèle évident d'un nouveau converti. Cependant, on y trouve aussi tout un ensemble de propositions visant à rendre le régime existant des opérations de maintien de la paix « viable », plus actif politiquement et plus axé sur une diplomatie de prévention. À cette fin, les textes préconisent une allocation nationale de fonds, d'équipements et de troupes destinées à un déploiement rapide, l'affectation de soldats de l'ONU aux endroits à risque, un meilleur entraînement et une meilleure gestion, des forces onusiennes de réserve permanente, plus d'autonomie pour le Secrétaire général, des centres de réduction des risques de guerre, et de meilleurs services de logistique et de renseignement. Notons au passage que beaucoup de ces propositions soviétiques ont déjà été lancées par des gouvernements occidentaux dans le passé.

Le moment est propice. Avant le récent accroissement de la 44<sup>e</sup> session, il régalait un rare consensus et la sécurité internationale. En fait, au terme d'un accord avec le vice-ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Vladimir Petrovsky, et M. Thomas Pickering, le président nigérian de l'Assemblée générale, M. Joseph Garba, a déclaré que l'organisation mondiale avait beaucoup gagné au réchauffement des relations entre les superpuissances.

Par le passé, le Canada a souvent servi de « pont » entre l'Est et l'Ouest dans de nombreuses instances. En tant que membre du Conseil de

la sécurité, son rôle devrait être maintenant de continuer à faire progresser le multilatéralisme. En vaincre Washington de l'occasion historique qui s'offre de faire progresser le multilatéralisme. En fin, le monde entier joue l'organisation mondiale pour sa capacité d'atténuer la violence et ne la dénie plus comme étant un lieu où l'on brasse du vent, où l'on s'investit, où l'on parade et où l'on cherche à intimider.

LE KREMLIN A COMMENCÉ À COMPRENDRE les limites de son pouvoir. Il a appris à ses dépens que la force ne peut servir de panacée aux conflits du tiers-monde. Les prétendus bénéficiaires des bases implantées à l'étranger et des expéditions d'armes qui les accompagnent sont, on le sait maintenant, très illusoires. Ces ressources sont nécessaires à la reconstruction intérieure, dont la réussite est en définitive plus essentielle à la sécurité soviétique qu'un empire démesuré dans le tiers-monde. Plus important encore, Moscou s'est aperçu que la compétition avec les États-Unis dans le tiers-monde s'est révélée préjudiciable aux relations bilatérales soviéto-américaines.

Si cette logique va à Moscou, pourquoi n'en trait-il pas de même à Washington ? Puisqu'il vient plus difficile d'exercer un pouvoir effectif dans le tiers-monde, la Maison-Blanche doit-elle aussi comprendre le potentiel vital que constituent les institutions internationales pour le maintien de la paix et la résolution de problèmes transnationaux. Même dans l'euphorie qui fait suite à l'opération « Juste Cause », il est bon de songer au potentiel des Nations-Unies dans une situation comme celle du Panama.

Ne peut-on envisager que le Conseil de sécurité agisse quand un chef d'État, soupçonné de s'adonner au trafic de drogue, viole de manière flagrante les droits de la personne et emploie la force pour annuler des élections au point de perdre virtuellement tout soutien diplomatique dans sa propre région ? Voici la fin des années 1990.

des Nations-Unies plus mordantes pourraient, par exemple, aider à combattre les fléaux que sont les drogues illicites et le terrorisme, assurer la sécurité de petits États, garantir l'achèvement des accords de limitation des armements et surveiller le déroulement d'élections. En outre, la consolidation et l'essor du régime de maintien de la paix pourraient s'étendre aux domaines économiques, sociaux et environnementaux.

L'occasion qui se présente est trop importante pour les intérêts américains et mondiaux pour qu'on la laisse échapper à cause des préjugés de modes d'une poignée de jobys américains. Le gouvernement Bush devrait comprendre que les opérations de maintien de la paix sont un moyen rentable de protéger les intérêts américains dans des régions stratégiques. La contribution américaine à l'opération namibienne s'élève à 175 millions de dollars US, ce qui correspond à 4 p. 100 environ du budget d'exploitation de la 82<sup>e</sup> Division aéroportée (quand elle est inactive), ou au tiers du prix d'achat d'un des bombardiers indectables B-2 si controversés. Les coûts d'exploitation du multilatéralisme paraissent bien minimes face aux frais que les autres solutions nécessiteraient. Il faut qu'un allié aussi fiable qu'Ottawa rappelle ces faits à Washington.

Quelques jours avant que soit approuvé l'envoi du Groupe d'observateurs de l'ONU en Amérique centrale, on assiste à New York à deux autres « premières ». Après quarante-quatre ans de croissance de Moscou au multilatéralisme, constataient aussi un signe encourageant de la part de Washington qui comprend de plus en plus que l'ONU joue un rôle essentiel pour garantir la paix internationale. Il régalait un rare consensus. En fait, au terme d'un accord avec le vice-ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Vladimir Petrovsky, et M. Thomas Pickering, le président nigérian de l'Assemblée générale, M. Joseph Garba, a déclaré que l'organisation mondiale avait beaucoup gagné au réchauffement des relations entre les superpuissances.

Par le passé, le Canada a souvent servi de « pont » entre l'Est et l'Ouest dans de nombreuses instances. En tant que membre du Conseil de la sécurité, son rôle devrait être maintenant de continuer à faire progresser le multilatéralisme. En vaincre Washington de l'occasion historique qui s'offre de faire progresser le multilatéralisme. En fin, le monde entier joue l'organisation mondiale pour sa capacité d'atténuer la violence et ne la dénie plus comme étant un lieu où l'on brasse du vent, où l'on s'investit, où l'on parade et où l'on cherche à intimider.

LE KREMLIN A COMMENCÉ À COMPRENDRE les limites de son pouvoir. Il a appris à ses dépens que la force ne peut servir de panacée aux conflits du tiers-monde. Les prétendus bénéficiaires des bases implantées à l'étranger et des expéditions d'armes qui les accompagnent sont, on le sait maintenant, très illusoires. Ces ressources sont nécessaires à la reconstruction intérieure, dont la réussite est en définitive plus essentielle à la sécurité soviétique qu'un empire démesuré dans le tiers-monde. Plus important encore, Moscou s'est aperçu que la compétition avec les États-Unis dans le tiers-monde s'est révélée préjudiciable aux relations bilatérales soviéto-américaines.

Si cette logique va à Moscou, pourquoi n'en trait-il pas de même à Washington ? Puisqu'il vient plus difficile d'exercer un pouvoir effectif dans le tiers-monde, la Maison-Blanche doit-elle aussi comprendre le potentiel vital que constituent les institutions internationales pour le maintien de la paix et la résolution de problèmes transnationaux. Même dans l'euphorie qui fait suite à l'opération « Juste Cause », il est bon de songer au potentiel des Nations-Unies dans une situation comme celle du Panama.

Ne peut-on envisager que le Conseil de sécurité agisse quand un chef d'État, soupçonné de s'adonner au trafic de drogue, viole de manière flagrante les droits de la personne et emploie la force pour annuler des élections au point de perdre virtuellement tout soutien diplomatique dans sa propre région ? Voici la fin des années 1990.

des Nations-Unies plus mordantes pourraient, par exemple, aider à combattre les fléaux que sont les drogues illicites et le terrorisme, assurer la sécurité de petits États, garantir l'achèvement des accords de limitation des armements et surveiller le déroulement d'élections. En outre, la consolidation et l'essor du régime de maintien de la paix pourraient s'étendre aux domaines économiques, sociaux et environnementaux.

L'occasion qui se présente est trop importante pour les intérêts américains et mondiaux pour qu'on la laisse échapper à cause des préjugés de modes d'une poignée de jobys américains. Le gouvernement Bush devrait comprendre que les opérations de maintien de la paix sont un moyen rentable de protéger les intérêts américains dans des régions stratégiques. La contribution américaine à l'opération namibienne s'élève à 175 millions de dollars US, ce qui correspond à 4 p. 100 environ du budget d'exploitation de la 82<sup>e</sup> Division aéroportée (quand elle est inactive), ou au tiers du prix d'achat d'un des bombardiers indectables B-2 si controversés. Les coûts d'exploitation du multilatéralisme paraissent bien minimes face aux frais que les autres solutions nécessiteraient. Il faut qu'un allié aussi fiable qu'Ottawa rappelle ces faits à Washington.





# RAMENER LES ÉTATS-UNIS AU BERCAIL

*Maintenant que les Soviétiques acceptent volontiers les Nations-Unies et les autres organisations internationales, les États-Unis restent la seule superpuissance à convoquer.*

PAR THOMAS G. WEISS

ES SOVIÉTIQUES, S'ÉCARANT NETTEMENT DE leurs discours et de leurs actions passés, renoucent à leur doctrine antérieure pour devenir des adeptes du multilatéralisme et notamment des mécanismes des Nations-Unies visant à prévenir et à limiter les conflits régionaux. Dans son lexique révisé du tiers-monde, le Kremlin ne parle plus de «soutien aux luttes de libération nationale» mais d'«opérations internationales d'établissement et de maintien de la paix». Quant à l'«interdépendance», thème dominant des sciences sociales occidentales depuis les années 1970, le Kremlin a décidé tout récemment de ne plus la vouer aux gémonies.

La nouvelle politique officielle du Kremlin est sans équivoque. Après des décennies d'indifférence ou d'opposition, l'URSS compte aujourd'hui parmi les plus francs partisans de la gestion des conflits et de leur règlement, tels que les Nations-Unies les recommandent. En outre, elle démontre de plus en plus souvent qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de beaux discours de sa part.

Ainsi, elle a accepté la présence des Nations-Unies en Afghanistan et en Angola, a fait pression sur les Vietnamiens pour qu'ils évacuent le Cambodge et semble disposé à régler aux organisations internationales ses arrières de contributions en devises fortes et à ralentir ses expéditions d'armes.

Cependant, au moment où l'URSS découvrirait les Nations-Unies, les États-Unis commencent à les abandonner. Cette inversion des rôles fut d'autant plus frappante que, sans le ferme soutien politique et financier des Américains, l'organisation mondiale aurait difficilement tenu le coup pendant près de quatre décennies. De bien des façons, l'idée de monter des opérations de maintien de la paix fut une réaction pragmatique de la Maison-Blanche à une époque où la Guerre froide imposait de rejeter l'idée de sécurité collective comme l'expression d'un idéalisme typique des années 1940. Plus particulièrement, les États-Unis payaient habituellement 30 p. 100, au moins, des factures afférentes au maintien de la paix, et parfois beaucoup plus. Sous la présidence de Ronald Reagan, néanmoins, le soutien officiel américain s'est réduit comme une peau de chagrin et, pour finir, Washington est devenu le plus mauvais payeur de l'Organisation. Le multilatéralisme ne s'est pas encore tout à fait remis de cette période de réserve et d'hostilité de la part des États-Unis.

Apparemment, le gouvernement Bush n'estime pas les Nations-Unies aussi défavorables aux intérêts américains que son prédécesseur. Même s'il est trop tôt pour affirmer que le soutien renouveau des États-Unis à l'ONU est entièrement

acquis, les événements des dix-huit derniers mois permettent un optimisme prudent. Washington a cessé de dénigrer à tout va les Nations-Unies en 1988, quand Ronald Reagan lui-même a rangé sa doctrine «d'intervention unilatérale et de soutien aux insurgés anticomunistes pour lui préférer un monde. Depuis lors, l'ONU a monté cinq nouvelles opérations de maintien de la paix (pour le départ d'Afghanistan de l'Armée rouge, le retrait des troupes cubaines d'Angola, l'arrêt du carnage entre l'Irak et l'Iraq, la transition pacifique de la Namibie à l'indépendance, et la contribution à une dépolitisation de l'Amérique centrale), toutes pleinement soutenues par les États-Unis et toutes bénéfiques à leur politique étrangère. De plus, la mise en place, sous l'égide des Nations-Unies, d'une administration intermédiaire au Cambodge et l'envoi sur place d'une force de maintien de la paix nombreuse, comme cela a été proposé récemment, permettraient à Washington d'abandonner une politique qui n'était ni morale ni sensée. En effet, jusqu'à présent, les États-Unis insistent pour que les Khmers rouges fassent partie du gouvernement cambodgien.

Le Canada, fervent partisan et pilier des missions de maintien de la paix, doit faire son possible pour que les États-Unis réintègrent pleinement les institutions multilatérales. Étant donné qu'ils ont renoncé au rôle dominant qu'ils jouaient au siège des Nations-Unies, les États-Unis sont forcés de réagir au vu et face de l'URSS en faveur de l'ONU et à certaines de ses initiatives intéressantes. Il n'est plus question, en effet, de rejeter les propositions soviétiques sous le seul prétexte qu'elles sont soviétiques.

Même si l'on ne connaît pas beaucoup ces organisations ni aux États-Unis ni ailleurs, le Canada ne devrait pas manquer une occasion de soutenir des élections au Nicaragua (ONUVEN), la Mission d'observation de l'ONU pour la vérification des Nations-Unies pour la période de transition (GANUPT) et le Groupe d'observateurs des Nations-Unies pour la période de transition (GANUPT), le Groupe d'as-

sisance des Nations-Unies pour la période de transition (GANUPT) et le Groupe d'observateurs des Nations-Unies en Amérique centrale (ONUCA) servent et ont servi les intérêts américains. Bien que plus de la moitié de la dette des Nations-Unies (un milliard de dollars) soit imputable aux États-Unis et que Washington bran-

disse souvent la menace financière, d'autres pays

assument aussi de grandes responsabilités. Environ 80 000 soldats canadiens (ce qui équivaut aux effectifs actuels des Forces armées canadiennes) ont porté le béret ou le casque bleus sur les 14 000 soldats des Nations-Unies aujourd'hui répartis dans le monde. 1 200 sont canadiens. Avec d'autres pays, le Canada expose la vie de ses soldats et n'est remboursé qu'en partie pour les opérations de maintien de la paix dans le programme bilatéral américain-canadien et dans les discussions de l'OTAN sur les structures militaires appropriées et sur la nature de la répartition des charges. À cause de l'échiquier politique interieur américain (vu, notamment le puissant lobby pro-israélien et l'aile droite du parti républicain qu'il faut régulièrement calmer), le gouvernement Bush devra peut-être mettre un frein au soutien qu'il commence d'accorder aux Nations-Unies. Au mois de décembre, par exemple, Washington a de nouveau émis des doutes sur le financement de l'ONU et sur le multilatéralisme, cette fois à propos d'une éventuelle promotion de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) au sein des Nations-Unies. Le vice-président Quayle a immédiatement donné le ton à la campagne en laissant entendre, avec une certaine malice, que le futur financement américain dépendrait probablement d'une annulation de la résolution de l'Assemblée générale qui, en 1975, avait assimilé le sionisme à une «forme de racisme». Il y a longtemps que tout le monde a oublié cette résolution considérée comme une erreur, mais le Congrès, et impossible si aucune percée diplomatique n'intervient au Moyen-Orient.

À New York et à Washington, les observateurs avertis ont du mal à comprendre cette marche arrière inopportune et, vue du Canada, l'inconsistance américaine semble totalement insoucieuse. Les Canadiens et Canadiennes prennent au sérieux, mais sans exagération, les obligations découlant des traités internationaux en vertu desquelles les États membres doivent payer leurs contributions. Ils posent donc trois questions à leur voisin méridional, à savoir : pourquoi y aurait-il deux poids, deux mesures ? Est-il bien nombreux de l'ONU ou pas ? Les opérations de maintien de la paix ne servent-elles pas ses intérêts ?

Le Canada devrait faire clairement comprendre que ce n'est pas uniquement un instinct de moyenne puissance qui le pousse à appuyer fer-

À Beijing, comme dans les autres villes, la patience est devenue le mot d'ordre silencieux. De plus en plus avide de nouvelles de l'étranger, la

traduire en appui important. Pour passer de la sympathie à l'action, la classe ouvrière de Beijing manquait de syndicats organisés en véritable nuit tragique du 4 juin, les premiers contre-révolutionnaires qui tombèrent sous les balles de Shanghai. La portée et l'exemplarité du

«cause de manifestation» s'était répandue. En usines ont tourné au ralenti; l'absentéisme pour pour applaudir les cortèges étudiants. Partout, les des échafaudages d'immeubles en construction ces lignes a pu observer les ouvriers descendre ces lignes a pu observer les ouvriers descendre sympathie des ouvriers envers les étudiants ne s'est jamais démentie. Plusieurs fois, l'attente de

Pendant tous les événements du printemps, la c'est l'alliance entre intellectuels et ouvriers. villes, et ce qu'il importe d'éviter à tout prix, fonctions. Les grandes craintes viennent des

Sans projet réel, le gouvernement est contraint que l'on n'entrevoit même pas. difficulté réelle qu'il y a à se rendre sur une rive ping. La formule décrit le désarroi et traduit la

Plus rien ne semble convaincre les Chinois de dans une crise qu'il ne soit plus «gérer». ture demeure, le gouvernement est désormais pris

Face à ce déferlement de revendications, le régime se replie sur la ligne dure et s'évertue à colmater les brèches et les fissures. Mais la Chine est aujourd'hui un pays plus poreux qu'autrefois.

revendique maintenant tout et tout de suite. Très fiers d'être Chinois, ils proclament bien haut leur amour de la patrie et ils l'ont écrit, sous de multiples styles, d'idéogrammes, des milliers de fois sur la place Tian anmen. Pour eux, l'Empire est humilié par la prospérité de Taiwan et de Hong Kong. Ils souhaitent maintenant que la Chine soit respectée pour sa prospérité économique et ils sont désormais convaincus que toutes les recettes de la réussite doivent être puisées en Occident.

Ce type de discours est révélateur d'un désespérance des Chinois se posent à propos de leur avenir. La principale d'entre elles demeure bien entendu l'orientation que pourrait prendre un changement radical de la société chinoise. Si l'on fait excep-

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de l'Armée populaire de libération au service du d'une bonne partie de la population. La légende À l'évidence, l'armée a perdu la confiance

population urbaine chinoise cherche à tromper son désespoir en échafaudant mille scénarios. Les plus audacieux attendent le retour de Zhao Ziyang, les plus réalistes observent avec attention les manœuvres politiques du comité central et n'entrevoient à court terme qu'une mainmise de plus en plus étroite de l'armée sur la société chinoise. Le Président de la République, Yan

L. *Beijing Information*, 31 juillet 1989, p.19  
2. *Le Devoir*, 11 janvier 1990, p.1

En levant symboiquement la loi martiale, dont le sens véritable a plus de portée en Occident qu'en Chine, le Premier ministre Li Peng a bien décrit l'ordre répressif rétabli : «La vie et la production fonctionnent en bon ordre, l'approvisionnement est suffisant, le peuple vit et travaille dans la paix et le contentement».

L'Empire figure très haut dans la liste des sujets de conversation les plus interdits. Partout ce pendant, quelques interlocuteurs finissent par admettre qu'il n'y aurait pas d'autre solution que celle de la décentralisation des pouvoirs. Seule une régionalisation, couplée à des hypothèses constitutionnelles aux dimensions plus réduites et facilitant l'apprentissage progressif des libertés publiques. Cette vision d'une Chine écartelée paraît encore peu pertinente et se justifie surtout comme l'aboutissement d'un processus lent et certainement douloureux.

Chine a poussé à la centralisation; concevoir un mouvement inverse provoque des haut-le-cœur. L'obstacle incontournable dans la conception d'options politiques. Sociologues et analystes politiques chinois cherchent en vain des réponses à l'existence de leurs frontières, et ils doivent admettre très vite qu'aucun régime n'a dans l'histoire du monde, à assurer la direction politique et démocratique d'un État de plus d'un milliard d'habitants. Toute l'histoire de la Chine a poussé à la centralisation; concevoir un mouvement inverse provoque des haut-le-cœur.

Une forme de société plus «libérale» celui de recourir encore à la force pour imposer qu'un nouveau régime n'aurait d'autre choix que nombreux sont les interlocuteurs convaincus étrange les structures profondément féodales, et tique. Quarante ans de communisme ont à peine en place d'un système véritablement démocratique occidentale, personne ne conçoit la mise



# LES MALAISES DE L'INCERTITUDE

Les Chinois et les Chinoises se posent de sérieuses questions à propos de leur avenir. Est-il possible de mettre en place un système central vraiment démocratique dans un Etat de plus d'un milliard d'habitants ?

PAR HEPING \*

À DÉFAUT D'ÊTRE EN MESURE DE L'OCCUPER tout à fait, les autorités chinoises cherchent à rendre flou et anecdotique le mouvement étudiant du printemps 1989.

Comme toujours, la façon avec laquelle on s'emploie à minimiser l'ampleur des turbulences sociales est révélatrice de ce que l'on veut vraiment dissimuler.

Réduite aux dimensions d'un cas de légitime défense, la chronologie des événements devient caricaturale et la version officielle perd toute crédibilité. Selon *Beijing Information*, seuls «des émeutiers sanguinaires» ont été tués... «il n'y a eu aucun mort parmi les étudiants, y compris ceux qui ont été forcés de se retirer».

Cette justification appartient au langage classique de la propagande; elle traduit, en plus, une bienveillante toute confiance destinée à récupérer les intellectuels, c'est-à-dire ceux qui dominent la vague populaire et qui n'ont pas compris qu'ils étaient manœuvrés par «la poignée des contre-révolutionnaires» eux-mêmes manipulés de l'extérieur.

On pourrait à l'infini débattre des versions controversées décrivant le déclenchement de la répression au soir du 3 juin. Cela n'ajouterait toutefois qu'un peu plus de confusion dans une tragédie déjà trop pénible. Il reste qu'une reconnaissance exacte de la séquence des événements aidera un jour les historiens à répondre aux questions que de nombreux Chinois se posent. Tout d'abord, dans quelle mesure le mouvement pro-démocratique fut-il planifié ? Qui a incité, dès le mois d'avril, les étudiants de l'Université Beida à prendre comme prétexte la mort de l'ancien Secrétaire général Hu Yaobang pour exprimer bruyamment sur la place Tian'anmen leurs aspirations démocratiques ? Pourquoi le gouvernement chinois a-t-il systématiquement provoqué les étudiants en les accusant d'être des contre-révolutionnaires ?

Chen Yizhi, proche collaborateur de Zhao Ziyang (ancien Secrétaire général du Parti communiste chinois), déclarait au journal *Le Monde* : «Au début, les étudiants étaient calmes... mais chaque fois qu'ils voulaient évacuer la place Tian'anmen, Li Peng (l'actuel Premier ministre) les a provoqués. Ainsi, après le discours de Zhao, Li Peng (l'actuel Premier ministre) a confirmé le désarroi du gouvernement, les hésitations de ses membres et l'existence de sourdes luttes politiques qui finissent par venir à bout des plus modérés, avec la démission du Secrétaire général du Parti, Zhao Ziyang.

La ligne de pensée qui a triomphé est bien celle qui s'accroche à la certitude que tout peut être réformé sans être trop transformé. Depuis

le 4 mai, presque tous avaient repris les cours. Li Peng convoqua alors les responsables des universités pour dénoncer les atteintes à l'ordre public et le caractère illégal des manifestations. Peu après, les étudiants redescendaient dans la rue et entamaient leur grève de la faim...»

En Chine, personne ne croit à la spontanéité des mouvements politiques, et les scénarios les plus machiavéliques alimentent parfois les conversations. Phénomène normal bien sûr dans une société close où toutes les personnes «bien informées» tirent leurs renseignements de rumeurs rarement vérifiables. Il est difficile toutefois de ne pas considérer comme plausible l'intention «planifiée» du gouvernement chinois d'aboutir à une punition exemplaire. Bien qu'habitée au châtiment suprême, la société chinoise (et surtout la population de Beijing) ne s'attendait pas à une répression aussi brutale. Jusqu'aux dernières heures, personne n'y a cru vraiment. Alors que les premiers coups de feu avaient été tirés, certains étudiants dans les permanences de l'Université Beida refusaient de croire les informations qui venaient de leur parvenir, tellement, avaient certains, «on avait foi en la droiture de notre armée».

«On tue le poulet pour effrayer le singe» est aujourd'hui la formule chinoise la plus répandue pour expliquer comment une intervention militaire débridée avait pour but de servir d'exemple. Bien sûr, cette peur fut exacerbée par la conjoncture internationale et par les bouleversements dans les pays socialistes, mais ses motifs profonds furent et demeurent essentiellement chinois.

Le régime a cru qu'il était en péril, car il n'avait pas anticipé l'ampleur du mouvement. Depuis 1949, les intellectuels font partie des marginaux. Ils sont aisément persécutés, et il est aussi assez facile de les «recupérer». Une fois encore on avait minimisé, au mois d'avril, l'influence que pouvait avoir certains milliers d'étudiants rassemblés sur la place Tian'anmen. Puis, le mouvement a basculé; en dénonçant surtout les difficultés économiques, il s'est rallié la population de Beijing. Le multiples témoignages ont confirmé le désarroi du gouvernement, les hésitations de ses membres et l'existence de sourdes luttes politiques qui finissent par venir à bout des plus modérés, avec la démission du Secrétaire général du Parti, Zhao Ziyang.

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\* Pseudonyme utilisé par un observateur attentif de la scène politique chinoise.

1979, le gouvernement chinois cultive avec soin de multiples paradoxes en affirmant, par exemple, qu'il est possible d'ouvrir le pays tout en le fermant, ou encore en favorisant le développement d'une économie de marché dans une structure politique marxiste-léniniste. La formule «Un pays, deux systèmes» permet de rassurer les étrangers et légitime en Chine toutes les contraventions les plus visibles. Ainsi, l'écoute de *Voice of America* maintenant encore n'est permise que pour apprendre l'anglais.

LA COMPARAISON DES CONTRAIRES APPARTIENT À une logique traditionnallement chinoise; dans la conjoncture actuelle, cette logique se perpétue à Beijing dans la pensée des dirigeants trop confiants d'être les héritiers d'une révolution réussie et d'un nationalisme profondément interiorisé. Le constatation que la Chine est un grand pays qui est parvenu à assurer à sa population de plus d'un milliard d'habitants un niveau de vie plus enviable que celui des autres pays du tiers-monde. Et il est vrai qu'en Chine, on ne fait pas la queue pour obtenir un morceau de savon ou une paire de chausures. La Chine est certainement le pays le plus prospère de tous les pays en développement; elle a praité pendant longtemps un «communisme primitif» dont plusieurs Etats du tiers-monde voulaient s'inspirer. À l'époque de Mao, le refrain le plus répandu était en effet : «Ce qu'il y a à manger, tout le monde le mange, les habits qu'il y a, tout le monde les met, le travail à faire, tout le monde le fait.»

Et puis le nationalisme, ou plutôt le chauvinisme de la population chinoise — celui surtout de la majorité Han bien sûr — est un facteur fondamental sur lequel le Parti et le gouvernement comptent pour se faire pardonner leurs erreurs. Si bien qu'il n'est jamais très difficile de recourir à la xénophobie traditionnelle chinoise et de rendre l'extérieur coupable de maux internes. À maintes reprises, nous avons pu constater que même certains opposants les plus durs au régime actuel demeuraient très perméables à l'argument de l'ennemi extérieur.

Toutes ces certitudes sur lesquelles s'appuie le gouvernement chinois ont cependant été ébranlées par le changement radical d'une grande partie de la jeunesse chinoise. Environ 37 p. 100 de la population a moins de vingt ans. Et, dans les villes surtout, cette génération d'enfants uniques

démographique à l'échelle de la planète et la dette du tiers-monde, passent avant la crainte d'une agression soviétique. D'ailleurs, le recul de la menace soviétique dans leur classement s'est confirmé quelques mois plus tard à l'occasion d'une étude approfondie de l'opinion de la population canadienne sur la paix et la sécurité, réalisée par l'Institut canadien pour la

et la sécurité internationale.

Il ressort de ces sondages que les questions qui préoccupent le plus la

population canadienne aujourd'hui sont des problèmes à long terme sur lesquels aucun pays n'a de prise réelle, des problèmes qui ne peuvent être réglés en cinq ans (voire moins) passés au pouvoir et que les gouvernements tendent à égliser quand ils répartissent leurs deniers. La dégradation de l'environnement, des changements climatiques de-sastreux pour la planète, la pauvreté grandissante au milieu d'une opulence croissante, les déséquilibres inacceptables de l'économie internationale, la croissance démographique accélérée, voilà les véritables menaces pesant sur l'avenir! De plus en plus de gens en ont d'ailleurs pris conscience. Ces pro-

blèmes peuvent menacer non seulement la sécurité immédiate de nombreux pays, mais aussi la viabilité et la continuité de la société humaine dans les prochaines décennies. De fait, ils ont déjà plongé certains pays dans des crises alors que pour d'autres, la crise surviendra sans doute dans dix ou vingt ans. Mais dans tous les pays, les signes avant-coureurs de très graves difficultés à venir, plus pénibles à résoudre qu'aucune par le passé, sont déjà bien visibles.

Les nouveaux défis qui se présentent à nous, citoyens de ce monde, offrent au Canada de grandes occasions d'agir de manière constructive et de donner l'exemple. Il serait idiot de laisser croire que nous pouvons sauver le monde, mais nous sommes certes à même de mettre de l'ordre chez nous pour être prêts à relever ces défis de demain, et chercher des alliances avec qui nous pourrions faire avancer le monde utilement dans un sens qui donnera espoir dans l'avenir du genre humain.

Le présent livre a pour objectif de stimuler l'intérêt du public pour ces questions importantes et de l'inciter à en débattre, ce qui conduira, nous


et de l'inciter à en débattre, ce qui conduira, nous

examinons sont fondamentalement liées à l'évolution des rapports du Canada avec le reste du monde. Nous nous sommes laissés dépasser par beaucoup des changements survenus et nous ne sommes guère préparés aux

répercussions qu'ils auront probablement pour nous. Premièrement, l'économie : Bien que le Canada soit l'un des pays les plus riches et les plus fortunés de la planète, et qu'il appartienne au club des sept pays industriels les plus puissants, sa dépendance traditionnelle vis-à-vis de l'exportation de matières premières ne l'a pas particulièrement bien préparé aux changements radicaux qui surviennent aujourd'hui dans le monde. Il ne fait aucun doute que tout ce que le Canada pourrait souhaiter faire pour offrir à tous ses habitants (et à ceux d'autres pays) une vie convenable et productive, mais il sait que la route qu'il attend sera semée de beaucoup plus d'embûches qu'elle ne l'a été ces quarante dernières années.

Malgré ces problèmes, si nous voulons donner l'exemple en contribuant à mettre un terme aux changements climatiques causés par l'être humain, il nous faudra renforcer l'idée désormais acceptée selon laquelle l'économie nationale doit devenir indéfiniment durable pour ce qui a trait à l'environnement et aux ressources. Cela signifie tout d'abord qu'il y aura des décisions très difficiles, voire révolutionnaires, à prendre quant à l'utilisation des énergies.

Deuxièmement, notre propre société : Nous ne pouvons rester indifférents à l'évolution de la situation démographique. D'immenses groupes de population, exclus du partage des biens terrestres, sont prêts à agir, et nous ne pouvons refuser de le voir. Nous allons continuer de recevoir des immigrants du tiers-monde en nombres croissants, et nous nous interrogeons trop



peu sur les conséquences probables de la nouvelle composition de notre population pour nos rapports sociaux. Mais s'il est possible (comme certains Canadiens et Canadiennes le croient) que ce pays benî puisse donner un exemple de tolérance et de vie convenable au reste du monde, nous ne pouvons certes nous attendre que cet exemple prenne corps sans un effort immense et de l'ingéniosité et sans que les différents peuples se tendent

volontairement la main. Troisièmement, l'environnement : Plus personne ne peut prétendre ne pas voir les signaux d'alarme que donne l'environnement. Nous appartenons à cette partie de la population mondiale qui abuse des ressources planétaires; il nous échoit donc au premier chef de trouver un moyen de résoudre les problèmes causés par la pollution atmosphérique, la pollution de l'eau, la dégradation des sols, le pillage des océans et les changements atmosphériques qui provoqueront presque à coup sûr des modifications climatiques mondiales. Nous devons commencer à réfléchir à ces questions. En tant que nation, nous devons devenir plus économes et moins gaspilleurs dans notre mode de vie et, bientôt, il nous faudra investir dans des mesures qui apporteront un début de solution à ces problèmes.

Mais ce n'est pas tout : nous devons aider plus que nous ne le faisons aujourd'hui la majorité défavorisée de la planète à mieux vivre et voir à ce qu'elle cesse de détruire l'environnement dont elle dépend. Puisque nous sommes responsables de cet état de choses dans une certaine mesure, à cause de nos politiques économiques et commerciales, il nous incombe de prendre des mesures correctrices qui concrétiseront ce que les membres de la Commission Brundtland ont appelé «une politique étrangère pour l'environnement».

Par exemple, on a admis maintenant que la population mondiale ne peut se permettre de laisser détruire les forêts tropicales humides. Néanmoins, il ne suffit pas d'exhorter les pays tropicaux à ne pas défricher leurs forêts. Il faudra transférer des ressources énormes vers ces pays pauvres pour qu'ils réussissent à sauver leurs forêts. Mais nos gouvernements ne semblent pas disposés à prendre les engagements nécessaires.

Nous devons nous résoudre à considérer le monde en étant conscients de notre interdépendance écologique, et à penser à une survie à long terme

plutôt qu'à une prospérité à court terme. Quatrièmement, la sphère internationale : Le Canada qui, géographiquement, fait le pont entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, a particulièrement intérêt à aider à maintenir la paix mondiale, à réduire la menace d'une guerre nucléaire et à assujettir les nouvelles technologies militaires à la surveillance internationale. Beaucoup pensent que le Canada parviendrait plus sûrement à ses fins s'il dépensait ses quelques milliards de réserve à renforcer cer des organisations mondiales, à consolider la coopération internationale et à favoriser le maintien de la paix aux quatre coins de la planète, au lieu de se laisser oublier par la tâche manifestement impossible qui consiste à protéger ses côtes intérieures contre des adversaires imaginaires. La paix, l'ordre et un bon gouvernement ont toujours été des idéaux canadiens, et nous devrions faire en sorte qu'ils deviennent aussi ceux du monde. □

1. La présente liste a été compilée par Eric Sölem, du Centre d'analyse et de recherche opérationnelle, à la Direction de l'analyse stratégique, au ministère de la Défense nationale, dans son intéressant monographie intitulée Futures of the International Systems, Rapport du projet n° 143, mai 1980, p.49.

2. Theodore Gordon, cité par Eric M. Kohn, à la page deux de sa monographie intitulée Planning in the Modern State, n° 139 dans la série de rapports de projet publiés par le Centre d'analyse et de recherche opérationnelle du ministère de la Défense nationale.

3. Ce sont les conclusions auxquelles sont arrivés 450 experts internationaux réunis à Ottawa en 1986 pour examiner les progrès réalisés en faveur d'un développement durable au cours des cinq années qui ont suivi la publication du rapport sur la Stratégie mondiale de la conservation en 1981. À leur avis, il ne s'était produit pratiquement aucun changement perceptible dans les attitudes des gouvernements.



Par conséquent, et bien que le principe sur lequel repose le présent ouvrage soit plus largement accepté qu'il ne l'était, nous pensons que le besoin de clarifier les faits et les choix est au moins aussi grand.

Nos dirigeants ont commencé à changer d'attitude parce qu'à la fin des années 1980, un consensus s'est dessiné entre les scientifiques, les prévisionnistes et l'ensemble de la population quant à la gravité de la menace grandissante qui pèse sur l'environnement. Depuis que le Club de Rome a publié sa fameuse étude intitulée *Quelles limites?* dans les années 1960, beaucoup d'analystes se sont mis au travail et, aujourd'hui, tous les principaux prévisionnistes et futurologues sont d'accord sur une demi-douzaine de points, à savoir :

1. La population et les biens matériels ne peuvent continuer de croître à l'infini sur une planète limitée.
2. Il n'existe pas, à l'heure actuelle, d'informations complètes et fiables sur la capacité de la planète d'absorber tous les déchets résultant des exigences humaines.


3. À moins de changer, les politiques actuelles contribueront à creuser le fossé entre riches et pauvres, entre nations et entre individus. Même une aide étrangère considérablement accrue ne peut réparer ces injustices d'envergure planétaire.
4. La technologie, si elle peut aider, n'apporte pas la réponse à elle seule.
5. L'interdépendance entre les peuples et les pays est bien plus grande qu'on ne le pense généralement. Autrement dit, des actions engagées dans une partie du monde de risques courent de s'avérer lourdes de conséquences ailleurs.
6. C'est pourquoi il vaut mieux modifier les politiques le plus tôt possible.

D'APRÈS CETTE LISTE, NOUS DEVRONS APPORTER DE profonds changements dans l'ordre actuel des choses, si nous voulons survivre. Cela ne signifie pas que les gouvernements les feront effectivement, puisque jusqu'à présent, les personnes qui se sont préoccupées de telles questions n'ont exercé aucune influence réelle sur la plupart des gouvernements. Si le Canada est typique, il s'agit surtout de fonctionnaires et de chercheurs enthousiastes qui travaillent d'arrache-pied à leurs études dans des bureaux isolés, se réunissent en colloques pour discuter de leurs idées et produisent une nuée de documents clartoyants qui pénètrent rarement la carapace dont se bardent les ministres.

Ces grandes idées qui font l'unanimité des futurologues ne sont guère rassurantes quand on les applique aux principaux problèmes du monde contemporain. Elles évoquent un avenir rempli de dangers et de pénuries, et une qualité de vie allant de mal en pis. Ainsi, voici cinq thèmes dont un futurologue dit qu'ils définiront le monde en 1994, soit d'ici cinq ans à peine : la capacité de mener une guerre nucléaire, de graves pénuries alimentaires, la détérioration de la biosphère, la répartition déséquilibrée des richesses, des pénuries matérielles et énergétiques.

L'implicite dans ces thèmes, c'est que le développement économique et l'environnement sont les deux revers d'une même médaille, qu'ils sont tous deux d'une importance cruciale pour notre avenir, et que nous devons trouver un moyen de rendre tout développement futur viable tant du point de vue environnemental que de celui des ressources.

Ce concept de développement durable est apparu sur le marché mondial des idées en 1981 avec la publication d'un rapport novateur sous le titre *quelque peu bureaucratique de Stratégie mondiale de la conservation* (S.M.C.). Ce document, élaboré par le Programme des Nations-Unies pour l'environnement (P.N.U.E.), l'Union internationale pour la conservation de la nature et de ses ressources et le *World Wildlife Fund*, tentait de répondre aux objections que la Conférence de Stockholm sur l'environnement humain (1972) avait suscitées de la part des habitants de pays du tiers-monde, en sommant l'alarme à propos de l'état de la planète.



À l'époque, on pensait surtout que le développement économique était en train de détruire une bonne partie du monde naturel, ce qui sous-entendait notamment que le développement était nuisible. Assez naturellement, les populations des pays qui désespéraient de se développer ont rejeté la thèse tout entière et y ont même vu une sorte de complot des Blancs pour empêcher les peuples indigènes de la Terre de se faire un place au soleil. La S.M.C fut la première étude à s'attaquer à ce problème. On y déclarait que la capacité de la planète de nourrir sa population est réduite à cause d'une mauvaise gestion des terres, d'une dilapidation des ressources, et de la pauvreté qui, dans beaucoup d'endroits, contraint les populations à détruire les ressources dont elles ont besoin si elles veulent survivre. Pour les auteurs de la Stratégie, d'accord avec les environnementalistes, il est essentiel de maintenir les cycles écologiques et les milieux vivants de la Terre ainsi que de préserver sa diversité génétique.

Mais ils allaient encore plus loin : ils recommandaient que les activités humaines continuèrent de dépendre de l'utilisation d'autres espèces et écosystèmes tout entiers. Ils ajoutaient, toutefois, qu'il allait falloir exploiter la nature d'une façon durable à très long terme.

Le PROGRAMME DES NATIONS-UNIES POUR l'environnement (P.N.U.E.) a donc pris le développement durable pour devise, ce que beaucoup ont accepté depuis lors, en théorie du moins. En affirmant que développement et environnement sont tous deux essentiels à la perpétuation de la vie humaine sur terre, le document a exorcisé l'analyse environnementale de la situation humaine dans les pays en développement. Mis au défi, nombre de gouvernements se sont officiellement engagés à repenser leur politique dans le sens de la durabilité et ils ont promis de définir et d'appliquer des stratégies nationales de préservation qui guideraient l'ensemble de leur développement futur.

Malheureusement, ces promesses n'ont pas donné grand-chose de concret. Un après l'autre, les ministres des Finances des divers pays et leurs conseillers économiques ont oublié l'environnement. Ils ont fait fi des avertissements formulés par les conseillers scientifiques et les penseurs veillant sur la planète. Les ministres de l'Environnement, relégués au second plan, ont un peu de poids dans les conseils d'État.

Pourtant, tous les pronostics ne sont pas mauvais. Si les dirigeants se sont mis à parler d'environnement dans leurs discours, c'est pour une bonne raison : le changement d'attitude chez les populations du monde occidental a été spectaculaire. De nombreux sondages d'opinion donnent à penser que, dans différents pays, l'électorat considère que les vrais dangers menaçant la sécurité ne sont plus les mêmes qu'avant. À en juger par ces sondages, les Canadiens et Canadiennes semblent prêts à agir pour écarter les menaces à long terme qui se dessinent aujourd'hui (même s'ils ne sont peut-être pas encore disposés à payer plus d'impôts afin de financer des actions en ce sens). Aux jours de la Guerre froide, l'Union soviétique faisait figure d'ennemi d'après un sondage réalisé en 1987 par l'Institut Nord-Sud d'Ottawa, une dent. Cette perception s'est grandement estompée, à telle enseigne que, d'après un sondage réalisé en 1987 par l'Institut Nord-Sud d'Ottawa, une même que les caprices de la politique étrangère américaine, la croissance



années, cependant, presque partout des gens ont commencé à s'apercevoir qu'en modifiant à long terme les éléments essentiels à la vie, l'être humain risquait de compromettre tout autant, sinon plus, sa sécurité qu'avec les guerres nucléaires et les agressions militaires contre lesquelles il s'est tellement appliqué à se défendre.

La vitesse à laquelle cette nouvelle perception s'est répandue illustre remarquablement le pouvoir de nos nouveaux systèmes de communications de masse. La publication, en 1987, du rapport de la Commission mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement, présentée à l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies et connu sous le nom de Rapport Brundtland, a conféré un caractère pressant à des craintes et à des préoccupations qui s'amplifiaient depuis plusieurs décennies. En deux ans, ce rapport s'est vendu à des dizaines de millions d'exemplaires dans des dizaines de pays et en plus grand nombre au Canada que nulle part ailleurs. Rapidement, donc, les dirigeants politiques ont dû prêter attention au phénomène.

Depuis que l'environnement est devenu un sujet d'inquiétude général à la fin des années soixante, la plupart des responsables politiques ont agi comme si les questions environnementales (propres de l'eau et de l'air, fertilité des sols, forêts vigoureuses) venaient au second plan derrière la véritable gestion des affaires de leur pays.

En fait, c'est à cause de ce manque d'empressement politique que l'idée du débat public tout autour de la planète :

la présidence Bush a reconnu l'existence des précipitations acides et s'est décidé à faire c'est à l'initiative de Margaret Thatcher qu'une conférence internationale sur les changements climatiques a eu lieu;

la Communauté économique européenne a adopté une politique agricole orientée vers la production de l'environnement, afin d'encourager l'emploi d'engrais organiques et de décourager l'agriculture industrielle;

le gouvernement hollandais aura été le premier au monde à être renversé sur une question environnementale. En effet, la coalition gouvernementale s'est désagrégée à cause d'un nouveau plan d'une portée considérable qui visait à résoudre la crise environnementale du pays en une

génération en doublant le budget affecté à l'environnement pendant les quatre prochaines années; les partis écologistes comptent plus de députés au Parlement européen et, en Angleterre, ils ont remporté 15 p. 100 des suffrages aux dernières


élections; au Canada, le gouvernement a abandonné son programme de réarmement, ce qui lui permet de se consacrer davantage à des problèmes à plus long terme; un groupe de gens d'affaires américains a même décerné un prix à Brian Mulroney pour les discours vibrants qu'il a prononcés au cours de conférences

internationales. Que tant de nos dirigeants se soient ralliés à la cause après des décennies d'indifférence montre toute l'importance que les questions environnementales ont désormais acquise. Pour ne pas se laisser dépasser par les événements, ces dirigeants ont dû, ne serait-ce que pour la forme, déclarer que l'espèce humaine ne pourra connaître un avenir sans inquiéter que si nous parvenons à bâtir une économie planétaire viable du point de vue

environnemental. Les paroles ne suffisent évidemment pas. Ainsi, un groupe de militants canadiens a suivi le premier ministre, M. Brian Mulroney, à une conférence en Europe et l'a fortement critiqué devant la presse mondiale, car ses discours vigoureux en faveur de politiques viables n'ont pas empêché son gouvernement de réduire les fonds alloués à des projets sur les énergies de remplacement tout en investissant sans compter dans des mégaprojets énergétiques lourds de conséquences d'ordre climatique. Les écologistes ont

accusé le premier ministre de parler plus qu'il n'agit. Nous avons ainsi découvert qu'en tant que dirigeants politiques à souscrire au concept de viabilité, et les forcer à prendre les mesures qui s'imposent, il y a un fossé énorme. Il ne fait aucun doute qu'il faudra des années de débat politique féroce et de lutte acharnée avant d'obtenir la

création d'un nouvel ordre international.



cours d'eau; la Tchécoslovaquie, la Chine ou la Pologne, avec leur pollution atmosphérique effroyable; le Brésil, avec sa destruction insensée de la forêt tropicale humide; les États-Unis ou le Canada qui, au nom du progrès industriel, deviennent des poisons mortels dans les campagnes et les océans. Voilà ce que nous ont servi quotidiennement nos médias qui, ayant découvert le fion, semblaient se complaire à nous faire tous mourir de peur.

À PEINE CE DÉLUGE D'INFORMATIONS EFFRAYANTES AVAIT-IL COMMENCÉ À

se présenter que les gouvernements canadiens se sentaient que le Rapport Brundtland et celle du

gouvernement canadien, telle qu'elle se révélait dans le Livre blanc sur la Défense (1987), était tout simplement trop flagrant pour qu'on en

restât là. Le Rapport Brundtland laissait entendre qu'il fallait envisager l'avenir différemment et

redistribuer sans tarder les ressources pour élever les défis inédits que nous pose notre sécurité à long terme, en tant que Canadiens

et citoyens du monde. En revanche, le Livre blanc sur la Défense passait cette nouvelle dimension sous le silence le plus complet pour ne présenter aux Canadiens et Canadiennes qu'un programme de réarmement reposant sur ce qui s'est avéré (et toujours plus de jour en jour) être des clichés dépassés datant de la

Croquer froide.

l'important, selon nous, de stimuler le débat public sur ces problèmes vi-

taux. C'est alors que quelque chose d'intéressant s'est produit. En effet, le hasard a voulu qu'entre la conception du présent

ouvrage et sa parution dix-huit mois plus tard, un profond changement s'opéra dans la façon dont la population percevait les choses. Peut-être

exceptionnellement chaud de 1988 y fut-il pour quelque chose? Tandis que les climatologues du monde entier se réunissaient à Toronto pour examiner la perspective de changements climatiques à long terme provoqués par l'être humain, changements à cause de siècles de grandes villes risquant d'être submergées, des forêts décimées et la superficie des terres agricoles réduite (premier, la vie humaine de se trouver révolutionnée), la ville souffrait sous les plus hautes températures enregistrées depuis des années, et beaucoup de gens éprouvaient des difficultés à respirer dans l'air lourd et

chargé de smog. Un a appris que les cinq années les plus chaudes qu'aient connues le Canada depuis un siècle qu'on relève les températures se trouvaient dans les années 1980. Il apparaissait donc que les changements climatiques n'étaient plus une perspective lointaine, mais qu'ils étaient déjà bien présents dans nos vies.

À ce moment-là, nous avons eu un aperçu de la destruction épouvantable de l'environnement à l'Amérique du Sud et de l'Afrique. Pendant un temps, ce fut apparemment à qui trouverait le pays le plus irresponsable : l'Éthiopie, avec son érosion massive des sols; l'Union soviétique, avec ses détournements désastreux de



# LE CANADA DANS UN MONDE EN CRISE PASSONS À L'ACTION

L'Institut pour la paix et la sécurité a produit un ouvrage fondamental sur les façons dont le Canada pourrait affronter les principales menaces qui pèseront sur la sécurité internationale dans l'avenir.

PAR BOYCE RICHARDSON

**V**ERS LA FIN DES ANNÉES 1980, partout, les gens ont commencé à prendre conscience de l'ampleur des changements qui attendent la société humaine. Bien entendu, le monde change constamment, mais souvent, cela s'est fait graduellement, si discrètement que la plupart des gens ne s'en sont même pas aperçus. L'être des communications par satellite a mis fin à cette époque. Des pays qui, il y a dix ans seulement, étaient à l'abri des grandes influences intellectuelles et technologiques qui balayaient la majeure partie de la planète reconnaissent aujourd'hui qu'ils ne peuvent plus se calfeutrer derrière leurs frontières. Pendant ce temps, dans des parties mieux loties du monde, l'idée bien ancrée et reconfortante d'une supériorité économique et technologique s'effrite inexorablement.

Vers la fin des années 1980, cela s'est traduit dans certains pays par des soulèvements cataclysmiques, comme les manifestations de Beijing, en 1989, au cours desquelles des millions de personnes ont réclamé des changements. En Europe de l'Est, de vieux liens se sont défaits avec une rapidité qui laisse encore incrédules les gens habitués aux rigidités de la Guerre froide. Et dans les pays qui goûtaient depuis longtemps les fruits de l'industrie et de la technologie, essentiellement ceux d'Amérique du Nord et d'Europe, de vieilles certitudes quant au caractère inéluctable et permanent du progrès se sont érodées.

Les raisons en sont nombreuses. Les populations sont plus promptes que jamais à exploser. Notre monde est de plus en plus bipolarisé, avec d'un côté les riches et de l'autre, les pauvres. Il est de plus en plus évident que notre planète ne peut supporter l'insouciance des méthodes actuelles de développement économique. Même les gens qui semblent tout avoir, parmi lesquels les Canadiens, se sont mis à douter fortement de l'avenir.

Ce qui est nouveau dans les années 1980, c'est que ces perceptions du besoin de grands changements dans l'évolution du monde sont aussi devenues celles de la masse des gens; du moins, elles sont maintenant monnaie courante dans le dialogue politique de pays dont les idéologies et les régimes varient considérablement.

Presque partout, les dirigeants reconnaissent aujourd'hui la nécessité d'un changement, et ceux qui ne l'admettent pas (la vieille garde qui a rêssé si brutalement son autorité en Chine en est le parfait symbole) font figure de dinosaures sociaux en voie d'extinction.

On doit cette évolution des perceptions à deux grandes influences : d'abord, à l'apaisement rapide des tensions Est-Ouest qui dominent les relations internationales depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et ensuite, à la prise de conscience grandissante du fait que les ressources de notre Terre sont limitées et que les êtres humains les pillent à un rythme et d'une manière qui ne peuvent continuer sans causer des dommages irréparables aux cycles dont toute forme de vie dépend.

Ensemble, ces deux influences ont amené les populations du globe à revoir leur définition de la sécurité. La sécurité a toujours été une préoccupation essentielle des groupes humains; depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, nous avons dépensé tant et plus pour défendre contre ce que nous percevions comme des menaces militaires pesant sur notre sécurité. Ces toutes dernières



Nicholas Viorco

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Boyce Richardson est écrivain et cinéaste pigiste à Ottawa; il est l'auteur du livre intitulé *Strangers Devour the Land*; Heping est le pseudonyme d'un observateur qui suit de près la scène politique chinoise; Thomas G. Weiss est expert invité principal à l'*Institute for International Studies* (Brown University), et il était autrefois directeur général de l'*International Peace Academy* à New York; Heribert Adam est professeur de sociologie à l'Université Simon Fraser; avec Kogila Moodley, il a publié l'ouvrage intitulé *South Africa Without Apartheid*; Michael Bryans est rédacteur en chef du magazine *Paix et Sécurité*; Vera Murray est correspondante du magazine *L'Actualité* à Moscou.





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## LE CANADA DANS UN MONDE EN CRISE

PAR BOYCE RICHARDSON



Dans le présent numéro :

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Beijing s'efforce  
de faire oublier le  
printemps 1989.

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Les rapports  
ambivalents de  
Washington avec  
l'ONU.

Heribert Adam  
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monde.

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La politique de  
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## WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

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SECURITY IN THE 1990s

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Madeleine Poulin

## Editor:

Michael Bryans

## Associate Editors:

Hélène Samson, Eva Bild

## French Review Editor:

Jocelyn Coulon

## Circulation:

Bradley Feasey

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Samantha Hayward

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
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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



"I would see a return to fairly classical forms of interstate politics." So goes one speculation about the future of Europe from **Denis Stairs**, one of five participants in a roundtable featured as this issue's cover story. We should all devoutly hope Dr. Stairs is wrong about Europe, for if not, we are in for a very unhappy and tragic time.

The key word here is "classical." The classical way in which the states and peoples of Europe have interacted in the last few centuries is through the almost constant preparation for, frequent threats of, and – often enough to kill upwards of seventy million people in

the last three hundred years – calculated use of war to achieve some goal or other. War, and all the social, political, and technological apparatus that went with it, has been an indispensable part of the daily conduct of business between the "civilized" nations of Europe.

The question we need to ask ourselves now, as we run to keep up with the rush of events there, is not "will the new Germany return to its former nasty ways?" or even "can Gorbachev steer his country around the various disasters that loom ahead?" Rather, it is how will states react to the inevitable ethnic rivalries, nationalist resurgences, and economic disasters.

Joining in common celebration of the demise of the Berlin Wall is one thing, but the real test will arrive in something like the year 2002, when whatever security system has evolved must deal all at the same time with – to cite only one of the possible combinations – a resurgent Germany, a nervous France, a civil-war torn Yugoslavia and a sullen, bankrupt post-Gorbachev Russia. The problems and provocations are classical, but the collective and individual responses of nations and their governments (including our own) must not be.

The three authors of our other feature stories this time are warily optimistic about the parts of the world they examine. **Christoph Bertram** contends that a security system less "tidy" and formalized than the one Europeans have become used to, is entirely appropriate, now that threats to security are more diffuse; **Peter Hakim** regards the new American ambivalence towards involvement in Central America as, on the whole, a positive development; and **Heribert Adam** sees the surprising lack of bitterness and desire for revenge among South Africa's *apartheid* victims as the precondition for a peaceful resolution there.

Beginning with this issue, *Peace&Security* will be printed on acid-free, non-chemically bleached paper. We are assured by our suppliers that this paper-making process is more benign environmentally than conventional methods, and results in a paper with superior archival qualities. Following comments from some of our readers, we have also ceased the practice of mailing the magazine in plastic protective envelopes.

– Michael Bryans

## Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada K1R 7X7  
Telephone (613) 990-1593  
Fax (613) 563-0894

## NEW INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS IN THE LAST QUARTER

**Cyprus – Visions for the Future: A Summary of Conference and Workshop Proceedings**, by François Lafrenière and Robert Mitchell, Working Paper 21, March 1990, 106 pages.

**The United Nations and International Security**, Factsheet 12, March 1990.

**The Geneva Talks: A New Nuclear Relationship Between the Superpowers?** by David Cox, Background Paper 32, May 1990, 8 pages.

*Other Publications From the Institute include:*  
*Occasional Papers • Background Papers • Working Papers • Factsheets • Annual Guide to Canadian Policies • Director's Annual Review • Institute's Annual Report.*

**Economic Sanctions and South Africa**, by Steven Godfrey, Background Paper 33, June 1990, 8 pages.

**Climate Change, Global Security and International Governance: A Summary of Conference Proceedings** by Kenneth Bush, June 1990.

*Use the tear-out card in this issue to obtain more information about these and other Institute publications.*

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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES HAVE grabbed the spotlight of public attention. Paradoxically, compared with all the doom and gloom scenarios, there has been little discussion, in *practical policy terms*, of what can or should be done to address environmental problems within the context of global security and international governance. In response to this lacuna, the Institute for Peace and Security assembled a wide range of decision makers and experts, on 11 and 12 April, to discuss the nature of climate change, its ecological, social, political and economic consequences, and possible policy responses at regional, national and international levels.

There was surprisingly little disagreement over the basic processes of climate change. It will have a range of geophysical impacts, including fluctuations in temperature, amount and distribution of precipitation, storm frequency and intensity, and sea level. But the focus of the conference was not on the geophysical effects of climate change, rather, it was on the political, social and economic impact.

An underlying theme was that the world's economy and ecology are now totally interlocked – as Jim MacNeill of the Institute for Research on Public Policy put it, “until death do them part.” This raises fundamental questions about how policy decisions are taken and their implications for ecological sustainability. While the scope for possible action may grow with technological opportunity, it is very clear that the obstacles to sustainability are not technical or even economic; they are social, institutional and political.

The 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere sponsored by the Canadian Government, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, called for a twenty percent reduction in global carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2005. Since then, worldwide emissions have *increased* by approximately six percent and it is unlikely that the target will be met. As Christopher Flavin of the Worldwatch Institute pointed out in Ottawa, the twenty percent goal was formulated on the basis of what the climate needs, not what politicians are ready to accept or what economists are willing to put into their econometric models.

Because energy use is the principal source of atmospheric contaminants, energy is the crux of the problem. An effective response to climate change, Flavin argued, must recognize two things: energy politics is “hardball politics” dominated by a handful of powerful in-

# FACING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE

*An international conference  
in Ottawa considers fundamental questions  
of policy and action.*

dustries and interests; and economic soundness and market forces must determine appropriate technologies and strategies. There was a strong call at the conference for a political and economic “levelling of the playing field,” with subsidies attracting particular attention. According to Jim MacNeill, “When you compare \$40 to 50 billion a year [for subsidies] in North America to promote fossil fuels, and hence to promote acid rain and global warming, with the decreasing amounts spent on efficiency and alternatives to fossil fuels, it is simply no contest. Acid rain and global warming win hands down.”

THE ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC SOUNDNESS and market forces should guide environmental policy raised the contentious question of whether subsidies should be a policy instrument at all and, if so, what activities should be subsidized. MacNeill reflected a view shared by a number of delegates when he argued that subsidies which encourage ecologically damaging production processes, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agricultural subsidies which reinforce the overuse of soils, wood, and other ecological capital, should be either scrapped or made ecologically sensitive. Others believed that levelling required they all be stopped. The debate, though animated, was inconclusive.

Peter Gleick of the Pacific Institute focussed the concern of the conference on the relationship between climate change and international conflict. He pointed out that while the impact of climate change will be fairly evenly distributed among nations, the ability to *respond and adapt* will not. This disparity is already causing some tension between rich and poor nations and may become a principal source of conflict in the years to come. Where international tensions already exist, the impact of climate change on resource availability and quality may trigger conflicts – the 1967 war in the Middle East was caused partly by the question of access to the Jordan River.

The further deterioration of North-South relations was another prominent theme of the conference. As the Cold War wanes, a new

type of power logic may be emerging. Some developing countries have clearly come to the conclusion that the second wave of environmental concern now sweeping Europe, North America and Japan, provides them with political leverage, however negative, that they can use in bargaining for action on those things that concern them most. The fact of rapid population growth and increasing energy use by developing countries means that the industrial-

ized world cannot deal with global warming on its own. Rich nations will, therefore, have to begin to address issues of crucial importance to developing countries such as resource and financial burden sharing, debt reduction, trade access, and preferential access to intellectual property and technology, if meaningful international agreements on the environment are to be implemented.

THE POLICY CHOICES AND ACTION WE TAKE NOW, will be played out in future climate trends. There is an inescapable lag between societal action and global ecological reaction due to the sheer momentum of climate change. Concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to build up in the atmosphere and the longer it takes to deal with them, the more the climate will change.

The broad scope of the ideas for action and policy options discussed in Ottawa is suggested by the following short-list: creation of new indices of climate change and sustainable development to measure progress in tackling environmental problems; the use of remote sensing as an early warning mechanism; an expanded role for international institutions; the creation of a world atmospheric trust fund; a tax on carbon emissions; use of regulatory and economic incentives; and reforestation. It was clear to most participants that the costs of action are far less than the costs of inaction.

The final statement of the 1988 Toronto conference warned: “Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences may be second only to a global nuclear war.” The response to the “unintended experiment” of climate change, if it is to be effective, must be rooted in the social, economic, and political as well as the scientific. □

– KENNETH BUSH

*Kenneth Bush is a doctoral student in the Government Department of Cornell University and is preparing the final report of the recent CIIPS conference, Climate Change, Global Security and International Governance. The report will be available from the Institute in June.*

# LYING LOW IN CENTRAL AMERICA

*Washington's new ambivalence towards Central America may offer the best hope yet for ending the region's devastating wars.*

BY PETER HAKIM

GEORGE BUSH AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE EVERY REASON TO BE pleased by developments in Central America. Since they took office, the two main objectives of US policy in the region have been accomplished: Sandinista rule has ended in Nicaragua and the Noriega regime has been deposed in Panama.

The situation has also brightened for the United States in El Salvador. Washington had seemed trapped in a no-win position, supporting a government and military that could not defeat a Marxist guerrilla insurgency, was unwilling to negotiate seriously, and was unable to control gross abuses of human rights. Now, for the first time, meaningful negotiations are underway to resolve that country's ten-year-old civil war.

What is remarkable is that these developments occurred during a period when US policy in Central America was marked by ambiguity and uncertainty. The Bush administration's approach to the region lacked both the direction and fervour of its predecessor. The Reagan White House was driven by ideological zeal and strong purpose. In Central America, Reagan charted a course with a clear set of goals and pursued them doggedly; he refused to be sidetracked either by the divisions his policies provoked in Congress or among the American people, or by the conflicts they produced with Latin American nations.

BUSH DID NOT COME TO POWER WITH STRONG IDEOLOGICAL MOORINGS. From the outset, his administration was motivated mainly by domestic political calculations and by a risk-avoiding pragmatism. The Bush White House saw itself engaged in a delicate balancing act of placating a distrustful Republican right while averting conflict with the Democrat-controlled Congress. The resulting policies were far more responsive not only to the political dynamics of Washington, but also to events in Central America. Latin Americans were, by and large, more comfortable with the Bush approach, a change that opened opportunities for US-Latin American cooperation in dealing with Central America's problems.

Ironically, the only opportunity that the US government grasped was in Panama. In May 1989, after General Noriega had annulled the country's presidential elections and sent his thugs into the streets to reassert his authority, the US turned to the Organization of American States (OAS) to deal with the Panama crisis. That effort at regional diplomacy, however, was half-hearted at best.

The OAS mission was given an impossibly short deadline of three months, and Washington's interpretation of its mandate was at odds with that of the Latin Americans. The White House wanted the OAS to pursue the same objective that its own policies had failed to accomplish — Noriega's departure from power. For their part, Latin American governments felt the task of the OAS was to negotiate a settlement among the different political groups in Panama. Since Washington was unwilling to accept any arrangement that involved a continuing role for Noriega, the OAS mission was effectively deprived of any real authority to conduct negotiations; Noriega quickly understood the situation and simply declined to deal with the OAS at all.

By September, the failure of the OAS initiative left Washington with

few options, it could either accept Noriega's continued rule or use force to oust him. The first option became increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of a rising clamour from Congress for tougher action. Criticism from both Republicans and Democrats intensified dramatically in October following Bush's decision not to support dissident Panamanian officers in their abortive coup attempt.

On 19 December, the US launched its invasion, and in defiance of Murphy's law, virtually everything that could have gone wrong went right. Troops rapidly subdued the Panamanian Defense Forces without an unacceptable loss of lives; the Panamanian population overwhelmingly supported the US action; the Panamanian opposition leaders, widely credited with having won last May's elections, agreed to take charge of a new government; and there was no serious guerrilla resistance. None of this was a sure bet; luck played a crucial role in the "success" of the invasion.

Absent from the administration's calculations, however, was any concern about the impact of the invasion in Latin America or regard for established international norms against armed intervention. Virtually every country of the region resented and condemned the US action. Moreover, it soon became clear that Washington had not prepared very effectively for the post-invasion period, and committed a series of blunders, starting with the inauguration of President Endara on a US military base, thereby compromising his claim to legitimate authority. It took the administration two months to lift its economic sanctions against Panama, and even now the economy remains in a shambles; promised US aid was delayed for many months; and US troops are still required to keep order.

None of this diminished enthusiasm back in the US, where the intervention provided an enormous boost to the Bush administration. The sniping in Washington about Bush's excessive caution and his ineffectiveness as a world leader was silenced. He and his administration gained stature and authority, and greater flexibility to deal with other international problems. However, Bush never sought to test his newly-acquired credibility elsewhere in the region. Ambiguity continued to characterize his policies elsewhere in the region.

NOWHERE WAS THAT AMBIGUITY BETTER ILLUSTRATED THAN IN NICARAGUA. For eight years, the Reagan White House had relentlessly supported the Contras in their war against the Sandinista government. More than any other initiative the Contra war came to symbolize what the Reagan presidency was about: the US had to reassert its power and influence, to stop further communist gains in this Hemisphere or elsewhere, and to challenge those gains wherever possible. While Congressional opposition brought a halt to military aid to the Contras a year before Reagan left office, he sustained to the end his campaign to revive that aid.

Bush chose not to engage in further battle with Congress over the Contras, but neither did he give up on the Contras as an instrument of US policy. Instead, the Bush administration, two months after it took office, hammered out a bipartisan agreement with congressional leaders. The Contras would be kept intact with another year of so-called humanitarian aid, but would continue to be denied military supplies.



Following the signing of the bipartisan accord, Secretary of State James Baker declared that the military approach in Nicaragua had failed and announced that the US would pursue a political settlement through a policy of carrots and sticks. The promised carrots and sticks never appeared. The administration infuriated avid Contra supporters when it failed to prevent or even denounce an August 1989 agreement among the five Central American presidents that called for the dismantling of the Contras by early December. The administration subsequently declined to veto a UN Security Council decision to establish a mission to oversee the Contra demobilization.

At the same time, however, Washington passed over several opportunities to disentangle itself from the Contra policy. The Sandinistas, for example, committed themselves in December 1989 to provide conditions for the Contras to return home. The US never sought to test that commitment by encouraging the Contra forces to attempt to repatriate. Instead, US aid flowed unabated to the Contras in Honduras giving them every incentive to remain where they were.

Washington was holding its breath, waiting to see whether the Sandinistas would keep their pledge to hold fair presidential elections. The hope was that the opposition, headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, would come out on top – providing an instant solution to the United States' Nicaraguan problem. The opposition did win. But, at the time, it was not the only, or even the most probable, scenario. Prior to the elections, the US was silent on whether it would respect a fair electoral victory by the Sandinistas and whether it would lift economic sanctions and help demobilize the Contras following such an outcome. Now those questions are all moot.

Only after the Sandinistas were clearly moving to turn over power did the US administration turn significant attention to Central America's most brutal conflict – the civil war in El Salvador. In late March, Secretary Baker began efforts to develop a bipartisan accord with Congress on future US policy in El Salvador. The timing was propitious – a few weeks before UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar announced that the warring parties – the government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas – had agreed to UN-mediated peace negotiations.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAD INHERITED A POLICY IN EL SALVADOR that was more nuanced than that for Nicaragua. The Reagan White House, after some prodding from Congress, also addressed the political dimensions of the struggle. The US sought to build a political centre in El Salvador; to encourage economic and social reforms; and to bring an end to widespread political killings and other abuses of human rights.

By the end of Reagan's term these aims were largely frustrated – and the situation further deteriorated through 1989. The US-backed centrist government of José Napoleon Duarte was swept out of office by the right-wing Arena party in presidential elections; human rights violations escalated; and the war with the guerrillas became even more violent.

The extent of the deterioration was starkly revealed by the massive offensive launched by the guerrillas in October. With simultaneous attacks in all of El Salvador's major cities the FMLN demonstrated a military capacity that exceeded even the best-informed estimates. Salvador's armed forces could no longer credibly claim that the guerrilla army was close to defeat. Whatever illusions the Salvadoran government had that it could control the military were shattered, first, by the army's brutal response to the FMLN offensive – which was carried out without real consultation with the elected authorities – and then by the cold-blooded murder of six Jesuit priests by members of a US-trained battalion.

What became clear was that US policy had been based on a patently false assumption – that steady, albeit slow, progress was being made. The war was stalemated; Salvadoran politics were not becoming more democratic or more decent. After ten years of deep involvement and an investment of more than \$4 billion, US policy had been stymied.

FROM THE START, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SEEMED LESS INTENT THAN its predecessor on defeating the FMLN guerrillas militarily and more open to the alternative of a negotiated settlement. But the administration never really decided which of these objectives it was pursuing, nor defined a strategy which could have achieved either one. The White House never tried to use its leverage – \$400 million a year in aid – to induce the Salvadoran government and army to work toward a settlement.

Since the guerrilla offensive and the slaying of the Jesuits, the administration and Congress have squabbled over aid to El Salvador. James Baker's efforts to seek an accord with Congress may have coincided

with de Cuellar's initiative to get the parties to the negotiating table, but it was mainly a response to growing Congressional resistance to sustaining past Salvadoran aid levels. It may finally have become clear that the US cannot indefinitely provide large-scale assistance to a Salvadoran government and army that can neither defeat the guerrillas nor control systematic human rights abuses by its partners.


The evolution of US policy since Bush took office has, in part, reflected the declining significance of Central America in Washington's calculations. With the warming of East-West relations and the crumbling of communist regimes, the

struggle against revolutionary Marxism and Soviet bloc influence in the Americas has lost most of its relevance.

Not wishing to confront the political risks of an activist policy in a region of secondary importance, the Bush administration sought to lower the profile of Central America in US politics, and, in the process, also lowered the US profile in Central America. As Washington diminished its engagement in the region, aside from Panama, the space widened for other actors: the Central American presidents, other Latin American leaders, the UN, and the OAS. All have played critical roles in Nicaragua and they are now weighing in in El Salvador. The crucial lesson may be that US foreign policy interests can, at least in some circumstances, be best advanced by reducing the intensity of the United States' direct involvement and by relying more on multilateral approaches.

Central America's problems are, of course, still a long way from resolution. The current negotiations in El Salvador may prove as fruitless as previous rounds of talks. The new US-backed governments of Nicaragua and Panama face immense problems: neither country has any tradition of democratic rule; their governing institutions are weak; and authority in the two countries is wielded by fragile coalitions bound together mainly by their opposition to the regimes they replaced. Moreover, both their economies are moribund and desperately poor. Two other countries in the region, Guatemala and Honduras, are in comparably difficult straits.

It is early – and unseemly – for the Bush administration to celebrate success in Central America. The countries and people of the region, after all, are still suffering the devastating effects of more than a decade of warfare in which the US was heavily involved. Even if, and when, the wars are halted, Central America's tragedy will not be over. Only if the US and the rest of the international community are willing to invest as much in economic reconstruction as they have in armed conflict does the region have a chance for a better future. □



Michael McPherson

# EUROPE'S MESSY REBIRTH

*Any new security system for Europe won't be nearly as tidy as the old one – maybe it doesn't need to be.*

BY CHRISTOPH BERTRAM

**I**T NEVER RAINS BUT IT POURS. FOR FORTY years, history seemed frozen in the Soviet empire and in East-West relations, and gradually West Europeans, including West Germans, came to arrange themselves in a reality which seemed enduring. Now that reality is past. As a result, old certainties have been replaced by new uncertainties.

The very base on which Europe's security system has rested for so long is crumbling: Eastern Europe, no longer a security bulwark for the Soviet Union, is becoming a large buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe. Soviet forces, against whom NATO was set up, are leaving their garrisons in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are being thinned out in Poland and East Germany. The threat which NATO deterred so effectively for so long, is shrinking, if not disappearing.

What will this mean for the future? In March, East Germans voted for a new government whose only mandate is to negotiate the quick unification of Germany. By this summer, economic and monetary union will be established between the two German states, and West Germany's Deutschmark the currency for the whole area. In three to four years – some think even earlier – there will not be two, but only one, united German state.

The Soviet Union has ceased to be the dominant power in the centre of Europe. That seems irreversible. Of course, nobody can predict the future of President Gorbachev and the fate of the reform for which he stands. The task of turning the Soviet Union into a modern state capable of integration into the international political and economic system is gigantic – the present reform leadership may well stumble and possibly fail in the effort. But even if it is replaced by a more traditional regime, the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe cannot be reversed.

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will not accept a return of Soviet troops and of Soviet tutelage, nor will East Germans forgo unity with the West. Any Soviet attempt to reconquer the lost terrain by military force would risk what East and West have so care-

fully avoided ever since the beginning of the nuclear age – direct, and possibly escalatory, military confrontation.

So much is clear. But now the uncertainties – and the chances – are coming to the fore. How should the unification of Germany be accommodated in the existing European security structure? How should the structure itself evolve, given the virtual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the need, for the Atlantic Alliance and its NATO-organization, to adjust to the fundamental changes in Europe? What threats, if any, are left to justify military alliances at all?

To date, nobody knows the answers to these questions. For some time the need to develop new structures of security in Europe has been widely recognized. But when the East European revolution occurred, none of them had been brought to conclusion. So there is no firm framework in which to integrate the united Germany, the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe or the two alliance systems.

THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHETHER SUCH A framework is at all necessary. Have the military threats not disappeared, is détente not finally accomplished? Unfortunately, the prospects for a Europe of peace and harmony remain clouded. Europe – despite the cuts in military forces that have been made and those that are currently, with good chances of success, being negotiated between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Vienna – remains, in military personnel and fire-power, the most militarized region in the world, and nuclear weapons are in the arsenals of the major powers.

It is true that the old concept of threat which the West has so long feared and which Soviet sources now confirm was part of Soviet military planning – namely a massive, rapidly moving attack by Warsaw Pact forces against the West – appears today like a faded cartoon in an old journal. But the potential for conflict remains: ethnic strife in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans; crises in the nearby Third World – the Middle East and Northern Africa – spreading to Europe. And there is, of course, one traditional problem of

European security which the unification of Germany has revived in the minds of many of her neighbours: whether a strong Germany might once again challenge European stability.

Europe's ability to address these problems would depend not least on the organization that can be found to deal with the new threats as effectively as the Atlantic Alliance has dealt with the old ones. Today, a number of candidates are available, but none of them fully qualify.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) seems best placed to provide a framework which spans East and West Europe. It includes practically all European states, plus the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada. However, it is a traditional international conference: every state has one vote, and no agreement or common action is possible unless there is total consensus among them. The CSCE is thus like the United Nations without a Security Council, a Secretary General, or even a Secretariat.

While it is increasingly accepted that the CSCE's organizational structure should be strengthened – for example, by regular meetings of foreign ministers, the establishment of a crisis centre, or an organization for arms control verification – it is essentially a framework for negotiation, communication and dialogue, not for decisive common action in case of crisis. The idea that one day the two existing alliance systems could merge under its roof, therefore, still belongs more to the realm of wishful thinking than to reality.

CAN THE TWO ALLIANCE SYSTEMS DO THE JOB, by serving on the one hand the security needs of their respective members and, on the other, by building a joint network of arms control and crisis cooperation? Again, the answer is negative, for the simple reason that the Warsaw Pact has ceased, for all practical purposes, to operate as a cohesive body. Instead, the Atlantic Pact with NATO is today the only functioning security structure left in Europe.

Nor does the demise of the Warsaw Pact imply that of NATO. In contrast to the Eastern bloc which was essentially a transmission belt



for Soviet military control and coordination, NATO has always been an alliance of sovereign states, addressing not only military but policy issues as well, including the coordination of arms control matters. There never was symmetry between these two European defence organizations.

Of course, NATO cannot now conduct business as usual. It has to devise new ways of military integration with much reduced forces; rethink and reformulate its nuclear strategy; and give greater emphasis than it has so far to the management of arms control. And it will also have to address the question whether in a world in which military forces are much less central to international politics, other forms and fora for transatlantic cooperation need to be found.

Yet NATO will remain essentially a Western club. The idea, advanced by some, that Eastern states, too, should join, overlooks three fundamental realities: that Eastern European countries, having just regained their independence, have no desire to submit themselves to any new supranational organization; that Western countries continue to want to discuss security and defence issues among themselves; and that the Soviet Union would regard any eastward territorial extension of NATO as thoroughly unacceptable.

THEN THERE IS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY of twelve Western European nations. This Common Market, which will become significantly more integrated with the internal market planned for 1992, is already exerting a major attraction on all other European countries, those of Eastern Europe included. Because of its wealth and its large market, the European Community has recently been pushed into a new kind of security role. For Eastern European economies, access to this market would offer the hope of economic recovery and hence could be highly useful in strengthening political stability in these countries. Perhaps some day, Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia might qualify for full membership. In the meantime, association agreements between the Community and East European states have to be arranged.

So the European Community indeed has a stabilizing role and hence a responsibility for security, but that does not qualify it to become a European system of security. Perhaps, as part of the reform in Western defence cooperation, the Community might increasingly offer a framework for a genuinely Western European defence integration, and there are many in Europe who feel that this would be desirable. But it is difficult to imagine that it could evolve into a wider European security forum.

Finally, there is the ongoing process of East-West arms control negotiations in Europe. The



talks in Vienna which started in March 1989 are moving ahead at a speed unheard of for such negotiations: a first agreement, setting equal ceilings of military forces for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, is probable by the autumn; a follow-up on deeper reductions is already being prepared. Of course, these talks do not amount to a formal organization. But some organizational structure is nevertheless likely to emerge in the proposed regime for verification and confidence-building measures.

SO THERE IS NO ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY system yet – or is there? Perhaps the apparent tidiness of the European security structure during the past forty years has misled us into thinking that a security system must, in order to function, be equally tidy and thoroughly organized. But remember, in the past this was the consequence of extraordinary circumstances – a threat assumed to be precise in a world assumed to be bipolar. Now that the threats have become more amorphous and the world pluralistic, a looser, less formalized and less comprehensive security system would seem to be quite appropriate. Indeed, Europe's new security system consists of the four elements outlined above, each imperfect in itself, but complementing the others.

All-European security matters can, therefore, be addressed in their political aspects in a

strengthened CSCE, in their military aspects in quasi-permanent arms control negotiations to which crisis centres and a verification regime would be added. All-European economic prosperity – and with it political stability – will be served by the European Community through its internal integration and a series of association agreements with other European states, possibly one day even including the Soviet Union. And Western political and military coordination would continue in a revamped NATO, with the European Community increasingly becoming the framework for close West European defence integration.

THE FIRST TEST OF WHETHER THIS MULTI-LAYER system can actually work will lie in the way German unification is embedded in an international consensus. Significantly, the diplomatic timetable already envisages stages which correspond to the various elements of the new European security system listed above. There will be a series of meetings between the two German states and the World War II allies (the US, the USSR, France and Britain) to seek agreement on the future alliance status of a united Germany and the expiration of still existing Four-Power rights in Germany.\*

The Vienna negotiations on arms control will have to define the size and equipment of military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, including a ceiling for future German forces (the large majority of Europeans, East and West, and of Germans want the united Germany to be a member of NATO). In late 1990, a CSCE Conference will bring together all thirty-five member states of the organization to review and settle the matter. In the meantime, the European Community will have to provide some prospect of closer association to other European states.

Of course, timetables can get tangled; things can go wrong. There are many actors who could throw spanners into the diplomatic works. Imagine for a moment that the Soviet Union might try to respond to Baltic aspirations to independence with military repression. Hence the task of getting from here to there is by no means an easy one. But if there is reason, nevertheless, for confidence that the unification of Germany can be achieved in a cooperative atmosphere, it is due to the existence today of the different elements of East-West, European and Atlantic cooperation. The layers are in place; now they have to be fitted together. □

\*In accordance with treaties signed in 1945, the four victorious powers of the Second World War – France, the UK, the US and the USSR – retain rights and responsibilities with respect to Germany. Any changes of the status quo of the three political organisms – the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Berlin – formed on the territory of Germany delineated by the Potsdam resolutions (1945) require the agreement of all four powers.

# ON RACISTS, TERRORISTS AND PEACEMAKERS

*The apparently amiable beginning to negotiations over South Africa's future presents yet more dangerous and intricate new puzzles to solve.*

BY HERIBERT ADAM

**T**HE EXTRAORDINARY SPECTACLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT and the African National Congress (ANC) amicably socializing and bantering with each other for the first time, needs to be decoded for its psychological implications. Politics is about the manipulation of symbols as a precondition for the exercise of real power. Not only was the ground laid for irreversible negotiations and compromises between two deadly enemies during the three days of talks at the foot of Table Mountain, they discovered, in the words of ANC foreign affairs spokesman, Thabo Mbeki, that to their mutual amazement they "had no horns." Members of the dreaded Security Police who guarded the ANC delegation became buddies with their enemies and were soon on first-name terms. While white and black South Africa wondered about respectable "terrorists" being invited into the official residence of South Africa prime ministers, a correspondent observed, flabbergasted: "But when he [Mbeki] began to crack jokes, accompanied by some boyish elbow-tugging with General Basie Smit, the chief of the Security Police, the unusual appeared to become elevated to the sublime."

The National Party-ANC instant love affair replicates an experience many South African exiles from different political backgrounds have encountered when they meet abroad. Free of the *apartheid* framework, and as a minority in a foreign society, they discover their common South Africanness. A psychological explanation of the cordial relations between former arch enemies would point to the rediscovery of bonds of origin, of a repressed kinship – children of the same soil.

The welcome back of estranged exiles by family in control of the estate, extends beyond the mere rational calculation that the outside world's acceptance is contingent on ANC endorsement. ANC forgiveness means renewed legitimacy for the beleaguered regime. The state president now can travel through the front door of the world. South African bankers can again collect long-term loans. Celebrated as peacemakers with strategic foresight, the same former *apartheid* engineers occupy a new moral high ground.

This constellation also explains the remarkable cohesion which the National Party displayed during the process of change. Most seasoned observers expected defections to the right, if the leadership were "to go so far." Yet the party caucus endorsed the cabinet's moves unanimously and issued encouragement and congratulations. Such support was particularly surprising because the caucus was left in the dark about the precise contents of the president's 2 February speech. The crucial last-minute input and consultation was not with his own constituency but with the opponent in prison. The potential coalition and government of national unity was born at this moment. As a result, a sense of relief, even euphoria, swept the land. One of the most frequent utterances quoted on both sides stressed the foolishness of not having undergone the exercise of reconciliation years ago.

The more remarkable feature of the process lies in the forgiveness by the victims. Without bitterness about decades of suffering, or expressions of revenge for horrendous crimes, Mandela publicly declares "let bygones be bygones." With this attitude, Mandela in fact manufactures a new myth, that the past no longer matters. However, the past may be

forgiven but cannot be forgotten. By legitimating the perpetrators of past apartheid crimes in the interest of future peace, conversion without repentance is condoned. Not without reason does the religious practice of cleansing from past sins insist on confession and restitution as a symbolic demonstration of the sincerity of conversion. However, neither an apology nor an offer of compensation has so far been heard from the official powerholders. The National Party has yet to apologize for the misery inflicted: so far there is only the cynical admission that *apartheid* has failed. To declare *apartheid* unworkable is not the same as denouncing it as criminal.

BY FORGIVING WITHOUT INSISTING ON SOME KIND OF MORAL REHABILITATION, Mandela may indeed compromise his credibility among his radical constituency. It is not enough to demand compensation in the form of nationalization. But even on this issue, the ANC has compromised after a howl of protest by the market and monopolies. Now nationalization will be considered only if the experts who are to study it find it feasible. This feasible socialism may make economic sense but will not be understood by a deprived constituency that demands tangible benefits now. Instead, it is fed with the imagery of a dual presidency.

De Klerk and Mandela assure each other of their mutual respect at a joint press conference. Stephen Gray, a Johannesburg writer, accurately describes De Klerk and Mandela on TV as "two propped-up grandfathers, both smiling awkwardly at the camera." The country's largest paper, on the other hand, editorializes glowingly: "The youngish, imperiously calm and sure-footed State President, and the tall, dignified and articulate black leader sitting side by side, making history together." The chairman of the South African Communist (SACP) Marxist-Leninist vanguard party joins the celebrations of harmony at the back of the polished Mercedes and at the bar of the luxury Lord Charles hotel. The papers dwell in infinite detail on the refined menu, not failing to notice the visitors' preference for the carvery.

In the meantime, fifteen miles down the road from Somerset West in Khayelitsha and the infamous Crossroads, thousands of shack dwellers freeze in the cold winter rain in cardboard shelters. The occupants of the vehicles in the ANC convoy, with police in front and behind, and a helicopter overhead, drive quickly past the misery behind the sand dunes on the N2 highway. Their air-conditioned comfort spares them the stench of overcrowding and poor sanitation. Thabo Mbeki addresses the well-heeled members of the press club over lunch at the Cape Sun Hotel and a packed hall with an enthusiastic audience at the elite, white-washed Stellenbosch University in the midst of charming vineyards. The occupants of the Cape Flats hear about the ANC being in town, but, apart from a poorly attended rally at Mitchells Plain, don't see their liberators. Langa, the oldest African township, is rumoured to have already become a stronghold of the rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a hard-line movement which rejects negotiation as appeasement. Adventurous journalists in search of evidence report graffiti: "one settler, one bullet!"



For security reasons, the ANC delegation cannot live in the dilapidated townships or even visit the winding lanes that they pass with expressions of horror. But the greying gerontocracy of the ANC in impeccable business suits and Gucci watches, with two token women included, must find themselves as alien in the cesspool of Khayelitsha as the white designers of this alternative to influx control. The ANC image is modelled on white expectations, not on the aspirations of the Lumpenproletariat. "Statesman-like," they must impress the oppressors that they are no longer the "terrorists" they were made out to be. As one commentator wryly noted: "The oppressors and terrorists have overnight begun to represent the centre of South African politics."

THE FAST PACE OF THIS POLITICAL METAMORPHOSIS HAS NOT YET ALLOWED its implications to be realized by those likely to be left out of the new alliance. Even the downtrodden borrow from the glory of their leaders being accepted in the halls of power. But the sensible trend of reconciliation means disaster looming under the surface: the closer the ex-prisoners get to their jailers, the further they move from their own powerbase. Gaining political power under South African circumstances means losing support at the same time. By restricting political education and suppressing organization for liberation for decades, the *apartheid* regime has laid the seeds for destroying even its liberators. "The Nats and the ANC are rapidly deligitimating each other by rubbing elbows," exaggerates American sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, who nonetheless senses the potential danger of the enlarged middle ground shrinking again under the *toenadering* – the Afrikaans word for rapprochement.

The random violence in Natal and elsewhere gives a foretaste of the potential anarchy ready to emerge if the rational chartist project of non-racialism fails. How often can Mandela afford to be ignored when he calls for arms to be thrown into the sea? This is the inevitable revenge of the bitter South African history, regardless of the noble intents to repress it. Are the actors for the oppressed aware of this dialectic? Or have they also become blinded by the taste of power in the shadow of the magic Table Mountain?

IF A PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AGENCY HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE South African government to design a campaign to discredit the ANC, it could not have conceived a better script. Yet the government and the ANC now need each other. Neither can afford to weaken a moderate partner for fear of extremist rivals taking over and South Africa falling apart in a murderous civil war. The indefatigable Pik Botha is reported to have pressed the emerging partnership ideology on his ANC dinner partner with the analogy: "We are all in one boat, and the sharks to the left and sharks to the right are not going to distinguish between us when we fall over." Mandela ominously speaks of the NP and the ANC as the "major actors" and "senior partners," relegating the junior rivals to the other side of the table – opposed to ANC hegemony.

The leader of a past Stalinist party, as Mandela's right-hand man, obsesses white South Africa. In fact, dedicated, bright SACP members occupy most of the influential positions in the ANC and the unions as a separate vanguard underground. To reveal its secret membership, as would be normal under democratic conditions, could embarrass the SACP. It would show its dominance in the ANC and vindicate government propaganda.

What white South Africa has not yet understood, is the recent development that turned rhetorical Stalinist ideologues into the more prag-

matic and moderate force in the ANC. With a disintegrating Soviet bloc seeking peace and investments instead of world revolution, South African communists have nowhere else to go than home. This makes them unexpected allies of Pretoria's negotiation project. The SACP's professed socialism in the second stage, after democracy has been achieved, depends, in SACP leader Joe Slovo's words, on the "class forces in play" at that time. In practical terms, this puts socialism on ice: once non-racial capitalism delivers the goods, relatively colour-blind, Marxist socialist parties shrink or turn into social democrats, as has been demonstrated the world over.

Because of its past radical image, the SACP leadership can entice a sceptical youth into the negotiation process. From this perspective the government should welcome the red flags rather than fear them. If anyone can prevent a latent counter-racism and make a rational colour-blind attitude prevail, it is the internationalist universalism of traditional Marxists. That is the historical merit of South African communists, their undemocratic Stalinism notwithstanding.



Jerry Kola

Meanwhile, new stories about past clandestine police atrocities daily strain the imagination of thriller readers. They have difficulties in distinguishing between reality in the *Cape Times* and fiction in the library. It would seem important that an amnesty not preempt the period of revelations. Determining the truth is essential for the nature of the new society whose moral foundations rest on an appropriate historical consciousness. The phase of revelations does not aim at estab-

lishing criminal liability of individual perpetrators, but political and administrative liability that allowed and encouraged the crimes in the first place. If the new order is to be qualitatively different from the old one, it would have to alter those institutional frameworks rather than appropriate them under new management. That was the error Zimbabwe made – simply continuing with the emergency legislation of its predecessor.

WE STILL LACK AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF WHY THE LEADERS OF THE victims of apartheid humiliation can so easily forget that the future is always a prisoner of the past. Perhaps the key to the puzzle why they do not show bitterness and preach revenge lies in their secure identity. The ANC's Barbara Masekela, who has spent most of her exile in the US, has highlighted a crucial difference: "The apartheid regime has not been able to deprive us of our culture, our language and our heritage, which is quite different from the position of black Americans, who have actually been deprived of their African culture." For this reason, she concludes, "the average black South African is not alienated" and South Africa lacks the US racial polarization.

In other words, South African blacks have been subjugated but not conquered spiritually. They can relate to their oppressors as equals. With his demeanour and discourse, Mandela displays a pride and self-confidence that equals his oppressors. He even learned their despised language – but not to gain entry as a colonized subject. Black Consciousness, as a sense of identity that has rid itself of the inferiority complex of an internalized slave mentality, has only reaffirmed a genuine non-racialism among black activists of all political strategies. There is no counter-racism among blacks. It is this universalism which transcends narrow group thinking, that the South African government has experienced for the first time. It was a precondition for the remarkable moderation. □

BETWEEN 20 AUGUST AND 14 September, 1990, the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) are to meet in Geneva to examine the functioning of the Treaty. It is an important event, because it will be the last meeting of its kind before the parties meet again in 1995 to decide whether the Treaty will remain in effect for an indefinite period, or be extended for one or more additional limited terms.

After many years of negotiations at the UN, the NPT (as it is commonly called) was opened for signature in 1968. It is expressly intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. According to the provisions of the Treaty, which came into effect in 1970, states with nuclear weapons commit themselves not to transfer such weapons to any other party. Non-nuclear-weapon states, for their part, agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. To verify compliance with this obligation, states without nuclear weapons also agree to submit activities they undertake in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear technology to the safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

#### The fourth review conference

The 1990 Conference (like those in 1975, 1980 and 1985) is one of the meetings which, according to the Treaty, is to take place every five years, and aims at ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty are being implemented. The first three conferences, however, did not always arrive at a consensus in this respect.

As far as the non-nuclear-weapon signatories are concerned, the NPT is not only intended to prevent the dissemination of those weapons, it is also supposed to achieve nuclear disarmament. Under Article VI, all parties to the Treaty "undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament." Moreover, in the Preamble to the Treaty, the signatories call for "the determination of the Parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (PTBT) ... to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons."

Because of the increasing quality and quantity of nuclear weapons held by nuclear-weapon powers that are party to the Treaty (the US, UK, and USSR), these countries have, in the past, been criticized by several non-

#### ARMS CONTROL DIGEST BACKGROUND

## THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

nuclear-weapon states for not trying hard enough to achieve the NPT's goals. According to the critics, it is incumbent upon the powers which are allowed under the Treaty provisions to own nuclear weapons and continue testing, to meet the requirements of the Treaty related to disarmament. The issue was so contentious that at the Second Review Conference of the Treaty in 1980, the parties could not agree on a final Declaration.

Although significant progress has been made on nuclear disarmament – namely the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) which bans a whole category of missiles and, more recently, advancement of the START talks on the possible reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by fifty percent – it is expected that the issue of a complete nuclear test ban will be of central concern at the 1990 discussions. Two of the three depository governments of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (the US and UK) have openly stated that they would oppose any initiative seeking to convert that treaty into a complete nuclear weapon test ban agreement at an amending conference scheduled for January 1991. Their efforts will probably not go unnoticed at this next NPT Review Conference.

Peaceful development of atomic energy is another important goal of the NPT. However, since nuclear technologies are less in demand (mainly because of economic factors, and disasters such as Chernobyl), the issue should attract less attention than at previous meetings. On the other hand, the problem of the nuclear capabilities of states that have not signed the Treaty could, once more, generate considerable controversy. On this point, many countries find the NPT flawed because it does not ban co-operation between signatory and non-signatory states, and the latter do not accept the IAEA's complete verification measures.

#### What is at stake?

In its twenty-year existence, the IAEA has not detected a single violation of the Treaty's provisions, and none of the parties has invoked its right to withdraw – a right a country can exercise under the Treaty if, in its view, its supreme interests are threatened. Although it is now recognized as the cornerstone of the international regime for preventing the spread of

nuclear weapons, the NPT remains a fragile instrument. Since China and France have not yet signed (although there have been some recent hints that France is reconsidering its policy) only three of the five nuclear-weapon powers are officially bound by the Treaty provisions. Moreover, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina have not signed it either and they are all suspected of owning, or wishing to procure, nuclear weapons – a fact which presents a serious challenge to the very existence of the Treaty.

Despite the significant disagreements that could arise on some issues, no-one thinks the 1990 Conference will fail. The meeting may, however, signal the beginning of talks on the future of the Treaty after 1995. The idea of extending the NPT for only a very short term in exchange, for example, for a firm commitment to conclude a complete nuclear test ban treaty at a definite date, could monopolize informal talks at the conference. For the advocates of the NPT, adopting such a strategy would be extremely dangerous, and could jeopardize the treaty. If the Treaty is abrogated, the IAEA will no longer have the right to inspect several nuclear programmes which, until now, have always been recognized (thanks to the Agency's verification measures) as being conducted for peaceful purposes only. Since one cannot distinguish between civilian atoms and military atoms, the disappearance of the NPT-IAEA system would shroud many nuclear programmes in uncertainty – an uncertainty that would be even greater since at least thirty countries will have the capability to build nuclear weapons before the end of the decade.

Some twenty-five years passed between the time atomic energy was discovered, and when the NPT came into effect. During that period, many attempts at preventing a greater proliferation of nuclear weapons were made, with varying degrees of success. Even though the Treaty is not without flaws, its advocates recognize that the implementation of a new international non-proliferation agreement would confront insurmountable difficulties. It is why the success of the 1990 Review Conference is so important to them. □

– MARIE-FRANCE DESJARDINS

*Marie-France Desjardins is a researcher at the Institute.*



## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

"Major" progress towards a START Treaty was reported from the Baker-Shevardnadze "ministerial" meeting in Moscow, from 7 to 9 February. The two sides settled two of the three outstanding issues they had hoped to resolve: telemetry encryption, and non-deployed missiles. On the third issue, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), the Soviets accepted the US proposal that bombers be counted as carrying an arbitrary number of missiles much lower than that which they are theoretically capable of carrying. Thus, US bombers would be counted as carrying ten ALCMs, and current Soviet bombers as eight, even though they are equipped for up to twenty and twelve, respectively. They would not be permitted to carry more than the latter numbers, however. Disagreement continued over the range at which ALCMs would be subject to START limits, with the Soviets continuing to argue for the 600 km definition from SALT II, while the US wanted it raised to 900–1,000 km (a drop from its previous proposal of 1,500 km).

The most promising advances toward an agreement in Moscow concerned strategic defences and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Regarding the first, the Soviets dropped their insistence on an agreed statement permitting withdrawal from the START Treaty in the event of abrogation or withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, although they indicated that they would continue their own policy of linking the two. On SLCMs, the Soviets finally accepted the US preference for a simple declaration of planned deployments, while the US agreed

to consider such a declaration as "politically binding." The two sides continued to disagree, however, on both the range above which missiles would be included (the US proposing 300 km, the Soviets 600), and the type of missiles (the US wanting it limited to nuclear missiles, the Soviets, to both nuclear and conventional types).

Finally, without committing itself to immediate follow-on negotiations, the US agreed to hear Soviet proposals for "START II" talks focussing on deeper cuts and stabilizing measures.

Hopes for a quick conclusion of the START Treaty were dimmed at the Baker-Shevardnadze ministerial in Washington, in early April. Although progress was made on some minor points, none of the major issues outstanding from Moscow were settled. Furthermore, according to American press reports, the Soviets "backtracked" on the issue of a purely declaratory approach to SLCM limits. An added complication was a new US proposal said to have been presented to Shevardnadze in Namibia, in March. This called for a ban on mobile land-based missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) as part of START I, and a ban on all MIRVed land-based missiles in START II. President Gorbachev reportedly ignored the former and objected to the latter on the grounds that it did not include submarine-launched ballistic missiles, in which the US has an advantage.

After the April meeting, with just one more ministerial planned before the Presidential summit, some US officials were reported as doubting that even an agreement in principle on START would be ready in time.

### Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

In early February, President Gorbachev rejected President Bush's 31 January proposal for unequal levels of US and Soviet personnel on allied territory in Eu-

rope. Just a few days later, however, at the Open Skies meeting in Ottawa, the Soviets reversed themselves by accepting the original Bush proposal, and hence the principle of a larger number of US than Soviet troops on foreign soil in Europe. The proposal requires the Soviets to reduce their forces by 370,000 to 380,000 men, compared to just 80,000 for the US.

The West's assumption that the issue of personnel reductions had thereby been solved was belied, however, when Soviet chief negotiator Oleg Grinevsky on 22 February suggested additional alliance-wide ceilings of 700,000 to 750,000 in Central Europe. Western negotiators, who want personnel limitations restricted to US and Soviet forces, immediately rejected the idea and warned that it could wreck the agreement if it was put forward as a formal proposal by the East.

On another issue, NATO's revised proposal in early February lowered the ceiling on combat-capable aircraft to 4,700, as desired by the Warsaw Pact. NATO also agreed to exempt approximately 2,700 "primary" trainer aircraft, again in line with Pact wishes, and to set a separate ceiling of 500 on air-defence interceptors. However, the East continues to insist on exempting some 1,500 interceptors and 1,500 combat-capable trainers, as well as medium bombers and land-based naval aircraft. Western negotiators complain that the resulting "ceiling" would be over 2,000 higher than the number of aircraft now possessed by NATO.

At the Washington ministerial meeting in early April, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reportedly proposed equal ceilings of 500 US and Soviet combat aircraft based on allied territory, while postponing other aircraft-related issues to the next stage of the talks; this was rejected by the US. Other outstanding issues include ceilings for artillery and armoured combat vehicles, restrictions on helicopters, and definitions of

armoured vehicles. Nevertheless, despite a widespread perception that the negotiations have stalled, both Eastern and Western delegates continue to believe that they can conclude an agreement before the end of the year.

### Open Skies


The negotiations on an Open Skies Treaty began with high hopes in Ottawa in mid-February, as the foreign ministers of the twenty-three participating states (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) endorsed the concept of mutual aerial surveillance with "maximum possible openness and minimum restrictions." However, the talks soon bogged down in the details, as the USSR – isolated among its allies – insisted on a number of provisions which would restrict the "openness" of the regime. The Western states resisted Soviet proposals for a pooling of aircraft and sharing of the data, as well as the extension of overflights to overseas bases.

When the Ottawa meeting broke up on 27 February, little progress had been made on the detailed points of contention. While dropping their initial demand for a common fleet of aircraft, the Soviets had raised a new one that would allow only Soviet aircraft to overfly their territory. Other disagreements arose over the idea of restricted zones over various types of installations and populated areas, as proposed by Moscow; the type of sensors to be permitted aboard the aircraft, with the Soviets arguing for greater restrictiveness than the West; and the number of overflights to be permitted, with the Soviets proposing a lower figure.

Shortly after the talks resumed in Budapest on 23 April, both the Soviet and American chief delegates expressed pessimism about the prospects of reaching an agreement by the target date of 12 May. □

— RON PURVER

## DEFENCE NOTES



### The Future of NATO

In recent months the rapid political developments leading towards German reunification have raised core questions about the future of NATO and European security. Official comments have revealed sharply different views on the place of a unified Germany in NATO.

At the end of January, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union accepted in principle the unification of Germany. The initial position of the Soviet Union was that gradual German unification should be accompanied by disengagement from the two alliances and the establishment by treaty of a neutral state. This view has been strongly rejected not only by NATO, but also within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In particular, Poland continues to express deep concern about a unified Germany, and is clearly skeptical that neutrality would be a practicable solution. Faced with somewhat ambiguous comments by Chancellor Kohl on future guarantees for the western frontier of Poland at the Ottawa meeting of the two alliances in mid-February, the Polish foreign minister called for a unified Germany to remain within NATO lest it become a "superpower on the European stage."

President Bush stated the official position of the United States and West Germany at a press conference on 25 February, where he commented: "We share a common belief that a unified Germany should remain a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including participation in its military structure." To this, Chancellor Kohl added: "One thing is clear: a united Germany cannot belong to two different pact systems." Although not all members of NATO appear to be enthu-

siastic about German reunification, all take the position that a reunified Germany should be in NATO. The Soviet Union thus appears to be diplomatically isolated.

In early April, the Soviets offered a different solution. A unified Germany could remain in both alliances for a transitional period of five to seven years, so that, according to Gorbachev, reunification could be synchronised with "new structures of security for all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." These comments, echoing the earlier Soviet concept of a "European house," were received negatively in Washington, but served to underline continuing Soviet unwillingness to accept the NATO solution.

### Arsenals in the Middle East

In late March and early April, two incidents refocused attention on the emerging potential for widespread deployment of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In late March arrests were made in England following an alleged attempt to smuggle key components of nuclear weapon triggers to Iraq. One week later British customs officials prevented the export to Iraq of lengths of metal tubing which, according to some experts, could be used to assemble a massive artillery piece capable of firing chemical or nuclear warheads over a distance of hundreds of kilometres. Iraq has denied seeking a nuclear capability (which is in any case conservatively estimated to require four or five more years of development), but has acknowledged possession of sophisticated chemical weapons.

During April also, a fire at a controversial chemical plant in Libya, the cause of which is unknown, may have seriously damaged production capabilities. While Libya denies that the plant at Rabta, outside Tripoli, is intended for chemical weapons production, in March, US officials provided information from intelligence analyses which concluded that Libya

had resumed the production of chemical weapons in late 1989.

Libya and Iraq are two of a number of states which have been seeking to acquire a ballistic missile delivery capability. Libya is believed to be developing a missile with a range in excess of 500 kilometres, while Iraq may have successfully extended the range of its Soviet-built Scud-B missile with the aid of an extra fuel tank designed by North Korea. US intelligence sources have also identified facilities close to the Rabta plant that could serve for the storage of poison gas canisters, but it is not yet clear that Libya has been able to design a chemical warhead for its ballistic missiles.

### Elusive Peace Dividend

In what promises to be a continuing debate, Washington is divided on defence policy. In early March, CIA chief William Webster and Defense Secretary Cheney openly disagreed on the nature of the Soviet threat. Testifying before a Senate committee, Webster claimed that the US intelligence community saw little likelihood that the Soviets would pose a conventional military threat in the foreseeable future, even if Gorbachev were deposed by Communist Party conservatives. Cheney, on the other hand, argued that recent Soviet changes were reversible, and described Webster's testimony as "not helpful" in securing Congressional support for the President's budget submission.

The following week the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee proposed to cut defence by four percent per year as opposed to the two percent cut called for by President Bush. With any such cut in the defence budget, possibly including the two percent proposed by the president, attention focusses anew on which of the major new weapons systems, including the B-2 Stealth bomber, the Trident nuclear missile submarine, the mobile MX missile and the Midgetman ICBM, will come under the axe. Meanwhile, Congress has begun to discuss how to

reallocate the \$140 billion over five years, which would be saved if the two-percent cut is accepted.

On 19 and 20 April, the influential chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn entered the debate with two speeches in the US Senate amounting to what the *New York Times* called "a benchmark" statement on how US military policy and spending plans should change. Nunn said the US should reduce troop strength in Europe to between 75,000 and 100,000 – the Bush administration has proposed 225,000. He also said that the US Navy should reduce the number of aircraft carrier battlegroups to 10 or 12, not the Navy's proposed 14. On the budget side, Nunn suggested cutting the proposed 1991 defence budget by \$18 billion, to \$289 billion.

On 26 April the Defense Secretary re-entered the fray with a proposal to reduce the development and production of new military aircraft. Instead of buying 132 B-2 Stealth bombers, the Air Force would purchase 75; the planned purchase of 210 C-17A transports would be reduced to 120; and the Navy's planned purchase of a new tactical attack plane would be cut by about one-quarter. Two other military aircraft development programmes, for the Navy and the Air Force, are being deferred. Cheney cited changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR as reasons for the reductions and is reported also to have indicated that the Navy would be asked to reduce the number of aircraft carriers it employs, to twelve.

In Canada, the peace dividend is scarcely visible. Under the budget tabled by Michael Wilson on 20 February, defence spending will be limited to five percent growth in 1990–1992, or about the level of inflation. A Department of National Defence task force is expected to produce a revised defence posture in the summer or early fall. □

— DAVID COX



## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### The Budget

Minister of Finance Michael Wilson tabled the federal budget on 20 February. The major cuts that had been anticipated for defence and foreign assistance did not materialize, although both areas were limited to five percent annual growth over the next two years, approximately the rate of inflation. Total spending by External Affairs was virtually frozen for 1990-91 at \$1.1 billion, while National Defence was increased by \$665 million to \$12 billion, and overseas aid funds were pegged at \$2.5 billion.

The latter funds had been severely cut in the 1989 budget, lowering from 0.49 to 0.43 percent the ratio of aid to the Gross National Product. Earlier in the year, External Affairs Minister Clark had waged a quite public battle to defend the aid budget from further cuts and, although he clearly succeeded, his prediction that the ratio would rise to 0.45 percent this year appeared unlikely given the constraints imposed on spending increases.

The only major defence item to be cut was the \$680-million Polar 8 icebreaker. The government said the cutback was in part a response to the 1988 bilateral agreement whereby the United States promised to give advance notice when it sent its icebreakers into the Northwest Passage. These waters are claimed by Canada, while the US continues to maintain that they are an international waterway. In the Commons on 13 March, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said that the agreement required the US to seek

the prior consent of Canada, but opposition members disputed this interpretation.

### African Issues

Joe Clark addressed the Commons on 7 March about his visit on 26 to 28 February to Lusaka, Zambia – the headquarters of the African National Congress (ANC) in exile – to meet with Nelson Mandela and leaders of the Front Line states which have led the fight against apartheid in South Africa. Clark indicated that Mandela was “unambiguous” on the issue of sanctions; that “the greatest assistance which could be offered by the outside world to the ANC is to maintain sanctions. Indeed, he spoke of intensifying sanctions, and I have asked him to indicate where and how this should occur.”

External Relations Minister Monique Landry reported to the House on 28 March about her recent visit to Ethiopia and the humanitarian and diplomatic initiatives which Canada has taken in that country. The House unanimously supported a resolution condemning all parties to the conflict “who would use food as a weapon to attain strategic, military and political objectives and who would not assist the international donor community to provide ... delivery of food to the starving millions in the area.”

### Changes in Europe

During a brief visit to Ottawa, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher appeared before the House External Affairs Committee on 5 April and called for Canada, the United States and the European Community (EC) to consider a new definition of their relationship in light of the rapid changes in the European political order. Beyond German reunifica-

tion, Genscher pointed to the increasing integration of the twelve members of the EC: “We are on the way to the political union of Europe, meaning the Europe of the Community...” He saw NATO retaining an important role in European security, with both American and Canadian troops, but predicted that its task would become more political, with greater emphasis on verification, arms control, confidence-building and the establishment of cooperative security structures in Europe.

In another corner of Europe, Lithuania’s declaration of independence on 11 March won unanimous approval from the Commons the following day. Government officials were careful to stress that Canada had never legally recognized the Soviet occupation of the three Baltic republics.

Despite the formal declarations Canada, like its Western allies, adopted a judicious course. This was reflected in an interview with MP Patrick Boyer, parliamentary secretary to Joe Clark, following a pro-independence rally in Toronto at the beginning of April. He is quoted as saying, “The hangup is that Canada and other countries find it hard to say we recognize Lithuania as a totally independent country when, in fact, it isn’t.”

### Parliamentary Committees

The House of Commons External Affairs Committee continued its study of Canada’s relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with a trip to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Berlin and Bonn from 20 April to 5 May. It is unclear how soon the Committee plans to report to the House on its findings, although a report on the trip is expected before the House rises late in June.

The House Defence Committee is engaged in drafting its report on Canada’s maritime sovereignty. The final report will be tabled in the House before the end of June.

The Committee held hearings at the beginning of May on the safety of the CF-18, following a series of five crashes which have killed four pilots. Since the 138 jet fighters were acquired in 1982, thirteen have crashed and eight pilots have died. DND maintains that “human factors,” not mechanical failures, are responsible for an accident rate significantly higher than that for versions of the same aircraft used by airforces of other countries.

### Short Notes

Canada hosted a meeting in Yellowknife of high-level officials from all eight circumpolar nations (the four Scandinavian nations, Iceland, the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada) on 18 to 23 April to discuss Arctic environmental problems. The Yellowknife meeting was only the second occasion in history when the circumpolar nations have met as a group, the first being in Finland in 1989. The new interest being shown in multilateral cooperation on Arctic issues is largely a reflection of the profound change in Soviet attitudes.

The federal government is proceeding with plans announced in 1988 for an International Institute for Sustainable Development, a research and public education institute focussing on environment and development, particularly in the Third World. To be located in Winnipeg, the centre’s core operating budget will be \$5 million per year over five years for a total of \$25 million. Funding will come from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Environment Canada, and the Manitoba government. Lloyd McGinnis, the President and CEO of Wardrop Engineering, was named Chairman of the new institute’s board of directors. □

— GREGORY WIRICK

## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Namibia Joins the UN

On 17 April, the Security Council unanimously endorsed Namibia's application to become the 160th member of the United Nations. The event marked the culmination of fourteen years of international diplomacy in which Canada played a prominent role. In the words of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, it was a demonstration of "how, with unity in aim and coherence of effort, multilateralism can be both fruitful and dynamic."

### Central America

Reflective of the renewed dynamism of the world body are the efforts now underway in Central America. On 27 March, the Security Council unanimously voted to expand the size and role of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The force, which numbered 260 troops, including a contingent of Canadians, was increased to about 1,060. Venezuela contributed the largest number of the new troops.

ONUCA's original duties had been limited to verifying the cut-off of aid to the Contra rebels, and patrolling borders to prevent guerrilla attacks. ONUCA's new mandate called for collecting weapons, ammunition, military equipment and uniforms from the Contras. Under the terms of the new mandate, rebels in Honduras were to be demobilized at already existing camps there. Rebels in Nicaragua, would go to temporary assembly points ("security zones") protected by ONUCA forces.

"There should be no doubt in anyone's mind about the position of the United States on the ques-

tion of the Contras," James Wilkinson, the US envoy, told the Council at the time. "We want and encourage them to demobilize freely and return to their land to contribute to its development."

Despite the US support for the Council's action, as of 1 May, Contra leaders in Nicaragua continued to insist they wouldn't lay down their arms until the Sandinistas relinquished power over the Nicaraguan military. Contras in Honduras cooperated with ONUCA and voluntarily demobilized, but the bulk of the Contra force remained in Nicaragua. On 20 April, the Council once again expanded ONUCA's mandate to include monitoring a ceasefire that had gone into effect the day before. It followed an agreement between representatives of the newly-elected government of Nicaragua, the Contras, and the Archbishop of Managua.

One other Latin American issue briefly held the attention of the Council. On 9 February, it met to hear a complaint from Cuba that a US Coast Guard vessel had fired on a Cuban-chartered freighter in the Gulf of Mexico while attempting to search the ship for drugs. Cuba portrayed the US as a "modern-day buccaneer." The US responded that the attack was legal because Washington had been granted the permission to board the freighter by Panama, the ship's flag state.

The Council adjourned without considering a resolution. Several Council members suggested it was unlikely that further action would be taken because the US action was not viewed as a serious violation of international law.

### Middle East

On 15 March, the Council met to consider allegations that Israel intends to settle Soviet Jewish emigres in the Occupied Territories. It's estimated that 50,000 to

100,000 Soviet Jews will immigrate this year to Israel. The meeting had been called at the request of the Soviet Union whose delegate urged Israel to make a "sober assessment of the situation." He said the settlement of immigrants in the Occupied Territories was a new and serious obstacle to peace. The issue, he said, was not whether the Soviet Union should cut-off emigration. Rather, the responsibility lay with Israel.

The Palestine Liberation Organization's representative accused Israel of usurping Palestinian land, adding that Jews were arriving from "all parts of the world to replace Palestinians in the homeland." Israel replied that the accusation was "preposterous" and an attempt by Arab states to create a "diplomatic storm" in order to halt Jewish immigration to Israel.

At a subsequent meeting on 29 March, Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier urged Israel to settle new immigrants exclusively within its pre-1967 borders, adding that Canada did not recognize "the permanence" of Israeli control over the Occupied Territories. "Canada will oppose, and will continue to oppose, any actions taken by the Israeli Government to alter the demographic structure of the occupied territories, particularly in the coming months," Fortier said.

The meeting was adjourned by the president of the Council who said the debate would be resumed at a future, unspecified date.

### Iran and Iraq

On 27 February, in an effort to nudge along peace talks between Iran and Iraq, the Council called on the two countries to "co-operate fully" with the Secretary-General in his efforts to hold direct talks between the two countries.

In a statement, the Council expressed its support for proposals by the Secretary-General for a new round of talks under his auspices for a two-month period and with a specific agenda. The

agenda hasn't been made public but is said to contain eight points that are aimed at ensuring the implementation of Resolution 598 that forms the basis of the UN ordered peace settlement.

On 29 March, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) for six months. During this meeting, the Secretary-General told Council members he "expects" that both governments are "determined to take advantage of the opportunity and the momentum created by the Security Council's statement of 27 February." But he also called on the two sides to notify him of their acceptance of the proposed agenda "and to give added political impetus to the talks by indicating to each other their sincerity and their determination to implement Resolution 598."

### Cyprus

In other UN sponsored negotiations, the Council on 12 March, called on the two Cypriot communities to pursue efforts towards the creation of an independent, sovereign and non-aligned federal republic. The call came after a week-long round of negotiations in New York failed to elicit agreement between Mr. Rauf Denktaş — the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, and Mr. George Vassiliou — the president of the Republic of Cyprus.

Assessing the talks, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that "in the circumstances, I came to the conclusion, regrettably, that we faced an impasse of a substantive kind, which raised questions regarding the essence of the mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council and, therefore, regarding the basis of the talks." □

— TREVOR ROWE



## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDST OF INTERNATIONAL TURMOIL

Cold War which has so darkened the international scene since the Second World War. We are embarrassed, or should be, because none of us predicted what would happen, when or how.

Peace and security are, of course, the indispensable foundations of any viable international order. What are peace and security likely to mean for us, and what we will need to do to secure them, over the coming decades?

For perhaps the first time, our entire species now shares security threats, and ones that come from sources other than human hostility. Global warming, for example, could conceivably do more damage to humanity over the next century than all the wars of history.

The threat to our planet's environment and life-support systems is only the most obvious symptom of our global interdependence. If we are unable to manage better issues such as trade, investment and protectionism, debt, exchange rates and technology flows, we will surely be bumping into each other harder and with more damage and danger. It is significant that even two years ago most Americans ranked their fear of Japanese economic competition as more threatening than the Soviet military challenge.

**E**AST-WEST MILITARY CONFRONTATION WILL remain a vital issue for our security. Even with successful negotiations in Vienna on conventional arms reductions, and strategic arms reductions between the superpowers, the USSR, the US and some other countries will remain heavily-armed states without enough mutual confidence and common values to rule out major armed conflict. As long as weapons modernization proceeds on both sides, with some seeking decisive military superiority, the level of danger will remain high.

Canadian objectives should be for the deepest possible military cuts, on a balanced basis, to leave the new Europe with much lower levels of arms and potential military threats. Simultaneously, we have a stake in building a new European security structure that will lock

**A**S PEOPLE WITH A special interest in international affairs, we are all exhilarated and embarrassed these days. We are exhilarated because of the rapid and generally peaceful lifting of the sombre pall of the

in these lower levels of threat and provide for better ways of resolving the conflicts which will inevitably arise.

The idea for using the thirty-five nation framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the new umbrella under which all the European countries (except Albania) and the two North American partners could manage their new security relationships, has steadily gained the support of many governments – including our own. But so far Washington has been less enthusiastic. We now have an important task in convincing our American neighbours that an institutionalized CSCE is not a threat to NATO. NATO will retain its key role in providing a North Atlantic security guarantee.

This security guarantee will continue to call for a credible deterrent or counter to any potentially threatening military capability. It will continue to require significant, if much reduced, American forces stationed in Europe – to give credibility to the American strategic guarantee – and as long as there are American forces in Europe, I can see very strong arguments for significant Canadian forces there as well. It is time to stop the simplistic debate in Canada about leaving our NATO contingent in Europe or pulling it out, and start thinking about what kinds of things we might best be doing there.

**W**ITH NATO STILL PROVIDING THE OVERALL guarantee, the most immediate security preoccupations within the new Europe may well be in managing disputes and small-scale conflicts derived from inter-ethnic or other frictions. We have already seen how some of the poisonous viruses of pre-War Europe have emerged as dangerous as ever from the ice of the Cold War. There is already serious talk of new machinery (possibly under the CSCE or the UN) for crisis management and peacekeeping.

If this role is to emerge and help to preserve the new security gains in Europe, there is no country better equipped and more trusted to help organize it than Canada. With limited troops but extensive experience, Canada may be able to make an especially useful contribution with a modest NATO contingent in Europe.

I do not see the East-West relationship as the most likely arena for serious military conflicts in the coming decades. In my Annual Statement this past January, I underlined the possibility of a "decade of proliferation" of weapons of mass destruction to many new countries.

These trends are not inescapable, but they will become so unless we now muster, as an inter-

national community, an extraordinary effort to both control the diffusion of advanced weaponry, and start seriously promoting conflict resolution and regional security arrangements in all parts of the world.

**O**NCE AGAIN, THERE IS A SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY for Canada – a trusted middle power, experienced mediator and peacekeeper, the fourth-ranking contributor to the UN system, with one of the largest and most respected aid programmes. We have earned a good measure of credibility and political goodwill, and these assets could be turned to good purpose in efforts to help with regional peace-building. But we must contend with a strange mid-life apathy and cynicism toward international institutions which could stifle these new efforts. Our closest friends and neighbours in the United States – who led in post-war order-building – are now the most alienated from the UN.

Surely it is the time for a group of like-minded governments, from all regions of the world, to advance the cause of these institutions for handling challenges like regional conflict, the arms trade, drug trafficking and terrorism, and environmental protection, as well as the continuing desperate need for economic improvement in the Third World.


Sometimes it is important to remind ourselves how the world sees us. In an admittedly imperfect world, Canada is seen by others as a model of peace and prosperity, a successful experiment in tolerance and practical compromise between two great language groups, diverse and far-flung regions and, now, practically all the world's cultures. It is these traits, and this political culture, which equip Canada for even greater roles in the new world order which seems to be emerging.

Happily, most foreigners do not yet know how we Canadians have faltered in recent months in our trusteeship at home of these scarce and precious commodities of tolerance and practical compromise. Those of us who work in the foreign policy field hope that they can be fully restored before the world finds out that they were ever in jeopardy. □

– BERNARD WOOD

*This column is based on an address given in mid-April by Bernard Wood to a meeting of Le Conseil des relations internationales de Montréal.*

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



In mid-April **Bernard Wood** gave a major address to Le Conseil des Relations Internationales in Montreal on Canadian security policy. Excerpts from the text, entitled *International Turmoil: The Challenges Facing Canadians* can be found in the Director's report on page 19. The following evening, Mr. Wood was the guest speaker at a meeting of the Montreal branch of the CIIA. Later that week, Mr. Wood, and **Sam Lewis**, president of the US Institute for Peace, spoke at a conference at Wayne State University in Detroit.

"Climate Change, Global Security and International Governance" was the title of a CIIPS conference in mid-April in Ottawa. Focussing on the security implications of climate change, the conference brought together parliamentarians, officials, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations. A brief summary of some of the conference highlights can be found on page 7.

In mid-March the Institute and Summerhill Press launched *Time to Change* by **Boyce Richardson**; an excerpt from the book appeared in the spring issue of *Peace & Security*.

**Deirdre Collings** recently joined the Institute staff as a researcher with primary responsibility as coordinator for a project on Lebanon. Ms. Collings did her graduate work at Carleton University specializing in the study of the Middle East. Her book on the Palestinians will soon be published in England and France. Some time ago, **Estelle Laferrière**

was appointed executive secretary when **Nicole Campbell-Morel** left the Institute.

In mid-April the Institute was a co-sponsor of Expo-Science, a pan-québécoise science fair for the school system in Quebec, the finals for which took place this year in Hull. "A project for my planet" was the theme this year. Over 80 finalists displayed their work; ten winners were chosen to participate in an international science fair in Prague.

A number of seminars were held during the quarter: we organized a one-day briefing on economic cooperation in Europe prior to the Bonn CSCE; Ambassador **David Peel** and some of his staff from Vienna led a discussion on the conventional arms control negotiations taking place there; **Sam Lewis**, president of the US Insti-

tute for Peace and formerly US Ambassador to Israel, gave a seminar on US policy in the Middle East; **Kevin Clements**, of the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand, spoke on New Zealand's defence and security policies.

**Ron Purver** gave a paper on Arctic arms control at a seminar sponsored by the Calgary branch of the Naval Officers of Association of Canada. He also spoke about Canada and arms control in the Pacific at the University of Victoria, and made a presentation at the University of California at Berkeley on security relations in the Arctic. **Fen Hampson** spoke at a conference at the University of Wisconsin at Madison on environmental security in the 1990s.

In March **Bernard Wood** gave an address on the evolving inter-

national security environment to a meeting cosponsored by the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. At the end of the month he spoke again in Washington to the 65th meeting of the Canadian American Committee: his subject was an alternative spending programme for Canadian defence. During March he led a session at the Collège militaire royal de St. Jean on Canada and the world in the 1990s.

During his official visit to Canada, at the end of April, **President Vassiliou**, of Cyprus, addressed a meeting at the Institute. On 24 April **Vitaliy Korotich**, editor of *Ogonyok* and member of the Congress of People's Deputies in the Soviet Union, led a seminar on developments in the USSR.

**Brad Feasey** gave a presentation to the spring conference of the Independent Schools History Teachers Association in Ontario at Upper Canada College. **Paul Gray**, a history teacher in Parry Sound, brought pupils from this Canadian and American history class to the Institute for a roundtable discussion.

**Nancy Gordon** represented the Institute at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian National Commission for UNESCO which took place in Hull in early April. **Federico Mayor**, UNESCO's Director-General, addressed the meeting which focussed on culture, science and development.

**Rychard Brûlé** attended a conference in Algiers in March organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The meetings, which brought together African Institutes involved with security and disarmament studies, focussed on areas of common and cooperative study, as well as on new avenues for research. □

### Peace and Security Competitions Fund

The Board of Directors of the Institute has recently implemented changes in the administration and adjudication of its responsive competitions to fund research and the encouragement of public discussion and information on issues of international peace and security. The goal is to ensure maximum fairness, rigour and efficiency in these competitions and to contribute to the very best resulting projects. These responsive programmes, like the Institute's Barton Awards Programme, will now be managed quite separately from the Institute's in-house and directed programmes.

Resources for these responsive contributions will now be allocated annually by the Institute to a PEACE AND SECURITY COMPETITIONS FUND which will continue to contribute to the most promising projects selected through a semi-annual, independent and competitive process.

The Fund's activities will be overseen by a Council of Trustees composed of four members of the Institute's Board plus up to three outside members. Daily operations will be the responsibility of a Fund Director who is also, at least at the outset, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute.

The semi-annual nature of the process remains as before as does the division of available money into two programmes: research; and public discussion and information. Applications will continue to be reviewed by Fund staff for their completeness and relevance to the specified fields of interest and criteria. They will then be considered (as in the past) by Advisory Committees composed of three external assessors, chaired by the Fund Director. Recommendations from these committees will be passed to the Council of Trustees for decisions.

The amount of money allocated to the Fund for the fiscal year 1990-91 is the same as that allocated the previous year. Criteria and application forms have been modified to reflect the above changes. Please note in particular that the winter deadline for applications has been changed to November 30. Thus the deadlines are June 30 and November 30, with notifications of the competition results expected in October and March respectively. Prospective applicants are encouraged to contact the Fund Director or Fund Administrators for copies of the new criteria and application forms.



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### New Reference Publications

The Institute has recently published a new bibliography, edited by Ron Purver, Senior Research Fellow, *Surviving the Nuclear Age: A Bibliography on Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control and Disarmament, 1987 Update*. The print version of this comprehensive English-language bibliography is available for the 1987 update only, although the core bibliography and updates cover materials from 1945 to the present. Access to these is available directly from the library.

Coming in June are two further publications, *Canada and International Peace and Security: A Bibliography, 1985-1989*, and the *Peace and Security Thesaurus*. The former compiles material from the library's database covering the serial literature, ephemeral literature, and some government documents containing the Canadian perspective on issues of international peace and security. It will be published annually.

The thesaurus is a listing of subject terminology in the field of peace and security. We hope it will prove useful as a basis for libraries and other information centres looking for a standardized vocabulary to use in providing subject access to their collections.

### PRICES:


*Surviving the Nuclear Age* - no charge  
*Canada and International Peace and Security* - \$15.00  
(\$10.00 each for 10 copies or more)  
*Peace and Security Thesaurus* - \$10.00

### CONFLICT RESOLUTION/ REGIONAL CONFLICTS

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- Bogdanor, Vernon. *Consensus and conflict: does international co-operation depend upon shared values and moral norms among nations, and can such norms exist?* Ditchley Conference Report D89/12. Ditchley Park, UK: Ditchley Foundation, 1989. 5p.
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- Dassé, Martial. «Birmanie: révolution et coups d'état» *Études polémologiques* (51)(3/89) 171-189.
- de Waele, Jean Michel. «La fin de l'immobilisme en Albanie?» *Études internationales* (mars 1990) 81-92.
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- Frédérick, Michel. *Le Canada et la protection de l'environnement dans l'Arctique: inventaire des instruments juridiques internationaux*. Cahiers du GERPE 90-01. Québec : Groupe d'études et de recherches internationales, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1990. 48p.
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- Khier, Elie. *Le Liban : éclatements et permanences*. Montréal: Centre d'études arabes pour le développement, [1989?]. 38p.
- Kim, Ha Poong. "The Green politics of peace" *IFDA Dossier* (75/76)(Ja/Ap'90) 3-18.
- Murray, John S. "Negotiating U.S. policy to counter terrorism" *Negotiation Journal* 6(1)(Ja'90) 15-22.
- Rix, Alan. "Japan's foreign aid policy: a capacity for leadership?" *Pacific Affairs* 62(4)(Wint'89-90) 461-475.
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- Westing, Arthur H. "Towards eliminating war as an instrument of foreign policy" *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21(1)(Mr'90) 29-35.
- Yorke, Valerie. "Imagining a Palestinian state: an international security plan" *International Affairs* [London] 66(1)(Ja'90) 115-136.
- Zackrisson, James L. "La Violencia in Columbia: an anomaly in terrorism" *Conflict Quarterly* IX(4)(Fall'89) 5-18.

Bibliography compiled by John Wright.

## REVIEWS



**Shadow of Heaven:**  
**The Life of Lester Pearson,**  
**Volume One: 1897–1948**  
John English

Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989,  
414 pp., \$28.95 cloth

For most readers of this journal, Lester Pearson is a familiar figure. Almost everyone knows something, and many know a lot, about his life and accomplishments, especially during his years of public prominence, the quarter century after World War Two. *Shadow of Heaven* is concerned to reconstruct and interpret his less public first fifty years. It is very much a study of a man and his times. John English not only explains Pearson's unfolding character and attitudes, from youth to middle age; he also writes, sensitively and evocatively, of Pearson's various milieus (his turn-of-the-century Methodist home, the University of Toronto in the 1920s, wartime London and Washington). And he suggests as well some of the circumstances and experiences that especially influenced Pearson's conduct, outlook, and career.

This is a readable and engaging biography. It is sympathetic and admiring but not uncritical or effusive. It gives a good sense of Pearson's concrete, lived experience, including the fortuitous elements, and a few rough passages (actually, very few). The phases of his life are well-distinguished, including his coming of age in World War One and his transition in the late 1920s from a teacher of history to a shaper of foreign policy. Pearson was almost constantly on the go, seeing the world, playing sports, meeting people, moving from here to

there. Between 1915 and 1946 he was almost as often abroad as at home. As English makes clear, Pearson's wife, Maryon, was not always a beneficiary of her husband's public successes.

*Shadow of Heaven* sheds light on the logic of Pearson's move from diplomacy to party politics. He possessed many of the qualities of a good politician and had refined these qualities over thirty years, some of them spent at or near the centre stage of world affairs (notably in the 1940s). English, in comparing Pearson and Mackenzie King, writes that "Both men scanned the surface with political antennae of exquisite sensitivity, and their feelings largely shaped their deeds." A feel for the surface – this was a precondition for political success. English likens Pearson to "a prospector of extraordinary skill and intuition." He was observant, resourceful, quick-witted, and wide-ranging. And he was persistently, and usually cheerfully, in search of usable political deposits, grounds for accommodation, practical opportunities, and better maps to the future.

This is an admirable book – a book that is likely to be enjoyed by a wide readership.

– Robert Malcolmson

Mr. Malcolmson is a Professor of  
History at Queen's University in  
Kingston.

**The Defence of Canada: In the  
Arms of the Empire, 1760–1939**  
Gwynne Dyer and Tina Viljoen

Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990,  
375 pp., \$34.95 cloth

This is the first of a two-book work, based on the controversial NFB/CBC TV series of the same name, broadcast in 1986. A lot of potential readers are no doubt

already prepared to love or hate this volume, depending upon how they feel about Canadian neutrality, a cause with which, especially thanks to the television series, the Dyer name is now closely associated.

Yet let us not get all worked up just yet, one way or the other. NATO supporters and Dyer's other ideological adversaries should save their real ire for the second volume, which will pick up with events in the summer of 1939 and eventually deal with NATO issues. Just about everyone interested in Canadian history, regardless of opinion on contemporary Canadian defence commitments, can welcome this first volume as a popular, well-written, often intriguing and sometimes moving survey of the roles military force and the threat of military force have played in the development of Canada from the fall of New France until the eve of the Second World War.

To be sure, this first volume is intended to set up the second. Dyer and Viljoen seem never to have encountered an alliance they have liked. And this certainly includes the British Empire. They underline that by the end of the 19th century the British could not be counted on, if necessary, to defend Canada against the US, although the British government took pains to conceal this from Ottawa. Yet, "London was able to inveigle Canada into a series of imperial wars that were none of Canada's concern, but in which millions of Canadians endured great hardship and a hundred thousand were killed, by playing on the gullibility of English Canadians who were blinded by their sentimental attachment to Britain."

Understandably then, Dyer and Viljoen are sympathetic to French Canada's historic resistance to overseas imperial commitments.

One of the book's greatest strengths is this openness to French Canada. The country's military history is not described as an English Canadian affair into which French Canadians periodically attempted to throw monkey-wrenches. Dyer and Viljoen are particularly effective in quoting both English Canadian and French Canadian historical sources.

The chief conclusions Dyer and Viljoen draw are twofold. Canada was created and has been shaped by European military struggles. Second – and to the authors' regret – participation in the British Empire conditioned Canadians to see their security frontier as lying overseas: "The old strategic and psychological equation of dependence on Britain to protect us from American invasion ... lasted just long enough to deliver us smoothly into our new obsession with playing a role in the European balance of power." This "new obsession" is to be the main subject of the second volume.

– Joseph T. Jockel

Mr. Jockel is with the Canadian Studies  
Program at St. Lawrence University,  
Canton, New York.

**Canada's Department of  
External Affairs, Volume I,  
The Early Years, 1909–1946**  
John Hilliker

Montreal and Kingston: The Institute of  
Public Administration of Canada,  
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990,  
406 pp., \$45 cloth, \$19.95 paper

(French translation:  
*Le ministère des Affaires extérieures  
du Canada, 1909–1946*, Les presses de  
l'Université Laval.)

This book is one of the Canadian Public Administration Series sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Although the emphasis throughout the book is on the evolution of the



Department of External Affairs as an institution, the work is also, inevitably, a short history of the development of Canadian foreign policy and the conduct of Canada's external relations up to 1946.

The book begins with a chapter on the very haphazard handling of external affairs from 1867 to 1909, when the Department of External Affairs was established. Except for the first three years, the responsible minister was always the Prime Minister. This arrangement had obvious advantages for the Department; but the author points out that it also had disadvantages. Successive Prime Ministers, lacking a proper secretariat of their own, relied on External Affairs for administrative support, and assigned to it tasks that had nothing to do with external relations.

John Hilliker, Head of the Historical Section of the Academic Relations Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada (the current designation of what was so long known as the Department of External Affairs), sets down the facts about such mundane matters as the recruitment of personnel, salaries, assignment of responsibilities, the opening of diplomatic missions, accommodation in Ottawa and abroad. This is all very interesting; but even more interesting are his descriptions of people, their interaction, and their influence on policy.

The first notable personality was Sir Joseph Pope, who successfully promoted the idea of having a Department of External Affairs which would provide for the orderly handling of papers on international matters. As the first Under Secretary, content with Canada's colonial status, he had no interest in developing a foreign service or an independent foreign policy. When he retired in 1925 there were in the Department only three officers, including himself, dealing with external affairs.

Much of the book is concerned with the regime of Dr. O.D. Skelton, Under Secretary from 1925 until his death in 1941, the period of transition from Empire to Commonwealth. Hilliker describes Skelton's efforts to recruit "the best brains" to staff a proper foreign ministry and an independent foreign service – efforts that were frequently frustrated, but were ultimately successful in bringing together a small group of talented generalists who formed the core of what became a first class service.

Others who figure prominently in the book were Loring Christie, adviser to Sir Robert Borden, close collaborator of Skelton, and first career Minister to the United States; Norman Robertson, the very wise successor to Skelton as Under Secretary; Lester Pearson, honing his diplomatic skills; Hume Wrong, a man of great intellect who played an important role in the Department and in Washington, where he was a highly effective number two serving with non-career heads of mission; Hugh Keenleyside, who strove manfully to introduce administrative reforms; and, towards the end, Escott Reid. Of special interest are the references to Mackenzie King, whose interaction with Skelton, and later with Robertson, is a recurring theme.

Throughout the book, especially while covering the Skelton and Robertson periods, Hilliker writes of the efforts of External Affairs to influence government policy. King had great regard for Skelton, but frequently rejected his advice for reasons of domestic politics. Skelton succeeded, however, in persuading King to approve a modest expansion of the department with a view to enabling Canada to play a greater role in international affairs. In the last chapter of the book the author shows how a rapidly maturing foreign service, Skelton's legacy, was able to help the government deal effectively with the complex issues that arose during and immediately following the war.

In so far as the book is an administrative history, it paints a

rather sorry picture. In Skelton's time capable junior officers with two or three university degrees worked at odd jobs assigned to them by the Under Secretary himself, and spent long hours deciphering telegrams, but were not assigned to work with, and be trained by, overworked seniors. It was only during World War II that, under the pressure of events, some administrative order was brought out of chaos. Women were not appointed as foreign service officers until after the war.

John Hilliker has produced a well organized, well written, and highly readable book. His second volume, to cover the period from 1946 to 1968, is awaited with great interest. – *Benjamin Rogers*

*Mr. Rogers held various positions in the Department of External Affairs from 1938 to 1975. He currently lives in Ottawa.*

#### BRIEFLY NOTED

##### **Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean**

Anthony T. Bryan, J. Edward Greene, Timothy M. Shaw, editors  
*London: MacMillan, 1990, 332 pp., \$134.95 cloth*

The essays here were, for the most part, originally presented at a workshop of the same name in Kingston, Jamaica in 1987. Influenced by the debate over the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the writers focus on five specific questions: Is the region prepared for another Grenada? How can defects in the present security arrangement be corrected? What kind of organization or institution is appropriate for these new arrangements? What can be done to improve the economic environment in which these security arrangements are rooted? How can the access of Caribbean small states to multilateral financial institutions be increased in ways that are not counterproductive?

The research project from which this volume stems was developed jointly by the Institute for Peace and Security, the International Peace Academy, the University of the West Indies and Dalhousie University.

##### **Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension** Cranford Pratt, editor

*Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, 167 pp., \$32.95 cloth*

In this volume, four analysts – Cranford Pratt, Asbjørn Løbræk, Bernard Wood and Raphael Kaplinsky – discuss the values, political constraints, economic interests, and international policies central to the development of a more conciliatory attitude by Western nations to the concerns and aspirations of poorer countries of the South. In particular, the five essays examine the special role of middle powers like Canada, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries in promoting this change. The volume is an outgrowth of the OECD's Development Centre "Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty Project."

##### **Voices From Tiananmen Square** Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, editors

*Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990, 203 pp., \$38.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper*

This book consists of original documents, translated for the first time into English, of speeches, handbills, posters, manifestos and interviews from leading activists, capturing the personal and political struggles of China's Democracy Movement. It situates the events of May and June 1989 in their historical context and covers the development of the Movement inside and outside China to the present day. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## LETTER FROM KUBINKA BY JOCELYN COULON



**After bouncing for an hour over what seem like endless potholed roads, our delegation of journalists and military officers arrive at the air force base at Kubinka, a hundred kilometres from Moscow.**

Members of the base command, there to meet us, are impeccably turned out. On a warm, sunny day in April, the Canadian flag snaps in the wind.

This military base is one of the Soviet Union's most modern; it was the first to receive the formidable MiG-29 jet-fighter, now the star of every air show in the world. In fact, Kubinka is the pride and joy of the Soviet military-industrial complex – the Red Army shows it off to all foreign visitors, and it's here that our group starts a week at the heart of the Soviet army.

The officers are especially friendly, they really like Canadians. Our two countries have so much in common they remind us: the climate, the landscape, the great expanses of territory, and hockey – the sport which has really brought us closer together. There's one thing that really separates us, however, and that's raw military power. The Soviets have a hard time believing that the Canadian armed forces are so hard up, especially when they see the smart, well-cut uniform of one of our colonels.

After the ritual tour of the military museum with its displays of feats of arms and gifts from abroad, we settle down in the beautiful dining room. The Soviet officers open the conversation about disarmament, but they are cautious when discussing Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. In Kantemirovka, also in the Moscow region, the officers of an armoured division were more direct with us and said that they didn't believe the economic reforms would succeed. Here in Kubinka they're more

restrained; it's all in the nuances, and we have to read between the lines.

"The population of this base has recently been reduced by a quarter," says the assistant base commander, Colonel Vladimir Basov – a young officer, fortyish, with fine features and elegant manners. "We're really at the limit now and only just able to get our

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**... The Soviets have a hard time believing that the Canadian armed forces are so hard up, especially when they see the smart, well-cut uniform of one of our colonels.**

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work done," he adds in the manner of all military people who must come to terms with budget cuts. When we ask for figures, so that we can make comparisons, he says there are no statistics available. The political commissar, who goes everywhere with us, is silently pleased.

The Soviet officers ask us how the Canadian forces operate. Just what is our country doing for disarmament at a time when the USSR is withdrawing from Europe and keeps making ever more attractive offers to the West? Kindly, a Canadian officer outlines the structure and the role of the armed forces in Canada and points out that even though we have only 88,000 people under arms, our government is thinking of making further cuts to the defence budget. At first the Soviets are taken aback, but then they burst out laughing; their sympathy for our officers is obvious.

After lunch we set out to visit the installations and see the equipment. In a large hangar, a MiG-29

and two combat helicopters are lined up, with an officer standing at attention in front of each one, ready to give a technical description of his aircraft. These three men are veterans of the war in Afghanistan. They invite us to climb aboard, and are very forthcoming with their explanations. Returning to the reception centre we drive along one of the runways where we see dozens of fighters and transport planes with pilots and technicians swarming over them. The aircraft are polished to within an inch of their lives.

The Soviet army is the most powerful in the world, and in a Soviet Union where the commu-

Army is well aware, furthermore, that its power to influence events has increased during these past few months as the Kremlin has asked it first, to crush the Azeri revolt in Bakou, then, to restore order in Georgia and finally, to impose a blockade on Lithuania.

The Army rejects the notion that it might become a volunteer force, because the present system of conscription assures cheap and obedient manpower. Our hosts proudly tell us that the integration of many ethnic groups is possible – even though ethnic violence was responsible for hundreds of deaths in the past year. Not a word is said about the number of deserters, nor about the draft resisters, nor about the growing gulf separating the officers of European origin from the draftees – forty percent of whom are from the Muslim and Asian republics. The Soviet military would be happy to transform their institution, but they want to do it their way and in their own good time. All evidence indicates that the Kremlin is listening carefully.

Leaving Kubinka I carry away a strange feeling of isolation. It wasn't easy at that base, or at others elsewhere for that matter, to break down the wall which separates journalists from soldiers. In fact, the Soviet officers were more at ease with the Canadian officers than with the representatives of the press. There was even one general who, near the end of our stay, lectured us for a whole hour about the role of journalists, recalling the good old days when journalists had to toe the party line. If *perestroika* still has a long way to go in the Red Army, at least *glasnost* allowed us to probe a little into the hearts and minds of those who make it work. □

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*Jocelyn Coulon is international affairs editor for Le Devoir.*

*Translation by Eva Bild*





## Notre délégation de journalistes et de militaires canadiens arrive à la base aérienne de Kubinka, à une centaine de kilomètres de Moscou.

Le petit cortège de voitures, après avoir brinquebalé pendant une heure sur ces étonnantes routes défoncées, est accueilli par les membres de l'état-major de la base, impeccables dans leur uniforme. Le drapeau canadien claque au vent en ce début d'avril chaud et ensoleillé.

Cette base militaire est l'une des plus modernes en Union soviétique. Elle fut la première à recevoir, en 1983, le redoutable chasseur MIG 29, qu'on peut voir maintenant dans tous les spectacles aériens du monde. En fait, Kubinka est un joyau du complexe militaro-industriel soviétique, que l'Armée rouge exhibe à tous les étrangers de passage. C'est par cette base que notre groupe a commencé un voyage d'une semaine au cœur de l'Armée soviétique.

L'Armée soviétique, ment affables, car ils aiment bien les Canadiens. Nos deux pays ont beaucoup en commun, rappellent-ils : le climat, le paysage, l'étendue du territoire et, bien sûr, le hockey ce sport qui a tant favorisé le rapprochement entre les deux nations.

Mais une réalité bien concrète nous sépare : la puissance militaire. Les Soviétiques ont de la difficulté à croire que les Forces canadiennes soient si pauvres, devant l'uniforme ruilant et bien coupé d'un colonel qui nous accompagne.

Après la traditionnelle visite du musée militaire qui étale les faits d'armes et les cadeaux reçus de l'étranger, nous nous installons dans une belle salle à dîner où les officiers soviétiques ouvrent la conversation sur le désarmement mais se montrent prudents sur les formes instaurées par Mikhail Gorbatchev. À Kantermirovka, aussi en banquette de Moscou, les officiers d'une division blindée ont été plus directs et ont déclaré qu'ils ne croyaient pas à la réussite de ces formes économiques. Mais si le ton

est plus retenu à Kubinka, tout est en subtilité, et il faut lire entre les lignes.

«Les effectifs de cette base ont été réduits de 25 p. 100 depuis peu», déclare le commandant adjoint, le colonel Vladimir Basov, un jeune officier de quarante ans, aux traits fins et aux manières élégantes. «Nous sommes cependant à la limite et tout juste en état d'effectuer le travail», dit-il comme tous les militaires du monde qui doivent composer, à contrecoeur, avec des réductions budgétaires. Si on lui demande de nous donner des chiffres aux fins de comparaison, il répond qu'il n'existe pas de statistiques. Le commissaire politique, notre groupe a commencé un

éclatent finalement de rire et sem-  
blent visiblement sympathiser avec  
nos militaires.

Le déjeuner terminé, nous com-  
mençons la visite des installations et  
du matériel. Dans un grand hangar  
sont alignés un MiG 29 et deux héli-  
copères de combat avec, devant  
chaque appareil, un officier au  
garde-à-vous qui nous décrit les  
performances techniques de son  
aéronef. Les trois militaires sont des  
anciens combattants de l'Afgha-  
nistan. Ils nous invitent à monter à  
bord des appareils et n'hésitent pas  
à nous donner toutes les explica-  
tions voulues. En revenant au bâti-  
ment de réception, nous roulons  
sur une des pistes de la base. Des  
dizaines de chasseurs et d'avions de  
transport sont alignés et reçoivent  
une attention méticuleuse de la part  
d'une nuée de pilotes et de techni-  
ciens qui astiquent toute cette quin-  
caillerie. Le soleil se charge de la  
faire briller.

## L'Armée soviétique est la plus puissante du monde et demeurera, pour un certain temps encore, l'institution la plus stable du pays alors que le Parti communiste est en voie de désintégration et que certaines républiques prennent le large....

qui nous accompagne partout, approuve silencieusement.

Les officiers soviétiques nous de-  
mandent comment les Forces cana-  
diennes fonctionnent et ce que notre  
pays fait pour le désarmement au  
moment où l'Union soviétique se  
retire d'Europe de l'Est et ne cesse  
d'offrir à l'Occident des proposi-  
tions alléchantes. Gentiment, un  
militaire canadien décrit les struc-  
tures et les rôles des Forces cana-  
diennes et souligne qu'avec 88 000  
personnes sous les drapeaux, le gou-  
vernement s'apprête quand même à  
sabler les effectifs. Un moment in-  
terloqués, les officiers soviétiques

L'Armée soviétique est la plus  
puissante du monde et demeurera, pour un certain temps encore, l'in-  
stitution la plus stable du pays alors  
que le Parti communiste est en voie  
de désintégration et que certaines  
républiques prennent le large. À nos  
questions politiques et même à cer-  
taines questions sur les problèmes  
de l'Armée, nous n'avons jamais  
reçu de réponses complètes. C'est à  
roverka, aux académies Frunze de  
Moscou et Grechko de Leningrad,  
avec les équipes de rédaction du  
*Soldat soviétique* et de l'*Etoile  
Rouge*, que nous avons pu tirer un  
portrait assez juste de cette énorme  
machine qu'est l'Armée rouge.

Cette dernière demeure un bloc  
très conservateur qui exige du gou-  
vernement que les économies réa-  
lisées par le désarmement soient  
réinvesties dans l'Armée pour

Les militaires soviétiques veulent  
bien transformer leur Armée, mais  
ils veulent la faire à leur rythme  
et à leurs conditions. Tout indique  
qu'au Kremlin, on les écouterait  
d'une oreille attentive.

En quittant Kubinka, je ressens  
un étrange sentiment de solitude. Il  
n'a pas été facile, ni dans cette base,  
ni ailleurs, de briser le mur qui sé-  
pare militaires et journalistes. En  
fait, les officiers soviétiques se  
sentent plus à l'aise avec les mili-  
taires canadiens qu'avec les repré-  
sentants de la presse. Il y a même eu  
un général qui, à la fin de notre  
séjour, nous a sermonnés pendant  
une heure sur le rôle des journalistes  
en évoquant le temps béni où ceux-  
ci étaient sous le contrôle du Parti.  
Si la *persistika* a encore du chemin  
à faire dans l'Armée rouge, la *glas-  
nost* nous a permis de sonder les  
cœurs et les esprits de ceux qui en  
constituent les rouages. □

*Jocelyn Coulon était membre d'une  
délégation de journalistes et de  
militaires canadiens invités par  
l'Armée soviétique en avril 1990.*

droit de la région des conceptions

romantiques. Car pour l'auteur, l'histoire de la médecine n'est point de tâche plus urgente que celle de démolir les idées reçues.

Le chapitre qu'il consacre à « la récolte sandiniste » frappe particulièrement juste même après la défaite électorale des Sandinistes en février dernier. « Au Nicaragua, c'est l'élite qui est dramatiquement di-

visée, l'élite qui a embrassé avec  
flueur les idéologies modernes et se  
livre une lutte sans merci pour le  
pouvoir, au nom du peuple qui four-  
nit la chair à canon. » Peu represen-  
tative des classes ouvrières et

l'unité révolutionnaire a dénigré d'emblée le modèle démocratique bourgeois au profit de Cuba, alors que tout était possible une fois la garde somoziste démembrée. Résolument partisan de la

démocratique pluraliste et réformiste, l'auteur ne peut que constater en bout de ligne le triomphe (momentané ?) du pluralisme armé, triomphé attribuable, au premier chef, aux stratégies et aux idéologies des

parties en lutte. Car si ce livre pose un seul mérite, c'est celui de rendre leur part de responsabilités aux pays de l'isthme. Les investisseurs américains y sont infimes, et quoiqu'à maints égards la politique

milien des Etats-Unis n'aide  
rien à désamorcer la crise, leurs  
intérêts demeurent guidés par des  
impératifs de stabilité. Entre recon-  
naître le rôle incontournable des  
Etats-Unis et leur imputer la respon-

—Christophe Horquelin est étudiant en science politique à l'Université de

□ *Montréal.*

l'influence américaine, en une seule

et même crise régionale. Celle-ci s'ouvre au moment où les commandants sandinistes achèvent de confisquer la révolution à leur seul profit, c'est-à-dire peu

avant l'entrée en fonction de Ronald Reagan en 1981. Une fois en selle, ce dernier arme la *Contra*, dont la mission est d'abord d'empêcher l'aide nicaraguayenne de parvenir au FMLN salvadorien. Au prix de

millions de dollars, le Honduras devient « la pièce centrale du dispositif américain », en servant à la fois de repoussoir au FMLN et de sanctuaire à la *Contra*. La politique américaine « d'encerclement démo-

Guatemala, le Honduras et le Salvador se doter de gouvernements démocratiquement élus. Et le Costa-Rica, qui observe dans cette affaire une «neutralité active», se lance au nez et à la barbe des États-Unis dans

la diplomatie régionale avec le plan Arias et les accords d'Esquipulas. Force est donc de constater que si la région apparaît, pour la première fois depuis l'éclatement des Provinces unies d'Amérique centrale en

1838, comme faisceau particulier d'interactions politiques, c'est d'abord à travers l'influence américaine et contre elle. Souligner, comme l'auteur le fait fort à propos, que la crise a des origines nationales

Malheureusement, au moment d'aborder la crise proprement dite, Alain Destexhe refuse de se plier à l'approche régionaliste que l'objet même de son livre suppose, et dont

à la pertinence. L'exclusion de Pa-

comme un enchevêtrement de monographies où le lecteur à peine à garder le fil et dont il ne retirera une véritable perspective régionale. Il y trouvera malgré tout son

comme s'il entrelient encore à l'en-

tentant d'organiser ces faits à l'in-

effort de théorisation aurait peut-être permis d'apprécier la logique d'ensemble de la politique menée par Ottawa (s'il y en eût une!). Au

lecteur donc le soin de tirer ses conclusions et de dresser son propre bilan de la contribution canadienne. Ces critiques ne doivent en rien masquer la valeur réelle de cet ouvrage, le premier, tant en français

qu'en anglais, sur cet aspect de la politique étrangère canadienne. Cette recherche constitue en fait une première étape essentielle à un travail de réflexion approfondie. En dégageant ainsi des données claires et détaillées les attentes quant à la

« Une diplomatie d'interprétation » restera un outil de travail indispensable et un guide sûr pour tous ceux et celles qui s'aventurent dans le labyrinthe de partici-

armements. — *Stéphane Roussel*  
Stéphane Roussel est candidat à la  
maîtrise au département de science  
politique, à l'Université du Québec à

(Ouvrage publié avec l'aide  
financière de l'Institut).  
Montréal.  
Amérique centrale.

**enjeux politiques**  
Alain Desexhe  
Éditions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1989  
276 pages, 15,95 \$

du Salvador tandis que le dictateur Anastasio Somoza fut le Nicaragua sous le feu des révolutionnaires sandinistes. À Washington, l'Amérique centrale se retrouve inopinément «promue au rôle peu convoité d'en-jeu vital pour la sécurité des États-

Unis». Dix ans et 200 000 morts plus tard, Alain Destexhe situe, à cette date, l'An 1 de la crise centre-américaine et son ouvrage, pour une bonne part, cherche à en retracer les origines et le déroulement.

Faut-il parler d'une ou de plusieurs crises en Amérique centrale ? À travers un précieux rappel historique qui va de l'indépendance du début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle jusqu'à 1980, l'auteur explique comment les

crises nationales qui affectèrent à divers degrés les pays de l'isthme en sont venues à se combiner, sous

ment sur les problèmes de vérité-

La diplomatie interalliée (rôle de médiateur entre les États-Unis et l'Europe).  
Les auteurs terminent par un sur-

vol général de l'apport du Canada aux différentes séries de négociations sur le désarmement, ainsi que par une évaluation de la gestion des politiques canadiennes dans ce domaine, tant au sein de l'appareil

Cet ouvrage permet de mesurer l'ampleur des difficultés qui ont marqué la recherche des différents accords sur la réduction des armements et de façon plus implicite, de faire ressortir les points de vue divergents.

peu de moyens dont dispose le Canada pour véritablement faire progresser le cours des négociations. Même si l'on admet avec les auteurs que « l'influence canadienne en matière de désarmement » de con-

trôle des armements est allée bien au-delà de ce que l'on était en droit d'attendre d'un petit ou d'un grand pays comme le Canada», il n'en demeure pas moins que cette influence ne s'est exercée que dans un

nombre limité de dossiers. Plus en-  
core, l'histoire tend à démontrer que  
l'activité canadienne ne fut que  
rarement déterminante. Mais ce bi-  
lan reste fortement lié à celui que  
l'on peut tirer de l'ensemble des

pourparlers qui se sont engagés de 1945 à 1988. Ainsi, en dépit de quelques succès au niveau du contrôle des armements (CTB, TNP, mesures de confiance), le processus de désarmement multilatéral s'est,


Dans cette perspective, la plus grande contribution canadienne fut sans doute d'avoir encouragé et soutenu la poursuite du dialogue. La principale critique qui pourrait être adressée à cet ouvrage est liée

La forme même que les auteurs ont choisie de lui donner. Certains pour-  
ront en effet déplorer le caractère  
essentiellement descriptif de cette  
histoire de la participation cana-  
dienne aux négociations sur le

désarmement puisque, à l'exception de quelques passages, les auteurs ne cherchent pas à interpréter les éléments qu'ils présentent, soit en tenant des hypothèses ou encore en



## LIVRES



### Tous azimuts

Régis Debray

Éditions Odile Jacob/IFEDN

Paris, 1989  
218 pages, 29,95 \$

«Penser l'Europe de la défense,

n'est-ce pas repenser l'Europe

d'aujourd'hui à la lumière de ce que

pourtait être un jour sa défense ou

encore dessiner ce que devrait être

l'Europe de demain pour qu'elle

puisse se défendre après-demain ?»

Voilà l'objet du tout nouveau livre

de Régis Debray.

L'analyse à laquelle se livre Régis

Debray n'est pas sans intérêt. L'au-

teur aborde plusieurs questions

situer au-delà des problèmes sou-

levés. En effet, le lecteur non spé-

cialisé sur les questions de défense

pourra facilement se retrouver dans

cet ouvrage. Réflexion tant philo-

sophique que politique, «Tous azi-

mut» ouvre de nouvelles pistes et

l'avenir du monde occidental.

A l'Europe est en pleine mutation,

un peu après les autres, l'Europe

issue de l'Union commence à être re-

ne se sert pas des conséquences

pour l'Europe et le système inter-

national, tant du point de vue poli-

tique que militaire. De ce fait, pour

sera plus dangereuse que celle de la

«Guerre froide car plus destructi-

menaces : la disparition de la me-

nace». De ce fait, en concentrant

son attention sur un ennemi préfé-

rentiel, c'est-à-dire l'URSS et le

certaine façon, un affaiblissement

du flanc sud de l'Alliance, d'où

pourrait venir la future menace.

Donc, nous sommes passés d'un axe

«Est-Ouest» improbable à un axe

«Nord-Sud» probable.

L'auteur démontre qu'il est

utopique, voire irréalisable, de penser

l'Europe en termes «d'Etats-Unis

d'Europe». Chaque Etat ayant ses

particularités propres, c'est-à-dire

son histoire, sa culture, etc., il sem-

ble difficile de penser que chacun

voudra les remettre en cause. En

fait, comme l'indique si bien De-

bray, l'Amérique a fait du neuf avec

du neuf, l'Europe doit faire du neuf

avec du vieux. Elle doit créer un

système qui lui est propre. «L'Eu-

rope du possible est à présent celle

du consensus».

Une Europe voulant jouer un rôle

sur la scène internationale, amène

à se poser la question : Washing-

ton, Londres, Bonn ou Paris ? Au

niveau des institutions, Régis De-

bray souligne l'incompatibilité des

formules qui prévalent actuellement.

En ce qui concerne l'Organisation

du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord

(OTAN), la prépondérance améri-

caine entraîne une certaine dépen-

dance; la communauté économique

européenne (CEE) n'est pas compé-

rente pour formuler des propositions

en matière de défense et l'Union de

l'Europe occidentale (UEO), bien

qu'étant habilitée à traiter des ques-

tions de défense, «n'a ni troupe ni

commandement propre». Il faudrait

plutôt augmenter la coopération au

lieu de créer un nouvel organisme

voué sans doute, comme les trois

autres, à un échec institutionnel.

Voulait créer une stratégie unique,

une armée unique et un commande-

ment unique ne serait qu'un leurre;

mieux vaut unir les forces et les

faiblesses au lieu de vouloir niveler

les postures et les doctrines.

Abordant le cas de la France,

l'auteur fait ressortir certaines

ambiguïtés résultant de la politique

allemande est-il possible ? Ces deux

pays peuvent-ils avoir une stratégie

commune ? Bien que ce sujet ait fait

l'objet de beaucoup d'analyses et de

discussions, il semble utopique de

stratégie commune est difficile à

obtenir et ce, pour plusieurs rai-

sons : les priorités, les marges de

manoeuvres et les affirmations des deux

pays ne sont pas les mêmes. De par

sa position sur le continent euro-

péen, l'auteur démontre un illo-

gisme de la politique militaire

française, qui est de penser terrestre

en oubliant le côté maritime. Quoi-

que cette option ne soit pas rejetée

(tout pousse à la France à la main-

tenir), il faut remarquer que «notre

défense nationale elle-même ne se

joue plus aux frontières terrestres,

mais très loin de nos côtes, par

100 mètres de fond au moins

(SMLB) et dans l'espace, sur orbite

géostationnaire».

La solution de Régis Debray est

simple. Il prône un retour au con-

cept gaullien tous azimuts. L'Eu-

rope, et donc la France, ne devrait

plus penser leur stratégie en fonc-

tion d'un ennemi préférentiel,

concept qui ne semble plus corres-

pondre à la réalité d'aujourd'hui,

mais bien instaurer un nouveau sys-

tème de défense qui ne soit dirigé

contre personne, donc tous azimuts,

utilisant toutes les ressources des

pays européens et lui permettant

d'assurer son indépendance et de

prendre en main son destin.

— Pierre Lhotellin

Pierre Lhotellin est chercheur en

relations internationales, à Montréal.

**Le Canada et le désarmement**

**1945-1988**

Albert Legault et Michel Fortmann

Presses de l'Université Laval/CQRI,

Québec, 1989  
640 pages, 39 \$

L'intérêt porté aux questions de

désarmement constitue une cons-

tante de la politique existant cana-

dienne, le Canada ayant participé à

la presque totalité des discussions

de cette dernière. L'un axe franco-

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
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## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Elle a écrit un livre sur les Pales-tiniens qui paraîtra bientôt en Anglais. Estelle Laferrière a été secrétaire de direction, quand Nicole Campbell-Morel a quitté l'Institut.

À la mi-avril, l'Institut a co-parrainé l'Expo-Science, forte scientifique pan-québécoise; les finales ont eu lieu à Hull, cette année. Le thème en était « Un projet pour ma planète ». Dix gagnant(e)s ont été choisie(s), et il(elles) participeront à une foire scientifique internationale à Prague.

Un certain nombre de colloques ont eu lieu pendant le trimestre : d'une journée sur la coopération économique en Europe, avant que se tienne la réunion de la SCSA à Bonn; l'ambassadeur David Peel et les membres de son personnel de Vienne ont mené une discussion sur les négociations concernant la limitation des armes conventionnelles.

À la fin d'avril, le président Vassilou de la République de Chypre a pris la parole pendant une réunion qui se tenait à l'Institut. Le 24 avril, Vitaliy Korotich, rédacteur en chef de la revue *Ogonyok* et membre du Congrès soviétique des députés du peuple, a mené un colloque sur l'évolution de la conjoncture en URSS.

Brad Feezey a fait un exposé à la conférence du printemps de l'Independent Schools History Teachers Association in Ontario, au Collège du Haut-Canada (*Upper Canada College*). Paul Gray, professeur de l'histoire à Parry Sound, a amené des élèves de sa classe d'histoire du Canada et des États-Unis à l'Institut pour les faire participer à une table ronde.

Nancy Gordon a représenté l'Institut à l'Assemblée générale annuelle de la Commission canadienne pour l'UNESCO, qui a eu lieu à Hull, en avril. Federico Mayor, Directeur général de l'UNESCO, a pris la parole pendant la réunion. À l'Institut, l'Assemblée générale an-

ciennes de la Commission canadienne pour l'UNESCO, qui a eu lieu à Hull, en avril. Federico Mayor, Directeur général de l'UNESCO, a pris la parole pendant la réunion. À l'Institut, l'Assemblée générale an-

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« Les changements climatiques, la sécurité internationale et le concept de gouvernement mondial », était le titre d'une conférence organisée par l'Institut à la mi-avril à Ottawa. Mettant l'accent sur l'incidence des changements climatiques sur la sécurité, la conférence a rassemblé des parlementaires, des dignitaires, des universitaires et des membres d'organismes non gouvernementaux. Le lecteur peut trouver un résumé des faits saillants de la conférence à la page 7.

À la mi-mars, l'Institut et la maison *Sumnerhill Press* ont lancé l'ouvrage de Boyce Richardson intitulé *Time to Change*; un extrait de ce livre a paru dans le numéro du printemps de *Paix et Sécurité*.

Deirdre Collings vient de se joindre au personnel de l'Institut en tant que chercheuse; elle s'occupera principalement de coordonner la réalisation d'un projet sur le Liban. Elle est diplômée de l'Université Carleton, où elle a mené des études spécialisées sur le Moyen-Orient.

Les activités du Fonds seront gérées par un Conseil de gestion qui comprendra quatre membres du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut et une à trois personnes de l'extérieur. Il incombera au directeur du Fonds d'en surveiller le fonctionnement quotidien; tout ou moins au début, le Secrétaire-trésorier de l'Institut assurera cette fonction.

Pour la gestion du processus, le Fonds conservera le calendrier semestriel ainsi que le mode de répartition des fonds entre deux programmes : la recherche, et les débats publics et l'information. Le personnel offrira continuera à évoluer les demandes quant à la pertinence du sujet et au respect des critères, et pour s'assurer que tous les délais exigés ont été fournis. Ensuite, comme par le passé, les demandes seront analysées par un comité consultatif composé de trois évaluateurs de transmission au Conseil de gestion pour qu'il statue sur chaque cas.

Pour l'année financière 1990-1991, le budget du Fonds sera le même que celui de l'exercice précédent. Les critères de demande ont été modifiés de manière à rendre compte des changements décrits ci-dessus. **Prêt de noter, en particulier, que la date limite pour la présentation des demandes en hiver a été fixée au 30 novembre.** Par conséquent, les dates de tombée seront désormais le 30 juin et le 30 novembre, et l'annonce des résultats est prévue pour octobre et mars respectivement. Nous invitons les candidat(e)s potentielle(s) à communiquer avec le directeur ou les administrateurs du Fonds pour obtenir des formulaires de demande et un exemplaire de l'énoncé des nouveaux critères.

## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

### PAIX, SÉCURITÉ ET NOUVEL ÉQUILIBRE MONDIAL

**P**OUR NOUS TOUS QUI nous intéressons particulièrement aux affaires internationales, la situation que nous vivons aujourd'hui est à la fois exaltante et troublante. Exaltante parce que nous assistons au lever extraordinaire, rapide et le plus souvent pacifique du triste rideau de la Guerre froide qui a tant assombri la scène internationale depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Troublante (du moins, elle devrait l'être) parce qu'aucun d'entre nous n'avait prévu la nature, la date ni les modalités des événements qui se sont déroulés. Pour la première fois peut-être, la sécurité de l'espèce humaine tout entière est compromise par des dangers qui ne sont pas attribuables à l'hostilité entre les humains. Le réchauffement de la planète, par exemple, pourrait causer plus de tort à l'humanité au cours du siècle prochain que toutes les guerres de l'histoire.

La menace qui plane sur l'environnement terrestre et sur les systèmes vitaux, ne constitue que le symptôme le plus évident de l'interdépendance mondiale. Si nous ne parvenons pas à mieux gérer les dossiers tels que ceux du commerce, des investissements et du protectionnisme, de la dette, des taux de change et des transferts de technologie, les chocs entre les différents pays seront certainement de plus en plus violents, dommageables et dangereux.

**A**FFRONTEMENT MILITAIRE ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST demeure un élément clef dans l'équation de notre sécurité. Même si les négociations de Vienne sur la réduction des armes conventionnelles et les pourparlers américano-soviétiques sur la réduction des armes stratégiques sont couronnés de succès, l'URSS et les États-Unis ainsi que certains autres pays seront encore des nations très armées ne se faisant pas encore suffisamment confiance et ne partageant pas assez de valeurs communes pour écarter toute possibilité de conflit armé d'envieure. Tant que la modernisation de certaines armes se poursuivra de part et d'autre et que grandes réductions équilibrées possibles des forces armées, de manière à abaisser considérablement le niveau des arsenaux ainsi que l'ampleur des menaces militaires en Europe. Parallèlement, nous avons tout intérêt à favoriser l'édification d'une nouvelle structure européenne de sécurité qui «gèlera» pour de bon l'ampleur de la menace à ces niveaux inférieurs et offrirait de meilleures façons de résoudre les conflits qui surgissent inévitablement.

L'idée de mettre à profit la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), trinitaire, nous a maintenu une importance relative. Nous avons maintenant une importante tâche à remplir : convaincre les États-Unis qu'une CSCE institutionnalisée ne représente pas un danger pour l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN). Pour garantir la sécurité de l'Atlantique Nord, l'Alliance devra continuer d'offrir une force de dissuasion ou une opposition crédible, face à toute menace militaire possible. Pareille conjonction exigera en Europe la présence de forces américaines importantes, quoique considérablement réduites; et tant qu'il y aura des forces américaines sur le Vieux Continent, le Canada sera pleinement justifié, à mon avis, d'y déployer également des forces armées. Le moment est venu de mettre un terme chez nous au débat simpliste sur la question de savoir s'il faut laisser notre contingent de l'OTAN en Europe ou le retirer; commençons plutôt à nous demander quels rôles nous pourrions le mieux assumer là-bas. Nous avons déjà vu comment certains des virus empoisonnés de l'Europe de l'avant-guerre ont émergé, aussi dangereux que jamais, des glaces de la Guerre froide (affrontements ethniques, etc.). On parle déjà sérieusement de nouveaux mécanismes de gestion des crises et de maintien de la paix, qui relèveraient sans doute de la CSCE ou des Nations-Unies.

Pour que cette perspective se concrétise et qu'elle contribue à préserver les progrès accomplis en Europe sur le plan de la sécurité, il faudra organiser les nouvelles structures, et je ne vois aucun pays soit mieux équipé et plus écouteux, le Canada est sans doute à même de fournir un apport particulièrement utile en déployant un modeste contingent auprès de l'OTAN en Europe.

**A** MON AVIS, CE N'EST PAS DANS LE CADRE DES relations Est-Ouest que l'on risque le plus de voir éclater des conflits militaires importants au cours des décennies à venir. Dans ma revue annuelle de janvier dernier j'ai souligné que nous risquions d'entamer une «décennie de profitez-vous» des armes de destruction massive dans les nombreux pays qui n'en étaient pas dotés jusqu'ici. Ces tendances ne sont pas entièrement inévitables, mais elles vont le devenir si la communauté internationale dans son ensemble ne mobilise pas toutes ses énergies dès aujourd'hui, à la fois pour limiter la diffusion d'armements perfectionnés et pour préconiser dans le monde entier le règlement des conflits et la signature d'accords régionaux de sécurité.

Une fois de plus, je crois qu'il y a pour le Canada des occasions spéciales à saisir, plus nombreuses qu'habituellement en sa qualité de puissance moyenne qui inspire confiance, qui a l'expérience de la médiation et du maintien de la paix et qui a un des programmes d'aide les plus importants et les plus respectés qui soient dans la plupart des régions du tiers-monde. Nous avons gagné par nos actions une bonne mesure de crédibilité et de bonne volonté politique, autant d'atouts que nous pourrions utilement mettre à profit en unissant nos efforts à ceux de nombreux autres pays pour contribuer aux processus régionaux d'instauration de la paix. Mais, nous sommes aux prises avec une étrange apathie «cyclique», une sorte de crise de la quarantaine, et avec une attitude de cynisme à l'endroit des institutions internationales. Les États-Unis sont maintenant le pays le plus éloigné de l'ONU.

**L** EST TEMPS, POUR UN GROUPE DE GOUVERNEMENTS qui représentent toutes les régions du monde et qui sont «sur la même longueur d'ondes» de promouvoir la cause des institutions internationales pour leur permettre de mieux relever les défis tels que les conflits régionaux, le commerce des armes, le trafic de drogues, le terrorisme et la protection de l'environnement, et pour leur donner également les moyens de répondre aux besoins toujours aussi criants de progrès économiques et sociaux dans le tiers-monde. Dans un monde dont il faut admettre qu'il est imparfait, le Canada est considéré comme un modèle de paix et de prospérité, comme un pays qui refuse de tolérance et comme l'expression du nouvel ordre mondial qui semble vouloir se façonner.

Heureusement, la plupart des étrangers ne savent pas encore comment, au cours des dernières mois, Canadiens et Canadiennes, n'avons pas réussi, dans notre propre pays, à sauvegarder ces atouts précieux et rares que sont la tolérance et la capacité de faire des compromis pratiques. Ceux et celles d'entre nous qui oeuvrent dans le domaine de la politique étrangère espèrent que le Canada retrouvera ces deux qualités avant même que le monde s'aperçoive que nous les avons momentanément mises en danger. □

— BERNARD WOOD

*Cet article est tiré d'une allocution prononcée à la mi-avril par M. Bernard Wood devant le Conseil des relations internationales de Montréal.*



# À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



## La Namibie dans les rangs de l'ONU

Le 17 avril, le Conseil de sécurité a accepté à l'unanimité la candidature de la Namibie, qui devient le 160<sup>e</sup> membre des Nations-Unies. L'événement marquant des quatre années de diplomatie internationale, au cours duquel le Canada a joué un rôle important. Selon les propres termes du Secrétaire général, M. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, il pouvait «com- bien le multilatéralisme, synonyme d'union vers un objectif et de co- hèrece dans l'effort, peut se révéler à la fois fructueux et dynamique».

## L'Amérique centrale

Les efforts déployés en ce moment en Amérique centrale proviennent bien le regain de dynamisme que connaît l'organisation mondiale. Le 27 mars, le Conseil de sécurité a voté à l'unanimité l'élargissement du rôle du Groupe d'observateurs des Nations-Unies en Amérique centrale (GONUAC) et l'accroissement de ses effectifs. La force, qui comptait 260 soldats, dont un contingent de Canadiens, passe à quelque 1060 personnes. Le gros des nouveaux venus est fourni par la Venezuela.

À l'origine, le GONUAC avait pour seules tâches de vérifier que les rebelles de la *Contra* ne reçoivent plus d'aide et de patronner le long des frontières pour prévenir des attaques de la guérilla. D'ores et déjà, il lui incombera aussi de récupérer les armes, les munitions, l'équipement militaire et les unités des *Contras*. Aux termes du nouveau mandat, les rebelles se devaient être démobiliés dans des camps existant. Ceux basés au Nicaragua devaient se rendre de des points de rassemblement temporaires (des «zones de sécurité») protégées par les forces du GONUAC.

«La position des États-Unis sur la question des *Contras* est on ne peut plus claire», a déclaré alors

M. James Wilkinson, envoyé américain, au Conseil de sécurité. «Nous voulons qu'ils se démobilisent librement et qu'ils retournent dans leur pays pour contribuer à son développement, et nous les y encourageons.»

Malgré le soutien que les États-Unis apportent à l'action du Conseil de sécurité, le 1<sup>er</sup> mai, les chefs de la *Contra* se trouvant au Nicaragua continuaient d'affirmer qu'ils ne déposeront pas les armes tant que les Sandinistes n'auront pas abandonné le pouvoir à l'armée nicaraguayenne. Les *Contras* basés au Honduras ont coopéré avec le GONUAC et se sont volontairement démobilisés, mais le gros des forces accusées est resté au Nicaragua. Le 20 avril, le Conseil de sécurité a de nouveau étendu le mandat du GONUAC pour lui attribuer un rôle de surveillance du cessez-le-feu entré en vigueur la veille. Ce cessez-le-feu faisait suite à un accord conclu entre des représentants du gouvernement nicaraguayen et le gouvernement élu, les *Contras* et l'archevêque de Managua.

Une autre question latino-américaine a brièvement retenu l'attention du Conseil. En effet, il s'est réuni le 9 février pour entendre une plainte de Cuba, qui accusait un navire de la garde-côte américaine d'avoir ouvert le feu, dans le Golfe du Mexique, sur un cargo affrété par Cuba que les Américains voulaient fouiller, certains d'y trouver de la drogue. Cuba a traité les Américains de «pirates des temps modernes».

Les États-Unis ont répondu que les garde-côtes avaient agi en toute légalité, puis que Washington avait reçu du Panama l'autorisation de monter à bord du cargo battant pavillon panaméen.

Le Conseil a levé la séance sans envisager d'adopter une résolution. Plusieurs membres du Conseil ont laissé entendre qu'il était improbable que l'affaire ait des prolongements parce que l'acte des États-Unis ne constituait pas une grave violation du droit international.

## Le Moyen-Orient

Le 15 mars, le Conseil de sécurité s'est réuni pour examiner des allégations selon lesquelles Israël aurait l'intention d'installer des

Juifs soviétiques immigrants dans les territoires occupés. On estime que de 50 000 à 100 000 Juifs soviétiques émigreront cette année en Israël. La réunion a eu lieu à la demande de l'URSS, dont le délégué a exhorté Israël à «évaluer sérieusement la situation». Ce même délégué a déclaré que l'installation d'immigrants dans les territoires occupés constituait un nouvel obstacle à la paix. La question, a-t-il déclaré, n'était pas de savoir si l'Union soviétique devait arrêter l'émigration, mais qu'Israël prenne ses responsabilités.

Le représentant de l'Organisation des États arabes, qui s'est tenue le 19 mars, a appelé que le Canada n'a pas ré- que les Israéliens exercent sur les territoires occupés. «Le Canada s'opposera, et continuera de s'opposer, à toutes les actions entreprises par le gouvernement israélien pour modifier la structure démographique des territoires occupés, notamment dans les mois à venir», a déclaré M. Fortier. Le président du Conseil a levé la séance en précisant que le débat reprendrait à une date ultérieure non déterminée.

## L'Irak et l'Irak

Le 27 février, pour donner un coup de pouce aux négociations de paix entre l'Irak et l'Irak, le Conseil a demandé aux deux pays de «co- opérer pleinement» aux efforts que le Secrétaire général déploie pour entre eux.

Dans une déclaration, le Conseil a exprimé son soutien aux propositions du Secrétaire général appelant à une nouvelle série de pourparlers

qui, placée sous ses auspices, dure- rait deux mois et se déroulerait dans un programme précis. Ce programme n'a pas été rendu public, mais on pense qu'il comportera huit points visant à assurer l'application de la Résolution 598, sur laquelle repose l'accord de paix imposé par l'ONU.

Le 29 mars, le Conseil a prolongé de six mois le mandat du Groupe d'observateurs militaires des Nations-Unies en Iran-Irak (GOMNUII). Pendant cette réunion, le Secrétaire général a informé les membres du Conseil qu'il «essaierait» que les deux gouvernements étaient «décidés à saisir l'occasion de l'impulsion créée par la déclaration faite le 27 février par le Conseil de sécurité». Mais il a également demandé aux deux parties de lui faire savoir si elles acceptaient le programme proposé et de «relancer les négociations en proclamant mutuellement leur sincérité et leur détermination à appliquer la Résolution 598».

## Chypre

Le 12 mars, à propos d'autres négociations se déroulant sous l'égide des Nations-Unies, le Conseil a demandé aux deux communautés chypriotes de poursuivre leurs efforts en vue de créer une république fédérale indépendante, souveraine et non alignée. Cet appel est intervenu après que M. Rauf Denktash (dirigeant des Chypriotes turcs) et M. George Vassiliou (président de la République de Chypre) n'ont pu parvenir à un accord au terme d'une semaine de négociations, à New York. Faisant le bilan des pourparlers, le Secrétaire général a déclaré au Conseil, «étant donné les circonstances, j'en suis arrivé à la conclusion, regrettable, que nous nous trouvons dans une impasse difficile et que l'essence même du mandat de bons offices que le Conseil m'a donné est remise en question, ainsi que les bases des négociations, par contrecoup». □

—TREVOR ROWE

# EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



## Le budget

■ Le ministre des Finances, M. Michael Wilson, a déposé le budget fédéral le 20 février. Les grandes coupes attendues dans les secteurs de la défense et de l'aide extérieure ne se sont pas matérialisées, bien qu'on ait limité le taux de croissance annuel des deux cas, au cours des deux prochaines années, à 5 p. 100, ce qui correspond à peu près au taux d'inflation. Le budget total des Affaires étrangères a, à toutes fins utiles, été plafonné à 1,1 milliard de dollars pour 1990-1991, tandis que celui de la Défense nationale a augmenté de 655 millions pour passer à 12 milliards; 2,5 milliards de dollars seront affectés à l'aide extérieure.

Dans le budget de 1989, les fonds réservés à l'aide extérieure avaient subi des coupes profondes, et leur valeur était passée de 0,49 à 0,43 p. 100 du Produit national brut. Plus tôt cette année, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, avait mené une campagne publique pour empêcher toute autre réduction du budget de l'aide extérieure et, bien que ses efforts aient de toute évidence été couronnés de succès, il est peu probable, vu le plafonnement des dépenses, que se réalise sa prédiction, à savoir que le rapport susmentionné passerait à 0,45 p. 100 cette année.

Le seul grand programme à être rayé du budget de la Défense est celui du bris-glaces *Polar 8*. Le gouvernement a prétendu que cette coupe de 660 millions de dollars se justifiait par l'accord bilatéral conclu en 1988 avec les États-Unis, en vertu duquel ceux-ci promettaient de noifier le Canada avant d'envoyer leurs bris-glaces dans le Pas-du-Nord-Ouest. Notre pays revendique des droits souverains sur ces eaux, tandis que Washington continue de soutenir qu'il s'agit là d'une voie maritime internationale. À la Chambre des communes le 13 mars, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, a fait valoir

## en Europe

### L'évolution de la conjoncture

■ Au cours d'une brève visite à Ottawa, le ministre ouest-allemand des Affaires étrangères, M. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a témoigné devant le Comité des affaires étrangères (Communes), le 5 avril; il a alors exhorté le Canada, les États-Unis et la Communauté européenne à envisager de redéfinir leurs relations à la lumière des changements s'opérant rapidement dans l'ordre politique européen. Regardant au-delà de la réunification allemande, M. Genscher a évoqué l'intégration grandissante des douze membres de la Communauté : « Nous marchons vers l'union politique de l'Europe, l'Europe de la Communauté... » Selon lui, l'OTAN, y compris les troupes américaines et canadiennes, conservera un rôle important aux fins de la sécurité européenne; il a cependant prédit que la mission de l'Alliance deviendrait plus politique et que l'on mettrait désormais davantage l'accent sur la vérification, la limitation des armements, le renforcement de la confiance et l'établissement de structures coopératives de sécurité en Europe.

Le 11 mars, la Lituanie a proclamé son indépendance, et le lendemain, la Chambre des communes lui a accordé unanimement son approbation. Les représentants du gouvernement ont pris soin de souligner que le Canada n'avait jamais reconnu juridiquement l'occupation des trois républiques baltes par l'URSS.

En dépit des déclarations officielles, le Canada, tout comme ses alliés occidentaux, a opéré pour une attitude empreinte de jugement. C'est ce qui a transpiré d'une entrevue accordée par le député Patrick Boyer, secrétaire parlementaire de Joe Clark, après un ralliement pro-indépendance à Toronto, au début d'avril. Il aurait déclaré que le problème tenait au fait que le Canada et d'autres pays trouvaient difficile de

## En Afrique

■ Joe Clark a informé les Communes le 7 mars sur la visite qu'il avait effectuée du 26 au 28 février à Lusaka, en Zambie, ville où l'*African National Congress* (ANC) en exil a son quartier général. M. Clark s'est alors réuni avec M. Nelson Mandela et des dirigeants des États de la ligne de front qui ont mené la lutte contre l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud. Il a précisé que M. Mandela était on ne peut plus clair sur la question des sanctions et, de dire M. Clark, « je lui ai pris d'indiquer comment et dans quel domaine il y aurait lieu de ce faire ».

La ministre des Relations extérieures, Monique Landry, a rendu visite aux Communes, le 28 mars, sur sa récente visite en Éthiopie et sur les efforts diplomatiques et humanitaires que le Canada déploie dans ce pays. La Chambre a sanctionné à l'unanimité une résolution condamnant toutes les parties au conflit qui se servent de la nourriture comme d'une arme pour atteindre des objectifs stratégiques, militaires et politiques, et qui refusent d'aider les organismes donateurs internationaux à faire parvenir la nourriture aux faibles dans la région.

### Les comités parlementaires

Le Comité des affaires étrangères (Communes) a poursuivi son étude sur les relations de notre pays avec l'Europe de l'Est et l'Union soviétique, et il s'est rendu à Moscou, Leningrad, Kiev, Berlin et Bonn entre le 20 avril et le 5 mai. On ne sait pas au juste quand le Comité envisage de rendre compte de ses conclusions à la Chambre, mais un rapport sur le voyage est attendu en chambre avant l'ajournement des débats à la fin de juin.

Le Comité de la défense nationale (Communes) s'affaire à rédiger l'ébauche de son rapport sur la souveraineté maritime du Canada. Le rapport définitif sera déposé devant

la Chambre avant la fin de juin. Le Comité a tenu des audiences au début de mai sur la sûreté du CF-18, après que cinq écrasements survenus cette année eurent entraîné la mort de quatre pilotes. Depuis l'acquisition des 138 chasseurs à réaction en 1982, treize se sont écrasés et huit pilotes ont été tués. Le ministre de la Défense nationale soutient que des facteurs humains, et non des défaillances mécaniques, expliquent plus élevé que dans les forces aériennes d'autres pays employant d'autres versions du même appareil.

### En bref

■ Du 18 au 23 avril, le Canada a accueilli à Yellowknife des hauts dignitaires des huit pays circumpolaires (les quatre pays scandinaves, l'Islande, les États-Unis, l'URSS et le Canada) pour discuter des problèmes environnementaux propres à l'Arctique. C'était seulement la deuxième fois dans l'histoire que ces pays se réunissaient en tant que groupe; le premier « sommet » de ce genre avait eu lieu en Finlande en 1989. Le nouvel intérêt que l'on manifeste pour la coopération multilatérale à l'égard de l'Arctique atteste pour une large part des changements profonds s'étant opérés dans les attitudes soviétiques.

Le gouvernement fédéral a entériné la mise en oeuvre des plans annoncés en 1988 relativement à la création d'un institut international pour le développement durable; il s'agit d'un institut de recherche et d'éducation publique s'intéressant surtout à l'environnement et au développement, notamment dans le tiers-monde. Cet organisme s'installera à Winnipeg et recevra 5 millions de dollars par année pour une période de cinq ans. Les fonds proviendront de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), d'environnement Canada et du gouvernement manitobain.


Lloyd McChinnis, président-directeur général de la maison *Wardrop Engineering*, a été nommé président du conseil d'administration. □

— GREGORY WIRICK





# CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



## Pourparlers sur la réduction des armements stratégiques (START)

Des progrès « importants » vers la conclusion d'un traité START ont, dit-on, été accomplis au sommet à Moscou du 7 au 9 février. Les deux parties sont parvenues à un accord sur deux des trois questions en litige : la réduction du nombre de missiles de croisière et des missiles de moyenne portée. Quant à la troisième, celle des missiles de croisière, les deux parties ont convenu de continuer à négocier. Les deux parties ont également convenu de continuer à négocier la réduction du nombre de missiles de croisière et des missiles de moyenne portée.

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## Europe (CFE)

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## La conférence sur l'ouverture des espaces aériens

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## — RON PURVER

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10 AOUT AU 14 SEPTEMBRE

prochains, les Etats signataires du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) doivent se réunir à Genève pour examiner le fonctionnement du Traité. L'événement est important, car ce sera la dernière rencontre de ce genre avant que les parties se réunissent de nouveau en 1995 pour décider si le Traité demeure en vigueur pour une période indéfinie, ou s'il sera prorogé pour une ou plusieurs périodes supplémentaires d'une durée déterminée.

Le TNP (comme on l'appelle communément) a été ouvert à la signature en 1968, après de nombreuses années de négociations aux Nations-Unies; il vise expressément à prévenir la dissémination de l'arme nucléaire. Selon les dispositions du Traité qui est entré en vigueur en 1970, chaque Etat doit d'ores et déjà s'engager à ne pas transférer ses armes à qui que ce soit. Les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires, pour leur part, acceptent de ne pas en faire l'acquisition. Pour que le respect de cette obligation soit confirmé, ces derniers s'engagent également à soumettre toutes leurs activités nucléaires pacifiques aux mesures de garanties prévues par l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA).

La Conférence de 1990 (tout comme celles de 1975, 1980 et 1985) s'inscrit dans le cadre des conférences quinquennales prévues par le Traité et elle a pour but de s'assurer que les objectifs et les dispositions du Traité sont en voie de réalisation. Au cours des trois conférences précédentes, toutefois, l'unanimité à ce sujet n'a pas toujours été acquise.

Pour les Etats signataires non dotés d'armes nucléaires, le TNP n'a pas seulement pour but de prévenir la dissémination de l'arme; il vise également à assurer le désarmement nucléaire. Aux termes de l'Article VI, par exemple, «toutes les parties s'engagent à poursuivre de bonne foi et à une date rapprochée des négociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives à la cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires et au désarmement nucléaire». De plus, le Préambule du Traité rappelle que «les parties au Traité interdisant les essais d'armes nucléaires dans l'atmosphère, dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique et sous l'eau (PTBT), sont résolues à en arriver à un arrêt complet de toutes les explosions d'armes atomiques...»

Etant donné la multiplication quantitative et qualitative des armements nucléaires chez les puissances signataires dotées de ces engins (c'est-à-dire les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Union soviétique), plusieurs Etats non «nucléaires» ont reproché à ces pays, dans le passé, de ne pas œuvrer pleinement à la réalisation des objectifs du TNP. En fait, selon eux, les obligations du Traité en matière de désarmement incomberaient avant tout aux seules puissances qui, en vertu des dispositions du Traité, peuvent posséder ces armes et continuer à procéder à des essais nucléaires. Le contenu de ce sujet fut tel

## COMPLÉMENT DU CONDENSE

# LA QUATRIÈME CONFÉRENCE D'EXAMEN DU TRAITÉ SUR LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES

Bien que des progrès importants aient été accomplis en ce qui concerne les questions de désarmement nucléaire (notamment depuis la conclusion du Traité de 1987 sur les FNL, qui élimine toute une catégorie de missiles et, plus récemment, avec l'avancement des négociations START sur une réduction possible de près de 50 p. 100 des armements nucléaires stratégiques), on s'attend tout de même à ce que la question d'une interdiction complète des essais nucléaires marque profondément les discussions de la Conférence de 1990. À cet égard, deux des trois gouvernements dépositaires du PTBT (les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne) ont déclaré ouvertement qu'ils s'opposeraient à l'initiation de signataires voulant convertir cet accord en un Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires, lors d'une conférence d'amendement prévue pour janvier 1991. Leurs efforts ne devraient pas passer inaperçus à la Conférence du TNP.

Laide au développement de l'énergie atomique à des fins pacifiques est considérée par plusieurs comme un autre objectif important du TNP. Toutefois, comme les technologies nucléaires sont moins en demande (à cause principalement de facteurs économiques et environnementaux comme l'accident de Tchernobyl), la question devait soulever moins de discussions qu'aux conférences précédentes. Par ailleurs, le problème de la capacité nucléaire des Etats non signataires pourrait, encore une fois, créer une vive controverse. Sur ce point, nombreux sont les pays qui reprochent au TNP de ne pas interdire la coopération entre les Etats signataires et les Etats non signataires, car ces derniers n'acceptent pas les vérifications complètes de l'AIEA, alors qu'il n'existe presque aucune différenciation possible entre les technologies nucléaires à buts pacifiques et celles servant à des fins militaires.

## Les enjeux

Quand le Traité est entré en vigueur en 1970, quarante parties y adhéraient. Il y en a maintenant quelque 140, soit plus que pour n'importe quel autre accord de limitation des armements jamais négocié. En vingt ans d'existence, l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique n'a décelé aucune dérogation aux obligations du Traité, et

aucune des parties n'a fait appel à son droit de retrait, dont un pays peut se prévaloir aux termes de l'entente s'il estime que ses intérêts suprêmes sont menacés. Bien qu'il soit maintenant reconnu comme la pierre angulaire du régime international pour prévenir la dissémination de l'arme atomique, le TNP demeure tout de même un instrument fragile. La Chine et la France n'y ont pas encore adhéré (quoique des rumeurs circulent voulant que Paris ait l'intention d'adhérer au Traité), ce qui fait que seules trois des cinq puissances dotées d'armes nucléaires sont officiellement liées par les obligations du Traité. De plus, l'absence de l'Israël, de l'Afrique du Sud, de l'Inde, du Pakistan, du Brésil et de l'Argentine, nous soupçonne d'avoir ou de vouloir acquiescer à un armement nucléaire, continue d'être une menace grave pour l'accord.

En dépit des débats importants que certaines questions risquent de soulever, personne ne pense que la Conférence de 1990 échouera. On prévoit, toutefois, que cette réunion des parties pourrait marquer l'annonce des discussions sur l'avenir du Traité après 1995. À ce sujet, et comme cela se discute déjà dans certains milieux, l'idée de prolonger le TNP pour un seul terme de très courte durée en contrepartie, par exemple, d'un traité ferme en faveur de la conclusion d'un traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires à une date précise pourrait monopoliser les discussions officielles de la Conférence. Pour les partisans du TNP, cependant, l'adoption d'une telle stratégie serait très dangereuse et pourrait entraîner la perte du Traité.

Si l'on met fin au Traité, l'AIEA perdra le droit d'inspecter plusieurs programmes nucléaires (notamment grâce à l'application des mesures de vérification de l'Agence) comme servant à des fins pacifiques seulement. L'énergie nucléaire ne pouvant être fractionnée entre atomes civils et atomes militaires, la perte du système TNP-AIEA aurait pour conséquence de jeter un voile d'incertitude sur de nombreux programmes nucléaires. Cette incertitude serait d'autant plus grande que, selon les données actuelles, pas moins de trente pays possèderaient désormais les moyens de fabriquer une arme nucléaire d'ici la fin de la décennie.


Entre la découverte de l'énergie atomique et la mise en œuvre du TNP, quelque vingt-cinq ans se sont écoulés. Pendant cette période, de nombreuses tentatives pour empêcher une plus grande prolifération des armes nucléaires se sont succédées avec plus ou moins de succès. Même si le Traité n'est pas sans faiblesses, ses partisans reconnaissent les difficultés insurmontables que présenterait la mise en œuvre d'un nouvel accord international de non-prolifération, et c'est pourquoi le succès de la Conférence d'examen de 1990 est très important pour eux. □

— MARIE-FRANCE DESJARDINS

Martie-France Desjardins est chercheuse à l'Institut.

Ce que les Blancs d'Afrique du Sud n'ont pas encore compris, c'est que les récents événements ont transformé les idéologues de la rhétorique stalinienne en la France la plus progressiste et la plus modérée du Congrès national africain. Avec un bloc soviétique qui recherche la paix et des investissements au lieu d'une révolution mondiale, les communistes sud-africains n'ont nulle part où aller sinon chez eux. Cette situation fait d'eux des alliés inattendus du projet de négociations de Pretoria. Le socialisme que professe le PCAS pour la deuxième étape, après que la démocratie aura été établie, dépend, selon les propres paroles de son dirigeant, Joe Slovo, des «forces sociales en présence» à ce moment-là. Autrement dit, cela met le socialisme en réserve : une fois que le capitalisme non raciste aura livré ses marchandises, les partis socialistes marxistants plujit «daltoniens» rétro-croient ou deviendront sociaux-démocrates, comme ailleurs dans le monde entier.

Grâce à son ancienne image radicale, la direction du PCAS peut entraîner une jeunesse sceptique dans le processus de négociation. De ce point de vue, le gouvernement devrait accueillir les drapeaux rouges au lieu d'en avoir peur. Si quelque un peut empêcher un racisme à rebours latent de se concrétiser et faire qu'une attitude non raciste prévaille, ce sont les marxistes classiques avec leur universalisme internationaliste. La police secrète défilait quotidiennement la chronique des journaux et les lecteurs, électrisés, ont du mal à faire la différence entre la réalité rapportée dans le *Capetown Times* et la fiction littéraire. Il serait impardonnable qu'une amitié ne coupe pas court à la période des révélations. Il est essentiel, pour la nature de la nouvelle société dont les fondements moraux reposent sur une conscience his-torique juste, de déterminer la vérité. La phase des révélations n'a pas pour objectif d'établir la responsabilité pénale des différents auteurs des crimes, mais la responsabilité de la classe politique et de l'administration qui, en premier lieu, ont permis et encouragé les crimes. Si le nouvel ordre doit être différent de l'ancien qualitativement, il devra modifier ces cadres institutionnels et non les maintenir sous une nouvelle direction. Le Zimbabwe a commis cette erreur de conserver la législation d'urgence adoptée par son prédécesseur.



Jerry K. L.

LA RAPIDITÉ DE CETTE MÉTAMORPHOSE POLITIQUE N'A PAS ENCORE PERMIS À ceux qui seront probablement tenus à l'écart de la nouvelle alliance d'en saisir les conséquences. Même les optimistes profitent un peu de la gloire de leurs dirigeants quand ceux-ci sont admis dans les allées du pouvoir. Mais la tendance à la reconquête signifie que le désastre pointe sous la surface :

pour au lendemain, oppresseurs et terroristes font figure de centristes dans la politique sud-africaine.»

Comme l'a fait observer un commentateur avec une ironie désabusée : «Du seuil du CNA répond aux attentes des Blancs, pas aux aspirations des blancs de cette solution qui visait à endiguer l'afflux des Noirs au Cap. doit se trouver aussi étranger au cloaque de Khyabitha que les concep-tions blanches de cette solution qui visait à endiguer l'afflux des Noirs au Cap. Gucsi, dans les rangs desquels on compte deux femmes, pour le principe, nante du Congrès national africain, en costumes impeccables et mantes

«d'approchement», le centre qui s'était élargi risque de se rétrécir. La violence aveugle au Natal et ailleurs donne un avant-goût de l'anarchie qui est prête à émerger si le projet de charte équitable pour une société non raciste échoue. Combien de fois Mandela peut-il se permettre d'être ignoré quand il demande que l'on jette les armes à la mer ? Qu'importe les nobles tentatives déployées pour l'empêcher, le recours aux armes est la revanche inévitable de l'amère histoire sud-africaine. Ceux qui représentent les opprimés ont-ils conscience de cette dialectique ? Ou bien le goût du pouvoir les a-t-il aussi rendu aveugles à l'ombre magique de la montagne de la Table ?

SI LE GOUVERNEMENT SUD-AFRICAIN AVAIT DEMANDÉ À UNE AGENCE DE RELATIONS publiques de concevoir une campagne pour discréditer le CNA, elle n'aurait pu rédiger meilleur scénario. Toutefois, le gouvernement et le CNA luxent d'affaiblir un partenaire modéré de crainte que des rivaux extrémistes prennent le pouvoir et que l'Afrique du Sud sombre dans une guerre civile meurtrière. On rapporte qu'au cours d'un dîner, l'infiniment petit P. W. Botha essaya de convaincre son invité du CNA de la nécessité de l'idéologie de participation naissante en recourant à l'analogie suivante : «Nous sommes tous dans le même bateau et les requins qui rodent à gauche comme à droite ne feront pas de différence entre nous quand nous tomberons par dessus bord.» Mandela parle sincèrement du Parti national et du CNA comme des «principaux acteurs» et des «associés majoritaires», reléguant ainsi les rivaux minoritaires, opposés à l'hégémonie de son mouvement, de l'autre côté de la table.

Le dirigeant d'un ancien parti stalinien, qu'est le bras droit de Mandela, est devenu l'idée fixe des Blancs d'Afrique du Sud. De fait, des membres dévoués et intelligents du PCAS occupent la plupart des postes influents au sein du CNA et des syndicats, en tant que résistants séparés d'avant-garde. Révéler son appartenance secrète, comme ce serait normal dans un pays démocratique, pourrait embarrasser le PCAS. Cela reviendrait, en montrant son rôle prédominant dans le CNA, à donner raison à la propagande gouvernementale.

NOUS NOUS EXPLIQUONS ENCORE MAL COMMENT LES DIRIGEANTS DES VICTIMES de l'humiliation qu'est l'*apartheid* peuvent si facilement oublier que l'ave-nir est toujours prisonnier du passé. Peut-être ne montrent-ils pas d'amertume et ne crèvent-ils pas vengeance parce qu'ils n'ont pas à affirmer leur identité. Barbara Massekala, membre du CNA qui a passé l'essentiel de son exil aux États-Unis, a mis en évidence une différence cruciale en disant : «Le régime de l'*apartheid* n'a pas pu nous priver de notre culture, de notre langue et de notre patrimoine, ce qui n'est pas le cas des Noirs américains, que l'on a dépossédés de leur culture africaine.» Pour cette raison, conclut-elle, «le Noir sud-africain moyen n'est pas aliéné» et il n'y a pas, en Afrique du Sud, de polarisation raciale à l'américaine.

En d'autres termes, les Noirs d'Afrique du Sud ont été soumis mais pas vaincus spirituellement. Par son attitude et son discours, Nelson Mandela fait preuve d'une fierté et d'une assurance qui égalent celles de ses oppresseurs. Il a même appris leur langue méprisée, mais pas pour gagner un droit d'entrée en tant que sujet colonisé. La conscience noire et un sentiment d'identité débarrassés du complexe d'infériorité propre à une mentalité d'es-clave intériorisée n'ont fait que réaffirmer un authentique antiracisme chez les activistes noirs de toutes tendances politiques. Il n'y a pas de racisme à rebours chez les Noirs. C'est cet universalisme, qui transcende l'étréité raciale, que le gouvernement sud-africain connaît pour la première fois. C'était une condition sine qua non de la remarquable modération. □



# DES RACISTES, DES TERRORISTES ET DES CONCILIATEURS

*Le début, apparemment aimable, des négociations sur l'avenir de l'Afrique du Sud présente de nouvelles inconnues encore plus dangereuses et complexes à résoudre.*

PAR HERIBERT ADAM

se terminant par des procès-verbaux. Sans exprimer d'amertume au terme de décennies de souffrance, sans crier vengeance pour des crimes abominables, Nelson Mandela déclare publiquement qu'il faut oublier le passé. Par cette attitude, il rabrique en fait un nouveau mythe, à savoir que le passé n'importe plus. Cependant, si l'on peut pardonner le passé, on ne peut l'oublier. Légitimement les auteurs des crimes passés de l'*'apartheid'* dans l'intérêt de la paix future devraient accepter une conversion sans repentir. Ce n'est pas sans raison que, dans l'acte qui consiste à se laver des péchés commis, la religion insiste sur la confession et sur la réparation comme preuves symboliques de la sincérité du converti. Cependant, les tenants du pouvoir officiel n'ont encore ni présenté d'excuses ni offert de réparation. Le Parti national ne s'est pas encore excusé des souffrances infligées. Jusqu'ici, il n'a fait que reconnaître l'existence de l'*'apartheid'*, ce qui ne manque pas de cynisme. Proclamer que l'*'apartheid'* est impraticable et le dénoncer comme étant criminel ne revient pas au même.

EN PARDONNANT SANS INSISTER SUR UNE FORME QUELCONQUE DE RÉHABILITATION morale, Nelson Mandela risque bien de compromettre sa crédibilité auprès des membres radicaux de son parti. Il ne suffit pas d'exiger réparation sous la forme de nationalisation. Même sur ce point, pourtant, le CNA a lâché du lest devant les cris poussés dans le monde des affaires et dans les momopies. On ne répartira de nationalisation que si les experts ont dû étudier la jauge réalisable. Ce socialisme est peut-être sensé du point de vue économique, mais les Sud-Africains d'en haut qui exigent des améliorations tangibles maintenant ne comprendront pas qu'on veuille l'instaurer.

En fait, il est aimablement par l'image d'une double présidence. La télévision montre un Frederik De Klerk et un Nelson Mandela qui s'assurent de leur respect mutuel au cours d'une conférence de presse commune. Stephen Gray, un écrivain de Johannesburg, décrit très justement les deux hommes comme «deux grands-pères revigorés qui soulevaient gauche-mment la caméra». Par contre, dans son édition, le plus grand journal du pays les présentait chaleureusement de la façon suivante : «Le toujours jeune, imperturbable et alerte président et le dirigeant noir grand, digne et éloquent assis côte à côte, écrivant l'Histoire ensemble.» A l'arrière d'une Mercedes noire rutilante puis au bar du luxueux Lord Charles Hotel, le président du parti communiste sud-africain (PSCA), parti marxiste-léniniste d'avant-garde, se joint aux cérémonies célébrant l'harmonie.

Pendant ce temps, à une vingtaine de kilomètres de Somerses West, à Khayelisheta et dans l'infâme Crossroads, des milliers de Noirs logés dans des cabanes géant de froid sous la pluie hivernale glaciale qui s'abats sur leurs abris en carton. Les véhicules du convoi du CNA, encadrés par la police et surveillés par un hélicoptère, passent à toute vitesse devant les dunes de sable qui masquent la misère, le long de la Nationale 2. Grâce à la climatisation, leurs occupants n'ont pas à supporter la puanteur ambiante de ces

«un colon, une balle !»,  
lures dans Langa rapportent avoir vu sur les murs des graffiti proclamant-  
la taxant de simple mesure d'apaisement. Des journalistes qui se sont aven-  
le Congrès panafricain (CPA), mouvement dur qui rejette la négociation en  
des *townships* noirs, est déjà devenu une place forte du parti rival du CNA,  
d'un déjeuner au *Cape Sun Hotel*. Le bruit court que Langa, le plus vieux  
prononce une allocution devant les nantis du club de la presse, à l'occasion  
nouveaux spectacles ou les installations sanitaires sont certains. I rabbo Mbeki

Pour des raisons de sécurité, la délégation du CNA ne peut loger dans les *townships* délabrés ni même emprunter les allées sinueuses dont la vue provoque chez eux des expressions horribles. Mais la gérontocratie gris-

E SPECTACLE EXTRAORDINAIRE DU GOUVERNEMENT SUD-AFRICAIN ET DU  
CONGRÈS NATIONAL AFRICAIN (CNA) devenant ensemble et plaisantant  
aimablement pour la première fois nécessaire un certain décadage si  
l'on veut en saisir la portée psychologique. La politique, c'est la ma-

Selon les propres termes du porte-parole du CNA pour les Affaires étrangères, M<sup>r</sup>. Thabo Mbeki, ils ont découvert, à leur grande surprise, qu'ils n'avaient rien de diabolique. Des membres de la redoutable police de sécurité qui surveillaient la délégation du CNA ont sympathisé avec leurs camarades et les autres s'en sont allés à l'appeler par leurs prénoms. Alors que Blancs et Noirs d'Afrique du Sud se demandaient pourquoi des

« Les responsables étaient invités à la résidence officielle des premiers ministres sud-africains, un correspondant s'était fait remarquer, à propos de Thabo Mbeki : « Mais quand il s'est mis à blâquer comme un pygmée en donnant des coups de coude au général Basile Smit, le chef de la police de sécurité, l'inhabitué a tourné au fantasmatique. »

Le coup de foudre entre le Parti national et le CNA est une répétition de l'expérience que beaucoup d'exilés sud-africains de divers horizons politiques vivent quand ils se rencontrent à l'étranger. Libérés du cadre de l'*apartheid* et devenus minorité dans une société étrangère, ils se découvrent une essence sud-africaine commune. Psychologiquement, les relations cordiales établies entre les anciens ennemis mortels s'expliquent par la redécouverte de liens d'origine, d'une parenté refoulée, car ils sont nés de la

Le fait que la famille qui dirige le domaine souhaite la bienvenue à des exilés avec qui elle était rouillée dépasse le simple calcul rationnel en vertu duquel l'approbation du monde extérieur dépend de la reconnaissance du CNA. Le pardon du CNA équivaut à redonner une légitimité au régime as- symétrique. Aujourd'hui, le président sud-africain est accueilli à l'étranger par la grande porte. Les banquiers sud-africains peuvent de nouveau obtenir des prêts à long terme. Petits comme des artisans de la paix kidnoués de prévoyance stratégique, ceux-là mêmes qui furent les ingénieurs de l'*apartheid* tiennent, moralement, le haut du pavé.

CETTE CONSTITUTION EXPLIQUE AUSSI LA REMARQUABLE COHESION AFFICHÉE par le Parti national (PN) durant le processus de changement. La plupart des observateurs avertis s'attendaient à des défections au profit de la droite, si jamais la direction du parti «allait aussi loin». Pourtant, le comité du PN a approuvé les décisions du gouvernement à l'unanimité et lui a présenté ses encouragements et ses félicitations. Ce soutien était d'autant plus surprenant que le président ne lui avait pas dévoilé la teneur exacte de son discours du 2 février. De plus, ce ne sont pas les membres de son propre parti que F. W. De Klerk a consultés pour un avis crucial de dernière minute, mais

La faculté de pardonner dont les victimes font preuve n'est d'ailleurs pas la seule à avoir été mise à l'épreuve. Les victimes ont également été confrontées à la difficulté de faire valoir leurs droits, de faire reconnaître leurs souffrances, de faire reconnaître leurs douleurs. Elles ont dû faire face à la difficulté de faire reconnaître leurs souffrances, de faire reconnaître leurs douleurs. Elles ont dû faire face à la difficulté de faire reconnaître leurs souffrances, de faire reconnaître leurs douleurs.

L'OTAN. Contrairement au bloc des pays de l'Est, qui jouait en fait le rôle d'une courroie de transmission pour le commandement et la coordination militaires soviétiques, l'OTAN a toujours été une alliance d'États souverains, s'intéressant non seulement à des questions militaires, mais aussi à des questions de politique, dont la coordination des différents aspects de la limitation des armements. Il n'y a jamais eu de symétrie entre les activités de ces deux organisations européennes de défense.

Il reste, bien évidemment, que l'OTAN ne peut plus continuer en faisant comme si de rien n'était. Il lui faut trouver de nouvelles méthodes d'intégration militaire avec des forces considérablement réduites, revoir et reformuler sa stratégie nucléaire et, enfin, accorder beaucoup plus d'importance qu'elle ne l'a fait jusqu'à présent à la gestion des accords de limitation des armements. Elle devra également voir dans quelle mesure, dans un monde où les forces militaires sont beaucoup moins cruciales pour les relations politiques internationales, il ne faudrait pas trouver d'autres formes et instances de coopération «transatlantique».

Mais l'OTAN va rester pour l'essentiel un club occidental. Ceux qui ont prétendu que l'Organisation devrait accueillir également les États d'Europe de l'Est omettent trois réalités fondamentales : les pays d'Europe de l'Est, qui viennent tout juste de recouvrer leur indépendance, n'ont aucun désir de se soumettre à une organisation supranationale quelle qu'elle soit ; les pays occidentaux veulent continuer à discuter en vase clos des questions de sécurité et de défense ; et l'Union soviétique rejeterait carrément toute expansion territoriale de l'OTAN à l'Est.

IL Y A AUSSI LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DES douze nations d'Europe occidentale. Ce Marché commun, dont l'intégration va être considérablement renforcée par la réalisation du marché intérieur prévue pour 1992, attire déjà beaucoup les autres pays européens, dont ceux de l'Est. Les richesses et le vaste marché de la Communauté européenne lui ont récemment conféré un nouveau rôle en matière de sécurité : pour les pays d'Europe de l'Est, ce grand marché représente, en effet, l'espoir d'une reprise économique et, partant, d'un renforcement de la stabilité politique. Peut-être qu'un jour, la Pologne, la Hongrie ou la Tchécoslovaquie rempliront les conditions requises pour devenir membres à part entière de la CE ; en attendant, il faut conclure des accords d'association entre la Communauté et les États d'Europe de l'Est.

La Communauté européenne joue donc, on le voit, un rôle stabilisateur et elle est investie, à ce titre, d'une certaine responsabilité en matière de sécurité. Mais elle ne peut pas constituer pour autant un système de sécurité européen. Peut-être que, dans le cadre de la réforme des mécanismes de la coopération occidentale au chapitre de la défense, la Communauté pourrait correspondre de plus en plus au cadre d'une défense européenne véritablement intégrée, et nombreux sont ceux qui en Europe appellent ce projet de leurs vœux. Mais il est difficile d'imaginer que ce cadre se transforme par la suite en une tribune élargie où



Don Weinman

l'on discuterait des questions intéressant la

sécurité européenne en général.

Enfin, il y a le processus permanent des négocia-

tions sur la limitation des armements en Europe entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Les pourparlers de

Vienna, amorcés en mars 1989, avancent à une

vitesse jamais vue : il est probable que nous au-

rons d'ici l'automne un premier accord qui fixera

des plafonds égaux pour les forces militaires de

l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie en Europe ; pour

faire suite à ces premiers efforts, on prépare déjà

des réductions plus importantes. Bien entendu,

ces négociations ne sauront remplacer une or-

ganisation en bonne et due forme. Mais il est

probable cependant que, du régime proposé pour

les mesures de vérification et de confiance, il se

dégagera une certaine structure organisationnelle.

IL N'EXISTE DONC PAS ENCORE DE SYSTÈME DE

sécurité pan-européen. L'apparente netteté de la

structure de sécurité en Europe au cours des qua-

rantie dernières années nous a peut-être amenés à

penser, à tort, que pour fonctionner, un régime de

sécurité doit être bien défini et complètement or-

ganisé. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que la structure

de sécurité est en fait un monde réparti bipo-

laire. À présent que les menaces sont devenues

plus difficiles à cerner et que nous vivons dans un

monde pluraliste, un régime de sécurité plus sou-

verain en Europe comprend les quatre éléments

énumérés plus haut, chacun d'entre eux étant

impartiel en soi, mais complétant l'autre.

Les questions de sécurité pan-européenne

pourraient donc être abordées sous leurs aspects

politiques dans le cadre d'une CSCE renforcée, et

sous leurs aspects militaires, dans le contexte de négociations quasi permanentes sur la limitation des armements, auxquelles on ajouterait des centres de gestion des crises et un régime de vérification. Pour assurer la prospérité économique de l'Europe dans son ensemble (et, par la même occasion, sa stabilité politique), on pourrait faire appel à la Communauté européenne par le biais de son intégration interne et à une série d'accords d'association avec d'autres États d'Europe, dont peut-être un jour l'Union soviétique. Et la coordination politique et militaire continuerait de se faire au sein d'une OTAN reformée, la Communauté européenne devenant de plus en plus le cadre d'une étroite intégration de la défense de l'Europe occidentale.

Pour savoir si ce système à «couches multiples» est vraiment praticable, il faudra voir dans quelle mesure l'unification de l'Allemagne fera ou non l'objet d'un consensus international. Il est révélateur de voir déjà sur le calendrier diplomatique, des étapes qui correspondent aux différents éléments du nouveau régime de sécurité européen décrit plus haut. On a prévu une série de réunions entre les deux États allemands et les alliés de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (les E.-U., l'URSS, la France et la Grande-Bretagne) pour trouver un accord sur le futur statut au sein de l'Alliance d'Europe des Quatre Grands en Allemagne.\*

Il faudra définir, dans le cadre des négociations d'Europe des Quatre Grands, la question de l'examen et réguler la question. Entre temps, la communauté européenne devra faire des offres d'associations plus étroites avec les autres États européens. Bien sûr, les calendriers peuvent s'embrouter ; les choses peuvent aller de travers. Nombreux sont les acteurs qui pourraient mettre des bâtons dans les roues de la machine diplomatique. Imaginez un instant que l'Union soviétique essaie de répondre aux aspirations indépendantistes des pays baltes par la répression militaire. La tâche à accomplir est loin d'être facile. Mais le fait qu'il existe aujourd'hui différents éléments de coopération entre l'Est et l'Ouest, entre l'Europe et l'Atlantique, nous donne des raisons d'espérer que l'unification de l'Allemagne se fera dans un climat de coopération. Les morceaux sont en place : à nous maintenant de refaire le puzzle. □

\* Conformément aux traités signés en 1945, les quatre puissances victorieuses de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (la France, le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis et l'URSS) conservent leurs droits et responsabilités relativement à l'Allemagne. Aucun changement ne peut être apporté au statu quo des trois entités politiques (la République fédérale d'Allemagne, la République démocratique allemande, et Berlin) formées sur le territoire allemand après la fin de la guerre. Les résolutions de Potsdam (1945) sans l'assentiment de ces quatre puissances.



# LA RENAISSANCE COMPLIQUÉE DE L'EUROPE

*Quel que soit le nouveau système de sécurité mis en place en Europe, il sera loin d'être aussi ordonné que l'ancien. Mais est-ce bien nécessaire qu'il le soit ?*

PAR CHRISTOPH BERTRAM

précautions à éviter depuis le début de l'ère nucléaire risquent de se produire : un affrontement militaire direct, voire une escalade.

VOilà qui est clair. Mais ce sont à présent les incertitudes (et les risques) qui se manifestent. Comment intégrer l'Allemagne unifiée dans l'actuelle structure de sécurité en Europe ? Comment cette structure doit-elle évoluer, compte tenu de la quasi-désintégration du Pacte de Varsovie et de la nécessité, pour l'Alliance atlantique de s'adapter aux bouleversements en Europe ?

Quelles menaces (si menaces il y a) reste-t-il qui justifient même le maintien d'alliances multilatérales ?

Nul n'a encore trouvé réponse à ces questions. Depuis un certain temps déjà, on reconnaît la nécessité de mettre en place de nouvelles structures de sécurité en Europe. Mais au moment où la révolution en Europe de l'Est a éclaté, aucune de ces structures n'avait encore été menée à terme.

Il n'existe donc aucun véritable cadre à l'intérieur duquel on puisse intégrer l'Allemagne unifiée, les nouveaux États démocratiques d'Europe de l'Est ou les deux alliances.

La première question consiste, bien évidemment, à savoir si un tel cadre est même nécessaire. Les menaces multilatérales n'ont-elles pas disparu ? L'heure de la décadence n'est-elle pas enfin venue ? Malheureusement, la perspective d'une Europe en paix et en harmonie n'est pas encore pour demain. Malgré les réductions des forces militaires déjà mises en oeuvre et celles que l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varsovie négocient actuellement à Vienne, avec de bonnes chances de réussite, l'Europe reste la région la plus militarisée du monde quant aux effectifs militaires et à la puissance de feu, et toutes les grandes puissances possèdent des armes nucléaires.

Il est vrai que la vieille menace telle que l'Ouest l'a longtemps crainte et qui, d'après ce que confirment des sources soviétiques, aurait bel et bien fait partie de la planification soviétique (à savoir, une attaque massive et rapide des forces du Pacte de Varsovie contre l'Occident) nous fait aujourd'hui l'impression d'une bande dessinée décolorée dans un vieux journal. Mais les risques de conflit subsistent, que ce soit les querelles ethniques en Union soviétique, en Europe de l'Est et dans les Balkans, ou les crises pas si loin de nous dans le tiers-monde (au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord) qui risquent de s'étendre à l'Europe. Sans parler, bien sûr, du sempiternel

**L'**OUT ARRIVE TOUJOURS EN MÊME TEMPS ! Semblait s'être arrêté dans l'empire soviétique et dans les relations Est-Ouest, et peu à peu, les Européens de l'Ouest, dont les Allemands, en étaient venus à s'accommoder d'une réalité qui paraissait vouloir durer. Maintenant les choses ont changé. C'est ainsi que de nouveaux points d'interrogation se sont substitués à de vieilles incertitudes.

Ce qui a été, pendant si longtemps, la base même du système de sécurité européen est en train de s'effriter : l'Europe de l'Est, qui n'est plus un glacis de sécurité pour l'Union soviétique, devient une vaste zone tampon entre la Russie et l'Europe occidentale. Les forces soviétiques, contre lesquelles l'OTAN a été créée, quittent leurs garnisons de Hongrie et de Tchécoslovaquie, et sont réduites en Pologne et en Allemagne de l'Est. La menace que l'OTAN a si bien refusé à repousser pendant tant d'années est en train de s'estomper, sinon de disparaître.

Que faut-il en conclure pour l'avenir ? En mars, les Allemands de l'Est ont voté pour un nouveau gouvernement dont le seul mandat est de négocier la réunification rapide des deux moitiés de leur pays. D'ici l'été, l'union économique et monétaire interallemande sera réalisée, et le deuschmark deviendra la seule monnaie du pays. Dans trois ou quatre ans (certains disent même avant), il n'y aura plus qu'un seul État allemand unifié, et non plus deux entités nationales distinctes.

L'Union soviétique n'est plus désormais la puissance dominante dans le centre de l'Europe. Et il semble qu'elle ne le redeviendra jamais plus. Bien entendu, personne ne peut prédire l'avenir du président Gorbatchev ni le sort de la réforme qu'il préconise. La tâche qu'il a entreprise, soit faire de l'Union soviétique un État moderne, capable de s'intégrer au système économique et politique international, est gigantesque, et les menaces actuelles de la réforme pourraient bien faire un faux pas, voire échouer dans leur effort. Mais même si le régime actuel devait être remplacé par un système plus traditionnel, les changements survenus en Europe de l'Est sont irréversibles.

La Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie n'accepteront pas un retour des troupes et de la tutelle soviétiques, pas plus que les Allemands de l'Est vont renoncer à leur unification avec l'Ouest. Si l'Union soviétique faisait la moindre tentative pour reconquérir par la force le terrain perdu, ce que l'Est et l'Ouest ont pris tant de

Pourrait-on ne compter que sur les deux al- liances qui, d'une part, répondraient aux besoins de sécurité de leurs membres respectifs et, d'autre part, uniraient leurs efforts en matière de limitation des armements et de coopération en cas de crise ? Ici encore, la réponse est négative, pour la simple raison que le Pacte de Varsovie a cessé, à toutes fins pratiques, de fonctionner harmonieusement. En fait, l'OTAN est aujourd'hui la dernière structure de sécurité encore opérationnelle en Europe.

Il ne faut pas croire non plus que la disparition du Pacte de Varsovie suppose également celle de

la réalité.

Pour les deux alliances actuelles réunies sous son égide relève encore davantage de l'utopie que de la réalité.

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plus en continuant de bénéficier d'une aide prétendument humanitaire, mais ils ne recevraient aucune fourniture militaire.

Après la signature de l'accord bipartite, le Secrétaire d'Etat, M. James Baker, a déclaré que la méthode militaire ayant échoué au Nicaragua, les Etats-Unis recherchaient un règlement politique en usant de la carotte et du bâton. Puis, en août 1989, la Maison Blanche déclencha la fureur des fervents partisans des *Contras* en n'empêchant ni ne dénonçant l'accord signé par les cinq présidents centra américains qui demandaient le démantèlement des *Contras* au début du mois de décembre au plus tard. Par la suite, Washington a refusé d'utiliser son veto contre une décision du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU relative à la mise sur pied d'une mission qui superviserait la démobilisation des *Contras*.

Dans le même temps, cependant, la Maison Blanche a laissé passer plusieurs occasions de prendre du recul par rapport aux *Contras*. Ainsi, les Sandinistes se sont engagés, en décembre 1989, à réunir les conditions voulues pour que les *Contras* rentrent au pays. Les Etats-Unis n'ont jamais cherché à vérifier si cela était vrai en encourageant les forces *contras* à essayer de regagner le Nicaragua. Au lieu de cela, l'aide américaine n'a cessé d'affluer au Honduras, au Nicaragua, au Guatemala, et dans d'autres pays d'Amérique centrale. Les forces armées du Salvador ne pouvaient plus proclamer que la guérilla était à deux doigts d'être vaincue. Si le gouvernement salvadorien gardait l'illusion de maîtriser son armée, il l'a perdue, d'abord en voyant la réaction brutale des militaires face à l'offensive du FMLN (l'armée n'avait pas vraiment consulté les autorités élues), ensuite, en apprenant le meurtre de


Des le départ, le gouvernement Bush a semblé moins déterminé que son prédécesseur à vaincre les guérilleros du FMLN par les armes et plus ouvert à la solution d'un règlement négocié. Mais le gouvernement n'a jamais vraiment décidé lequel de ces objectifs il poursuivait ni défini de stratégie pour l'atteindre. La Maison Blanche n'a jamais essayé d'user de son influence (400 millions de dollars d'aide par an) pour amener le gouvernement et l'armée du Salvador à s'efforcer de négocier un règlement. Depuis l'offensive de la guérilla et le massacre des jésuites, le gouvernement et le Congrès se sont querellés au sujet de l'aide au Salvador. Les efforts de James Baker pour trouver un accord avec le Congrès ont peut-être coïncidé avec l'initiative de M. Pérez de Cuellar pour amener les belligérants à la table des négociations, mais il s'agissait surtout d'une réponse aux réticences croissantes des élus du Congrès à maintenir cette aide telle qu'elle était. Il a sans doute fini par devenir évident que les Etats-Unis ne peuvent aider indéfiniment et massivement une armée et un gouvernement salvadoriens incapables de vaincre la guérilla et de mettre un terme aux violations des droits de la personne commises par leurs propres partisans.

L'évolution de la politique américaine depuis que George Bush a pris ses fonctions traduit, en partie, l'importance décroissante de l'Amérique centrale dans les calculs de Washington. Avec le réchauffement des rapports Est-Ouest et l'effondrement des régimes communistes, la lutte contre le marxisme révolutionnaire et contre l'influence du bloc soviétique sur les continents américains n'a plus vraiment lieu d'être. Peu désireux d'affronter les risques d'une politique activiste dans une région d'importance secondarise, le gouvernement Bush s'est efforcé de réintégrer l'Amérique centrale au second rang de la politique étrangère américaine et de s'y faire plus discret. En diminuant son engagement dans la région, excepté au Panama, Washington a laissé plus d'espace à d'autres acteurs : les présidents centra américains, d'autres dirigeants latino-américains, les Nations-Unies et l'OEA. Tous ont joué des rôles considérables au Nicaragua et ils s'intéressent activement au Salvador. La leçon la plus importante est sans doute que les intérêts de la politique étrangère américaine, du moins dans certaines circonstances, sont mieux servis quand les Etats-Unis interviennent moins directement et quand ils s'en remettent davantage à des approches multilatérales.

Les problèmes de l'Amérique centrale sont, évidemment, encore loin d'être résolus. Les négociations actuelles au Salvador peuvent se révéler infructueuses, comme lors des séries de pourparlers passées. Les nouveaux gouvernements nicaraguayen et panaméen, soutenus par les Etats-Unis, sont confrontés à d'immenses problèmes : ni le Nicaragua ni le Panama n'ont de tradition démocratique ; leurs institutions gouvernementales sont fragiles ; et aux régimes qu'elles remplacent qui exercent le pouvoir. De plus, leurs économies des deux pays, ce sont des coalitions surtout unies par leur opposition aux régimes démocratiques ; leurs institutions gouvernementales sont fragiles ; et les Nations-Unies et l'OEA. Tous ont joué des rôles considérables au Nicaragua et ils s'intéressent activement au Salvador. La leçon la plus importante est sans doute que les intérêts de la politique étrangère américaine, du moins dans certaines circonstances, sont mieux servis quand les Etats-Unis interviennent moins directement et quand ils s'en remettent davantage à des approches multilatérales.

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Michael McPherson



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# SE TÊNIR COI EN AMÉRIQUE CENTRALE

La nouvelle ambivalence de Washington à l'égard de l'Amérique centrale offre peut-être encore le meilleur espoir de mettre un terme aux guerres qui ravagent la région.

PAR PETER HAKIM

E PRÉSIDENT AMÉRICAIN, M. GEORGE BUSH, ET SES CONSEILLERS ONT perdu le pouvoir au Nicaragua et Manuel Noriega a été déposé au Panama. Les cieux s'éclaircissent aussi au Salvador, où Washington semblait dans une impasse. La Maison Blanche soutenait un gouvernement et une armée qui ne pouvaient vaincre une insurrection marxiste de type guérilla, qui ne voulaient pas négocier sérieusement et qui étaient incapables de lutter contre des violations flagrantes des droits de la personne. À présent, pour la première fois, des véritables négociations sont en cours pour mettre fin à la guerre civile qui mine le pays depuis dix ans.

Ce qui est remarquable, c'est que ces événements se sont produits à un moment où la politique des États-Unis en Amérique centrale se caractérisait par son ambiguïté et son indécision. L'attitude du gouvernement Bush vis-à-vis de la région manquait à la fois de la volonté et de la fermeté qui avaient marqué celle de son prédécesseur. La Maison Blanche de Reagan était animée d'un zèle idéologique et d'un ferme dessein. En qui concernait l'Amérique centrale, Ronald Reagan avait tracé une voie et des objectifs bien définis dont rien ne réussit à l'écarter ne fut-ce que d'un iota, ni les divi-

ni les conflits qu'ils suscitaient avec les pays latino-américains.

GEORGE BUSH N'EST PAS ARRIVÉ AU POUVOIR EN MANIFESTANT DE FORTS ancrages politiques. Dès le départ, son gouvernement s'est montré motivé par des calculs de politique intérieure et a fait preuve d'un pragmatisme prudent. La Maison Blanche devait accomplir un délicat numéro de funambule qui consistait à apaiser une droite républicaine très troublée tout en évitant des conflits avec le Congrès à majorité démocratique. Il en a résulté des politiques beaucoup plus sensibles non seulement à la dynamique politique de Washington, mais aussi aux événements d'Amérique centrale. Dans l'ensemble, les Latino-Américains se sont sentis assez rassurés par l'attitude de George Bush, grâce à laquelle, les États-Unis et l'Amérique latine ont pu créer des occasions de coopérer au règlement des problèmes centra-américains. Paradoxalement, la seule occasion que les États-Unis ont saisi a été le Panama. En mai 1989, après que le général Noriega a annulé les élections présidentielles et envoyé ses hommes de main rétablir son autorité dans les rues, les États-Unis se sont adressés à l'Organisation des États américains (OEA) pour trouver une solution à la crise panaméenne. Toutefois, ce recours à la diplomatie manquait pour le moins d'enthousiasme.

La mission de l'OEA avait trois mois pour agir, délai ridiculement court, et Washington n'était pas d'accord avec les Latino-Américains quant à l'interprétation de son mandat. Les Américains voulaient que l'OEA poursuivise l'objectif même qu'ils n'avaient pu atteindre par leurs propres politiques : retirer le pouvoir à Noriega. Les gouvernements latino-américains estimaient, pour leur part, que la tâche de l'OEA était de négocier un accord entre les différents groupes politiques panaméens en présence. Comme Noriega de continuer à jouer un rôle politique, la mission de l'OEA était simplement refusé de traiter avec l'Organisation. Au mois de septembre, l'échec de l'initiative de l'OEA laissait peu d'options aux États-Unis, qui pouvaient soit accepter que Noriega reste au pou-

caractériser sa politique.

À l'épreuve ailleurs dans la région. En fait, l'ambiguïté a continué d'y jouer un rôle. George Bush n'a jamais cherché à mettre sa crédibilité toute entière en ce qui concerne le règlement d'autres problèmes internationaux. Néanmoins, son gouvernement ont acquis stature et autorité, et davantage de latitude excessive et de n'avoir pas la dimension d'un dirigeant mondial. L'omnipotence de Washington n'accusait le président de se montrer d'une prudence où l'intervention à grande échelle redore l'image du gouvernement Bush. Plus pour maintenir l'ordre.

Rien de tout cela n'a entamé l'enthousiasme qui régnait aux États-Unis, de nombreux mois et le pays compte toujours sur les soldats américains en place. L'aide que les États-Unis avaient promise s'est fait attendre en ce qui concerne le Panama et, aujourd'hui encore, l'économie de ce dernier est en plein déclin. La Maison Blanche pour lever ses sanctions économiques, compromettant par là même la légitimité proclamée de son autorité. Il a fallu deux mois au gouvernement Bush pour lever ses sanctions économiques, compromettant par là même la légitimité proclamée de son autorité. Il a fallu deux mois au gouvernement Bush pour lever ses sanctions économiques, compromettant par là même la légitimité proclamée de son autorité. Il a fallu deux mois au gouvernement Bush pour lever ses sanctions économiques, compromettant par là même la légitimité proclamée de son autorité.

Cependant, le gouvernement Bush n'avait nullement pensé aux réactions que l'opération *Just Cause* provoquerait en Amérique latine, ni tenu compte des normes internationales en vigueur qui condamnent les interventions armées. Presque tous les pays de la région se sont indignés de l'action américaine et l'ont condamnée. De plus, il n'a pas tardé à devenir évident que les États-Unis n'avaient pas réellement préparé les lendemains de l'invasion, ce qui leur fit commettre une série d'impair, comme d'organiser la cérémonie de prestation de serment du président Endara sur une base militaire américaine et l'ont condamnée. De plus, il n'a pas tardé à devenir évident que les États-Unis n'avaient pas réellement préparé les lendemains de l'invasion, ce qui leur fit commettre une série d'impair, comme d'organiser la cérémonie de prestation de serment du président Endara sur une base militaire américaine.

Rien de tout cela n'était gagné d'avance. La chance a joué un rôle crucial dans la «réussite» de l'invasion. Les troupes américaines sont rapidement venues à bout des résistances des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches. Résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches. Résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches. Résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches.

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de la guerre civile, ont accepté de former un nouveau gouvernement; et la résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches. Résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches. Résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches. Résistance des hommes de Noriega, s'est résommée à quelques escarmouches.

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Thérault : Je n'ai jamais compris pourquoi les Canadiens en sont arrivés à la conclusion que pour contribuer valablement à la sécurité collective, il fallait nécessairement en passer par la présence de troupes canadiennes en Europe. Mais je n'en est pas ainsi. Quand George Kennan a défini le concept de l'endiguement, il l'a présenté comme un ensemble de mesures de précaution, de prévention visant à protéger l'Europe et à empêcher les Soviétiques de déborder d'Europe de l'Est en Europe occidentale le temps que les Européens de l'Ouest se remettent des ravages de la guerre et assurent leur propre protection. Nous l'avons oublié et cet arrangement entier s'est institutionnalisé. D'un point de vue purement stratégique, ce paternalisme est totalement injustifié. Pourquoi ne resterions-nous pas dans l'Otan, aussi longtemps que nous bénéficions d'un article 5, en attendant notre propre retour de la guerre et contribution de façon valable à la sécurité collective dans le contexte de l'Otan, et nous ne devrions pas hésiter sur ce point.

Hill : Soyons plus terre à terre, quels devraient être, selon vous, les effets de la force et quelle en serait la fonction principale ?

Thérault : Par fierté canadienne, je recommanderais qu'au moins, nous nous chargions de la surveillance et de la défense de notre propre territoire et que nous n'ayons plus l'air de mendier l'aide militaire américaine. Ce que nous faisons, dans un sens. Donc, le principal objectif de nos futures dépenses de défense devrait être de nous donner, au minimum, les moyens physiques d'occuper le territoire canadien ou de nous y déployer, de veiller au respect des lois canadiennes et de pouvoir assurer une présence suffisante dans le pays entier. La menace terrestre en soi est difficilement concevable.

Lox : Je pense que nous devrions coopérer pleinement avec les États-Unis en ce qui concerne la surveillance des espaces aériens et maritimes et les patrouilles s'y rattachant. Mais pour ce qui est de définir cette surveillance, je dirais qu'il faut d'abord de la défense en temps de paix, sans aller jusqu'à choisir des moyens comme les États-Unis en voulaient et en veulent toujours peut-être, à savoir des forces qui pourraient participer à une guerre nucléaire intercontinentale; et je répondrais qu'il ne faut pas aller jusque-là, parce que je doute fortement que l'on puisse le faire. Il faut trouver un juste milieu extrêmement difficile à maintenir.

Stein : Je suis d'accord avec les arguments avancés par David et Denis, à savoir qu'en avançant une brigade en Europe, nous avons payé le droit de nous asseoir à la table. J'ai l'impression que l'image que nous avons de nous-mêmes ne correspond pas avec celle que se font les États-Unis et les Européens. Cette équation di-

recte entre les ressources militaires et l'efficacité politique est beaucoup trop schématique.

Il nous arrive souvent de ne pas saisir les occasions qui se présentent à cause de la loi de la réaction anticipée. Nous appréhendons la réaction de Washington. Mais je crois que notre préoccupation est exagérée. Je voudrais vraiment que le Canada s'efforce d'envisager, d'un oeil neuf et indépendant, l'aspect «sécurité» des rapports ainsi que leur aspect «défense». Et qu'il joue de ses atouts. Car il a une réputation de bâtisseur d'institutions à l'étranger qui ne tient pas qu'à sa brigade européenne. Cette réputation repose sur les opérations de maintien de la paix, pour lesquelles la demande va considérablement augmenter. Il faudrait que nous puissions ne pas

## Le Livre blanc de 1987

### a malheureusement

### démontré de manière

### très éclatante que le

### ministère a beaucoup de

### mal à s'attaquer à

### ses problèmes.

penser à nos limites mais à nos ressources politiques en matière de sécurité, que nous sous-estimons systématiquement.

**Morton** : Nous en revenons à une vieille réalité historique de la défense canadienne, qui remonte aux années 1860, à savoir que soit il n'y a pas de menace, soit la menace est si grande que nous n'y pouvons rien. Qui va nous attaquer ? Pour le moment, la réponse est personne. À dire vrai, personnellement, je ne suis pas sûr que nous n'ayons pas de quoi nous défendre.

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1 million de dollars; aujourd'hui, il en atteint 17 milliards, mais il devrait baisser après le prochain budget fédéral. Nous disons à l'armée libérienne qu'elle bénéficie d'apuis solides. Parce que nos dépenses ont toujours eu un côté politique, parce qu'il n'existe pas de raisonnablement militaire qui soit si manifeste et évident qu'il faille procéder d'une certaine façon. Avec cet argent, nous devrions nous doter de moyens pour parler aux imprévus; car, à mon sens, c'est l'imprévisible qui justifie divers moyens et non les forces pour les mettre en oeuvre. C'est pourquoi je laisserais la brigade en Europe, parce que c'est le seul endroit où l'armée peut voir la guerre conventionnelle de premier ordre que ses voisins pratiquent. C'est pourquoi j'éprouve une préférence hétéroclite et méchante pour des sous-marins nucléaires, parce qu'il me semble qu'ils sont les seuls navires de guerre qu'il vaille la peine de posséder au vingt-et-unième siècle.

Les opérations de maintien de la paix sont très morales. Aux yeux du public, elles constituent le seul rôle positif que l'armée puisse jouer. Elles la débarrassent de ses attributions habituelles, mais il s'agit malheureusement la du seul rôle que la population veut lui voir jouer en priorité, et il faut respecter cette réalité politique. Je me dis toujours que ces opérations calment le désarmement impérialiste dont souffrent les Canadiens. C'est grâce à nos braves bêtes bleues que l'ordre règne dans les populations sous-développées. C'est sous le couvert du maintien de la paix que les Britanniques ont étendu leur empire, morceau après morceau. Les indigènes sont agités et ils ont tué un missionnaire : allons rétablir l'ordre. Les Américains ont agi de même sur ce continent. Donc je dis que je n'ai pas autant de respect pour les opérations de maintien de la paix que la plupart des gens.

Stoits : Quand on n'a pas de pouvoir, et nous n'en avons guère, il faut avoir des idées. Cela permet parfois de l'emporter sur les gros bataillons. Il est fort possible que le personnel diplomatique qui rédige des câbles tous les jours et gîane les démarches des ambassades soit bourré d'idées, mais je n'en vois guère de preuves. En tout cas, ce que le gouvernement canadien essaie de faire dans ce domaine ne me donne pas à penser que notre personnel diplomatique soit doué de grandes qualités de réflexion. Et quelque chose au fond de moi me dit que cela tient peut-être à la formation que nous leur donnons, au fait que nos universités ne le préparent pas très bien.

Je crains, pour ma part, qu'une fois le calme revenu, nous aurons bel et bien une sorte de système de concert sur le théâtre européen et que les moyennes puissances n'y seront pas admises; nous nous retrouverons avec le même genre de problème qui préoccupait tant les Affaires extérieures vers la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à savoir comment éviter que cela arrive. La réponse avait été de créer l'ONU. >





de moins en moins présent : est-ce une mauvaise

recette pour un accord de sécurité ? Pourquoi !

devons-nous tant nous inquiéter du développe-

ment économique de l'Union soviétique ? Les

Soviétiques savent le retard qu'ils ont pris. Ils

savent qu'ils n'ont aucune chance de le rattraper

à court ou à moyen terme. Ils sont en bien plus

mauvaise position que les Britanniques, à qui il

n'est arrivé que quelques fois de perdre la tête.

Eux se sont adaptés au fait que leur pays ressem-

ble plus aujourd'hui au tiers-monde qu'à l'Eu-

rope continentale. Les Soviétiques pourraient-ils

en faire de même ? Sommes-nous en présence

d'un mélange détonnant pour la stabilité

européenne ?

Hill : Denis, vous partiez du colosse européen

qui pourrait être en train d'émigrer. Quel rapport

pourrait-il avoir avec le Canada ?

Stairs : Nous spéculons tous comme des forcés.

Or, si l'on spécule, on revient à ce que l'on a

appris en premier, parce que c'est ce que l'on lit à

vingt et un ou vingt-deux ans qui compte. Si l'on

considère ce problème des rapports entre l'Alle-

mage naissante et l'Union soviétique, la logique

veut évidemment que ces deux pays n'entrent ja-

mais en guerre l'un contre l'autre. La logique

rassemble à un concert. De plus, le modèle his-

torique est le Pacte germano-soviétique et non le

modèle des impasses nucléaires. Je verrais plutôt

un retour à des formes assez classiques de

politiques interétatiques.

Voilà qui reflète notre dilemme, parce qu'à

mon avis, tout cela n'a changé en rien la position

du Canada. Comme nous le savons tous, la poli-

tique de défense canadienne a surtout consisté à

épauler la diplomatie canadienne dans la période

de l'après-guerre. Si nous sommes vraiment hon-

nêtes, et en laissant de côté les problèmes parti-

culiers que pose, par exemple, la surveillance

de l'espace aérien septentrional, la vérité, c'est

que notre contribution n'est nullement décisive

pour la protection de la sécurité occidentale.

Donc, les dépenses de défense du Canada ont

servi à acheter un billet d'entrée dans les organi-

mes multilatéraux où nous aimons nous exprimer.

Nous espérons empêcher d'autres pays de se

ridiculiser en partant du principe, bien entendu,

que nous ne nous ridiculisons jamais.

Il suffit de découvrir quel organisme sort de

l'ombre et de le promouvoir du mieux que l'on

peut. Ensuite, on fait le tour de l'organisme pour

demander à tous ses membres ce qu'ils aime-

raient que le Canada fasse, ensuite, on marchand

pour devenir soi-même membre au meilleur

compte. Je sais que je peux sembler irrévéren-

cieux, mais c'est à cela que se résume encore le

problème de la sécurité canadienne.

Thériault : Voilà qui est très intéressant, mais je

suis d'accord. C'est certainement ce qui a déter-

miné notre politique extérieure et notre politique

de défense ces vingt dernières années. Mais je

pense également qu'il y a eu une très grande part

d'aveuglement dans ces politiques. Je n'ai jamais

été un fervent partisan de la théorie mise de

l'avant par les occupant(e)s de l'édifice Pearson

pour laquelle les relations internationales re-

posent sur un jeu d'influences. Pour moi, l'in-

fluence est quelque chose qui part de la capacité

d'influer sur les événements et de faire bouger les

choses. En définitive, au bout de l'équation, il y a

le pouvoir. Or, nous n'avons aucun pouvoir.

Bien sûr, grâce à cet arrangement structurel, on

nous a plus ou moins accueillis au sein de divers

conseils. Si j'en crois ma propre expérience, et

j'ai travaillé dans plusieurs de ces organismes, il

y a longtemps que nous n'avons plus de crédibi-

lité et que nous n'exercions plus aucune influence.

Si quelque'un garde des illusions à ce sujet, ce

sont les Canadiens et personne d'autre.

Morton : J'ai beau chercher, je ne vois pas le

monde signifier que nous sommes plus indépen-

dants aujourd'hui que nous l'étions il y a dix ou

quinze ans, sauf catastrophes trop déplorables

pour que l'on y songe. Ce n'est pas dit par souci de

paratire modeste ou pour l'être, c'est ainsi que

nos priorités sont ordonnées. Après l'avoir laissé

pérorer un moment, les Canadiens et Canadien-

nes rappelleront à leur gouvernement que ce

sont les réalités économiques qui passent avant

tout. Or, nous nous sommes liés aux États-Unis

de vue diplomatique et politique. À mon avis, les

Américains (vu leur gouvernement actuel et ceux

qui suivront probablement) préféreront la solu-

tion de l'OTAN et s'attendraient à ce que le

Canada les imite docilement. Quelle raison

auraient-ils de penser autrement ?

Hill : Si nous rédigeons tous des Livres blancs,

quelles directions aimerions-nous imprimer aux

politiques canadiennes pour les dix ou quinze ans

à venir ?

Lox : Je crois, en fait, qu'il faudrait essayer de

définir le contexte politique dans lequel cela se

passera. À mon avis, peu importe que l'on pense

que nous avons trop ou peu dépensé pour la

défense, puisque nous allons moins dépenser ces

prochaines années. Je ne suis pas pour quitter

l'OTAN, en tout cas pas pour les raisons invoquées

à payer pour rester pour les raisons invoquées

par Janice pourrait baisser considérablement.

Stairs : Je m'inquiète vraiment de ce qui va arri-

ver aux ressources océaniques tant côté Atlan-

tique que Pacifique et je crois qu'il nous faut des

moyens de surveillance sur les deux côtes, or, ils

sont insuffisants à l'heure actuelle. Je vous par-

le en connaissance de cause, je vis à Halifax. Voilà

les vraies questions de sécurité qu'un Etat doit ré-

soudre pour assurer sa protection au sens tradi-

tionnel. Au-delà, on entre dans les échanges de

bons procédés et c'est alors qu'il faut décider si

l'on veut s'y prêter ou pas.

Dans le cas de l'Europe, le Canada pourrait se

révéler tellement impuissant que ce n'est même

pas la peine qu'il l'essaie, parce qu'on va tout sim-

plement l'ignorer. On ne demandera pas l'avis du

Canada, de la Belgique et ainsi de suite, qui de-


viennent se contenter de rôles de spectateurs. Or, si

tel est le cas, à quoi bon dépenser un seul dollar ?

Je ne sais pas où cela nous amène, mais certaine-

ment pas à des sous-marins à propulsion

nucléaire, pas à des jouets coûteux !



... nous ne faisons rien

des choses élémentaires

et indispensables dans

une société si l'on entend

soutenir sérieusement une

stratégie fondée sur le

multilatéralisme.

n'éprouve pas la moindre nostalgie pour le sens de la prévision que ces règles imposaient. J'ai évoqué les dangers qu'il y aurait dans des régions autres que l'Europe, des dangers réelles. Celle-ci se poursuit malgré le Moyen-Orient. Survenu dans les rapports entre les États-Unis et l'URSS. En Irak, en Libye, en Israël, elle est antérieure à ce changement. La question est de savoir si de meilleurs rapports entre les Américains et les Soviétiques nous aideront à mieux la gérer.

Thérault : Il me semble tout à fait concevable que, dans quinze à vingt ans, l'expression même de «rapports Est-Ouest» ne correspondra plus à la situation. L'hostilité qui caractérisait ces rapports s'atténue très rapidement. Mikhaïl Gorbatchev manifeste très clairement son intention de se rapprocher de l'Occident, qui l'aideront dans la tâche immense qu'il doit entreprendre, à savoir restructurer l'économie de son pays.

Cependant, c'est franchir un pas très important que de proposer, à partir de cette situation certes très prometteuse, que l'Union soviétique de l'époque, pour les pays occidentaux, le rôle de pivot, pour les pays occidentaux, à savoir des investissements à l'étranger. Les Soviétiques ont une très lourde responsabilité à assumer : il leur incombe d'aller bien loin vers le désarmement. Les Américains vont vouloir voir quelques changements de taille de la part de l'URSS, en ce qui concerne les rapports entre les puissances et la réduction des forces armées, des changements qui montreront très clairement l'absence de volonté de se rapprocher de l'Occident, qui l'aideront dans la tâche immense qu'il doit entreprendre, à savoir restructurer l'économie de son pays.

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du moins pour les Canadiens et Canadiennes. La terreur que nous connaissons était, en fait, une terreur stable dont nous comprenions tous les règles. Et les règles étaient, à dire vrai, suffisamment stables pour que, moi le premier, je n'aie jamais vraiment craint qu'elles s'effondrent à un moment ou à un autre. Ce qui se passe actuellement, c'est que nous les changeons toutes sans connaître celles qui viendront à la place. Par ailleurs, nous tournons autour d'un problème évident : le problème allemand.

Stoier : C'est le problème allemand classique : l'Allemagne est une énorme agglomération de



*Il y a longtemps que nous n'exerçons plus aucune influence... Si quelquel'un garde des illusions à ce sujet, ce sont les Canadiens et personne d'autre.*

foli longes

puissance qui, quoique l'on en dise, va être, ou pourrait être, alimentée par un regain de nationalisme. Maintenant, la question est de savoir si cette renaissance du nationalisme prendra des formes dangereuses. J'éprouve quelque appréhension à ce sujet et, si j'étais polonais, je me sentirais très nerveux.

Stein : Avant de passer au problème allemand, j'aimerais revenir sur ce qu'a dit Denis. Une grande part de la recherche faite ces derniers temps à partir des nouvelles informations transmises par les Soviétiques contredit son propos et donne à penser que les règles du jeu étaient mal définies pour plusieurs sujets explosifs. Nous avons froie plusieurs fois le conflit dans la période de l'après-guerre. Je ne crois guère en la justesse des jugements de gens qui ont été confrontés de travailler avec ces règles du jeu. Je

Varsovie a cessé d'exister à des fins pratiques. Nous assistons, en URSS, à des événements qui amènent à se demander si la fédération y survivra.

Je pense que les États-Unis sont fatigués de leur rôle de garant de la sécurité occidentale et en ont assez de dépenser les sommes astronomiques que cela suppose. On se demande donc si la position bien ancrée de repli unis s'accroîtra davantage dans les années à venir. On se demande aussi ce que cela signifierait pour le Canada du point de vue des alliances et des conséquences. Je partage pleinement votre pessimisme.

David Cox : Depuis dix ans maintenant, je m'intéresse principalement à la limitation des armements et à la sécurité. Le débat sur la limitation des armements avait essentiellement pour objectif de trouver des solutions non catastrophiques à la situation dans laquelle nous nous trouvons, qui résulte en grande partie du développement et de la prolifération des armes nucléaires. Du point de vue de la limitation des armements, la situation est donc meilleure, pas pire, mais je pense que, maintenant, la limitation des armements pose un problème psychologique. Au lieu d'être confronté à un dilemme et à une question politiques assez claires (comment abandonner les armes nucléaires), nous découvrons qu'il nous faut régler un ensemble de questions qui ont été soulevées autour de la table.

Alors que faire ? Je serais tenté de répondre qu'il faut réessayer ce que l'on a déjà essayé avant. C'est-à-dire de reprendre les procédures de limitation institutionnelles et de recommencer. Comme l'ont fait la Ligue puis les Nations-Unies pour maîtriser des conflits qui n'étaient pas catastrophiques, mais qui risquaient de s'envenimer. D'un point de vue canadien, cette solution offre des possibilités, mais aussi une vaste zone d'incertitude dans laquelle notre influence serait très limitée.

Stein : Dans tout ce que nous avons dit, il y a un thème commun, à savoir que les changements actuels provoquent une instabilité qui, à son tour, est l'élément d'incertitude. Pourquoi y penser en termes négatifs ? Moi, je ne vois pas ainsi. Si nous regardons ce qui existait auparavant, nous apercevons que les structures de ces quarante dernières années étaient dangereuses. Nous avons évité ces dangers en usant de toute une série de processus formels. Les changements actuels nous exposent à de nouveaux dangers, à de nouvelles formes de dangers, à de nouvelles formes de dangers. Je ne crois guère en la justesse des jugements de gens qui ont été confrontés de travailler avec ces règles du jeu. Je

Canada en Europe dans quinze ans ?

Hill : Y aura-t-il encore dans quinze ans quelque chose que l'on puisse toujours qualifier de menace, de ces choses que contenait le Livre blanc de la défense ? Y aura-t-il une place pour le rôle de la défense ?

Cox : Imaginons une Europe au sein de laquelle nous aurions une Union soviétique quelque peu en retrait, et cette Allemagne réunifiée en pleine éclosion, mais dans le contexte de la communauté européenne, avec les États-Unis et le Canada, surtout les États-Unis, comme garant étranger



# QUE FAUT-IL FAIRE ?

## La sécurité militaire du Canada dans les années 1990



### LES MEMBRES DU GROUPE

DAVID COX

professeur associé d'études politiques à l'université Queen's de Kingston, est l'auteur de La défense continentale : analyse des tendances et perspective canadienne, paru dans «Les Cahiers de l'Institut».

DESMOND MORTON

professeur d'histoire et doyen de l'École Collège (Université de Toronto) est l'auteur et le co-auteur de dix-neuf ouvrages consacrés à l'histoire militaire et politique du Canada.

DENIS STAIRS

professeur de sciences politiques et vice-président de l'Université Dalhousie d'Halifax, est l'auteur de The Diplomacy of Construct: Canada, the Korean War and the United States.

JANICE STEIN

professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de Toronto, vient d'écrire pour l'Institut pour la paix et la sécurité, en collaboration avec Richard Ned Lebow, une monographie intitulée Les paramètres de réussite de la dissuasion.

GÉRARD THÉRIAULT

a été Chef de l'état-major des forces armées canadiennes de 1983 jusqu'à son départ à la retraite, en 1986. Il est maintenant vice-président pour le Canada de AEG Aktiengesellschaft.

Le présent compte rendu rapporte une discussion qui a eu lieu le 30 mars, à Ottawa. Roger Hill, Directeur de la recherche à l'Institut, dirigeait les débats.

Roger Hill : Comment voyez-vous l'évolution du monde et qu'est-ce qui est, selon vous, le plus important aujourd'hui en matière de politique de défense et de sécurité ?

Denis Stairs : Le changement le plus profond concerne l'évolution des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest qui, très manifestement, est en train de modifier, de manière assez fondamentale, le cadre très stable dans lequel la politique de sécurité canadienne fonctionne depuis ces quarante dernières années. De toute évidence, nous savons ce qui est en train de disparaître, mais nous ne savons pas réellement ce qui surgira à la place. À mon sens, les changements fondamentaux tiennent à une sorte de discordance qui se développe entre, d'une part, une interdépendance mondiale croissante sur tout un ensemble de fronts de nature fonctionnelle, technique, économique et dans le domaine des communications et, d'autre part, une résurrection de formes très traditionnelles de nationalisme, une soit d'identification ethnique et un besoin d'expansion politique de l'appartenance culturelle. Ce phénomène, qui provoque une espèce de désintégration politique en Union soviétique, existe aussi en Europe de l'Est. On peut même dire qu'on en trouve des signes bien vivants dans notre propre pays.

Janice Stein : D'après moi, ce ne sont pas les changements que vous avez nommés, ceux relatifs aux rapports entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, qui importent le plus, mais la durabilité de ces changements. Or, ce sujet suscite des polémiques passionnées selon le point de vue que l'on adopte et les indices dont on se sert pour évaluer cette durabilité. Je suis d'accord avec Denis quant au fait que nous assistons au développement simultané de deux tendances opposées.

J'imagine que l'on assistera au Moyen-Orient au développement de tendances extrêmement déséquilibrées, qui résulteront du changement très positif dans le rapport entre les deux grands. Ainsi, du fait de la désescalade entre le Kremlin et la Maison Blanche, la région pourra se procurer beaucoup plus d'armes. On assistera aussi à la disparition des contraintes que Moscou et Washington exerçaient, autrefois, sous prétexte de leur engagement dans les conflits du tiers-monde. Du point de vue de leurs rapports, il s'agit d'une évolution positive, de celui du tiers-monde, il se peut fort bien qu'elle soit négative.

Desmond Morton : Les historiens ont la mauvaise habitude, qu'ils essaient de maîtriser, de faire des analogies, pour la plupart fausses, mais je pense à un scénario d'avant 1914, année où dans une certaine mesure, la guerre a éclaté à cause de l'énorme instabilité qui régnait en Europe centrale et dans les Balkans. Je pense également à l'789. Je me suis, en fait, replongé dans cette époque pour retrouver des citations traduisant la joie ressentie quand la France monarchiste est devenue républicaine, pacifique, aimante et idéaliste, et j'ai pensé au reportage sur l'Europe centrale et l'Union soviétique. Je me suis mis à penser également aux conséquences de 1789, pas seulement pour les Français, mais pour le monde. Je ne vois donc pas l'avent d'un œil optimiste, mais c'est rarement le cas avec les historiens. L'instabilité de l'Europe centrale m'inquiète réellement, tout comme le risque d'un morcellement de l'Union soviétique, où l'expérience politique pèche par absence de sens du compromis. J'ai bien peur de ne pas voir à un monde consistant de façon moins dangereuse, sauf à très court terme.

Gérard Thériault : Je crois que, depuis un certain temps, nous nous rendions tous compte du recul de l'idéologie en Union soviétique, mais cela n'a pas empêché même les experts d'être surpris par le rythme effréné pris par la débâcle une fois qu'elle a été amorcée. Par parenthèse, le Pacte de

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Peter Hakim est directeur d'*Inter-American Dialogue* à Washington (D.C.); Christoph Bertram est correspondant diplomatique de l'hebdomadaire *Die Zeit*, à Hambourg, et il a déjà siégé au Conseil d'administration de l'Institut pour la paix et la sécurité; Heribert Adam est professeur de sociologie à l'Université Simon Fraser et il se rend fréquemment en Afrique du Sud; Jocelyn Coulon est rédacteur au journal *Le Devoir* (chronique des affaires internationales).

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# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

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DU CANADA DANS LES  
ANNÉES 1990

Gérard Thériault  
Janice Stein  
Denis Stairs  
Desmond Morton  
David Cox

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Des ennemis  
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Christoph Bertram  
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bouversements  
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# PEACE & SECURITY

## AFTER THE REVOLUTION

*Poland, Romania,  
Hungary and  
Czechoslovakia –  
state of the nations.*

BY JACQUES LÉVESQUE

**Shridath Ramphal**  
Ending the Cold  
War between North  
and South.

**Robert Bothwell**  
**J.L. Granatstein**  
Pierre Trudeau's  
last international  
hurrah.

**David Runnalls**  
Progress on saving  
the planet.  
**Selig Harrison**  
Showdown over  
Kashmir.

**Jean-François  
Lépine**  
Letter from  
Hebron, life in the  
occupied territories.

**Bernard Wood**  
On a post-Meech  
Canada in the  
world.

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
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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



By the time this issue of *Peace & Security* finds its way into readers' hands, warships of the Canadian navy will have arrived in the waters of the Persian Gulf. As I write on 20 August, one of the few certainties about this crisis is that with the sending of battle-ready ships, and with some eight hundred Canadian citizens living in Iraq and Kuwait – all apparently subject to the whims of a government, which, putting aside all other complexities, is the only existing government, we must remember, known to have used nerve gas on its own unarmed citizens – Canada is directly involved. Another, is that the Gulf

confrontation threatens military action with levels of lethality and destruction not seen by Western countries since the Korean war.

Our cover story bears on the post-war period's singular international event – Eastern Europe and the demise of the Cold War. It is immediately evident from Jacques Lévesque's report that something else died in 1990, the very idea of a place called "Eastern Europe" – an eventuality bound to complicate the lives of journalists, academics, policy makers and citizens, because it will now be necessary to take into account seven places not one. The "Eastern Bloc" stands revealed not as a block at all, but rather as separate countries with different histories and aspirations, and as Lévesque underscores, very different futures.

We also present an address given at the Institute by **Shridath Ramphal**, the out-going Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. Sir Shridath reminds us of the sobering fact that even while East-West cooperation has increased, the North-South dialogue on the structure of the international economy, begun in the seventies, has stalled completely.

The reactivation of "meaningful, structured" talks between North and South on the world economy is exactly what is envisaged by **David Runnalls** in "Saving Earth's Atmosphere." The Third World now has considerable bargaining power with the West when it comes to deciding how to minimize and adapt to imminent global climate change. Runnalls sketches for us the agendas of and strategies behind these negotiations.

While the world watches the Persian Gulf and waits, another local conflict with terrifying implications plays itself out in the mountain valleys of Kashmir. **Selig Harrison** sorts through the complex of conflicting national, religious and tribal interests at the heart of this centuries-old dispute.

And from a new book on the foreign policies of Pierre Trudeau by **J.L. Granatstein** and **Robert Bothwell**, we present an excerpt on the 1983 "peace initiative." Regardless of one's judgement of this period, it is of considerable interest to this Institute since in a very important way, the legislation to create the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security grew directly from those diplomatic efforts.

– Michael Bryans

## Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada K1R 7X7  
Telephone (613) 990-1593  
Fax (613) 563-0894

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## NEW INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS IN THE LAST QUARTER

**Surviving the Nuclear Age**, a bibliography on nuclear weapons, arms control and disarmament for the year 1987, by Ron Purver and Jutta Paczulla, May 1990.

**Canada and International Peace and Security, a bibliography 1985-1989**, June 1990, \$15.00

**Peace and Security Thesaurus**, June 1990, \$10.00

**The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW): Strengthening International Verification and Compliance**, Summary of a Conference, Toronto, 4-5 April 1989, by Dianne DeMille, Working Paper 25, July 1990, 72 pages.

*Other Publications From the Institute include:*  
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**Canada et sous-marins. Technologie et politique**, by Bernard Goulard, Working Paper 24, June 1990, 58 pages.

**The Case for a United Nations Verification Agency**, by A. Walter Dorn, Working Paper 26, July 1990, 41 pages.

**East-West Relations in Transition: Towards a New European Order**, Excerpts from a Report of the Strategic Assessment Group of Experts to CIIPS, Working Paper 27, July 1990.

**Annual Report 1989-90.**

*Use the tear-out card in this issue to obtain more information about these and other Institute publications.*



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Jacques Lévesque is Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal; Shridath Ramphal is out-going Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; Selig S. Harrison is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and former South Asia Bureau Chief for the *Washington Post*; Robert Bothwell is Professor of History at the University of Toronto; J.L. Granatstein is Professor of History at York University; David Runnalls is Director of the Sustainable Development Programme at the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Ottawa; Jean-François Lépine is out-going Middle-East correspondent for Société Radio-Canada’s *Téléjournal* and CBC Television’s *The National*.

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**T**HE YEAR 1989 WAS A TIME OF REVOLUTIONARY EUPHORIA IN EASTERN EUROPE, BUT THE DAYS FOLLOWING a revolution are rarely easy. This has been especially true for most of the East bloc countries. Democracy, the prize most cherished by the social movements in each of these nations, remains fragile, its future far from everywhere assured.

In a 1989 Canadian interview, Professor Bronislaw Geremek, a Polish politician and leader of the parliamentary group that came out of the Solidarity labour movement, rightly pointed out that even if several countries had made the transition from dictatorship to democracy, none had yet made it while moving from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. The problems and risks and challenges are of a completely new order.

Almost everywhere in Eastern Europe, the backlash created by the wave of revolutions has seen foundering Communist parties pulling down with them not only the political and economic model of Stalinist socialism, but indeed the whole idea of democratic socialism, or even social democracy. Maximum privatization and the supremacy of the law of supply and demand have become the order of the day. Among the great majority of Eastern European intellectuals, most of whom are ex-Communists, one senses the emergence of a new

orthodoxy (replacing the old one) which advocates an extreme economic liberalism and is regarded as a universal panacea.

Those who support this radical liberalism are well aware that the complete adoption of the rule of market forces, and a rapid integration of Eastern European economies into the world market, can only worsen their situation in the short term by creating runaway inflation and causing hundreds of factories to shut down. These enterprises are unaccustomed to competition and unable to adapt, and the result will be widespread unemployment and considerable social injustice. Yet the defenders of this policy consider it the inevitable price that must be paid, maintaining that there is no other way and that things will soon change for the better.

HERE, BRIEFLY, IS HOW THE SITUATION APPEARED IN FOUR EASTERN EUROPEAN nations I visited in April and May of this year. It seems reasonable to begin with Poland, since it is home to the oldest non-Communist government, dating from September 1989. Poland has also been the quickest to implement a completely free-market system, so clear-cut results are already evident and several possible political consequences are beginning to emerge.

According to official Polish government statistics, the standard of living for the average Polish family dropped forty percent in a five-month period – from September 1989 to March 1990.<sup>1</sup> The figure is striking, especially since the standard of living in Poland had already declined significantly since the beginning of the decade. The recent

dramatic deterioration has been particularly noticeable since January 1990. The easing of almost all price controls brought the rate of inflation in that month to an annual rate of more than one thousand percent.

At the beginning of the summer, there were some 350,000 unemployed, a relatively small number for a country with a population of thirty-seven million. However, if the figure seems low, it is because a large share of the unemployment has been absorbed "collectively," if you will. Here is how it worked. The shock therapy administered to the Polish economy from January onwards led to a severe recession that saw many companies reduce their total production by twenty-five to fifty percent. Instead of extensive layoffs, workers agreed together to reduced working hours for everyone. It is clear that this situation cannot continue for any length of time and that a genuine restructuring of industries must take place. Most Polish economists expect a sizeable wave of unemployment in the second half of 1990.

IT IS ABSOLUTELY REMARKABLE THAT IN SPITE OF EVERYTHING THE MAZOWIECKI GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ABLE UP to now to retain an impressive popular standing, a legitimacy so great that the Communist party's successor has not dared to break openly with it. Popular discontent is mounting, however. At the beginning of January, the government promised an economic improvement over the following six months. The deadline is past, and rather than an improvement, there is good reason to expect a decline.

For several months now, Lech Walesa has been finding it increasingly difficult to contain the dissatisfaction among his followers and to suppress the numerous strikes that have cropped up on the local level. This shaky situation, along with his own personal ambitions, explains the still embryonic war that he has begun to wage against the government, a government that was formed by his own advisors and, for all intents and purposes, appointed by him.

Because of the tarnished reputation of the former Communist party, there is no real left-wing option in Poland. The party has tried to get back into favour by calling itself the Social Democracy Party of the

# EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE REVOLUTION

*For Eastern European countries last year's  
euphoria has given way to harsh economic and  
political reality.*

BY  
JACQUES  
LÉVESQUE






Polish Republic, a move bound to contribute further to the ill-repute into which the whole idea of social democracy has fallen. This limits the choice even more, leaving the door open for an extreme right-wing regime that could replace the present government.

Walesa is currently attempting to outbid his opponents by taking a populist, nationalist, and authoritarian stance. On the eve of the Solidarity congress where he was easily reelected president, he had begun to criticize "his" government, accusing it of "dragging its feet" and calling for "speedier reforms." He was basically referring to the elimination of Communists – or rather, former Communists, since there has been a mass exodus from the party as well as from its successor – who still hold a large number of important posts at various levels of the administration and in state-owned companies. Under the present conditions, a Communist witch-hunt could be a political ploy to divert attention from Poland's economic and social woes. The consequences could be far-reaching, since almost all of the Polish intelligentsia, including most of Solidarity's advisors, have been Communists at one time or another.

The president of Solidarity is now accusing intellectuals of having betrayed him, his tone becoming increasingly hostile. Last May he declared: "I allowed myself to be taken in by the intellectuals. I believed too much in the Polish intellectuals and followed their advice. They misled me."<sup>2</sup> Contrary to what the Polish government hoped for, Walesa asked for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. In March he affirmed his intention of running for the presidency of the country and has since called for an early election.

It is clear from all this that he sees himself as a new Pilsudski.<sup>3</sup> In any case, he remains a national hero in Poland, and if he decided to encourage a general strike, which in the present state of affairs would assume considerable magnitude, he could quite easily bring down the government.



IT IS IN ROMANIA, WHERE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS are catastrophic compared with those of Poland, that the future appears most dismal. I was shocked when I returned there. Romanians' standard of living has fallen to the level experienced by Soviets in the early 1960s. One can say without fear of exaggeration that Ceausescu's ruthless dictatorship and megalomania have reduced the country to an economic, political, and cultural wasteland.

It is exactly these conditions that account for the great paradox of Romania compared to other Eastern European countries. The fact is that the successor to the Romanian Communist party, the National Salvation Front, has been able not only to stay in power, but also to win the May 1990 presidential elections with an unprecedented eighty-nine percent majority, when much more reformist parties in Poland and Hungary were routed.

Over the last few years, repression in Romania has been so severe that in contrast with that in other Eastern bloc countries, no opposition group with any real structure has been able to operate or even make an appearance. There were no political options at hand. It was for this reason that a small group of several former Ceausescu supporters, as well as a few others co-opted at the last minute, was able to seize power in circumstances that remain mysterious.

The events of December 1989 have the character of both a genuine people's revolt and a coup d'état. It was the spontaneous uprising in Timisoara between 15 and 20 December, and in Bucharest a few days later, that initiated Ceausescu's downfall. But it was precisely because they were spontaneous reactions, without organized political direction of

any kind, that Ion Iliescu's group was able to seize power by striking a political compromise with the army, the terms of which are still unknown.

Contrary to initial accounts, it was quickly established that it was not the *Securitate* – the political police – but the army that opened fire on the crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest, the day before Ceausescu's flight. Only at the very end, with the intensification of the popular uprising, did the army turn against the dictator. The main purpose of the grotesque and hastily organized trial, at the end of which Ceausescu was promptly executed for "genocide," was to blame him for everything, to prevent him from speaking, and to play down the army's role in the repression. General Stanculescu, one of the trial's organizers, was allegedly responsible for the crackdown at Timisoara. The most complete recorded version of the trial was cut at the very moment when Ceausescu, having denied giving the order to open fire at Timisoara, was getting ready to point the finger.

Ion Iliescu and several of those in his circle, such as Silviu Brucan and Petre Roman, are surely well intentioned and truly want to see a democratic Romania. They are in danger, however, of being considerably hampered not only by the army and the state machinery, but also by the political apparatus of the former regime. Just as Ceausescu's execution permitted his government to escape trial, banning the Communist party served a similar purpose. The party disappeared in name only, and since it had no real political organization of its own, the new National Salvation Front took over the apparatus the outlawed party maintained throughout the country.

EVEN BEFORE CEAEUSCU'S FALL, HIDDEN CONFLICTS EXISTED AMONG various factions in his regime, especially between the *Securitate* and the army. There were clear indications of this during the events of December and several disturbing incidents have still not been cleared up. We now know that the mass grave "discovered" near Timisoara was a complete fabrication, with "stitched together" bodies transported there from hospital dissecting rooms and morgues. We still do not know who masterminded the operation nor whom it was supposed to discredit. In the days following Ceausescu's overthrow sixty thousand were reported dead throughout Romania. In fact the number was closer to six hundred.

Just an error in counting? The most farfetched rumours continue to circulate in Bucharest. There are those who maintain that someone (who?) tried deliberately to create panic and disorder while the difficult negotiations of setting up the new government were carried out. Nevertheless, it seems that Iliescu must come to terms with forces he barely controls. As a result of the army's refusal to suppress the rioters, in June, he was forced to call on the miners, who, flanked by political organizers from the old Communist party, exceeded their "mandate" – most obviously by arresting leaders of the new political groupings.

Given the underdeveloped political culture in Romania, making Ceausescu take the blame for all the country's ills seems to have largely succeeded as far as the National Salvation Front is concerned. Yet this is not the only reason for its overwhelming election victory. After Ceausescu was eliminated, opposition parties were put together very hastily. The major established parties, such as the re-formed National Peasants Party and National Liberal Party, have for the most part remained empty shells. Their respective leaders, Ratiu and Campeanu, candidates who ran against Iliescu for the presidency, had not lived in the country for many years (thirty-five in Ratiu's case and fifteen in Campeanu's). They had little credibility, and their parties, active mainly in Bucharest, had not penetrated much beyond the capital into the more remote parts of a country still controlled by former party cadres now siding with the Front.

What's more, during the time it was acting as an interim government, the Front adopted "vote-getting" methods of a cynical Western kind. While continuing price controls, it appreciably increased workers' salaries and made Saturday a paid holiday, even though the state obviously had no means of paying for such initiatives. In addition, the Front

government imported great quantities of consumer goods, even though the effect on the standard of living would have been marginal. Ceausescu had virtually eliminated the country's foreign debt, while these measures increased it by \$2 billion between January and May alone.

Clearly, things cannot continue in this fashion for much longer. The Front has promised a cautious transition towards a market economy: according to its spokesmen, it aims at privatizing seventy percent of industry. But room to manoeuvre is not just tight, it is practically non-existent. The Romanian economy is teetering on the brink of disaster. Given the already appalling standard of living of the population as well as its newly raised expectations, spontaneous strikes and uprisings could easily become commonplace. One cannot rule out the country's sinking into chaos or adopting a military dictatorship.



HUNGARY'S SITUATION IS BETTER IN ALL RESPECTS than Romania's, and from several points of view, better than Poland's. Arising from the spring's elections is a genuine political pluralism. The coalition government installed in May is dominated by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which won almost twenty-five percent of the vote with nearly twenty-

two percent going to its nearest rival, the Alliance of Free Democrats – still part of the opposition.

The Alliance of Free Democrats was the creation of the first dissident intellectuals. It is a party of an extremely hard-line and uncompromising political and economic liberalism – typically Jacobin in character. It sees itself as resolutely modern, anti-nationalist, and internationalist. For example, it considers the issue of Hungarians in Transylvania to be a problem of human rights and the proper subject of international discussion rather than the concern of the Hungarian government. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, on the other hand, is both pro-nationalist and closer to Hungarian political traditions. Tinged with populism, it has been wrongly accused by its chief opponent of anti-semitism. On socio-economic questions it claimed in the beginning to represent a "third way." But under election pressure from the Free Democrats and, according to them, in order to win the confidence of international financial institutions, the Democratic Forum has gradually adopted an economic programme that is hardly distinguishable from that of its rival.

Among all the Eastern European countries, Hungary is undoubtedly the best position to make an easy transition to a market economy. Having been better prepared, the ground is much more receptive. Since the end of the 1960s, Prime Minister Kadar's government, by far the most "liberal" in the region, has put numerous market mechanisms into place. The formation of industrial and state economic structures has long been a product of this school and they are both used to operating under a regime where real competition – admittedly often of a limited sort – existed between various economic units.


In Poland as well as in Hungary, economists close to the government maintain that it is not loans from foreign governments they need so much as direct foreign investments, whether for new projects or for purchasing state-owned industries. Poles consider the progress so far to be very unsatisfactory. Over the last year, foreign investments in Poland came to an estimated \$300 million. During the same period, while it still had a Communist government, Hungary received \$700 million. Even if one sees this latter figure as completely inadequate as well, it does nevertheless show that the state of the economic foundations and infrastructure is still better in Hungary than in Poland.

DESPITE THESE ADVANTAGES, HUNGARY'S PER CAPITA FOREIGN DEBT IS THE highest in the region and the change to a market economy will require considerable sacrifices on the part of the population. In fact, as one of the leaders of the Democratic Forum observed, the new Hungarian gov-

ernment does not have even half the popularity of the Polish administration – a legitimacy enabling it to impose such sacrifices. In conditions like these, the Hungarian government might have been tempted to strengthen unity and solidarity by putting more weight on the nationalist option. But this would carry with it some serious problems on the international level.

During the election campaign, the Democratic Forum spoke of a Hungarian nation of fourteen million people and proclaimed itself defender and champion. In reality, there are 10.6 million Hungarians in Hungary itself. So in fact, the Forum was referring to the 2.5 million Hungarians in Transylvania (a figure still open to dispute), to 500,000 others in Slovakia, and to a few hundred thousand who live in Yugoslavia.

It's with Romania that the problem could become most acute. In January, after the fall of Ceausescu and with the opening of the Romanian borders, whole busloads of militants from the Democratic Forum were sent into Transylvania to support and mobilize Hungarians, an action that heightened tensions between the two countries. For the past few months, some two hundred Hungarian refugees have been leaving Romania for Hungary every day – a figure higher, proportionally, than the number of East German refugees last summer. The Hungarian government suspects its Romanian counterpart of favouring this exodus in order to rid itself of a problem. One intellectual, an advisor to the Hungarian government and otherwise fairly moderate, told us in Budapest: "If this is really a deliberate Romanian policy, we will accept the refugees, but we will insist that they bring their land with them." Obviously, it has not yet come to that.



IN CONCLUDING WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WE can end on a much more optimistic note. The economic and political conditions there are the best in Eastern Europe, the standard of living is higher than anywhere else, and foreign debt negligible. As a result, the government has more room to manoeuvre in making a gradual transition to a market economy. Perhaps precisely for that reason, views on economic liberalism are less doctrinaire than in Poland or even Hungary. President Havel's economic advisors envisage a mixed economy emphasizing the private sector.

The relative absence of sectarianism and dogmatism is also fundamental to the country's political culture, which is marked by a high level of tolerance. There is no evidence of the anti-semitism that is resurfacing to varying degrees in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Resentment against the Communists exists, of course, but there is less of an urge for revenge and the settling of scores. Czechoslovakia was, between the wars, the only Eastern bloc country to live under a genuine democracy, an experience that has left a deep impression.

Czechoslovakia, like its neighbours, will have difficult problems to solve. The environment has been seriously damaged. Modernizing its industrial equipment, as well as bringing its economy up to Western European levels – where it was before the Second World War – will be expensive. The latent issue of Slovak nationalism is coming to the fore once again, and could in the end compromise the future of the federation. But Czechoslovakia appears to have all the assets it needs to meet these challenges. □

1. See "Downhill," *Gazeta International*, no. 17, 1990, p. 9.

2. See *New York Times*, 10 May 1990, p. A13.

3. Jozef Pilsudski (1867–1935), a Polish national hero in the newly independent state of Poland after World War One. He was at various times a revolutionary, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, and head of state.

Translation by Marcia Rodriguez.



## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### "MYTHS" AND REALITIES OF A POST-MEECH CANADA IN THE WORLD

**W**HETHER OR NOT they originally favoured the Meech Lake prescription, all thoughtful Canadians are now bracing themselves for some basic changes in the Canadian *status quo*. Internationally, too, the "peaceable king-

dom" has attracted unusual attention and concern, beginning with mystification on the part of foreigners that such a blessed and benign people as Canadians could get themselves into such a rancorous mess in the first place.

Few Canadians realize that in an imperfect world this country has long been admired as one of the world's most successful models for managing plural societies and mixed economies. For this reason, the perceived danger of a failure of the Canadian experiment causes deep international concern. This is especially so at a time when the management of such complex societies is coming to the fore as a priority challenge around the world.

As we think and talk through our future directions, all Canadians need to see themselves in this international mirror. For all the differences and frictions we are so intimately aware of, in global perspective the reservoir and habits of tolerance in this country are still very deep, and our advantages for the tasks of management are immense. This broader perspective is a vital antidote to the climate of feckless introspection and self-indulgent gloom fostered by the bitterness of the Meech process.

**T**HIS NEGATIVISM HAS BEEN FED BY SOME WHO have long been hostile to Canada anyway, and by others who have been shaken to the point of asking whether we have, or have ever had, the necessary unifying myths to forge a common identity and pursue common purposes. Some of this debate was spurred by William Thorsell's essay in the April *Report on Business*, where he claimed to strip bare our myths about the monarchy, the two founding peoples, the mixed economy, the "kinder gentler nation," and the role as "helpful fixer in international affairs."

Like some other debates in Canada in recent months, the discussion on myths has got somewhat out of hand, with a failure to recognize that no people's myths are ever entirely true — they are evolving combinations of past lega-

cies, present ideals and future aspirations. In all of this, too little attention has been paid to the issue of Canada's international identity. Thorsell, for his part, produced no evidence for the alleged hollowness of Canada's activist international tradition; he seemed simply to assume that since the world has changed, our role must have diminished — he got it absolutely wrong.

Only the most myopic of Canadians can fail to appreciate the dramatic changes taking place in the world and the impact they will have on all our lives in what Barbara Ward recognized, as long ago as 1967, as "the first international nation." For Canada to help shape these changes is crucial. Our foreign policy serves to protect our interests and project our values, and even though we have diversity in both, it is often in the wider world that we find a true perspective on just how much Canadians have in common.

**A**T THE PURELY PERSONAL LEVEL, MOST Canadians travelling anywhere in the world have had the agreeable surprise of finding an especially warm welcome afforded their passport and nationality. None of us should think this welcome is a mere quirk, or the hold-over of some popular nostalgia abroad. In a classic survey of foreign policy elites in other countries some years ago, Professors Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin found Canada classed with countries which are (in order of frequency mentioned): "generous"; "peace-promoters"; "modest"; "principled or moral"; and "internationalist." Canada was *contrasted* most with countries which are: "selfish or unresponsive"; "irrational"; "ideological"; "expansionist or violent"; and "isolationist."

Is this favourable Canadian image derived merely from Canada's distance and irrelevance to major world events? Once again, such a boundlessly self-sceptical question could probably leap only to a Canadian mind — and that, too, is one of our positive traits in a world not marked by modesty. In fact, Canada has the seventh largest economy in the world and the seventh largest share of trade — no one does business on that scale without being tested.

For those abroad who follow world affairs, it is less surprising than it is to most Canadians that we are the world's fourth largest voluntary contributor to the United Nations system, the seventh largest donor of foreign aid, and, inci-

dentally, we rank twelfth in the world in total military expenditure. These investments give Canada real credibility and significant influence among a widening community of nations, in which issues are becoming more diverse and influence more diffuse.

For a decade at least, it has often been Canada (the smallest of the G-7 powers at the Western Summit table) which worked to bridge the differences among those powers, and between them and many other outside countries. Canadian leaders have done so on issues of North-South relations, Southern Africa, Third World debt, and the environment. And in doing so only Canada can claim the insights which come from active membership in the Commonwealth, Francophone and inter-American communities.

**C**ANADA PLAYED ITS FULL PART IN THE Helsinki process which helped bring an end to the Cold War. In fact, European and international security will now call much more for involvement in verification activities to ensure security at much lower levels of armaments and in conflict management, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Canada has long been Number One in the world in this type of work. As illustrated most recently by our pivotal role in resolving conflict in Namibia and Central America, Canadians probably have a greater share than any other people in the 1988 Nobel Prize awarded to the "blue berets" of UN Peacekeeping.

In the 1982 Presidential address to the Canadian Political Science Association on the subject of "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Professor Denis Stairs showed brilliantly how the special Canadian contribution to the world draws upon an understanding at home of the constancy of "conflicts rooted in diversity," and thus the need for flexibility, moderation, and give and take. The qualities to be avoided in international life also mirror those to be avoided at home: dogmatism; and the valuing of emotion over reason, the symbolic over the real. "To be governed thus," he stated "is to be denied the ability to perceive conflict as a matter of competing interests rather than irreconcilable absolutes, and hence to be deprived of both the will and the capacity to bargain, to trade, to find satisfaction in middle ground."

We do indeed have our myths, and some of them are vital, compelling and the envy of the world. □

— BERNARD WOOD

# NEIGHBOURHOOD VALUES FOR A COMMON FUTURE

*Even as East and West join hands, North and South, rich and poor, remain in the depths of their own Cold War.*

BY SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL

IT IS INTRIGUING THAT ONE OF THE MOST APT DESCRIPTIONS OF OUR world, as we prepare for the third millennium, is that of the medieval poet Langland who described his world as he knew it as "a field full of folk." We know it now to be a much larger field and there are many billion more folk in it than Langland ever dreamt of. Yet, the description holds; indeed, it is closer to our present perceptions than it has been for many an era.

That field of folk is our human neighbourhood: our global village. We continue, it is true, to act more in response to the lure of materialism than the claims of humanity. We live most of our lives with yesterday's images of far away places with strange sounding names only to be reminded with increasing frequency that our genius has made our planet small and that our own survival requires that we care and share it better than we have done. Today both ethical and practical considerations compel us to put otherness behind us and acknowledge that our humanity is inseparable. And all this presses upon us as we hurtle towards the 21st century with mixed emotions of confusion and excitement, of great hope and some panic.

But the auguries are auspicious; certainly compared to say five years ago. 1985 was a dire time. The Soviet Union was entrenched in Afghanistan. The Gulf War ground on. Namibia was occupied, and its border lands were still killing fields. There was relentless repression, not talk of reform, in *apartheid* South Africa. A dead hand lay across Eastern Europe; Vaclav Havel was a dissident, not a president. And there were grave doubts over the whole future for international cooperation. There was no valid basis for assuming the existence of an ethic of multilateralism; the spirit guiding superpower decision-making was certainly not an ethos of internationalism.

But, fortunately, that ethos lingered among people, and especially among young people who understood instinctively the global community they shared. Everywhere, people were making manifest, wherever the right of dissent existed – but also, whenever they could, in places where that right was denied – their sense that they were being led to disaster. We were moved out of complacency by both mass demonstrations and the heroism of lone voices, like those of Andrei Sakharov and Nelson Mandela. The question asked by the tapestry hanging in St. James's Church in London – woven by one of the Sisters of Soweto – "How Long?" has been answered with respect to Mandela's captivity; and with regard to an end to *apartheid* itself, the answer is surely: "Not long now."

THE CLIMATE FOR MULTILATERALISM AND FOR INTERNATIONALISM HAS improved with the improvement of relations between the superpowers; this could be the true end of the post-war era – the beginning of a new age of enlightenment. But human values are about people and how they live day-to-day. Our global neighbourhood – like any other neighbourhood – is about life at the street level, not the penthouse. We would be guilty of Panglossian optimism if we ignored these large realities.

When we set out to consider the state of the world, we must be clear of what world we speak. Is it, for example, the one-quarter world that is developed and materially prosperous, or is it the other three-quarters that exists on the margins of prosperity and progress? But even if we answer in rejection of a world of separate worlds, a question remains: the world as seen through whose eyes? The eyes of strategic planners of West or East? The eyes of stockbrokers in New York or Tokyo; the eyes of farmers in the paddy fields of Bangladesh; the eyes of many who will not see or others who look as through a glass darkly? The viewpoint profoundly colours judgements on values, particularly neighbourhood values, and to a substantial extent determines whether living by them will remain an illusion or is capable of fulfilment.

MY ASSERTION IS THAT THIS IS INDEED ONE WORLD, UNEVEN AND DISPARATE but integral nonetheless. Our closely knit, interlinked human society is a contemporary reality, however much the instincts of yesterday recall us to old nationalisms and summon up the adversary habits of crude sovereignty. What interdependence means in the global context is that we all need each other. Neither rich nor poor, West nor East, has the option to go it alone. Our shrinking world really holds no human sanctuaries. There are no shelters that insulate anyone, anywhere, from disease, from poverty, from nuclear holocaust, from environmental collapse. The concept of jurisdiction, increasingly, has meaning mainly for lawyers.

In Commonwealth countries like Canada whose precious inheritance is the common law – it is recognized in law that we all owe a duty of care to our neighbour, a duty to act in a reasonable way to avoid injury to him or her. Today, that duty of care is imposing new imperatives – the duty of care we owe is to all the world's people who are our neighbours now. The nature of that duty, the notion of what is reasonable conduct in relation to others, is known intuitively by ordinary people the world over. We must, in a new, more enlightened internationalism, provide conceptual space for these realities; we need to develop new precepts of rights and duties as relevant to our time as any formulated in an earlier era. We need the rule of enforceable law between nations if human society is to live by global neighbourhood values.

But to assert what we need is to acknowledge what we lack. For all of humankind's rich catalogue of achievements, this world remains a dangerous enigma: advanced in some ways, yet primitive in others; a combination of genius and perversity that may yet cause it to self-destruct – less now with a bang than a whimper. Contrasting elements of variety and oneness have been age-old features of human society. But today they contend with a special fierceness; and this contention seems destined to constitute a great struggle of ideas which will replace the clash of idealogies that has dominated so much of the 20th century. Let me try to illustrate these preoccupations of the years ahead by looking awhile at "democracy" and "freedom."

Many will assert that the most dramatic and exciting aspect of our changing times is the compulsion towards democracy, the demand for freedom; and so it is. In China, in 1989, through the miracle of the communications revolution which has helped to make the world an intimate



human neighbourhood, the young people of Tiananmen Square who called for freedom were calling to us all, in words that could have been those of our own sons and daughters, refusing to accept for their generation denials of freedom deriving from an era which has ended. They were asserting democracy as a universal right and appealing to worldwide human solidarity.

In a number of countries, part of the dramatic change is a new enthusiasm for the market economy – for the Western way of doing things – because it represents, in contrast to the experience of the collectivist model, a way of getting things done. That does not surprise those of us who come from the Third World; for before Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, many Third World countries had already come to terms with the marketplace. But it has been a lesson of bitter experience that the marketplace is anything but magical and can, indeed, be a heartless environment. It is to be hoped that the new leaders in Central and Eastern Europe will recognise that capitalism, like socialism, needs a human face.

IT IS AN INDICTMENT OF OUR COMMON HUMANITY that today, despite massive achievements, our primal reach for freedom is still not everywhere satisfied. All too often this is because of an almost unbelievable capacity to withhold from fellow human beings the freedoms we most cherish for ourselves, and to inflict on them the most horrendous injustices when they demand them as being theirs of right. And mixed up with some movements for freedom, implicit in some of them, is the instinct for separateness; an emphasis on ethnicity, on narrow nationalisms, on tribalisms of one kind or another, a fashion even for fundamentalism. The cry of freedom could herald the breakup of societies in ways we have not yet begun to contemplate.

Last night – respecting the constraint on outsiders not to meddle, but fulfilling, I hope, the duty of friends and family not to stay silent when danger threatens – I ventured to give expression to some thoughts on current problems here in Canada. I reminded the Royal Commonwealth Society how much the Commonwealth cares for Canada which has made the Commonwealth strong and respected; how much the world cares for Canada which has made the world a better place by being Canada. I said that the wholeness of Canada, its multi-cultural ethic, its national integrity (territorial and otherwise) are not just national assets but international ones as well; that one Canada is itself a “distinct society” whose preservation is important to the world; that both the Commonwealth and the wider world will be diminished if your affairs go awry; that what is at stake has implications for us all.


Today, I want to add this: whatever the arguments, or even the agreements to disagree – they must surely all be within the parameters of one Canada. There is no principle of self-determination that leads inexorably to national dismemberment; decolonisation was another matter altogether. Self-determination there meant freedom from external domination. That concept has no application within established nations. Autonomy, devolution, federalism, pluralism of all kinds; forms of economic, social, cultural and political self-expression that we are yet to devise; are the pathways of self-determination within nations. They do not violate borders; they do not diminish the nation’s territorial integrity. The right of self-determination of all Canadians – like all Guyanese, all Indians, all Russians, all Papua New Guineans, all Yugoslavs, all South Africans – is not a right to cease to be Canadian or to make Canada cease to be. This is not new doctrine. You have for years lived by it and

become stronger and nobler for it. Long may you continue to do so – for Canada, and for all plural societies.

BUT THERE IS A FURTHER POINT: WE ARE SURELY TAKING TOO LONG TO acknowledge that we simply have to trim the edges of sovereignty and move to the rule of enforceable law worldwide if we are to save ourselves. There is urgent need for bold spirits to articulate an ethic of human survival and for us to develop global responses to the challenges of today that fill out the internationalist vision glimpsed by the victors back in 1945 when the UN was established.

Peace and security were at the centre of that vision. For peace between the superpowers, for avoidance of an apocalyptic war between them, the prospects are the best for many years. But that is not the end of the matter. We agree readily that peace is more than the absence of war; but are we really ready as a human society to turn our swords into ploughshares? At the level of every human being, but even at a national level, security cannot in any real sense be said to exist in a condition of chronic deprivation.

Poverty itself is insecurity. It is insecurity for the individual because of the fear of hunger, disease, and early death that afflicts the hundreds of millions who live on the margins of existence in subsistence agriculture and in urban slums. It is insecurity for the nation because of the lack of control over unstable and adverse external elements in commodity and capital markets; the inability to afford basic public expenditures, the dependence on external financial assistance with its attendant conditionalities; and the inequality of bargaining power which affects external economic relationships. In North-South relations we are still in the midst of the equivalent of the “Cold War.” There was no meaningful, structured dialogue between North and South on the world economy throughout the 1980s.



WE RECOGNIZE THAT A NATIONAL SOCIETY CANNOT be at peace if power, privilege and prosperity are the prerogatives of only a few. Why do we think our world society can be at peace when

such disparities prevail within it? Far more people today suffer from economic rather than military insecurity: those who die prematurely and others whose lives are blighted by the same deprivations and deformities that go hand in hand with military conflict. Even if we use the crude reckoning of war, the conclusions are staggering. Over a period of five years, the ravages of poverty and under-development account for a minimum of thirty-five million lives and countless shortened and unfulfilled lives. For the poor, it is always war-time.

The relaxation of East-West tensions has surely created a window of opportunity for us to respond to interdependencies through change in many fields, and advance towards a world that respects our inseparable humanity: one in which there must be a better opportunity for development and for a resumption of the dialogue on cooperation – a better opportunity for global solidarity. There is a path opening before us – an ethical path to human survival, an alternative way forward, through strengthening collective processes and discovering new ways of dealing with problems in cooperative not adversarial terms; a more democratic world with more enlightened global governance.

*On his last visit to the capital city of a Commonwealth nation as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal delivered a speech at the Institute for Peace and Security in Ottawa on 5 June. This article is an excerpt from that address.*

# SHOWDOWN IN KASHMIR

*A fourth Indo-Pakistan war would probably start over the long-disputed territory of Kashmir, and be fought with nuclear weapons.*

BY SELIG S. HARRISON

ON 15 MAY 1990, AMID MOUNTING CONCERN OVER A SOUTH Asian nuclear war, President Bush suddenly dispatched a high-level mission to India and Pakistan. It was headed by Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates, his principal Soviet affairs specialist, then in Moscow, who was instructed to abandon his preparations for the impending Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting in order to proceed immediately to Islamabad and New Delhi.

What precipitated the Gates mission at a time so inconvenient for the White House were satellite photos from the National Security Agency suggesting that Pakistan, alarmed by Indian troop movements it regarded as threatening, might be preparing for a preemptive attack. Some of the photos showed unusual traffic from Islamabad's nuclear development facility at Kahuta to airfields where American-built, nuclear-capable F-16 aircraft are based. Four months after the Gates mission, there is still a serious danger of a fourth Indo-Pakistan war. But the possibility of an imminent explosion appears to have receded, partly as a result of timely intervention by Gates in Islamabad and subsequently by Soviet diplomats in New Delhi.

American leverage is much greater in Pakistan than in India because the US has long been Islamabad's major military supplier. Washington gave the Ayub Khan regime \$1.2 billion in military hardware during the Fifties in the name of deterring Soviet and Chinese aggression. When this weaponry was used against India in the 1965 war, it was cut off. But another \$1.5 billion in military assistance was agreed upon in 1981 as the price for Pakistani cooperation in the Afghan war, over and above \$2 billion in aid channeled through Islamabad for the Afghan resistance between 1980 and 1989. Then in 1986, Washington added \$1.4 billion more, which has continued to flow since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

According to American and Pakistani officials, Gates served notice that the US would cut off aid, spare parts, and ammunition in the event of a war, as it did in 1965. More important, he warned that the administration might even suspend or terminate aid, short of a conflict, unless Islamabad's Interservices Intelligence Directorate stopped its support for Muslim insurgents in the Indian-held Kashmir Valley.

IT WAS PAKISTAN THAT PRECIPITATED THE PRESENT CRISIS BY PROVIDING funds, training and escalating supplies of weaponry to the Kashmir insurgency, inflaming Hindu chauvinist demands in India for an all-out military response. L.K. Advani, leader of the powerful Hindu nationalist faction in Prime Minister V.P. Singh's governing coalition, said that Pakistan would "cease to exist" if another war broke out. To be sure, Indian insensitivity to legitimate Kashmiri grievances over the past four decades led to the rise of the insurgency. But the problem was manageable for New Delhi until Islamabad's Intelligence Directorate began supplying Kalashnikov rifles, rocket launchers, mortars and other weapons from US Afghan aid stockpiles beginning in 1988.

To back up his warning, Gates pointed out that the administration has a variety of legal avenues readily available for cutting off aid. Congress has made military assistance conditional on an annual presidential certi-

fication that Pakistan does not "possess" a nuclear weapon. Every year, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, the White House has hitherto swallowed hard and given its go-ahead for continued aid. Gates told Pakistan military leaders that certification was becoming "increasingly difficult" for the President, adding that anti-terrorist laws could also be invoked as a rationale for suspending or terminating military aid.

It is now clear that the level of Pakistani support for the Kashmir guerrillas has sharply dropped off in the months since the Gates visit. India, for its part, has moderated its rhetoric and has pulled back some of its border forces in response to Soviet as well as American pressures. Although New Delhi has developed a significant military-industrial complex in recent years, it is still heavily dependent on Moscow for spare parts for Soviet military equipment, especially its MiG aircraft.

FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE CAUTIONED SECRETARY OF STATE Baker in their Bonn meeting in June that any overt Soviet-American collusion in cutting off arms deliveries would merely exacerbate nationalist passions in India and Pakistan alike. However, while not directly threatening a cutoff, he said, Moscow had used strong words in New Delhi, and India was well aware that the Soviet Union could find excuses for slowing down critical arms deliveries in the event of a conflict.

Apart from American pressure, two other factors have helped to dampen Pakistani support for the Kashmir insurgent movement. One is a renewal of covert Indian support for separatists in Pakistan's key southern coastal province of Sind, designed to show that two can play at the same game. New Delhi suspended its support for the Sindhi groups two years ago in the hope that Pakistan would stop fuelling insurgent movements in the Punjab and Kashmir. But when Pakistani involvement in Kashmir escalated last year, India revived its operations in Sind, signalling its readiness to back off if Islamabad cooled it in Kashmir.

An even more significant factor that may help to prevent intensification of the fighting in Kashmir is a split between the Intelligence Directorate and the strongest insurgent group, the Liberation Front, which advocates Kashmiri independence. Until recently, the Directorate has been supporting both the Front and the Hezbe Islami, a coalition of Islamic fundamentalist factions favouring accession to Pakistan. But a simmering conflict between the Front and its Pakistani mentors has now burst into the open. Islamabad has consistently opposed the idea of an independent Kashmir, insisting on a United Nations plebiscite that would give all Kashmiris a choice between joining India or Pakistan. The state has been divided into Indian- and Pakistani-administered sectors since a ceasefire line was demarcated following the first Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir in 1948.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in May that independence could trigger "Balkanization" of the subcontinent by stimulating similar demands for autonomy or independence by other minorities in both countries. Behind this position lies a strategic concern that creation of an independent Kashmir would cut off Pakistani access to China. The



Front demands that the projected new state encompass not only Indian-held areas of Kashmir but also the Pakistan-occupied areas of Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, Hunza and Baltistan, as well as pockets of territory ceded by Pakistan to Beijing. Half of Pakistan's hydroelectric generating capacity and the headwaters of the Chenab, one of its major rivers, would lie within the new entity. Moreover, the creation of an independent, Muslim-majority Kashmir would invalidate Pakistan's own raison d'être as the homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims, a rationale already undermined by the Indian-supported secession of Bangladesh.

Although Pakistan insists that any aid to Kashmir comes from private, not governmental sources, the Front exposed the Islamabad connection in a detailed attack on 26 April, stating that the insurgency was directed from Azad Kashmir by "Brigadier Intiaz," chief of the Intelligence Directorate's "Cell No. 202." Reaffirming its goal of "an independent Greater Kashmir," the Front declared that "anyone who allows himself to be used by the Pakistani intelligence authorities for promoting their own narrow purpose of bringing all of Kashmiri territory under their control, would be looked upon as a traitor by the Kashmiri people."

The Intelligence Directorate, manned by fundamentalist officers installed during the regime of the late Pakistani president Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq, helped to build up the Liberation Front in the mistaken belief that Hezbe Islami would dominate a unified insurgent movement and would force the Front to shelve the independence demand. Kashmir, in this perspective, would be engulfed by the fundamentalist wave already spreading in the Middle East and nearby Soviet Central Asia.

Still embittered over the loss of Bangladesh, many Pakistani leaders saw in Kashmir a low-risk opportunity to get even with their more powerful neighbour. Acquisition of the nuclear option and a continuing flow of American weaponry induced a mood of heady confidence. On visits to Islamabad in July 1988, and October 1989, I was repeatedly assured that India would not launch a general counter-attack in re-sponse to subversion in Kashmir, as it did in 1965, because Islamabad's nuclear deterrent had made such a course too dangerous.

TO THE SURPRISE AND DISMAY OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, THE Liberation Front is now stronger than the Hezbe Islami. Islamic fundamentalism is a recent implant in Kashmir, claiming a fervently dedicated but limited band of adherents. The Front makes a much broader and deeper appeal to the historically-rooted aspiration for autonomy in the Kashmir Valley, a mountain-bound region with its own language and a strong sense of separate identity. Long before their current struggle against absorption by Hindu-majority India, Kashmir Valley Muslims have resisted incorporation by Muslim rulers, notably the Mogul Emperor Akbar in 1586 and Ahmad Shah of Afghanistan two centuries later.

India granted nominal, limited autonomy to its sector of Kashmir in 1950 under a special constitutional provision but promptly nullified this provision in practice. Kashmiri leaders who have attempted to exercise autonomy have been either jailed or replaced by corrupt local opportunists willing to accept Indian dictation. Adding insult to injury, India has spent little on the economic development of the state.

Relations between New Delhi and Kashmir are complicated by the fact that the state is an artificial conglomeration inherited from the British period. The Muslim-majority Valley is lumped together with Hindu-majority Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh, each of which has sizeable Muslim minorities. Autonomy would place the Jammu Hindus

under Muslim dominance, and to avoid this fate, they have frequently enlisted the support of Hindu nationalists in other parts of India to block autonomy moves.

For India, one possible way out of the present impasse might be to split the state, integrating Jammu and Ladakh with the Indian Union while giving an autonomous Kashmir Valley special confederated status within the Indian defence and foreign policy sphere. Such a strategy, accompanied by large-scale economic developments, might well win over significant elements of the Liberation Front who recognize the futility of the independence objective in the face of combined Indian and Pakistani resistance. At present, however, Prime Minister Singh, constrained by his hard-line Hindu coalition partners, shows no sign of moving in this direction. Indian policy is to crush the insurgency militarily before pursuing a political solution.

India, like Pakistan, sees control of its part of strategically located

Kashmir as militarily vital and fears that autonomy there would set a precedent for demands by others. The controversy in India over what to do in Kashmir is part of an ongoing debate over whether the entire Indian federal system, with its linguistically-defined provincial boundaries, should be more decentralized.

THIS DEBATE IS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE SENSITIVE problem of Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Contrary to the widespread image in the West, the 1947 partition of the subcontinent did not produce a tidy division in which Pakistan got all of the Muslims and India, all of the Hindus. India has ninety million Muslims, nearly as many as Pakistan. Nominally, India is a secular state, but the secular principle is under attack from the Hindu right. Advocates of secularism fear that an autonomous, Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley would end up seeking independence or accession to Pakistan, thus exposing Muslims in other parts of India to continuing attack as potential traitors.

While important in itself, Kashmir has become the focus of a broader unresolved struggle,

going back more than seven centuries, between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority in South Asia. Invading Muslim armies conquered perennially feuding Hindu kingdoms and gradually established a series of strong dynasties culminating in the Mogul Empire.

For the Hindu right, independence from Britain was a chance to dominate the subcontinent at last. Partition was a trauma, and it was accepted reluctantly on the assumption that Pakistan would become a deferential junior partner within an Indian sphere of influence. Indian leaders did not bargain for the Cold War and the inflated power that Pakistan would acquire through three decades of American military aid. Above all, they did not foresee a nuclear-armed Pakistan. As the Hindu right grows ever more powerful in India, pressures are likely to intensify for a showdown before Islamabad perfects an operational nuclear capability with sophisticated delivery systems. The growth of Hindu nationalism is accelerated, in turn, by the increasing assertiveness of Islamic fundamentalist leaders in Pakistan and their military allies following the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto in August.

For the foreseeable future, the prospect of a nuclear war is marginal barring major political convulsions in New Delhi or Islamabad. But by the same token, the unprecedented process of political instability and decay now developing on both sides of the border make long-term scenarios of nuclear Armageddon all too credible.



# PIERRE TRUDEAU'S LAST HURRAH

*In a new book on the impact of the Trudeau years on Canadian foreign policy, two historians take a harsh view of the 1983 "peace initiative."*

BY J.L. GRANATSTEIN AND ROBERT BOTHWELL

**T**HE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND ADMINISTRATION WERE IN A PARTICULARLY jingoistic mood in late 1983. The Grenada invasion, botched though it was in its military implementation, had been trumpeted as a sign of a new resurgence of pride in the military, patriotism, and the old American virtues. The propaganda tomtoms were beating furiously to hail the virtues of the Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as "Star Wars"), announced by President Reagan (without consultation with his allies or even with the State Department) in a TV address in March 1983, as a way to protect America completely from nuclear attack. While few took SDI seriously in the West, the Soviets had been greatly alarmed. In Washington, the president continued to ride high in the opinion polls, many of his advisers remained true believers in the necessity to grapple with the communists, and Trudeau, a proponent of Canadian equidistance, inevitably was seen as suspiciously soft on the Soviets.

A Pentagon official recalled that when he heard of the initiative, his response was, "Oh God, Trudeau's at it again." But why worry, he added, if Trudeau had no influence on other people? An officer of the National Security Council noted that "there was no predilection here to alter [Trudeau's] lack of influence." And Lawrence Eagleburger, the third-ranking official of the Department of State, told a private dinner party a week before Trudeau arrived in Washington that the Canadian's peace efforts resembled nothing so much as those of a leftist high on pot. Eagleburger was thought to be one of the more "pro-Canadian" officials in the State Department, which made that slap all the more stinging – and outrageous.

IN THESE UNPROFITABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW TRUDEAU PRESENTED HIS case to Reagan was obviously critical. Some of his advisers insisted that the prime minister say precisely the same things he had said to other leaders. But the ambassador to Washington, Allan Gotlieb, urged Trudeau to appeal directly and personally to Reagan on the high ground. The prime minister agreed and handled himself well. Realizing that he was approaching from the margin, he took the softest of soft lines. As the Gwyns [Richard and Sandra, writing in *Saturday Night*, May 1984] reconstructed it, Trudeau had said: "Mr. President, your intentions are good and I agree with them wholly. You are a man of peace. You want peace through strength. Because of your policies, the U.S. has regained its strength and self-confidence. But, Mr. President, your message is not getting through. The people think you want strength for its own sake, and that you are ready to accept the risks of war. That must change, Mr. President. You must communicate what you truly believe in." At least one American present felt offended by this approach, even if Reagan was not. Trudeau, he remembered, "took a condescending view of the President as a simpleton in international affairs." Instead, "that hour was a tutorial for Trudeau on superpower politics. We never heard much more about the initiative."

Reagan emerged from the White House after the meeting to wish Trudeau "Godspeed," a phrase that struck many Canadians as dismissive and patronizing and as an indication of Canada's – and Trudeau's –

influence. The Canadian was important enough to be treated politely, but his message was not. Still, for whatever reason, the president's militant rhetoric toned down slightly in the weeks that followed, and Trudeau and other Canadians clung to that as a positive result of the prime minister's visit. Even some Canadian officials in Washington who thought the initiative nothing other than "a form of local madness to which Canadians are prone" believed that Trudeau had cooled the president's fervid expressions of anti-communism. To no one's surprise, however, very few American officials appeared to agree.

THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE PAUSED FOR A MONTH OVER THE CHRISTMAS holiday and into the new year. In the middle of January, the prime minister met UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar to urge him to convene a meeting of the five nuclear powers, a request that met no action. Later in the month, with Andropov still ill and unable to receive visitors, Trudeau took his show on the road once more, this time to Eastern Europe. Perhaps the satellites, known to be troubled by Soviet missile deployment on their territory and by the slow pace of negotiation between Moscow and Washington, might have more freedom to act if the Soviet leadership was incapacitated, or so Trudeau was said to feel. As one official working on the initiative put it, "If there was no one home in the USSR, then you went to the satellites." That at least was the motivation behind the visits to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania, the first two of which were sites for Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles. The Czechs called the initiative "useful and correct," but denounced the Americans for deploying cruise missiles in Europe. The East Germans, pleased that Trudeau was the first NATO leader to visit East Berlin, pledged their support. President Ceausescu of Romania, the most independent-minded of satellite leaders, hailed Trudeau's efforts for peace, even though the prime minister generally hewed close to the NATO line in his seven hours of conversations with the Bucharest leader. \*

After his return to Ottawa, Trudeau wrapped up the peace initiative – and declared victory – in a speech in the House on 9 February. In this speech, the prime minister suggested "ten principles of a common bond between East and West," a new decalogue that had been put together by Ivan Head, then the president of the International Development Research Centre.

The prime minister reiterated that his goal had remained the one he had announced in October at Guelph: to change the trend line of crisis. There had been, he believed, some small successes in Reagan's cooled rhetoric, in the Soviet return to the MBFR talks, in the meeting between Shultz and Gromyko at Stockholm. In any case, Trudeau concluded on the highest note possible by saying that "Canada and Canadians ... saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals;

*\*Romania was in economic crisis with food and electricity shortages in 1984 (and after) and a leadership that heaped praise on itself. The current joke in Bucharest asked why Romanians were like penguins. The answer: because they live in the cold, eat no meat and clap all the time.*



and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war." The prime minister's initiative was endorsed by opposition leader Brian Mulroney and NDP leader Ed Broadbent, striking testimony to the popular support Trudeau's efforts had received in Canada.

Though apparently concluded, the initiative had one last gasp remaining. Within days of Trudeau's address to parliament, Soviet leader Andropov finally expired and Trudeau jetted to Moscow for the funeral and, with luck, a meeting with Konstantin Chernenko, the new general secretary and a man whose health was little better than Andropov's had been. Trudeau got his thirty-five minutes, and used them to tell Chernenko that there was now a window of opportunity for accommodation between East and West. The dour Gromyko, present at the talks, responded bleakly that the West had to put something in the window if relations were to improve. Although the prime minister emerged from the meeting to claim that the initiative had received another jolt of political energy, there was room for doubt. Chernenko, desperately ill, could take only the most cautious steps in the direction of détente. And Robert Ford, long-time ambassador in Moscow, delivered a damning assessment two years later. Trudeau's "peace initiative was a total absurdity," Ford told the *Globe and Mail*, "and the Russians just laughed at it." Trudeau had no leverage in Washington and "no corresponding clout in Moscow ... he had no credit in the banks of either place."

The prime minister had one final crack at his allies when he attended the summit meeting in London in his last days in office and helped secure a communiqué that called for "security and the lowest possible level of forces." Trudeau had a shouting match with Reagan, telling the president "you have to do more" to promote détente. That led the usually unflappable (or comatose) president to pound the table and shout, "Damn it, Pierre, what the hell can I do to get those guys back to the table!" The source for that story, Patrick Gossage noted sourly, was "a well-detailed U.S. briefing."

PERHAPS FORD'S WAS THE PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE WHOLE OF TRUDEAU's failed crusade or "world walkabout," as some sneered at it. Somehow, although he had been in power for sixteen years and a participant in NATO, Commonwealth, and summit meetings, Trudeau seemed not to understand how great power relations worked. Convinced of his intellectual powers and in no way immune from vanity, Trudeau naively continued to believe in the power of words and ideas, to believe that reason could dislodge the strenuous pursuit of self-interest by great powers, and to believe in his own star. He was and remained an adventurer in ideas, certain that he could persuade other leaders to join him in personal involvement in altering the nuclear threat. But for all his brilliance, he could not grasp why the Soviets and Americans were unwilling to take any risks for peace. Nor could he understand the American and Russian disinclination to allow smaller states to get in their way. In addition, as a believer in equidistance and a respecter of the superpowers' spheres of influence, Trudeau suffered from what his critics saw as an apparent unwillingness or inability to distinguish between the superpowers. Andropov's Russia was infinitely worse than the United States, even Reagan's United States, but Trudeau often seemed unable to make the distinction.

As important, Canada simply did not have the standing and power to

make such an ambitious effort. Canada was a small country, despite its citizens' puffed-up view of its power and influence. If Canadian foreign policy had had influence in the past, and it had, that was because of the unusual global situation that had followed the Second World War, not because of any fundamental shift in power. In other words, once the ravages of war had been repaired, Canada sank back to its normal place in the centre of the third rank. Only a near-Great Power could have had a chance of success in a peace initiative in the 1980s – and only if the preparations and plans had been carefully prepared well in advance.

That was not true of the Trudeau initiative. Inevitably, given Trudeau's sporadic interest in foreign policy, his unilateral initiative had been hurriedly cobbled together. Some of its ideas, notably the five-power meeting, were non-starters – "one of the worst ideas in arms control produced in modern times," one senior Canadian ambassador called it. And no effort had been made to build support for the initiative through patient low-level diplomatic discussions. Without that, success was virtually impossible. The result was that at times Trudeau seemed to be flying around the world, desperately trying to be received by national leaders. If he got in the door, he was listened to politely enough, but his message, satirized by one Canadian official as "let's love one another," left glazed eyes. On balance, this official concluded, the effect had been to diminish Trudeau – and his nation.


STILL, TRUDEAU HAD BEEN RIGHT TO TRY, AND NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE Canadian public overwhelmingly supported his efforts (and realistically expected little to come of them). The world was in crisis, and Soviet-American relations were so bad that war seemed to be a possibility. Someone had to speak out, and Trudeau took the risk. Whether or not the prime minister could claim the credit, the upward spiral of tension did ease. Leaders like Kohl in West Germany and Craxi in Italy began to press their allies towards accommodation, Thatcher in Britain eased off on her hard line, and Reagan became less interested in painting the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" than in beginning to talk to it. Trudeau had taken the risks, and he deserved some of the credit.

There was a definite irony here, however, most notably for those who seek consistency in their leaders' deeds and thinking. Trudeau at the end of his career had clearly resumed his assault on the entrenched positions of the Cold War, an effort he had earlier abandoned after his cuts in the Canadian NATO contingent in 1969. Moreover, he had turned himself into a helpful fixer. The prime minister who in 1968 had attacked Lester Pearson's style and role was, by 1983–4, trying to don the Pearsonian

mantle – and probably with less success than the original. Pearson certainly would have realized that preparation and careful lower-level negotiation were essential first stages to any peace initiative. Mike Pearson had his vanity and his desire to shine on the world stage, to be sure, but he also knew the strengths, weaknesses, and potential of middle-power diplomacy. Despite sixteen years in office, Trudeau still did not recognize the limitations that living precariously in a superpowers' world placed on his country. †

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# SAVING EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE

*A progress report on the complex strategy and  
hardball politics behind the international effort to  
rescue the atmosphere*

BY DAVID RUNNALLS

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THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE IS BEING CHANGED AT AN UNPRECEDENTED RATE BY POLLUTANTS RESULTING FROM HUMAN ACTIVITIES, INEFFICIENT AND WASTEFUL FOSSIL FUEL USE, AND THE EFFECTS OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH IN MANY REGIONS. THESE CHANGES REPRESENT A MAJOR THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARE ALREADY HAVING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OVER MANY PARTS OF THE GLOBE.

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THESE ALARMING WORDS, READERS MAY recall, were part of the statement of the Changing Atmosphere Conference, hosted by the Canadian Government, in Toronto immediately after the 1988 economic summit. Some three hundred senior scientists and politicians convened for sober discussion of the implications of changes in the earth's climate, decided to "outgreen" Greenpeace.

But is the remarkable consensus that developed at the Toronto Conference beginning to fray at the edges? Hardly a day goes by without some new group of boffins claiming that no global warming has taken place, or citing some exotic study of Antarctic ice cores or remote sensing data to challenge the basic assumptions. These debates have been seized upon by those politicians who wish to do little or nothing about the problem, at least not until the spate of elections due to be held in 1992 in a number of Western industrialized countries has passed.

The old American cry of "do nothing until research tells us more about the problem" which so frustrated action on acid rain is being heard once again, most recently from John Sununu, the White House Chief of Staff. Speaking at one of the briefings which accompanied the Houston economic summit, he even summoned up one of the other hoary old chestnuts of the Reagan presidency – the one known in the White House press corps as the "killer tree" theory after the famous Reagan notion that trees cause pollution.

But when the curtain is pulled back on the scientific debates, one critical observation remains unchallenged. In the words of the American climatologist Stephen Schneider testifying before an unprecedented joint session of eight committees of Parliament earlier this year:

"... while legitimate uncertainty remains, and will continue to remain for decades over precisely where and when changes will occur, the vast bulk of responsible experts believe that we have a substantial chance of unprecedented change." This view was reinforced by the recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC represents a consensus of some of the world's leading scientists. Their conclusions were that emissions of the so-called "greenhouse gases," if left uncontrolled, would result in global mean temperature increases of up to three degrees Celsius and sea level rises of up to three-quarters of a metre by the end of the next century.

ENVIRONMENTALISTS HAVE LONG BEEN ACCUSTOMED to describing problems as "global," sometimes with dubious accuracy. But climate change is an issue that is of genuinely worldwide concern. Caused by all of us and affecting all of us, it has two aspects. First, the earth's thin layer of ozone which protects us from the worst of the sun's ultra-violet radiation, is being destroyed by the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), previously thought of as benign chemicals used for refrigeration, for blowing insulating foam, and as solvents in the electronics industry. If not controlled quickly, this erosion of the ozone layer will lead to vastly increased numbers of skin cancers (this is now beginning to happen), reductions in crop yields, and perhaps most ominously, effects on the human immune system.

Second, the emission of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) and the other greenhouse gases may profoundly alter the earth's climate in ways that we cannot accurately predict. But, in the

words of our sober Toronto participants: "Such high rates of change would be sufficiently disruptive that no country would likely benefit in toto from climate change." The poorer countries of the Third World, with the least resilience, are likely to fare very badly as their already fragile agricultural sectors are buffeted by changes in rainfall patterns and growing seasons, or as large portions of their coastal areas, along with valuable infrastructure and industrial investments, are threatened with inundation. As populations continue to grow and the climate begins to change, the world is bound to experience more conflicts over resources that will make today's Middle East water disputes or the floods of environmental refugees that already dominate parts of Africa, seem routine.

If the effects of climate change are global, so are its causes. The overwhelming majority of the greenhouse gases emitted as a result of development (i.e. industrialization) are emitted by the developed countries. The US alone contributes some twenty percent of man-made greenhouse gases. The remainder of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries together contribute twenty percent while Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union chip in an additional one-fifth. Yet the developing countries are not without blame. When all greenhouse gas emissions (including those from deforestation and agricultural development) are added together, Brazil, China and India become the third, fourth and fifth largest producers.

THERE IS COMMON AGREEMENT THAT THE FIRST step in combatting climate change must be to eliminate the production and use of CFCs. Not only are they damaging to the ozone layer, they are among the most potent of the greenhouse gases, accounting for up to thirty percent of the total for industrialized countries. There has been substantial progress in this area already – Canada opened the batting on this issue in 1987, by hosting the meeting which led to the Montreal protocol. This agreement called for a halt to the production of CFCs by the end of the century. Before the ink was dry



on the pact, it became evident that this was inadequate. The hole in the ozone layer was still growing and an additional hole had been identified over the Arctic.

This led the new green Margaret Thatcher to convene two meetings in London to strengthen the protocol. The first was held in February of last year, and agreed on the need to speed up the timetable. This meeting was followed by a conference in Helsinki which identified a the critical need for some form of burden sharing, if the large developing countries, such as India and China, were to sign the document. Both of these countries have plans to spread the use of refrigerators, at least so that each village has a capacity for the safe storage of medical supplies. Why, they ask, should they cut back on these plans because of ozone depletion caused almost entirely by the developed countries? Why should they pay five or six times the price for less efficient CFC substitutes?

This led to a proposal at the second London meeting in June of this year for the creation of a fund to ease the transition away from CFCs in the developing world. The fund was initially resisted by the White House, which feared the precedent that might be created for a much larger fund to deal with global warming. After considerable arm twisting by the other industrialized powers, the US agreed to go along with a level of US \$240 million for the first three years. If China and India signed the protocol, as it appears certain they will, the fund would rise to approximately \$320 million.

FOR THE FIRST THREE YEARS, THE FUND WILL BE used mainly for assessing the needs of developing countries. After that period, it will help finance the acquisition of the technology to use (and perhaps to produce) the CFC substitutes, the halochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), whose use is thought to be less hazardous to the ozone layer, although they remain fierce greenhouse gases. Some have criticized this arrangement on the grounds that the technical experts involved in the discussions tend overwhelmingly to be experts on chemicals and not on refrigeration, and therefore have neglected the potential for other refrigerants such as propane or butane which do not contribute to global warming. Nevertheless, the London meeting represents an enormous step forward in responding to the special needs of developing countries.

The success of the ozone negotiations opens the door to progress on the far more difficult question of global warming. The Toronto Conference recommended a cut in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of twenty percent by the year 2005, leading to



Michael McPoline

an eventual stabilization of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere. The latter would require a cut of at least fifty percent in current levels of fossil fuel combustion. Even if draconian measures were taken by the developed industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, the planned massive expansion of coal-fired electricity production by India and China would wipe out these gains – two hundred coal-burning generating stations are planned by China alone.

This gives developing countries a good deal of leverage in the formulation of the so-called global bargain, or more accurately, as Jim MacNeill of the Institute for Research on Public Policy points out, a series of small bargains leading up to a larger one. And as the preparations for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Brazil have shown, the Third World intends to use that leverage to bring attention to its priority issues of trade, debt and the need for economic growth in exchange for action on climate change.

THE AGENDA FOR ARRIVING AT SUCH A SERIES OF deals is now clear. The first steps must be taken by the developed world and will be a series of unilateral decisions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Some countries have already made such commitments. The Federal Republic of Germany recently said it would reduce West German emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> by twenty-five percent of 1987 levels by the year 2005. The UK has promised a freeze by that date and the Japanese, a freeze by the turn of the century. Although Canadian policy has been muddy on this point, Mr. de Cotret, the acting Environment minister, also has promised a freeze by the end of the century.

All of these countries have concluded that not only are these policies technically feasible, but in most cases, they will result in enhanced international competitiveness and major savings in expenditures on energy. The exception is the US where, in his post-Houston press conference, a petulant President Bush equated controlling emissions with causing massive job

losses. None of the other leaders agreed with him.

The second part of the bargain is creating arrangements to allow developing countries to pursue more sustainable forms of development of the kind that would provide jobs and incomes for the poor without massively increasing their GHG emissions. These would include easier terms of technology transfer for non-polluting technologies; debt relief, perhaps in the form of debt-for-nature swaps that would provide substantial sums of money for reforestation programs to soak up some of the atmospheric carbon; and finally, it

must include the establishment of the very kind of fund which the Bush administration feared when it agreed to the CFC fund in London.

This new fund would need to be quite large by traditional international standards – US \$20 to 40 billion annually, according to Dutch estimates – but small when compared with world arms expenditure. It appears that a start had been made on a US \$2.5 billion fund at Houston, but German Chancellor Kohl, its main advocate, was unable to persuade his host to go along.

THERE ARE PLENTY OF FORA TO ACCOMMODATE this process. November will see the convening of the World Climate Conference in Geneva. A “framework convention” on climate change could be discussed at that time. The argument here is between those who, like the Germans, favour a convention with specific commitments for the limitation of greenhouse gases and arrangements for technology transfers, and those who are arguing for an “empty shell” containing a general commitment to deal with the issue, and to work out the details later. The latter group seems to be led by the US, but some other countries may also hold this view, content to let the Americans take the blame.

The denouement of this issue may well come at the 1992 Brazil Conference when the optimists hope to have a convention opened for signature. Whether the convention has substance may well be a function of whether or not the Houston summit has signalled the long awaited change in economic power relationships. Chancellor Kohl, and to a lesser extent, the other European leaders, seem determined to make real progress on the issue of climate change in the near future. It would be interesting to see what would happen if six members of the summit, perhaps led by Canada as the closest to the United States, decided to establish the initial \$2.5 billion fund on their own. After all, it is not a lot of money when the future of the planet may be at stake. [

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## Key

OP — Occasional Paper

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## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

At their summit in Washington from 30 May to 3 June, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a "joint statement" declaring that the "basic provisions" of a START Treaty had been agreed to, and reaffirming their determination to have it completed and signed before the end of the year. Two of the major outstanding issues had been solved during US Secretary of State Baker's visit to Moscow from 16 to 19 May. First, the US accepted the Soviet preference for 600 km as the range over which air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) would be subject to START limits, in return for Soviet agreement to exempt conventionally-armed ALCMs, including the US anti-radar missile known as "Tacit Rainbow," that are distinguishable from nuclear-armed ALCMs. On the number of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range of over 600 km, the two sides agreed on a "politically-binding" limit of 880 for the duration of the Treaty (15 years), but in an attached declaration rather than in the Treaty itself.

Further progress on START was announced at the summit, when the two sides agreed on a "sub-limit" of 1,100 on mobile ICBM warheads – a compromise between the initial Soviet proposal of 1,600 and the US preference for 800. The two Presidents also signed a joint statement agreeing to begin follow-on START II negotiations "at the earliest practical date" following the signing of START I.

### Pacific Security Initiative

In a speech in Victoria on 17 July, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark called for a new "North-

Pacific security co-operation dialogue," to explore the possibility of European-style confidence- and security-building measures for the region. Composed of the US, USSR, the two Koreas, Japan, China, and Canada, the forum would seek "to identify those proposals that have serious merit and to make serious counter-proposals." Mr. Clark mentioned specifically "information exchanges, military manoeuvre notification and Open Skies regimes." Broaching the highly sensitive subject of naval arms control, he went on to say that "if the dialogue on conventional forces in Europe develops into a dialogue on naval forces, the Pacific Ocean is an obvious locus of concern and action." Mr. Clark repeated his proposal in talks with government leaders in Tokyo a week later but reportedly received little support, although the Japanese were said to be considering similar ideas.

### Chemical Weapons (CW) Agreement

At their Washington summit on 1 June, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral "executive agreement" to destroy at least eighty percent of their CW stockpiles independent of negotiations on a global CW ban. Under the agreement, at least fifty percent of each country's declared stocks are to be destroyed by the end of the century, beginning in 1992, while stocks are to be reduced to 5,000 tons each (representing an 80% cut in current US stocks) by 2002.

The US had sought Soviet support for its desire to retain two percent of its stocks (500 tons) even after a global CW Convention went into effect, until all CW-capable states had joined it. The bilateral agreement of 1 June commits the parties to reduce their stocks further to a maximum of 500 tons each by the eighth year after a global Convention enters into force, at which time they propose to hold a special conference

"to determine whether participation in the convention is sufficient to complete the elimination of chemical weapons stocks over the following two years."

### Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Little progress was reported at the CFE negotiations until late June, when agreement was reached on a French-Polish proposal regarding definitions and limits for tanks and other armoured combat vehicles. The Final Declaration of the NATO summit meeting in early July called for the CFE talks to remain in continuous session until an agreement was reached, and for the latter to be followed immediately by further negotiations (CFE II). Most important from the Soviet perspective, it also noted that "a commitment [would] be given at the time of signature of the C.F.E. Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany."

Perceived Soviet "stalling" on CFE had been widely attributed to their insistence on limiting German forces prior to accepting a CFE agreement. This critical stumbling-block was finally overcome with the announcement by West German Chancellor Kohl and Soviet President Gorbachev on 16 July that a future unified German defence force would be limited to 370,000 troops, with reductions beginning after CFE I comes into effect. The only other major obstacle to the treaty concerns combat aircraft, particularly the Soviet desire to exclude land-based naval aircraft from the limits. In the wake of the Kohl-Gorbachev agreement, most observers were optimistic that a treaty would be concluded before the end of the year.

### Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)

At the beginning of May, President Bush cancelled modernization programmes for the Lance short-range nuclear missile and US nuclear artillery based in Eu-

posed and won NATO acceptance of an accelerated timetable for SNF arms control negotiations, calling for them to begin shortly after the signature of a CFE Treaty, without awaiting its implementation as previously stipulated by the West.

In early June, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced the unilateral withdrawal of sixty of the USSR's 1,400 tactical nuclear missile launchers in Central Europe, as well as over 250 pieces of nuclear-capable artillery and 1,500 of its estimated 8,000 nuclear warheads there. US Secretary of State Baker welcomed the announcement as "something that we had been seeking for quite some time because the Soviet Union has a significant advantage in these types of weapons." A few days later, a Soviet proposal to begin SNF negotiations even before conclusion of a CFE agreement was rejected by Washington.

At its summit meeting in early July NATO agreed that, once SNF negotiations began, it would propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells in Europe.

### Short Notes


The Budapest round of the Open Skies Conference adjourned without an agreement on 10 May. According to chief Canadian delegate John Noble, the main stumbling-block remained a Soviet refusal to allow overflights of its territory by foreign aircraft. The negotiations may resume later in the year.

During their Washington summit, the US and Soviet presidents signed verification protocols to the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, which limit underground nuclear explosions to 150 kt in yield. The US had made its ratification of the treaties contingent on a strengthening of their verification provisions, and the agreements will now be submitted to the US Senate for ratification. □

— RON PURVER



## DEFENCE NOTES



### Canadian Forces Sent to Persian Gulf

At a press conference on 10 August, Prime Minister Mulroney announced the decision by the government to dispatch three ships to the Persian Gulf region "to assist in the deterrence of further aggression" by Iraq. The ships are: the HMCS *Athabaskan*, a Tribal-class destroyer commissioned in 1972 and equipped with torpedoes, guns, two helicopters, passive air defence systems and Sea Sparrow air defence missiles; HMCS *Terra Nova*, an Improved Restigouche-class frigate commissioned in 1959 and equipped with guns, torpedoes, and passive air defence systems, but no air defence weapons; and HMCS *Protecteur*, an unarmed supply and maintenance ship. The combined compliment on the ships is approximately 800.

The ships will be "on location in the region by mid-September," said the Prime Minister. He also noted that the ships precise operating location and manner of employment will be decided in light of circumstances at that time.

At a press conference immediately following the Prime Minister's, the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas stated that in the days before actual sailing from Canada, *Athabaskan* and *Terra Nova* would be modified by adding "close-in weapons systems," new electronic warfare equipment, and upgraded chaff and decoy systems for improved defence against air attack.

### The London Summit

At the beginning of July NATO leaders met in London to consider their response to the political changes in Europe. In advance of the meeting, President Bush sent a

letter to NATO heads of state proposing a variety of changes in alliance force structure and doctrine. In particular, recalling his earlier decisions to cancel plans for a follow-on missile to the short-range Lance, and for new nuclear artillery shells, Bush suggested modifying the doctrine of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. He also proposed to eliminate the nuclear artillery shells currently deployed in Europe.

Initial reaction to the Bush letter was mixed at home, but warm in Europe. The Bush letter appeared to reflect the thinking of allied leaders, with the partial exception of the French, and respond to the needs of the Soviet Union. In Washington, doubts were expressed, however, about the meaning of the proposed change in nuclear doctrine. In sum, the Bush proposal appeared to favour preserving the option of first use of nuclear weapons, while reducing reliance on such weapons.

### The NATO Declaration

On 6 July, at the end of the London meeting, a lengthy declaration was issued. Among other things, it proposed a non-aggression statement by NATO and the Warsaw Pact affirming the intention "to refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...." The declaration underlined the need "to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate power on the continent."

The declaration also dealt with NATO forces in Europe. It noted that, with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, NATO's integrated force structure would change to include the following: smaller active forces, which will be multinational, mobile and versatile, permitting maximum flexibility for political leaders in crisis situations; a re-

duction in the readiness of active units, fewer exercises and less training; reliance on mobilisation to build up large forces should they be needed.

Echoing the language of the Bush letter, the communique spoke of nuclear weapons as "truly weapons of last resort," but asserted the need to maintain "for the foreseeable future" a mix of nuclear and conventional forces. However, the declaration proposed to negotiate the elimination of nuclear artillery shells in Europe, and to move away from the military strategy of forward defence.

Soviet reaction to the London meeting was positive. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze expressed general satisfaction with the declaration, describing the changes in doctrine as "potentially important decisions."

### Gorbachev Meets Kohl

Meeting at Mineralnye Vody in the Soviet Union on 16 July, Gorbachev and Kohl reached agreement on the place of a united Germany in NATO. Under an agreement to be worked out between a unified Germany and the Soviet Union, the 350,000 troops in East Germany will withdraw over a period of three or four years. The Soviet Union agreed that a united Germany can be a member of NATO. Chancellor Kohl agreed to accept a ceiling of 370,000 troops in the armed forces of a unified Germany. He also stated that when Soviet forces leave what is now East Germany, German troops under NATO control would be stationed there, but no foreign troops would be permitted. The two leaders also agreed that a united Germany would renounce the manufacture and possession of chemical weapons, and sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

### Britain's Peace Dividend

In May, a defence paper intended for the private use of Prime Minister Thatcher and se-

nior Cabinet members, was leaked to the *Economist*. The study proposed to reduce the British Army from fifty-five battalions to thirty-two, and Royal Navy frigates from fifty-eight to thirty-two, promising savings of almost \$40 billion over ten years. In mid-June less sweeping but highly controversial cuts were announced by Defence Minister Tom King. He told a Commons committee that the Warsaw Pact has "to all intents and purposes ceased to exist." Announcing a cut of approximately \$1.2 billion in the defence budget (about three percent before inflation), King cancelled an order for thirty-three Tornado aircraft and confirmed that Britain is planning major reductions in its army and air force units assigned to NATO. The planned reductions in forces stationed in Germany appear to be greater than those under negotiation at the Conventional Forces talks in Vienna.

### Grounded Looking Glass

Since 3 February 1961 the US Air Force has maintained a fleet of airplanes which would guarantee command and control of US nuclear forces even after the destruction of ground facilities. Referred to as "Looking Glass," one of the planes has been in the air at all times, commanded by an Air Force General. On Tuesday 24 July, the twenty-four-hour airborne alert was ended when General John Chain, Commander of Strategic Air Command, landed at Offutt AFB. The move to "ground alert status" reflects both budgetary pressures and greater confidence that a Soviet nuclear alert could be detected in time to take precautionary measures. The Soviets have also cooperated. A US Senate Armed Services Report released in late July noted that the Soviets have ceased submarine patrols off the US coast, and flights by Bear bombers to Canada's northern border. □

- DAVID COX

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### Visits to Ottawa

Ottawa played host to three eminent statesmen in quick succession in the late spring: first to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar on 27 May; then on 29 to 30 May to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (the first visit by a Soviet leader since 1971); and finally to South African black activist and Deputy President of the African National Congress Nelson Mandela, who addressed both Houses of Parliament on 18 June – a highly unusual event for a non-head of government.

### The Middle East

Prior to the first two visits, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark confirmed in the House on 22 and 24 May that Middle East questions would be addressed with Pérez de Cuellar and Gorbachev. On 22 May he indicated that the Canadian Ambassador to Israel had that day expressed to Israeli authorities shock and great concern at the increasing violence in the occupied territories.

On 14 June, following the formation of a new Israeli government, NDP External Affairs critic Bill Blaikie asked the Minister in the House whether the government would consider using its position on the UN Security Council to influence the development of a peacekeeping force that would finally be acceptable to Israel to operate in the occupied territories to protect Palestinians. Mr. Clark responded that Canada would be prepared to apply its influence toward that end, but underlined the Member's own suggestion that "any action by the United Nations would have to be something that was acceptable to Israel."

Following the pipe-bombing death in Israel of a Canadian

woman, Mr. Clark, on 28 July, strongly condemned "this vicious act of terrorism" which he stated served only to perpetuate the distressing cycle of violence which characterized the Middle East dispute. Only five days later, on 2 August, he was again obliged to address the question of violence in the region following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He termed Iraq's actions "totally unacceptable" and promised that Canada would work with other members of the UN Security Council to ensure an "effective international response." (See "Report from the Security Council" for more on the UN and Iraq.)

### NATO and European Policy

On 17 May in the Commons – following a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Kananaskis, Alberta the week before – NDP MP Bill Blaikie challenged Defence Minister William McKnight for not opposing modernization of all nuclear weapons. The Minister rejected the Member's allegation and insisted that the testing of US cruise missiles in Canada did not constitute the testing of nuclear missiles, but of "a guidance system."

Minister Clark addressed the broader questions of European policy in the House on 31 May and indicated the five broad areas of discussion that had taken place during the recent visit of Mr. Gorbachev. He described the institutional pillars of Canadian policy toward Europe as: a new, more political, direction for NATO (to which Canada's military contribution was "bound to decline"); an expanded role for the CSCE; and an intensified relationship with the European Community.

### Environmental Issues

There were frequent questions in the House during the spring weeks relating to questions of global warming. NDP Environment critic Jim Fulton was particularly persistent in Question Period, pressing the government

to adopt measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly. On 10 May, Herb Gray, the acting Opposition Leader, joined in the attack by referring to a leaked US State Department telex which implied that Canada had agreed to join forces with the Americans "to block further progress in the fight against global warming" in discussions to be held in Bergen, Norway later in the week.

This was strenuously denied by then Environment Minister Lucien Bouchard who stated in Bergen that Canada was committed to the stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2000 at current levels. Liberal MP Charles Caccia tried unsuccessfully in the House on 23 May to have the Prime Minister confirm this statement, but it was later confirmed on 28 May by Acting Environment Minister Robert de Cotret who replaced Mr. Bouchard.

### Asian Policy Shifts

A Canadian ban on aid to Indochina was lifted in January. By mid-May, Ottawa had agreed to commit \$8 million over five years to humanitarian projects in Cambodia, matching money from Canadian non-governmental organizations. Then, at the end of May Mr. Clark declared that Canada would no longer support the US-sponsored resolution at the United Nations that has given Cambodia's UN seat to the rebel coalition that includes the Khmer Rouge rather than to the Hun Sen government that is backed by Vietnam. All of these moves came in advance of the widely-hailed announcement of 18 July that the US would open a dialogue with Vietnam, which could include a shift in their UN position toward Cambodia.

The Cambodian seat at the UN was a major topic at the ministerial conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which opened on 27 July in Jakarta, Indonesia and which Mr. Clark attended following an official visit to Japan. On both stops he proposed a new North Pacific security organization

with Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the two Koreas as members to cope with regional instability in the wake of the Cold War.

### Parliamentary Short Notes

Eight House standing committees collaborated on 23 and 24 April in an unprecedented Parliamentary Forum on Global Climate Change under the leadership of Dr. Harry Brightwell, chair of the House Agriculture Committee.

Mr. Clark, in an appearance before the House External Affairs Committee on 24 May, noted the meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa that he chaired in Abuja, Nigeria on 16 and 17 May. He said that the committee was universally optimistic about changes in South Africa, while recognizing that they were partial and preliminary and that sanctions "must remain until there is clear evidence of irreversible change."

On 13 June the House Standing Committee on the Environment tabled a report, Part I of its "Our Changing Atmosphere" series, called *Deadly Releases CFCs*.

The House of Commons External Affairs Committee tabled two reports in the House on 18 June, one (*Report on the Committee's Visit to the Soviet Union and the Germanies*) the work of the full committee, and the other (*Securing Our Global Future: Canada's Stake in the Unfinished Business of Third World Debt*) the report of a sub-committee specifically struck to consider international debt issues under the leadership of Walter McLean.

On the same day, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House Standing Committee on Human Rights and Disabled Persons tabled its third report which reviewed Canada's policy regarding human rights vis-à-vis international financial institutions and international trade including military equipment exports. □

– GREGORY WIRICK



## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

On 2 August, the Council met and condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The resolution demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and called on the two countries to begin immediate, intensive negotiations. Iraq told the Council that the "Free provisional government of Kuwait" had requested its assistance to help establish "security and order" in that country. The US accused Iraq of having "carefully planned" the invasion. "They invaded Kuwait and then staged a coup d'état in a blatant and deceitful effort to try and justify their actions," US ambassador Thomas Pickering told the Council.

Resolution 660, which was co-sponsored by Canada, was supported by fourteen of the fifteen Council members. Yemen did not vote because its delegate had not received instructions.

Four days later on 6 August, the Council adopted Resolution 661 mandating comprehensive economic and trade sanctions against Iraq. The resolution was supported by thirteen Council members with Yemen and Cuba abstaining, and in rarely-used tough language conveyed the Council's decision that all States were thereafter obliged to prevent:

the import into their territories ... of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait.... [A]ny activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote ... the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait.... The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities ... including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories,

but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait.... [and] [D]ecides that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial, or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources...

Like the earlier Resolution 660, 661 was co-sponsored by Canada.

### Western Sahara

On 27 June, the Security Council unanimously adopted a peace plan for Western Sahara and called on Morocco and the Polisario guerrillas to extend indefinitely a temporary cease-fire. Resolution 658 calls for the peace plan to be implemented over a thirty-five week period during which a UN supervised referendum would be held. Western Sahara's 75,000 indigenous inhabitants would be asked to choose between independence under the Polisario or remaining under Moroccan control. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar is optimistic that a referendum can be held by early 1991.

### Middle East

On 31 May, the Council granted a six month extension to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The force, located in the Golan Heights, includes 227 Canadian military observers. On 1 August, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) also saw its mandate extended for six months.

In other business, on 3 May, the Council met to continue its ongoing debate on the issue of settlement in the Occupied Territories by newly arriving Soviet Jews. On 25 May, the Council met for the first time in Geneva, Switzerland. The Council shifted location as the result of a compromise to enable PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat

to participate without running the risk of being denied a visa by the US should he attempt to speak in New York. The meeting was prompted by an upsurge of violence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank following the killing of seven Palestinians by an Israeli said to be mentally disturbed. During a speech, Arafat called for an international force to protect the Arab population.

On 31 May, the US vetoed a resolution which would have sent a commission to the occupied territories to determine how best to ensure the safety of the Palestinians there. Canada and thirteen other members voted in favour of the resolution. After the meeting, a US official told reporters that Washington favoured a solution in which the Secretary-General would send a personal representative to the area. After meeting the Secretary-General, Jochanan Bein, Israel's ambassador, announced on 13 June that his country was ready to receive the UN representative who would "be able to go where he wants to in Israel."

### Cyprus and the Peacekeeping Deficit

On 19 July, the Council met and expressed its support for the Secretary-General's plan to help Greek and Turkish Cypriots reach a negotiated solution. Reflecting on the failure of negotiations to advance, the Secretary-General said "the time has come to stop mutual recriminations and to concentrate efforts on promoting reconciliation."

The Council action comes in the wake of a 15 June decision to approve, once again, a six-month extension to the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). During the Council meeting, Canada and seven other members issued a statement pointing to the financial problems facing the force, particularly the drop in voluntary contributions to UNFICYP.

Saying they were "gravely concerned," that the situation put an "unfair" burden on those members providing contingents to the force, the eight countries proposed that rather than relying on voluntary contributions, the force should be financed from assessed contributions. As of last year, the accumulated shortfall had reached almost US\$175 million.

The issue has taken on added urgency as Council members ponder future peacekeeping operations. Recent progress in negotiations between the five permanent members of the council and the parties involved in the Cambodian conflict have raised hopes of a major UN role there both in peacekeeping and overseeing elections. On 28 June, the Secretary-General briefed the Council on a request by Haiti's provisional president Ertha Pascal-Trouillot for UN help in organizing elections.

As the UN is called on to monitor elections, some members of the General Assembly are expressing wariness at this new role. Countries such as Cuba and Columbia have expressed concern that in future, the Council may use this new function as a form of intervention. They prefer that any action involving elections be handled through the General Assembly, where the permanent members wield less power.

On 4 May, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) for six months. The resolution was adopted with the understanding that ONUCA's involvement in the ceasefire and demobilization of members of the Nicaraguan Contras cease no later than 10 June. On 8 June, the Council extended its deadline to 29 June 1990. On 27 June, a final demobilization ceremony was held in Nicaragua. □

- TREVOR ROWE

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



Southern Africa was the focus of a good deal of Institute attention during the past few months. Stopping in London on his way to Zimbabwe, **Bernard Wood** gave a seminar on Canadian policy in Southern Africa at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies. The presentation will be published in the Commonwealth journal, *Round table*. In Harare, he spoke to the Canada-Zimbabwe Society on the effects of changes in Eastern Europe on developing countries, warning against the danger of the Third World becoming the new arms market for weapons systems now being removed from Europe as a result of the thaw in East-West relations.

In Mozambique Mr. Wood participated in a conference at the Institute for International Relations on the prospects for peace in the region. While the destabilization campaign by South Africa has lessened considerably, the rural areas of Mozambique are ravaged by violence, brutality and banditry. The possible applicability of some parts of the CSCE process to Southern Africa was one of the themes he raised for discussion at the conference.

He spent several days in South Africa talking with politicians, officials, journalists, diplomats and academics about the exciting developments in that country. "De Klerk and Mandela are now married", he said, "with all that such a union implies. They are at the centre of the political spectrum – a fragile centre – and have had to forsake all others on their respective margins."

On his return to Canada, Mr. Wood gave a press briefing at the Institute, and participated in various activities at the time of the Mandela visit to Canada, including providing commentary for

coverage by Télé-Métropole and CBC's *The Journal*. He also spoke to a conference in Hull on Canadian policies towards Southern Africa in the 1990s, organized by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation.

**Eugene Nyati** from the Centre for African Studies in Johannesburg, led a discussion at the Institute in June on the actors and possible scenarios for negotiations in South Africa.

**Arkady Cherkasov**, an exchange visitor from the Institute for the USA and Canada in Moscow, spent several weeks in Canada as a guest of CIIPS. Dr. Cherkasov, a geographer, is very interested in the non-military aspects of Canadian and Soviet northern development. At the end of his research in Canada, he gave a seminar at the Institute on prospects for cooperation in the north between the two countries.

The NORAD agreement between Canada and the United States, originally signed in 1958, is due for discussion and renewal in 1991. The debate during the next year promises to be particularly interesting, considering the changes which have taken place in the world since 1986 when it was last renewed, and the shifts in perceptions of the nature of the threat to continental North America. In June, Major-General **David O'Brien**, Commander of the Canadian NORAD region and of the fighter air forces in Canada, gave a briefing and led a discussion at the Institute on his perceptions of the requirements for air defence.

Five members of the UN Association of China visited the Institute in late June to exchange views on Canadian and Chinese foreign policy.

**Katherine Laundry** and **Susan Connell** participated in meetings

of the Canadian Library Association in Ottawa in June. They introduced two new publications: *Peace and Security Thesaurus*, and *Canada and International Peace and Security: a Bibliography, 1985–1989*. They also convened a workshop on peace and security reference materials.

In June **Ron Fisher** gave an address on "Social-Psychological Approaches to International Conflict Resolution" to the annual convention of the Canadian Psychological Association. Later in the month he gave a presentation to the annual conference of the International Association of Conflict Management on "Training Third Party Consultants in International Conflict Resolution." Dr. Fisher also gave workshop at the Institute on his on-going work in the same fields.

**Bernard Wood** spoke at a conference at Montebello sponsored by York University and the Institute on security in South-East Asia. He addressed a workshop in Mont Tremblant convened by the Centre of Research and Development in the Department of National Defence: his topic was "Current and Long-Range World Relations." And he gave the key-note speech at the annual meeting of The Peace Centre in St. John's Newfoundland on alternative security policies for Canada and their implications for disarmament, development and the environment.

There were a number of staff changes during the summer: **Gordon Sharpe**, a DND Fellow for the past year, was promoted to full Colonel in June and returned to National Defence Headquarters to become Director, Doctrine Coordination and Development. **Ron Fisher**, who spent the first year of a sabbatical from the University of Saskatchewan at the Institute, will spend the next year at Carleton University. **Fen Hampson**, a half-time research associate at the

### Major International Conference on Soviet Affairs in Ottawa

A major international conference on the Soviet Union will take place in Ottawa in late November 1990, involving some of the world's leading experts on Soviet affairs and East-West relations.

Titled *The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World*, the conference will provide over the course of two-and-a-half days from 26 to 28 November, in-depth analysis and expert opinion on a wide range of topics, including "The Soviet Economy: Prospects for Perestroika"; "The Climate for Trade and Investment"; "Rethinking the East-West Balance"; and "Soviet Power in a Changing World."

Among the featured speakers from abroad will be **Vitaliy Korotich**, the editor of *Ogonyok*, a leading reformist Soviet weekly; **Vladimir Popov**, the author of *The Turning Point*, a radical exposé of the immense economic problems facing the Soviets; **Anders Aslund**, a Swedish economist and author of what the *New York Times* calls the authoritative book on Gorbachev's struggle for economic reform; international journalists **Martin Walker** of the *Manchester Guardian* and **Christoph Bertram** of *Die Zeit*; **Vladislav Malkevich**, President of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry; **Michael Sturmer**, a prominent German commentator on international affairs; **Goran Enerfelt**, a leading Swedish businessman who heads the world's largest trading company with the Soviet Union; and **Georgi Arbatov**, the Director of the Institute for USA and Canada in the Soviet Academy of Sciences – along with many others.

The conference fee of \$385.00 includes three lunches and two dinners. Dinner speakers – as yet unconfirmed – are expected to be **Aleksandr Yakovlev**, Soviet Politburo member and former Ambassador to Canada, and **Zbigniew Brzezinski**, former National Security Adviser to the President of the United States.

The conference is co-sponsored by the PARLIAMENTARY CENTRE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN TRADE, THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, and the CANADA-USSR BUSINESS COUNCIL. For registration, please contact the Parliamentary Centre, 275 Slater St., Suite 500, Ottawa K1P 5H9, tel (613) 237-0143 or fax (613) 235-8237.



Institute for the past three years, has taken a full-time position at the Norman Paterson School at Carleton. **Marie-France Desjardins** will begin a doctoral programme at the University of London, England, next year. **Johanne Di Donato** has left the Institute, as have **Dianne DeMille**, **Lynne Cardinal**, **Samantha Hayward**, **Annemarie Bélanger** and **Chantale Beaudoin**. **Marc Pierre-Louis** was a summer student in the Public Programmes section of the Institute. **Walter Bernyck** and **Réjean Hallé** have been working in the Research section.

**John Toogood** participated in an international meeting of peace institutes in Des Moines, Iowa in June. In August he attended a conference sponsored by St. Lawrence University and Queen's in Canton, New York, entitled "The Road from Ogdensburg: Fifty Years of Canada-US Defence Cooperation." **Roger Hill** spoke on the work of the Institute to Inter-action 1990, a national conference on dispute resolution in July. In August he gave a presentation on the role of the Warsaw Pact, to the Bedford Institute in Nova Scotia.

## Barton Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for its Awards Programme, designated the Barton Awards in honour of the first Chairman, former UN Ambassador William Barton. The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue studies in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in that area by supporting Canadians and permanent residents who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad or in Canada.

The Institute expects to make eleven awards: two fellowships valued at up to \$30,000 and nine scholarships at up to \$14,000 each. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1991.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents whose experience or academic qualification enable them to pursue advanced study.

The deadline for applications for the 1991-1992 academic year is 1 February 1991.

For further information and application forms please write to:

The Barton Awards Programme  
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

## Peace and Security Competitions Fund Procedures and Deadlines

The Fund allocates contributions semi-annually. Contact the Fund for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:

30 June for an October decision

30 November for a March decision

Peace and Security Competitions Fund  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

**Ron Purver** presented a paper on "A Canadian Perspective on Maritime Security in the Arctic" to a conference at Glendon College in Toronto. He also spoke at a conference on Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security sponsored by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University; his topic was "Ballistic Missile Submarine Sanctuaries and Stand-off Zones."

**Gabrielle Mathieu** participated in a conference at Carleton University's School of Journalism on the implications of *glasnost* for journalism in the Soviet Union. Participants included Canadian and Soviet journalists. **Michael Bryans** gave a presentation on issues of peace and security to a group of Soviet and Canadian students who were meeting on the shores of Georgian Bay under the auspices of the Canadian Society of Friends. **Nancy Gordon** participated in the annual meeting of the Academic Council of the UN System in New York in June where, among other speakers, Secretary-General **Pérez de Cuellar** addressed the delegates. □



## US perspective unacceptable in Canadian magazine

I am appalled that a magazine whose stated mandate is a "Canadian perspective" would print the article "Lying Low in Central America,"

legitimizing Washington's point of view. The US government already has the biggest propaganda machine in the world and doesn't need or deserve our cooperation. Although Peter Hakim acknowledges some token and obvious criticisms of US policy, he also makes some untenable basic assumptions.

Increasingly, Canadians concerned with peace and security have come to the realization that these goals cannot be separated from the goal of justice. Canada gives lip service to desirability of a stronger United Nations, the rule of international law, and non-violent conflict resolution. Why would you print, unchallenged, an article that assumes a US right to invade and otherwise interfere in other sovereign countries, thereby breaking international law?

The arrogance of the statement: "Troops rapidly subdued the Panamanian defense forces without an unacceptable loss of lives" is astounding. Whose lives? Acceptable to whom? Why should Canadians buy the US idea that American lives are the only ones that matter? An American life is not more important to me than a Panamanian life, or a Nicaraguan life, or a Salvadoran life. Another US propaganda theme that the article furthers is that misnaming, as "communist," popular nationalist movements struggling for freedom, democracy and human rights somehow gives the US a sacred right to annihilate them.

Hakim's article misrepresents (downward) the degree to which the US owns and controls the Contra forces in Nicaragua, and exaggerates the innocence of George Bush concerning "Reagan" policies. He was, after all, the vice president and former head of the CIA, and wasn't born, new and clean, in November 1988.


Past US policy in El Salvador is totally misrepresented. For that \$4 billion in aid, the Salvadoran government was supposed to defeat the people's revolution (i.e. establish peace without justice). The goals of democracy and reform were only trotted out when necessary to make the US people keep paying. Negotiation is being considered only because demolition didn't work. The article also implies a (false) separation between the Salvadoran government and the military wing responsible for the murders of the Jesuit priests, not to mention the four American women church workers, Archbishop Romero, and countless other Salvadoran leaders, teachers, organizers and church workers. No American responsibility for conditions in Guatemala and Honduras is acknowledged, although the US helped overthrow the last democratic government in Guatemala in 1954, and "USS Honduras" has become an international joke.

The closing paragraph is sickeningly pious, including "the rest of the international community" as co-spenders on armed conflict. The US government was assessed \$12.2 billion in reparations to Nicaragua by the World Court, which it conveniently ignores. Other countries, including Canada, have been trying for years to help Nicaragua rebuild, only to have their efforts destroyed by the US via Contra attacks. Switzerland, Sweden and Canada, among others, gave money and material aid for the last Nicaraguan electoral process, while the US spent millions to get "their" candidate elected.

After the publication of this article in *Peace & Security*, I have doubts about many others on subjects where I don't have as much background knowledge. I really have to question whether *Peace & Security* is fulfilling its obligations to Canadians, or whether it is serving other ends.

Lorna Diggle, Rimbey, Alberta □

## REVIEWS



### Continental Divide:

#### The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada Seymour Martin Lipset

New York: Routledge, 1990, 337 pp.,  
\$35.00, cloth

Rumours of Canada's imminent demise are flourishing south of the border following the failure of Newfoundland and Manitoba to vote for ratification of the Meech Lake accords. Many analysts are jumping to the pessimistic conclusion that Canada's days as a unified nation-state are numbered; that first Quebec and later other provinces will go their own way or join the giant to the south.

In this context the differences between the Quebecois and other Canadians, or those between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians take centre stage in current and historical studies of Canada. The similarities between Americans and Anglophone Canadians are usually taken for granted. For Canadians in need of an elixir that reaffirms their identity as a people distinct from Americans, Seymour Martin Lipset provides it in *Continental Divide*.

Lipset theorizes that the multitude of differences between Canada and the United States, two "complex, continent-spanning federal unions marked by great social heterogeneity and economic diversity," stem from the contrasting circumstances of their births. Variations in governmental structure, institutions, policies, values and public opinion on a host of topics are traced to their origins as nations.

The United States, the product of a revolt against Mother Britain remains suspicious of government, rejects aristocratic notions, and is fervently devoted to the rights of the individual. Canada slowly evolved into a nation, long

clinging to the same parent the US rejected. Canadians, as a consequence, are more respectful of authority – both governmental and that flowing from class position – and persistently protective of groups' rights.

Lipset acknowledges the role of variation in geography, climate, demography, and economics in forging the present condition of the two states. Yet he supports his theory with an impressively broad array of evidence, ranging from economic data to literary criticism to public opinion polls. He argues that differences in welfare policy, education, religion, societal violence, national heroes, regional identification, and many others all stem to one degree or another from America's revolutionary genesis and Canada's anti-revolutionary foundation. Some of the differences are very small, others, like the sharp contrast in accessibility of health care, indicate seriously different societal choices.

While Lipset overuses the explanatory power of his theory, even if he is right only part of the time, his work deserves serious thought. Lipset weaves two tapestries, profoundly different in their intricate design, that appear at first glance to be remarkably similar. The book's main contribution may be more his insightful description of the differences that permeate each nation's identity, rather than his theory of their origins. – *Marie Isabelle Chevrier*

*Ms. Chevrier is a doctoral candidate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. An American, she counts among her grandparents the first Francophone mayor of Casselman, Ontario; a Scottish Tory; and German immigrants to Nebraska.*

#### Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces Paul Hellyer

Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990,  
306 pp., \$29.95, cloth

The problem facing any memoir writer is how to deal with the extraordinary mass of events that

make up a hectic life. Good memoirs read like novels, not like an exhaustive mining of private journals and cabinet minutes. If no way is found to accomplish this, the reader is left with the morass of details and confusion that make up day-to-day existence. For the reader, a work that does not transmute life into art becomes exhausting. It is difficult in Mr. Hellyer's book to gauge how he feels about any subject; they all seem to be treated equally, only some go on much longer.

This is, of course, literary criticism. But it is the first means to deal with the problems of this book. I know not everyone can write memoirs like Charles Ritchie (it would be wonderful if they could) but prolixity and sloppiness seem to be the hallmarks of this book. While discussing the introduction of Bill C-243, the unification bill, Paul Hellyer recounts the story of how Elgin Armstrong, deputy minister of National Defence, came to see him to discuss the minister's draft speech:

He was extremely nervous as he sat down opposite me and finally, ashen-faced, told me clearly and unequivocally that the second, and central, section was unacceptably bad.... "In that case," I said, "we will have to do it over again."

Mr. Hellyer needs a firm editorial hand.

In addition, Prime Minister Mike Pearson's initials never were "LPB," and as for calling Judy LaMarsh "the one and only" more than once ... And since I am carping about minor details: Ron Sutherland and R.J. Sutherland are two different people, but the indexer missed that, as well as getting numerous page references wrong.

"My fight to unify Canada's armed forces" – the subtitle for this book – should really read: "My fight, and Bill Lee's." The fight itself is between two "ideas fixes" – on the one side Paul Hellyer and Bill Lee and on the

other, Admirals Brock, Landymore and Dyer, Air Marshall Frank Miller and others. Bill Lee certainly played an enormous role in the whole unification debacle, though he seems to have been less Hellyer's Svengali than an extremely ambitious operator who was willing to play the Minister card as far as possible. Lee clearly believed that Hellyer would become Prime Minister and that he could help push his career.

Bill Lee is still remembered by many officers with particular loathing, and is reputed to have been somewhat of a trouble-maker even before he latched onto Hellyer (apparently he was involved in bringing in General Lauris Norstad to Canada during the time of the Diefenbaker government – a visit that contributed to the woes of a government already struggling with its own defence policy). During his stint as Hellyer's Executive Assistant, Lee seems to have become a sort of alter ego to the "MND," as he calls him.

The whole fight to unify the Armed Forces has passed into history: the Canadian Armed Forces were given one name; they were given unattractive "garbage bag" green uniforms (now replaced with distinctive uniforms once more) and the duplication and waste of three entirely separate services has dwindled to merely the duplication and waste of three inherently different services with one Chief of Defence Staff. Although the United States has never attempted unification (and probably never will), Paul Hellyer's term as Minister of National Defence saw the Canadian Armed Forces, above all the Navy, lose their traditional British character and style to become much more American.

What Hellyer never really seemed to understand during his battles with the Admirals, and with groups like "TRIO" (the "Tri-Service Identity Organization") was that the group loyalty and bonding that a clearly identifiable service and uniform pro-



mote are fundamental parts of military behaviour. Of course, it is not efficient or cost-effective, but what military forces are supposed to do is not part of our everyday, cost-effective world. No doubt inter-service rivalry has lost many lives, as well as costing millions of dollars, but I find it hard to believe that accountants would make good generals.

Hellyer's argument for unification is that he was streamlining the Army, Navy and Air Force and turning them into more efficient, modern forces. While he probably was right that the Air Force was extremely unlikely ever to have to play a nuclear role in Europe, he may have missed the point when he wanted to beef-up the F-104's capabilities in conventional warfare. Hellyer thought that "it didn't make sense to have planes sitting helplessly like so many stationary ducks." Actually, that was the role of the Canadian and the American Forces in Europe; they were there to make sure that Washington's commitment to European defence would not vanish during a crisis.

Nevertheless, Mr. Hellyer does begin to understand that the Canadian Armed Forces might have a useful contribution to make. When he discusses the forced withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Suez he admits that this was "a 'setback' to the cause of world peacekeeping ... the ideals of the United Nations Charter have been frustrated by the unwillingness of member states to accept restraints on the exercise of national sovereignty implicit in such a system."

Mr. Hellyer strikes one as a tremendously hard worker: he laboured at unification until he wore everybody down (how many tempests in a teapot can anyone bear?). His book has the same doggedness about it – there is a tremendous amount of information, but a lack of clarity about purpose, and effect. – *Tina Viljoen*

*Ms. Viljoen is co-author with Gwynne Dyer of The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the Empire.*

## Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid Brian Loring Villa

*Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989,  
314 pp., \$14.95, paper*

The minor resort and port town of Dieppe lies on the French coast facing England. There are literally hundreds of much nicer places in France worth remembering, yet in Canada the name resonates through the collective memory. There are dozens of "Dieppe" avenues across the country in towns and suburbs – incongruously stuck among the "maplewood" and "oak" streets.

The August 1942 raid on Dieppe has always been a puzzle. Of the five thousand soldiers – most of them Canadians – who actually landed on the beach that morning, 2,700 were killed or captured by lunch time. In proportion, this was the costliest Allied expedition of the entire war, and it had, according to the author of this new book – and contrary to the official British record of the event – no discernable military purpose or hope of success.

Dieppe has always been a tribulation not because it was a failure, but because it was not a beautiful failure, nor even a good gamble. It was a botched job from its conception and it should never have happened. The bravery of the Canadian soldiers was wasted. Military historian John Keegan, wrote of it: "Dieppe, in retrospect, looks so recklessly hairbrained an enterprise that it is difficult to reconstruct the official state of mind which gave it birth and drove it forward." In *Unauthorized Action*, Brian Loring Villa attempts that reconstruction, not as a bit of dark conspiracy, but with a view to understanding how the decision to launch the doomed operation got made, why, by whom and "explain why the evidence surrounding the background to the Dieppe raid has become so hopelessly muddled."

Villa's thesis is that Louis Mountbatten, then head of Britain's Combined Operations, and his assistant John Hughes-Hallett, were determined to launch the Dieppe operation against all military logic and in the face of considerable expert opposition

within the senior levels of the British and Canadian military. The operation went ahead anyway, with predictable – and at the time, predicted – results, because of a "corrupt" decision-making apparatus within the British government. The responsible people, from Churchill on down through the British High Command and senior civil service, could have stopped the raid and should have.

Borrowing on the theories in the American political scientist Graham Allison's seminal 1971 study of government decision making, the author constructs a classic case history of "why governments do what they should not do." It is a highly readable and well-documented account from which the British officers most directly implicated in the affair, Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, emerge as egregiously flawed individuals. Mountbatten especially, comes off very badly.

My own first recollection of a real war story is of a family friend visiting the house when I was six or seven – some twenty years after he was delivered onto the beach in front of Dieppe port and almost immediately captured by the German defenders. He spent the rest of the war shuttling from one prison camp in Germany to another. What still sticks in my memory of him is his fierce anger and bitterness. His voice was that of a man betrayed – outraged that he could be used by people he trusted in such a foolish way for nothing at all, at least nothing he could discern. If he were alive to read this book, I wonder whether Villa's attempt to answer the question, "why?", would give him some peace of mind.

– *Michael Bryans*

*Mr. Bryans is Editor of Peace & Security and co-creator of the NFB film series War.*

## BRIEFLY NOTED

### The Sea Is At Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy Tony German

*Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990,  
360 pp., \$39.95 cloth*

*The Sea is at Our Gates* recounts the story of Canada's navy

from its colonial roots through the two world wars to the close of the Cold War in 1990. The story presented – the author is a retired Canadian naval officer – is one of "courage and sacrifice at sea ... [and] a proud force scuttled time after time by its political masters."

### The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

David Taras and  
David H. Goldenberg, editors

*Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's  
University Press, 1989, 250 pp., \$29.95  
cloth*

This book examines the domestic politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and challenges the assumption that the Canadian state is relatively free from domestic pressures when it comes to making foreign policy. The first section describes some of the domestic actors and the policy-making roles they have taken "in the contest over Canada's Middle-East policy." The second looks at the decision making process in Ottawa, and the last section is an overall assessment of Canada's role in the region and initiatives that might be taken in the future. Contributors to this volume include, David Bercuson, University of Calgary; David H. Goldberg, director of Canadian Professors for Peace in the Middle East; John Sigler, Carleton University; and David Taras, University of Calgary.

### Avoiding the Brink: Theory and Practice in Crisis Management

Andrew Goldberg et al, editors

*London: Brassey's / Center for Strategic  
and International Studies, 1990, 138 pp.,  
US \$31.95, cloth*

A fairly specialized and scholarly survey of the field of international conflict crisis management, this volume contains chapters by *inter alia*: Joseph Nye on nuclear crisis management; Robert Jervis on psychology and crisis stability; Coit D. Blacker on Soviet approaches to crisis management; and Paul Bracken, Andrew Goldberg and Debra van Opstal on various elements of crisis simulation. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## LETTER FROM HEBRON BY JEAN-FRANÇOIS LÉPINE



**When the interview was over, Nader Tamimi just sat there behind the desk in the little office where he receives**

**customers who come to his pottery in Hebron.**

Then, after an almost embarrassingly long silence, he pointed to the article in the Jerusalem Arab daily, *Al Fajr*, open on his desk: "You see, even in South Africa things have changed. Why is it that we, after twenty-three years, are almost the only ones in the world who are still living under the domination of a foreign army?"

That was on 8 June, and the morning newspapers reported that the day before the South African government had announced the lifting of the state of emergency allowing the white minority to impose a curfew in black townships, make arrests without warrants, and hold people without trial. In Hebron this has been the situation since 1968, only a few months after Israeli troops invaded and occupied part of Jordan. Hebron has known four different occupiers in the past hundred years. This thousand-year old city, built around the tomb of Abraham, is populated by Palestinians, and has been occupied in turn by the Ottoman empire, the British mandate, and the Hashemite kingdom, before the arrival of the Israelis.

The day we met Nader Tamimi, the people of Hebron were opening their doors for the first time after eight days of strict curfew, during which no one except doctors and medics were allowed to go out. The curfew had been imposed after young Palestinians attacked Israeli occupying troops with stones. Now, the whole town was at the market, hurrying to stock up with food.

*This article is the first in a series of pieces, written from varied perspectives, that Peace & Security will present on the many elements that comprise the Middle East conflict – one of those confrontations that so far has seen little of the improvement evident in East-West relations and some other regional situations. It is appropriate to begin the series with Jean-François Lépine; he has for three years been a principal source of information for Canadians about this part of the world.*

Downtown, the Israeli army had put the troops on alert, with armoured personnel carriers at all the strategic crossings, soldiers armed to the teeth on the roofs and in the streets, and jeeps on constant patrol. But that day, nothing happened – maybe because the leaders of the *intifada* had not given the order to fight, but more probably because after eight days of house arrest, the citizens of Hebron had more important things to do than wage their daily little war.

**... about 100,000 Palestinians have been detained at least once.... That works out to one arrest per family, quite enough to make a lasting impression on a people.**

The Israeli authorities refuse to divulge just how many people – soldiers, special police, secret agents, bureaucrats, prison guards and interrogators – it takes to administer the occupied territories. The army runs municipal government, makes rules and hands out permits. The army closes schools, hospitals and businesses on a whim; it regulates public morality, and automobile traffic.

Israeli authorities maintain that present conditions are a direct result of the "aggressions" that have taken place since the beginning of the *intifada*. But Abu Nader, sixty-four year old head of the Tamimi family, and teacher turned businessman, sees things quite differently. Since 1985 he has been unable to leave Hebron to go to Amman, in Jordan, where most of his family lives. Today the two towns are separated by a world of political division and aggression between Jews and Arabs.

Abu Nader still has his Jordanian passport, even though King

Hussein of Jordan, weary of the war, relinquished all claim to the Israeli-occupied territories in 1988. It's the Israeli forces that have been preventing Abu Nader from going to visit his family since 1985, and all for reasons which even Israeli lawyers call fraudulent. For several years the army has been demanding that Abu Nader pay certain taxes that had never been levied before, mostly because the earlier Israeli administration simply wasn't sophisticated enough to do so.

Most of the family heads in the Israeli-occupied territories have had to face this kind of taxation over the past few years. The military administration assesses your

property and your income and then estimates, quite arbitrarily, what taxes you should have been paying all this time – when nobody was bothering to collect them. In some cases the sums are enormous.

Because Abu Nader resisted this arbitrary measure, he was forbidden to go the Amman. Around the time of our visit he had just won his case before an Israeli court which had all but wiped out his "debt" to the taxman. But the military authorities still refuse to allow him freedom of movement because some of his brothers haven't settled their own "debts."

Each time a citizen of the occupied territories wants to take advantage of normal human rights, like travelling, buying some land, building a house or even registering the birth of a new baby, he or she must obtain approval from the military administration which governs everything. The authorities have been using this "blackmail by permit" to put pressure on the leaders in towns and villages to stop the violence, and get information

about the leaders of the *intifada* so that arrests can be made. In fact, practices such as guilt by association, intimidation, limiting the freedom of movement, and extortion are all forbidden under international human rights conventions.

But in Hebron, as elsewhere in the occupied territories, this is just routine stupidity compared with the usual violence of this very unusual war. Eight hundred people have been killed by the Israeli army since the *intifada* began in December 1987, and two hundred more were killed in internal political struggles. Around fifty Israelis, civilians and military, were killed during the same period. Thousands, especially young people, have suffered gun-shot wounds – many are handicapped for life. Then there are the daily arrests: according to Israeli sources, about 100,000 Palestinians have been detained at least once during the *intifada*. That works out to one arrest per family, quite enough to make a lasting impression on a people.

In June, a few days after our visit with the Tamimis, the leaders of the European Community, meeting in Dublin, condemned the systematic violation of human rights in territories illegally occupied by the Israeli military administration. The Dublin Conference appealed to the Israeli authorities to accept the presence of permanent UN observers to protect the population against arbitrary measures by the army.

There isn't the slightest reason to think that the appeal from Dublin was heard. Yitzhak Shamir, leader of the Likud party, had just come to power at the head of a coalition of all the right-wing, and extreme right-wing parties in the country. After almost three years of uprising, the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the territories had never looked as bleak. □

*Jean-François Lépine was Middle East correspondent for CBC's The National as well as for SRC's Le Téléjournal from 1988 to 1990.*

*Translation by Eva Bird*





## LETTRE DE HÉBRON

PAR JEAN-FRANÇOIS LÉPINE

**L'entrevue terminée, Nader Tamimi est demeuré assis quelque temps derrière le petit bureau où il accueille les clients, au rez-de-chaussée de son atelier de Hébron.**

Puis, après un silence presque embar-

assant, il pointe du doigt un article du journal *Al Fajr*, un quotidien arabe de Jérusalem, ouvert sur la page de devant lui : « Tu vois, dit-il, même pour l'Afrique du Sud, la page est tournée; alors pourquoi nous, après vingt-trois ans, sommes-nous pratiquement les seuls au monde à vivre encore sous la domination d'une armée étrangère ? »

« C'était le 8 juin dernier, les journaux, le gouvernement sud-africain avait annoncé la levée de l'état d'urgence qui avait permis à la minorité blanche, depuis 1986, d'imposer des couvre-feux dans les banlieues noires, d'arrêter sans mandat et de détenir indéfiniment sans procès. À Hébron, c'est le régime gèrès : ville millénaire bâtie autour d'Abraham et peuplée de Palestiniens de souche. Hébron a vécu tout à tour sous le joug ottoman, sous la dynastie bedouine des Husseins avant de passer sous la férule israélienne.

Le jour où nous avons rencontré Nader Tamimi, la ville de Hébron ouvrait ses portes après huit jours de couvre-feu strict où personnes, sauf les médecins et les ambulanciers, n'avaient eu le droit de sortir. Le couvre-feu avait été imposé après que des jeunes Palestiniens eurent affronté les troupes d'occupation israéliennes avec des pierres.

Le présent article est le premier d'une série de documents que l'Etat et l'armée israélienne ont publié pour illustrer les nombreux aspects propres au conflit du Moyen-Orient. Le dernier n'a pas profité de l'anthropologie récente du climat dans les relations Est-Ouest et dans d'autres régions du monde. Il semble pertinent de commencer avec un texte de Jean-François Lépine, car il est depuis trois ans une source principale d'information des Canadiens et Canadiennes sur cette partie du monde.

Dans les rues du centre-ville, l'armée israélienne avait déployé des troupes en alerte : blindés lance-pierres aux croisements stratégiques, soldats armés jusqu'aux dents partout sur les toits et dans les rues. Mais, jeps en patrouille constante. Hébron avait des besoins plus pressants que celui de poursuivre la petite guerre quotidienne. Les autorités israéliennes refusent de divulguer le nombre de soldats — policiers spéciaux, agents secrets,

fonctionnaires, gardiens de camps de détention ou interrogateurs — affectés à la gestion permanente des territoires occupés. L'armée dirige l'administration municipale, adopte ses règlements et décide unilatéralement de l'attribution des permis municipaux. L'armée ferme écoles, hôpitaux et commerces au gré de ses humeurs, régit les mœurs et la circulation automobile. Les autorités israéliennes prétendent que les conditions présentes résultent des «agressions» subies depuis le début de l'*infada*. Mais Abu Nader, chef de la famille Tamimi, notable de 68 ans et ancien enseignant devenu commerçant, ne voit pas les choses de la même façon. Depuis 1985, Abu Nader n'a pu quitter Hébron pour se rendre à Jourdain, où la majorité de sa famille habite. Aujourd'hui, les deux villes sont séparées par un monde de division politique et d'agressivité entre Juifs et Arabes.

Abu Nader détient encore un pas-seport jordanien, même si, en 1988, de guerre lasse, le roi Hussein de Jordanie a renoncé aux territoires occupés par Israël. Mais ce sont les militaires israéliens qui empêchent Abu Nader de visiter sa famille à Amman, et ce, depuis 1985. Le chef de famille de Hébron est victime de pratiques que même des avocats israéliens qualifient de frauduleuses. L'armée, depuis quelques années, exige d'Abu Nader qu'il paye des impôts que personne n'avait perçus à l'époque (parce que l'administration israélienne n'était pas assez face à cette méthode de taxation. L'administration militaire évaluait vos biens et vos revenus, puis elle estimait, souvent arbitrairement, que vous auriez dû payer, durant les années où personne ne percevait ces

impôts, des sommes souvent gigantesques. Parce qu'Abu Nader a refusé cet arbitraire, on lui a interdit de se rendre dans sa famille à Amman. Au moment de notre passage, il venait d'obtenir gain de cause devant une cour israélienne qui avait réduit presque à zéro sa «dette fiscale». Mais les autorités militaires lui refusaient toujours le droit de se déplacer librement, parce que certains de ses frères n'avaient pas réglé leur propre dette. Chaque fois qu'un citoyen des territoires occupés par Israël veut profiter des droits de tout être humain normal — droit de voyager, d'acheter une propriété, de construire une maison, ou même d'entretenir une nouvelle naissance — il doit obtenir le sceau d'approbation des sept laïcs qui régissent ses libertés, dont la police et des taxes. Avec le «changement» des permis de toutes sortes,

## ... environ 100 000 Palestiniens, selon les données fournies par Israël, auraient été détenus au moins une fois durant l'*infada*. Une personne arrêtée toute une population.

En juin dernier, quelques jours après notre visite chez les Tamimi, les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de la Communauté européenne, réunis à Dublin, ont condamné l'atteinte systématique aux droits fondamentaux dont l'administration militaire israélienne se rend coupable dans les territoires qu'elle occupe illégalement. La Conférence de Dublin enjoignait les autorités israéliennes d'accepter que des observateurs permanents de l'ONU soient affectés à la protection des populations locales contre l'arbitraire de l'armée. Mais rien ne permet de penser que l'appel de Dubin a été entendu, au même moment, Itzaak Shamir, chef du Likoud, accablait au pouvoir, cette fois à la tête d'une coalition de tous les partis de droite et d'extrême droite du pays. Après bientôt trois ans de révolte palestinienne, jamais les perspectives d'un règlement pacifique dans les territoires occupés n'avaient été aussi sombres. □

Jean-François Lépine était correspondant au Moyen-Orient pour les émissions «Le Téléjournal» (SRC) et The National (CBC) depuis 1988.

avant le Parti nazi non pas par peur,

mais surtout par désir de sécurité

dans une société qui se relevait mal

de la crise économique de 1929 et

qui n'avait pas préparé ses membres

Ces femmes ont donné une autre

image du nazisme. «Une image dif-

férente du III<sup>e</sup> Reich prenait forme.

À côté de la brutalité dominante des

hommes, Gertrud Scholtz-Klink et

ses millions de disciples avaient

donné une coloration sociale à la

tyrannie.»

«Ce livre devrait faire partie des

lectures de base pour les étudiants

en histoire ou en science politique,

car il jette un regard nouveau sur le

nazisme et il démontre que chacun

est responsable des horreurs com-

mises par le système politique

auquel il adhère. Personne ne peut

dire après coup qu'il ne savait pas,

parce que, même dans la vie quoti-

dienne, en acceptant les préceptes

de l'idéologie au pouvoir, il con-

tribue, lui aussi, au maintien de ce

système. — *Andrée Laprise*

*Andrée Laprise est diplômée en science*

*politique de l'Université de Montréal.*

## Une Afrique en marche

*Éditions Plon, Paris, 1989.*

336 pages, 32 \$

leur reste à couvrir, mais surtout de

l'immense travail déjà accompli.

des échecs n'ont ni lieu entre

1971 et 1973. Ils voulaient prendre

la relève des organisations officiel-

souvent contrôlées à des fins poli-

tiques. Les groupes désiraient briser

le marasme qui avait entraîné des

siècles de colonisation et de dépen-

sance. Le constat était tragique : les

payans n'avaient plus confiance en

leurs propres forces. Ils étaient

passifs et attentistes.

«C'est la famine qui les a poussés à

s'organiser. «C'est à cause des dif-

fcultés que les initiatives payannes

ont échoué. Les groupes s'associent

reunis en vastes associations trans-

nationales tel «6-5» (Se Servir de la

Saison Sèche en Savane et au Sahel)

— n'avaient pas pour fonction d'être

des cornes d'abandonnement d'être

ainsi que, lentement mais sûrement,

précède donc l'aide financière. C'est

d'organiser. L'aide structurelle

faire la preuve d'une capacité

pui d'associations devaient d'abord

payans qui désiraient recevoir l'ap-

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payans qui désiraient recevoir l'ap-

raient nourriture et argent. Les

des cornes d'abandonnement d'être

éduquer les populations des pays

naissent que les destins des deux

humains sont liées. En effet, le

quatre décennies, les États-Unis et

l'Union soviétique ont apporté, à

leurs manières, des solutions aux

problèmes de l'Allemagne de

l'Ouest aussi bien qu'à ceux de

l'Europe mais que cette période

nouvelle, en répandant que les Occiden-

taux se doivent de trouver des

solutions aux problèmes de sécurité

de cet empire en plein éclatement,

mais se demande ce qui va succéder

au légalisme. «La question capi-

tales», écrit-il, «demeure : qu'est-ce

qui a commencé ?»

Nationalisme, conflits ethniques

en Europe centrale, puissance de

la Chine et du Japon, unification

observée, rien n'échappe à cet

universel, à l'origine de deux guerres

mondiales». — *Jocelyn Coulon*

*Éditions Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1989.*

271 pages, 34,20 \$

La nouvelle Europe est en train

de mûrir après quarante-cinq

ans d'un condominium américano-

soviétique qui ne fut pas toujours

facile à vivre même s'il fut néces-

saire pour assurer la paix sur un

Vieux continent déchiré par d'incen-

sants conflits. Retraçant l'histoire

de cette époque unique qui s'est

achevée avec l'effondrement du mur

William Pfaff tente de mettre en re-

lief les facteurs qui façonneront les

relations internationales de demain.

Le célèbre éditeur de *l'Inter-*

*national Herald Tribune* a terminé

son livre en mai 1989, mais le re-

gard qu'il porte sur une «Europe qui

prend à nouveau la mesure de son

importance et de sa force» garde

toute son actualité tant par la finesse

de l'analyse que par l'éclair des

jugements et des conclusions qu'il

confits. □

alliances militaires ou des

luation des systèmes d'armes, des

tant dans ses descriptions des doc-

problèmes militaires de notre temps.

Le livre de Citardet se veut objectif.

Voici un ouvrage dont la

voix n'est pas étrangère à un public

de non spécialistes les éléments

premiers d'information nécessaire

à la compréhension des grands

problèmes militaires de notre temps.

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
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ce sont les Allemands qui ont exercé le plus d'influence dans cette

Dans un effort de recherche remarquable, Korhman fait état non seulement du développement de la pensée de Ratzel et de ses disciples, mais aussi de ceux qui s'y opposent.

allemand. Il est intéressant de constater un écho favorable chez le peuple japonais à cette discipline de trouver l'utile dans ses raisons et tout ont

Allemands, causé par le Traité de Versailles qu'ils considéraient injuste et par leur dispersion à travers l'Europe, surtout en Europe centrale. À travers de nombreux ouvrages et dans les pages de revues spécialisées comme la *Zeitschrift für*

Geopolitik, les Allemands ont vu miroiter devant eux de multiples options politiques. C'est avec l'accès au pouvoir d'Adolf Hitler, en janvier 1933, que sont apparues les possibilités d'un lien direct entre la géopolitique et la politique.

Korinnan retrace très exactement les changements qu'a subi la géopolitique en régime national-socialiste. C'est un général devenu géographe, Karl Haushofer, qui a tiré le plus célèbre auteur de

époque, Konman consistait néanmoins que « la convergence entre le géopolitique et le national-socialisme sera de courte durée... Effective-ment les divergences étaient très profondes. Elles portaient sur les effets du raisonnement géopolitique

Est-ce que l'Allemagne pensait le monde ? Si l'on en juge par cet ouvrage, la réponse est «oui», mais, l'ayant ajouté, au même titre que

es autres grandes puissances de l'époque. La lecture du livre de Körtinman, qui n'est pas toujours

facile car elle suppose de bonnes connaissances en histoire et en géo-

graphique, nous peignons de voir tous les contours de la géographie qui et de constater la tragédie qui en a résultée quand elle fut utilisée, voire abusée, par les projets d'extension du régime nazi. C'est une leçon qui

—Stanislav Kirschbaum  
mérite de n'être jamais oublié.  
Stanislav Kirschbaum est professeur  
international à l'Université York,  
Collège Glendon à Toronto.

Les mères-patries du III<sup>e</sup> Reich.  
Les femmes et le nazisme  
Claudia Koonz  
Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1989.  
556 pages, 45 \$

Plusieurs livres ont été écrits sur le nazisme. On a même souvent l'impression que tout a été dit sur le sujet et qu'un nouvel ouvrage ne pourrait que se reproduire ce qui a déjà maintes fois été analysé. Ce n'est pas le cas avec le livre de Chandra

Koonz qui nous plonge dans une dimension du nazisme jusqu'ici jamais explorée, ou si peu, qu'on pourrait croire que l'on a jamais rien écrit sur le sujet. *Les mères-patries du IIIe Reich* aborde un sujet presque

L'autre, dans une recherche féministe, nous démontre d'une façon magistrale l'apport des femmes au mouvement, de la création du Parti

jusqu'à la guerre. À travers le cheminement de la société allemande, un assiste à la montée du nazisme, par le biais des associations féminines. Ces associations, qui regroupaient des milliers de femmes sous la République de Weimar

un, petit à petit, laisse leur pouvoir à la Ligue nationale-socialiste des femmes, dirigée par Gertrud Scholtz-Klink.

responsables des camps de concentration, des politiques d'eugénisme, etc. ? Pourquoi ont-elles accepté que l'Elat nazi intervienne dans leur vie privée au point de leur indiquer quand se marier, quand avoir des

enfants et combien, et même comment faire la cuisine et s'occuper de la maison ?

Le livre débute par une entrevue avec Gertrud Scholtz-Klink. Cette femme, comme l'auteur le souligne, n'a en aucune manière renié son passé et l'idéologie nazie. « Je

n'avais pas été convoquée à recueillir une confession et cette femme n'était pas une ex-nazie. Elle était aussi nazie qu'elle l'avait été en 1933 ou en 1945... Ce qui l'intéressait, ce n'était pas d'éviter qu'un autre régime aussi meurtrier revienne.

un jour, mais de faire l'apologie de celui qu'elle avait soutenu. En fait, c'est que Claudia Koonz démontre, c'est que le Parti nazi et ses dirigeants considéraient les femmes comme peu intelligentes et n'étant que le complément du

«nouvel homme». Hitler aurait même déclaré devant un collaborateur : «Un homme intelligent doit choisir une femme primitive et stupide. Imaginez qu'un par-dessus le marché, je sois obligé de supporter qu'une femme se mette de mon

« Quand je me repose, je travail ! »

La soumission totale au mari, mais surtout à l'Etat allemand, était exigée de la femme allemande. Celle-ci avait pour principale fon-

tion de «produire» des enfants et de faire en sorte que sa famille (le centre de sa vie) vive en communion constante avec les préceptes du nazisme. La femme représentait, en fait, le rouage essentiel de ce système, où l'Etat prend en charge

toutes les parties de la vie privée et publique. « Tandis que l'Etat nazi détruisait toute moralité dans la sphère politique, les épouses et la famille devaient garder un espace affectif pour les hommes qui super-


L'Allemagne hitlérienne, les femmes offraient dans une sphère distincte créée par elles, l'illusion de valeurs maternelles qui donnaient un sain vernis au monde aryen des élus.»

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## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



L'Institut a accordé beaucoup d'attention à l'Afrique australe au cours des derniers mois. S'articulant à Londres tandis qu'il se rendait au Zimbabwe, **Bernard Wood** a présidé un colloque sur la politique du Canada à l'égard de l'Afrique australe.

Le texte de l'exposé paraitra dans la revue du Commonwealth intitulée *Round table*. À Harare, il a parlé à la *Canada-Zimbabwe Society* des effets qu'ont sur les pays en développement les changements survenant en Europe de l'Est, et il a dit craindre que le tiers-monde devienne un nouveau marché où seraient écoulés les systèmes d'armes que l'on est en train de retirer d'Europe par suite du dégel des relations Est-Ouest.

Au Mozambique, M. Wood a participé à une conférence qui se tenait à l'Institut des relations internationales sur les perspectives de paix dans la région. La campagne de désaffectation que menait l'Afrique du Sud s'est résorbée considérablement, mais la violence, la brutalité et le banditisme font encore des ravages dans les localités rurales du Mozambique. Parmi les thèmes évoqués à la Conférence, il a qu'il a abordés à la Conférence, il a évoqué la possibilité que certains éléments du processus de la CSCE soient appliqués en Afrique australe.

M. Wood a passé plusieurs jours en Afrique du Sud pour dialoguer avec des hommes politiques, des dignitaires, des journalistes, des diplomates et des universitaires sur l'énervante évolution de la conjoncture dans ce pays. «De Klerk et Mandela sont maintenant marés, ils ont dû abandonner tous les autres dans leurs univers respectifs.»

À son retour au Canada, M. Wood a tenu une conférence de presse à l'Institut et il a participé à diverses activités quand M. Mandela a visité le Canada; il a notamment contribué à des reportages sur les ondes de

### Une importante conférence internationale sur l'Union soviétique est organisée à Ottawa

Une importante conférence internationale sur l'Union soviétique va se tenir à Ottawa à la fin de novembre 1990, à laquelle participeront quelques-uns des plus grands spécialistes et spécialistes des relations Est-Ouest au monde.

Initiée par l'Union soviétique au mouvement : *conséquences pour le Canada et le reste du monde*, la conférence, qui doit durer deux jours et demi, soit du 26 au 28 novembre, va être l'occasion pour les participants d'analyser en profondeur une vaste gamme de thèmes et d'entendre l'opinion de spécialistes. Au nombre des sujets abordés, mentionnons : «l'économie soviétique : l'avenir de la *perestroïka*», le contexte des échanges et des investissements», «Réponses à l'équilibre Est-Ouest», et «le pouvoir soviétique dans un monde en changement».

Parmi les orateurs étrangers qui ont été invités, il y aura **Vladimir Kozlovich**, le rédacteur en chef de *Gonoyok*, un grand hebdomadaire soviétique de tendance réformatrice; **Vladimir Popov**, l'auteur de *The Turning Point*, un exposé radical des gigantesques problèmes économiques auxquels sont confrontés les Soviétiques; **Anders Åslund**, économiste suédois et auteur d'un ouvrage dont le *New York Times* déclare qu'il fait autorité pour ce qui est de la lutte que livre Gorbatchev pour mener à bien sa réforme économique; les chroniqueurs internationaux **Walter Wolk**, du *Manchester Guardian*, et **Christopher Barrett**, du journal *The Zeit*; **Vladislav Malkevitch**, président de la Chambre de commerce et d'industrie d'URSS; **Michael Sturmer**, un important commentateur allemand, spécialiste des relations internationales; **Goran Eimerfeldt**, un des principaux hommes d'affaires suédois, qui est à la tête de la première société d'import-export avec l'Union soviétique; et **Georgi Arbatov**, directeur de l'Institut des études canado-américaines à l'Académie des sciences de Moscou — ainsi que beaucoup d'autres.

Le droit d'entrée à la conférence est de 385 \$, ce qui comprend trois déjeuners et deux dîners. Sous réserve, les orateurs invités aux dîners seront **Aleksandr Yakovlev**, membre du *Politburo* de sécurité nationale auprès du président des États-Unis.

La conférence est parrainée conjointement par le Centre parlementaire pour les Affaires étrangères et le Commerce extérieur, l'Institut canadien pour la Paix et la Sécurité internationales et par le Conseil canado-soviétique des Affaires. Pour vous inscrire, veuillez communiquer avec le Centre par téléphone : (613) 233-8237.

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**Katherine Laundry et Susan Connell** ont participé à des réunions de la *Canadian Library Association*, à Ottawa en juin. Elles ont alors présenté deux ouvrages, à savoir *Le Thésaurus de la paix et la sécurité et Le Canada, la paix et la sécurité internationale. Une bibliographie, 1985-1989*. Elles ont aussi dirigé un atelier sur les ouvrages de référence concernant la paix et la sécurité.

En juin, **Ron Fisher** a fait un exposé sur les votes socio-psychologiques susceptibles de conduire au règlement de conflits internationaux, pendant le congrès annuel de la Société canadienne de psychologie. Plus tard ce mois-là, il a participé à la conférence annuelle de l'*International Association of Conflict Management*. Il a alors choisi comme thème *Training Third Party Consultants in International Conflict Resolution*. M. Fisher a par ailleurs présenté un atelier à l'Institut sur le travail qu'il mène en permanence dans ce même domaine.

**Bernard Wood** a pris la parole pendant une conférence que par-tenait à l'Institut au sujet de la sécurité en Asie du Sud-Est. Il a aussi participé à Mont-Tremblant à un atelier organisé par le Centre de recherche et de développement du ministère de la Défense nationale; il s'est alors penché sur les relations mondiales actuelles et à long terme. Enfin, il a prononcé l'allocation-thème à la réunion annuelle du *Peace Centre*, à Saint-John's (Terre-Neuve); il s'est alors interrogé sur les nouvelles politiques canadiennes en matière de sécurité et sur leurs conséquences pour le désarmement, le développement et l'environnement.

De nombreux changements ont eu lieu dans les rangs du personnel au cours de l'été : **Gordon Sharpe**, chargé de recherche détaché par le MDN depuis un an, a été promu co-lonnel en juin et est retourné au Quartier général de la Défense nationale pour prendre le poste de Directeur — Coordination et développement de la doctrine. **Ron Fisher**, qui a passé le congé sabbatique accordé par l'Université de la Saskatchewan, travaillera à l'Université Carleton

durant la seconde. **Fen Hampson**, versité de la Saskatchewan, travaillera à l'Université Carleton

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# A L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



## L'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak

Le 2 août, le Conseil s'est réuni et a condamné l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak. Dans une résolution, il a exigé le retrait immédiat des forces irakiennes du territoire koweïtien et a exhorté les deux pays à entreprendre immédiatement des négociations intensives. L'Irak a déclaré au Conseil que le «gouvernement provisoire libre du Koweït» lui avait demandé son aide pour rétablir la «sécurité et l'ordre» dans le pays. Les États-Unis ont accusé l'Irak d'avoir soigneusement planifié l'invasion. «L'Irak a envahi d'État, dans un effort aussi éhonté que rompre pour essayer de justifier ses actions», a déclaré l'ambassadeur américain Thomas Pickering au Conseil.

## Le Sahara occidental

Le 27 juin, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté à l'unanimité un plan de paix pour le Sahara occidental, et il a exhorté le Maroc et les guérillas du Polisario à prolonger indéfiniment le cessez-le-feu provisoire. La résolution 658 prévoit que le plan de paix serait mis en oeuvre sur trente-cinq semaines, au cours desquelles l'autorité administrative du Sahara occidental serait transférée à l'ONU. Les 75 000 réfugiés du Sahara occidental seraient rapatriés dans leur pays d'origine. Le 13 juin, après s'être réuni avec le Secrétaire général, l'ambassadeur d'Israël, M. Jochanan Benin, a annoncé que son pays était disposé à recevoir le représentant de l'ONU, qui «pourrait aller où bon lui paraîtrait en Israël».

## Chypre et le déficit des opérations de maintien de la paix

Le 19 juillet, le Conseil s'est réuni et a sanctionné le plan qu'avait élaboré le Secrétaire général pour aider les Chypriotes grecs et turcs en arrivant à un règlement négocié de leur conflit. Dénonçant l'ennemi des négociations, le Secrétaire général a affirmé que le moment était venu de cesser de part et d'autre de réclamer, et de se concentrer plutôt sur la promotion de la réconciliation. Le geste du Conseil suit une décision qu'il a prise le 15 juin pour prolonger le mandat de la Force des Nations-Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre (UNFICYP). Pendant la réunion du Conseil, le Canada et sept autres membres ont émis une déclaration qui soulignait les problèmes

interdire l'importation dans leurs territoires respectifs... de tout bien ou produit provenant du Koweït ou de l'Irak; empêcher toute activité de leurs ressortissants, ou dans leurs territoires; l'exportation ou le transit de tout bien ou produit provenant de l'Irak ou du Koweït... Interdire la vente ou la fourniture à toute personne ou à tout organisme en Irak ou au Koweït, par leurs ressortissants, ou depuis leurs territoires, ou encore avec des navires bat-

## Le Moyen-Orient

Le 31 mai, le Conseil a prolongé de six mois le mandat de la Force des Nations-Unies chargée d'observer les dégagements (FNUOD), qui est déployée sur les hauteurs du Golan. Elle compte notamment 227 observateurs militaires canadiens. Le 1er août, le mandat de la Force d'intermédiation des Nations-Unies au Liban (FINUL) a lui aussi été prolongé.

Par ailleurs, le Conseil s'est réuni le 3 mai pour continuer son débat sur la question de l'établissement de nouveaux colons juifs soviétiques dans les territoires occupés. Le 25 mai, le Conseil s'est réuni pour

la première fois à Genève (Suisse). Il s'est déplacé ainsi par suite d'un compromis dont l'objet était de permettre au président de l'OLP, Yasser Arafat, de participer au débat sans mettre en danger son visa par les États-Unis, à supposer qu'il ait tenté de prendre la parole à New York. La réunion a été convoquée par suite d'une recrudescence de la violence dans la Bande de Gaza.

Le 31 mai, les États-Unis ont opposé leur veto à une résolution en vertu de laquelle une commission aurait été envoyée dans lesdits territoires pour établir la meilleure façon d'y garantir la sécurité des Palestiniens. Le Canada et les treize autres membres ont voté en faveur de la résolution. Après la réunion, un porte-parole des États-Unis a déclaré à la presse que Washington privilégiait une solution en vertu de laquelle le Secrétaire général enverrait un représentant personnel dans la région. Le 13 juin, après s'être réuni avec le Secrétaire général, l'ambassadeur d'Israël, M. Jochanan Benin, a annoncé que son pays était disposé à recevoir le représentant de l'ONU, qui «pourrait aller où bon lui paraîtrait en Israël».

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financiers auxquels la Force fait face, notamment la baisse des contributions volontaires. Précisant qu'ils étaient très inquiets et que la situation imposait injustement un fardeau aux États membres fournissant des contingents à la Force, les huit pays ont fait valoir que celle-ci devrait être financée à même les contributions mises en recouvrement, au lieu de dépendre des contributions volontaires. L'année dernière, le déficit accumulé atteignait presque 175 millions de dollars US. La question se fait d'autant plus pressante que les membres du Conseil s'interrogent sur les opérations de maintien de la paix à venir. Les récents progrès accomplis dans les négociations entre les cinq membres permanents du Conseil et les parties au conflit cambodgien ont fait grandir l'espoir que l'ONU joue là-bas un rôle important relativement au maintien de la paix et à la surveillance des élections. Le 28 juin, le Secrétaire général a communiqué au Conseil une demande émanant du président intérimaire d'Haïti, Mme Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, qui réclamait l'aide de l'ONU pour organiser des élections. À mesure que l'on fait appel à l'ONU pour surveiller des élections, certains membres de l'Assemblée générale se disent inquiets face à ce nouveau rôle. Des pays tels que Cuba et la Colombie craignent que cette nouvelle fonction pour s'infiltrer dans les affaires des pays. Ils préféreraient que toute mesure intéressante des élections soit débattue et définie à l'Assemblée générale, où le pouvoir des membres permanents est moindre. Le 4 mai, le Conseil a prolongé de six mois le mandat du Groupe d'observateurs des Nations-Unies en Amérique centrale (ONUCA). La résolution à cet égard a été adoptée à condition que l'intervention du Groupe pour le maintien de la paix et la démobilisation cessent le 27 juin 1990, et le 27 du même mois, une cérémonie a eu lieu au Nicaragua pour marquer la démobilisation finale. □

— TREVOR ROWE



## EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



Visites officielles à Ottawa

Au printemps dernier, en l'es-

pace de quelques semaines, Ottawa

a reçu trois hommes d'Etat émi-

nents. Elle a d'abord accueilli le

secrétaire général des Nations-

Unies, M. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar,

et enfin, au mois

de juin, du militant noir sud-africain

et vice-président du Congrès natio-

nal africain, M. Nelson Mandela,

qui, le 18 juin, a pris la parole de-

vant les deux chambres du Par-

lement, événement extrêmement

inhabituel pour une personne autre

qu'un chef de gouvernement.

### Le Moyen-Orient

Avant les deux premières visites

susmentionnées, le ministre des

Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark,

avait confirmé aux communs, les

22 et 24 mai, qu'il serait question du

Moyen-Orient avec M.M. de Cléllar

que l'ambassadeur du Canada en

Israël avait ce même jour exprimé

aux autorités israéliennes la conste-

nation et la vive inquiétude de notre

pays face à la montée de la violence

dans les territoires occupés.

Le 14 juin, après la formation du

nouveau gouvernement israélien,

M. Bill Blaikie, chargé au NPD des

questions relatives aux Affaires ex-

trérieures, a demandé au ministre si

le gouvernement pensait utiliser sa

position au Conseil de sécurité de

l'ONU pour insister sur la mise sur

le pied d'une force de maintien de la

paix qu'Israël accepterait de laisser

obtenir l'agrement d'Israël.

Le 28 juillet, après la mort d'une

jeune Canadienne dans un attentat

en Israël, M. Clark a fermement

condamné «cet acte de terrorisme

qui, a-t-il déclaré, ne servait

qu'à perpétuer le cycle affligeant de

la violence qui caractérise la con-

flit moyen-oriental. Cinq jours à

peine plus tard, le 2 août, il a de

nouveau dû aborder la question de

la violence dans la même région,

quand l'Irak a envahi le Koweït. Il a

alors qualifié l'invasion irakienne de

«totallement inacceptable» et promis

que le Canada s'efforcerait avec

d'autres membres du Conseil de

sécurité de l'ONU de trouver une

«règle internationale efficace».

(Voir «A l'ordre du jour du Conseil

de sécurité» pour plus de détails

concernant l'ONU et l'Irak).

### L'OTAN et la politique

européenne

Le 17 mai, à la Chambre des

communes, suite à une réunion la

semaine précédente des ministres de

la Défense de l'OTAN à Kananaskis

(Alberta), M. Bill Blaikie (NPD) a

accusé le ministre de la Défense,

M. William McKinnigh, de ne pas

s'être opposé à la modernisation de

toutes les armes nucléaires. Le mi-

nistre a rejeté l'allégation du député

et insisté sur le fait que les essais

des missiles de croisière américains

d'armes nucléaires mais de

Le 31 mai, abordant les questions

«systèmes de guidage».

plus générales de la politique eu-

ropéenne, M. Clark a précisé quels

avaient été les cinq grands domaines

discutés durant la récente visite de

M. Gorbachev. Il a décrit les piliers

institutions de la politique eu-

ropéenne du Canada comme étant

une réorientation plus politique de

l'OTAN (à laquelle la contribution

militaire du Canada «devait dimi-

ner», un rôle accru de la CSCE, et

une intensification des relations

avec la Communauté européenne.

### L'environnement

Le printemps, il a souvent été

question à la Chambre du réchauffe-

ment du globe. Pendant la période

des questions, M. Jim Fulton, chargé

des problèmes d'environnement au

NPD, n'a cessé de presser le gou-

vernement d'adopter des mesures

visant à réduire considérablement

les émissions de gaz responsables

de l'effet de serre. Le 10 mai, se

joignant à l'attaqu, M. Herb Gray,

chef de l'opposition par intérim, a

cité un téléx du Département d'Etat

américain, obtenu par des fuites, qui

laisseait entendre que le Canada avait

accepté de faire front avec les Etats-

Unis pour «bloquer de nouveaux

progrès dans la lutte contre le

réchauffement du globe» au cours

des discussions qui devaient avoir

lieu plus tard dans la semaine, à

Bergen (Norvège).

Le ministre de l'Environnement

d'at, M. Lucien Bouchard, a

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
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# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



## Des forces canadiennes déployées dans le golfe Persique

Le 10 août, au cours d'une conférence de presse, le premier ministre, M. Mulroney, a annoncé que le gouvernement avait décidé d'envoyer trois navires dans le golfe Persique, où ils « vont participer à l'effort collectif de dissuasion » en réponse à l'encontre de l'Irak. Ces navires sont le NCSM *Athabaskan*, un destroyer de type *Tribal* armé en 1972 et équipé de torpilles, de canons, de deux hélicoptères, de systèmes de défense anti-aérienne passive et de missiles anti-aériens de type *Sea Sparrow*; le NCSM *Terra Nova*, une frégate de type *Restigouche* armée, et des torpilles et de systèmes de défense anti-aérienne passive, mais par d'armes de défense anti-aérienne; et le NCSM *Protec*, un navire de ravitaillement, d'entretien, sans armes. Ces bâtiments, qui compte en tout 800 hommes d'équipage, arriveront dans la région à la mi-septembre, a déclaré le premier ministre.

Au début du mois de juillet, les dirigeants de l'OTAN se sont réunis à Londres pour réfléchir à la façon de réagir aux changements politiques survenus en Europe. Avant cette réunion, le président Bush avait envoyé une lettre aux chefs des États membres de l'OTAN pour

## Le communiqué de l'OTAN

Le 6 juillet, à la fin de la réunion de Londres, un long communiqué a été publié. Entre autres choses, les alliés y proposaient d'affirmer le Pacte de Varsovie l'assentiment à une clarification de non-agression affirmant leur intention de « ne pas menacer d'employer la force ni de l'employer contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout État... » Le communiqué insistait sur la nécessité « d'empêcher tout pays d'entretenir sur le continent une puissance disproportionnée ». Le communiqué abordait aussi la question des forces de l'OTAN en Europe. Il faisait remarquer que, suite au retrait des forces soviétiques d'Europe de l'Est, la structure de force intégrée de l'OTAN serait modifiée de la façon suivante : elle comporterait des forces actives moins nombreuses, multinationales, mobiles et souples, pour donner le maximum de latitude aux dirigeants politiques dans les situations de crise; on réduirait l'état de préparation des unités actives, qui feraient moins d'exercices et d'entraînement; et, le cas échéant, on recourrait à la mobilisation pour constituer des forces importantes.

Faisant écho à la lettre du président Bush, le communiqué parlait des armes nucléaires comme de « véritables armes de dernier recours », mais affirmait la nécessité de conserver « dans un avenir prévisible » un mélange de forces nucléaires et de forces classiques. Cependant, il proposait de négocier l'élimination des obus d'artillerie nucléaire en Europe et de s'éloigner de la stratégie militaire de défense soviétique en Europe et de s'éloigner de la stratégie des changements doctrinaux de « décisions » et il a qualifié les engagements menés satisfait par le communiqué de la place de l'Allemagne unifiée dans l'OTAN. En vertu d'un accord que devront négocier l'Allemagne unifiée et l'Union soviétique, les 350 000 soldats stationnés en Allemagne de l'Est seront retirés sur une période de trois ou quatre ans. L'Union soviétique a accepté qu'une Allemagne unifiée soit membre du Pacte de Varsovie, le 16 juillet, MM. Gorbachev et Kohl ont trouvé un terrain d'entente sur la question de la place de l'Allemagne unifiée dans l'OTAN. En vertu d'un accord que devront négocier l'Allemagne unifiée et l'Union soviétique, les 350 000 soldats stationnés en Allemagne de l'Est seront retirés sur une période de trois ou quatre ans.

## Mikhail Gorbachev reçoit Helmut Kohl

Lors d'un tête-à-tête à Mineral-nye Vody (URSS), le 16 juillet,

les rempassements, mais qu'aucune force étrangère n'y serait acceptée. Les deux dirigeants ont aussi décidé qu'une Allemagne unifiée remon-terait à fabriquer et à posséder des armes chimiques et qu'elle signerait le traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

**Grande-Bretagne :**

Les bénéfices de la paix


Au mois de mai, un document du ministère de la Défense britannique a été divulgué dans l'*Economist* de Londres. L'étude en question portait sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

posait de réduire l'armée britannique de cinquante-cinq bataillons à trente-deux, et de ramener le nombre de frégates de la Marine royale de cinquante-huit à trente-deux également, ce qui permettrait d'économiser pour ainsi dire 40 milliards de dollars en dix ans. À la fin juin, le ministre de la Défense, M. Tom King, a annoncé à la Chambre des communes britannique des coupures moins radicales mais très controversées. Il a affirmé devant un comité parlementaire que le Pacte de Varsovie « avait virtuellement cessé d'exister ». Après avoir annoncé une réduction de 1,2 milliard de dollars du budget de la défense (soit quelque 3 p. 100 avant inflation), le ministre a annulé une commande de trente-trois avions *Tornado* et confirmé que la Grande-Bretagne envisageait de réduire considérablement ses unités terrestres et aériennes affectées à l'OTAN. Ces réductions des effectifs stationnés en Allemagne semblent plus importantes que celles dans le cadre des pourparlers sur les forces conventionnelles.

Depuis le 3 février 1961, l'armée de l'air américaine entretenait une flotte aérienne qui garantissait la maîtrise et le contrôle des forces nucléaires des États-Unis même après la destruction des installations terrestres. Un des avions, sommairement baptisé « Looking Glass », a volé de manière constante, piloté par un général d'aviation. Le mardi 24 juillet, l'alerte en vol continue a pris fin au moment où le général John Charn, commandant de commandement aérien stratégique, a atterri sur la base d'Offutt. Le passage à « l'attente terrestre » résulte à la fois des pressions budgétaires et de la quasi-certitude qu'une alerte nucléaire suffisamment tôt pour prendre des mesures de précaution. Les Soviétiques y sont également pour quelque chose. Un rapport du sénat américain sur les services armés, publié à la fin juillet, faisait remarquer que les Soviétiques n'envoient plus de sous-marins patrouiller le long des côtes américaines ni de bombardiers *Bears* survoler la frontière septentrionale canadienne.



## CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



### Pourparlers sur la réduction des armements stratégiques (START)

Au sommet de Washington, les présidents Bush et Gorbatchev ont signé une «déclaration conjointe» précisant que leurs pays

s'étaient entendus sur les «dispositions fondamentales» d'un traité START, et réaffirmant leur détermination de conclure et de signer ce

Tout d'abord, les États-Unis ont accepté de n'assujettir aux limites

édictées dans le Traité que les missiles de croisière air-sol (ALCM)

donc la portée dépasserait 600 km; en retour, les Soviétiques ont convenu d'exclure du Traité les ALCM

armes de munitions conventionnelles (y compris le missile antiaérien *Tachikawa*), qui se distinguent des ALCM à tête nucléaire. En ce qui

concerne les missiles de croisière mer-sol nucléaires (SLCM) ayant une portée supérieure à 600 km, les deux camps ont convenu d'en limiter le nombre à 880. Il s'agit là d'un «en-gagement politique», et il vaudra pendant toute la durée du Traité (quinze ans); cependant, cet élément fera l'objet d'une déclaration connexe au lieu d'être intégré au Traité même.

D'autres progrès ont été accomplis au sommet, quand les deux blocs se sont entendus sur une «limite seconde» de 100 ogives montées sur les ICBM mobiles; c'était là un compromis initial, qui fixait ce nombre à 1 600, et celle des Américains, qui l'établissait à 800. Les deux présidents ont également signé une déclaration conjointe dans laquelle ils s'engageaient à amorcer des pourparlers START II dès que possible après la signature du traité START I.

### Régime de sécurité dans le Pacifique

Dans un discours prononcé à Victoria le 17 juillet, le ministre des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, a réclame un nouveau dialogue sur la coopération dans le Pacifique Nord afin d'étudier la possibilité d'adopter dans la région des mesures à l'appui d'un renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité. Particulièrement en ce qui concerne les

peraient à la nouvelle tribune les États-Unis, l'URSS, les deux Corées, le Japon, la Chine et le Canada; ces pays chercheraient à circonscrire les propositions présentant un intérêt certain et à formuler des contre-propositions valables. M. Clark a expressément mentionné des échanges de renseignements, la notification des manœuvres militaires et l'établissement de régimes d'ouverture des espaces aériens. Abordant la très délicate question de la limitation des armements navals, il a poursuivi en disant que, si le dialogue sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe finit par inclure aussi les forces navales, il faudra de toute évidence se préoccuper de l'océan Pacifique. M. Clark a réitéré sa proposition dans des entretiens avec des dirigeants gouvernementaux à Tokyo une semaine plus tard, mais on ne semble pas lui avoir prêté une oreille très attentive, bien que les Japonais fussent, disait-on, en train d'étudier des idées semblables.

### Accord sur les armes chimiques

À leur sommet de Washington le 1<sup>er</sup> juin, les présidents Bush et Gorbatchev ont signé un accord bilatéral de haut niveau par lequel leurs pays se sont engagés à détruire au moins 80 p. 100 de leurs arsenaux chimiques, quelle que pût être l'évolution des négociations sur l'interdiction mondiale de ces engins. Aux termes de l'accord, au moins la moitié des quantités déclarées par chaque pays devra avoir été détruite d'ici la fin du siècle, à partir de 1992; par ailleurs, les stocks doivent passer à 5 000 tonnes de part et d'autre (ce qui représente une réduction de 80 p. 100 du côté américain) d'ici l'an 2002.

Les États-Unis souhaitaient conserver 2 p. 100 de leur arsenal (500 tonnes) même après l'entrée en vigueur d'une convention mondiale sur les armes chimiques, tant que tous les pays capables de se procurer de tels engins n'auraient pas adhéré à une telle entente, et ils voulaient obtenir la sanction de l'URSS à cet égard. L'accord bilatéral du 1<sup>er</sup> juin oblige les parties à réduire leurs arsenaux encore davantage, en le ramenant à 500 tonnes de part et d'autre avant la fin de la huitième année après l'entrée en vigueur d'une convention mondiale; à ce moment-là, les États-Unis et l'URSS tiendraient une conférence

spéciale pour établir si l'adhésion totale des armes chimiques au cours tirait pour garantir l'élimination des divers pays à la convention sur-ferait pour garantir l'élimination des deux années suivantes.

### Forces conventionnelles en Europe (CFE)

Peu de progrès ont été accomplis aux négociations sur les CFE avant la fin de juin, moment où les participants ont réussi à s'entendre sur une proposition franco-polonaise concernant les définitions et les limites à employer pour les chars et d'autres véhicules blindés de combat. Dans la Déclaration publiée à l'issue du sommet de l'OTAN, au début de juillet, les signataires exhortaient les participants à poursuivre leurs pourparlers jusqu'à l'obtention d'un accord et à entreprendre ensuite d'autres entretiens (CFE II). Aspect fort important aux yeux des Soviétiques, la Déclaration stipule qu'un engagement serait pris, au moment de la signature d'un traité sur les CFE, au sujet des effets militaires d'une Allemagne unifiée.

Dans divers milieux, on pense que l'URSS a «bloqué» les pourparlers FCE parce qu'elle tenait à limiter les effectifs des forces allemandes, avant d'accepter un accord FCE.

Cet obstacle de taille est finalement tombé quand le chancelier ouest-allemand Kohl et le président Gorbatchev ont annoncé le 16 juillet que les forces militaires d'une Allemagne unifiée ne complèteraient pas plus de 370 000 membres et que des réductions seraient amorcées dès l'entrée en vigueur du traité FCE I.

Le seul autre grand obstacle à la conclusion d'un traité concerne les atteronnements de combat, et notamment le désir des Soviétiques d'exclure de l'accord les appareils de l'aviation basée à terre. Vu l'entente intervenue entre MM. Kohl et Gorbatchev, la plupart des observateurs s'accordent à penser qu'un traité serait conclu d'ici la fin de l'année.

Au début de mai, le président Bush a annulé les programmes de modernisation visant l'artillerie nucléaire américaine et les missiles nucléaires soviétiques à 1 500 kilotonnes. Les États-Unis exigeaient le renforcement des clauses sur la vérification avant de ratifier ces documents, qui seront maintenant soumis au Sénat américain. □

### — RON PURVER

commencent peu après la signature d'un traité sur les CFE, sans que l'on attende la mise en oeuvre de ce dernier comme l'Occident l'avait exigé antérieurement.

Au début de juin, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Chavardnadze, a annoncé le retrait unilatéral d'Europe centrale de soixante des 1 400 lance-missiles nucléaires tactiques soviétiques, ainsi que celui de 250 pièces d'artillerie à capacité nucléaire et de 1 500 ogives stockées dans cette région.

Le secrétaire d'État américain, M. James Baker, s'est dit heureux d'apprendre la nouvelle; c'était, a-t-il dit, une concession que Washington essayait d'obtenir depuis longtemps, car l'URSS possédait un avantage marqué dans ce domaine de l'armement nucléaire. Quelques jours plus tard, Washington a rejeté une proposition soviétique voulant une réduction de 50 p. 100 des forces militaires tactiques soviétiques en Europe, une fois amorcées les négociations sur les CFE.

Pendant leur sommet du début de juillet, les membres de l'OTAN ont convenu de proposer au Pacte de Varsovie d'éliminer tous les obs-

d'artillerie nucléaire en Europe, une fois amorcées les négociations sur les CFE.

La session de Budapest sur l'ouverture des espaces aériens s'est achevée le 10 mai sans qu'il y ait eu entente. Selon le chef de la délégation canadienne, M. John Noble, l'URSS a continué de refuser que des atteronnements étrangers survolent son territoire, ce qui a constitué le principal obstacle au progrès des pourparlers. Ceux-ci pourraient reprendre plus tard cette année.

Pendant les présidents Bush et Gorbatchev ont signé des protocoles de vérification qui seront annexés au Traité de 1974 sur la limitation par-tielle des essais nucléaires et au Traité de 1976 sur les explosions nucléaires à buts pacifiques; les protocoles limitent la puissance des explosions nucléaires soviétiques à 150 kilotonnes. Les États-Unis exigeaient le renforcement des clauses sur la vérification avant de ratifier ces documents, qui seront maintenant soumis au Sénat américain. □

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Les États-Unis souhaitaient conserver 2 p. 100 de leur arsenal (500 tonnes) même après l'entrée en vigueur d'une convention mondiale sur les armes chimiques, tant que tous les pays capables de se procurer de tels engins n'auraient pas adhéré à une telle entente, et ils voulaient obtenir la sanction de l'URSS à cet égard. L'accord bilatéral du 1<sup>er</sup> juin oblige les parties à réduire leurs arsenaux encore davantage, en le ramenant à 500 tonnes de part et d'autre avant la fin de la huitième année après l'entrée en vigueur d'une convention mondiale; à ce moment-là, les États-Unis et l'URSS tiendraient une conférence

spéciale pour établir si l'adhésion totale des armes chimiques au cours tirait pour garantir l'élimination des divers pays à la convention sur-ferait pour garantir l'élimination des deux années suivantes.

Peu de progrès ont été accomplis aux négociations sur les CFE avant la fin de juin, moment où les participants ont réussi à s'entendre sur une proposition franco-polonaise concernant les définitions et les limites à employer pour les chars et d'autres véhicules blindés de combat. Dans la Déclaration publiée à l'issue du sommet de l'OTAN, au début de juillet, les signataires exhortaient les participants à poursuivre leurs pourparlers jusqu'à l'obtention d'un accord et à entreprendre ensuite d'autres entretiens (CFE II). Aspect fort important aux yeux des Soviétiques, la Déclaration stipule qu'un engagement serait pris, au moment de la signature d'un traité sur les CFE, au sujet des effets militaires d'une Allemagne unifiée.

Dans divers milieux, on pense que l'URSS a «bloqué» les pourparlers FCE parce qu'elle tenait à limiter les effectifs des forces allemandes, avant d'accepter un accord FCE.

Cet obstacle de taille est finalement tombé quand le chancelier ouest-allemand Kohl et le président Gorbatchev ont annoncé le 16 juillet que les forces militaires d'une Allemagne unifiée ne complèteraient pas plus de 370 000 membres et que des réductions seraient amorcées dès l'entrée en vigueur du traité FCE I.

Le seul autre grand obstacle à la conclusion d'un traité concerne les atteronnements de combat, et notamment le désir des Soviétiques d'exclure de l'accord les appareils de l'aviation basée à terre. Vu l'entente intervenue entre MM. Kohl et Gorbatchev, la plupart des observateurs s'accordent à penser qu'un traité serait conclu d'ici la fin de l'année.

Au début de mai, le président Bush a annulé les programmes de modernisation visant l'artillerie nucléaire américaine et les missiles nucléaires soviétiques à 1 500 kilotonnes. Les États-Unis exigeaient le renforcement des clauses sur la vérification avant de ratifier ces documents, qui seront maintenant soumis au Sénat américain. □

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15 PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ



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La deuxième partie du contrat consiste à créer des mécanismes qui permettent aux pays en développement de poursuivre des formes plus durables de développement (qui apportent emplois et revenus aux pauvres sans accroître massivement les émissions de gaz provoquant l'effet de serre. Il s'agit, entre autres, de faciliter les transferts de technologie pour les techniques non polluantes; d'alléger l'endettement; peut-être en trouvant des idées contre des mesures écologiques, ce qui débloquent des sommes considérables pour des programmes de reboisement visant à absorber une partie du carbone de l'atmosphère; et, finalement, de créer le type même de fonds que le gouvernement de M. Bush redoutait se voir demander en acceptant la création du fonds pour les CFC, à Londres.

Ce nouveau fonds devrait être assez important au regard des normes internationales habituelles (entre 20 et 40 milliards de dollars américains par an, selon des estimations néerlandaises), mais insignifiant comparé aux dépenses mondiales, d'armement. Il semble que l'on ait proposé, à Houson, un fonds initial de 2,5 milliards de dollars, mais que le chancelier allemand Kohl, son principal détracteur, n'ait pu vaincre les objections de son hôte américain.

Michael McFadine



tion dans l'atmosphère. Pour cela, il faudrait diminuer de moitié au moins la consommation actuelle des combustibles fossiles. Même si les pays industrialisés développés prenaient des mesures draconiennes pour réduire leurs émissions de gaz provoquant l'effet de serre, les projets de l'Inde et de la Chine, qui comptent multiplier le nombre de leurs centrales électriques alimentées au charbon, annuleraient ces gains. À elle seule, la Chine prévoit de construire 200 de ces centrales. Voilà qui donne une grande force aux pays en développement dans la formulation du contrat dit mondial ou, plus précisément, comme M. Jim MacNeill, d'une série de petits contrats conduisant à un contrat plus vaste. Or, comme le montrent les préparatifs de la Conférence des Nations-Unies sur l'environnement et le développement, le monde entend se servir de cet atout pour attirer l'attention sur les problèmes prioritaires que sont pour lui le commerce, la dette et le besoin d'une croissance économique, en échange de mesures pour lutter contre les changements climatiques.

Le CALENDRIER DE NÉGOCIATION DE CETTE SÉRIE d'accords est maintenant bien défini. Il revient au monde développé de faire les premiers pas et de prendre un ensemble de décisions unilatérales visant à réduire les émissions de gaz entrainant l'effet de serre. Certains pays ont déjà pris de tels engagements. La République fédérale d'Allemagne a récemment déclaré que, d'ici 2005, elle réduirait les émissions ouest-allemandes de CO<sub>2</sub> de 25 p. 100 par rapport aux quantités de 1987. Le Royaume-Uni a promis un gel de ses émissions dans les mêmes délais et les Japonais, d'ici la fin du siècle. Bien que la politique canadienne soit confuse sur ce point, M. de Cotter, le ministre de l'Environnement par intérim, a lui aussi promis un gel des quantités émises d'ici la fin du siècle. Tous ces pays ont conclu que non seulement ces politiques sont techniquement applicables, mais que, dans la plupart des cas, elles accroîtront la compétitivité internationale et feront réaliser de grosses économies dans les dépenses énergétiques. L'exception vient des États-Unis où le président Bush a déclaré dans une conférence de presse qui suivait le sommet de Houson que l'inter contre les émissions équivalait à supprimer quantité d'emplois. Aucun des autres dirigeants ne partageait son avis.

Il se peut fort que le dénouement de cette affaire survienne au Brésil, à la Conférence de 1992, au cours de laquelle les optimistes espèrent qu'une convention sera soumise à la signature des États. La portée de cette convention dépendra probablement des retombées du sommet de Houson, dont on saura alors s'il a déclenché le changement attendu de longue date dans les rapports de puissance économique. Le chancelier Kohl et, dans une moindre mesure, les autres dirigeants européens, semblent déterminés à aboutir dans un proche avenir à des progrès réels en matière de changement climatique. Il serait intéressant de voir ce qui arriverait si six participants au sommet, peut-être entrainés par le Canada en tant que plus proche voisin des États-Unis, décidaient de créer seuls le fonds initial de 2,5 milliards de dollars. Après tout, il ne s'agit pas d'une grosse somme si l'on songe que c'est peut-être l'avenir de la planète qui est en jeu. □

Dans un élan écologiste, Mme Margaret Thatcher décida donc d'organiser deux rencontres à Londres afin de renforcer le protocole de Montréal. À la première, qui s'est tenue au mois de février, l'an dernier, on a convenu de la nécessité d'accélérer le calendrier. Cette rencontre a été suivie d'une conférence à Helsinki, où l'on s'est rendu compte qu'il était indispensable de partager le fardeau, si l'on voulait que de grands pays en développement, comme l'Inde et la Chine, signent le document. Ces deux pays entendent répandre l'utilisation de réfrigérateurs, pour qu'au moins tous les villages puissent conserver convenablement des fournitures médicales. Pourquoil devaient-ils revoir leurs plans à cause d'un appauvrissement de l'ozone causé presque entièrement par les pays industrialisés? Pourquoi devaient-ils payer cinq ou six fois plus cher des produits de remplacement des CFC moins efficaces que ceux-ci?

Ils se le demandaient.

En juin de cette année, à la seconde rencontre londonienne, on est donc arrivé à une proposition portant sur la création d'un fonds destiné à aider le monde en développement à se passer des CFC. La Maison-Blanche a commencé par rejeter l'idée, par crainte de créer un précédent pour un fonds bien plus important destiné à lutter contre le réchauffement planétaire. Après les forces pressions exercées par les autres puissances industrialisées, les États-Unis ont accepté l'ouverture d'un fonds doté de 240 millions de dollars américains pour les trois premières années. Si la Chine et l'Inde signaient le protocole, comme elles le feront certainement, cette somme passerait à environ 320 millions de dollars.

Les TROIS PREMIÈRES ANNÉES, LE FONDS SERVIRA principalement à évaluer les besoins des pays en développement. Après cette période, il aidera à financer l'acquisition des techniques d'emploi (et peut-être de production) des produits de remplacement des CFC, les HCFC (halochlorofluorocarbones), dont l'utilisation semble moins dangereuse pour la couche d'ozone, bien qu'ils restent des gaz à effet de serre intenses. Certaines personnes ont critiqué cet arrangement en faisant valoir que les experts techniques qui ont participé aux discussions sont en grande majorité des spécialistes de la chimie et non de la réfrigération et qu'ils ont donc négligé la possibilité de recourir à d'autres produits réfrigérants potentiels comme le propane ou le butane, qui ne contribuent pas au réchauffement de la planète. Néanmoins, la rente de Londres constitue un immense pas en avant pour ce qui est de répondre aux besoins particuliers des pays en développement.

Le succès des négociations sur la couche d'ozone ouvre la porte à des progrès sur la question bien plus difficile du réchauffement planétaire. À la Conférence de Toronto, on a recommandé de réduire les émissions de CO<sub>2</sub> dans l'atmosphère de 20 p. 100 d'ici l'an 2005, pour arriver, on l'espère, à en stabiliser la proportion.



# SAUVONS L'ATMOSPHÈRE TERRESTRE

Rapport intégrative sur la stratégie complexe et les jeux d'influence politiques que cache l'effort international entrepris pour sauver l'atmosphère.

PAR DAVID RUNNALLS

LES POLLUANTS RÉSULTANT D'ACTIVITÉS HUMAINES, DE L'UTILISATION INEFFICACE ET EXCESSIVE DE COMBUSTIBLES FOSSILES ET DES EFFETS DE LA CROISSANCE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE RAPIDE SONT EN TRAIN DE TRANSFORMER L'ATMOSPHÈRE TERRESTRE À UNE VITESSE INOUIE. CES CHANGEMENTS FONT PESSER UNE LOURDE MENACE SUR LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE ET ILS ONT DÉJÀ DES RÉPÉRCUSSIONS NOCIVES DANS BEAUCOUP D'ENDROITS DE LA PLANÈTE.

ES PAROLES ALARMANTES. LE LECTEUR S'EN souvient peut-être, ont été prononcées dans la déclaration de la Conférence sur les changements atmosphériques, organisée à Toronto par le gouvernement canadien aussitôt après le sommet économique de 1988. Quelque 300 éminents scientifiques, hommes et femmes politiques réunis pour parler sérieusement des incidences de changements dans le climat terrestre ont décidé de «damner le pion» à *Grenpeace*. Mais le remarquable consensus qui s'est dessiné à la Conférence de Toronto n'est-il pas en train de s'effiloche? Il se passe à peine une journée sans qu'un nouveau groupe de chercheurs affirme que la planète ne s'est pas réchauffée, ou qu'une étude exotique des glaces antarctiques ou des données recueillies par télédétection remet en question les hypothèses de base. Les politiciens qui souhaitent ne rien faire, ou pas grand-chose, du moins pas tant que l'échecane des élections prévues en 1992 dans plusieurs pays occidentaux industrialisés ne sera pas passée, tirent partie de ces controverses.

Le vieux slogan américain qui veut qu'on ne bouge pas tant que la recherche n'en dit pas plus long sur le problème et qui a rendu si vaines les actions contre les pluies acides s'est de nouveau fait entendre, cette fois dans la bouche de M. John Sununu, chef de Cabinet de la Maison-Blanche. À l'une des réunions d'information qui accompagnaient le sommet économique de Houston, il a même repris une autre des blagues écoulées de la présidence Reagan, celle que, dans le service de presse de la Maison-Blanche, on appelle la théorie de «l'arbre tué», d'après la fameuse idée de Reagan selon laquelle ce sont les arbres qui polluent.

Mais lorsque le rideau retombe sur les débats scientifiques, une observation essentielle reste incontestée. Selon les propres termes du climatologue américain Stephen Schneider, qui témoigna au début de l'année devant huit commissions parlementaires réunies pour la toute première fois

en session mixte : «... alors qu'il demeure une incertitude légitime, qui persistera des dizaines d'années encore, quant aux lieux et aux moments où les changements se produiront, la grande majorité des spécialistes responsables pensent que la probabilité de changement est importante.» Cette opinion a été renforcée par le rapport récent du Groupe intergouvernemental sur le changement climatique (GICC). Le GICC représente un consensus de quelques-unes des sommités scientifiques mondiales, qui ont conclu que les gaz à effet dit de serre, si l'on n'y fait rien, entraîneront de là fin du siècle prochain une hausse moyenne de la température terrestre pouvant atteindre trois degrés Celsius et une montée du niveau des océans de soixante-quinze centimètres.

LES ENVIRONNEMENTALISTES NOUS ONT DEPUIS longtemps habitués à qualifier les problèmes de «planétaires», parfois avec une exactitude dont il est permis de douter. Mais le changement climatique est une question qui regarde vraiment le monde entier. Causé par nous tous et nous touchant tous, il présente deux aspects. D'abord, la mince couche d'ozone qui nous protège des rayons solaires ultra-violetes les plus dangereux est détruite par l'émission de chlorofluorocarbones (CFC), que l'on prenait jadis pour des produits chimiques inoffensifs utilisés pour la réfrigération, pour gonfler les mousses isolantes et comme solvants dans l'industrie électronique. Si l'on ne la maintient pas rapidement, cette dégradation de la couche d'ozone conduira à une forte augmentation du nombre des cancers de la peau (augmentation à laquelle on assiste déjà) et à une baisse des rendements agricoles, et elle aura des incidences sur le système immunitaire humain, ce qui est sans doute plus inquiétant.

Ensuite, l'émission de gaz carbonique (CO<sub>2</sub>) et d'autres gaz responsables de l'effet de serre risque de bouleverser le climat terrestre de manières que l'on ne peut prédire précisément. Néanmoins, à en croire les participants de la Conférence de Toronto : «Ces changements clima-

producteurs.

ON S'ACCORDE À DIRE QUE, DANS UNE PREMIÈRE étape, la lutte contre le changement climatique doit consister à éliminer la production et l'utilisation de CFC. Non seulement ils endommagent la couche d'ozone, mais ils comptent aussi parmi les plus puissants des gaz de l'effet de serre et, pour les pays industrialisés, ils représentent le tiers des émissions de ces gaz. On a déjà bien progressé dans ce domaine; c'est d'ailleurs le Canada qui a ouvert le débat sur cette question en 1987, en organisant la réunion qui a abouti au Protocole de Montréal. Cet accord demandait que l'on cesse de produire des CFC d'ici la fin du siècle. Avant même que l'encre en soit sèche, il apparaît déjà qu'il était insuffisant. Le trou dans

et cinquième rangs dans le peloton de tête des occupants respectivement les troisième, quatrième et cinquième rangs dans le peloton de tête des producteurs.

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un certain poids par le passé, c'était en raison de la conjoncture mondiale d'après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et non pas parce que la puissance du Canada avait fondamentalement changé. En d'autres termes, une fois ré-placé ordinairement, au centre du troisième rang. Seul un pays qui aurait presque eu le statut de grande puissance aurait eu une chance de faire aboutir une initiative unilatérale avait inévitablement été concoctée à la hâte. Un certain nombre de ses idées, en particulier celle de réunir les cinq puissances, étaient absolument irréalisables — «l'une des plus mauvaises idées jamais formulées à notre époque en matière de limitation des armements», avait déclaré un ambassadeur canadien de haut rang. Et rien n'avait été fait pour faire approuver l'initiative grâce à de patientes discussions diplomatiques en coulisses. Or, sans de pareils efforts, il était presque impossible que l'initiative réussisse. Par conséquent, Trudeau semblait parfois s'illuminer le monde, essayant désespérément de se faire recevoir par les dirigeants des pays qu'il visitait. S'il arrivait à obtenir une audience, on l'écoutait assez poliment, mais son message, dont un fonctionnaire canadien s'était moqué en disant que Trudeau recommandait aux dirigeants de «aimer les uns les autres», n'éveillait absolument aucun intérêt dans le regard de ses interlocuteurs. Tout compte fait, avait conclu ce responsable, l'initiative avait eu pour effet d'amoindrir Trudeau — et son pays — aux yeux du monde.

POURANT, TRUDEAU AVAIT EU RAISON D'ESSAYER, ET PAS SEULEMENT PARCE que le public canadien avait unanimement souscrit à ses efforts (sans pour autant se faire trop d'illusions quant aux résultats possibles). Le monde traversait une période de crise, et les relations américano-soviétiques étaient si mal en point qu'on allait même jusqu'à envisager l'éventualité d'une guerre. Il fallait que quelqu'un parle, et c'est Trudeau qui s'est lancé. Que ce soit ou non grâce aux efforts du premier ministre, l'escalade de la tension à quelque peu ralenti. Des chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement comme Kohl, en Allemagne de l'Ouest, et Craxi, en Italie, ont commencé à faire pression sur leurs alliés pour qu'ils se mettent à la recherche d'un compromis. En Grande-Bretagne, Mme Thatcher a assoupli sa position, et Reagan a cessé de dépendre l'URSS comme l'«empire du mal», pour amorcer un dialogue avec elle. Trudeau avait pris les risques, et il méritait une partie des honneurs. Toutefois, il y avait vraiment quelque chose de paradoxal dans cette situation, surtout pour ceux qui cherchent la cohérence dans les actions et le raisonnement de leurs dirigeants. À l'autonomie de sa carrière, Trudeau avait, de toute évidence, repris la lutte contre les positions très arrêtées de la Guerre froide; c'était une croisade qu'il avait pourtant abandonnée quelques années auparavant, après avoir réduit le contingent canadien à l'OTAN, en 1969. De plus, il s'était transformé en commode médiateur. Le premier ministre qui, en 1968, avait critiqué le style et le rôle de Lester Pearson, se retrouvait, en 1983-1984, en train d'essayer de révéler l'habit «pearsonien» — et probablement avec son serai certainement rendu compte que des négociations préalables soigneusement orchestrées étaient essentielles à toute initiative de paix. Mike Pearson avait certes son orgueil et son désir de briller sur la scène mondiale, mais il connaissait également ses points forts, ses faiblesses et les limites des efforts diplomatiques d'une puissance moyenne. En seize ans de règne, Trudeau n'avait toujours pas compris les contraintes qu'imposait à son pays le fait de vivre de façon précaire dans un monde dominé par les superpuissances. □

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Contrairement aux apparences, l'initiative n'était pas tout à fait terminée. Dix jours à peine après l'allocation de Trudeau devant le parlement, le ministre canadien a pris le premier avion pour Moscou; il comptait assister aux dirigeant soviétique Andropov à finalement rendu l'âme, et le premier ministre canadien a pris le premier avion pour Moscou; il comptait assister aux nouveaux Secrétaire général du Parti, dont la santé n'était pas meilleure que obsèques et, avec un peu de chance, rencontrer Constantin Tchernenko, le Canada n'avait obtenu ses trente-cinq minutes d'entretien, dont il a profité pour dire à Tchernenko qu'il y avait maintenant un compromis possible entre l'Est et l'Ouest. L'austère Gromyko, qui assistait à l'entrevue, répondit d'un ton morne que les pays occidentaux devraient faire des propositions s'ils voulaient que les relations pussent s'améliorer. Même si le premier ministre a déclaré, en sortant de la salle de réunion, que l'initiative venait de recevoir une autre impulsion politique, le doute était permis. Tchernenko, très malade, ne pouvait faire, en direction de la détenté, que des pas tout timides. Et Robert Ford, ambassadeur depuis longtemps à Moscou, au journal le *Globe and Mail* que «l'initiative de paix de Trudeau était une absurdité complète» et «que les Soviétiques en avaient fait des gorges chaudes». Trudeau n'avait aucune influence politique à Washington, et «non plus qu'à Moscou... il n'avait aucun crédit dans l'une ni dans l'autre ville».

ALORS QU'IL VIVAIT SES DERNIERS JOURS AU POUVOIR, LE PREMIER MINISTRE A fait une dernière tentative auprès de ses alliés à la réunion au sommet à Londres; il a alors participé à la rédaction d'un communiqué exigeant «la sécurité et le niveau de forces le plus bas possible». Trudeau a eu, à cette occasion, une bruyante altercation avec le président Reagan, à qui il a déclaré qu'il «devait en faire plus» pour promouvoir la détente. Contrairement à ses habitudes, l'imperturbable (ou comateux) chef d'Etat a répondu en frappant la table du ping et en criant : «Bon Dieu, Pierre, qu'est-ce que je pourrais bien faire pour les ramener à la table de négociations ?» La source de cette anecdote ? «Une session d'information très détaillée organisée par les Etats-Unis», a souligné d'un ton acerbe Patrick Grossage. Finalement, Ford avait peut-être raison : toute cette croisade manquée de Trudeau n'était qu'un «bain de jouie mondial» comme ont indiqué certains d'un ton railleur. Trudeau était au pouvoir depuis seize ans et il avait participé aux travaux de l'OTAN et du Commonwealth ainsi qu'à des réunions au sommet, mais il ne semblait toujours pas comprendre les rouages des relations entre les grandes puissances. Sûr de ses capacités intellectuelles et en aucun cas à l'abri de la vanité, Trudeau continuait naïvement de croire au pouvoir des mots et des idées, de croire que la raison pouvait convaincre les grandes puissances de renoncer à rechercher frénétiquement leur seul intérêt, et de croire enfin à sa propre étiole. Trudeau était un original, convaincu qu'il pouvait persuader les autres dirigeants de se joindre à lui dans le combat personnel qu'il menait contre la menace nucléaire. Mais malgré tout son génie, Trudeau n'a pas réussi à comprendre pourquoi les Soviétiques et les Américains rechignaient à prendre le moindre risque pour la paix. Pas plus qu'il n'a réussi à com-

prendre pourquoi les deux Grands hésitent à laisser des Etats plus petits venir leur mettre des bâtons dans les roues. De plus, en tant que tenant de l'équidistance et soucieux qu'il était de ne pas compléter sur les plates-bandes des superpuissances, Trudeau souffrait d'un mal que ses détracteurs assimilaient à un appareil refusé ou à une incapacité de faire la moindre distinction entre les superpuissances. La Russie d'Andropov était infiniment plus menaçante que les Etats-Unis, même sous Reagan, mais Trudeau semblait souvent incapable de le reconnaître.

AUTRE FACTEUR TOUT AUSSI IMPORTANT, le Canada n'avait tout simplement pas le rang ni les moyens de mener à bien une initiative aussi ambitieuse. Le Canada était un petit pays, et ce, malgré l'option un peu surestimée qu'avait de lui-même un peu d'influence. Si la politique extérieure du Canada avait effectivement





que le Pakistan exigerait un accès direct à la Chine. Le Front exige que le nouveau État envisagé comprenne non seulement les régions du Cachemire sous contrôle indien mais aussi les régions suivantes : l'*Azad Kasmir* (ou Cachemire libre), le Gilgit, l'Hunza et le Baltistan, que le Pakistan occupe, ainsi que les poches territoriales que ce dernier a cédées à la Chine. La moitié de la capacité de production hydroélectrique du Pakistan et les sources du Chenab, l'un de ses principaux fleuves, se trouveraient à l'intérieur de la nouvelle entité. De plus, outre les objections stratégiques et économiques pakistanaises, la création d'un Cachemire indépendant à majorité musulmane invaliderait la raison d'être même du Pakistan «partie des musulmans du sous-continent», que la sécession du Bangladesh, avec l'appui de l'Inde, avait déjà sapée.

Bien que le Pakistan affirme que toute l'aide au Cachemire provient de sources privées et non gouvernementales, le Front a dévoilé ses liens avec Islamabad dans une attaque en détail, menée le 26 avril, dans laquelle il a révélé que l'insurrection était dirigée depuis l'*Azad Kasmir* par le «général Imtiaz», chef de la «cellule n° 202» des services secrets pakistanais. Réaffirmant que son objectif était «l'indépendance du Grand Cachemire», le Front a déclaré que «quiconque se laisserait manipuler par les services secrets pakistanais pour servir ses propres visées étroites, à savoir, devenir maître du territoire kasmirien entier, serait considéré comme un traître par le peuple kasmirien».

Les services secrets pakistanais, dirigés par des officiers fondamentalistes nommés sous le régime de feu le président Zia Ul-Haq, sont en partie responsables de ce que le Front de libération croit à tort que le *Hezbe Islami* dominerait un mouvement rebelle unifié et qu'il le forcerait à mettre en sommeil sa demande d'indépendance. Le Cachemire, dans ce cas, serait submergé par la vague fondamentaliste qui se répand déjà dans le Moyen-Orient et, non loin de là, en Asie centrale soviétique.

Encore amers d'avoir perdu le Bangladesh, beaucoup de dirigeants pakistanais ont vu avec le Cachemire une occasion peu risquée de rendre à leur puissant voisin la monnaie de sa pièce. L'acquisition de l'option nucléaire et le flot continu d'armes américaines ont suscité une confiance envahissante. Lors de passages à Islamabad en juillet 1988 et en octobre 1989, on m'a assuré à maintes occasions que l'Inde ne lancerait pas une contre-attaque générale en réponse à la subversion au Cachemire, comme elle l'avait fait en 1965, parce que la dissuasion nucléaire rendrait cette réaction trop dangereuse.

À la surprise et à la consternation des services secrets, le Front de libération dépasse maintenant le *Hezbe Islami*. Le fondamentalisme islamique, d'implantation récente au Cachemire, compte des adhérents tout dévoués à leur cause, mais en nombre limité. Le Front en appelle bien plus largement à la population du Cachemire, une région montagneuse où l'on parle une langue distincte et où le sentiment d'une identité propre est fort. Bien avant leur lutte actuelle contre l'absorption par l'Inde à majorité hindoue, les musulmans de la vallée du Cachemire ont résisté à l'intégration par des dirigeants musulmans, notamment par l'empereur moghol Akbar, en 1586, et par l'Afghan Ahmad Shah, deux siècles plus tard.

En 1950, l'Inde a accordé à son secteur du Cachemire une autonomie symbolique en vertu d'une disposition constitutionnelle spéciale, qu'elle s'est cependant empressée d'invalider dans la pratique. Les dirigeants kasmis qui ont essayé de faire valoir cette autonomie ont été soit emprisonnés, soit remplacés par des opportunistes locaux corrompus prêts à se soumettre à la loi de New Delhi. Pour comble, l'Inde a peu investi pour le développement économique de la région.

Les rapports entre New Delhi et le Cachemire sont compliqués par le fait que ce dernier est une agglomération artificielle héritée de la période britannique. La vallée à majorité musulmane se trouve réunie avec le Jammu à une majorité hindoue et le Ladakh bouddhiste, deux régions aux minorités



Inde, ont fait obstruction aux demandes d'autonomie. L'une des possibilités qui s'offrent à l'Inde pour se sortir de l'impasse actuelle serait de scinder l'État, d'intégrer le Jammu et le Ladakh à l'Union indienne tout en conférant à une vallée du Cachemire autonome un statut confédéral particulier dans la défense et la politique étrangère indiennes. Cette stratégie, accompagnée de développements économiques importants, pourrait bien attirer des éléments importants du Front de libération qui reconnaissent avoir peu de chance d'accéder à l'indépendance face à la résistance combinée de l'Inde et du Pakistan. Pour l'heure, cependant, le premier ministre Singh, sous la pression des «durs» de la coalition hindoue, ne semble pas s'orienter dans cette direction. La politique indienne consiste à écraser l'insurrection par les armes avant de rechercher une solution politique.

L'Inde, comme le Pakistan, estime qu'il est essentiel pour elle, du point de vue militaire, de contrôler sa partie du Cachemire, région stratégique, et elle craint que l'autonomie de cette dernière crée un précédent dans le pays. La controverse indienne sur ce qui est de savoir quoi faire du Cachemire s'inscrit dans un débat en cours dont le sujet est : le système fédéral indien entier, avec ses frontières provinciales définies par les langues, devrait-il être plus décentralisé ?

CE DÉBAT EST DIRECTEMENT LIÉ AU DÉLICAT PROBLÈME DES RAPPORTS ENTRE HINDOUS ET MUSULMANS EN INDE. Contrairement à ce que l'on croit généralement en Occident, la partition du sous-continent en 1947 n'a pas abouti à une répartition nette dans laquelle le Pakistan aurait hérité de tous les musulmans et l'Inde, de tous les Indiens. L'Inde compte 90 millions de musulmans, soit presque autant que le Pakistan. Officiellement, s'attaque au principe de la laïcité. Les partisans de la laïcité redoutent, quant à eux, qu'une vallée du Cachemire autonome, à majorité musulmane, finirait par demander son indépendance ou son rattachement au Pakistan, ce qui exposerait les musulmans des autres parties de l'Inde à des attaques continues et à des accusations de trahison. Déjà important en lui-même, le Cachemire est devenu le foyer d'une lutte plus vaste et sans solution entre la majorité hindoue et la minorité musulmane dans l'Asie du Sud. L'origine de cette lutte remonte à plus de sept siècles. Des armées musulmanes étrangères ont conquis des royaumes hindous qui ne cessaient de se quereller entre eux et, au fil du temps, elles ont instauré une série de dynasties solides dont l'empire moghol a marqué l'apogée. L'accession à l'indépendance par rapport à la Grande-Bretagne a offert à la droite hindoue une chance de dominer enfin le sous-continent. La partition a été trahie, et les dirigeants indiens lui ont donné leur aval en pensant que le Pakistan deviendrait un associé minoritaire de l'Inde, d'une sphère d'influence indienne. Ils n'avaient pas négocié la Guerre froide ni la puissance gonflée que ce pays acquerrait en trois décennies d'aide militaire américaine. Surtout, ils n'avaient pas prévu que le Pakistan posséderait l'arme nucléaire. La droite hindoue prenant une puissance croissante en Inde, il est probable que les pressions s'intensifieront pour qu'une claire opérationnelle par des vecteurs ultra-modernes. La montée du nationalisme hindou est, quant à elle, accélérée par l'assurance grandissante des dirigeants fondamentalistes musulmans au Pakistan et de leurs alliés militaires, après la chute du gouvernement de Mme Benazir Bhutto en août.

Dans un avenir prévisible, la perspective d'une guerre nucléaire est faible, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que le processus d'instabilité et de détérioration politiques sans précédent qui se développe de part et d'autre de la frontière ne rend que trop crédibles les scénarios d'Armageddon nucléaire. □



# ÉPREUVE DE FORCE AU CACHEMIRE

Une quatrième guerre indo-pakistanaise éclaterait probablement à cause du Cachemire, territoire disputé de longue date, et les belligérants feraient usage d'armes nucléaires.

PAR SELIG S. HARRISON

Le 15 mai 1990, alors que le risque d'une guerre nucléaire dans le Sud asiatique suscitait une inquiétude croissante, le président Bush décidait soudain d'envoyer une mission de haut niveau en Inde et au Pakistan. Elle avait sa tête le vice-conseiller à la sécurité nationale, M. Robert Gates, principal spécialiste des affaires soviétiques à la Maison-Blanche, à qui M. Bush avait donné l'ordre d'abandonner les préparatifs de la prochaine rencontre au sommet entre les chefs d'Etat soviétique et américain. La raison de ce départ précipité de la mission Gates à un moment aussi inopportun pour Washington, ce sont des photos prises par satellite par la *National Security Agency* qui donnaient à penser que le Pakistan, alerté par des mouvements des troupes indiennes jugés menaçants, pouvait être en train de préparer une attaque préventive. Certains clichés montraient une circulation inhabituelle entre le centre de recherche nucléaire pakistanaise de Kahuta et des terrains d'aviation où des F-16 de fabrication américaine à capacité nucléaire sont basés. Quatre mois après la mission Gates, le danger d'une quatrième guerre entre l'Inde et le Pakistan est toujours sérieux. Mais la possibilité d'une explosion immédiate a apparemment reculé, en partie grâce à l'intervention opportune de Robert Gates à Islamabad, puis de diplomates soviétiques à New Delhi.

La raison de ce départ précipité de la mission Gates à un moment aussi inopportun pour Washington, ce sont des photos prises par satellite par la *National Security Agency* qui donnaient à penser que le Pakistan, alerté par des mouvements des troupes indiennes jugés menaçants, pouvait être en train de préparer une attaque préventive. Certains clichés montraient une circulation inhabituelle entre le centre de recherche nucléaire pakistanaise de Kahuta et des terrains d'aviation où des F-16 de fabrication américaine à capacité nucléaire sont basés. Quatre mois après la mission Gates, le danger d'une quatrième guerre entre l'Inde et le Pakistan est toujours sérieux. Mais la possibilité d'une explosion immédiate a apparemment reculé, en partie grâce à l'intervention opportune de Robert Gates à Islamabad, puis de diplomates soviétiques à New Delhi.

L'influence américaine est beaucoup plus grande au Pakistan qu'en Inde parce qu'il y a longtemps que les Etats-Unis sont le premier fournisseur d'armes d'Islamabad. Dans les années 1950, aux fins de décourager une agression soviétique et chinoise, Washington a donné au régime d'Ayub Khan pour 1,2 milliard de dollars de matériel militaire. Quand ce arsenal a été utilisé contre l'Inde dans le conflit de 1965, les Américains ont cessé leur ravitaillement. Mais, en 1981, une nouvelle aide militaire chiffrée à 1,5 milliard duquel les Etats-Unis ont fait transiter pour notamment plus que 2 milliards de dollars de matériel destiné à la résistance afghane contre 1980 et 1989. Puis, en 1986, Washington a rajouté 1,4 milliard de dollars et, depuis le retrait soviétique de l'Afghanistan, continue de fournir des armes au Pakistan. Selon des officiels américains et pakistanaï, M. Gates a signifié aux Pakistanaï que les Etats-Unis mettraient fin à leur aide et ne hiverneraient plus de pièces de rechange ni de munitions en cas de guerre, comme ils l'avaient fait en 1965. Plus important, il les a prévenus que Washington pourrait suspendre l'aide ou y mettre fin, sauf en cas de conflit, à moins que les services secrets d'Islamabad cessent d'aider les insurgés musulmans dans la vallée du Cachemire que l'Inde contrôle.

C'est le Pakistan qui a préicipité la crise actuelle en approvisionnant les rebelles kasmitis en capitaux, en assurant leur entraînement et en leur livrant de plus en plus d'armes, ce qui a enflammé le patriotisme des Hindous, qui exigent que leur pays réponde par une action militaire totale. C'est en faisant la sourde oreille aux griefs légitimes des Kasmitis pendant les quarante dernières années que les Indiens ont, à n'en pas douter, favorisé la montée de l'insurrection. Mais New Delhi pouvait encore apaiser le jeu, jusqu'au moment où les services pakistanaï se sont mis, en 1988, à fournir des fusils *Kalashnikov*, des lances-roquettes, des mortiers et d'autres armes puisées dans les stocks de l'aide américaine aux Afghans. Pour donner du poids à son avertissement, M. Gates a précisé que la législation américaine donnait déjà à son gouvernement plusieurs moyens de couper l'aide. Le Congrès a mis une condition à l'aide militaire, à savoir que le président certifie chaque année que le Pakistan ne «possède» pas

d'arme nucléaire. En dépit de preuves grandissantes à l'effet contraire, la Maison-Blanche a jusqu'ici fermé les yeux et donné tous les ans son feu vert au renouvellement de l'aide. M. Gates a prévenu les responsables militaires pakistanaï qu'il devenait de plus en plus difficile au président américain de certifier que leur pays ne possédait pas d'arme nucléaire et qu'il suffisait, en outre, d'invoquer les lois anti-terroristes pour justifier la suspension ou la suppression de l'aide militaire.

Il est évident maintenant que le soutien pakistanaï aux rebelles kasmitis a nettement diminué depuis la visite de M. Gates. L'Inde, pour sa part, a modéré son discours et retiré une partie de ses troupes de la zone frontalière suite aux pressions exercées par les Soviétiques et par les Américains. Bien que New Delhi ait développé un complexe militaro-industriel important au cours des dernières années, elle dépend encore beaucoup de Moscou pour les pièces détachées de son matériel militaire soviétique, notamment de ses astronautes *MiG*.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétiques, M. Chevardnadze, a mis en garde le Secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Baker, lors de leur rencontre de Bonn, au mois de juin. Selon lui, toute entente manichéiste de leurs deux pays quant à l'arrêt des livraisons d'armes ne ferait qu'exacerber les passions nationalistes en Inde comme au Pakistan. Cependant, a-t-il ajouté, sans menacer directement de cesser ses livraisons, Moscou avait vertement sermonné New Delhi et l'Inde avait bien conscience que l'Union soviétique pouvait trouver des excuses pour ralentir les envois d'armes essentielles en cas de conflit.

OUTRE LES PRESSIONS AMÉRICAINES, DEUX FACTEURS ONT CONTRIBUÉ À TEM-pérer le soutien pakistanaï au mouvement insurrectionnel kasmiti. D'une part, New Delhi a recommencé à aider secrètement les séparatistes de la province côtière méridionale pakistanaise clé, le Sind, pour prouver au Pakistan qu'à bon chat bon rat. L'Inde avait suspendu son aide aux groupes sinitis il y a deux ans en espérant qu'Islamabad cesserait d'attiser les mouvements rebelles du Pendjab et du Cachemire. Mais, lorsque les Pakistanaï ont accueilli leur aide aux Kasmitis l'an dernier, les Indiens ont ravivé leurs opérations dans le Sind, tout en faisant savoir qu'ils étaient disposés à se retirer si Islamabad ne faisait autant dans le Cachemire.

D'autre part, facteur plus important grâce auquel on empêchera peut-être une intensification des combats dans le Cachemire, il y a eu rupture entre les services secrets pakistanaï et le principal groupe rebelle, le Front de libération, qui prône l'indépendance du Cachemire. Jusqu'à récemment, les factions fondamentalistes musulmanes favorables au rattachement du Cachemire au Pakistan. Mais un conflit qui couvait entre le Front et ses mentors pakistanaï a maintenant éclaté au grand jour.

Islamabad, qui s'est toujours opposé à l'idée d'un Cachemire indépendant, continue d'insister pour que les Nations-Unies organisent un plébiscite qui permettrait à tous les Kasmitis de se prononcer pour le rattachement à l'Inde ou au Pakistan. Depuis qu'une ligne de cessez-le-feu a été tracée après la première guerre indo-pakistanaise, en 1948, l'Etat est divisé en secteurs placés sous administration indienne ou pakistanaise.

Le premier ministre pakistanaï, Mme Benazir Bhutto, a déclaré en mai que l'indépendance risquait de déclencher une «balkanisation» du sous-continent en encourageant d'autres minorités de ce pays à demander elles aussi leur autonomie ou leur indépendance. Cette position cache une préoccupation stratégique. En effet, un Cachemire indépendant naîtrait-il

*La présente article est tiré du discours.  
Au cours de la dernière visite qu'il effectuait dans la capitale d'un pays du Commonwealth en qualité de Secrétaire général de cet organisme, Shridath Ramphal a prononcé un discours à l'Institut pour la paix et la sécurité, à Ottawa, le 5 juin.*

Nous savons reconnaître qu'une société nationale ne peut pas être en paix si le pouvoir, les privilèges et la prospérité ne sont l'appanage que de quelques-uns. Comment pouvons-nous croire que notre société mondiale puisse vivre en paix alors qu'elle souffre de pareilles disparités ? Il y a aujourd'hui beaucoup plus de gens souffrant d'insécurité économique que militaire : ceux qui meurent avant l'heure et ceux dont l'existence est marquée par les mêmes privations et mutilations que celles allant de pair avec les conflits militaires. En cinq ans, les ravages de la pauvreté et du sous-développement ont fait au moins 35 millions de victimes, sans compter les innombrables vies écourtées et insatisfaisantes. Pour les pauvres, c'est toujours la guerre.


Le relâchement des tensions Est-Ouest nous fournit certainement une occasion de profiter de nos interdépendances pour apporter des changements humains, un espoir d'avancer en renforçant les mécanismes collectifs et en découvrant de nouvelles façons de résoudre les problèmes dans la coopération, et non dans l'affrontement; un monde plus démocratique régi par une administration mondiale plus éclairée.

Mais il y a autre chose : nous tardons certainement trop à reconnaître le rôle du Canada et de toutes les sociétés pluralistes. Bien sûr, le Canada est un pays grand et riche, mais il n'est pas le seul à avoir un visage humain. Dans un certain nombre de pays, ce changement est caractérisé en partie par un engagement pour l'économie de marché, pour la méthode occidentale de faire aboutir les choses, par opposition au modèle collectiviste. Il n'y a rien de surprenant pour ceux et celles d'entre nous qui viennent du tiers-monde; car avant l'Europe de l'Est et l'Union soviétique, beaucoup de pays du tiers-monde avaient déjà eu un avant-goût de la marche à la fin de la guerre. Mais ils avaient dû apprendre à leurs dépens que la loi du marché n'est pas magique et qu'elle peut, en effet, se révéler impitoyable. Il faut espérer que les nouveaux dirigeants en Europe centrale et en Europe de l'Est vont comprendre que le capitalisme, comme le socialisme, doit avoir un visage humain.

Le fait que, de nos jours, il y a encore des droits du monde où le vote de liberté n'est pas comparable, et ce en dépit de nos autres réalisations, constitue une véritable mise en accusation de l'humanité tout entière. Cette situation s'explique encore trop souvent par notre capacité quasi incroyable de priver d'autres êtres humains de libertés que nous apprécions le plus nous-mêmes, et de leur infliger les plus horribles injustices quand ils les réclament en disant y avoir droit. Et on distingue, parfois de façon implicite, une violation de certains mouvements de libération, au milieu de certains mouvements de libération, on semble mettre l'accent sur le fait ethnique, sur des nationalismes étroits, sur les tribalismes d'un genre ou d'un autre, voire sur un engouement pour le fondamentalisme. Cette violation de liberté pourrait présager la désintégration des sociétés selon des modalités que nous n'avons pas encore commencé à envisager.

Hier soir, soucieux de respecter l'obligation faite aux gens de l'extérieur de ne pas intervenir, mais aussi désireux de remplir (du moins, je l'espère) le devoir incommodant aux amis et à la famille, qui ne doivent pas se taire quand le danger menace, je me suis risqué à exprimer quelques réflexions sur certains problèmes actuels du Canada. J'ai rappelé à la Royal Commonwealth Society à quel point le Commonwealth apprécie le Canada, pour la puissance et le respect qu'il lui a apportés, à quel point le Canada, de par sa simple existence, a fait du monde un endroit meilleur. J'ai dit que l'unité du Canada, son éthique multiculturelle, son intégrité nationale (territoriale et autre), ne sont pas simplement des atouts nationaux, mais aussi des cartes internationales; que le Canada est lui-même une «société distincte» qu'il est impossible de préserver; que le Commonwealth et le monde dans son ensemble en pâtiront si les choses tournent mal ici, que l'enjeu à des répercussions pour nous tous.

Aujourd'hui, je tiens à ajouter ceci : quels que soient les arguments avancés, pour ou contre, il y a sûrement moyen de satisfaire toutes les demandes dans le contexte d'un Canada uni et unique. Il n'existe aucun principe d'autodétermination qui même inexorablement au démentement national; à l'époque de la décolonisation, le problème était tout autre. À ce moment-là, les peuples voulaient l'autodétermination pour se libérer d'une domination extérieure. Or, cette notion n'a aucune application dans les pays établis. L'autonomie, la décentralisation, le fédéralisme, le pluralisme sous toutes ses facettes, des formes d'expression économique, sociale, culturelle politique qu'il nous reste à formuler, voilà autant de visages que peut prendre l'autodétermination au sein des nations. Ces expressions n'ont pas pour résultat de violer les frontières; elles ne portent pas atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale d'une nation. Le droit à l'autodétermination de tous les Canadiens — comme celui de tous les Guyanais, de tous les Indiens, de tous les Russes, de tous les citoyens de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée, de tous les Yougoslaves et de tous les Sud-Africains — ne donne pas le droit de cesser d'être Canadien ou de faire disparaître le Canada. La doctrine n'a rien de nouveau. Vous vous y conformez depuis des années déjà; elle a renforcé et



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la démocratie constitue un droit universel, et ils ont lancé un appel à une solidarité humaine d'envergure planétaire.



# VIVRE EN BON VOISINAGE

*Au moment où l'Est et l'Ouest se tendent la main, les pays riches du Nord et les États pauvres du Sud sont toujours enlisés dans leur propre Guerre froide.*

PAR SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL

IL EST CURIEUX DE CONSTATER QUE L'UNE DES MEILLEURES DESCRIPTIONS que l'on puisse faire de notre monde à l'aube du troisième millénaire est celle de Langland, un poète de l'époque médiévale, qui a peint le monde tel qu'il l'a connu il y a de cela six siècles, c'est-à-dire comme un «champ plein de gens». Nous avons à présent que le champ en question est beaucoup plus vaste qu'on ne le pensait à l'époque et qu'il contient plusieurs milliards d'habitants de plus que Langland ne l'a jamais imaginé. Et pourtant, la description du poète tient toujours; en fait, elle est plus proche de nos perceptions actuelles qu'elle l'a été pendant de nombreuses époques.

Ce «champ de gens» représente notre voisinage humain, notre village mondial. Il est vrai que nous continuons d'agir d'avantage en fonction de notre attrait pour le matérialisme que des exigences de l'humanité. Aujourd'hui, des considérations à la fois éthiques et pratiques nous obligent à rejeter l'individualisme et à reconnaître que l'humanité forme un tout indivisible. Et tout cela alors que nous sommes précipités vers le XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, en épouvanté en même temps de la confusion, de l'excitation, de grands espoirs et un vague sentiment de panique.

Mais les augures nous sont favorables: la situation est en tout cas meilleure que ce qu'elle a déjà été, ne serait-ce que par rapport à il y a cinq ans. L'année 1985 a été dure. L'Union soviétique était embourbée en Afghanistan. La guerre du Golfe faisait rage. La Namibie était occupée, et ses régions frontalières ressemblaient encore à des champs de bataille. Dans l'Afrique du Sud de l'*apartheid*, une répression impitoyable sévissait, et l'on ne parlait pas encore de réforme. L'Europe de l'Est étouffait dans son carcan. Vclav Havel était dissident, pas président. Et de sérieux doutes planaient sur tout l'avenir de la coopération internationale. On n'avait aucune raison valable de supposer qu'il existait une éthique du multilatéralisme; les décisions des superpuissances n'étaient certainement pas issues d'une morale de l'internationalisme.

Mais heureusement, cette morale a survécu parmi les gens, et surtout parmi les jeunes, qui ont compris la communauté mondiale qu'ils se partagent. Partout dans le monde, les gens qui avaient le droit de manifester leur désapprobation (et aussi ceux à qui l'on refusait ce droit) ont fait comprendre qu'ils avaient l'impression d'être menés à la catastrophe. Nous avons été tirés de notre passivité, tant par des manifestations de masse que par l'héroïsme de voix solitaires, comme celle d'Andrei Sakharov et de Nelson Mandela.

LES CONDITIONS SONT DEVENUES PLUS PROPICES AU MULTILATÉRALISME ET À l'internationalisme depuis que les relations entre les superpuissances se sont améliorées. Mais les valeurs humaines concernent les gens et leur vie quotidienne. Notre voisinage mondial — comme n'importe quel autre voisinage — concerne la vie dans la rue, et non dans un appartement de luxe.

Si nous voulons nous pencher sur l'état du monde, il nous faut d'abord savoir de quel monde exactement nous parlons. S'agit-il, par exemple, du quart du monde qui est développé et matériellement prospère, ou des trois autres quarts qui ne vivent qu'en marge de la prospérité et du progrès? Mais se pose, à travers quels faut-il voir ce monde? Ceux des stratégies de l'Ouest, ou de l'Est? Ceux des courtois de New York ou de Tokyo? Ceux des agriculteurs des champs de riz du Bengladesh? Le point de vue que l'on adopte a une profonde influence sur les jugements que l'on peut porter sur les valeurs, en particulier sur les valeurs de bon voisinage.

À mon avis, le monde dans lequel nous vivons forme un tout, indégé et disparait, mais néanmoins complet. Notre société humaine étroitement unie et interdépendante constitue une réalité contemporaine, et ce, malgré la vigueur avec laquelle les instincts d'hier nous appellent aux anciens nationalismes et font renaitre les habitudes hostiles de la souveraineté pure et dure. À quoi correspond l'interdépendance dans le contexte mondial? Elle signifie que nous avons tous besoin les uns des autres. Riche ou pauvre, de l'Ouest ou de l'Est, nul ne peut se permettre de sous-estimer de faire cavalier seul. En réalité, il n'y a plus, dans notre monde de plus en plus petit, de sanctuaires humains. Or que ce soit dans le monde, il n'y plus d'endroit où l'on puisse aller se réfugier pour se mettre à l'abri que ce soit de la maladie, de la pauvreté, de l'holocauste nucléaire ou d'une catastrophe écologique. Nous constatons de plus en plus que le concept de juridiction n'a de sens que pour les avocats.

Dans les pays du Commonwealth comme le Canada, doté du précieux héritage qu'est la *common law*, il est reconnu dans la loi que nous avons tous le devoir de veiller au bien-être de notre voisin ou de notre voisin, d'agir de manière raisonnable de manière à lui éviter tout préjudice. Aujourd'hui, ce devoir de bienveillance nous impose de nouveaux impératifs: nous devons désormais le devoir de veiller sur tous les habitants du monde, devenus nos voisins, eux aussi. Dans le contexte d'un internationalisme nouveau, plus éclairé, nous devons de prendre en compte ces réalités dans nos idéologies; nous devons élaborer de nouvelles notions de ce que signifie «droits» et «devoirs», des notions qui soient adaptées à notre temps, au même titre que tous ceux qui ont été formulés par le passé. Il faut que les nations s'astreignent à la loi du droit exécutoire si nous voulons, en tant que société humaine, pouvoir vivre en conformité avec les valeurs de bon voisinage mondial.

Mais qui énonce ses besoins suppose qu'il reconnaît ses lacunes. Malgré la longue liste de réalisations que l'humanité peut porter à son actif, le monde où nous évoluons reste une énigme dangereuse: il est avancé à certains égards, et primitif à d'autres; il est caractérisé par un mélange de génie et de perversité qui pourrait encore le mener à l'auto-destruction. La société humaine a toujours été faite d'éléments de variété et d'identité, et ce depuis la nuit des temps. Mais aujourd'hui, ces éléments s'opposent avec une vertu grand combat d'idées qui va remplacer l'affrontement idéologique qui nous a dominés pendant une si grande partie du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Permettez-moi d'essayer d'illustrer un peu les préoccupations qui nous attendent au cours des années à venir, en examinant quelques instants la «démocratie» et la «liberté».

Nombreux sont ceux et celles qui vont dire que l'aspect le plus saisissant et le plus fascinant de notre monde en évolution constitue la marche forcée vers la démocratie, la revendication de liberté; et c'est bien vrai. En Chine, en 1989, grâce au miracle de la révolution des communications qui a contribué à faire du monde un voisinage humain plus intime, les jeunes de la Place Tian anmen qui revendiquaient la liberté ont lancé un appel à chacun et à chacune d'entre nous, en des termes qui auraient pu être ceux de nos propres fils et filles qui se seraient opposés à ce que l'on refuse la liberté à leur génération en vertu de principes issus d'une ère révolue. Ils affirmaient

# NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

## « MYTHES » ET RÉALITÉS DU CANADA DANS LE MONDE APRÈS MEECH

« ILS AIENT OU NON été partisans de l'ordonnance du lac Meech, tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes réfléchissent à quelques changements fondamentaux dans le statut quo de leur pays. Au niveau international aussi, le « pactirique royanne » a suscité une attention et une inquiétude inhabituelles, et tout d'abord une certaine perplexité face à ce peuple si heureux et affrable qui s'est laissé entraîner dans un tel gâchis et une telle

anecdote. Peu de nos compatriotes se rendent compte que, dans un monde imparfait, notre pays est depuis longtemps admis comme étant un des modèles les mieux réussis de gestion de sociétés pluralistes et d'économies mixtes. C'est pourquoi le pressentiment d'un échec de l'expérience canadienne provoque une profonde inquiétude internationale, d'autant plus vive que la gestion de sociétés complexes se révèle être un défi

profondément dans le monde entier aujourd'hui. À l'heure où ils réfléchissent aux orientations futures et où ils en discutent, c'est à travers de ce miroir international que les Canadiens et Canadiennes doivent tous se voir. Malgré toutes les différences et les frictions dont nous avons conscience, globalement, nous avons toujours dans notre pays d'immenses réserves et des habitudes profondément ancrées de tolérance, et nous possédons de multiples atouts pour mener à bien ces tâches de gestion. Cette perspective élargie est un antidote vital au climat d'inspection maladroite et de tristesse aplomb sur soi-même nourris par l'amertume du processus du lac Meech.

« E NÉGATIVISME EST ALIMENTÉ PAR DES PERSONNES QUI SONT, DE TOUTE FAÇON, DEPUIS LONGTEMPS HOSTILES AU CANADA, ET PAR D'AUTRES QUI SONT À CE POINT BOULEVERCÉS QU'ELLES SE DEMANDENT SI NOUS POSSÉDONS, SI NOUS AVONS JAMAIS POSSEDE, LES MYTHES D'UNITÉ NÉCESSAIRES POUR FORGER UNE IDENTITÉ COMMUNE ET POUR POURSUIVRE LES MÊMES OBJECTIFS. CE DÉBAT A ÉTÉ, EN PARTIE, ARTISÉ PAR L'ESSAI DE M. WILLIAM THORSELL PARU AU MOIS D'AVRIL DANS *REPORT ON BUSINESS*, DANS LEQUEL L'AUTEUR PRÉTENDAIT DÉMONTRER NOS MYTHES RELATIFS À LA MONARCHIE, AUX DEUX PEUPLES FONDATEURS, À L'ÉCONOMIE MIXTE, À LA « NATION LA PLUS AIMABLE » AU RÔLE DE « CONCILIATEUR DANS LES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES ».

« Comme certains autres débats au Canada ces derniers mois, celui-ci a quelque peu dérapé, car nous n'avons pas su admettre que les mythes nationaux ne sont jamais entièrement vrais, jusqu'à ce qu'ils ne soient la combinaison changeante des héritages d'hier, des idéaux d'aujourd'hui et des aspirations de demain. Dans tout cela, on a un peu trop oublié l'identité internationale du Canada. M. Thorsell, quant à lui, n'a nullement prouvé l'existence du préjudice vide dans la tradition canadienne de participation active à la vie internationale; il semble s'être contenté de partir du principe que, le monde ayant changé, notre rôle a forcément diminué, ce en quoi il se trompe du tout au tout.

« Seuls les plus myopes des Canadiens et Canadiennes peuvent ne pas apprécier les bouleversements que connaît le monde et les conséquences qu'ils auront pour notre existence à l'échelle internationale. Notre politique étrangère sert à protéger nos intérêts et à présenter nos valeurs et, même s'il y a diversité sur ces deux plans, c'est souvent dans le contexte du monde extérieur que nous nous apercevons véritablement de tout ce que les Canadiens et Canadiennes ont en commun.

« UN POINT DE VUE PUREMENT PERSONNEL, LA plupart des Canadiens et Canadiennes qui voyagent ont l'agréable surprise d'être reçus très chaleureusement partout dans le monde du fait de leur passeport et de leur nationalité. N'allez surtout pas penser que cet accueil est une simple bizarrerie ou le signe de quelque nostalgie populaire. Dans une étude classique sur les élites de la politique étrangère réalisée il y a quelques années, les professeurs Peyron Lyon et Brian Tomlin ont découvert que le Canada se classe parmi les pays qui sont (par ordre d'importance) : «murs par des principes ou une éthique», et «généreux», «artisans de paix», «modérés», «internationalistes». À l'inverse, on l'opposait surtout à des pays qualifiés d'«égotiques et d'irréfléchis», d'«irrationnels», d'«idéologues», d'«expansionnistes ou de violents» et d'«isolationnistes».

« Cette image favorable tient-elle seulement à la distance qui sépare le Canada des grands événements mondiaux et au fait qu'il n'y soit pas partie ? Une fois encore, ce genre de question au scepticisme illimité ne pourrait germer que dans l'esprit d'un Canadien, et cela aussi est un de nos traits positifs dans un monde qui n'a pas le mode de vie pour fort. En fait, le Canada se classe au septième rang dans le monde pour ce qui est de l'économie et du commerce international; or, nul ne fait d'affaires à ce niveau sans être mis à l'épreuve.

« Les personnes qui suivent les affaires internationales sont moins surprises que les Canadiens et Canadiennes d'apprendre qu'en contributions volontaires au système des Nations-Unies, notre

« pays arrive en quatrième position, qu'il occupe le septième rang relativement à l'aide extérieure, soit dit en passant, qu'il est douzième au classement des dépenses militaires totales par État. Ces investissements lui confèrent une réelle crédibilité et un certain poids dans une communauté grandissante de pays où les problèmes se diversifient et où l'influence devient plus diffuse. Pendant dix ans au moins, c'est souvent le Canada (la benjamine des sept grandes puissances résidentes au Sommet des pays occidentaux) qui s'est efforcé d'aplanir les différends entre les membres du G-7 et entre ces derniers et de nombreux autres pays, des différends qui avaient pour thème les relations Nord-Sud, l'Afrique australe, le tiers-monde et l'environnement. D'ailleurs, seul le Canada peut se targuer d'une connaissance qui est le fruit d'une appartenance active au Commonwealth et aux communautés francophone et interaméricaine.

« E CANADA A JOUÉ PLEINEMENT SON RÔLE DANS le processus d'Helinski qui a contribué à mettre fin à la Guerre froide. En fait, pour assurer la sécurité européenne et internationale avec des niveaux d'armement beaucoup plus bas et pour être sûr de bien gérer les conflits, de les régler et de maintenir la paix, il faudra désormais s'engager bien davantage dans des activités de vérification, de type de travail. Comme l'a illustré tout récemment le rôle central joué par notre pays dans le règlement des conflits namibien et centrafricains, les «casques bleus» canadiens ont probablement mérité plus que ceux de n'importe quelle autre nation le prix Nobel décerné en 1988 en 1982 devant l'Association canadienne des sciences politiques, sur la «culture politique de la politique étrangère canadienne», le professeur Denis Stairs a démontré brillamment comment la contribution particulière du Canada au monde

« tient à ce qu'il comprend la constance de «conflits qui prennent racine dans la diversité», et, donc, le besoin de souplesse, de modération et de compromis. Les pièges à éviter dans la vie internationale sont les mêmes qu'il faut éviter chez nous, à savoir, se montrer dogmatique, faire primer les symboles et les symboles sur la réalité. «Un peuple qui est gouverné ainsi», a-t-il déclaré, «se voit nier la possibilité de percevoir un conflit comme une question d'intérêts concurrents plutôt que d'absolus irréconciliables et il est, par conséquent, privé de la volonté et de la capacité de discuter, de trouver des compromis et d'aboutir à un moyen terme satisfaisant.»

« Nous avons effectivement nos mythes, et il est indéniable que certains d'entre eux sont essentiels et que le monde nous les envie. □

— BERNARD WOOD



ment les salaires des ouvriers et accordé le samedi de congé payé, alors que l'Etat n'avait évidemment pas les moyens de supporter de telles mesures. Il a importé des quantités considérables de produits de consommation, bien que les effets d'une telle mesure sur le niveau de vie aient été assez marginaux. Mais alors que Ceausescu avait pratiquement liquidé la dette extérieure du pays, celle-ci aurait augmenté de 2 milliards de dollars entre janvier et mai seulement!

LES CHOSES NE PEUVENT EVIDEMMENT CONTINUER TRÈS LONGTEMPS DE CETTE façon. Le Front a promis une transition prudente vers l'économie de marché. D'après ses représentants, il vise à privatiser 70 p.100 des entreprises. Mais sa marge de manœuvre est plus qu'étroite. Elle est quasi inexistant. L'économie roumaine est au bord du précipice. Etant donné le niveau de vie déjà lamentable de la population et ses attentes, des grèves spontanées et des révoltes pourraient devenir monnaie courante et, à défaut de forces politiques réelles, on ne peut exclure que le pays sombre dans le chaos ou adopte une dictature militaire.


En Hongrie, la situation est à tous égards meilleure que en Roumanie et à plusieurs points de vue meilleure qu'en Pologne. Par suite des élections de la fin de mars et du début d'avril 1990 un véritable pluralisme politique en mai est dominé par le Forum démocratique hongrois qui a remporté 24,73 p.100 des voix contre son plus proche rival qui demeure dans l'opposition, l'Alliance des démocrates libres, qui a recueilli 21,39 p.100 des suffrages.

L'Alliance des démocrates libres a été formée par des intellectuels dissidents de la première heure. C'est le parti d'un libéralisme économique et politique des plus intransigeants et de type jacobin. Il se veut résolument moderne, anti-nationaliste et internationaliste. À titre d'exemple, il considère que la question des Hongrois de Transylvanie est un problème afférent aux droits de la personne et relevant des forums internationaux et non du gouvernement national hongrois. Le Forum démocratique hongrois, quant à lui, est nationaliste et plus près des traditions politiques hongroises. Témoin de populisme, il est accusé, plutôt à tort, par son principal adversaire, d'antisémitisme. Sur le plan socio-économique, il se voulait au départ partisan d'une «troisième voie». Mais, sous la pression électorale des Démocrates libres et, selon ceux-ci, pour gagner la confiance des institutions financières internationales, il a peu à peu adopté un programme économique qui ne se distingue plus guère de celui de son rival.



DE TOUS LES PAYS DE L'EUROPE DE L'EST, LA Hongrie est sans doute le mieux placé pour passer à une économie de marché. Le terrain y est beaucoup plus favorable, parce que mieux préparé. Depuis la fin des années 1960, le régime «libéral» de la région, avait mis en place de nombreux mécanismes de marché. Les cadres économiques des entreprises et de l'Etat ont été formés de longue date à cette école et ils sont habitués à fonctionner sous un régime où existe une concurrence, certes souvent limitée, mais réelle entre diverses unités économiques.

Tant en Hongrie, les économistes proches des gouvernements affirmant que ce n'est pas de crédits gouvernementaux étrangers que leurs pays ont besoin, mais plutôt d'investissements étrangers directs, soit dans de nouveaux projets, soit pour l'achat d'entreprises d'Etat. Les Pologne et la Hongrie en ont reçu insuffisamment. Bien que l'on juge ce chiffre tout aussi insuffisant, il montre bien que le terrain économique et l'état de l'infrastructure sont déjà meilleurs en Hongrie qu'en Pologne. Malgré ces éléments favorables, la dette extérieure de la Hongrie per capita est la plus élevée de toute la région, et le passage à l'économie de marché exigera des sacrifices importants de la population. Or, comme nous



L'économie de marché. Peut-être justement à cause de cela, le dogmatisme à l'égard du libéralisme économique est moins fort qu'en Pologne et même qu'en Hongrie. Les conseillers économiques du président Havel envisagent une économie mixte dominée par le secteur privé.

L'absence relative de sectarisme et de dogmatisme est aussi une caractéristique fondamentale de la culture politique du pays, marquée par un niveau élevé de tolérance. L'antisémitisme qui refait surface à différents degrés en Pologne, en Hongrie et en Roumanie ne se manifeste pas en Tchécoslovaquie. Certes, le ressentiment à l'égard des communistes y existe, mais on y observe moins qu'ailleurs une volonté de revanche et de réglementation de comptes. Avant l'avènement du communisme, entre les deux guerres, la Tchécoslovaquie était le seul pays d'Europe de l'Est à avoir vécu une expérience authentiquement démocratique. Cette dernière a laissé des traces profondes.

La Tchécoslovaquie aura, elle aussi, des problèmes difficiles à résoudre. L'environnement a été considérablement dégradé. Moderniser son équipement industriel et ramener son économie au niveau de celle de l'Europe de l'Ouest, comme avant la guerre, seront des opérations coûteuses. La question nationale slovaque refait surface et pourrait, à terme, compromettre l'avenir de la fédération. Mais la Tchécoslovaquie paraît disposer d'atouts pour faire face à ces défis. □

EN CONCLUANT AVEC LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE, on peut terminer sur une note beaucoup plus optimiste. C'est certainement là que les conditions économiques et politiques sont les meilleures en Europe de l'Est. Le niveau de vie de la population y est nettement plus élevé que n'importe où ailleurs. L'endettement extérieur est faible. Le gouvernement dispose donc d'une assez bonne marge de manœuvre pour un passage prudent à l'économie de marché. Peut-être justement à cause de cela, le dogmatisme à l'égard du libéralisme économique est moins fort qu'en Pologne et même qu'en Hongrie. Les conseillers économiques du président Havel envisagent une économie mixte dominée par le secteur privé.

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Pendant la campagne électorale, le Forum démocratique a parlé d'une nation hongroise de 14 millions d'habitants, dont il se posait en défenseur. Or, on sait qu'il y a 10 600 000 Hongrois en Hongrie. Il faisait donc référence aux 2 500 000 Hongrois de Transylvanie (chiffre contesté), aux 500 000 autres de Slovaquie et aux quelques centaines de milliers qui vivent en Yougoslavie. C'est avec la Roumanie que les problèmes pourraient de venir les plus aigus. En janvier, après la chute de Ceausescu et l'ouverture des frontières roumaines, des autobus entiers de militaires du Forum démocratique ont été envoyés en Transylvanie pour y soutenir et y mobiliser les Hongrois, ce qui a accentué les tensions entre les gouvernements des deux pays. Actuellement, et depuis plusieurs mois, environ 200 réfugiés hongrois quittent chaque jour la Roumanie pour la Hongrie. Proportionnellement, il s'agit d'un chiffre plus élevé que le nombre quotidien des réfugiés est-allemands de l'été dernier. Le gouvernement hongrois soupçonne son homologue roumain de favoriser cet exode, pour se débarrasser du problème. Un intellectuel, conseiller du gouvernement hongrois et par ailleurs plutôt modéré, nous disait à Budapest : «Si c'est bien la une politique délibérée de la Roumanie, nous allons accepter les réfugiés, mais nous allons exiger qu'ils viennent avec leurs terres.» On en est bien sûr pas encore là.

1. Voir «Downhill», *Gazeta International*, n° 17, 1990, p. 9.  
2. Voir *New York Times*, 10 mai 1990, p. A13.  
3. *José Pilsudski (1887-1935), héros national polonais et chef d'Etat du premier gouvernement indépendant de la Pologne.*

Malais c'est justement parce qu'il s'agit d'un mouvement spontané et sans direction politique organisée que le groupe dirigé par Ion Iliescu a pu s'emparer du pouvoir en adoptant avec les forces armées un compromis politique dont on ignore toujours les termes.

Contrairement à ce qui avait été affirmé au départ, il a été rapidement établi que ce n'est pas la *Securitate*, mais l'armée qui a tiré sur la foule à Timisoara et à Bucarest, la veille de la fuite de Ceausescu. Ce n'est qu'à la toute dernière minute, avec le'intensification de l'insurrection populaire, que l'armée s'est retournée contre le dictateur. Le processus presque organisé à toute vitesse et à l'issue duquel Ceausescu a été immédiatement exécuté pour «généralisme», avait notamment pour objectif essentiel, de blâmer le dictateur pour tout, de l'empêcher de parler, et d'amoindrir le rôle de l'armée dans la répression. Le général Blanculescu, un des organisateurs du procès, serait celui qui aurait ordonné la répression à Timisoara. La version la plus longue de l'enregistrement du procès a été coupée au moment où Ceausescu, après avoir nié avoir donné l'ordre de tirer à Timisoara, s'apprêtait à désigner les responsables.

Petre Roman, son certainement bien intentionné et comme Silviu Brucan et Ion Iliescu et plusieurs de ceux qui l'entourent, comme Silviu Brucan et prisonniers de l'armée et non seulement de l'appareil d'Etat, mais aussi de l'appareil politique de l'ancien régime. Tout comme l'exécution de Ceausescu a évité que l'on fasse le procès du régime, la mise hors-la-loi du parti communiste a servi des buts semblables. Elle n'a fait disparaître que le nom du parti: n'ayant pas d'organisation politique véritable, le Front de salut national s'est appuyé essentiellement sur l'organisation et les cadres du parti interloqué, partant du pays.

Avant même la chute de Ceausescu, de sourdes oppositions existaient entre différents éléments de son régime, notamment entre la *Securitate* et les forces armées. Des signes très nets sont apparus pendant les événements de décembre, et plusieurs faits troublants à cet égard n'ont toujours pas été éclaircis. On sait maintenant que le charnier «découvert» près de Timisoara a été crevé de toutes pièces, notamment avec des cadavres «recouverts» trans-Portés jusque-là depuis des salles de dissection d'hôpitaux et de morgues. On ne sait toujours pas qui a monté l'opération, et pour disculder qui. De même, dans les jours qui ont suivi la chute du dictateur, on a dit qu'il y avait eu 60 000 morts dans toute la Roumanie. Finalement, la réalité serait plus près de 600. S'agissait-il simplement d'erreurs d'estimation? Les rumeurs les plus extravagantes continuent de circuler à Bucarest là-dessus. Certains affirment que l'on a cherché (qui?) à susciter délibérément panique et confusion pendant que des difficultés de tractions pour la mise en place du nouveau pouvoir. Quoi qu'il en soit, il semble bien qu'Iliescu doive maintenant composer avec des forces qu'il maîtrise très mal. Ainsi, ce serait en raison du refus de l'armée de réprimer les émeutes, en juin, qu'il aurait été forcé de faire appel aux mineurs, qui, encadrés par des organisateurs politiques de l'ancien Parti, ont dépassé leur «mandat» notamment en arrêtant des dirigeants des nouvelles formations politiques.

Compte tenu d'une culture politique qui n'a guère pu se développer en Roumanie, la mise au pilon de Ceausescu, comme seul responsable de tous les maux du pays, semble avoir largement réussi pour le Front de salut national. Ce n'est cependant pas là la seule raison de sa victoire électorale éclatante. Les partis politiques d'opposition constitués à la hâte après la chute de Ceausescu. Les grands partis traditionnels comme le Parti national paysan et le Parti national libéral qui se sont reconstitués sont largement demeurés des coquilles vides. Leurs dirigeants respectifs, Ratiu et Campeanu, candidats à la présidence contre Iliescu ne vivaient plus dans le pays depuis trente-cinq ans dans le cas du premier et quinze ans, dans le cas du second. Ils avaient peu de crédibilité, et leurs partis, surtout actifs à Bucarest ont pu pénétrent les profondeurs du pays encore sous la coupe des anciens cadres ralliés au Front.

De plus, pendant qu'il servait de gouvernement intermédiaire, le Front a adopté des méthodes «électorales» au sens occidental et péjoratif du terme. Tout en continuant de contrôler les prix, il a également sensible-

Dans la mesure où il n'y a pas de véritable opposition de gauche en Pologne, ni à court terme, ni probablement à moyen terme en raison du discredit de l'ancien parti communiste qui a cherché à se réhabiliter en prenant le nom de Social-Démocratie de la République de Pologne, contentant par là à discréditer d'avantage une telle option, c'est un régime d'extrême-droite qui pourrait remplacer le présent gouvernement. Walesa est actuellement tenu par une surenchère de type populiste, nationaliste et autoritaire. À la veille du Congrès de Solidarité, dont il a fait le régal président, il avait commencé à critiquer «son» gouvernement en lui reprochant de «se traîner les pieds» et en exigeant «l'accélération des réformes». Par là, il entendait essentiellement l'élimination des communistes (ou plutôt des anciens communistes, car ils ont quitté massivement le Parti et son successeur) qui occupent effectivement encore un très grand nombre de postes importants aux différents niveaux de l'Administration et dans les entreprises d'Etat. Dans les conditions actuelles, une «chasse aux sorcières» communistes pourrait devenir un moyen politique pour détourner l'attention des difficultés économiques et sociales de la Pologne. Elle pourrait aller très loin dans la mesure où presque toute l'intelligentsia polonaise, y compris la majorité des conseillers de Solidarité, a été communiste pour des périodes plus ou moins longues.




Le président de Solidarité accuse maintenant les intellectuels de l'avoir trahi et il prend un ton leur étant de plus en plus hostile. Il affirmait en mai : «Je me suis peut-être pris les intellectuels, j'ai trop cherché dans les intellectuels polonais et trop suivi leurs conseils. Ils m'ont induit en erreur». 2. Contrairement à ce que souhaitait le gouvernement polonais, Walesa a demandé le retrait complet des troupes soviétiques de Pologne. Au mois de mars, il a affirmé son intention d'être candidat à la présidence du pays et il réclamait, depuis, des élections présidentielles anticipées.

Tous ces éléments montrent qu'il semble voir son rôle politique comme celui d'un nouveau Plisudski. 3. Quoiqu'il en soit, il demeure en Pologne un héros national et, s'il décidait d'encourager un mouvement de grève qui, dans les conditions actuelles, risquerait de prendre une ampleur considérable, il pourrait sans doute facilement faire renverser le gouvernement.

C'est cependant en Roumanie, où les conditions économiques générales sont beaucoup plus catastrophiques qu'en Pologne, que les perspectives d'avenir s'annoncent les plus sombres. Pour nous, qui avons connu la Roumanie il y a près de vingt ans, un retour sur place après toutes ces années produit un effet de choc. Le niveau de vie des Roumains est tombé à celui que les Soviétiques connaissaient au début des années 1960. On peut dire sans beaucoup d'exagération que la dictature mégalomane et impitoyable de Ceausescu a pratiquement désertifié le pays, sur les plans économique, politique et culturel.

Ce sont précisément ces conditions qui expliquent le grand paradoxe de la Roumanie par rapport aux autres pays d'Europe de l'Est et qui fait que le successeur du Parti communiste roumain, le Front de salut national a pu non seulement conserver le pouvoir, mais aussi remporter les élections présidentielles de mai 1990 avec une majorité inouïe de 89 p. 100, alors que les succès des partis beaucoup plus réformistes de Pologne et de Hongrie se sont effondrés.

AU COURS DES DERNIÈRES ANNÉES, LA RÉPRESSION avait été tellement forte en Roumanie que, contrairement à ce qui s'était passé dans les autres pays d'Europe de l'Est, aucun groupe d'opposition relativement structuré n'avait pu fonctionner ni se manifester d'un seul coup dans la société. Il n'y avait pas d'autre choix politique immédiat. C'est ce qui a permis à un petit groupe composé de plusieurs anciens collaborateurs de Ceausescu et de quelques autres personnalités coplées à la dernière minute de s'emparer du pouvoir dans des conditions qui Roumanie en 1989 en Roumanie ont tenu simultanément d'une véritable insurrection populaire et d'un coup d'Etat. Ce sont effectivement les révoltes spontanées de Timisoara du 15 au 20 décembre, et de





ANNÉE 1989 AURA ÉTÉ CELLE DE L'EUROPHORIE RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE EN EUROPE DE L'EST. LES LÉNINISMES DE révolution sont rarement faciles, et c'est particulièrement le cas pour la plupart des pays de l'Est. Même la dictature, qui constituait l'enjeu le plus précieux des mouvements sociaux de chacun de ces pays, demeure fragile, et son avenir est loin d'être partout assuré.

Dans une entrevue donnée au Canada en 1989, le professeur Bronislaw Geremek, l'homme politique polonais chef du groupe parlementaire issu de Solidarité, faisait très justement observer que si auparavant, plusieurs pays étaient déjà passés de la dictature à la démocratie, aucun n'avait encore jamais expérimenté un passage simultané de la dictature à la démocratie et d'une économie centralisée planifiée à une économie de marché. Les problèmes, risques et défis sont donc d'une ampleur et d'un ordre nouveaux.

Presque partout en Europe de l'Est, le ressaucage par la vague révolutionnaire a été tel que les partis communistes ont emporté dans leur chute non seulement le modèle politique et économique du socialisme stalinien, mais aussi toute l'idée de socialisme démocratique, ou même de social-démocratie. La privatisation au maximum et le regain complet des lois du marché sont devenus des mois d'ordre impératifs. Chez la grande majorité des intellectuels d'Europe de l'Est, qui dans la plupart des cas sont d'anciens communistes, on peut même parler d'un nouveau dogmatisme (qui a remplacé l'ancien) à l'égard du libéralisme économique le plus absolu, qui est considéré comme une panacée pour tous les problèmes.

Tous les tenants de ce libéralisme radical savent très bien que l'application intégrale des lois du marché et l'intégration rapide des économies de l'Est au marché mondial ne peuvent qu'aggraver à court terme leur situation en suscitant une inflation galopante, en entraînant la fermeture de centaines d'usines (peu habituées à la compétition et incapables de le devenir rapidement), en créant un chômage massif et des inégalités sociales considérables. Ils considèrent que c'est à un prix inévitable à payer, qu'il n'y a pas d'autre choix et que les choses iront nécessairement mieux.

*Certains pays de l'Est sont mieux équipés que d'autres pour relever les défis de taille qui se présentent.*

VOYONS DE FAÇON GÉNÉRALE ET SCHEMATIQUE COMMENT LA SITUATION SE  
présente dans les quatre pays de l'Est que nous avons visités, outre la  
République démocratique allemande (RDA) en avril et mai 1990, en com-  
mençant par la Pologne, car c'est là que la présence d'un gouvernement non  
communiste, qui date de septembre dernier, est la plus ancienne. C'est là  
aussi qu'on a appliqué le plus rapidement et le plus radicalement la loi du  
marché, de telle sorte que des résultats assez nets apparaissent déjà et que  
commencent à émerger différentes conséquences politiques possibles.

Selon les statistiques officielles du gouvernement polonais, le niveau de  
vie de la famille polonaise moyenne a baissé de 40 p.100 en cinq mois, soit  
de septembre 1989 à mars 1990 ! Le chiffre est très impressionnant, surtout  
si l'on tient compte du fait que le niveau de vie en Pologne avait déjà chuté  
considérablement depuis le début de la décennie. La détérioration drama-  
tique récente s'est surtout fait sentir à partir de janvier 1990, par suite  
d'une libéralisation de presque tous les prix qui a porté ce mois-là,  
le taux d'inflation à plus de 1000 p.100, ramené sur une base annuelle.  
Au début de l'été, il y avait environ 350 000 chômeurs, ce qui est  
relativement peu dans un pays de 37 millions d'habitants. Cependant, si le  
chiffre est encore peu élevé, c'est qu'une grande partie du chômage a été  
absorbé collectivement. Voici de quoi il s'agit. La thérapie de choc ap-  
pliquée à l'économie polonaise a partir de janvier a entraîné une sévère ré-  
cession qui a conduit de très nombreuses entreprises à réduire leur production de 25 à 50 p.100. Phénomène qui a conduit de très nombreuses  
entreprises à effectuer des mises à pied considérables, les ouvriers ont accepté que les heures de travail de tous  
soient réduites. Il est évident que cette situation ne peut durer très longtemps et qu'une restructuration véritable des  
entreprises devra intervenir. La plupart des économistes polonais s'attendent à une importante vague de chômage  
dans la seconde moitié de 1990.

NAS CES CONDITIONS, IL EST ABSOLUMENT REMARQUABLE QUE, MALGRÉ CELA, LE GOUVERNEMENT MAZOWIECKI ait pu jusqu'ici conserver une cote de popularité impressionnante. Elle tient à la légitimité tout à fait exceptionnelle dont il bénéficie. Sa légitimité est celle que le parti ayant succédé au parti communiste n'a pas osé encore rompre ouvertement avec ce dernier et que les ministres communistes demeurent encore au gouvernement. Malgré cela, cependant, la cote est grande de plus en plus dans la population. Le gouvernement a promis au début de janvier une amélioration de la situation économique au cours des six mois suivants. Ce délai touche à sa fin, et ce n'est pas à depuis quelques mois, Lech Wałęsa a de plus en plus de mal à contenir le mécontentement de ses troupes et à éprouver les nombreuses grèves qui surgissent à l'échelle locale. Cette situation difficilement tenable et ses ambitions personnelles expliquent la guerre larvée qu'il a commencée à livrer au gouvernement formé par ses propres conseillers et pratiquement nommé par lui.

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Jacques Lévesque est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université du Québec à Montréal; Shridath Ramphal est Secrétaire général sortant du Commonwealth; Selig S. Harrison est associé principal à la Carnegie Endowment for International Peace à Washington et il était autrefois chef du Bureau de l'Asie du Sud pour le *Washington Post*; Robert Bothwell est professeur d'histoire à l'Université de Toronto; J.L. Granatstein est professeur d'histoire à l'Université York; David Runnalls est Directeur du Programme pour un développement durable à l'Institut de recherche politique à Ottawa; Jean-François Lépine était correspondant au Moyen-Orient pour les émissions *Le Téléjournal* de Radio-Canada et *The National* de la CBC.



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## LE RÊVE ET LA RÉALITÉ

L'état de santé de  
certains pays de l'Est  
après la révolution.  
PAR JACQUES LÉVESQUE



Shridath Ramphal  
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


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BY JANICE GROSS STEIN



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On Europe's new  
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**Michael Bryans**  
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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



Our cover story this issue by **Janice Gross Stein**, deals with the gravest issue of war and peace that has faced Canada and the rest of the world in a long time. The House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade has been holding hearings on the Gulf crisis, and on 8 November heard testimony from three Canadians. The brief excerpts presented below from these committee witnesses illustrate the broad range and quality of the debate.

**Bernard Wood**, CLIPS Chief Executive Officer: "What are the international community's legitimate goals? They are straightforwardly defined by the UN

resolutions concerned: withdrawal, restoration of the status quo ante, including the restoration of what was internationally recognized as the legitimate regime in Kuwait.

We cannot waiver on those conditions.... By the same token, it is not a legitimate objective of the international community to eliminate Saddam Hussein and his regime. We cannot choose Iraq's rulers any more than he can choose Kuwait's.

... I do not believe full-scale war is inevitable. There should still be at least an even chance that it can be avoided. However, we cannot ignore the proven track record of Saddam Hussein and the unconcerned resort to large-scale warfare.... [T]he international community is forced to conclude that a credible threat of overwhelming attack on himself may be essential to ensure the compelling of his compliance with international law ..."

**Ernie Regehr**, Project Ploughshares: "There is a moral obligation, we increasingly hear, to be prepared to go to war, whether under formal UN authority or not, in order ... to uphold international law. The reasoning is familiar,... If Saddam Hussein does not pull out of Kuwait, the failure to resort to direct mili-

tary action would set an unacceptable precedent. It would show that one can flagrantly violate international law and get away with it....

I want to argue that this is fundamentally wrong ... direct military action against Iraq, as distinct from monitoring and enforcement of sanctions, will exact unacceptable human, political, and material costs. In addition, it will undermine the very principle that its proponents claim they most want to defend: respect for international law."

**Gwynne Dyer**, Military analyst and historian: "Saddam Hussein's great virtue, in a sense, is his undoubted wickedness....

The great majority of international conflicts have incredibly tangled pasts and there is always some wrong on both sides. This case, almost uniquely, is a nice open and shut case, and handled well it is a great opportunity, but of course it has enormous risks. If this precedent is successfully pursued and established, particularly if it can be done without war, a year from now we will almost miraculously find ourselves at least half way toward a workable international security system based on United Nations principles.... But we have to get through this one first."

— Michael Bryans

## Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

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by Robin Hay, Working  
Paper 28, July 1990, 52 pages.

### The Soviet Concept of Reasonable Sufficiency: Conventional Arms Control in an Era of Transition.

by Elaine Holoboff, Working  
Paper 29, October 1990,  
45 pages.

### The Gulf Crisis: the Debates and the Stakes.

by Bernard Wood, Working  
Paper 30, September 1990,  
20 pages.

### The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1990.

439 pages.

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### A Review of the Geneva Negotiations: 1989-1990.

by David Cox, Background  
Paper 32, 8 pages.

### Economic Sanctions and South Africa.

by Stephen  
Godfrey, Background  
Paper 33, 8 pages.

### Ballistic Missile Prolifera- tion.

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Janice Stein is a professor of political science at the University of Toronto; Madeleine Poulin is co-host of Radio-Canada's *Le Point*; David Cox is a professor of political studies at Queen's University in Kingston; Claude Moïse is a professor of history at Université du Québec à Montréal; Michael Bryans is editor of *Peace&Security*; Jim Lederman, a writer based in Jerusalem, is former Middle East correspondent for CBC Radio and National Public Radio; and Mirko Lauer is chief editorial writer of Lima's daily *Pagina Libre* and political editor for the *Andean Report*.

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# THE CHALLENGE OF THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

*For the fragile, new world order,  
fault lines through the Middle East  
are a clear and present danger.*

BY JANICE GROSS STEIN

**T**HE PEACE THAT BROKE OUT WHEN THE COLD war ended did not last. Less than a year after the Berlin wall came down, the world is on the brink of a war that threatens to spread destruction throughout the Middle East. Riven with multiple conflicts, the region has become more dangerous in the last decade as the size of armies has grown and sophisticated military technology has proliferated.<sup>1</sup> The fault lines running through the Middle East have shattered the optimistic expectations of the peaceful shaping of the new international order.

Despite the new and improved relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the propensity to serious crisis in the new international order is clear, as are the changing dynamics of managing international crises without resort to war. The possibility of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union as a result of a crisis in the Middle East has disappeared, but the probability of chemical warfare and widespread civilian casualties in a regional war is real – for the people who live there, a distinction with very little difference.

Before dawn on 2 August, Iraqi troops poured across the border into Kuwait. Within three hours, the army had accomplished its objectives: the overthrow of the government of Kuwait and control of its oilfields. A week later, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait.

The use of force by one Arab government to annex another is unprecedented in the modern Middle East. World-wide condemnation, an international air and naval embargo, the deployment of air and ground forces in the Gulf states, and the presence of naval forces in the Gulf have not yet succeeded in compelling Iraq to withdraw. On

the contrary, as the weeks have passed, both President George Bush and President Saddam Hussein have manipulated the risk of war in a test of resolve.

The international community, led by the United States, has deployed substantial forces in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states both to deter further use of force by Iraq and to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, by raising the risk of war. The unprecedented approval by the United Nations of wide-ranging sanctions has strengthened international pressure against Iraq.

In considering the origins and evolution of this crisis, several sets of issues are relevant. First, could this use of force have been avoided through more effective strategies of crisis prevention? If indeed a

crisis could have been avoided, why were these strategies not used? And now that the crisis is upon us, can it be managed, can international coercion succeed short of a catastrophic war throughout the region?

## Did the US Fail to Prevent the Crisis?

The strategies used by the US in the weeks before Iraq's invasion are already the object of intense debate. The controversy focusses both on the intentions of Iraq and the response of the United States. To understand American strategy, it is necessary to put the current crisis in context.

In 1980, a year after the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Tehran, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq attacked Iran, hoping for a quick victory over armed forces that were disorganized in the midst of a revolution. After a series of initial victories by Iraq, Tehran gradually began to reverse the tide of battle. Although the war had been initiated by Iraq, most Arab states were sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of an Iranian victory that they began to supply extensive military and financial aid to Baghdad.

The relationship between the United States and Iraq similarly began to improve in the context of tense relations between Washington and the government in Tehran. After the war ended in 1988, the US continued to try to strengthen its relationship with Iraq as a regional counterweight to Iran. Despite the improved relationship, President Saddam Hussein made a series of disturbing speeches in the spring of 1990.

In February, at the end of a meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council,<sup>2</sup> Iraq's president predicted that because of the decline of Soviet power, the US would exercise hegemonic power in the Middle East for five years. Hussein argued:

The country [the United States] that will have the greatest influence in the region, through the Arab Gulf and its oil, will maintain its superiority as a superpower without an equal to compete with it. This means that if the Gulf people, along with all Arabs, are not careful, the Arab Gulf region will be governed by the wishes of the United States ... [Oil] prices will be fixed in line with a special perspective benefiting American interests and ignoring the interests of others.

The answer, he concluded, was the use of Arab economic power to force changes in American policy.

On 2 April, after a shipment to Baghdad of devices suitable for triggering nuclear weapons had been intercepted, President Hussein announced that Iraqi scientists had developed advanced chemical weapons and threatened to use them against Israel should Israel attack. At an Arab summit the following month in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein denounced the Arabs of the Gulf who were keeping the price of oil artificially low and thereby engaging in economic sabotage of Iraq.

1. Iraq's armed forces numbered 188,000 in 1977, and 1,000,000 in 1987; Iraq now deploys the fourth largest army in the world. Iran's forces numbered 342,000 in 1977 and 645,500 in 1987, excluding 350,000 listed as reserves; Syria's forces numbered 227,500 in 1977 and 407,500 in 1987; and Saudi Arabia's forces numbered 61,500 in 1977 and 73,500 in 1987. Israel's reserve call-up system makes troop strength comparisons difficult, but in the same period its tank strength increased from approximately 3,000 to almost 4,000. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), *The Military Balance*, 1977/78 and 1987/88.

2. The Arab Cooperation Council included Egypt, Jordan, and then North Yemen, as well as Iraq.



It was against this backdrop that the Bush administration, on 24 July, evaluated intelligence reports of the movement of two Iraqi armoured divisions to its border with Kuwait. In his Revolution Day speech on 17 July, President Hussein had attacked Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates as agents of imperialism who were waging economic warfare against Baghdad. Iraq demanded that Kuwait and the UAE stop violating their OPEC quotas and reduce their production of oil. In response to Iraqi threats, the US dispatched two ships for manoeuvres in the Gulf. At the OPEC meeting that followed, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates agreed to observe their quotas and permit a modest increase in the price of oil.

Hussein was not satisfied: he alleged that Kuwait had promised to observe the quotas for only two months and insisted that Kuwait forgive Iraq's debt that had accumulated during the long and costly war with Iran, that it cease its unfair exploitation of the disputed Rumaila oilfields along their common border, and that it agree to new arrangements for the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah at the top of the Gulf that controlled access to Iraq's only port on the Gulf.

In an effort to prevent a crisis, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt quickly arranged a meeting between Kuwait's Sheikh Saad al-Sabah and the vice-chairman of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim, in Jidda on 1 August, with further meetings to follow in Baghdad. After only a single meeting, the talks broke down and Iraq's tanks crossed the border the next morning.

Although the United States had accurate intelligence of the growing concentration of Iraq's forces on its border with Kuwait, its strategy to prevent the crisis was unclear. Uncertain of Iraq's intentions, Washington made only a token and confused attempt to deter Saddam Hussein from acting and instead relied principally on efforts at reassurance. The difference between these two approaches is no small matter.

#### To deter or reassure – that is the question

A strategy of deterrence uses threats to prevent an adversary from taking an unwanted action – “don’t do that or else.” It requires that leaders of state define the behaviour that is unacceptable, publicize their commitment to punish transgressors or deny them their objectives, possess the capability to do so, and communicate their resolve to implement their threats. Deterrence is most appropriate as a strategy of crisis prevention against an adversary that is opportunistic and bent on expansion.

Strategies of reassurance begin from a different set of assumptions. Like deterrence, they too presume the other side is hostile, but root the source of that hostility in an adversary's feelings of acute vulnerability. Reassurance attempts to diminish hostility by trying to reduce the fear, misunderstanding, and insecurity that are so often responsible for escalation to war. Reassurance dictates that countries anticipating the possibility of an attack by a vulnerable opponent would try to communicate their benign

intentions and their interest in alternative ways of addressing the issues in dispute.<sup>3</sup>

The US first tried to prevent a crisis with a weak and ambiguous attempt at deterrence. On 19 July, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney told journalists that the American commitment made during the war between Iran and Iraq – to come to the defence of Kuwait if it were attacked – was still valid. His press spokesman subsequently emasculated the American commitment by explaining that the secretary had been quoted with “some degree of liberality.”

Margaret D. Tutwiler, the spokesperson for the State Department, was even less forthcoming. When asked on 24 July whether the US had any commitment to defend Kuwait, she replied: “We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.” Asked whether the US would help Kuwait if

it were attacked, she said: “We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf with whom we have deep and long-standing ties.”

Even more telling was a meeting on 25 July in Baghdad, at President Saddam Hussein's request, with the American ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. In discussing the conflict with Kuwait, the American ambassador told Iraq's president:

... we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction.<sup>4</sup>

After clearly dissociating the United States from a commitment to defend Kuwait, the ambassador concluded the discussion by asking “in the spirit of friendship, not in the spirit of confrontation,” about Iraq's intentions. President Hussein replied that President Mubarak had arranged a meeting between Iraq and Kuwait in Saudi Arabia (he was referring to the meeting that would subsequently end in failure). President Hussein concluded with the warning that Iraq's patience was not unlimited. Ambassador Glaspie did not warn President Hussein of the consequences of the use of force.

The American strategy of crisis prevention was both poorly conceived and badly executed; Washington neither deterred nor reassured effectively. When an Iraqi use of military force against Kuwait became possible, the US first chose to deter and then to reassure Iraq. And the execution of deter-

rence was seriously flawed: the Pentagon first communicated a commitment to defend Kuwait and then drew back; the State Department distanced the US from any commitment whatsoever to Kuwait and reassured Iraq of the benign intentions of the United States.

This confusion in strategy was in large part a function of Washington's uncertainty about whether Iraq was motivated principally by the opportunity to expand or by the vulnerability of its economy. Most analysts across the political spectrum in the West are persuaded that President Saddam Hussein is an opportunity-driven expansionist – the analogy to Hitler and 1939 is often drawn – but a plausible argument can be made that Iraq's leader was motivated by perceptions of

*Through its action,  
Iraq has heightened  
the strategic  
vulnerabilities of every  
state in the Gulf  
as well as many in the  
fertile Crescent.*



Nicholas Vitacco

3. For detailed discussion of these two strategies and their requirements, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Occasional Paper 8, 1990) and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds. *Behaviour, Society, and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.)

4. The transcript of the meeting between President Hussein and Ambassador Glaspie was released by the government of Iraq and published by The New York Times on 23 September 1990. The US State Department refused to confirm or deny its validity.

vulnerability as well. Even now, some four months after the fact, the evidence is not decisive.

### Why Did Saddam Do What He Did?

It is likely that Saddam Hussein identified an opportunity to assert Iraq's long-standing claim to Kuwait, to establish a commanding position in the international oil market, and that he decided to exploit the opportunity. Most of the available evidence sustains such an interpretation. One critical component of such a "war of opportunity" is the expectation by leaders that the victim state will not be able to mobilize the assistance of powerful outsiders or friends in time to affect the outcome. As we have seen, this condition was met.

A second component is the calculation by leaders, in this case Saddam Hussein and his regime, that the local balance of military capabilities is strongly in their favour. This condition was also met. Iran was still recovering from its eight-year war and no other combination of Arab states in the Gulf could conceivably match the battle-tested Iraqi army. Moreover, Baghdad had received substantial amounts of financial aid from Gulf states and sophisticated military technology and equipment from the Soviet Union and the Western world, who all felt threatened, albeit in different ways, by the Khomeini revolution in Iran.

Iraq's military supremacy in the Gulf was overwhelming. If, indeed, Saddam Hussein was motivated largely by the opportunity he saw to expand, then reassurance from the US and others was an inappropriate strategy against this kind of challenge.

It is also possible that President Hussein was driven in part by the growing vulnerability of Iraq's economy. Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, in an interview after the invasion, explained that Iraq was stunned by Kuwait's insistence that Iraq's debt be repaid; the debt had accumulated during the war with Iran, a war fought to defend the Gulf states as well as Iraq. He then drew an explicit linkage between Iraq's deteriorating economy and the invasion of Kuwait:

The economic question was a major factor in triggering the current situation. In addition to the forty billion dollars in Arab debts, we owe at least as much to the West. This year's state budget required seven billion dollars for debt service, which was a huge amount, leaving us with only enough for basic services for our country. Our budget is based on a price of eighteen dollars a barrel for oil, but since the Kuwaitis began flooding the world with oil the price has gone down by a third.

When we met again – in Jidda, at the end of July – Kuwait said it was not interested in any change. We were now desperate, and could not pay our bills for food imports. It was a starvation war. When do you use your military power to preserve yourself?

To the extent that Iraq was motivated principally by opportunity, only a clear and unequivocal commitment combined with an explicit threat of the consequences of the use of force stood any chance of preventing Iraq's massive use of force against Kuwait. Deterrence had to be forcefully executed. If, on the other hand, Hussein was driven primarily by Iraq's economic vulnerability, then a strategy of reassurance had to address the issues that were central to ameliorating its acute economic problems.

If the United States was uncertain of Iraq's motives and intentions, then it could have used a mixed strategy of a strong and unequivocal commitment to come to Kuwait's defence, and reassurance to address Iraq's pressing economic concerns. Although it is far from certain that a mixed strategy of deterrence and reassurance would have succeeded if it had been tried, Washington did neither effectively. It did not warn of the

consequences of an invasion of Kuwait – on the contrary it distanced itself from an "inter-Arab dispute" – and it did not address Iraq's concerns about its growing debt. Under these conditions, crisis prevention stood little chance of success.

### Crisis Management and the Risk of Inadvertent War

Now that the crisis is upon us, the acute dilemmas inherent in managing it are evident if we assume that neither Iraq nor the United States want war, but that both wish to achieve their fundamental objectives: for Iraq, the annexation of Kuwait and for the US, the withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait. In order to achieve their objectives, both are now manipulating the threat of war to compel the other to back down.

In the short term, as Iraq and the American-led international coalition both wield the threat of war, each risks losing control of events through

accident, or because the other side anticipates an attack and decides to strike first. War could break out accidentally if some unit, ship or soldier in one of the many national contingents that are now deployed in the Gulf fires mistakenly at a target it considers hostile; the shooting down of the Iranian Airbus by the USS Vincennes in the Gulf in 1988, and the erroneous attack by an Iraqi fighter-bomber on the USS Stark in 1987 are vivid examples of how easily such an accident can occur.

War could also occur if any of the military powers in the region anticipate an attack. Iraq has threatened, for example, to strike first against forces in the Gulf if its economy were strangled by economic sanctions, and to broaden the war to include Israel. In response, Israel's air force was placed on the highest possible state of alert and a significant proportion of its fighters is in the air at all times. In a context of rising tension where the military cost of being attacked first is very high, the incentives to pre-empt rise dramatically.

In the longer term, either side may find that it has so committed itself that despite the heavy costs it sees no political alternative but war. In such a case, Iraq's armed forces are likely to mount strong resistance but suffer massive casualties. The 955,000-man army, organized in fifty-three divisions, varies in quality from the six formidable divisions of Republican Guards to poorly-trained and armed conscripts. In addition, Iraq has reached the limit of its capacity to mobilize forces. Iraq's faltering economy and its infrastructure would be devastated. As Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz recently acknowledged, "This is more frightening to Iraq than eight years of war with Iran."

The consequences of the military options available to the United States are also grave. The option of a swift "surgical strike" against Iraq does not exist. Iraq's nuclear research centres and chemical plants are located in the midst of densely populated areas. The destruction of Iraq's military infrastructure would of necessity involve thousands of civilian as well as military casualties. A more limited attack against Iraq's forces in Kuwait would involve extensive fighting, heavy military casualties on both sides, and the risk of chemical warfare and widespread collateral damage, both to civilians and to the economic infrastructure.

These estimates do not include the consequences of a war that could easily spread throughout the region. Once war begins, it could escalate in scope and intensity with devastating consequences.

The *London Observer* of 30 September reported a claim by a senior officer attached to the armoured brigade the UK has sent to the Gulf that "if they are attacked with chemical gas by Iraqi troops, they will retali-

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ate with battlefield nuclear weapons.” The armoured brigade normally operates with howitzers designed to fire shells filled with conventional or nuclear explosive. Prime Minister Thatcher later said “she knew of no authority” for such a claim. While governments routinely hedge on such matters, the fact that the use of nuclear weapons is the subject of open discussion dramatizes the possibility of escalation.

The economic consequences of war are likely to be grave as well. If oil fields in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are badly damaged, the international price of oil would soar. Many of the industrialized economies would be pushed into a cycle of stagflation and the economies of the developing world would suffer even more seriously.

As for the political consequences of a regional war in the Gulf, these are almost inestimable. The political landscape of the Middle East is likely to be changed beyond recognition. The shape of a post-Hussein regime in Baghdad is unclear and would not necessarily be an improvement as far as the international community is concerned. Arab governments in the Gulf that fought against a fellow Arab state in a war initiated by the American-led international coalition would be at risk, as would the shaky regime of King Hussein in Jordan.

Such an earthquake in the Middle East could also create severe aftershocks in the nascent international order that is emerging in the wake of the Cold War. It is far from certain that the coalition forged between the US and the USSR would survive a war initiated by the United States without approval by the UN. In early October, General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, explicitly warned that force should not be used in the Persian Gulf unless it was approved by the United Nations.

Yet if the UN publicly debates and then authorizes the use of force before military action is taken, at best the advantage of surprise is lost and at worst, a cycle of pre-emptive logic is set in motion throughout the region – knowing that war is coming, each side will be strongly tempted to attack first.

If war is a bad choice for both, retreat is also very difficult. Unless he is compensated politically and economically, a retreat for Saddam Hussein would be very costly. In addition, Iraq’s resolve is in part a function of the expectation that it is prepared and equipped to suffer far greater casualties for a much longer time than is the American-led coalition. As President Hussein told Ambassador Glaspie at their meeting in July: “Yours is a society which cannot accept ten thousand dead in one battle.”

Finally, President Hussein may be convinced that there is no exit, that even the withdrawal of Iraq’s forces from Kuwait will not satisfy the minimum demands of the forces deployed against him and that they seek his removal from office. Under these conditions, he may deliberately provoke Israel to military action in order to split the Arab members of the international coalition that President Bush has assembled, and unify the Arab world in a war against the US and Israel.

George Bush has committed the United States to secure the withdrawal of Iraq’s forces. If, as time goes on, President Hussein does not withdraw, a retreat by the United States would be politically costly at home. It would also have serious consequences in the Middle East. Even without major armed conflict, through its action Iraq has heightened the strategic vulnerabilities of every state in the Gulf as well as many in the fertile Crescent. If Kuwait’s borders are illegitimate, then so are those of almost every state in the region. When fears of Iraq’s ambitions are reinforced by its relatively sophisticated military capabilities,

including its nascent nuclear weapons capability, an acute perception of threat spreads beyond the Gulf throughout the region.

Compounding these dilemmas are the high costs to the United States of a prolongation of its large military deployment in the Gulf – not only the obvious economic and political consequences at home, especially if the recession deepens – but the impact of the deployment on the politics of the Middle East.

The deployment is large, visible, and intrusive, and for the first time since the death of President Nasser of Egypt, a leader has won the widespread sympathy and support of Arab opinion in the Middle East. He has done so in large part because of the explosive appeal of his amalgam of Arabism and his attacks against Western imperialism and those Arabs who do its bidding. The longer the stalemate continues, the more powerful Saddam Hussein becomes in Arab streets.

### Choosing the Lesser Evil

This analysis suggests that there is no desirable resolution to this crisis. Political leaders consequently must focus on achieving the least damaging outcome. Given the large and ultimately unpredictable costs of war, compelling a negotiated withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait through sanctions seems preferable. If this fails, a war – most likely a high-intensity and destructive war of unprecedented scope – will change dramatically the military and political configuration of the Middle East.

Even if war is avoided through the withdrawal of Iraq’s forces from Kuwait, the post-crisis strategic order will be built around a permanent American military presence in the Gulf. Under these conditions, President Hussein will threaten not only the military security of the Gulf, but also the political security of governments throughout the Middle East as he exploits the intrusive character of foreign military forces and the weaknesses of Arab governments. And the heightened vulnerabilities of governments in the Middle East will be shared by the world as a whole.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait precipitated the first post Cold War crisis. At its deepest level, the crisis is about the shaping and management of the new international order. On this, ironically, Baghdad, Moscow, and Washington are all agreed. Iraq acted as it did in order to prevent the consolidation of what Saddam Hussein considers imminent American pre-eminence in the Gulf. At the first meeting of the National Security Council in Washington after the invasion, the crisis was defined as the first test of American ability to maintain global and regional stability in the post Cold War era.

Yevgeny M. Primakov, a member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Presidential Council and one of his closest advisers, offered a strikingly similar analysis: “However dangerous the Gulf crisis may be in itself and however important it is to settle it, I think we should proceed from the fact that it offers a kind of laboratory, testing our efforts to create a new world order after the cold war.”

The Gulf crisis is so grave because it involves the intersection of political, economic, and strategic vulnerabilities throughout the Middle East. How the crisis is resolved will indeed tell us a great deal about the resilience of the new order in the making. What is already apparent is that priority must be given to crisis prevention. In the new order, as in the old, finding the safest way through a crisis is difficult and fraught with grave dangers; the challenge is to prevent a crisis in the first place. Once in a crisis, there are often no good options, only a choice among lesser evils.

*As Iraq and the American-led coalition wield the threat of war, each risks losing control of events through accident, or because the other side anticipates an attack and decides to strike first.*



# NEW GERMANY: EUROPE'S BENEVOLENT GIANT?

*The old East Germany may have been swallowed whole, but its unique culture could be just what the Federal Republic needs.*

BY MADELEINE POULIN

ONE CAN SAY A LOT ABOUT THE UNIFICATION of Germany; there is economics, sociology, history, even futurology – and of course, there is anxiety. Claude Cheysson, a former French minister of foreign affairs in the Socialist government, hasn't quite gone this far yet. But as he sees it, to speculate about the eventual absorption of Austria into Germany – “So is Austria next?” – is more than just a bad joke: it's a way of saying, “What are they capable of next?” This senior civil servant, who served as European commissioner in Brussels, is clearly annoyed with the manner in which the West Germans have steamrolled their way to political and monetary union, without regard to either the fragile state of the East German economy – “It's a kind of colonization,” he says – or to the delicate structure of European integration.

Despite all the reassurance emanating from Bonn, France wonders whether Germany will lose some of its enthusiasm for forging ahead with the Europe of tomorrow; there is so much to do at home now. After they have finished their work, will a counterbalance to the powerful German voice within the great European concert still be possible? Chancellor Kohl has said he wants “a united Germany in a united Europe.” The first part of this wish has already come true; the second is still a long way off.

In this Parisian apartment overlooking the Luxembourg gardens, there is a prevailing sense of unease. Will Germany be the guarantor of European security or a destabilizing force? It's a question that preoccupies Claude Cheysson, but one for which he can only answer, “I don't really know.”

BUT HOW CAN WE KNOW, after all the new Germany has not taken shape. Maybe it will simply become a larger version of the Federal Republic, adding another sixteen million inhabitants in much the same way that a person adds kilos and now tips the scales at seventy-eight with no change in personality. The former German Democratic Republic did agree after all, to be swallowed whole, leaving no trace of its previous political, economic and legal structure.

In West Germany, however, no one is betting on this. These events are absolutely un-

precedented and even the economic outcome, to take the area most easily measured and analyzed, is still very much in doubt. At the prestigious *Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung*, quartered in a quiet suburb of (West) Berlin, the economist Heiner Flassbeck reminds us that in the space of just a few short months East Germany has gone through a political revolution, followed by two severe economic jolts: the abrupt introduction of a market economy and, most important, the drastic revaluation of its currency from the unofficial, but realistic, rate of 4.4 to the Deutschmark, to parity.

No other country has ever undergone such a transition, Flassbeck points out. No doubt, East German citizens were happy to exchange the anaemic communist marks they had accumulated (up to a certain amount, depending on the age group) for powerful capitalist marks, but the impact on East German businesses and industries was disastrous. In the space of a day, they were rendered totally uncompetitive in the new larger German market. The result in the East was unemployment, disenchantment and numerous demonstrations. Easterners knew immediately that they would remain poor cousins for a long time to come.

“DO YOU THINK IT'S A PLEASURE BEING SWALLOWED up?” asked Ludwig the Second of Bavaria at the time of the first German unification carried out by Bismark in 1871. Even Wilhelm the First, who had done the swallowing, reportedly had nothing more positive to say than, “It's the saddest day of my life.” Why so? Because he feared that the Prussian virtues would be diluted and lost in the larger Germany. This same apprehension exists today in what was once the Federal Republic.

Today's West German intellectuals have different virtues in mind to be sure, and if they worry it is because they believe these only recently acquired virtues to be still fragile. The “virtues” can be summarized in a single word: democracy. After Bismark and the Kaisers, after the brief unhappy interlude of the Weimar Republic, and after Hitler, the West Germans

were presented, as it were, with democracy by the victorious Western Allies. But is democracy all that more firmly entrenched among West Germans than totalitarian socialism was among the East Germans who, having been given it by Soviet victors, now say “no thank you.” It is a question that some dare to ask.

GEORGIA TORNOW IS AN ELEGANT YOUNG woman who manages *Die Tageszeitung*, more familiarly known as “Taz”, the most anti-establishment of West Berlin's newspapers and a vehicle for the avant garde. “Here in the FRG we have experienced democracy, how it works, the checks and balances, its interest groups, etc. But in the GDR, even the most politically astute people have no idea of all this when they try to imagine an effective political order. They have been living in a cocoon all this time.”

Georgia Tornow is impatient. She fears that the sixteen million new citizens will retard Germany's progress toward the kind of society of which she dreams. They will want, she says, a failure-proof social security system and guaranteed employment rather than flexible arrangements which take into account the quality, and not just the standard of life. In the eyes of some, however, most notably the always restless left, the situation appears even more grave.

Dieter Esche was born during the Second World War and has worked with the entire spectrum of left-wing parties, including the Greens. He is one of many Germans who distrusts Germans, who expresses doubts about the depth of democratic sentiment in the Federal Republic and is astonished that West Germany is viewed in Eastern Europe as an exemplary democratic society. The doubts are even greater when it comes to the sixteen million new citizens who have joined the ranks of the expanded Germany. For evidence, Esche points to the traditions of old authoritarian Prussia, the core of East Germany, on to which, over the last forty years, have been grafted habits of obedience to the totalitarian state. He does not discount the possibility that these influences could change the Federal Republic, and above all, he fears the emergence of a new nationalism.



For Esche, nationalism is original sin. "We always understood that the division of Germany resulted from Nazism, from the war that Germany inflicted on all of Europe, from German crimes. We had to live with that. It was a form of penance." That is why, he says, left-wing intellectuals abandoned the national question – the question of German unification – to the right, rather than seizing it and lending it a more democratic hue. It is not clear whether it would have made any difference. In any case, the triumph of Kohl's approach only adds to their feelings of guilt and responsibility.

IF YOU CROSS THE BRANDENBURG GATE INTO the East, past the long scar the Wall has left across Berlin, you hear similar sentiments in certain quarters, but expressed without the guilt. Here too they worry about a right-wing, nationalist revival. According to Tatiana Galla – a rock star and idol who personified for some young people the defiance and anger that preceded the dismantling of the Wall – the shadow of Hitler is already visible.

East Berlin's 10,000 mostly local squatters – with a few West Germans, Dutch and others – have to defend the abandoned buildings in which they live against attacks from "skin-heads" in paramilitary gear. This very unusual group of extremists, also called "Fachos" (from Fascists), not only take on the "punks" and other squatters, but also homosexuals, foreign workers and students mostly from Vietnam and Mozambique.

What is behind these youth gangs? One hears of an extreme right-wing group that has established itself on the street, the Movement for Social Alternatives. In the upper storey of a little apartment building the skin-heads are renovating, two kids sit behind a table. Only the leader talks; he is about twenty years old and has the sober appearance of an office clerk. "We favour a sovereign Germany, free from all foreign influence. We also believe that Germany should withdraw from all political blocks, whether the East block – the Warsaw Pact – or NATO or even the European Community." This is Claude Cheysson's nightmare.

BUT HOW SERIOUSLY SHOULD we take these people? They are a few friends many of whom were imprisoned as juvenile delinquents under the old regime. They have modest jobs and share a taste for German military history. They have no visible means of support, and apart from the skin-heads, have no following in the general population. And yet when the media speaks of dangerous right-wing move-

ments, it is this group which turns up over and over again.

There is a legitimate political party of the extreme right to be sure: the Republican Party. However, the fact of its existence cannot be laid at the feet of the East, it was born in the Federal Republic. Moreover, its information booths were not exactly overrun by interested voters during the run-up to the October elections in the former GDR, and Republicans drew few votes in the East's five new *Länder* or states. Voters placed their fate in the hands of Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats, except in the state of Brandenburg around "red" Berlin, which elected the Social Democrats.

Of course, it's not all over yet. Galloping unemployment in the five Eastern states and the widespread popular sense of being second-class citizens could well have a pernicious influence on the newly-annexed Germans. It should not be forgotten that poverty and humiliation have a history of raising demons in Germany. But much time has passed and societies change, even inside totalitarian rule.

Winston Churchill said of the Germans, they are always either "at your throat or at your feet." But in which Germans is this notorious submission to authority supposed to be most ingrained these days? Nothing says that it must be the East, where the people have developed a healthy blend of cynicism and humour through the years, closer, in fact, to the Polish tradition than the German. Before rising up last year, East Germans long feigned submission, an attribute which often required enormous inge-

nuity, especially in the simple chores of day-to-day living and which helped to develop in them a flare for improvisation. All this was hidden, of course, but private life, as such, was enriched. Mutual aid and solidarity, and for those who had no chance for foreign travel, art and literature – nourished and sustained a kind of internal exile.

THE WEST BERLIN AUTHOR PETER SCHNEIDER speaks of the East's *Nischenkultur* – society that values friendship over success. In a Leipzig apartment lovingly decorated and lined with books, Karin and Stefan Haidekker recall with a hint of nostalgia that their West German visitors used to envy their calmer, more congenial lives. In the same vein, our interpreter in East Berlin told us with some pride about the results of a recent survey showing that East Germans were superior to their Western cousins in at least one way:

they have sex more often and masturbate less. It is undoubtedly the same survey cited several days later in the *New York Times*, according to which East German women are eleven per cent more likely to achieve orgasm.

A central question, therefore, is: what if East Germans, in exchange for the marvelous *Deutschmark*, brought to the marriage an even greater gift, that of the art of living, a sort of languid warmth. Some years ago, the late British social critic Malcom Muggeridge said: "There are hopeful signs that the Germans are becoming less industrious and efficient, and may well soon be as indolent and improvident as we English are ... what a blessed relief."

It is a wish that perhaps is to be fulfilled twenty-five years later with the arrival in serious, industrious, and not very happy West Germany of millions of sons and daughters of the *Nischenkultur*. François Mauriac, the noted French novelist and journalist of the early post-war years, said he loved Germany so much that he was happy there were two of them. And there still are; despite monetary and political union, genuine unification is still far off.

Why then not hope that with time the virtues and strengths of each Germany will combine to create a benevolent giant in the heart of Europe.



James Woodall

# TO NEW YORK, A MESSAGE FROM GENEVA

*Holding an existing treaty hostage to progress on another  
is the wrong way to go about arms control.*

BY DAVID COX

**A**T FOUR IN THE MORNING OF 15 SEPTEMBER – FIVE HOURS AFTER the official deadline for the end of the Fourth Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – four weeks of diplomatic negotiations among the states party to the Treaty appeared to have failed. Amidst threats that the translators would soon leave, the air conditioning would stop and the lights would go out for want of money, the Conference President received a one paragraph report from the Conference drafting committee. It stated simply that the committee was unable to agree on common language describing progress, or the lack of it, in halting the nuclear arms race and, most significantly, in achieving a comprehensive ban on all testing of nuclear weapons.

A latecomer to the conference might well have been puzzled by the stalemate. The past year has been full of promise for arms control and disarmament, particularly in Europe, where the end of the Cold War and reductions in conventional forces must surely be welcomed. Led by Mexico, however, the non-aligned states zeroed in on the single issue – an end to nuclear weapon tests – which they see as the touchstone of superpower good faith in the collective effort to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Geneva Review Conference was only the first round in an on-going attempt to confront the United States on the test ban issue. The second round is scheduled for early January in New York, when, again on the initiative of a group of non-aligned states, the signatories to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty will gather to consider an amendment which would ban all nuclear tests. In turn, the New York meeting will set the tone for future actions and policies which may well determine the ultimate fate of the NPT, for in 1995 the next review conference will decide whether to extend the Treaty, and for how long.

In the last hour of the Review Conference, therefore, it was well understood that the disagreement involved far more than the inability to find common language for a final document. The United States wanted an acknowledgement of its negotiations with the Soviets on verification protocols for the existing threshold treaties as part of a step-by-step approach to a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). Mexico did not agree, taking the view that any such acknowledgement would detract from the essential point that the Bush administration, like its predecessor, had no intention of seeking an end to nuclear weapon tests. On that single sticking point, efforts to achieve compromise language stalled.

WELL AWARE OF THE BROADER ISSUES AT STAKE, CONFERENCE PRESIDENT Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru had prepared a last ditch compromise which he was in no mood to discuss further. When the plenary session reconvened, Mexico asked for the floor and objected, confirming that its month long opposition to the Western position was not a bluff intended to wring the maximum concessions at the eleventh hour. The compromise draft was withdrawn, and, amidst mutual recriminations, the President gavelled the meeting closed.

The failure to achieve a final document is not a death threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 1980 Review Conference was also

unable to agree on a document, and in 1985 failure was averted only by a diplomatic sleight of hand. The five-year review conferences, however, are not simply a month of wrangling about nuclear weapon tests. The NPT is a framework within which the flow of commercial nuclear technology and materials is authorized, regulated and monitored. It is a forum in which the non-nuclear weapon states can reaffirm their own belief that security is enhanced by not having nuclear weapons in their arsenals and address the problems posed by the commercial trade in nuclear goods.

Canada, for example, pressed hard and successfully to secure a draft agreement governing trade in tritium. Such an agreement, which would have been included in a final document, is part of a broader attempt to bring non-nuclear materials, including heavy water and possibly beryllium, into a safeguard system. This is intended to give assurance that materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted into weapons development.

When such tangible, practical purposes of the Review Conference are lost, the damage is not so much to the fundamentals of the Treaty as to the ability of the signatories to tackle cooperatively the serious issues that threaten to erode the non-proliferation regime. These include the failure to date to draw “threshold” or near-nuclear states such as Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan and South Africa into the Treaty, and the monitoring of increasingly large plutonium stockpiles which are a by-product of civilian nuclear facilities.

IN 1963, AFTER SEVERAL YEARS OF UNSUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE a total ban on all nuclear weapon tests, the United States and the Soviet Union were able in a matter of weeks to agree on a partial ban which did not apply to underground tests. The preamble to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, however, reaffirmed the determination of the superpowers to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. Five years later, without any real progress made, the preamble to the NPT repeated the same commitment.

Despite these treaty declarations, it is doubtful whether a compelling case can still be made for a direct linkage between a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests and the substantive issues of non-proliferation. There is a broad scientific consensus, for example, that near-nuclear states do not need to test in order to develop and deploy first generation nuclear weapons – fission weapons, with yields anywhere from a few kilotons to perhaps a hundred kilotons.

Moreover, even if a single test were thought necessary, it would likely be a “deniable” test, such as India undertook in 1974, and Israel and South Africa may have done in 1979. In regional contexts, the fine tuning of nuclear weapons – perhaps only possible through testing – may be militarily unnecessary. The political and deterrent impact of Israeli nuclear weapons in the Middle East, for example, is not diminished by the possibility that they may be of relatively small yields. Used against cities or large military targets, a basic fission weapon is more than adequate to alter irrevocably the course of battle.

The key to home-built nuclear weapons, therefore, is not testing but the availability of weapons-grade fissionable materials. It follows that



the non-proliferation regime would be better served by focussing on the spread of fissionable materials rather than on a treaty commitment to a comprehensive test ban which no longer has the arms control significance that it had in the early 1960s.

PURE ARMS CONTROL LOGIC, HOWEVER, DOES NOT DRIVE THE TEST BAN question. For the non-nuclear weapon states continued testing is a political issue. It is the most flagrant symbol of the nuclear profligacy of the "have" states (meaning essentially the US) who, determined to modernize their arsenals, are unwilling to foreclose potential future nuclear options. The test ban, therefore, has become a good faith issue: if the nuclear weapon states really want the Non-proliferation Treaty, they must show that they care by taking serious measures to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

This linkage between the CTB and the NPT will be argued again in January 1991 when the Conference to amend the Partial Test Ban Treaty reconvenes in New York. Urged on by Parliamentarians for Global Action, an international group currently chaired by Canadian Liberal MP Warren Allmand, a number of the signatories of the 1963 Treaty have acted on the Treaty provisions which require the depositary states – the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union – to call an amendment conference. The proposed amendment is very simple – to make the ban on test explosions total rather than partial.

To many supporters of the NPT regime, the amendment conference is a further example of the wrong way to go about arms control. It is bad enough to hold one treaty ransom to another, as in linking the future of the non-proliferation regime to the comprehensive test ban. Now, in the amendment conference, another valuable treaty is undermined by resorting to the fiction of an amendment which amounts in reality, to a new treaty.

In these circumstances, US policy in New York could easily turn the amendment conference into a multi-million dollar charade. As one of the three states that negotiated the Partial Test Ban, the US has a veto on amendments. In political terms, there is simply no prospect that US policy on testing will change dramatically before January. What is the point, therefore, in convening a conference which cannot succeed in its principal purpose and which could be easily turned into a mere rhetorical show if, at the outset, the United States called for an immediate vote?

IF THE WORST IS NOT TO HAPPEN IN NEW YORK, Canada and other states need to address two key questions. The first, and more important one, is to settle on a policy which, over the next several years, might help to soften the dispute about the comprehensive test ban, and so improve the prospects for the continuation of the NPT regime. The second is to turn the amendment meeting into a more constructive meeting than it seems to promise at present.

Looking ahead to the 1995 NPT Review Conference, there can be no doubt that current Canadian policy places a higher value on the non-proliferation regime than on the achievement of a total test ban. But if it is the case, as now appears, that the one is politically threatened by the failure to achieve progress in the other, then the Canadian government will need to move beyond its rather lame current position whereby it supports a step-by-step approach (no time frame indicated) to a comprehensive test ban.

The most plausible way to do this is to support a very low yield threshold test ban. When the US government talks of a step-by-step, "ratcheting down" approach to a CTB, the great danger is that the next steps down will be both politically and militarily insignificant. Reducing the current threshold of 150 kilotons to 100, for example, will have no significant effect on the US nuclear programme, and will cut no ice with those who plan to support the Mexican position in 1995. Instead, a significant reduction in testing is required which could plausibly be achieved by 1995. While the precise threshold is open to discussion, the threshold chosen must show boldness. This suggests that Canada should declare its support for a threshold around five kilotons, accompanied by a quota on the number of annual tests. Not the least of the strengths of this position is that considerable independent scientific support can be marshalled in support of the claim that the threshold could be verified.

This policy would do little to constrain the ambitions of the near nuclear states – but then, neither would a CTB. On the other hand, it would severely constrain the modernization programmes of states that already have nuclear weapons, and it would encourage further political reviews of the testing issue. Would it satisfy the non-nuclear states? Perhaps only a total ban could do that, but a low threshold would force the non-aligned to reassess their position. Regional security is enhanced by the NPT, which, despite its inequities, does benefit the non-nuclear powers. It would be foolish for them to undermine the protection afforded by a non-proliferation regime if there were significant progress towards a CTB, just as it is foolish now for the US to prejudice its fundamental interest in non-proliferation by its intransigent approach to nuclear weapon testing.

A POLICY WHICH LOOKED AHEAD TO 1995 WOULD ALSO HELP AT THE amendment conference. To avoid a destructive meeting, the amendment conference can best be used not to corner the United States, but to air the issues surrounding the linkage between the NPT and the CTB. There

will be, moreover, a significant difference in the composition of the conference in New York. A number of the threshold states – India, Israel, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, for example – are parties to the partial test ban treaty where they are not to the non-proliferation treaty. While this may complicate life in New York, it provides an unusual opportunity to discuss proliferation problems with the states most likely to acquire nuclear weapons in the future.

Paradoxically, the broad range of issues covered by the 1990 Review Conference convincingly demonstrated that the non-proliferation regime is more important than a comprehensive test ban. But that is why it is necessary to take steps to curtail nuclear weapon testing. Following the failure of the Geneva Review Conference, the Western states, Canada included, will not relish the prospect of the impending amendment conference, but they cannot now dismiss it or simply assume that it has no bearing on the future of the NPT. Nor is it sufficient to argue that a CTB is no longer as important as it once was. If the gavel is not to fall on another failure to reconcile the differences between the nuclear haves and have-nots at the 1995 Review Conference, a renewed effort is required now to salvage the upcoming amendment conference in New York.

### How the Non-proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Weapons Testing are Linked

The Non-proliferation treaty was opened for signature in 1968. When it was being negotiated, the nuclear weapon states were under pressure to match the undertaking of the non-nuclear states not to acquire nuclear weapons, with some recognition of their own obligation to halt the arms race. The result was Article 6:

*"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."*

Since the Treaty came into effect, Article 6 has been the focus of debate between the two classes of states party to the Treaty – the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. The linkage between Article 6 and progress towards a comprehensive test ban is made in the Preamble to the Treaty, which recalls the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty,

*"...to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end..."*

This preambular statement combined with Article 6 has led the non-aligned states to point to a comprehensive test ban as the single most important indication that the nuclear weapon states are keeping their side of the bargain.

# HAITI'S LONG UNHAPPY ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

*The hopes of many Haitians are riding on the outcome of national elections set for December.*

BY CLAUDE MOÏSE



HAITI IS AN ASTONISHING COUNTRY WHICH AROUSES MIXED feelings of admiration and sorrow. It gained national independence in 1804, at a time when most of the Americas were still European colonies, and yet today, after a turbulent history, its level of human and social development can only be described as disastrous. In addition to bankruptcy, Haiti must contend with political repression, widespread corruption, contempt for human life and personal freedom, and the continuing exodus of its people to nearby islands and the large cities of Europe and North America.

The fall of Jean Claude Duvalier in February 1986 raised hopes that Haiti would rediscover the path to dignity, justice and democracy. However, since the dictator fled, observers and citizens alike have been further discouraged by a seemingly interminable transition period marked by violence, coups d'état, shortages, decay of public infrastructure and an inability to establish civil institutions. Anyone acquainted with Haiti's history might well be tempted to view the present situation as a tragic repetition of its tumultuous past – an echo of the many misfortunes that plagued the island throughout the nineteenth century.

HAITI WAS BORN IN VIOLENCE. THE EUROPEANS WHO FOLLOWED Christopher Columbus in 1492, slaughtered the indigenous people, and repopulated the island with slaves from Africa. Under the impulse of burgeoning European capitalism, the land's resources were exploited to the hilt. Thus the foundations were laid for the colonial, slave-owning, racist society within which Haiti incubated for three centuries, until the general upheaval of the 1789 French revolution.

Between 1789 and 1804, white colonists, freed slaves, representatives of colonial power, poor whites and black slaves, struggled to preserve established privileges or gain new rights. Revolts, insurrections, civil wars, foreign campaigns and wars of independence led to the overthrow of colonial rule and Haiti emerged as an independent nation in 1804.

With independence, the victorious coalition of freemen from colonial times, the newly-free elite created by the revolutionary wars and liberated slaves, inherited the task of constructing the new state. Their first obligation was the preservation of Haiti's independence, but there were other challenges: a trade embargo imposed by France, putting the country's economy back on its feet, sharing out colonial wealth and guaranteeing civil liberties. In short, a new social contract had to be written.

Faced with these challenges, the "sacred union" formed against the French under the leadership of General Dessalines, the first Haitian head of state, began to fall apart almost immediately. While all social classes were united in striving towards the consolidation of national independence, they could not agree on economic and social issues. A power struggle had already broken out during the 1791–1804 revolutionary period between two factions of the ruling class. Now the farmers, former slaves, laid claim to land and showed little inclination to working for new masters.

To this background of nineteenth century Haitian political history we must add the danger of war and the threat of attack by the former colonists. Repeated peasant revolts reflected discontent in the country-

side, but the conflicts and power struggles within the ruling classes were the major cause of Haiti's chronic political instability. The assassination of Dessalines by generals from the south of the country marked the beginning of this struggle. It continued with the outbreak of civil war and the partition of the country into a northern state and the Republic of the East and South (1807–1820). Haiti suffered insurrections, conspiracies and plots, civil wars, and *pronunciamentos* (army coups d'état) until the American occupation in 1915.

MILITARISM IN HAITI IS A LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WARS; THE army attended the birth of the nation. It was the military which advanced the nationalist, anti-slavery cause and coordinated the political struggle. The army was the guarantor of the interests of the nation, particularly of the emerging oligarchies, and provided a natural incubator for leaders of the new state. Through the nineteenth century, twenty-four of Haiti's twenty-six presidents were soldiers.

The role of the army became even more central because governments created by coups believed they could survive only by eradicating their opponents. Adversaries, real or potential, had to be kept under close surveillance, and were often driven into exile or physically eliminated. A vicious cycle of repression and conspiracy resulted in irreconcilable government and opposition views. In fact, an opposition as such did not exist in the Haitian system.

Haiti's level of economic and social development deteriorated over time, with problems getting worse on all fronts: population growth, over-exploitation of land and resources, declining productivity, a deteriorating public infrastructure, and financial anarchy. The State existed only during the short lulls between "revolutions." Between 1913 and 1915 the National Assembly elected four presidents; three of whom came to power by *pronunciamentos* and were retroactively approved by the Assembly. It was then that Haiti – like Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua – fell like ripe fruit into the hands of an American imperialism eager to ensure stability in the Caribbean basin and to extend its domination over Central America.



HAITI WAS OCCUPIED BY THE US MARINES FROM 1915 TO 1934, breaking the cycle of coups d'état and scattering the traditional army. With the collapse of the ruling classes' political structure, the Americans imported their own solutions, and imposed their own peace. They had the existing National Assembly elect a new government, overhaul the regime and restore the administrative apparatus. The Americans replaced the army with a police force which, after battle hardening in the struggle against peasant guerillas from 1915 to 1920, became a central pillar of government authority after the occupation. Under American tutelage, the government was stabilized and political turmoil greatly reduced by the simple expedient of replacing parliament with a Council of State, the composition of which was left in the hands of the executive.




The American occupation succeeded neither in changing the system nor in transforming Haitian political culture. It reduced the level of conflict within the ruling elites but failed to deliver them from their demons, eliminate their predilection for dictatorship or restore the rule of law. The *pax americana* lasted for thirty years, until 1946.

The recovery of national sovereignty began in 1930 with the re-establishment of Parliament, and was completed in 1934 with the departure of the last contingents of Marines. Apart from a brief period when an attempt was made to establish parliamentary democracy after the general elections of 1930, power was exercised in the traditional manner under the iron rule of a dictator drawing his strength from an Americanized army – one that was disciplined, hierarchical and obedient.

As in the past, no opposition was tolerated. Opponents of the regime were driven from parliament and the independent press was beaten into submission. The government controlled the entire electoral machinery, and the two legislative chambers contented themselves with rubber-stamping decisions of the executive. One difference from the century before was that the presidents were now civilians recruited from the ranks of the professions – almost all of them lawyers. In the office of president appeared a succession of five lawyers, a soldier with a law degree, and one doctor. And the government of the doctor – François (Papa Doc) Duvalier – proved to be the bloodiest and most destructive Haiti had experienced since 1804.

During the American-imposed peace, successive governments were able to carry out the affairs of state calmly and the country was relatively free of turmoil. With the end of World War II came a thaw, and notions of civil liberty, democracy, social justice, and human rights began to gain ground. Nourished by these ideas, a large opposition movement swept into power in January 1946 – an event that marked a genuine break with the past. For the first time since 1930, a government was overthrown by the popular will.

 THE RESULT WAS A GREAT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHURNING giving rise to new forces: a trade union movement, professional associations, and an array of political groupings. On a political level, the upper middle class began its rise to power by noisily denouncing what it called the exclusiveness of the mulatto bourgeoisie, and by posing as the champion of the middle class and the black masses. Their black-power ideology was fused with the nationalism fashionable under the US occupation in order to justify claims to a position of dominance in the State, as well as admittance into the ranks of the bourgeoisie.

The movement gave birth to the government of President Estimé, which lasted from 1946 to 1950. But hopes were soon dashed. From this new crop of politicians, whether advocates of black power or not, emerged speculators and criminals who scandalously enriched themselves. When challenged by opposition forces, President Estimé succumbed to the temptation of a constitutional coup in order to have himself re-elected. He then fell victim himself, in May 1950, to a coup d'état organized by Colonel Paul Magloire. Taking over the presidency after thoroughly manipulated elections, Magloire was himself forced to resign six years later under the pressure of widespread popular opposition.

In 1957, political interest and unrest flared anew: the number of political parties mushroomed, newspapers appeared, and the island was awash in radio programmes. However civil war threatened, and the ensuing crisis engulfed five provisional governments before a military junta finally cleared the decks, enabling Papa Doc to defeat his principal rival, Louis Déjoie, in largely fraudulent presidential and legislative elections.

The political struggles of 1946, 1950 and 1957 proved that political power was held at the pleasure of the heads of the army. Duvalier pondered this, no doubt, and moved quickly to neutralize the military in order to ensure a lengthy stay in power. He bribed officers, "macoutized"\* the army, and created his own militia and parallel police force loyal only to him.

Duvalier did not stop there. He destabilized all traditional centres of political power in Haiti through unprecedented demonstrations of force. Besides taming Parliament and assassinating his opponents, he defied the Americans, took on the Roman Catholic hierarchy and subjected the middle class to unsurpassed levels of repression. Finally, he dismantled the democratic organizations and labour unions that had sprung up during the movement of 1956–57 and terrorized the peasantry by unleashing the large landowners.

Under Duvalier, personal dictatorship took on an unprecedented criminal character. As we now know all too well, the results were catastrophic: thousands of dead and disappeared, social and political collapse, the spreading of corruption and mediocrity throughout society, the dismissal of qualified public servants, and mass emigration. Haiti lost an enormous number of trained personnel and young people – the best and brightest of an entire generation. Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeded his father, doing little to correct the disaster.



IN THE END, DUVALIERISM REPRESENTS A CRITICAL MOMENT IN the long history of a country that seems devoted to the development of underdevelopment. It was under the "macoute" regime between 1975 and 1986 that the most socially mobile and vigorous democratic movement in recent history took root, raising political awareness among Haitians, and encouraging democratic ideas. It was back room manoeuvring and public demonstrations involving the entire country in a campaign of sustained pressure and mass resistance, that finally destabilized Jean-Claude Duvalier's government.

Unlike some earlier changes in government, the political succession of 1986 plunged the whole society into crisis. Haiti not only woke up from a long dictatorship, but it began to understand the historic failure of the bourgeoisie and the ruling elite to rise to the challenges presented by development and democracy. The present crisis is aggravated by this failure, and by the fragility of the democratic movement. The old ways, represented by the Duvalierists and the entire range of forces opposed to change, are not quite dead; while the new ways, nurtured in the institutions of civil society and democratic political parties, have not yet succeeded in asserting themselves.

The present predicament can be attributed largely to the disunity of the democratic movement in a society that has few points of reference and has lost its traditional methods of settling conflict. The usual supreme authority, the army, has disintegrated; the state is crumbling, and the ongoing crisis at the centre has cleared the way for all sorts of gangsters. To the general anti-dictatorial anger of the population, the impotent State responds with whatever is expedient. Anti-democratic elements, clinging to their privileges, respond with banditry and terror.

TO THE GREAT COST AND ANGUISH OF THE COUNTRY THE ORGANIZED democratic movement remains crippled by a lack of cohesion and strategic vision. Meanwhile, the most resolute people are also among the most criminal of the anti-democratic elements. The explosiveness of the elections to be held in December stems from the determination of the Duvalierists – seeing the advanced state of decay of the central authority and the wrangling that undermines the democratic forces – to act against the clear aspirations of the population.

The interests of various social and political camps, and the international context, would seem to indicate that the "macoute" dictatorship has no chance of returning to power. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that democracy will easily triumph. Under current conditions, successful elections represent the first basic step on the path to democracy; even if they succeed, the largest task remains to be accomplished. Democratic forces must bring together a national movement capable of mobilizing the nation's resources to tackle the problems of democratization and development.

\*Papa Doc Duvalier organized a private military force, the Tontons Macoutes, to suppress his opponents.

# EMPTY SHELVES AND EMPTY MONEY

*In the Soviet Union's most difficult hour, paralysis overwhelms the government.*

BY MICHAEL BRYANS

**A**FTER AN AUTUMN OF INCESSANT RAIN in Moscow, and equally endless wrangling over competing approaches to economic recovery – a period that could fairly be dubbed the “battle of the plans,” Shatalin, Ryzhkov, the grand compromise – the Soviet parliament and Mr. Gorbachev’s government finally agreed on one of them. But calling what they have to do a “plan” is misleading. The Soviet Union is in uncharted waters, its peoples inventing a new political economy for themselves and beginning from somewhere we have never been.

It is not an experiment they are taking part in voluntarily, and like the Irish joke about the lost man who asks a local farmer how to get to Dublin, and the farmer replies, “Lad, if you want to get there, this is a poor place to start from” – Soviets, or Russians as many Soviets who are Russian prefer to call themselves, must start from where they are.

Moscow air is thick with the population’s depression and apprehended misery, but there are those who have more objective ways of gauging the public mood. Uri Levada is a sociologist by profession, attached to the new centre for public opinion studies which has its offices on a side street not far from the famous GUM department store – a place now eerily devoid of goods and shoppers.

SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION POLLING IS NOT THE high art it has become in the West; methods and results are often criticized by Western pollsters as suspect. However, the striking trends in popular opinion revealed by Levada and his colleagues would overwhelm even a large statistical margin of error. The losers in this survey – governments, politicians and optimism of any kind – aren’t even close.

Pulling a hand-drawn chart down from the wall displaying the September polling results, he points to the lines which show that people’s expectation for the future has slipped yet again. Only ten percent think things will get better and over fifty percent, and rising fast, expect life in the USSR to get worse. Positive expectations ticked up briefly in the spring

after Gorbachev’s accession to the presidency, but have been in a long steep dive since May after his prime minister predicted rising prices for basic foods and other staples.

Levada continued with more gloomy statistics: fifteen percent, and rising, anticipate civil war or a coup d’état; only seven percent of the population believe their life to be better since Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985, and two out of three think life is worse. And as an aside, he adds that Gorbachev’s personal popularity has dwindled from over fifty percent at the end of last year down to less than thirty percent in July.

ALONG WITH ALL THE OTHER SHORTAGES, Russians seem to have run out of faith. Modern economies run on it – faith that the currency in one’s hands will in one year be worth more or less as much as it is today, faith that not everyone who has money deposited at your bank will attempt to withdraw it the same day you do. It is the essential bargain citizens make with the future that allows for savings, investment and all the things that make up a prosperous, civilized life. It is a shell game that everyone, but most of all a nation’s institutions, has a duty to keep going.

And it is here in the figure of Gorbachev, and the behaviour of his all-Union government, that there lies a great puzzle: why do they seem to be doing nothing about the mounting political chaos and economic misery that surrounds them? It is a puzzle because Gorbachev and his advisors have demonstrated masterful political agility and humanity for over five years. Yet in what is arguably the USSR’s most difficult hour – the country’s leaders openly acknowledge that economic collapse at this point will almost certainly mean the demise of the place we call the USSR – paralysis and sheer fecklessness appear to have gripped the centre.

Gorbachev’s first act under the emergency powers given him by parliament in late September was a Presidential Decree ordering state enterprises to fulfil production quotas under the five year plan, and then to draft – yet

again – university students into vegetable picking for part of their first semester. These edicts were greeted by Muscovites I met with open derision – deck chair rearranging of the most desperate kind.

Another explanation for the paralysis, which finds fertile ground in the very active rumour mill, is that the existing government ministries, which have little stake in real reform, are engaged in active sabotage of Gorbachev’s and others’ efforts. In early October *Izvestia* ran an investigative piece about the ever growing shortage of meat in Moscow shops. It seems that in an effort to obtain more meat, the state procurement agency responsible decided it would increase prices paid to state farms. The rub was that the agency announced its intentions three months in advance of the actual price rise. The result – as any first year economics student could have predicted – was that the already pitiful meat supply vanished altogether. State farms, quite sensibly from their perspective, stopped slaughtering meat to wait for the new prices. The food ministry had finally discovered the microeconomic power of price signals – sort of.

Question: was this an example of an inept state enterprise experiment or deliberate sabotage by a recalcitrant bureaucracy? Answer: it is impossible to prove, and, in any case, as one person expert in the ways of Soviet bureaucracy put it, the central planners don’t need to conspire actively against economic reform. All they have to do is sit on their hands and say, “you can’t do this without us.”

THE EXASPERATION AND GENUINE DISAPPOINTMENT with Gorbachev’s regime runs deep within the intellectual and expert community – the kind of people governments at every level will need on their side if the country is to have a chance at a stable future. Sociologist Levada was only one of several observers of the Soviet political and economic state of mind who told me that the central government under Gorbachev, and his widely disliked prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, was becoming more feeble as the weeks passed. The sense is not one of recrimination, but more a sad realization that a once admired man is no longer in the game, for



whatever reason, that the levers of power at the central government's disposal are just not connected to anything, and so it's time to look elsewhere.

Nikolai Shmelev is a respected pillar of the movement for genuine economic and democratic reform. Head of the USA and Canada Institute's economics department, novelist, member of the Congress of People's Deputies, and self-professed "economic liberal," he


toiled in the intellectual wilderness for years before Gorbachev's *glasnost* set him loose on the impossible task of rescuing the Soviet economy. Shmelev's disappointment with the present government is palpable.

He has long promoted a scheme, now shared by many other reformers in the country, to buy several tens of billions of dollars of Western consumer items to sell in Soviet stores. This would soak up the vast quantity of roubles now held in people's hands, avert hyperinflation during the transition to a market economy, and not incidentally, quickly improve the grim, deprived lives of ordinary citizens. He is perplexed by what he sees as the indifference of the Gorbachev government:

I know Mr. Gorbachev has begun to understand the enormity of the situation, but our government is so stubborn. I am afraid of this tradition of the Soviet leadership to despise its own people – just as the old aristocracy despised the people. They find it hard to spend such an enormous sum of money on medicine, pants, cosmetics, personal computers. Why? In our history we have spent our money on huge Egyptian pyramids – and now to spend it on such trifles?

AFTER OUR INTERVIEW, SHMELEV WAS OFF ON A trip to Bonn with Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian republic. This action itself says a lot. Yeltsin is widely seen, in the West at least, as a less appealing character than Gorbachev. But Yeltsin's stock is rising in public opinion polls, and most important for those who want to get things done, he is perceived by Russians as wanting to move more quickly and decisively than Gorbachev. An obvious advantage in a situation which cries out for someone to do something, but also a great danger. In desperate situations, "do something" can become "do anything" – a focus of power for opportunists and ideologues.

Regarding the opportunists of Russia's last great political upheaval in 1917, Adam Ulam, a pre-eminent historian of the Russian revolution, wrote that the Bolsheviks did not



seize power, they picked it up. "Any group of determined men could have done what the Bolsheviks did in Petrograd in October 1917: seize a few key points of the city and proclaim themselves the government. But the government of what? ... the Russian empire was in full dissolution."

The sense of disarray in the Soviet capital makes historical comparisons of this kind unavoidable. The impression that governments at all levels are losing their grip is growing. One of Gorbachev's principal economic advisors, Abel Aganbegyan, admitted to the Soviet parliament recently that no one actually knows what is happening to the economy. In Lenin-grad, the council of a local district (essentially a city ward) debated the option of declaring independence and printing its own currency – for the moment, cooler heads prevail.

ON THE FACE OF IT SUCH ACTIVITY SEEMS ABSURD, yet it is driven by its own inner logic. The rouble has lost so much value – "empty money" was one common euphemism – that it no longer makes sense to work for them. People don't need roubles and neither do state enterprises and republics. An increasing proportion of wholesale trade occurs on the barter system: cotton for wheat, meat for oil – a reversion to feudal era economics and yet another sign of the disintegration of the state.

Packages of foreign cigarettes, preferably "Marlboro", are displacing the national currency, the rouble, as the medium of exchange, a daily indignity that cannot help but have a corrosive effect on what little remains of the popular sense of what it means to be Soviet.

Nicolai Shmelev is impatient with questions about what a functioning Soviet economy would look like after the immediate crisis. He is thinking in months and weeks, not years: "So what kind of economy would emerge from the present mess? God knows. We ourselves don't know. I have no comprehensive vision of what kind of society it will be in ten years. But I hope we have had enough suffering and enough madness."

To set against all the pessimism, a glimmer of light. Until the various new property laws come into effect, there remains only one tiny crack in the door of the state's complete monopoly over economic activity – the so-called "cooperative." Two years ago, according to Shmelev, there were about 100,000 co-op members in the country generating production that could be measured in millions of roubles. Today

there are five million co-op members with a turnover of some sixty billion roubles – restaurants, taxis, and other small businesses. These co-ops have operated in the face of a hostile state bureaucracy "strangling them," in Shmelev's words, and a large proportion of the population regarding them as exploiters and mafia. "A miracle," says Shmelev – "grass growing through the concrete."

IF WORLD EVENTS IN THE LAST EIGHTEEN remarkable months have taught us anything, it is to be circumspect about predicting what will happen next. But for observers of the Soviet economy, it is clear that the issue is not whether the USSR will be a wealthy nation by Western standards within ten or twenty years, rather, it is whether there will be a Soviet Union at all by the middle of the decade, or even by the end of next year. The disappearance of the Soviet state would not necessarily be a calamity for the world. It all depends on how it's done.

If it is smaller political units, republics or regions, that pick up the political reigns and work with people to create local productive economies, why not. But such large-scale political upheavals have the nasty tendency to become violent and dangerous. The 1989 East European revolution was a rare event in that respect. So while the West has an enormous stake in how events unfold in the USSR, it is also the case that we have very little influence on the outcome – which is no reason not to worry about it.

"Why would a peace and security institute be interested in our economy?" a Russian friend asked me as we sped along in her state-supplied car with driver. "Because a country with 285 million impoverished, sullen, people and 30,000 hydrogen bombs is a menace to the world. We want you to be content and prosperous." When she translated for the driver, he laughed.

# THE GULF CRISIS AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN EQUATION

BY JIM LEDERMAN

HE NEAR-UNANIMOUS SUPPORT by Palestinians for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is yet another example of what happens when a popular national myth confronts and then takes control over national political policies. The Iraqi invasion brought the Palestinian masses out into the streets of Jordan and the West Bank in an extraordinary show of support for Saddam Hussein.

Palestinian newspapers of all political hues in East Jerusalem were unanimous in their praise of the Iraqi leader. Even among Palestinians who are Israeli citizens, the degree of applause was remarkable. A telephone poll released on 9 August, showed that 62 percent supported the invasion and 69 percent believed that Saddam Hussein was a national hero. Only 15 percent thought he was mad or irrational.

The practical consequences of this support were felt almost immediately. Egypt ordered its frontier posts to restrict the entry of Palestinians. Thousands of Palestinians who had been working in the Gulf states were expelled. The \$250 million they sent annually in remittances to their families in the Israeli-occupied territories slowed to a trickle. And once again, the PLO was condemned and became politically isolated in most of the Western world. To understand why the Palestinians acted as they did, and why they acted as uniformly as they did, one has to examine the context of events that were occurring in the Middle East at the time immediately prior to the invasion.

THE KUWAITIS WERE AMONG THE MOST WIDELY unpopular people in the Arab world. Whether they appeared in Cairo, Tunis, or Beirut, they were viewed as arrogant spendthrifts who used their money to throw their weight around and to ride roughshod over local sensitivities. The Sabahs, the ruling family, in particular, were viewed by most Palestinians as avaricious and unwilling to contribute more to the Palestinian cause than was absolutely necessary to contain Palestinian unrest at home.

Moreover, the Palestinian's political position prior to the invasion of Iraq looked particularly bleak. The Americans had suspended their low-level contacts in June in the wake of a terrorist attack on Israeli beaches. Israel's government had become dominated by ideological and security hawks. There was a crisis in Palestinian-Egyptian relations. The Soviet Union had withdrawn as an active patron. And the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories had stagnated and turned on itself. In July, more Palestinians had been killed by other Palestinians than by Israeli soldiers.

ANOTHER MAJOR REASON FOR PALESTINIAN despondency, which has gone virtually unnoticed in the Western press, is the massive Soviet immigration to Israel. Some 90,000 Soviet Jews had arrived in Israel in 1990 by the time the invasion occurred, and Israeli officials were predicting that immigration might reach two million by the end of the decade. This challenged one of the central Palestinian theses – that even if the Arabs could not defeat the Israelis on the battlefield, the far higher Palestinian birthrate would soon change the demography of the area and cause a political crisis.

To expatriate Palestinians, the arrival of the Soviet Jews meant more Jewish soldiers and, eventually a stronger Israeli economy. To Palestinians in the occupied territories the new arrivals represented an immediate threat to their jobs in Israel, and more importantly, a huge new source of Jewish settlers for the occupied territories. To Israeli Arabs, they represented a twofold threat. The first was that settling the immigrants was putting such a strain on the Israeli economy that Arab efforts to achieve parity with Jews in government grants for municipal services would be halted. The second was that Israeli Arabs, because of their high birthrate, were on their way to becoming a significant fulcrum of power in the Knesset. With the arrival of the Soviet Jews, this potential source of power would be lost.

ONE OF THE CENTRAL NATIONAL MYTHS THAT Palestinians turn to in times of crisis is that Zionist Jews are modern Crusaders – a foreign Western body implanted within the Arab midst, which can and will be cauterized by the sword. The model for almost all Palestinians is Salladin, the Kurdish general who drove the Crusaders from Jerusalem in 1187, and reestablished Moslem hegemony in the holy city.

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had cultivated an image of himself as the modern Salladin. His willingness to confront the American superpower, his ability to sow fear in the Gulf sheikdoms where the Palestinian workers had few civil rights, and his calls for holy war against the infidels the Saudis had invited onto

their territory, elicited an immediate emotional response among Palestinians. In many ways, Saddam Hussein was viewed as a secular messiah.

The effects on the Israeli-Palestinian equation have been substantial. The right in Israel launched a campaign of “we told you so” – Palestinians had entered into a perfidious alliance with Israel's most dangerous enemy and so they could not be trusted. Israeli doves, including many who had worked hard for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, were

left in disarray. The doves' elder statesman former foreign minister Abba Eban, stated, “My colleagues and I cannot possibly have a fruitful discussion with Palestinians who applaud the brutality of Saddam.” Knesset member Yossi Sarid, a leading peace activist added, “You need to put on a gas mask to protect yourself against the poisonous smell of the pro-Saddam stand of the Palestine Liberation Organization.”

THE ISRAELI LEFT'S PRIMARY INTERLOCUTORS in the occupied territories, like Feisal al Hussein, arguably the most influential political figure in the West Bank, tried to soften the effect the Palestinian stand was having in Israel. He stated that Palestinian support for Saddam was “a sign of frustration.” Furthermore, Palestinians were not for the Iraqi invasion, but against the “American double standard” of supporting Israel despite its conquest of the West Bank and Gaza, while opposing Iraq's similar conquest of Kuwait. The latter argument made little impression on the Israelis, who recalled that they did not launch the war that led to the capture of the West Bank, while Iraq's action was one of naked aggression.

For the majority of the Israeli centre and right wing the emphasis has shifted to another concern, the fear that any resolution of the Gulf crisis, including an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, will somehow be linked to Western efforts to pressure Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Both the right and the left are, however, united by a concern over the as yet unimaginable short and long-term consequences of a possible Iraqi decision to launch a major international terrorist campaign led by Palestinian terrorist mercenaries like Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal.

*This is the second in a series of articles Peace&Security will present on issues that comprise the Middle Eastern and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Jim Lederman, a Canadian, is the longest-serving foreign correspondent in Israel. He is currently finishing a book on US media coverage of the Intifadah.*



## FROM THE DIRECTOR

*Policy reviews – when are they more trouble than they are worth?*



REVIEWS OF FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY POLICY, defence policy and aid policy are not always a good idea – at least in the somewhat irregular manner in which Canada has traditionally undertaken them. One thing we have surely now learned from recent history is that events can move very quickly – the agenda is a continuously evolving one, and perhaps we should now be looking at rolling reviews and annual white papers on the British model. This would help ensure that the consultation process is never closed, nor focussed in great spasms of input, followed by long periods of silence.

There are some lessons specific to the Canadian government context: most of the policy review exercises of the late 1960s and early 1970s – with the possible exception of the Defence White Paper of 1971 – were poorly conceived and executed, with full involvement of the top levels of government. The net results were reviews that did more harm than good, and some of that harm has been quite lasting.

The then new Conservative Government's "Grey Paper" on foreign policy of 1985 (*Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations*) was largely countermanded by the subsequent Special Joint House-Senate committee report (Hockin-Simard) as well as by the government's own response to this parliamentary study. This response was never enshrined as official policy in a White Paper, nor was the earlier Grey Paper ever withdrawn, raising the possibility of confusion in a number of areas. Some subsequent debates and decisions about independent Canadian agendas, multilateral participation and bilateral coordination with the US might conceivably have been more straightforward if a clearer review process had produced a more definitive result, but this is debatable. These discrete and sometimes conflicting agendas, and the contentious issues which tend to focus them, are the hardy perennials of Canadian foreign policy.

FOR ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HOW THE PROCESS handicaps the product, we need only look to the Defence White Paper of 1987. It was motivated by a perceived need to review the means

for security and defence policy, but was undertaken at what proved to be a supremely unlucky time for the reviewers – just when the objectives of Canadian defence policy, after remaining largely static for some decades, had begun to shift under their feet. Many of us were strongly critical of the White Paper at the time, mostly because we thought it misdirected. Some of us judged its goals unrealizable as well.

In the end, fiscal concerns did more to gut the White Paper than did reduced East-West tensions. However, the fact that new directions for the armed forces were once again blunted, and raised expectations were once again dashed, has also done lasting harm. On balance in this case, "twere better never to have reviewed at all, than to have reviewed and lost."

It is not clear whether or to what extent this mixed history of recent Canadian foreign policy and defence reviews may have contributed to a reluctance to plunge in again in 1989, even after Mr. Gorbachev had quite evidently begun to turn the international order inside out. Other factors obviously played a role, including the constant necessity for policy fire-fighting – intensified because of these very developments – and internal resource and organizational preoccupations.

There was also prolonged official and political debate in Canada about whether Gorbachev would bring qualitative change. Canada, while never a leader in armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, had always been one of the toughest in the West on issues of human rights abuses of the Soviet totalitarian system. The net result was that our government was one of the slowest in the West to acknowledge and then respond to this change.

ONCE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER, THE INDISPENSABLE policy review proceeded apace and has so far produced well. A Minister has provided personal and institutional commitment, and has been prepared to carry the results of the review into dialogue with interested Canadians and with our partners abroad. Officials seem, from the outside, to have managed their internal analyses and debates relatively expeditiously. The immediacy of substantive change in some of the pillars of the international system seems to have given direction to the review so there was neither the need nor the temptation to start out from abstract first principles, as, for example, the 1970 review had done.

Many Canadians have contributed to the review process, some in more organized ways

than others. Many of us in the field took the opportunity to organize consultations, prepare papers, and contribute to the mechanisms of policy formulation. The public products of the security policy review have, so far, also been conditioned to promote ongoing dialogue – mainly a series of speeches by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, beginning with the exploratory McGill University speech in February, on principles of our future relationship with Europe, and the Humber College speech in May confirming Canadian directions on Europe.

There was also an interesting debate in the House of Commons on 31 May triggered by an Opposition motion which referred to a lack of policy initiative in the foreign policy area. Mr. Clark has moved on to open up the debate on security questions in the Asia-Pacific arena, which has now helped generate lively and important discussions with our Pacific partners.

IN THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY THAT HAVE SO FAR emerged, there has been some intriguing analysis and risk-taking. The Canadian position on the strengthening and enlarging of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), long a preoccupation of this Institute, was well ahead of that of either Washington or London, and helpful in moving NATO forward on the issue. We, outside government, do not know what all the other shoes are that are supposed to drop. We understand that there has been some thinking about policies on multilateral participation which should be well-timed to respond to the many new challenges and opportunities facing the UN.

Of course, there is one big shoe still to drop, and that is the defence policy review – much promised and often delayed. In fairness we should remember that the '87 review came out when it came out, and as it came out, in part through desperation – another unhappy imperative of the spasmodic review approach. In light of the events of the past few months, we must recognize that the issues facing Canadians in the defence area have changed radically. Mr. McKnight has stated unequivocally that "the geopolitical basis for much of the [1987] policy had evaporated" by the end of 1989. The new geopolitical realities are even more complex and our defence options need to be even more closely and flexibly geared to our foreign policy and security policy agendas. All Canadians will have a stake in getting these reviews right as we move through the 1990s.

– BERNARD WOOD

IN AUGUST 1990, THE CANADIAN AND QUEBEC governments called on the Canadian armed forces in two very different situations. On 6 August, the Government of Quebec made a formal request for aid from the Canadian armed forces in order to deal with the confrontation between the Mohawk Indians and the Sûreté du Québec (SQ) at Oka and at the Mercier Bridge. Four days later, on 10 August, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that two naval destroyers and a supply ship, along with eight hundred personnel, would travel to the Persian Gulf to aid the multinational force gathering there to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. In both cases, authority for the actions undertaken derives from the National Defence Act.

The National Defence Act or Defence of Canada Act is a lengthy document which outlines the regulations governing the Canadian Armed Forces, including inter alia, regulations for court martials, calling up and releasing men and women from the armed forces, and regulations for reserve forces.

#### **Aid to the Civil Power: The Army at Oka and Kahnawake**

Part XI of the National Defence Act provides for aid of the civil power. This means that the armed forces can be called to aid the civil power in instances where it can no longer control a situation. This differs from the 1970 use of the armed forces in Quebec during the FLQ crisis. In that case the federal government declared that a state of apprehended insurrection existed. Under the War Measures Act this gave them special powers of arrest.

The War Measures Act has since been replaced by a new Emergencies Act which contains a number of safeguards against abuse of the powers to be used in an emergency, provides for Parliamentary review and gives provinces a greater role than they had under the War Measures Act. Since the actions at Oka and the Mercier Bridge were carried out under the authority of the National Defence Act, it must be assumed that it was determined that an emergency did not exist.

According to the National Defence Act, the request for aid must be made by the attorney general of the province in which the situation arises. The request can be made on the initiative of the attorney general but may also be based on information received from a judge of a superior, county or district court.

Section 275 states that aid can be requested

## **CALLING OUT THE TROOPS**

### *The National Defence Act and How It's Used*

when "... a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with ... occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur." The attorney general must make the request in writing. The act provides an outline of the wording that should be used in the request.

The request is made to the Chief of the Defence Staff who from that point onwards makes decisions about the number of forces needed, and may increase or decrease them as he sees fit. The forces stay in place until notification is received from the attorney general that the aid is no longer required. Previously, the National Defence Act required the province requesting the aid to pay all costs incurred in using the armed forces. Under the new Emergencies Act, this provision was changed and the federal government now pays for the use of the forces. Within seven days of the request from a province, the attorney general must hold an inquiry into the circumstances requiring the call-up of forces and give the report to the Secretary of State of Canada.

In the incident at Oka, the army initially undertook to relieve the SQ at Oka and Kahnawake. On 27 August, when the Government of Quebec determined that negotiations had broken down, it asked the armed forces to proceed with the mandate initially given to them by the Quebec government. The mandate included removal of the barricades, restoration of freedom of movement on roads and bridges, removal of strong points, and the restoration of public order. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, gave the orders to the forces in place to proceed with this mandate.

#### **Active Status: Canadian Navy to the Persian Gulf**

The use of the armed forces in the defence

of Canada is also provided for by the National Defence Act. Section 31 states that the ... Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, ... thereof ... on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so (a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or (b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.

Under Section 32, if Parliament is not meeting at the time the forces are placed on active service, "... a proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parliament within ten days..."

Traditionally, an order-in-council is used to place troops on active service. The three naval vessels assigned to join the multinational force in the Gulf by Prime Minister Mulroney left Canada on 24 August. However, at the time, no order-in-council was signed placing the forces on active service. Parliament was due to reconvene on 24 September. To avoid calling Parliament any sooner, the naval forces could not officially be placed on active service until 14 September.

This presented a problem of timing when the Canadian contingent found itself ready to enter the Suez Canal two days prior to the expected order-in-council. According to the regulations in United Nations resolutions establishing the sanctions and their enforcement, those military forces taking part in the enforcement process are on active status once they enter the zone. Since the Canadians would enter the zone immediately upon leaving the Canal, the Canadian ships remained in Sicily until their passage through the Canal would coincide with active status.


Once on active status, the Canadian forces receive their orders from the Chief of the Defence Staff. Canadian forces operate under rules of engagement established prior to departure. The multinational force undertaking to enforce the UN sanctions has been operating under general guidelines established by the UN and developed through consultations among the military chiefs of the countries involved. □

—JANE BOULDEN

*Jane Boulden is a researcher and writer based in Kingston, and holds a Masters degree in international law from Queen's University.*



## DEFENCE NOTES



### Ballistic Missiles and the Gulf Crisis

The Gulf crisis has focussed attention once again on the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Iraq is believed to have deployed three types of ballistic missiles: the Scud-B, a Soviet built short-range missile with a range of 300 kilometres, and two Iraqi developments of the Scud-B, the *al-Husayn* and the *al-Abbas*. The *al-Husayn*, with a range of 650 kilometres, has a greater fuel capacity and a larger warhead than the Scud-B. The *al-Abbas* is a further modification which increases the range to around 900 kilometres. Iraq also has under development the *el-Abid*, a three-stage rocket designed to launch satellites into orbit, but which could also serve as an intermediate-range missile.

In a controversial change of policy, on 5 September the US State Department issued an export license for missile casings destined for Brazil. Several press reports, neither confirmed nor denied by Brazilian officials, claim that contracts were signed in 1989 establishing cooperative projects between Brazil and Iraq on missiles and satellites.

September press reports also claimed that in 1989 Western intelligence had detected the Iraqi test of a missile armed with a chemical warhead. According to these reports, Iraq unsuccessfully sought an agreement with Mauritania to allow further tests in deserted areas of that country. Baghdad used chemical weapons repeatedly in the last phases of the war with Iran, mainly in the form of canisters dropped from airplanes. Iraq manufactures both mustard and nerve gas, and is

believed to have significant stockpiles of both.

### Ballistic Missile Defences

On 9 September, Israel for the first time flight-tested the Arrow, an anti-tactical ballistic missile intended to intercept and destroy short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles of the Scud type. Although the test was described as a success, Israeli officials stressed that many more tests would be required before the missile could be considered ready for production. The Arrow development is co-funded by Israel and the United States.

Meanwhile, in Washington key administration officials have stressed the connection between events in the Gulf and the importance of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In July Henry Cooper, former US defence and space arms negotiator in Geneva and a strong supporter of SDI, was appointed as the new director of the SDI programme. Threatened with cutbacks which could reduce funds for the research programme, Cooper has strongly emphasized the importance of SDI as a counter to the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Perhaps coincidentally, in August the US Senate proposed to redirect SDI funding from "exotic" space-based technologies to land-based ballistic missile defences which, in the short term, would be less likely to threaten the ABM Treaty and have more immediate application to defence against short- and intermediate-range missiles.

### The US Defence Budget

In late October, the House-Senate Conference Committee finally reached agreement of a sort on the fiscal year 1991 US defence budget. The compromise agreement authorized total expenditures of US\$288.3 billion. While many programmes were cut, no major projects were abandoned. The SDI budget was held to \$2.9 billion, almost \$2 billion less

than requested by the Pentagon. Funding for the B-2 was continued at levels close to Pentagon requests, but dispute continued between the Senate and the House on the future of the programme. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney fought to preserve the SDI programme, but earlier signaled his own intentions in mid-August when he cut nine destroyers and one submarine from the Navy building programme. In cutting one of the two advanced, high speed Seawolf attack submarines, Cheney opened the door to the critics in the Congress who want to cancel the entire Seawolf project. The Seawolf, at a cost of US\$1.2 billion per submarine, may be judged unnecessary if the Soviet threat continues to decline.

### Rethinking US Defence Policy

While the FY 1991 budget promised few changes other than fiscal restraint, long-term defence policy appeared destined for change. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Pentagon proposed a fundamental restructuring of US military forces based on the assumption that the defence budget would shrink by ten percent over five years. The plan, reportedly overseen by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and first presented to the President in June, is premised on the assumption that, once the Soviets have withdrawn from Eastern Europe, it would take up to two years to mobilize a full-scale, multi-front attack on Western Europe. It envisages reducing US forces in Europe to between 100,000 and 125,000 as part of an overall reduction which would cut the armed forces by 500,000 from the current level of 2.1 million.

Further key elements in the proposal include cutting the number of navy aircraft carrier groups from fifteen to eleven, and reducing the number of active Army divisions from eighteen to twelve. In addition, the plan calls for the

establishment of two "reconstitutable" divisions which would stockpile equipment and rely on small cadres of permanent soldiers while relying on the rapid call-up of reservists to bring the divisions to operational strength. In general, the plan emphasises the need to respond to a variety of regional conflicts rather than to the defence of Western Europe against the Soviets.

### The End of World War II

Largely unheralded in the midst of the Gulf crisis, on 12 September the victors of World War II relinquished their military occupation rights in Berlin. In Moscow the British, French, US and Soviet foreign ministers signed a treaty representing the final settlement with Germany. Building on the "two plus four" formula developed in Ottawa in February, the occupying powers surrendered their right to maintain air corridors to Berlin, to oversee the administration of the city, and to determine the boundaries of Germany. In exchange, the two Germanies agreed that the new unified country will limit the size of its army, will not acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and will consist of the area enclosed by the boundaries of the two countries as they were immediately before unification. On 2 October 1990 the two Germanies were officially united.

The combined German armies, now numbering over 600,000, will be reduced to 370,000 over the next four years. In a separate agreement, Germany undertook to pay Moscow \$US7.5 billion to resettle Soviet soldiers in the Soviet Union. The unified Germany will be a member of NATO. However, there are restrictions. Until 1994, German units assigned to NATO will not be allowed to deploy in East Germany. After 1994, German but not foreign NATO troops will be allowed to deploy in East Germany, but without nuclear weapons.

— DAVID COX

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### NPT Review

The Fourth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), meeting in Geneva from 20 August to 15 September, failed to agree on a consensus final document, as the result of a dispute over the issue of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). Mexico and Iran objected to a last-minute draft paragraph by the conference President that merely noted the differences of opinion on this issue. Earlier, proponents of immediate negotiations on a CTB had blocked a US attempt to insert a reference to its agreement with the USSR to proceed with "step-by-step negotiations on further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing, leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process."

Nevertheless, most delegates described the conference as largely successful. Agreement was reportedly reached on about ninety-five percent of the issues under discussion, including the need for full-scope nuclear safeguards as a condition for "significant" nuclear supply, and tighter export controls on nuclear technology. Some states, led by the US, called for an indefinite extension of the Treaty after its first term expires in 1995, but many non-aligned states insisted that this depended on progress towards a CTB. Meanwhile, a conference to amend the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 by transforming it into a CTB is scheduled for January 1991. Its proponents, while not expecting the US and Britain to agree to

such a move, are nevertheless hoping that it will raise public awareness and increase the pressure on those governments to begin negotiations on a CTB. (For more on the review conference see *To New York – A Message From Geneva*, on page 8).

### Conventional Forces in Europe

In New York in early October, US Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that they had reached an agreement in principle on all the major issues remaining in the negotiations for a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. They predicted that the Treaty would be ready for signing at the 19 to 21 November Paris CSCE Summit – a document ready for signature has been a long-standing Western condition for convening the summit.

The two countries had previously decided to drop the limits on personnel in Central Europe agreed to in Ottawa last February, noting that they had become obsolete as a result of the announced Soviet withdrawal of all of its forces from Germany by 1994. Instead, personnel reductions are to be discussed in follow-on "CFE-IA" negotiations which they have agreed will begin on the basis of the same membership and mandate, after the Paris Summit.

As the result of consultations in late September and early October, the two alliance leaders were able to agree to a ceiling of 5,550 on Soviet aircraft, including a politically-binding limit of 400 on land-based naval aviation (not including maritime patrol aircraft); "sufficiency rules" that would limit the USSR to an average of 33.6 percent of the European total in ground forces; and the destruction, rather than conversion, of the vast majority of equipment to be reduced. NATO and the Warsaw Pact will each be allowed 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000

helicopters. Within these ceilings, no one country can have more than 13,300 tanks, 13,700 artillery pieces, 20,000 ACVs, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 helicopters. NATO will destroy about 4,000 tanks, compared to 19,000 for the Warsaw Pact (the latter figure is lower than previous estimates because of the recent transfer of large Soviet forces to the east of the Urals). In addition, because of the existing disparity in numbers between East and West, the Pact will have to destroy thousands of armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, and aircraft.

Meanwhile, as part of a "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany" signed by the "two-plus-four" countries in Moscow on 12 September, Bonn formally agreed to reduce the military personnel of a united Germany from over 600,000 at present to 370,000 within three to four years, of which no more than 345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces. It also agreed that no foreign armed forces or nuclear weapons and their carriers would be stationed in former East German territory after Soviet military withdrawal. The restriction would not apply to dual-capable weapon systems, however, as earlier demanded by the Soviets.

### Nuclear Testing

The US Senate on 25 September ratified the 1974 Threshold Test Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, by a vote of 98-0. The USSR Supreme Soviet followed suit on 9 October by a vote of 347-0, with 3 abstentions.

The two bilateral agreements, which limit the yield of underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons (kt), had been held up by US insistence on the strengthening of their verification provisions, by means of Protocols agreed to at last June's Washington Summit. Under the new Proto-

cols, the US will be able to use its favoured "CORTEX" method to measure the yield of every Soviet explosion planned to exceed 50 kt. In addition, on-site inspection will be permitted for all other explosions with a planned yield of over 35 kt.

While the Soviets are eager to proceed immediately with further "intermediate" testing limitations in the absence of a CTB, the current US position is that the resumption of such negotiations must await the putting into practice of the new Protocols. In a UN speech on 26 September, Canadian External Affairs Minister Clark called for the US-Soviet commitment to further restrictions on nuclear testing to "be followed up immediately."

### Short Notes

US and Soviet officials continue to express the hope that a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will be completed before the end of the year and ready for signature at the next Presidential summit, planned for Moscow. In early October, Foreign Secretaries Baker and Shevardnadze reported "substantial progress" on the outstanding issues, which were said to include non-circumvention (especially Soviet concerns about the transfer of US weapons and technology to Britain) and US concerns about the Soviet Backfire bomber. However, President Bush suggested that the next Moscow summit – with a START treaty as its centrepiece – was unlikely before 1991.

In his 26 September UN speech, External Affairs Minister Clark announced that Canada, in support of efforts at greater "transparency" of arms transfers and procurement, this year for the first time will be releasing an annual report on its exports of military goods. —

— RON PURVER



## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Middle East

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, the UN Security Council has been engaged in one of its most intense and prolific periods ever. Not since its creation forty-five years ago, have the five major powers and the ten other nations worked with such unanimity within the Council.

The new tone was set at 5 a.m. on 2 August, when the Council voted to condemn the Iraqi invasion. The adoption of Resolution 660, which demanded the unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces, became the foundation for further Council action as Iraq steadfastly refused to heed the demand. It also marked the beginning of almost non-stop diplomatic activity that would continue in the coming months.

On 6 August, the Council adopted Resolution 661, which imposed on Iraq the most sweeping set of mandatory sanctions in the history of the UN. In explaining Canada's support for the measure, ambassador Yves Fortier told the Council that it was necessary to safeguard the rule of law and to deter future aggressors. "We owe this responsibility particularly to the small and vulnerable states such as Kuwait who look to this Council for protection and support," he said.

On 9 August, the Council declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait "null and void." The vote was unanimous. On 18 August, after Iraq announced that foreign nationals would be treated as "guests" and could not leave the country, the Council again acted unanimously. It adopted Resolution 664 which demanded Iraq "permit and facilitate" the immediate depart-

ture from Kuwait and Iraq of all third-country nationals.

Soon after, the US indicated it planned to "interdict" ships headed for Iraq and Kuwait, a unilateral move strongly opposed by Canada which led a diplomatic offensive in the Council to persuade Washington to act within the authority of the UN. This led to intense negotiations which resulted in Resolution 665. The document, adopted on 25 August with only Cuba and Yemen abstaining, called on States deploying maritime forces in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea area to use "measures commensurate to the specific circumstances" to halt all inward and outward shipping. It also requested the states involved to coordinate their actions using "as appropriate," mechanisms of the Council's Military Staff Committee.

The language was carefully chosen and reflected the desire to accommodate the differing views of the US and the Soviet Union on the role of the Military Staff Committee, a long dormant organ whose original purpose, among other things, was to direct UN military operations.

The Soviet Union wanted to activate the committee by invoking article 42 of the UN Charter, a move successfully resisted by the US. The result was a compromise, which gave a UN blessing to naval interdiction efforts but avoided placing US and other forces under a unified UN command.

Amidst reports that Iraq was depriving third-country nationals of food, the Council adopted Resolution 666 on 13 September. The resolution stated that the Council "expects" Iraq to comply with its obligations and that it was responsible for their safety. It also authorized the sanctions committee created by Resolution 661 to keep the situation regarding foodstuffs under constant review. The document also requested that the sanctions committee pay particular attention to the needs of children under fifteen, expectant mothers, the sick and the elderly with a

view of exempting them from the impact of the UN embargo.

On 16 September, the Council took further action after Iraq entered various diplomatic premises and arrested a number of diplomats and foreign nationals. Resolution 667, adopted unanimously, "strongly condemned" Iraq and demanded that it protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel.

On 25 September, the Council voted 14 to 1 (Cuba) to tighten the embargo against Iraq. At an unusual meeting attended by the foreign ministers of thirteen of the fifteen member countries, the Council elected to ban air transport to and from Iraq or Kuwait. The resolution did not allow for military interdiction of aircraft. Rather, it called on all states to deny overflight permission to any aircraft destined for Iraq or Kuwait unless the aircraft landed at a specified airport for inspection. The resolution further stated that only humanitarian food aid and medical supplies should be allowed to pass.

On 12 October, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution that condemned Israeli actions that resulted in the deaths of over twenty Palestinians four days before (8 October) at the Temple Mount (Al Haraam alShareef) in Jerusalem during clashes with security forces. The resolution was significant in that the US supported the condemnation and the unanimity of the Council was preserved.

Diplomats feared that a US veto or abstention would signal to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein that the Council was divided. At the same time, a number of non-aligned countries insisted that the Council not be perceived as having a double standard, one for dealing with issues dear to the US and another for issues of concern to Arab nations.

Under the terms of resolution 672, the Secretary General was requested to send a mission to the region and report back by the end

of the month. Israel, however, refused to receive the mission. On 24 October, the Council voted, again unanimously, to deplore the Israeli refusal and urged it to reconsider. Underlying Israel's refusal was a reluctance to grant the UN any role in East Jerusalem, which it considers part of its capital but which the international community considers to be under occupation.

### Cambodia

On 20 September, in the midst of consideration of further measures against Iraq, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 668 that welcomed the formation of a Supreme National Council by the parties in the Cambodian conflict. The decision by the warring factions was the result of prolonged efforts by the five permanent members to create a framework for a peaceful solution in Cambodia.

The resolution was viewed by diplomats as a significant step forward in the efforts to end the conflict. Soon afterwards, the UN began planning for a possible operation in Cambodia which would be one of the biggest of its kind with a force that some officials said could be as high as 20,000 military and civilian personnel.

### Other Business

The Council also managed to attend to some routine matters. On 14 August, it adopted Resolution 663, which recommended that the Principality of Liechtenstein be admitted to membership of the United Nations. Liechtenstein became the 160th member, and in October, the 159th when the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany united.

On 27 September, the Council extended the mandate of the Iran-Iraq military group (UNIIMOG) by two months, to 30 November. Diplomats predict the group will eventually be dismantled as a result of Iraq's decision to settle its dispute with Iran.

— TREVOR ROWE

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### The Gulf Crisis

On 8 August, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark announced that the government had put regulations in place to give effect to UN sanctions against Iraq: all Iraqi and Kuwaiti imports to Canada and all Canadian exports there were prohibited; all unused export credits ceased and nothing further would be issued; and any assets or securities of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments or their agencies were frozen, while no funds could be transferred there.

On 10 August, shortly after a visit with US President Bush on 6 August, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would send two destroyers and a supply ship, with 934 personnel aboard, to join the multinational force that was being assembled in the Persian Gulf. Both Liberal House Leader Herb Gray and NDP external affairs critic Bill Blaikie pointed out that it was the first time since World War II that Canada had sent troops abroad other than under the flag of the United Nations. Both also called for Parliament to be recalled immediately from its summer break to debate the decision.

The Prime Minister chose to avoid this course, which is required under the National Defence Act, by delaying putting the ships on active service ("war ready") until they reached their destination. (For more on the National Defence Act, see *Defence Notes Background* on page 16).

On 14 September the Prime Minister also announced that the government would deploy a squadron of CF-18 fighter aircraft to the Gulf to provide air cover for Canadian ships and sailors, as well as

another 450 personnel. At the same time, an additional sum of up to \$75 million was allocated for humanitarian and economic assistance for people and countries seriously affected by the crisis. An initial \$2.5 million had already been provided.

### The Oka Dispute

Meanwhile, on 14 August, in response to a request from the Quebec government, 2,500 Canadian troops were deployed to two Quebec sites at Oka and Chateauguay which were the scene of blockades by Mohawk natives in a dispute over land claims in the area. After prolonged negotiations, Mohawks began working with the army on 29 August to dismantle barricades near Chateauguay, which had blocked the Mercier Bridge that links South Shore communities to Montreal. The bridge reopened to traffic 6 September (after being closed since 11 July), but a small enclave of Mohawks continued to hold out at Oka until 26 September, with the army operation finally ending some days later.

### The Debate in Parliament

Parliament finally resumed on 24 September, the date originally agreed to at adjournment in June, but since protested by an opposition anxious to debate both the Oka dispute and the Gulf crisis. Joe Clark presented a motion for the House's approval which condemned the invasion of Kuwait, supported all relevant UN Security Council resolutions since then, and supported the dispatch of Canadian Forces to take part in the multinational military effort.

During the lengthy debate that followed, the opposition parties focussed their objections on the fact that Parliament had not been recalled earlier to debate the motion and on the need for the government to adhere strictly to United Nations-sanctioned mea-

sures. Thus the Liberals presented an amendment which called on Canadian Forces to enforce the UN resolutions, while the NDP urged an amendment "that Canada work at the Security Council to seek assurances that no country will undertake offensive military operations against Iraq unless they are under UN command and explicitly authorized by the Security Council."

Ultimately, after discussions between the Liberals and Conservatives, a new motion was presented on 19 October which included an undertaking by the government "to present a further motion to this House in the event of the outbreak of hostilities involving Canadian Forces in and around the Arabian Peninsula." This motion was agreed to in a vote on 23 October of 170 to 33, with most of the NDP and a handful of dissident Liberals and the Bloc Québécois voting against.

### Committee Work

The House motion was referred to the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, which had already begun a series of hearings on the Gulf crisis. Joe Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight appeared before it on 25 October. There Clark declared that "Canada is ready to use force to get Iraq out of Kuwait, even without UN approval." This prompted a spate of questions in the House that afternoon, with the opposition parties expressing strong disapproval of such a course. The Committee will seek to report to the House before Christmas.

In addition to its work on the Gulf crisis, the House Committee also held hearings on 16 and 18 October on the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement with the United States, whose current five-year term ends in the spring of 1991. Thereafter, a sub-

committee was established under the chairmanship of Walter McLean. The sub-committee called for submissions from various interested groups on the question of NORAD renewal and commissioned a paper by a small group of outside experts. It is hoped that the sub-committee will report its recommendations to the full Committee some time in December.

The House of Commons Standing Committee on the Environment tabled its fourth report entitled *No Time to Lose: The Challenge of Global Warming* on 17 October. It called for Canada to cut its emissions of carbon dioxide by at least twenty per cent by 2005. The government had not yet staked out its position on carbon-dioxide cuts for the World Climate Conference that was held in Geneva, 29 October to 6 November. The report contained sixteen other recommendations, including a strong admonition that "energy policy-making must have as its most immediate focus the more efficient and conserving use of energy."

### Shadow Cabinets


Both opposition parties reorganized their shadow cabinets. The Liberal critic for External Affairs is Lloyd Axworthy, for Defence, William Rompkey and for Environment, Paul Martin. In addition, Warren Allmand took responsibility for Disarmament and Arms Control, Christine Stewart for CIDA. Liberal Leader Jean Chrétien also organized a series of caucus committees, including ones on External Affairs and Defence, chaired by Lloyd Axworthy, and Sustainable Development, chaired by Paul Martin.

New Democratic Party Leader Audrey McLaughlin named British Columbia MPs Svend Robinson as External Affairs critic and John Brewin as Defence critic, while Jim Fulton remained responsible for the Environment. □

— GREGORY WIRICK



## REVIEWS



### Kennedy & Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border

Knowlton Nash

Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990,  
336 pp., \$28.95, cloth

John Diefenbaker and John Kennedy disliked one another intensely. In this fascinating portrait of their relationship and their times, Knowlton Nash explores both the personal and the substantive reasons for their distrust of one another, and analyses the effects of their personal differences on relations between the two countries.

Diefenbaker and Kennedy were completely different personalities and neither had much respect for the attributes of the other. Diefenbaker loved the House of Commons, and the cut and thrust of debate. He revelled in campaigning and grand speeches. He was effective in Opposition but, once in power, dithered and found decisions difficult. Kennedy was the opposite; while a member of the US Senate, he had given at best perfunctory attention to it. Campaigning was only a means to an end. What he loved was to govern, to exercise the levers of power in order to further his ideas.

Diefenbaker revered Dwight Eisenhower, and from 1957 through 1960, relations between the two countries were friendly and cordial. Indeed, the seeds of later discontent might have been sown in those early days of the Diefenbaker government when the NORAD agreement was signed with what seemed in retrospect to have been undue haste.

Many of the subsequent irritants during the Kennedy years focused on arming with nuclear warheads the Bomarc missiles already in place in North Bay and La

Macaza, and the CF-104s which were part of the Canadian forces in Europe. The Americans and our NATO allies were convinced that in accepting the missiles and the assignment of a strike force capacity for the 104s, we had agreed to obtain nuclear warheads for them – otherwise they were not effective. The Americans would continue to own and to authorize the use of the weapons in consultation with Canada.

During the three meetings between Diefenbaker and Kennedy there was continued discussion of the nuclear issue, with, according to Nash, Diefenbaker vacillating between acceptance and denial. Howard Green, the Minister of External Affairs, was very active at the UN and on issues of disarmament, and counselled against acquiring nuclear weapons; Douglas Harkness, the Minister of National Defence, was equally convinced that we should live up to what he thought was our commitment to accept them. Kennedy supported the latter view, but more than anything else, wanted a decision, and grew increasingly irritated by Diefenbaker's refusal to make one.

The book is full of interesting bits of information, including details about the so-called lost memo of Kennedy's which Diefenbaker found and locked away in a safe, and the famous State Department release of January 1963 which set out American views of the state of negotiations between Canada and the US on nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker seized the release to claim American interference in Canadian affairs, an issue which he used during the subsequent election campaign.

Nash has written an accessible and compelling account both of the times and the protagonists, and in the course of so doing has demonstrated that personal chemistry is indeed an important factor in the conduct of foreign policy.

– Nancy Gordon

Ms. Gordon is Director of Public Programmes at the Institute.

### Besieged: A Doctor's Story of Life and Death in Beirut

Chris Giannou

Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1990,  
254 pp., \$28.95, cloth

Much more than a "story of life and death," *Besieged* is an organizational manual for resistance, a war surgeon's textbook, a piercing analysis of Middle East politics and a commentary on the tremendous human capacity to withstand great suffering. The author is a Canadian surgeon, and the book is a lucid and detailed account of his experiences in Shatila, a Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut, during its intermittent besieging by Amal (a Lebanese Shi'ite militia) from 1985 to 1987. The longest of these sieges lasted for nine months causing the 2,500 inhabitants of Shatila to suffer extreme shortages of food, water, electricity, space and hope.

Six months of incessant military bombardment by tanks and howitzers pummelled the tiny camp into a pile of dust, sending the residents into cramped and dirty subterranean shelters. The camp's defenders also went underground, digging tunnels around Shatila's perimeter to continue their defence foxhole-style. Unable to overrun Shatila's rubble militarily, Amal resorted to psychological and starvation tactics for three more months in the hopes of bringing the camp to its knees. And still, Shatila's resistance held, the question is how?

Giannou's perspective is hardly non-partisan, but neither is it sentimental or uncritical. He was not only an observer of events, but was also an active participant, playing a key role in the camp's internal politics and external resistance. His importance stemmed from his skill as a surgeon and his position as director of the camp's only functioning institution, the hospital, which itself became a prime target of Amal attacks.

Giannou and the hospital also played an important role in the camp's inter-factional political

rapprochement. Within Shatila, there were five major Palestinian political factions as well as other minor dissident groups, all of which were more or less at war with each other. Of course, the siege necessitated Palestinian internal cooperation and coordination in order for them to withstand the onslaught. The hospital, as a camp-wide, Palestinian institution provided the meeting ground and Giannou acted as political liaison.

While Giannou's analysis, as he states in his preface, is not an "academic treatise," he has a exceptional grasp of the political intricacies of Palestinian and Middle Eastern politics. As participant-observer Giannou provides us with the personalities of the faction leaders, and the reasons behind their actions, and thus renders the events more comprehensible to the outsider.

This comprehension is important because what happened inside Shatila between 1985 and 1987 both contributed to and was a reflection of the wider Palestinian rapprochement which paved the way for eruption of the *Intifadah* in the Occupied Territories. The symbolic significance of a united Palestinian resistance to the terrors of siege in Lebanon was not lost on their brethren in the Territories.


Lurking beneath the book's matter-of-fact style of writing is a simmering anger. Both in his book and in person, Giannou's pointed, judgemental words could be mistaken for arrogance, but this would be to miss their meaning. It is not from self-importance that Giannou condemns. Rather, the anger is drawn from the devastating experiences which forged his profoundly humane sense of what is wrong with our world.

– Deirdre Collings

Ms. Collings is a Research Fellow at the Institute.

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



A number of new staff members joined the Institute during the summer and autumn. **Louise Graham** is the new receptionist, **Marcel Langlois** an administrative clerk, **Robert Gosselin** a library technician, **Veronica Suarez** the public programmes secretary, and **Larry Miller** the distribution and publications technician. **Maria Sievers** is the executive assistant to the director, and **Veronica Baruffati** is an editor. **Karen Balentine**, **Ross Mallick** and **Jean-François Rioux** are new research fellows, specializing in the Soviet Union, regional conflict and non-proliferation issues respectively. **George Lindsey** and **Ron Fisher** are part-time visiting senior fellows. While the research section has expanded, other new staff members are filling positions created by resignations or promotions.

Prior to the Paris summit of the leaders of the thirty-four member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Institute sponsored a roundtable briefing for members of the media. Speakers included **Jirí Stépanovsky**, Deputy Director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague, Czechoslovakia, who addressed the question of CSCE institutionalization and future security arrangements in Europe; **Roger Hill** on the CFE agreement and its implications for NATO; and **Mark Moher** of the Department of External Affairs who spoke about the agenda of the summit and the Canadian views on its items. **Bernard Wood**

chaired the session. In addition to those who participated in person, a number of journalists from outside Ottawa participated in the discussion via telephone hookups.

The Institute has embarked on a major study of the conflict in Lebanon, with the objectives of developing a better understanding of it, and possibly, recommendations for concrete action. Under the direction of **Deirdre Collings** there will be three workshops and a final seminar during the 1990/91 year. The first workshop took place in late September at the Institute, and was preceded in the evening with a public session entitled "Lebanon: Hope from Within." Mgr **Gregoire Haddad** of the Mouvement social in Beirut, and Dr. **Amal Shamma'**, Chief of Paediatrics at the Berbir Medical Centre in Beirut, spoke of the services provided by the non-governmental sector in a country where, because of the fifteen-year civil war, government services are severely limited. During the following two days, a group of twenty-five academics, policy makers and analysts examined the various proposals to end the war put forward

between 1976 and 1989. The next workshop, which is scheduled for mid-December, will look at the social and economic costs of the prolonged war. Following the final seminar, the Institute will publish a conference report on the four sessions.

In late November the Institute for Peace and Security, the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and the Canada-USSR Business Council, co-sponsored a major conference in Ottawa entitled "The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World." Featuring a number of prominent policy makers and analysts, including the Rt. Hons. **Brian Mulroney** and **Joe Clark**, the conference looked at Soviet power in a changing world and the consequent necessity for rethinking the east-west balance; the impact of *glasnost* and democratization and the prospects for *perestroika* on the Soviet economy. Smaller groups examined the climate for trade and investment, Arctic questions, nationalism and human rights, and a new security agenda. At each session of the conference there was a

Soviet, a European or American, and a Canadian speaker.

The autumn schedule at the Institute featured a full complement of seminars on a variety of topics. **John Baylis** of the University College of Wales and **Peter Schmidt** of the Ebenhausen Institute in Munich spoke on contemporary European security issues; the Hon. **Monique Landry**, Minister for External Relations and International Development, led a discussion on peace and international development; **Chris Smith** of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in England, examined military technology and security in the Third World.

The non-proliferation treaty review conference was held in Geneva in early September, and the Institute was able to hear a number of perspectives on the subject. **Mitsuru Kurosawa** of the Faculty of Law at Niigata University in Japan, spoke on the Japanese perspective on non-proliferation; **William Epstein**, formerly with the UN and UNITAR, gave a briefing on the review conference, as did **David Cox** of Queen's University. **Hans Blix**, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna led a discussion on the world's energy needs, nuclear energy and non-proliferation.

**Peggy Falkenheim** of the University of Western Ontario, and **Ron Purver** gave a briefing on a conference they both attended in Vladivostok on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region; **John Halstead** spoke about a seminar he had attended in Helsinki on the developing CSCE framework.

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### Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security

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This exciting new publication from the Institute provides teachers with a flexible tool for teaching international relations in the classroom. Thoroughly field-tested and revised, the Handbook includes:

- simulations and group activities for introducing concepts
- authoritative readings and factsheets carefully tailored to student reading levels
- charts and maps to help students organize and visualize international relations issues
- detailed lesson plans to address a variety of student learning styles
- historical and current case-studies specifically written to illustrate key concepts of international relations
- evaluation forms for debates, oral presentations and student contracts.

The handbook is available now from the Institute for \$ 35.00. Please order directly.



**Serge Sur**, deputy director of UNIDIR, the UN specialized agency dealing with disarmament research, led a delegation of verification experts who gave a seminar at the Institute. **Bassam Tibi**, professor of international relations at Georgia Augusta University of Göttingen, Germany, and a specialist on the Middle East, gave a seminar on the repercussions of the Gulf Crisis. **Martin Lee**, a barrister, member of the Legislative Council, and Chairman of the United Democrats in Hong Kong spoke on the future of Hong Kong. **Gerald Segal** of the University of Bristol led a discussion on China and east Asian regional security.

His Holiness the **Dalai Lama** of Tibet visited the Institute during his recent visit to Canada, and led a seminar on the human dimension of conflict resolution.

**Michael Bryans**, Senior Editor at the Institute, spent two weeks in Moscow and Leningrad in the autumn conducting research on the Soviet economy. His visit was part of an exchange agreement between CIIPS and the Institute for the USA and Canada, as was that of **Edward McWhinney**, an international lawyer, whose area of study was constitutional development in the Soviet Union. **Olga Shapryrina** and **Sergei Molotchkov**, both of ISCAN, were each guests of CIIPS for a month during the fall.

In October, **Bernard Wood** spoke to a group of teachers in Gander, Newfoundland on the new security environment. At that meeting, as well as at the Ontario History and Social Science Teachers' Association meeting in Toronto and at professional development days in Cobourg, Alexandria, and Edmonton, **Brad Feasey** gave workshops based on the Institute's publication "Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security."

"National Security and Defence in a Changing World" was the subject of a one-day meeting

in Ottawa of the Defence Associations National Network, Eastern Canada region, in which **Bernard Wood** participated. The afternoon session was devoted to a hypothetical role-playing scenario and panel discussion focussing on Canadian defence capabilities. Later that same week, Mr. Wood participated in a conference organized by York University in connection with a research project commissioned by the Institute on new challenges to security. In Ottawa he spoke to a joint meeting of the India-Canada Association and the Mahatma Gandhi Society: the subject was Mahatma Gandhi, and his message for today's Canadians. He also spoke at the Annual Canadian International Development Agency/Non-government Organizations Consultation in Ottawa on the relationship between peace and development, emphasizing the enormous challenge they represent for us in the 1990s.

In early September, **John Toogood** participated in the annual

meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Virginia where the subject was "America's Role in a Changing World." Defense Secretary Cheney spoke of the shift in US policy away from preparations to fight a global conflict with the USSR towards dealing more with regional conflicts. He said that strategies were being prepared during the summer for gradual implementation during 1990 and 1991. The crisis in the Gulf, of course, changed the planning cycle. "We have now had to put all our briefings and speeches about the new strategy on hold because we've been too busy dealing with regional contingencies in order to have time to talk about it," he said.

**Katherine Laundy**, **Susan Connell** and **Grazyna Beaudoin** attended disarmament week activities in Quebec City where they staffed a kiosk and answered questions about the Institute, its publications and other peace and security resources. In early November, Ms.

**Laundy** and **Ms. Connell** performed similar tasks at Université de Montréal, as part of its annual week of activities. Ms. Beaudoin took part in the first World Summit of Children of Peace, organized in Montreal by the Association canadienne du programme de diminution des tensions.

**Roger Hill** participated in a conference at Queen's University on new relationships amongst Canada, the US and Japan, and at a meeting in Montebello on verification. He also gave a presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on the question of NORAD renewal. In November **Bernard Wood** appeared before the same committee to make a statement on the crisis in the Gulf. He also spoke at the National Defence College in Kingston. **John Toogood** spoke to a meeting of the Ottawa Rotary Club on Canada and the Gulf, and attended meetings in Quebec City sponsored by the Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales on the new Germany. **Gabrielle Mathieu** participated in a conference at Laval on the media and conflict. **Ross Mallick** represented the Institute at a conference in Washington sponsored by the US Institute for Peace on conflict resolution. **Karen Ballentine** attended a conference on nationalism and *perestroika* at Columbia University in New York. **Jean-François Rioux** participated in a conference in Washington on the role of private organizations in nuclear non-proliferation. In September **Ron Purver** toured the Western Arctic as part of Operation Napoleon sponsored by the Department of National Defence. He also organized a workshop on security and political cooperation as part of the third Northern Regions conference in Anchorage, Alaska.

### Barton Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for its Awards Programme, designated the Barton Awards in honour of the first Chairman, former UN Ambassador William Barton. The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue studies in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in that area by supporting Canadians and permanent residents who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad or in Canada.

The Institute expects to make eleven awards: two fellowships valued at up to \$30,000 and nine scholarships at up to \$14,000 each. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1991.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents whose experience or academic qualification enable them to pursue advanced study.

The deadline for applications for the 1991-1992 academic year is 1 February 1991.

For further information and application forms please write to:

The Barton Awards Programme  
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

### Peace and Security Competitions Fund Procedures and Deadlines

*The Fund allocates contributions semi-annually. Contact the Fund for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:*

30 June for an October decision

30 November for a March decision

Peace and Security Competitions Fund  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

## LETTER FROM LIMA BY MIRKO LAUER



**It is eight in the morning. My wife and I are in a queue behind twenty-five other cars, slowly pushing our 1974 Volkswagen towards a gas station,**

where each sale is limited to five gallons. Two days ago the workers of Petroperu, the State's oil monopoly, went on strike demanding pay raises. So fuel is just reappearing on the market. A new oil workers' strike is announced for next week.

Around us the first dollar dealers are appearing on the sidewalks, pocket calculator in hand, waiting for the early customers. The day's exchange rate is 430,000 Intis to the dollar. As we reach the end of the queue, almost one hour later, we change a US\$10 bill, enough money for seven gallons. At home we had no electricity today and, since our building uses an electric pump, no water until six in the afternoon. Some neighbourhoods can go weeks without electricity or water. Many shantytowns get their electricity through illegal connections and buy their water by the canister.

After ten years of blackouts in the main cities, the blowing up of high-voltage pylons by Sendero Luminoso (the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas who have caused 19,500 deaths and \$17 billion in material damages – almost equal to Peru's foreign debt – since they first emerged in May 1980) hardly makes it to the inner pages of the local newspapers. Even the news of dozens of soldiers or campesinos dead in confrontations with Sendero Luminoso every month receive grudging attention from the population.

Under President Fujimori's (elected on 28 July) government adjustment plan, which has slashed incomes by seventy-five percent, people fear the new electricity rates more than the power-cuts or Sendero Luminoso manoeuvres in the provinces. Electricity rates increased by five hundred percent for domestic use of over thirty KW a week, and water rates increased

by more than eight hundred percent. Ex-President Fernando Belaunde, who lives in a small apartment, went on TV in September to complain about his 50 million Inti (about US\$135 at that moment) August electricity bill.

The same day that the Petroperu workers went on strike, the minister of Energy and Mining, a member of the Socialist Left coalition, announced that to meet Electrolima workers' salary demands a further four hundred percent hike

shock, they face the same basic problems. "All this suffering for nothing" is a frequent remark. Fujimori's government admits that the number of Peruvians at the extreme poverty level has increased from seven to twelve million since coming to power, out of a total population of twenty-three million.

The government's first reaction to the resurgence of inflation has been to condemn private monopolies in the food business and announce the liberalization of imports. One serious weakness in the Fujimori adjustment plan is that cocaine paste exports pour around one billion dollars in cash into the Peruvian economy and keep the Inti higher than the local ex-

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**... Fujimori has managed to prevent the development of serious opposition through a sort of political judo, which consists of playing all sectors against each other.**

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in electricity bills would be necessary. Most of the larger unions are discussing salary increases now, and all public services see rate increases as their only way out of insolvency. So the prospect of a wave of strikes and shortages is the clearest sign that after one hundred days of sailing in what most Peruvians still consider the right direction – adjustment along IMF and World Bank guidelines – the government is now bracing for a new bout with inflation.

After forty to fifty percent a month inflation in Alan Garcia's final semester as President (1985 to July 1990), and compared to the 397 percent price jump which reflected Fujimori's anti-inflation drive, people may still consider the fifteen percent price increase this October mild. But it is nearly double the September figure, and caused a four-fold increase in food prices for Peru's poor.

So a new, restless mood is setting in as the population realises that in the aftermath of the August

porters' stated needs. Up until now the Central Bank has managed to boost the dollar exchange rate from 300,000 to 430,000 Intis by buying close to US\$10 million a day from private banks, who in turn pick up their dollars on the street. Now the Central Bank will try to hoist the exchange rate by unloading reserves into the hands of the importers.

Local producers have not protested this new scheme as yet. In part because they fear that criticism of Fujimori's programme will bring a return of populist politics and controls of the economy, and also because they have no qualms about starting to import what they had been producing. The population believes that a more liberal import policy will translate into cheaper goods. An example frequently cited these days is tires. The two local producers, both multinational companies, were selling them for US\$70 each before imports forced the price down by half.

Another widespread, albeit unfounded, belief is that Peru's re-

turn to the fold of the international financial community will make funds available to relieve the crisis situation. Peru has started making down payments on its external debt (former President Alan Garcia refused to make debt payments causing Peru to fall out of grace with the IMF and World Bank), but government officials concede in private that they expect no significant loans from outside before the second half of 1991.

So far, Fujimori has managed to prevent the development of serious opposition through a sort of political judo, which consists of playing all sectors against each other. A lack of significant protest on the streets has given Fujimori ample room to develop his own presidential style, to the extent that he has enhanced his reputation as a pragmatist and a creator of unlikely alliances. One effect of Fujimori's luck so far is that all political and institutional forces seem eager to collaborate in his current struggle against inflation.

Fujimori's Prime Minister comes from the Right and several of his ministers from the Left. Most of his proposals are being pushed through Congress by an alliance between his Cambio 90 movement, the Centre-right APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance which came to power for the first time in its fifty year history with Alan Garcia) and a segment of the Left. And since coming to power he has established close ties with the military.

Last week the Minister of Agriculture, another Socialist Left member, resigned after hearing from the Prime Minister that the funds earmarked for financing local agriculture would go to food imports. But even as he was taking leave from the government, he urged his party and the rest of the population to stay on the government's side. □

*Mirko Lauer is chief editorial writer at the daily Pagina Libre and politics editor at the monthly Andean Report, both in Lima.*





**Huit heures du matin. Derrière une file de vingt-cinq voitures qui font la queue à la station service,**

ma femme et moi attendons notre

tour dans notre vieille Volkswagen.

Nous n'aurons droit qu'à cinq gallons

d'essence. Avant-hier, les ouvriers

de *Petropervu*, la compagnie na-

tionale qui a le monopole du pétrole

dans le pays, se sont mis en grève

pour obtenir des augmentations de

saire. L'essence fait donc tout juste

sa réapparition sur le marché, mais

pour la semaine prochaine.

Au tour de nous, les premiers

changements font leur apparition sur

les trottoirs, calculée en main, à

l'affût des clients matinaux. Aujourd-

d'hui, le cours est à 430 000 intis

pour un dollar américain. Quand

nous arrivons aux pompes, presque

une heure plus tard, nous changeons

10 dollars américains, de quoi ache-

ter sept gallons d'essence. Ce matin,

il n'y avait pas de courant à la mai-

son et comme dans notre immeuble,

on se sert d'un autre pompe électrique,

nous n'aurons pas d'eau non plus

jusqu'à six heures. Dans certains

quartiers, il arrive qu'il n'y ait ni eau

et dans nombre de bidonvilles, les

gens se raccrochent illégalement au

réseau municipal et achètent leur

Après dix ans de pannes générales

dans les plus grandes villes, c'est

tout juste si la destruction de pylon-

nes de haute tension par le *Sendero*

*luminoso*, autrement dit le Sendero

luminoso (depuis son apparition en

mai 1980, ce mouvement maoïste

de guérilla a à son actif 19 500 morts

et 17 milliards de dollars de dégâts

en pages intérieures des journaux

Avec le plan de redressement du

gouvernement du président Fujimori

(élu le 28 juillet de cette année), qui

launde, qui vit aujourd'hui dans un

petit appartement, est passé à la té-

lvision en septembre pour se plain-

dre de ce que sa facture d'électricité

de 400 p. 100 les factures d'électricité.

La plupart des syndicats les plus im-

portants sont en train de négocier

services publics voient dans le

relèvement des tarifs le seul moyen

de s'en sortir. Donc, la

goutte d'huile qui tombe sur le feu

de la crise économique péruvienne

est devenue une explosion.

La première réaction du gouverne-

ment face à la reprise de l'inflation

a été de condamner les monopoles

privés du secteur alimentaire et

de donner la libéralisation des im-

portations. Une des graves faiblesses

du plan de redressement de Fujimori,

c'est que les exportations de

de dollars environ, en espèces, dans

maintenant le cours de l'inti plus

haut que les besoins déclarés de ex-

portateurs péruviens. Jusqu'à pré-

sent, la banque centrale est parvenue

à gonfler le taux de change du dollar

tion, remise du choc du mois d'août,

se rend compte que les problèmes

«Avoir enduré tout cela pour rien»,

entend-on souvent dire. Le gou-

vernement Fujimori reconnaît que,

depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, sur

un total de 23 millions d'habitants,

le nombre des Péruviens vivant dans

des conditions d'extrême pauvreté

est passé de 7 à 12 millions.

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portateurs péruviens. Jusqu'à pré-

sent, la banque centrale est parvenue

à gonfler le taux de change du dollar

part de ses réserves en dollars aux

importateurs.

Les producteurs locaux ne se sont

pas encore insurgés contre ce nou-

veau procédé. En partie, parce qu'ils

cratigant, en critiquant le programme

de Fujimori, de provoquer le retour

à des politiques et à des contrôles

populistes en matière d'économie, et

aussi parce que c'est sans scrupule

qu'ils se mettraient à importer ce

qu'ils produisaient jusqu'ici. La po-

lisation croit qu'une politique plus

libérale des importations leur ap-

portera des produits meilleur marché,

L'exemple souvent cité est celui des

peus. Les deux producteurs locaux,

filiales de sociétés multinationales,

les vendaient 70 dollars pièce avant

que les importations les forcent à

diminuer leurs prix de moitié.

Selon une autre croyance large-

ment répandue, et pourtant sans fon-

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dement, en rentrant dans le giron de

la communauté financière interna-

tionale, Lima pourra se procurer des

fonds pour atténuer la situation de

crise. Le Pérou a commencé à verser

des accompagnements sur le remboursement

de sa dette extérieure (le dernier

ce qui avait sommé la disgrâce du

pays auprès du FMI et de la Banque

mondiale), mais les responsables

gouvernementaux admettent en privé

qu'ils ne s'attendent pas à bénéficier

de prêts étrangers importants avant

la dixième moitié de 1991.

pour le moment, Fujimori a réussi

à prévenir la montée d'une réelle op-

position par une sorte de judo poli-

tique qui consiste à opposer tous les

secrétaires les uns aux autres. Grâce à

l'absence de manifestations de rue

importantes, Fujimori a pu ample-

ment développer son propre style

présidentiel, à tel point qu'il s'est

forcé la réputation d'un homme

pragmatique capable de susciter des

alliances improbables. Un des effets

de la chance du président, c'est qu'il

l'heure actuelle, toutes les forces

politiques et institutionnelles sem-

blent impuissantes de collaborer à la

lutte anti-inflationniste qu'il est en

train de mener.

Son premier ministre est de droite

et plusieurs membres du Cabinet

sont de gauche. La plupart de ses

propositions sont adoptées par le

Congrès grâce à l'appui de son

mouvement, *Cambio 90* (Change-

ment 1990), avec l'APRA du

centre-droit (!) Alliance populaire

révolutionnaire américaine qui, avec

Alan Garcia, a tenu les rênes du pou-

voir pour la première fois en cin-

quante ans d'existence) et avec une

partie de la gauche. De plus, depuis

son élection, il a noué des liens

étroits avec l'armée.

La semaine dernière, le ministre

de l'Agriculture, socialiste lui aussi,

a démissionné après s'être entendu

dire par le premier ministre que les

fonds destinés à financer l'agricul-

ture locale traitent à l'importation de

denrées alimentaires. Mais, alors

même qu'il prenait congé, il a ex-

horté son parti et le reste de la popu-

lation à continuer de soutenir le

gouvernement. □

*Mirko Lauer est éditorialiste en chef*

*du quotidien Pagina Libre (Page*

*libre) et rédacteur politique du*

*mensuel Andean Report, paraissant*

*deux à Lima.*

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HIVER 1990-1991

L'ancien président Fernando Be-

clément et augmentés de 800 p. 100.

Quant aux tarifs de l'eau, ils ont fa-

iblement augmentés de 30 p. 100.

Les foyers dont la consommation

des foyers ont augmenté de 500 p. 100 pour

dans les provinces. En effet, ces la-

manoeuvres du Sendero l'innu-

que les coupures de courant ou les

mentations des tarifs de l'électricité

Péruviens réduisent plus les aug-

réduit les revenus de 75 p. 100, les

(élu le 28 juillet de cette année), qui

gouvernement du président Fujimori

plan de redressement du

local.

en pages intérieures des journaux

(métrés), fait l'objet d'un entrefilet

et 17 milliards de dollars de dégâts

de guérilla à sa son actif 19 500 morts

mai 1980, ce mouvement maoïste

luminoso (depuis son apparition en

luminoso, autrement dit le Sendero

tréal par l'Association canadienne du programme de diminution des tensions.

**Roger Hill** a assisté à une conférence à l'Université Queen's sur les nouvelles relations entre le Canada, les États-Unis et le Japon, et a rendu visite à l'Institut au cours de son récent passage au Canada et il a dirigé un colloque sur la dimension humaine du règlement des conflits.

**Michael Bryan**, rédacteur principal de l'Institut, a passé deux semaines à Moscou et Leningrad cet automne pour faire de la recherche sur l'économie soviétique, dans le cadre d'un programme d'échange entre l'ICPSI et l'Institut des études canado-américaines (ISCAN), à Moscou. **Edward McWhinney**, avocat en droit international, participait aussi à ce programme, et ses recherches portaient sur le développement constitutionnel en Union soviétique. **Oлга Shapryina et Sergei Molotchkov**, de l'ISCAN, étaient tous deux les invités de l'ICPSI pendant un mois cet automne.

Au mois d'octobre, **Bernard Wood** a parlé de la nouvelle conjoncture en matière de sécurité à un groupe d'enseignants à Gander (Terre-Neuve). Au cours de cette réunion, de même qu'à l'Assemblée de l'Association des professeurs de l'histoire et de sciences sociales de l'Ontario, et dans le cadre des journées de formation professionnelle à Cobourg, **Alexandra et Edmonston, Brad Feasey** a dirigé des ateliers inspirés de la nouvelle publication de l'Institut, le *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*.

Le Réseau national des associations de la défense (région de l'est canadien) s'est réuni pour une journée à Ottawa. Le thème de cette réunion, à laquelle participait **Bernard Wood**, était *National Security and Defence in a Changing World*. La séance d'après-midi était consacrée à des mises en scène et à des débats sur les capacités du Canada en matière de défense. Plus tard dans la même semaine, **M. Wood** a pris part à une conférence organisée par

l'URSS pour se concentrer davantage sur le règlement de conflits régionaux. Il a déclaré que l'on a élaboré des stratégies pendant l'état d'urgence de leur application progressive en 1991. La crise du Golfe a évidemment changé les plans. «Nous avons dû reporter toutes nos séances d'information et nos discours sur la nouvelle stratégie, a-t-il dit, car les événements imprévus à l'échelle régionale ont pris tout notre temps.»

**Katharine Laundy, Susan Connell et Grazyna Beaudoin** ont participé aux activités de la semaine de désarmement, à Québec, où elles se sont occupées d'un kiosque et ont répondu aux questions concernant la crise du Golfe devant le Comité. Il s'est aussi adressé aux membres du Collège de la Défense nationale, à Kingston. **John Toogood** a parlé aux membres du club Rotary d'Ottawa de la position qu'il a assumée, à Québec, et sur la nouvelle Allemagne organisée par le Centre québécois des relations internationales. **Gabriele Laval**, à une conférence sur le rôle des médias dans les conflits. **Ross Mallick** a représenté l'Institut à une conférence sur le règlement des conflits organisée à Washington par le *US Institute for Peace*. **Karen Balentine** a assisté à un colloque sur le nationalisme et la *perestroika*, qui s'est tenu à New York, à l'Université Columbia. **Jean-François Rioux** a pour sa part assisté à un autre colloque, qui a eu lieu à Washington, sur le rôle des organisations privées dans le contexte de la non-prolifération nucléaire. En septembre, **Ron Purver** s'est rendu dans l'Arctique occidental dans le cadre de l'Opération Napoléon, rainée par le ministère de la Défense nationale. Il a aussi organisé un atelier sur la sécurité et la coopération en matière de politique dans le contexte de la trisisme conférence des régions septentrionales à Anchorage (Alaska).

**Concours «Paix et Sécurité» : procédure et échéancier**

Le Fonds pour les Concours «Paix et Sécurité» accorde de l'aide financière deux fois par année. On est prié de communiquer avec les personnes responsables pour obtenir des formulaires et la liste à jour énonçant les critères à respecter. Veuillez prendre note des échéances suivantes :

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre  
le 30 novembre, pour la sélection de mars

Concours «Paix et Sécurité»  
360, rue Albert, bureau 900  
Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

**Programme de bourses Barton**

Dans le cadre de son programme des «Bourses Barton», ainsi appelé en l'honneur de son premier président, **M. William Barton**, ancien ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU, l'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à déposer leur dossier de candidature. Le programme est ouvert aux universitaires et aux autres personnes qui veulent entreprendre ou poursuivre des études sur la paix et la sécurité internationales. Il entend favoriser l'accroissement des compétences et des connaissances de haut niveau dans ce domaine, en appuyant des Canadiens, Canadiennes, immigrants et immigrantes reçus(e)s qui souhaitent poursuivre des études dans des institutions au Canada et à l'étranger.

L'Institut compte choisir onze récipiendaires, deux d'entre eux reçoivent chacun une bourse de «fellow» de 30 000 \$ maximum et les neuf autres bénéficieront chacun d'une bourse d'étude de 14 000 \$ maximum. Un comité de sélection indépendant évaluera les candidatures et rendra ses décisions en mai 1991.

Les candidat(e)s doivent être citoyen(ne)s canadien(ne)s ou immigrant(e)s reçu(e)s pour(eu)s d'expérience ou des compétences universitaires leur permettant de poursuivre des études supérieures.

Les candidat(e)s pour l'année universitaire 1991-1992 doivent parvenir à l'Institut le 1er février 1991 ou plus tard.

Pour obtenir plus de détails et des formulaires de demande, prière d'écrire à l'adresse suivante :


Programme des bourses Barton  
Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales  
360, rue Albert, bureau 900  
Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

Au début septembre, **John Toogood** a assisté à l'Assemblée annuelle de l'International Institute for Strategic Studies, en Virginie, dont le thème était *America's Role in a Changing World*. Le secrétaire à la Défense, **M. Cheney**, a parlé de la reconstitution de la politique américaine en matière de conflits, c'est-à-dire de l'abandon des préparatifs à un conflit mondial contre

le Mahatma Gandhi et son message aux Canadiens d'aujourd'hui. À l'occasion de la Consulation annuelle entre l'Agence canadienne de développement international et les organismes non gouvernementaux, il a aussi parlé du rapport entre la paix et le développement, en insistant sur les énormes difficultés que nous réservent les années 1990.



# NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



L'Institut a entrepris une étude importante sur le conflit du Liban, en se donnant comme objectifs de mieux faire comprendre la situation et, peut-être, de formuler des recommandations concernant des mesures concrètes. Pendant l'année 1990-1991, il y aura, sous la direction de **Deirdre Collings**, trois ateliers suivis d'un colloque de clôture. Le premier atelier, précédé d'une séance publique en soirée intitulée «Le Liban : espoir provenant de l'interieur», a déjà eu lieu à l'Institut le 7 septembre. Mgr **Gregoire Haddad**, du Mouvement social de Beyrouth, et le docteur **Amaal Shamma**, directrice du département de pédiatrie du Centre médical Berth à Beyrouth ont parlé des services offerts par le secteur non gouvernemental dans un pays où les services gouvernementaux sont gravement limités en raison de la guerre civile qui sévit depuis quinze ans. Au cours des deux jours suivants, un groupe de vingt-cinq universitaires, décideurs et analystes ont examiné les diverses propositions avancées entre 1976 et 1989, pour mettre fin à la guerre. Le prochain atelier, prévu pour la mi-décembre, portera sur les conséquences sociales et économiques d'une guerre prolongée. Après la dernière conférence, l'Institut publiera un rapport sur les quatre réunions.

De nouveaux membres se sont joints à l'Institut cet été et cet automne. **Louise Graham** est la nouvelle réceptionniste; **Marcel Langlois** est commis administratif; **Robert Gosselin**, bibliothécaire; **Veronica Suarez**, secrétaire des programmes publics et **Larry Miller**, technicien de la distribution et des publications. **Maria Sievers** est adjointe administrative auprès du directeur et **Veronica Baruffati** est rédactrice. **Karen Balemite**, **Ross Mallick** et **Jean-François Rioux** sont de nouveaux chargés de recherche, et ils se spécialisent respectivement dans les questions relatives à l'Union soviétique, aux conflits régionaux et à la non-prolifération. **George Lindsey** et **Ron Fisher** sont chargés de recherche de recherche s'est élargie et d'autres nouveaux membres du personnel occupent maintenant des postes libérés par des démissions et des promotions.

Avant le sommet de Paris réunissant les dirigeants des treize-cinq Etats membres de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), l'Institut a parrainé une table ronde d'information à l'intention de membres des médias. Parmi les orateurs, on comptait **Igor Stépanovskiy**, directeur adjoint de l'Institut des relations internationales de Prague (Tchécoslovaquie), qui s'est exprimé sur la question de l'institutionnalisation de la CSCE et sur les futures dispositions relatives à la sécurité en Europe; **Roger Hill**, FCE et de ses conséquences pour l'OTAN; **Mark Mohr**, du ministère des Affaires étrangères, qui a parlé du programme du sommet et de la position du Canada sur les éléments qui le composent. **Bernard Wood** présidait cette table ronde. En plus des personnes présentes, plusieurs journalistes de l'extérieur d'Ottawa ont participé à la discussion par téléphone.

## Le temps de changer

À la fin novembre, l'Institut pour la paix et la sécurité, le Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur et le Conseil canado-soviétique des affaires ont coparrainé une importante conférence à Ottawa intitulée «L'Union soviétique en mouvement : conséquences pour le Canada et le reste du monde». Un grand nombre de dirigeants et d'analystes y ont assisté, notamment le premier ministre du Canada, **M. Brian Mulroney** et le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures, **M. Joe Clark**. On y a abordé les thèmes suivants : le pouvoir soviétique dans un monde en changement et la nécessité qui en découle de repenser l'équilibre Est-Ouest; les conséquences de la glasnost et de la démocratisation et l'avenir économique de l'URSS dans le cadre de la *perestroika*. Des plus petits groupes ont examiné les possibilités d'échanges et d'investissements, des questions relatives à l'Arctique, le nationalisme et les droits de la personne ainsi qu'un nouveau programme de sécurité. A chaque séance, il y a eu un orateur soviétique et un orateur canadien, ainsi qu'un orateur européen ou américain.

Le programme de l'automne de l'Institut a comporté une série de conférences complémentaires sur divers sujets. **John Baylis**, du University of Western Ontario, et **Ron Purver** ont fait le compte rendu d'une conférence sur les questions de sécurité dans la région de l'Asie-Pacifique, qui a eu lieu à Vladivostok et à laquelle ils ont tous deux assisté; **John Halseid** a parlé d'un colloque sur les progrès de l'organisation de la CSCE auquel il a participé, à Helsinki.

**Serge Sur**, directeur adjoint de l'Institut de recherche des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, était à la donne une conférence à l'Institut. **Bassam Tibi**, professeur de relations internationales à l'Université de Göttingen (Allemagne), et spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, a présenté un exposé sur les répercussions de la crise du Golfe. L'avocat **Martin**

Les Editions Libre Expression ont publié, à l'automne dernier, l'ouvrage de **Boyce Richardson** intitulé «Le temps de changer». Les questions environnementales sont aujourd'hui au coeur des préoccupations de la majorité des Nord-Américains. Le livre de **Boyce Richardson** esquisse les cinq grands défis qui sont aujourd'hui les nôtres : environnemental, économique, démographique, militaire et politique. Comment nous, habitants de l'hémisphère nord, pouvons-nous influencer l'ordre des choses dans le monde? **Boyce Richardson** énonce la-dessus plusieurs hypothèses qui ont le grand mérite d'incarner chacun de ces défis dans ses dimensions les plus concrètes. Gagnant du prix de la Presse nationale, **M. Richardson** s'est aussi mérité le prix **Flaherty** de la *British Society of Film and TV Arts*, accordé au meilleur documentaire ainsi qu'une nomination aux *Academy Awards* pour son film tourné en 1984, *The Children of Soong Ching Ling*.

Il a déjà cinq publications à son actif. «Le temps de changer» a été écrit en collaboration avec l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité Editions Libre Expression.

224 pages, 19,95 \$.







# EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE

Le 14 septembre, le premier ministre a fait savoir que le gouverne-

ment envisageait une escadrille de chasseurs CF-18 dans le Golfe pour fournir une couverture aérienne aux navires et aux marins canadiens et qu'il accorderait de 450 hommes les effectifs militaires sur place. Par ailleurs, le Canada versera un maximum de 75 millions de dollars supplémentaires en aide humanitaire et des pays fortement touchés par la crise, somme qui viendra s'ajouter aux 2,5 millions de dollars déjà fournis.

## Crise d'Oka

Entre temps, le 14 août, à la demande du gouvernement du Québec, 2 500 soldats canadiens ont été déployés dans les villes d'Oka et de Châteauguay, où des barricades avaient été dressées par des Mohawks revenant à la propriété de certaines terres dans la région. Après de longues négociations, les autochtones ont accepté de coopérer avec l'armée pour débayer les barricades près de Châteauguay et de mettre ainsi fin au blocage du pont Mercier, qui relie les agglomérations de la Rive sud à Montréal. Le 6 septembre, un petit groupe de Mohawks a continué à résister jusqu'au 26 septembre, l'opération militaire s'est terminée quelques jours plus tard.

## Débats à la Chambre

Le Parlement a finalement repris ses travaux le 24 septembre, date qui avait été convenue au moment de l'ajournement en juin, mais que l'opposition a contestée depuis, car elle souhaitait discuter de la situation à Oka et de la crise dans le Golfe. M. Joe Clark a présenté une motion à la Chambre condamnant l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak, appuyant toutes les résolutions prises à ce sujet par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU et donnant le feu vert à l'envoi de forces canadiennes dans le Golfe pour participer à l'opération militaire multinationale.

Durant le long débat qui a suivi, les partis de l'opposition se sont plaints surtout de ce que le Parlement n'avait pas été rappelé plus tôt pour débayer la motion et ils ont exigé que le gouvernement se conforme à la lettre aux mesures sanctionnées par les Nations Unies. Les

## Crise du Golfe

Le 8 août, le secrétaire d'État Clark, a annoncé que le gouvernement avait introduit des procédures pour faire appliquer les sanctions décrétées par l'ONU à l'encontre de l'Irak. Ainsi, toutes les importations de produits irakiens et koweïtiens et toutes les exportations de produits canadiens vers l'Irak et le Koweït sont désormais interdites; tous les crédits à l'exportation non utilisés ont été annulés et aucun crédit additionnel ne sera débouqué. Par ailleurs, tous les biens ou titres appartenant aux gouvernements irakien et koweïtiens ou à leurs organismes sont gelés, et aucun fonds ne peut être transféré dans ces pays.

Le 10 août, peu après son entretien avec le président des États-Unis, M. Bush, le premier ministre, M. Mulroney, a déclaré que le Canada enverrait deux destroyers et un navire de ravitaillement dans le golfe Persique. Ces bâtiments et les 934 membres d'équipage se joindraient à la force multinationale que l'on réunissait dans cette région du globe.

MM. Herb Gray et Bill Blacketer, respectivement chef du groupe libéral à la Chambre et porte-parole du NPD pour les Affaires extérieures, ont souligné que c'était la première fois depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale que le Canada envoyait des troupes à l'étranger autrement que sous l'égide des Nations Unies. Ils ont également tous deux réclamé la convocation immédiate du Parlement, afin qu'il débâte la question.

Le premier ministre a décidé de ne pas rappeler les députés, mesure normalement exigée aux termes de la Loi sur la défense nationale, en retardant la mise en service

acrit «préparation au combat» des navires jusqu'à ce qu'ils arrivent à destination (pour de plus amples détails concernant la Loi sur la défense nationale, voir la Chronique de la

Défense, à la page 16).

libéraux ont présenté un amendement dans lequel ils demandaient que les Forces canadiennes appuient les résolutions de l'ONU, tandis que le NPD a demandé que la motion soit modifiée comme suit :

«que le Canada cherche à convaincre le Conseil de sécurité de faire le nécessaire pour obtenir la garantie qu'aucun pays ne lancera une offensive militaire contre l'Irak, à moins de le faire sous la banquette de l'ONU et avec l'approbation du Conseil de sécurité.»

Finalement, après les discussions entre députés libéraux et conservateurs, une nouvelle motion a été présentée le 19 octobre. Le gouvernement y promettait «de présenter une autre motion à la Chambre en cas de desclenchement d'hostilités auxquelles seraient mêlés des Forces canadiennes, dans la péninsule arabique ou dans une région voisine.» Cette motion a été adoptée le 23 octobre par une majorité de 170 voix contre 33, une poignée de libéraux dissidents et le Bloc québécois s'y opposant.

## Travaux des comités

La motion présentée en Chambre a été soumise au Comité permanent des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce extérieur, qui avait déjà entamé une série d'audiences sur la crise du Golfe. M. Joe Clark et le ministre de la Défense M. Bill McKnight, ont comparu devant le Comité le 25 octobre. À cette occasion, M. Clark a déclaré que «le Canada est prêt à recourir à la force pour débayer les forces irakiennes pour déloger les forces irakiennes du Koweït, même sans l'approbation de l'ONU.» L'après-midi du même jour, cette déclaration a été l'objet de nombreuses questions en Chambre, les partis de l'opposition désapprouvant fortement la position exprimée. Le Comité fera son possible pour soumettre un rapport à la Chambre avant Noël.

Le Comité a également tenu des audiences les 16 et 18 octobre à propos du renouvellement de l'Accord sur la défense aérospatiale de l'Armée-rique du Nord (NORAD) conclu avec les États-Unis, qui arrive à expiration au printemps de 1991. À la suite de ces audiences, un sous-comité a été créé et placé sous la présidence de M. Walter Maclean. Ce sous-comité a demandé que les différents groupes s'intéressant à la question du NORAD lui communi-

## Cabinets-fantômes

Les deux partis de l'opposition ont remanié leurs cabinets-fantômes. Dans le camp des Affaires extérieures, le porte-parole pour les Affaires extérieures, M. Lloyd Axworthy, a été nommé à la Défense, et un autre, M. Jean Chrétien, a mis sur pied un certain nombre de comités de caucus, dont un sera présidé par M. Lloyd Axworthy et examinera les questions liées aux Affaires extérieures et la Défense, et un autre, dirigé par M. Paul Martin, se verra confier les dossiers concernant le développement durable.

Le chef du Nouveau Parti démocratique, Mme Audrey McLaughlin, a nommé les députés MM. Svend Robinson et John Brewin, l'un des porte-paroles extérieures et de Défense. Quant à M. Jim Fulton, il continuera de se charger des questions liées à l'environnement. □

— GREGORY WIRICK

## A L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

Institut canadien pour  
la paix et la sécurité internationales



## Le Moyen-Orient

Peu après, les Etats-Unis ont annoncé qu'ils envisageaient d'intervenir pour faire cesser l'occupation du Koweït. Le Canada, fermement opposé à cette décision unilatérale, a mené une offensive diplomatique au sein du Conseil pour persuader Washington d'agir sous l'autorité des Nations Unies. D'où d'intenses négociations qui ont débouché sur la résolution 665. Le document, adopté le 25 août (seuls Cuba et le Yémen se sont abstenus) demandait aux Etats déployant des forces maritimes dans le golfe Persique et la mer Rouge d'employer «des mesures en rapport avec les circonstances particulières» pour arrêter tout trafic maritime en direct et en provenance de ces deux pays. Il demandait également aux Etats concernés de coordonner leurs actions en utilisant «comme il convient» les instruments mis à leur disposition par le Comité d'état-major du Conseil.

La formulation, soigneusement choisie, traduisait la volonté de tenir compte des points de vue divergents des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS quant au rôle du Comité d'état-major, organe depuis longtemps relégué aux oubliettes dont le mandat, à l'origine, était entre autres de diriger les opérations militaires des Nations Unies. L'URSS souhaitait activer ce comité en invoquant l'article 42 de la charte de l'ONU, ce à quoi les Etats-Unis se sont opposés avec succès. Le Conseil a finalement trouvé un compromis : les Nations Unies donnaient leur bénédiction aux efforts d'interdiction navale américains et autres, sous un commandement unifié de l'ONU.

Le 13 septembre, alors que le bruit courait que l'Irak affirmait les étrangers qu'il recevait, le Conseil a adopté la résolution 666. Il y déclarait espérer que l'Irak respecterait ses obligations et lui rappelait qu'il était responsable de la sécurité des «navires». Il autorisait aussi le comité de sanctions créé en vertu de la résolution 661 à suivre l'évolution de la situation en ce qui concerne les produits alimentaires, en prenant une attention particulière aux besoins des enfants de moins de quinze ans, des femmes enceintes, des malades et des personnes âgées, afin de leur épargner les conséquences de l'embargo décrété par l'Assemblée générale.

Le 16 septembre, le Conseil a pris de nouvelles mesures à l'encontre de l'Irak après que ce dernier a persisté dans plusieurs encroissements diplomatiques et arrêté un certain nombre de diplomates et de ressortissants étrangers. La résolution 667, adoptée à l'unanimité, condamnait officiellement l'Irak et l'exhortait à assurer la sécurité et le bien-être des personnels diplomatiques et consulaires.

Le 22 septembre, par 14 voix contre 1 (Cuba), le Conseil a décidé de renforcer l'embargo contre Bagdad. Au cours d'une réunion inhabituelle des ministres des Affaires étrangères de treize des quinze pays-membres, le Conseil a décidé d'interdire les transports aériens à destination et en provenance de l'Irak ou du Koweït. La résolution n'autorise pas l'interception d'aéronefs. En fait, elle demande à tous les Etats de refuser toute autorisation de survol de leur territoire à des appareils faisant route vers l'Irak ou le Koweït à moins qu'ils avertissent sur un aéroport donné aux fins d'inspection. La résolution précise que seules l'aide alimentaire et les fournitures médicales doivent être autorisées pour des raisons humanitaires.

Le 12 octobre, le Conseil a adopté à l'unanimité une résolution condamnant Israël après les affrontements entre forces de sécurité et Palestiniens qui, quatre jours plus tôt (le 8 octobre), s'étaient soldés par la mort d'une vingtaine de Palestiniens à la colline de Temple/Haram (Al-Chart). La résolution (l'Israël-Chart) que les Etats-Unis appuyaient la condamnation et préservée. Les diplomates craignant qu'un veto ou une abstention des Américains ne soient interprétés par Saddam Hussein comme un signe de division du Conseil.

Parallèlement, plusieurs pays non alignés ont insisté pour que le Conseil ne donne pas l'impression d'appliquer deux poids deux mesures, à savoir qu'il ne semble pas traiter les questions chères aux Etats-Unis d'une façon et celles intéressant les nations arabes d'une autre façon. Aux termes de la résolution 672, le Secrétaire général devait envoyer

## En bref

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
- TREVOR ROWE

Le Conseil a également réussi à régler quelques questions de routine. Le 14 août, il a adopté la résolution 663 par laquelle il reconnaît d'admettre la principale titularité de membre. Le Liechtenstein est donc devenu le 166<sup>e</sup> membre des Nations Unies, avant de remonter, en octobre, au 159<sup>e</sup> rang, quand la République démocratique allemande et la République fédérale d'Allemagne se sont unifiées.





# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



Les missiles balistiques et la crise du Golfe

La crise du Golfe a remis une fois de plus, la question de la prolifération des missiles balistiques sur le devant de la scène. L'Irak dispose-rait en effet de trois types de missiles appartenant à cette catégorie : le *Scud-B*, un missile soviétique de portée intermédiaire pouvant atteindre des objectifs situés à 300 kilomètres et deux missiles de conception irakienne inspirés du *Scud-B*, soit l'*al-Husayn* et l'*al-Abbas*. Le premier, est muni d'un plus grand réservoir de carburant et d'une ogive plus importante que le missile soviétique. L'*al-Abbas*, modèle plus avancé, est capable de détruire des cibles situées à 900 km. L'Irak a également entrepris la mise au point d'une fusée à trois étages, l'*el-Abid*, qui servirait à placer des satellites sur orbite, mais qui pourrait aussi être utilisée comme missile de portée intermédiaire.

Le 5 septembre, le Secrétaire d'Etat américain a octroyé un permis d'exportation de tubes enveloppés de missiles vers le Brésil, ce qui, outre constituer un revirement politique, lui a valu des critiques. En effet, plusieurs journalistes affirment que le Brésil et l'Irak ont signé, en 1989, des contrats portant sur des projets conjoints de missiles et de satellites, mais, ces affirmations n'ont été ni confirmées ni démenties par les autorités brésiliennes. En septembre, on a rapporté dans la presse qu'en 1989 également, les services de renseignement occidentaux avaient détecté, en Irak, l'essai d'un missile armé d'une ogive chimique. Selon la presse toujours, Bagdad aurait essayé, en vain, de conclure une entente avec Nouakchott qui lui aurait permis de poursuivre ses essais dans les régions désertiques de Mauritanie. L'Irak n'est servi d'armes chimiques que dans les dernières reprises dans la forme de épisodes de la guerre contre l'Iran, principalement sous la forme de

boîtes larguées depuis des avions. L'Irak produit du gaz moutarde et des gaz neurotoxiques dont il posséderait d'importantes réserves.

## Interception des missiles balistiques

Le 9 septembre, Israël a procédé à une premier essai en vol de son missile anti-missile balistique *Arrow*, conçu pour intercepter et détruire les missiles balistiques à moyenne et courte portées du genre *Scud*. Même si l'essai a été couronné de succès, les représentants israéliens ont souligné que de nombreux autres essais étaient nécessaires avant de décider de sa fabrication en nombre. La mise au point du missile *Arrow* est cofinancée par Israël et les Etats-Unis.

Entre temps, à Washington, des hauts fonctionnaires américains ont affirmé que les événements du Golfe monteraient à quel point l'Initiative de défense stratégique (IDS) est importante. En juillet, M. Henry Cooper, l'un des négociateurs américains aux pourparlers à Genève sur la Guerre des étoiles et grand partisan de l'IDS, a été nommé directeur du programme IDS. Devant la menace de compression budgétaires risquant de toucher le programme de recherche, il a fait valoir toute l'importance de l'IDS comme un moyen de contourner la prolifération des missiles balistiques. Il s'agit sans doute d'un hasard, mais au mois d'août, le Sénat a proposé de réorienter les fonds technologiques spatiales « exotiques » vers les systèmes de défense terrestres mettant en oeuvre des missiles balistiques, ce qui, à court terme, menacerait moins l'avenir du trafic ABM et offrirait plus de possibilités dans l'immédiat en matière de protection contre les missiles à courte et moyenne portées.

Vers la fin octobre, les membres du Comité mixte de la Chambre et du Sénat sont finalement arrivés à un compromis en ce qui concerne le budget de la défense des Etats-Unis pour l'exercice 1991. Les dépenses totales autorisées s'élèvent à 288,3 milliards de dollars. Même si de nombreux programmes ont été éliminés, aucun des grands projets n'a été abandonné. Le budget de l'IDS a été établi à 2,9 milliards de

dollars, ce qui représente presque 2 milliards de moins que la somme demandée par le Pentagone. Les fonds alloués pour le développement du B-2 sont très proches de ceux demandés, mais la politique a continué entre le Sénat et la Chambre quant à l'avenir du programme.

Le Secrétaire à la Défense, M. Richard Cheney, a défendu l'IDS avec ardeur, mais il a dévoilé ses propres intentions à la mi-août, en rayant neuf destroyers et un sous-marin de la liste des bâtiments devant être construits pour la Marine. En éliminant ainsi l'un des deux sous-marins perfectionnés *Seawolf*, il a donné aux destructeurs du programme *Seawolf* au Congrès une occasion rêvée de réclamer son annulation pure et simple. Si la menace soviétique continue de s'estomper, il se pourrait fort bien que ces sous-marins, qui coûtent 1,2 milliards de dollars pièce, soient jugés superflus.

## Réforme de la politique de défense des Etats-Unis

Alors que le budget de 1991 promettait peu de changements en dehors des mesures de restriction, la politique de défense a long terme, par contre, semble vouer à un renouveau. Avant l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak, le Pentagone avait posé une restructuration complète des forces militaires américaines en partant du principe que le budget de la défense serait réduit de 10 p. 100 sur cinq ans. Le plan, apparemment établi sous la direction du général Colin Powell, le chef d'état-major interarmes, et qui a été soumis au président en juin, se fonde sur la supposition suivante : une fois que l'Europe de l'Ouest. Dans le plan, on propose de ramener les effectifs américains stationnés en Europe à quelque 100 000 à 125 000 hommes, dans le cadre d'une réduction générale qui diminuera les effectifs actuels d'un demi-million d'hommes par rapport aux 2,1 millions actuels. Autres réductions importantes : le nombre de groupes de porte-avions passerait de quinze à onze et le nombre de divisions militaires actives, de dix-huit à douze. Par ailleurs, on mettrait sur pied deux divisions « reconstituables », qui accumuleraient

du matériel et seraient dirigées par une poignée d'officiers permanents. De plus, il sera possible de rapatrier rapidement les réserves pour rendre les divisions opérationnelles. D'une façon générale, le plan met plus l'accent sur l'intervention dans divers types de conflits régionaux que sur la défense de l'Europe

soviétique. Le 12 septembre, les pays victorieux de la Seconde guerre mondiale ont renoncé à leurs droits d'occupation Berlin, mais l'événement a été largement éclipsé par la crise du Golfe. À Moscou, les ministres des affaires étrangères britannique, français, américain et soviétique ont signé un traité, marquant la dernière étape du processus de règlement final avec l'Allemagne. Appliquant la formule des «deux plus quatre» adoptée à Ottawa en février, les quatre pays occupants ont, en effet, renoncé au droit de maintenir des troupes au-delà des frontières de la ville de Berlin, de surveiller l'administration de la ville et de tracer les frontières de l'Allemagne. En contrepartie, les deux pays ont accepté que le pays hôte ne dispose que d'une armée limitée et n'acquière pas d'armes nucléaires, chimiques ou biologiques et que son territoire ne s'étende pas au-delà des frontières existantes. Le 2 octobre 1990, les deux Allemagne se sont officiellement unifiées.

Les effectifs combinés des deux armées, qui s'élevaient à plus de 600 000 hommes à l'heure actuelle, seront réduits à 370 000 hommes au cours des quatre prochaines années. Aux termes d'un accord distinct, l'Allemagne a versé 7,5 milliards de dollars américains à Moscou pour l'aider à rapatrier ses soldats. La nouvelle Allemagne fera partie de l'OTAN, mais devra toutefois se plier à certaines restrictions. Jusqu'en 1994, les unités allemandes ne pourront pas être déployées en Allemagne de l'Est. Après 1994, seules les unités allemandes de l'OTAN pourront être envoyées dans cette partie du pays, mais sans armes nucléaires.

— DAVID COX



# LA LOI SUR LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET L'UTILISATION QUI EN EST FAITE

mettre en service actif les Forces canadiennes ou tout élément constitutif... n'importe où au Canada ou à l'étranger quand il estime opportun de le faire :

- a) soit pour la défense du Canada, en raison d'un état d'urgence;
  - b) soit en conséquence d'une action entreprise par le Canada aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies, aux traités de l'Alliance Nord ou de tout autre instrument semblable pour la défense collective que le Canada peut souscrire.» (sic)
- En vertu de l'article 32, si le Parlement ne siège pas au moment où les forces sont mises en service actif, «celui-ci doit se réunir dans les dix jours de la proclamation le convoquant...».

C'est traditionnellement par le biais d'un décret que l'on met les troupes en service actif. Les trois navires de guerre que le premier ministre Mulroney a envoyés dans le Golfe ont quitté le pays le 24 août. Toutefois, à ce moment-là, aucun décret n'a été signé qui plaçait les forces en service actif. Le Parlement devait reprendre ses travaux le 24 septembre. Pour éviter d'avoir à le convoquer plus tôt, il fallut attendre le 14 septembre avant de mettre les forces navales en service actif officiel.

Il y eut un problème de synchronisation lorsque le contingent canadien se trouva prêt à pénétrer dans le canal de Suez deux jours avant l'émission du décret. Selon les règlements enon- cés dans les résolutions des Nations Unies qui établissent les sanctions et la façon dont elles seront appliquées, les forces militaires prenant part à la mise en vigueur des sanctions sont considérées en service actif dès qu'elles ont pénétré dans la zone visée. Puisque les Canadiens au- raient pénétré dans la zone en question dès le moment où ils auraient quitté le canal de Suez, les navires canadiens ont dû demeurer en Sicile jusqu'à ce que le moment de leur passage dans le Canal corresponde avec le début de leur service actif.

Dès qu'elles sont en service actif, les Forces canadiennes reçoivent leurs ordres du Chef d'état-major de la Défense. Elles agissent en vertu des règles d'engagement établies avant leur départ. La force multinationale chargée d'im- poser les sanctions des Nations Unies a, depuis le début des opérations, suivi les directives établies par l'ONU et élaborées à la faveur des consulta- tions qu'ont tenues les chefs militaires des pays constituant cette force. □

— JANE BOULDEN

Jane Boulden est chercheure, et auteure à Kingston. Elle défend une maîtrise en droit international de l'Université Queen's.

9 MOIS D'AOÛT 1990, LES GOUVERNE-

ment aux Forces canadiennes dans deux situations très différentes. Le 6 août, le gouvernement du Québec a officiellement de- mandé l'aide des Forces canadiennes afin de ré- gler le conflit qui opposait les indiens Mohawks à la Sûreté du Québec (SQ) dans la ville d'Oka et au pont Mercier. Quatre jours plus tard, soit le 10 août, le premier ministre Brian Mulroney a annoncé que deux destroyers et un navire de ravitaillement transportant 800 militaires se rendraient dans le golfe Persique pour appuyer la force multinationale regroupée là-bas pour faire respecter les sanctions des Nations Unies impo- sées contre l'Irak. Dans les deux cas, les mesures en question ont été prises en vertu de la Loi sur la défense nationale.

La Loi sur la défense nationale, ou Loi sur la défense du Canada, est un long document qui définit les règlements régissant les Forces cana- diennes et notamment ceux concernant les cours maritimes, les forces de réserve et la mobilisation ou la libération des hommes et des femmes des Forces armées.

## L'aide au pouvoir civil : l'armée à Oka et à Kahnewake

La partie XI de la Loi sur la défense nationale traite de l'aide au pouvoir civil. En effet, les Forces armées peuvent être appelées à prêter main-forte aux autorités civiles lorsque celles-ci ne peuvent plus maîtriser une situation. Ce n'est pas ce qui s'est passé en 1970, lors de l'interven- tion des Forces armées au Québec au moment de la crise du FLQ. Le gouvernement fédéral avait alors proclamé l'existence d'un état d'insurrec- tion appréhendée, et la Loi sur les mesures de guerre lui donnait des pouvoirs d'arrestation exorbitants.

La Loi sur les mesures de guerre a depuis été remplacée par la nouvelle Loi sur les mesures d'urgence qui contient diverses sauvegardes con- tre les abus de pouvoir risquant de survenir dans une situation d'urgence; elle prévoit également un examen par le Parlement des décisions prises et elle accorde aux provinces un rôle plus impor- tant que sous le régime de la Loi sur les mesures nationales; il faut donc conclure que, selon les autorités, il n'y avait pas de situation d'urgence. Selon la Loi sur la défense nationale, c'est au procureur général de la province touchée qu'il incombe de demander l'aide des Forces cana- diennes. Le procureur général peut rédiger lui- même la requête, mais celle-ci peut également être fondée sur l'information reçue d'un juge d'une cour supérieure, de comité ou de district. L'article 275 mentionne que l'on peut deman- der l'aide des forces armées «... en cas d'émeutes

## Le service actif :

Dans le cas des événements de 1990, l'armée a tout d'abord remplacé la Sûreté du Québec à Oka et à Kahnewake. Le 27 août, après que le gou- vernement du Québec eut constaté l'échec des négociations, il a demandé aux Forces armées de s'acquiescer du mandat qu'il leur avait accordé à l'origine, soit enlever les barricades, rétablir la liberté de circulation sur les routes et les ponts, démanteler les centres de résistance, et restaurer l'ordre public. Le Chef d'état-major de la Dé- fense, le général John de Chastelain, a ordonné aux Forces armées déployées sur place de s'acquiescer de ce mandat.

## La marine canadienne dans le golfe Persique

La Loi sur la défense nationale autorise également le recours aux forces armées pour assurer la défense du Canada. L'article 31 men- tionne que : «Le gouvernement en conseil peu

## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

Le danger des bilans politiques.



préparation ne pouvait tomber à plus mauvaise époque, à savoir précisément au moment où les objectifs de la politique de défense du Canada, après être restés inchangés pendant des décennies, ont commencé à se modifier. Beaucoup d'entre nous ont sévèrement critiqué le Livre blanc à sa sortie, surtout parce que nous le pensions mal orienté, encore que certains jugeaient également ses objectifs utopiques.

En définitive, ce sont d'abord des considérations financières que l'apaisement des tensions Est-Ouest qui l'ont vidé de sa substance. Cependant, le fait qu'on ait une fois encore édulcoré des orientations nouvelles données aux forces armées et qu'une fois encore les attentions suscitées ont été déguisées à cause des dommages durables. En l'occurrence et tout bien considéré, il aurait mieux valu ne dresser aucun bilan plutôt que d'en avoir dressé un en vain.

On ne sait pas vraiment si, et dans quelle mesure, l'histoire mitigée des derniers bilans de la politique étrangère et de la défense canadienne a contribué à une certaine réticence à renouveler l'exercice, même après que M. Gorbatchev a très manifestement entrepris de «chambarder» l'ordre international. À l'évidence, d'autres facteurs ont joué un rôle, dont la nécessité constante d'éteindre des incendies politiques, nécessaires renforcés par ces événements-mêmes, et les préoccupations internes d'ordre financier et organisationnel.

Il y a aussi eu au Canada un débat officiel et politique incessant sur la question de savoir si M. Gorbatchev allait apporter des changements qualitatifs. Le Canada, sans jamais avoir joué les va-et-vient contre l'Union soviétique, a tout de même compté parmi les pays qui, en Occident, critiquaient le plus sévèrement les violations des droits de la personne dans le système totalitaire soviétique. En conséquence, notre gouvernement a été un des plus lents à reconnaître les changements et à y réagir.

EXAMINER LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE, LA POLITIQUE en matière de sécurité, de défense et d'aide au développement n'est pas toujours une bonne idée, du moins lorsque l'examen se pratique aussi irrégulièrement qu'au Canada. S'il y a une chose que nous a enseignée l'histoire récente, c'est bien que les événements peuvent s'enchaîner à un rythme très rapide. La situation est en évolution constante, c'est pourquoi nous devrions peut-être envisager une forme de bilans continus, à la publication annuelle de Livres blancs, à l'instar des Britanniques. Nous y gagnons un processus de consultation ininterrompu qui ne connaîtrait plus de ces périodes d'activité effrénée entrecoupées de longs silences. Certaines leçons s'appliquent particulièrement au gouvernement canadien, car la plupart des examens politiques réalisés à la fin des années 1960 et au début des années 1970, à l'exception peut-être de celui qui a donné lieu à la publication du Livre blanc de la défense, en 1971, étaient mal conçus et mal exécutés, malgré la pleine participation des plus hauts échelons du gouvernement. Il en a résulté des bilans plus préjudiciables que bénéfiques, et une partie de ce préjudice a mis du temps à s'effacer.

Le «Livre gris» du nouveau gouvernement conservateur d'abord sur la politique étrangère de 1985 (*Compétitivité et sécurité : les orientations des relations internationales canadiennes*) a été en grande partie annulé par le rapport qu'en a fait ensuite le comité mixte extraordinaire du Parlementaire. Cette réaction n'a jamais été officialisée par aucun Livre blanc, pas plus que le Livre gris n'a été retiré, ce qui a pu sembler une certaine confusion dans plusieurs domaines.

Certains débats et décisions qui ont suivi sur l'indépendance des programmes canadiens, la participation multilatérale et la coordination bilatérale avec les États-Unis auraient sans doute gagné en franchise si un processus d'examen plus clair avait produit un résultat plus net, mais c'est difficile à dire. Ces programmes parfois contradictoires et les questions litigieuses qui les entouraient inmanquablement constituent le sempiternel lot de la politique étrangère canadienne.

SI VOUS VOULEZ UNE AUTRE PREUVE QUE LE PROCESSUS d'élaboration de la politique de défense de la défense de la sécurité et de la défense, sa

de la sécurité internationale, avons saisi l'occasion pour organiser des consultations, préparer des documents et apporter notre contribution aux mécanismes de formulation des politiques. À ce jour, la participation du public à l'examen de la politique de sécurité a aussi été conçue pour favoriser un dialogue permanent, principalement par le biais d'une série d'allocations du ministre des Affaires étrangères, dont la première, présentée à l'Université McGill en février, portait sur les principes de nos futures relations avec l'Europe, et une autre, donnée en mai au Collège Humber, a permis de confirmer les orientations canadiennes en Europe.

En outre, une motion de l'opposition reprochant au gouvernement son manque d'initiative en matière de politique étrangère a provoqué un débat intéressant à la Chambre, le 31 mai. Débat que M. Clark a d'ailleurs élargi aux problèmes de sécurité dans la région de l'Asie et du Pacifique, ce qui nous a amené aussi à des discussions animées et importantes avec nos partenaires du Pacifique.

DANS LES ÉLÉMENTS POLITIQUES QUI ONT ÉMERGÉ jusqu'ici, sont apparues des analyses et des prises de risques intrigantes. Ottawa s'est déclaré en faveur du renforcement et de l'élargissement de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCPE), depuis longtemps préconisée par l'Institut, bien avant Washington ou Londres, et notre pays a contribué à orienter l'OTAN dans ce sens. Nous qui ne sommes pas au gouvernement, ne savons pas quels sont tous les autres dossiers à régler. Nous savons que les politiques relatives au multilatéralisme ont fait l'objet d'une certaine réflexion de façon à répondre en temps voulu aux nombreux nouveaux problèmes et opportunités auxquels les Nations Unies seront confrontées.

Bien entendu, il reste encore du pain sur la planche, en l'occurrence la révision de la politique de défense, bien promise mais souvent repoussée. Soyons justes et rappelons-nous que le bilan de 1987 a été publié dans les conditions que nous savons, en partie en désespoir de cause, ce qui est malheureusement inévitable lorsque l'on choisit de procéder à des révisions sporadiques. Au vu des événements de ces tout derniers mois, force nous est de constater que les problèmes que le Canada a à résoudre en matière de défense ont changé radicalement. M. McKnight a déclaré sans équivoque qu'à la fin de 1989, les fondements géopolitiques de l'essentiel de la politique [de 1987] avaient disparu. Les nouvelles réalités géopolitiques sont encore plus complexes et les options relatives à la défense doivent suivre de plus près encore et avec plus de souplesse les programmes de notre politique étrangère et de notre sécurité. À l'aube des années 1990, tout Canadien et Canadienne a intérêt à ce que les bilans soient dressés convenablement.

NE FOIS ENTAMÉ, NEANMOINS, L'INDISPENSABLE bilan politique est allé bon train et, jusqu'ici, il se révèle efficace. Un ministre s'y est investi personnellement et au nom du gouvernement, et il est disposé à discuter de ses conclusions avec les Canadiens et Canadiennes intéressés ainsi qu'avec nos partenaires à l'étranger. De l'extérieur, les dirigeants semblent avoir conduit leurs analyses et leurs débats internes de manière assez expéditive. L'urgence de modifications importantes à apporter à certains piliers du système international a apparemment orienté l'examen de telle manière qu'ils n'ont éprouvé ni le besoin ni la tentation de partir de principes fondamentaux abstraits comme cela avait été le cas en 1970, par exemple.

Nombre de Canadiens ont contribué au processus d'examen, certains de façon plus organisée que d'autres. Beaucoup d'entre nous, qui travaillons dans le domaine de la paix et



# LA CRISE DU GOLFE L'ÉQUATION ISRAËLO-PALESTINIENNE

PAR JIM LEDERMAN

lui-même. En juillet, on dénombrait plus de Palestiniens tués par leurs frères que par des soldats israéliens.

UNE AUTRE CAUSE D'ABATTEMENT POUR LES Palestiniens, qui est passée pratiquement inaperçue dans la presse occidentale, c'est l'arrivée massive de Juifs soviétiques en Israël. Quand la crise irakienne a éclaté, ils étaient déjà 90 000 à avoir immigré en Terre sainte en sept mois, et les autorités israéliennes en attendent 2 millions d'autres avant la fin de la décennie. Or, voilà qui défie une des principales thèses palestiniennes, à savoir que, même si les Arabes sont incapables de gagner une guerre contre les Israéliens, grâce aux taux de massacres bien plus élevés des Palestiniens, la démographie de la région serait bientôt modifiée et il s'ensuivrait une crise politique.

Pour les Palestiniens expatriés, l'arrivée des Juifs soviétiques signifierait d'ailleurs un double menace. D'abord, l'installation de ces immigrants mettrait l'économie israélienne à si forte contribution que les efforts des Arabes pour obtenir les mêmes subventions publiques que les Juifs pour leurs services municipaux n'aboutiraient pas. Ensuite, les Arabes israéliens, en raison de leur croissance démographique élevée, auraient bien-tôt pesé d'un poids important à la Knesset; or, avec l'arrivée des Juifs soviétiques, ils pouvaient dire adieu à ce pouvoir potentiel.

Selon un des grands mythes nationaux que les Palestiniens brandissent dans les périodes de crise, les Juifs sionistes ont un corps étranger occidental incrusté en terre arabe qu'il faut extirper par l'épée. La plupart des Palestiniens ont pour modèle la peur dans les émirats du Golfe où les travailleurs palestiniens avaient peu de droits civils, et ses appels à la guerre sainte contre les Sadam Husseins s'est forgé une image de Sionisme. La plupart des Palestiniens ont pour modèle la persécution antijuive, le fait qu'il ait su semer la peur dans les émirats du Golfe où les travailleurs palestiniens avaient peu de droits civils, et ses appels à la guerre sainte contre les Sadam Husseins s'est forgé une image de Sionisme.

En outre, j'ai vu à Bagdad, même parmi les Palestiniens, une certaine peur de l'agitation palestinienne sur son territoire. En outre, j'ai vu à Bagdad, même parmi les Palestiniens, une certaine peur de l'agitation palestinienne sur son territoire. En outre, j'ai vu à Bagdad, même parmi les Palestiniens, une certaine peur de l'agitation palestinienne sur son territoire.

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E SOUTIENS QUASI UNANIMES DES Palestiniens à l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak démontre une fois encore ce qui arrive quand un mythe populaire national est confronté à des politiques nationales et qu'il l'emporte sur elles. Après le coup de force irakien, les Palestiniens sont descendus en masse dans les rues de Jordanie et de Cisjordanie pour montrer, de façon extraordinaire, qu'ils soutenaient Saddam Hussein. À Jérusalem-Est, les journaux palestiniens, toutes tendances confondues, ont chanté les louanges du maître de Bagdad. Même parmi les Palestiniens qui sont citoyens israéliens, nombreux ont été ceux qui ont applaudi. D'après un sondage par téléphone dont les résultats ont été publiés le 9 août, 62 p. 100 d'entre eux donnaient raison à Saddam Hussein et 69 p. 100 le considéraient comme un héros national. Seulement 15 p. 100 des personnes interrogées pensaient qu'il était fou ou qu'il avait perdu la tête.

Les conséquences pratiques de ce soutien n'ont pas tardé à se faire sentir. L'Égypte a ordonné un filtrage strict des Palestiniens à ses postes frontaliers. Des milliers de Palestiniens qui travaillaient dans les pays du Golfe ont été expulsés. Alors que c'était 250 millions de dollars que ces travailleurs immigrants envoyaient chaque année à leurs familles dans les territoires occupés par Israël, aujourd'hui, l'argent du Golfe n'arrive plus qu'à compte-gouttes. Et une fois de plus, l'OLP, condamnée, s'est retrouvée isolée politiquement. Le fait d'étudier la conjoncture unanime, il faut ajouter la conjoncture moyen-orientale juste avant l'invasion.

Dans le monde arabe, les Koweïtiens comprenaient parmi les gens plus largement impopulaires. Partout où ils allaient, que ce soit au Caire, à Tunis ou à Beyrouth, on trouvait qu'ils dépassaient avec ostentation, qu'ils écrasèrent les populations locales de leur richesse sans pudeur ni tact. Aux yeux de la plupart des Palestiniens, la famille régnante notamment, c'est-à-dire les Sabah, était avare et peu disposée à contribuer à la cause palestinienne plus qu'il ne fallait pour contenir l'agitation palestinienne sur son territoire.

Palestiniens traversaient une très mauvaise passe politique. En juin, suite à une attaque terroriste contre des plages israéliennes, les Américains avaient suspendu leurs contacts à des niveaux internationaux. Pour ce qui était de l'idéologie et de la sécurité, le nouveau gouvernement israélien était dominé par les «faucous». Les relations palestino-égyptiennes étaient notoirement tendues. L'Union soviétique avait renoncé à apporter son soutien actif à la cause palestinienne. De plus, en Cisjordanie et dans la bande de Gaza occupées, le soulèvement stagnait et se retournait contre

indignes que les Saoudiens avaient invités sur leur territoire ont tout de suite fait vibrer le cœur des Palestiniens. De bien des façons, Saddam Hussein faisait figure de messie laïc. Tout cela n'a pas été sans effets sur l'équation israélo-palestinienne. La droite israélienne s'est lancée dans une campagne de «nous vous l'avons dit», les Palestiniens se sont engagés dans une alliance perfide avec l'ennemi le plus dangereux d'Israël, on ne peut donc pas leur faire confiance. Les «colombes» israéliennes, dont beaucoup n'avaient pas ménagé leurs efforts pour instaurer un dialogue entre Israéliens et Palestiniens, étaient au désarroi. Dans leurs rangs, le vétéran de la politique qu'est Abba Eban, ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères, déclarait : «Nous ne pouvons, mes collègues et moi, avoir une discussion fructueuse avec des Palestiniens qui applaudissent à la brutalité de Saddam. Yossi Sarid, député et militant pacifiste en vue, ajoutait : «On doit porter un masque à gaz pour ne pas respirer le poison distillé par la position pro-irakienne affichée par l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine».

Les interférences privilégiées de la gauche israélienne dans les territoires occupés, comme Feisal Al Hussein, qui passe pour être le personnage politique le plus influent de Cisjordanie, ont essayé d'atténuer l'effet déclencheur en Israël par l'Irak. Ce dernier argument n'a guère convaincu les Israéliens, qui ont rappelé que ils n'avaient pas commencé la guerre qui s'était solidée par la prise de la Cisjordanie, alors que l'action de l'Irak était une agression non déguisée.

Pour la majorité des Israéliens du centre et de droite, il y a un autre sujet d'inquiétude : le risque que Israël de se retirer des territoires occupés. Par ailleurs, la droite et la gauche réduisent toutes deux les conséquences encore inimaginables de Bagdad de lancer une campagne terroriste internationale qui serait dirigée par des mercenaires palestiniens tels que Abou Abbas et

Abou Nidal. □


Le présent article est la deuxième d'une série que Paix et Sécurité consacrera à des problèmes tels que les conflits moyen-orientaux et arabo-israéliens. Jim Lederman, journaliste canadien, est depuis longtemps correspondant étranger en Israël. Il est en train de terminer un livre sur l'initia vue par les médias universitaires.

14 HIVER 1990-1991

FACE AU PESSIMISME GÉNÉ-  
ralisé, brille une lueur  
d'espoir. Jusqu'à ce que les  
nouvelles lois sur la pro-  
priété entrent en vigueur, il  
dans le monopole complet  
que l'Etat exerce sur l'ac-  
tivité économique, à savoir  
les «coopératives». Il y a  
deux ans, selon Chmelev,  
le pays comptait environ  
100 000 «coopératives»,  
dont la production se  
chiffrait en millions de rou-  
bles. Aujourd'hui, on en  
dénombrerait 5 millions, et leur  
chiffre d'affaires global  
s'élève à quelque 60 mil-  
liards de roubles. Ils font tourner ces coopératives  
(restaurants, taxis et autres petites entreprises)  
malgré une bureaucratie étatique hostile qui «les  
étrangle», dit Chmelev, et alors qu'une large pro-  
portion de la population les considère comme des  
exploiteurs affiliés à la mafia. Pour Chmelev, leur  
existence est aussi minuscule que de l'herbe qui  
pousserait dans du ciment.

Si les événements mondiaux des dix-huit  
derniers mois nous ont enseigné quelque chose,  
c'est de nous montrer étonnés quand il s'agit  
de prédire l'avenir. Mais pour ceux qui suivent  
les tribulations de l'économie soviétique, il est  
évident que l'important, ce n'est pas de savoir si,  
dans dix ou vingt ans, l'URSS sera riche au re-  
gard des normes occidentales, mais plutôt de  
savoir s'il existera encore une Union soviétique  
d'ici cinq ans, voire à la fin de l'année prochaine.  
La disparition de l'Etat soviétique ne serait pas  
fatallement un mal pour le monde. Cela dépendra  
des conditions dans lesquelles elle surviendrait.  
Si ce sont de plus petites unités politiques, les  
républiques ou les régions, qui reprendront les rênes  
du pouvoir et qui travailleront de concert avec la  
population pour créer des économies locales pro-  
ductives, pourquoi pas. Mais des bouleversements  
politiques d'une telle ampleur ont une fâcheuse  
tendance à tourner dangereusement à la violence.  
À cet égard, la révolution est-européenne de 1989  
aura été l'exception confirmant la règle. Or, même  
si l'Occident a beaucoup à gagner au bon dérou-  
lement des événements en URSS, il a très peu  
d'influence quant à leur issue, ce qui ne justifie  
nullement de ne pas s'en préoccuper.

«Pourquoi un Institut pour la paix et la sécurité  
s'intéresserait-il à notre économie ? » m'a de-  
mandé mon amie moscovite, alors que nous  
fitions à bonne allure installés dans sa voiture de  
fonction avec chauffeur. «Parce qu'un pays  
peuple de 285 millions d'habitants apparaît  
maussades et en colère, et doit de 30 000 bombes  
à hydrogène est une menace pour le monde. Nous  
voulons le voir heureux et prospère.» Quand  
elle a eu traduit mes propos au chauffeur, il a  
bien ri. □



l'avaient cueilli. «N'importe quel groupe d'hommes  
déterminés auraient pu faire ce que les bolche-  
viques ont fait à Petrograd au mois d'octobre  
1917 : s'emparer de quelques points clés de la  
ville et se proclamer gouvernement. Mais gou-  
vernement de quoi ? ... l'Empire russe était en  
pleine déliquescence.»

La confusion qui semble régner dans la capi-  
tale soviétique rend ce genre de comparaisons  
historiques inévitable. On a de plus en plus l'im-  
pression que les gouvernements sont en train de  
perdre pied, à tous les niveaux. Un des principaux  
conseillers économiques de Gorbatchev, Abel  
Aganbegian, a reconnu il y a peu de temps de-  
vant le parlement soviétique que personne ne sait  
réellement ce qui arrive à l'économie. À Lenin-  
grad, un conseil de district local (ce qui corres-  
pond, en gros, à un quartier) a envisagé de  
proclamer son indépendance et d'imprimer sa  
propre monnaie, mais en fin de compte, ce sont  
les têtes les plus froides qui l'ont emporté.

À première vue, un tel acte paraît absurde.  
Pourtant, il répond à sa propre logique interne. Le  
rouble s'est tellement dévalorisé — par cupé-  
tisme, les Soviétiques parlent d'«argent facile»  
— que cela ne vaut plus la peine de travailler pour  
en gagner. Les gens n'en ont pas besoin, pas plus  
que les entreprises publiques ou les républiques,  
d'ailleurs. Une part croissante du commerce de  
échange du coton contre de la viande, de la  
viande contre de l'huile, ce qui, outre de cons-  
tituer un retour à une économie de type féodal,  
est un signe supplémentaire de la désintégration  
de l'Etat.

Les paquets de cigarettes étrangères, de  
préférence des «Marlboro», supplantent la mon-  
naie nationale, le rouble, en tant que moyen  
d'échange. Outre qu'il n'aide en rien, cet affront  
quotidien a un effet corrosif sur le peu de sens  
que la population attache encore au fait d'être  
soviétique.

Nicolas Chmelev est impatient de savoir à quoi  
ressemblera une économie soviétique en état de  
marche après la crise immédiate. Il pense en mois  
et en semaines, pas en années : «Quelle sorte  
d'économie sortira-t-elle du pétrin actuel ? Dieu seul  
le sait. Nous pas. Je n'ai pas de vision détaillée  
du genre de société qui sera la nôtre dans dix ans.  
Mais j'espère que nous aurons en notre part de  
souffrance et de folie».

Nicolas Chmelev est un  
pilier respecté du mouve-  
ment pour une vraie ré-  
forme économique et  
démocratique. Chef du dé-  
partement d'économie à  
l'Institut sur les États-Unis  
et le Canada, romancier,  
membre du Congrès des  
députés du peuple et parti-  
san déclaré d'une écono-  
mie libérale, il a trime  
pendant des années dans le  
dessert intellectuel avant  
que la glasnost de Gor-  
batchev le laisse s'atteler  
en toute liberté à la tâche  
impossible que constitue le  
sauvetage de l'économie  
soviétique. On sent bien, cependant, que le  
gouvernement actuel le dégoûte.

Comme beaucoup d'autres réformateurs  
aujourd'hui dans son pays, il prône depuis long-  
temps d'acheter pour des dizaines de milliards de  
dollars de biens de consommation à l'Occident  
afin de les vendre dans les magasins soviétiques.  
Cela permettrait d'éponger l'énorme masse de  
roubles en circulation, d'éviter une hyperinflation  
pendant le passage à une économie de marché  
et, fait non négligeable, d'améliorer rapidement  
le fait sinistre et misérable du Soviétique moyen.  
L'attitude, qu'il qualifie d'indifférente, du  
gouvernement Gorbatchev le rend perplexe :

Je sais que M. Gorbatchev commence à com-  
prendre l'énormité de la situation, mais notre  
gouvernement est tellement entêté. Je redoute  
cette tradition qui veut que les dirigeants sovié-  
tiques méprisent le peuple, exactement comme  
la vieille aristocratie le méprisait. Ils ont du  
mal à se faire à l'idée de consacrer une somme  
d'argent aussi faramineuse dans les médica-  
ments, des pantalons, des produits cosmétiques  
et des micro-ordinateurs. Pourquoi ? Parce que  
nous avons jadis englouti notre argent dans de  
gigantesques travaux; alors pourquoi aller le  
dépenser dans pareilles bagatelles ?

APRÈS NOTRE ENTRETIEN, CHMELEV S'ENVOLAIT  
pour Bonn (Allemagne) avec Boris Eltsine, le  
président de la république de Russie. Ce seul fait  
en dit long. En Occident du moins, Eltsine plaît  
moins que Gorbatchev. Mais sa cote monte dans  
les sondages d'opinion et, plus important pour  
ceux qui veulent que les choses changent, les  
Russes pensent qu'il est décidé à aller plus vite  
en besogne que Gorbatchev. Ce qui est manifeste-  
ment un atout dans une situation qui demande  
d'espérer un homme d'action, mais qui est  
également périlleuse. Or, dans des situations  
transformer en «faire n'importe quoi», ce qui est  
la porte ouverte aux opportunistes, voire aux  
idéologues.

S'agissant des opportunistes du dernier grand  
soulèvement politique qu'a connu la Russie,  
en 1917, Adam Ulam, éminent historien de la  
révolution russe, a écrit que les bolcheviques ne  
étaient pas emparés du pouvoir, mais qu'ils



# RIEN DANS LES MAINS, RIEN DANS LES POCHES,

*Un hiver de grogne en Union soviétique.*

PAR MICHAEL BRYANS



PRÈS UN AUTOMNE DE PLUIES INCESSANTES sur Moscou, et une interminable querelle autour de programmes de redressement économique opposés, que d'aucuns qualifient de « bataille des plans » entre Chataline, Ryzhkov et le grand compromis, le parti soviétique et M. Gorbatchev se sont mis d'accord sur l'un d'eux. Mais, si l'on considère la tâche à accomplir, parler de « plan » est trompeur. L'Union soviétique, qui navigue à l'aveuglette, est en train de s'inventer une nouvelle politique économique en partant de conditions jamais vues ailleurs.

Ce n'est pas une expérience dans laquelle les puples de l'Union soviétique s'embarquent de gaieté de coeur, mais comme dans la blague irlandaise sur l'homme qui, demandant son chemin à un paysan, s'entend répondre qu'il est Soviétiques, ou les Russes, comme ils préfèrent se présenter quand ils sont de nationalité russe, doivent partir de là où ils se trouvent.

La déprime des Russes et la misère redoutée sont omniprésentes à Moscou, mais certaines personnes ont des façons plus objectives de prendre le poids de la population. Sociologues de formation, Lvi Levada travaillait pour le tout nouveau centre d'études de l'opinion publique, qui a ses bureaux à deux pas du célèbre grand magasin GUM, un endroit aujourd'hui sinistrement vide de marchandises et de clients.

En Union soviétique, les sondages d'opinion qu'ils ont en Occident, d'ailleurs, les instituts occidentaux critiquent souvent les méthodes employées et les résultats obtenus. Cependant, les sondages révélés par Levada et ses collègues sont tellement frappantes que peu importe une marge d'erreur statistique, même importante. Pour les perdants de ces sondages, gouvernementaux, personnalités politiques et optimistes de tous bords, on est même bien en deçà de la réalité.

Prenant au mur un graphique des sondages de septembre, M. Levada montre les courbes qui indiquent une nouvelle baisse des espoirs populaires, à la main, les résultats des sondages de fin d'été, estimant que la situation augmentait à vue d'oeil, l'accession de M. Gorbatchev à la présidence au printemps, mais le moral est resté en l'air.

En plus de toutes les autres pénuries, les Russes semblent à court de foi. Or, la foi est le moteur des économies modernes. La foi en ce que la monnaie que l'on a entre les mains vaudra plus ou moins autant dans un an qu'aujourd'hui, la foi en ce que tous les gens qui ont déposé de l'argent dans la même banque que vous ne tenteront pas de le retirer le même jour que vous. C'est grâce à ce parti essentiel que les citoyens font sur l'avenir que l'épargne, les investissements et toutes les choses qui rendent une vie prospère et civilisée existent. C'est un jeu que tout un chacun, mais surtout toutes les institutions d'une nation, ont le devoir de pérenniser.

Mais c'est ici, dans le personnage de Gorbatchev et dans le comportement de son gouvernement « fédéral » que réside un grand mystère : pourquoi ne semblent-ils tous ne faire à propos du chaos politique croissant et de la misère économique que l'environner ? C'est un mystère parce que, depuis plus de cinq ans, Gorbatchev et ses conseillers ont su faire preuve d'une maîtrise agitée politique doublée d'humanité. Pour tant, à l'heure que l'on pourrait qualifier de plus difficile qu'il ait connue l'URSS — les dirigeants du pays reconnaissent ouvertement qu'un effondrement de l'économie sonnerait le glas de ce que l'on appelle l'Union soviétique — le centre décisionnel semble frappé de paralysie et d'incapacité totale.

Les premières décisions que M. Gorbatchev a prises en vertu des pouvoirs spéciaux que le parlement lui a conférés à la fin septembre ont été d'ordonner aux entreprises publiques de respecter les quotas de production fixés par le plan quinquennal, puis de mobiliser, une fois encore, les étudiants pour ramasser des légumes pendant une partie de leur premier semestre. Les Moscovites que j'ai rencontrés ont accueilli ces décrets

présidentielles avec une franche dérition : pour eux, Mikhail Gorbatchev, pris à la gorge, brasse du vent. La paralyse politique s'expliquerait aussi autrement, comme le veulent les rumeurs, très abondantes dans ce pays. En effet, les ministères actuels, qui ont peu d'intérêt à tirer de véritables réformes, s'acharnent à saboter les efforts de Gorbatchev et de ses partisans. Au début du mois d'octobre, le quotidien *Izvestia* a publié un reportage sur la pénurie croissante de viande dans les boutiques de Moscou. Apparemment, pour se en procurer davantage, l'organisme public chargé du ravitaillement a décidé d'augmenter les prix qu'il payait aux fermes d'État. Le hic, c'est qu'il l'a fait savoir trois mois avant la majoration effective des prix. Résultat, comme n'importe quel étudiant en économie de première année aurait pu le prédire, l'approvisionnement en viande déjà lamentable a simplement cessé. Les fermes d'État, ce qui est assez sensé de leur part, ont arrêté tout abattage jusqu'à l'application des nouveaux tarifs. Le ministre de l'Alimentation venait enfin de découvrir le pouvoir économique de l'établissement des prix.

QUESTION : S'AGISSAIT-IL D'UN EXEMPLE DE CITOYENNETÉ ? RÉPONSE : IL EST IMPOSSIBLE D'UN SABOTAGE DÉLIBÉRÉ ORCHÉSTRÉ PAR UNE BUREAUCRATIE COMMISSAIRE À L'ENTREPRISE PUBLIQUE OU À L'ÉTAT. L'exaspération et la réelle déception que cause le régime Gorbatchev sont profondes chez les intellectuels et les spécialistes, qui sont des gens sur lesquels les gouvernements, à tous les niveaux, doivent pouvoir compter s'ils veulent donner au pays une chance d'avenir stable. Le sociologue Lvi Levada n'est pas le seul observateur à scruter l'état d'esprit politique et économique soviétique qui a été déclaré que le gouvernement central dirigé par Gorbatchev, et par son très impopulaire premier ministre, Nicolas Ryzhkov, s'affaiblissait de semaine en semaine. Il ne s'agit pas de récrimination, mais plutôt du triste constat que l'on admettrait se retrouve hors jeu, peu importe pourquoi, que les leviers du pouvoir dont dispose le gouvernement central ne sont tout bonnement reliés à rien et qu'il est donc temps de regarder ailleurs.

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LA FAVEUR DE LA PAIX AMÉRICAINES, LES GOUVERNEMENTS SUCCESSIONS ONT pu gérer l'Etat tranquillement, sans grandes secousses. L'un d'eux, celui de Lescro (1941-1946) exerça un despotisme absolu pendant la guerre. Grâce au dégel consécutif à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les concepts d'ordre, de liberté, de démocratie, de justice sociale et de droits du peuple gagnent le pays et nourrissent un large mouvement de contestation qui empêche le gouvernement de l'1 janvier 1946. Cet événement marque un véritable rupture. C'est la première fois depuis 1930 qu'un gouvernement est renversé sous la pression populaire. Il en est résulté un grand brassage social et politique d'où ont émergé de nouvelles forces (naissance d'un mouvement syndical, création d'associations professionnelles, foisonnement de groupements politiques et d'organes de presse). Sur le plan politique, l'élite des classes moyennes reprendra sa montée vers le pouvoir en s'opposant bruyamment à ce qu'elle appelle l'exclusivisme de la bourgeoisie mulâtre et en se posant en défenseurs des classes moyennes et des masses noires. L'idéologie noiriste va alors se conjuguer à l'idéologie nationaliste, en voguant sous l'occupation, pour légitimer la préférence de cette nouvelle élite à occuper une position dominante dans l'appareil d'Etat et forcer ainsi son entrée dans la bourgeoisie.

montrer que Duvalier aura gouverné pendant les officiers policiers para



# HAÏTI : LA LONGUE MARCHÉ

Les élections de décembre permettront-elles à la démocratie de s'installer en Haïti?

PAR CLAUDE MOÏSE



CUR DE NOMBREUX OBSERVATEURS, HAÏTI EST UN PAYS ÉTON-  
nant qui suscite tantôt l'admiration, tantôt le découragement.  
Ce pays a accédé à l'indépendance nationale en 1804, au  
moment où la quasi-totalité du continent américain était sous  
la dépendance coloniale européenne; il offre aujourd'hui,

après un parcours historique cahoteux, un bilan de

développement humain désastreux.

À l'état de faillite du pays, il faut ajouter la répression, l'absence de

liberté, le mépris de la vie humaine, l'exode et les tribulations des émigrés

haïtiens dans les Antilles et les grandes capitales occidentales et la corrup-

tion. La chute de Jean-Claude Duvalier survenue en février 1986 a fait

naître l'espoir que Haïti reprendrait vigoureusement sa marche vers la digi-

nité, la justice et la démocratie. Mais depuis la fuite du dictateur, les péti-

tes d'une inévitabile transition marquée par la violence, désespèrent la

population et les observateurs. À bien des égards, la crise actuelle semble

renouer avec un passé de turbulence et avec les malheurs qui ont accablé le

pays tout au long du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Qui connaît l'histoire d'Haïti est tenté de

lire dans le présent une répétition tragique du passé.

HAÏTI EST NÉE DE LA VIOLENCE. AU COMMENCEMENT ÉTAIT LE GÉNOCIDE DES

autochtones (1492-1500). Puis, lentement et laborieusement, dans le sillage

de Christophe Colomb, des Européens occupèrent les terres, repoussèrent

l'île de travailleurs esclaves noirs attachés à l'Afrique et organisèrent une

exploitation à outrance des ressources sous la poussée du capitalisme eu-

ropéen en expansion. Tels furent les éléments de base de la formation d'une

société coloniale, esclavagiste et raciste au sein de laquelle Haïti demeura en

gestion durant trois siècles (1500-1804). C'est du bouleversement de cette

société, consécutif à la Révolution française de 1789, qu'elle vit le jour le

1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1804 en tant que nation indépendante. Entre 1789 et 1804, les

colons blancs, les affranchis, les représentants du pouvoir métropolitain, les

petits blancs et les esclaves noirs se sont affrontés dans une lutte sans merci

pour la conservation des privilèges divers ou pour la conquête des droits

nouveaux. Durant quinze ans, les révoltes, les insurrections, les guerres

civiles, les guerres étrangères, les guerres d'indépendance se sont succédé

pour faire exploser la colonie et aboutir à la naissance du nouveau pays.

L'indépendance solennellement proclamée en ce 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1804, la coa-

lition victorieuse des anciens libres de la colonie, de l'élite des nouveaux habi-

tants libres constituée à la faveur des guerres révolutionnaires et les esclaves

libérés, hérité de la tâche de construire un nouvel État. La préservation de

ces mobilisées derrière ses généraux, vainqueurs des Français. Mais d'autres

défis les attendent : il faudra survivre à la mise en quarantaine imposée

par la France, reconstruire l'appareil de production, réactiver les réseaux

économiques, partager l'héritage colonial, sauvegarder la liberté générale.

En somme, l'ordre colonial esclavagiste du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle dément, il s'agit de

réorganiser la production dans un nouveau cadre de relations de travail.

Confrontée à ces questions fondamentales, l'union sacrée réalisée jadis

contre les Français est déjà menacée de dislocation au lendemain de la vic-

toire. En effet, si toutes les classes de la société tiennent farouchement à

consolidier l'indépendance, elles ne s'entendent pas sur ses volets écono-

mique et social. Déjà pendant la période révolutionnaire (1791-1804), la

conquête du pouvoir et la prise de possession des habitations abandonnées



Benoit Frenette

par les colons. De leur côté, les cultivateurs, hier esclaves, réclament  
aujourd'hui leur part des terres et n'entendent nullement travailler pour  
de nouveaux maîtres.

TELLE EST LA TOILE DE FOND DE L'HISTOIRE POLITIQUE HAÏTIENNE AU XIX<sup>e</sup>

siècle. Il faut y ajouter les menaces de guerre et le danger d'un retour offen-

sement dans les campagnes, mais c'est surtout aux conflits d'intérêt et

aux luttes de pouvoir qui déchirent les classes dirigeantes que nous devons

l'instabilité politique chronique au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. La tragédie a commencé en

1806 avec l'assassinat de Dessalines, père de l'indépendance, par les géné-

raux du Sud. Elle s'est poursuivie par la guerre civile et par la scission du

pays entre l'État du Nord et la République de l'Ouest et du Sud (1807-1820).

Puis, tout le reste du siècle jusqu'à l'occupation américaine de 1915 est

marqué par des insurrections, des complots d'importance variable (on en

compte une centaine) des guerres civiles, des *pronunciamientos*, etc.

Au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, vingt-quatre des vingt-six présidents ont été des mili-

taires. Les généraux, commandants d'arrondissement ou de département,

sont les piliers du pouvoir central. Ils règnent en maîtres sur les grandes

villes et dans les régions.

Le militarisme est un héritage des luttes révolutionnaires. À l'origine

de la nation, ce sont les armées qui relaient les revendications nationalistes

et anti-esclavagistes et coordonnent les luttes politiques. Elles sont à la

fois gardiennes des intérêts de la nation toute entière et de ceux, en particulier,

des oligarchies naissantes. Elles constituent donc tout naturellement les

épinières de dirigeants du nouvel État.

Le rôle des militaires est encore amplifié par la place qu'occupe la sécu-

rité gouvernementale dans les priorités du pouvoir. Toujours en quête de

légitimité, les gouvernements issus de coup de force ne croient pouvoir sur-

vivre qu'en exterminant leurs adversaires. Ils doivent exercer une surveil-

lance de tous les instants sur les opposants réels et potentiels qui sont,

le plus souvent, contrainits à l'exil quand ils ne sont pas physiquement éli-

minés. C'est un engraisage infernal de répression et de conspiration qui rend

inconciliables gouvernement et opposition. En réalité, celle-ci n'existe pas

en tant que composante du système haïtien.

Depuis l'indépendance, Haïti marche dans le sous-développement. Avec

le temps, les problèmes se sont creusés dans tous les domaines : croissance

de la production, détérioration de l'équipement collectif, anarchie financière, etc.

L'État n'existe que le temps d'une accalmie, entre deux « révolutions ». De

1913 à 1915, l'Assemblée nationale a élu quatre présidents, parmi eux, trois

*pronunciamientos* confirmés par la suite par l'Assemblée. Haïti, après Cuba,

la République dominicaine et le Nicaragua, tombera alors comme un fruit mûr

dans le panier de l'impérialisme américain préoccupé d'assurer la stabilité

au bassin des Caraïbes et d'étendre sa domination sur le sous-continent.

ES MARINES AMÉRICAINES ONT OCCUPÉ LE PAYS DE 1915 À 1934.

Leur intervention a pris le mécanisme des *pronunciamientos*

et dispersé l'armée traditionnelle. À la faillite des classes

dirigeantes, les Américains apportent leur solution et imposent

leur paix. Ils font élire un nouveau gouvernement par la même

Assemblée nationale qu'ils ont trouvée sur place, ramenant

le régime et remettent en marche les institutions administratives. Pour rem-

placer l'ancienne armée, ils créent une gendarmerie qui, après s'être aguer-

rie en luttant contre la guérilla paysanne (1915 à 1920), se prépare à devenir

La meilleure façon d'y arriver consisterait pour notre pays à préconiser le gouvernement américain parle d'un cheminisme progressif vers l'ICJ, il y a fort à craindre que les prochaines étapes soient insignifiantes tant poli-

tiquement que militairement. Ramener le seuil actuel de 150 à 100 kilotonnes, par exemple, n'influerait pas sensiblement sur le programme nucléaire américain et n'impresionnerait guère ceux qui comptent appuyer la position mexicaine en 1995. Il faut plutôt réduire considérablement le seuil sus-mentionné et tenter de parvenir à un accord là-dessus d'ici 1995. Reste à fixer le seuil en question, mais, chose certaine, il doit témoigner d'audace. Voilà donc à penser que le Canada devrait se dire en faveur d'un seuil d'environ cinq kilotonnes et d'un nombre déterminé d'essais autorisés chaque année. Aspect digne de mention qui renforce cette position, de nombreuses données scientifiques prouvent que le respect d'un tel seuil serait vérifiable. Pareil régime n'altérerait pas beaucoup à limiter les ambitions des pays rattachés considérablement les programmes de modernisation des puissances nucléaires et il encouragerait d'autres examens politiques de la ques-

tion des essais. Cela satisfait-il les pays non munis de l'arme atomique ? Rien de moins qu'une interdiction complète serait sans doute nécessaire pour cela, mais l'adoption d'un faible seuil obligerait les pays non alignés à réévaluer leur position. Le TNP renforce la sécurité régionale et, en dépit de ses lacunes, il profite aux pays non munis d'armes nucléaires. Il serait stupide de leur part d'affaiblir la protection que leur procure le régime de non-prolifération, si l'on accomplit des progrès sensibles vers une ICF, tout comme les États-Unis auraient tort de compromettre le succès de leurs efforts en faveur de la non-prolifération en refusant mordicus de bouger sur la question des essais d'armes nucléaires.

UNE POLITIQUE Tournée VERS 1995 FAVORISERAIT AUSSI LA RÉUSSITE DE LA Conférence d'amendement. Afin d'éviter des affrontements destructeurs en janvier prochain à New York, il vaudrait mieux éviter d'accueillir les États-Unis au pied du mur et profiter plutôt de l'occasion pour étudier les questions intéressantes le rapport entre le TNP et l'ICJ. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus qu'à New York, la composition de l'Assemblée diffèrera sensiblement de celle de Genève. Un certain nombre des États quasi nucléaires (l'Inde, Israël, le Brésil et l'Afrique du Sud, par exemple) sont parties au Traité d'arrêt partiel des essais, mais non au TNP. Voilà qui risque de compliquer les choses à New York, mais qui offre aussi une occasion unique de discuter des problèmes de la prolifération avec les États les plus susceptibles d'acquiescer des armes nucléaires dans l'avenir.

Paradoxalement, la vaste gamme des questions abordées à la Conférence d'examen de 1990 a montré de façon éclatante que le régime de non-prolifération importe davantage qu'une interdiction complète des essais. Voilà pourquoi il faut prendre des mesures pour limiter les essais d'armes nucléaires. Par suite de l'échec de la Conférence d'examen à Genève, la perspective de la Conférence d'amendement ne sourit guère aux États occidentaux, dont le Canada, mais ils ne peuvent désormais plus y passer outre, ni supposer tout simplement qu'elle n'influera en rien sur l'avenir du TNP. Et il ne suffit pas non plus de soutenir qu'une ICF n'est désormais plus aussi importante qu'autrefois. Afin de réussir cette fois à concilier les points de vue des «manus nucléaires» et des autres à la Conférence d'examen de 1995, un effort renouvelé s'impose maintenant pour éviter la catastrophe totale à la Conférence d'amendement de New York.

matières au lieu de mettre l'accent sur l'adoption d'un traité d'interdiction complète des essais, qui n'a plus l'importance qu'elle revêtait au début des années 1960, aux fins de la limitation des armements.

Le DÉBAT SUR L'INTERDICTION DES ESSAIS NE REPOSE CEPENDANT PAS SUR LA logique pure et simple de la limitation des armements. Aux yeux des États non munis de l'arme nucléaire, il s'agit là d'une question politique. C'est le symbole le plus manifeste de la prodigalité nucléaire des pays dotés d'un engin atomique (les États-Unis, essentiellement) qui, déterminés à maintenir leurs arsenaux, refusent de se priver d'option pour l'avenir. C'est donc une question de bonne foi : si les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires tiennent vraiment au Traité sur la non-prolifération, ils doivent le prouver en prenant des mesures concrètes pour réaliser une interdiction complète des essais.

On fera de nouveau valoir ce lien entre l'ICJ et le TNP en janvier 1991, quand se tiendra la Conférence d'amendement du Traité sur l'arrêt partiel des essais. New York. Poussez par «Action mondiale des parlementaires», groupe international actuellement présidé par le député libéral canadien Warren Allmand, un certain nombre des signataires du Traité de 1963 ont fait valoir les clauses de ce dernier qui obligent les pays depositaires (le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique) à convoquer une conférence d'amendement. L'amendement proposé est très simple : rendre totale plutôt que partielle l'interdiction des explosions nucléaires expérimentales. Pour de nombreux partisans du TNP, la conférence d'amendement, comme bien d'autres mesures antérieures, va nuire aux efforts de limitation des armements. On a bien tort de lier l'avenir du régime de non-prolifération à la conclusion d'un accord d'interdiction complète des essais. Maintena-

ment, on s'apprête à affaiblir un autre précieux traité en recourant à l'article d'un amendement; ce qu'il faut en réalité, c'est un nouveau traité sur la limitation partielle des essais.

Vu la conjoncture et la politique américaine, les États-Unis pourraient facilement, à New York, transformer la conférence d'amendement en une charade fort coûteuse. Ils comptent parmi les trois pays qui ont négocié le PTBT et, en cette qualité, ils peuvent opposer leur veto aux amendements. Rien ne laisse prévoir que la politique américaine sur les essais changera sensiblement d'ici janvier. À quoi bon, par conséquent, convoquer une conférence vouée à l'échec et risquant facilement de dégénérer en un spectaculaire affrontement verbal, si dès le début, les États-Unis exigent un vote immédiat ?

Pour ÉVITER LE PIÈGE À NEW YORK, LE CANADA et d'autres États doivent se pencher sur deux questions clés. Tout d'abord, et c'est là l'aspect crucial, il leur faut s'entendre sur une politique susceptible, au cours des prochaines années, d'aider à adoucir le différend au sujet de l'interdiction complète des essais et d'améliorer ainsi les chances de survie du régime de non-prolifération. En second lieu, ils doivent transformer la conférence d'amendement en une réunion plus constructive qu'elle ne paraît destinée à l'être à l'heure actuelle.

En égard à la prochaine Conférence d'examen du TNP prévue pour 1995, il est certain que la politique canadienne actuelle accorde plus d'importance au régime de non-prolifération qu'à l'adoption d'un traité d'interdiction complète des essais. Mais s'il est vrai, comme cela semble être maintenant le cas, que ce régime est menacé par l'incapacité de progresser vers la réalisation d'un autre accord, alors le gouvernement canadien a devoir s'éloigner de sa position actuelle plutôt qu'imposer une démarche progressive (sans échéancier) vers l'interdiction complète des essais.

que les États dotés d'armes nucléaires auront respecté leurs obligations dans ce contexte.

«Chaque partie au traité s'engage à poursuivre de bonne foi des négociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives à la cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires, et sur une date rapprochée et où désarmement nucléaire, et sur un traité de désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international strict et efficace.»

Depuis l'entrée en vigueur du traité, l'article VI a été au cœur du débat entre les deux catégories d'États parties au Traité, à savoir les puissances nucléaires et les pays non dotés d'armes atomiques. Le rapport entre l'article VI et la progression vers une interdiction complète des essais est établi dans le Préambule du traité, qui rappelle la détermination des parties au Traité de 1963 sur la limitation partielle des essais

«à assurer l'arrêt de toutes les explosions expérimentales d'armes nucléaires à tout jamais (et) à poursuivre les négociations à cette fin...»

Cette déclaration, combinée au libellé de l'article VI, a conduit les pays non alignés à faire de l'interdiction complète des essais l'étape la plus importante à franchir pour ostenser que les États dotés d'armes nucléaires ont respecté leurs obligations dans ce contexte.

## Le rapport entre le Traité sur la non-prolifération et les essais d'armes nucléaires

C'est ce qui a donné lieu à l'article VI :

«Chaque partie au traité s'engage à poursuivre de bonne foi des négociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives à la cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires, et sur une date rapprochée et où désarmement nucléaire, et sur un traité de désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international strict et efficace.»

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# GENÈVE : UNE LEÇON POUR NEW YORK

Les négociations nucléaires : à tout vouloir, on risque

de tout perdre.

PAR DAVID COX

QUATRE HEURES DU MATIN LE 15 SEPTEMBRE. CINQ HEURES APRÈS l'échec d'examen du Traité sur la fin de la quatrième Conférence d'examen du Traité sur la non-prolifération (TNP), quatre semaines de pourparlers entre les États parties au Traité semblaient avoir abouti à l'échec. Les interprètes et traducteurs menaçaient de partir, les climatiseurs allaient s'arrêter et les lumières, s'éteindre, faute d'argent; au milieu de tout cela, le président de la Conférence a reçu un rapport d'un paragraphe qui émanait du Comité de rédaction, lequel y précisait que ses membres ne pouvaient s'entendre sur les mots à employer pour décrire le progrès accompli (ou l'absence de progrès) afin de mettre un terme à la course aux armements et, aspect primordial, de conclure une entente sur l'interdiction complète des essais d'armes nucléaires.

L'impasse aurait pu intriguer un nouveau-venu à la conférence. L'année qui venait de s'écouler aurait fort bien dû désarmer et de la limitation des armements, notamment en Europe, où l'on accueillait certes avec enthousiasme la fin de la Guerre froide et les réductions des forces conventionnelles. Cependant, les pays non alignés ont, sous la gouverne du Mexique, concentré leur attention sur une seule question : la fin des essais d'armes nucléaires. Pour eux, c'est là le gage de la bonne foi des superpuissances, dans la Conférence d'examen de Genève n'était que le premier round dans les démarches que les États parties font pour mettre les États-Unis au pied du mur relativement à l'interdiction des essais. Le deuxième round est prévu pour le début janvier à New York, quand, encore une fois par suite d'une initiative d'un groupe de pays non alignés, les signataires du Traité de 1963 sur l'arrêt partiel des essais (PTBT) se réuniront pour étudier une modification qui interdirait tous les essais nucléaires. En outre, la réunion de New York déterminera le ton des actes et politiques à venir qui, quant à eux, pourraient bien sceller le sort du TNP, car en 1995, les participants à la conférence d'examen décideront s'il faut proroger le Traité et, le cas échéant, de combien de temps.

À la toute fin de la conférence d'examen, il était évident que le désaccord ne tenait pas simplement au libellé du document final. Les États-Unis voulaient que l'on prit en compte leurs négociations avec l'URSS sur les protocoles de vérification devant être intégrés aux traités existants de limitation partielle des essais, et que l'on vît là une des étapes d'une démarche progressive vers une interdiction complète des essais (ICBE). Le Mexique a dit non, en soutenant qu'un tel acquiescement violerait le point essentiel, à savoir que le gouvernement Bush, tout comme l'administration précédente, n'avait aucunement l'intention de mettre un terme aux essais d'armes nucléaires. Les efforts pour trouver un texte de compromis ont échoué sur ce seul point litigieux.

Parfaitement conscient des enjeux, le président de la Conférence, M. Oswaldo de Rivero (Pérou), avait en dernier ressort rédigé un texte de compromis qu'il n'était pas disposé à discuter davantage. Quand la séance plénière a repris, le Mexique a demandé la parole et a objecté ses motifs, en confirmant qu'il ne s'était pas opposé à la position occidentale pendant un mois simplement pour bluffer et arracher le plus de concessions possible à la onzième heure. On a dès lors retiré le texte de compromis, et, au milieu des réminiscences, le président a abruptement clos la séance.

Le fait que les pays signataires n'aient pas réussi à s'entendre sur un texte final ne met pas le Traité sur la non-prolifération en péril. Aucun document


n'a transpiré de la conférence d'examen en 1980 et, en 1985, l'échec ne fut évité que par un tour de passe-passe diplomatique. Cependant, ces conférences, qui ont lieu tous les cinq ans, ne se résument pas uniquement à l'échange d'efforts plus vastes pour assujettir des matières non nucléaires, dont l'eau lourde et peut-être même le béryllium, au régime des garanties. Lorsque l'on oublie de tels objectifs aussi concrets et pratiques de la conférence d'examen, ce ne sont pas tant les bases du Traité qui sont minées, mais plutôt la capacité des signataires de s'attaquer ensemble aux problèmes graves menaçant d'affaiblir le régime de non-prolifération : citons à cet égard le fait que les États parties n'aient pas encore réussi à convaincre des pays quasi nucléaires tels que le Brésil, l'Argentine, le Pakistan et l'Afrique du Sud d'adhérer au Traité, et la surveillance de quantités toujours plus grandes de plutonium, lesquelles sont un sous-produit des installations nucléaires civiles.

En 1963, après plusieurs années de négociations infructueuses sur l'adoption d'un traité d'interdiction complète des essais d'armes nucléaires, les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique avaient réussi en quelques semaines à s'entendre sur un arrêt partiel qui ne s'appliquait pas aux essais souterrains. Dans le préambule du Traité sur l'arrêt partiel des essais nucléaires (PTBT), cependant, les superpuissances se disaient résolues à négocier une entente d'interdiction complète. Cinq ans plus tard, sans que des progrès sensibles aient eu lieu sur ce dernier plan, elles ont répété le même engagement dans le préambule du TNP.

En dépit de ces déclarations, il n'est pas certain que l'on puisse établir hors de tout doute un lien direct entre une interdiction complète des essais d'armes nucléaires et les aspects fondamentaux de la non-prolifération. Par exemple, les scientifiques s'entendent généralement pour dire que les États quasi nucléaires n'ont pas besoin de faire des essais pour mettre au point et déployer des armes nucléaires de première génération (armes à fission, dont la puissance varie de quelques kilotonnes à une centaine de kilotonnes). En outre, si un seul essai était jugé nécessaire, ce serait sans doute un essai dont on pourrait ensuite «nicher» l'exécution, tout comme l'Inde le fit en 1974, et tout comme Israël et l'Afrique du Sud l'ont probablement fait en 1979. Dans les contextes régionaux, il n'est sans doute pas nécessaire, aux fins militaires, de perfectionner les armes nucléaires (ce n'est peut-être possible qu'avec des essais). Par exemple, la possibilité que les armes nucléaires israéliennes soient d'une puissance relativement limitée ne diminue en rien leur influence politique et dissuasive au Moyen-Orient. Employée contre des villes ou de grands objectifs militaires, une arme à fission élémentaire est plus que suffisante pour modifier irréversiblement le cours de la bataille.

La fabrication «domestique» d'armes nucléaires ne dépend donc pas essentiellement des essais, mais plutôt d'un approvisionnement en matières fissiles de qualité appropriée. Il s'ensuit que le régime de non-prolifération progresserait davantage si l'on cherchait à enrayer la production de ces

Jonas Meckel



De son côté, François Mauriac disait tant aimer l'Allemagne qu'il se refusait à y en être deux. Il y en a toujours deux. En dépit de l'union monétaire et de l'union politique, la vraie, la profonde union n'est pas espérée pour qu'on ne se cède pas le temps, les vertus de chacune et la qualité fon-

damentale de l'Allemagne en feront un géant bienveillant au coeur de l'Europe ? □

heureuse. Dans l'Allemagne industrielle, et pas très dans l'Allemagne sérieuse, avec l'arrivée de millions d'enfants de la «Nischenkultur» venant aussi insouciant et de l'Ouest se relâchaient et de ceux qui les Allemands (de déjà cru voir des signes de Malcom Muggeridge à la britannique, le regrette l'homme d'esprit indolente ? à dire, un art de vivre, une chaleur plus grande, c'est-à-dire, une richesse bien corbellée de mariage, apportant, dans la Allemagne de l'Est, les Deux-Deutschmark, les Et si, contre le tabou allemand, à atteindre l'orgasme...

ce même sonde, cité quelques jours plus tard dans le *New-York Times*, selon lequel les femmes allemandes sont plus nombreuses (11 p. 100) que leurs collègues ouest-allemandes (11 p. 100) que moins dans un domaine : ils ont davantage de rapports sexuels et se masturbent moins que les Allemands de l'Ouest... il s'agit sans doute de son côté, à Berlin-Est, notre interprète nous annonce, non sans fièvre, qu'un récent sondage mode de vie plus calme et plus chaleureux. De visiteurs ouest-allemands disent leur envie leur rappellent avec un brin de nostalgie que leurs tapissés de livres, Karin et Stefan Handwerker se dans un appartement amoureusement privé et belle à l'amitié qu'à la réussite. Et à Leipzig,

Evidemment, tout n'est pas encore dit. Il se pourrait bien que le chômage galopant, dans les cinq Länder de l'Est, et le sentiment d'être des citoyens de seconde zone aient une influence néfaste sur les Allemands fraîchement annexés. La pauvreté et l'humiliation ont déjà révélé des démons en Allemagne, on ne peut pas l'oublier. Mais le temps passe, et les sociétés changent, même sous la «cloche à fromage» d'un gouvernement totalitaire.

WINSTON CHURCHILL disait : «QUAND ILS NE sont pas à nos pieds, ils sont à notre gorge.» Mais aujourd'hui, cette fameuse soumission à l'autorité, chez quels Allemands est-elle la plus profonde ? Rien ne dit que ce soit à l'Est ou, au contraire, au fil des ans, les gens ont acquis un sens scepticisme accompagné d'humour, plus proche de la tradition polonaise que germanique. Avant de se rebeller, ils ont longtemps fait semblant de se soumettre, ce qui souvent demandait des prodiges d'ingéniosité, comme pour la vie matérielle, où le bricolage nécessaire à développer l'esprit d'ordre privé. Mais la vie privée étant bien sûr d'ordre privé. La solidarité, la complicité, l'entraide, et pour ceux à qui manquent les voyages, la fréquentation des arts et des livres, nourrissent l'exil intérieur.

L'auteur ouest-berlinois Peter Schneider évoque cette «Nischenkultur» qui fait la part plus

de longue cicatrice qu'a laissée le mur dans la char de Berlin, on peut entendre, dans certains milieux, des propos semblables, culpabilité en moins. On craint, ici aussi, le réveil d'un nationalisme de droite. Chantreuse de rock, idole d'une certaine jeunesse pour qu'elle a incarné l'insubmission qui a précédé le démantèlement du mur. Tatiana Galla voit déjà se profiler l'ombre d'Adolf. Mais on est là dans le royaume du «skat», où les 10 000 squatters de Berlin-Est, surtout locaux, mais aussi de RFA, des Pays-Bas, donnés qu'ils occupent contre les «skin-heads» en tenues paramilitaires, qualifiés de «fachsos» (pour fascistes). Ceux-ci ne s'en prennent pas aux homosexuels et aux travailleurs ou étudiants étrangers, vietnamiens et mozambicains.

QU'Y A-T-IL DERRIÈRE CES BANDES DE JEUNES ? On nous parle d'un groupe d'extrême-droite qui a pignon sur rue : le Mouvement pour l'alternative sociale. Au dernier étage d'un petit immeuble d'habitation que des skin-heads sont en train de rénover, deux jeunes gens sont assis derrière une table. Seul le chef parle. Il a vingt ans, et l'apparence discrète d'un employé de bureau. «Nous sommes pour une Allemagne souveraine, libre de toute influence étrangère. Nous considérons également que l'Allemagne doit se retirer de tous les blocs, que ce soit le bloc de l'Est, le Pacte de Varsovie, ou bien l'OTAN, ou même la Communauté européenne.» Le cauchemar de Claude Cheysson ! Mais quelle importance faut-il accorder à ces jeunes gens ? Ils sont quelques amis, qui ont pour la plupart été emprisonnés pour délinquance sous l'ancien régime. Ils ont des emplois modestes. Ils partagent un goût pour l'histoire militaire allemande. Ils semblent totalement dépourvus de moyens, et en dehors des skin-heads, ne paraissent avoir aucun appui. Il pourrait, quand la presse parle de dangereux mouvements d'extrême-droite, c'est leur nom qui revient.

Il y a aussi, bien sûr, un parti reconnu d'extrême-droite : le parti République. Mais l'Ouest ne peut pas l'imputer à l'Est, puisqu'il est né en RFA. Et ses kiosques d'information n'attirent pas les foules avant les élections d'octobre dans l'ancienne RDA. Il a d'ailleurs été boudé par les électeurs des cinq nouveaux «Länder», qui ont remis leur sort entre les mains du chancelier Kohl, à l'exception du Brandebourg qui entoure Berlin «La Rouge» et qui a voté pour le parti social-démocrate.





La crise du Golfe est si grave, c'est parce qu'elle met à nu la fragilité politique, économique et stratégique du Moyen-Orient entier. En fait, le règlement de cette crise nous en dira beaucoup sur la souplesse du nouvel ordre mondial au lendemain de la Guerre froide.

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### Choisir le moindre mal

Après cette analyse, il n'existerait pas de solution heureuse à la crise. Il reste donc aux dirigeants politiques à s'efforcer de trouver l'issue la moins préjudiciable. Etant donné le prix énorme et, pour finir, imprévisible d'une guerre, il semble préférable d'imposer, par le biais de sanctions, un retrait négocié des forces irakiennes du Koweït. Si cette stratégie devait échouer, une guerre, à n'en pas douter extrêmement violente, destructrice et d'une ampleur inouïe, bouleverserait la configuration militaire et politique du Moyen-Orient.

Quant bien même la guerre serait évitée par un retrait des forces irakiennes du Koweït, l'ordre stratégique d'après la crise se construirait autour d'une présence militaire permanente des Américains dans le Golfe. Dans ces conditions, le président Hussein menacerait non seulement la sécurité du Golfe, mais aussi la sécurité politique des gouvernements de tout le Moyen-Orient en exploitant l'intrusion de forces militaires étrangères et les faiblesses des gouvernements arabes. Or, la fragilité accrue des gouvernements moyen-orientaux se répercuterait dans le monde entier.

L'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak a provoqué la première crise d'après la Guerre froide qui, au fond, vise la formation et la gestion du nouvel ordre international. Paradoxalement, Bagdad, Moscou et Washington sont d'accord sur ce point. L'Irak a agi comme il l'a fait pour empêcher la consolidation de ce que Saddam Hussein estime être une domination américaine imméritée dans le Golfe. À Washington, à la première réunion du Conseil de sécurité nationale après l'invasion, la crise a été définie comme étant la première mise à l'épreuve de l'aptitude des États-Unis à maintenir la stabilité mondiale et régionale maintenant que la Guerre froide est bel et bien terminée.

George Bush s'est engagé à ce que les États-Unis obtiennent le retrait des troupes irakiennes du Koweït et de beaucoup de ceux du Croissant fertile. Si les frontières du Koweït ne reposent sur aucune légitimité, c'est aussi le cas des frontières de presque tous les pays de la région. Quand l'arsenal militaire assez perfectionné de l'Irak, qui comprend une capacité nu-

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Si la guerre est un mauvais choix pour tous, un retrait tenté d'attaquer la première sachant que la guerre est proche, chaque partie sera la surprise et, au pire, un cycle de logique d'anticipation se mettra en branle dans la région entière, car la détermination de l'Irak explique en partie qu'on le croit tout à fait prêt à subir de grosses pertes en hommes pendant bien plus longtemps que la coalition dirigée par les États-Unis. Comme le président Hussein l'a déclaré à l'ambassadeur Claspie pendant leur entretien de juillet, « Dans votre société, on ne peut accepter de perdre 10 000 hommes en une seule bataille ».

Enfin, le président irakien est persuadé qu'il n'y a pas d'issue, que même le retrait des forces du Koweït ne satisferait pas les plus petites exigences des forces déployées contre lui et que celles-ci cherchent à le renverser. Dans ces conditions, il pourrait provoquer délibérément une réaction militaire d'Israël pour inciter les membres arabes de la coalition réunie par le président Bush à en partir, ce qui lui permettrait d'unir le monde arabe dans une guerre contre les États-Unis et Israël.

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a agi parce qu'il se sentait pris au piège. Même aujourd'hui, quelque quatre mois après les faits, rien n'avantage nettement une thèse plutôt que l'autre.

## Pourquoi Saddam Hussein n'a-t-il agi de la sorte ?

Il est probable que Saddam Hussein ait vu une occasion de satisfaire la vieille revendication territoriale irakienne sur le Koweït et de se placer en position de force sur le marché pétrolier international, et qu'il ait décidé de saisir cette occasion. La plupart des données connues corroborent une telle interprétation. Dans ces « guerres opportunistes », l'agresseur doit pouvoir, entre autres, compter sur le fait que la victime ne pourra mobiliser l'aide de tiers ou d'amis à temps pour changer l'issue de l'attaque. C'est ce qui s'est produit cette fois, nous l'avons vu.

Ensuite, l'agresseur, en l'occurrence Saddam Hussein et son régime, doit s'assurer que l'équilibre des capacités militaires locales joue nettement en sa faveur, ce qui lui encores s'est avéré. L'Irak pense encore les plates d'une guerre

de huit ans et les États arabes du Golfe, encore al-liance qu'ils concluent entre eux, n'étaient assurément pas de force à affronter l'armée irakienne aguerrie. De plus, Bagdad avait reçu une aide financière considérable des pays du Golfe et bénéficié de la technologie et du matériel militaires de pointe des Soviétiques et des Occidentaux, qui se sentaient tous menacés, quoique accidentellement, par la révolution iranienne de Khomeiny.

La suprématie militaire irakienne dans le Golfe était écrasante. Si c'est effectivement une occasion d'étendre son territoire qui a motivé Saddam Hussein, en décidant de le rassurer, les Américains et les autres

ont choisi la mauvaise stratégie.

Se peut aussi que le président Hussein ait été poussé par la fragilité croissante de l'économie irakienne. Dans un entretien accordé après l'invasion, son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Tariq Aziz, a expliqué d'exiger le remboursement de la dette contractée par Bagdad pendant la guerre avec l'Iran, une guerre qui visait autant à défendre les États du Golfe que l'Irak. Puis il a établi un lien formel entre la détérioration de l'économie irakienne et l'invasion du Koweït :

La question économique a agi comme un détonateur dans la situation actuelle. En plus des 40 milliards de dollars que nous devons à des pays arabes, nous en devons au moins autant à l'Occident. Cette année, le service de la dette compte pour 7 milliards de dollars dans le budget de l'Irak, et c'est une somme colossale qui nous laisse tout juste assez pour assurer les services essentiels de notre pays. Notre budget est calculé en fonction d'un bari à 18 dollars, mais depuis que les Koweïtiens inondent le monde de leur production, les cours ont chuté d'un tiers. Quand nous nous sommes à nouveau rencontrés, à Djeddah, à la fin du mois de juillet, le Koweït a refusé d'envisager tout changement. Nous étions donc acculés, et dans l'impossibilité de payer des importations alimentaires. On cherchait à nous affamer. Quand doit-on employer la force armée pour se protéger ?

Si l'Irak était principalement motivé par une occasion qui se présentait, seul un engagement clair et sans équivoque combiné à une menace explicite quant aux conséquences d'un recours à la force avait une chance d'empêcher Bagdad de lancer sa machine de guerre contre le Koweït. Il fallait user d'une dissuasion vigoureuse. Si, au contraire, Saddam Hussein était surtout poussé par la vulnérabilité économique que de l'Irak, il fallait le rassurer en lui proposant des solutions qui auraient permis d'atténuer les graves problèmes de son économie.

Si les États-Unis n'étaient certains ni des motivations ni des intentions de l'Irak, ils pouvaient toujours utiliser une stratégie mixte alliant un engagement formel et sans équivoque à venir à la rescousse du Koweït et la promesse d'aider l'Irak à résoudre des problèmes économiques pressants. Bien que rien ne prouve qu'une telle stratégie mixte aurait porté ses fruits, l'États-Unis n'ont pas prévenu des conséquences auxquelles il s'exposait



## Washington n'a fait qu'une vague tentative pour dissuader Saddam Hussein de passer à l'action.

## La gestion de la crise et le risque d'une guerre accidentelle

Il y avait peu de chance de réussir à éviter la crise.

en cas d'invasion du Koweït — au contraire, ils ont pris leurs distances par rapport au « différend inter-arabe » — et ils ne se sont pas soucés des préoccupations qu'une dette croissante causait à l'Irak. Dans ces conditions, il y avait peu de chance de réussir à éviter la crise.

Maintenant que la crise est là, les dilemmes profonds inhérents à sa gestion sont évidents si l'on part du principe que ni l'Irak ni les États-Unis ne veulent la guerre, mais que tous deux souhaitent atteindre leurs objectifs ; à savoir, pour le premier, annexer le Koweït et, pour le second, obliger l'Irak à retirer ses troupes du Koweït. Pour y parvenir et obliger l'autre à céder, l'un comme l'autre brandissent maintenant la menace d'un conflit armé.

À ce jeu-là et à court terme, les Irakiens comme la coalition internationale conduite par les Américains risquent de perdre le contrôle des événements en cas d'accident, ou parce que la partie adverse, anticipant une attaque, décide de frapper la première. La guerre pourrait éclater si une unité, un navire ou un soldat d'un des nombreux contingents nationaux maintenant déployés dans le Golfe ouvre le feu sur une cible jugée à tort hostile ; la destruction d'un Airbus iranien par le USS Vincennes dans le golfe Persique en 1988 et l'attaque contre l'USS Stark en 1987 montrent combien il est facile de commettre de telles bêtises.

La guerre pourrait aussi être déclenchée si l'une des puissances militaires présentes dans la région attaque par anticipation. L'Irak a menacé, par exemple, de frapper le premier les forces présentes dans le Golfe si son pays était pris à la gorge économiquement à cause des sanctions, et d'étendre la guerre jusqu'en Israël. Aussi, l'armée de l'air israélienne a été mise en état d'alerte maximale et un nombre important de ses avions de chasse sont en service vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre. Dans une situation de tension croissante où le coût de la première attaque est très lourd pour l'armée qui la subit, la tentation de porter le premier coup augmente considérablement.

À long terme, il se peut que l'une et l'autre partie estiment s'être tellement engagées que, malgré les coûts énormes, elles ne voient pas d'autre solution politique que la guerre. En pareil cas, les forces armées irakiennes opposeront probablement une résistance farouche à l'ennemi, mais elles subiront des pertes massives. La qualité de son armée, forte de 955 000 hommes répartis entre cinquante-trois bataillons, varie des six redoutables divisions des Gardes républicains aux conscrits mal entraînés et mal équipés. En outre, Bagdad ne peut mobiliser plus d'hommes. Son économie et son infrastructure chancelantes en seraient amhaies. Comme l'a reconnu récemment le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Tariq Aziz, « cette situation est plus effrayante pour l'Irak que huit années de guerre contre l'Iran ».

Les conséquences des options militaires dont disposent les États-Unis sont également sérieuses. Une opération éclair contre l'Irak est hors de question. Les usines chimiques et les centres de recherche nucléaire irakiens se trouvent au cœur de régions densément peuplées. En plus des soldats tués, la destruction de l'infrastructure militaire irakienne ferait obligatoirement des milliers de victimes parmi les civils. Une attaque plus circonscrite contre les forces irakiennes stationnées au Koweït entraînerait des combats importants, de lourdes pertes en vies humaines, de part et d'autre et le risque d'une guerre chimique qui, parallèlement, causerait des dégâts considérables, tant dans la population civile et pour l'infrastructure économique.

Ces estimations ne tiennent pas compte des répercussions d'une guerre qui risquerait fort de s'étendre à la région entière. Une fois déclenchée, le conflit pourrait s'amplifier et s'intensifier et avoir des conséquences désastreuses.

Le 30 septembre, le *London Observer* rapportait les propos d'un officier supérieur membre de la brigade blindée que le Royaume-Uni a envoyé dans le Golfe, qui affirmait qu'« en cas d'attaque aux gaz chimiques par les Américains ne l'ont pas prévenu des conséquences auxquelles il s'exposait





LA PAIX QUI S'EST INSTALLÉE AVEC LA FIN DE LA Guerre froide n'a pas duré. Moins d'un an après la chute du Mur de Berlin, le monde est au bord d'une guerre qui menace de répandre la destruction à travers le Moyen-Orient. Avec le gonflement des armées et la prolifération des armements modernes, la région, que déchirent maints conflits, est devenue plus dangereuse au cours des dix dernières années.<sup>1</sup> Les lignes de faille qui parcourent le Moyen-Orient ont vite fait volé en éclat les espoirs de voir le nouvel ordre international se modeler pacifiquement.

Malgré l'amélioration des relations américano-soviétiques, le risque de grave crise du nouvel ordre international est aussi évident que les paramètres de gestions des crises internationales, sans recours à la guerre, sont changeants. La possibilité d'un échange nucléaire entre les Etats-Unis et l'URSS suite à une crise au Moyen-Orient a disparu, mais la probabilité d'une guerre chimique et d'un conflit régional qui ferait de l'immensité des populations de cette région, victimes est réelle, ce qui, pour les populations de cette région, revient au même.

Le 2 août avant l'aube, les troupes irakiennes franchissaient en masse la frontière koweïtienne. En l'espace de trois heures, l'armée avait atteint son objectif, qui était de renverser le gouvernement de l'émirat et d'inverser ses champs pétroliers. Une semaine plus tard, l'Irak annexait officiellement le Koweït. L'utilisation de la force par un pays arabe pour annexer un autre pays arabe est sans précédent dans le Moyen-Orient moderne. La condamnation mondiale, l'embargo aérien et naval international, le déploiement de forces aériennes et terrestres dans les Etats du Golfe et la présence de forces navales dans le Golfe n'ont pas encore réussi à forcer l'Irak à se retirer du Koweït. Au contraire, depuis des semaines, pour éprouver leur détermination mutuelle, le président Bush et le président Saddam Hussein jouent avec le risque de guerre.

# LE DÉFI DU GOLFE PERSIQUE

Pour le nouvel ordre mondial encore fragile, les lignes de faille qui traversent le Moyen-Orient constituent un réel danger.

PAR JANICE GROSS STEIN

La communauté internationale, Etats-Unis en tête, a déployé une véritable armada en Arabie saoudite et dans d'autres Etats du Golfe, autant pour dissuader l'Irak d'utiliser davantage de la force que pour l'obliger, en brandissant le risque d'une guerre, à se retirer du Koweït. Le fait que les Nations Unies approuve, pour la première fois, toute une panoplie de sanctions a renforcé la pression internationale contre l'Irak.

A examiner les origines et l'évolution de cette crise, on s'aperçoit qu'il y a plusieurs ensembles de problèmes. D'abord, cet usage de la force aurait-il pu être évité moyennant des stratégies plus efficaces de prévention des crises ? Si cette crise avait pu effectivement être évitée, pourquoi ne les a-t-on pas employées ? Et main-

## Les Etats-Unis se sont-ils montés les impoibles de prévenir la crise ?

Les stratégies utilisées par les Américains dans les semaines qui ont précédé l'invasion irakienne font déjà l'objet d'un vif débat. La controverse porte essentiellement sur les intentions de l'Irak et sur la réaction des Etats-Unis. Pour comprendre la stratégie américaine, il est nécessaire de replacer la crise dans son contexte.

En 1980, un an après l'arrivée de l'ayatollah Khomeiny au pouvoir à Téhéran, le président irakien, Saddam Hussein, a attaqué l'Iran avec l'espoir d'une victoire rapide sur des forces armées désorganisées par une révolution. Après une première série de victoires irakiennes, Téhéran a peu à peu pris le dessus sur le champ de bataille. Bien que la guerre ait été déclarée par Bagdad, la plupart des Etats arabes tremblaient sur-le-champ de bataille. Cependant, les relations entre l'Irak et l'Iran ont commencé à s'améliorer alors que les rapports entre Washington et Téhéran étaient tendus. Une fois la guerre terminée, en 1988, les Américains ont continué d'essayer de renforcer leurs liens avec l'Irak, qui faisait figure de contre-poids face à l'Iran. Malgré ces plusieurs relations, le président Saddam Hussein a tenu plusieurs fois des propos troublants durant le printemps 1990. En février, à la fin d'une réunion du Conseil de coopération arabe, le président irakien a prédit qu'en raison du déclin de la puissance soviétique, les Etats-Unis exerceraient un pouvoir hégémonique sur le Moyen-Orient pendant cinq ans. Il s'est exprimé en ces termes :

Le pays [les Etats-Unis] qui exercera la plus grande influence dans la région, grâce au golfe Persique et à son pétrole, conservera sa supériorité de superpuissance sans égal pour lui faire concurrence. Cela signifie que si les populations du Golfe, ainsi que tous les Arabes, ne font pas attention, la région du golfe Arabique sera soumise au bon vouloir des Etats-Unis... Les cours [du pétrole] seront fixés en fonction des seuls intérêts américains.

La parade, a-t-il dit en conclusion, consistait à utiliser la puissance économique arabe pour obliger les Américains à modifier leur politique. Le 2 avril, après l'interception d'une cargaison de pièces pouvant servir à des démonstrateurs d'armes nucléaires destinée à Bagdad, le président Hussein a annoncé que les savants irakiens avaient mis au point des armes chimiques perfectionnées et il a menacé de s'en servir contre Israël si ce dernier l'attaquait. Puis, lors d'un sommet arabe le mois suivant, à Bagdad, il a accusé les Arabes du Golfe de saboter l'économie irakienne en maintenant le prix du pétrole artificiellement bas.

En 1977, les forces armées irakiennes comptaient 188 000 hommes, ce chiffre était passé à 1 000 000 d'hommes. L'armée irakienne est maintenant la quatrième du monde pour elle comptait 342 000 hommes en 1977 et 645 000, en 1987. Plus 350 000 réservistes. La Syrie allignait pour sa part 227 500 soldats en 1977 et 407 500, en 1987 ; et l'Arabie saoudite, 61 500 en 1977, et 73 500 en 1987. A cause du système de rappel de réservistes en vigueur, il est difficile d'établir une comparaison des effectifs, mais entre ces deux années repère, le nombre des chars est passé de 3 000 à presque 4 000 dans l'armée israélienne. Voir The Military Balance de l'Institut international d'études stratégiques (Londres), 1977-1978 et 1987-1988.

2. Appartenant au Conseil de coopération arabe l'Egypte, la Jordanie, le Yémen du Nord et l'Irak.

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Janice Gross Stein est professeure de sciences politiques à l'Université de Toronto; Madeleine Poulin co-anime l'émission *Le Point* à Radio-Canada; David Cox est professeur d'études politiques à l'Université Queen's de Kingston; Claude Moïse est professeur d'histoire à l'Université du Québec à Montréal; Michael Bryans est rédacteur en chef de *Paix et Sécurité*; Jim Lederman est ancien correspondant de CBC Radio et de *National Public Radio* au Moyen-Orient; et Mirko Lauer est rédacteur en chef du quotidien *Pagina Libre* à Lima et rédacteur politique de l'*Andean Report* de la même ville.

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À peine la Guerre froide termi-

née, des hostilités risquent déjà

d'éclater au Moyen-Orient. Y

aurait-il le moyen d'éviter cette

crise, et comment ? Ce sont là

quelques-unes des questions aux-

quelles tente de répondre Janice

Gross Stein dans l'article principal

du présent numéro de Paix et Secu-

rité. Selon l'auteure, maintenant

que la crise est là, il incombe aux

dirigeants politiques de trouver

l'issue la moins dommageable.

Comme la guerre entraînerait des

coûts humains et matériel très élevés,

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ans le présent numéro :



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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



At the end of December, Canada came to the end of its two-year term on the United Nations Security Council. During that time the world passed from one epoch – the period of frozen history and predictable future we call the Cold War – to we know not what. For at least a year, the Security Council has been at the centre of that alternately exhilarating and troubling transformation.

The editors of *Peace & Security* see it as the mandate of the magazine to venture behind the daily headlines and beyond tomorrow's battles to identify problems and issues that are not necessarily grist for the mass media which has, after all,

a different job to do. With one of the central issues of Gulf War debate in Canada being the function and legitimacy of the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, *Peace & Security* gathered together a group of individuals from various countries and with different perspectives. We asked them to look critically at how the UN Security Council machinery has functioned in recent months, tell us what the lessons from that experience might be, and how they could be used to improve the peace and security functions of the United Nations. Without any prompting the discussion quickly turned to the phrase "new world order," what it meant or, indeed, whether it had any meaning at all. The result of this discussion is our cover story.

One might conclude, judging from the daily content of our newspapers and television since mid-January, that there were three countries on the planet – the US, Kuwait and you know where. We have two stories that contain barely a mention of "the Gulf." The first is by our frequent contributor on Asian affairs, **Gérard Hervouet**, on the interminable wrangling over a possible settlement of the Cambodian conflict, an ordeal for the Cambodian people that has lasted seventeen

years. The other is by **Sharon Stevenson**, a freelance writer and resident of Lima, Peru on the new president's various wars against internal corruption, domestic insurrection, external debt and the destructive international commerce in narcotics.

Our feature stories do not neglect the Gulf War entirely. **Chris Smith**, a writer and academic in the field of arms sales to Third World countries, speculates on what might seem to be paradoxical implications of the war for arms sales. Finally, in addition to his survey of Canadian attitudes to the world and international issues in general, **Don Munton**, in *From Paardeberg to the Persian Gulf*, gives us an historical perspective to consider on Canadians' opinions of Canada's wars. And where is Paardeberg anyway?

On 18 February 1900, Canadian soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, fought a small battle with a Boer army near the village of Paardeberg, Orange Free State, in South Africa. It was the first time Canadians had fought a battle outside Canada. Ninety-one years later, almost to the day, Canadians found themselves again at war far away from home.

— Michael Bryans

Canadian  
Institute for  
International  
Peace and  
Security

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada K1R 7X7  
Telephone (613) 990-1593  
Fax (613) 563-0894

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**Indian Naval Expansion.** by Paul George, Working Paper 32, 50 pages.

**The Commonwealth.** Factsheet 15, January 1991.

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Gérard Hervouet is professor of political science at Université Laval in Quebec and editor of *Études Internationales*; Chris Smith is a researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex; Sharon Stevenson is a freelance writer based in Lima, Peru and frequent contributor to *Time* magazine and the *Miami Herald*; Don Munton is professor of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.

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# WHAT KIND OF WORLD AND WHOSE ORDER?

*The meaning of "new world order," and what part  
the UN will play in it, depends on who you talk to.*

## ROUNDTABLE

### THE PANELISTS

#### THOMAS FRANCK

*is Professor of Law and Director,  
Center for International Studies at the  
New York University School of Law.*

*He is author most recently of*

*The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations,  
Oxford University Press.*

#### C. R. GHAREKHAN

*is the Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations. India has just begun a  
two-year term on the Security Council.*

#### AMRE MOUSSA

*is the Permanent Representative of Egypt  
to the United Nations.*

#### ENID SCHOETTLE

*is the Director of the  
International Affairs Program at  
The Ford Foundation in New York.*

#### BRIAN URQUHART

*is Scholar in Residence at the  
Ford Foundation in New York and was  
formerly UN Under-Secretary General for  
Special Political Affairs.*

#### OLIVIA WARD

*is a reporter for the Toronto Star  
specializing in international  
and UN affairs.*

*This roundtable is based on a discussion held  
on 23 January in New York. The moderator  
was Bernard Wood, Chief Executive Officer of  
the Canadian Institute for International Peace  
and Security.*

**Bernard Wood:** Without plunging into today's events I want to take one step back and look at the changed role the Security Council and UN have taken on in relation to peace and security. How close is what the UN is now doing to what the Charter writers intended, and should we be thinking of putting in place the other machinery in support of the Security Council that was envisaged in the Charter? Should we have a military staff committee as a fully operating entity, and should we be putting in place standby forces so that in another crisis, where aggression is as clear-cut as in the recent one, you could follow the Charter provision-by-provision because all the machinery would be there?

**Brian Urquhart:** Though there is a great deal of talk about the renaissance of the United Nations, the truth of the matter is that a lot of machinery of the United Nations has been frozen stiff for forty years. And far less attention has been paid to Chapter VII of the Charter, and the preparations you are supposed to make for it, than I think to any other chapter of the Charter. It has become extremely clear in this particular crisis. When we get through the Gulf crisis it will be terribly important for the Security Council to try to see itself as a systematic mechanism for the maintenance of international peace and security, rather than a last resort and safety net it has tended to be.

**C. R. Gharekhan:** I think we must all acknowledge that the reactivation of the Security

reference to the Gulf crisis, but even before that, when cooperation between the two started. You will recall that many of us in the non-aligned world were not exactly looking forward to the two superpowers coming together. You know the famous anecdote about the two elephants making love or making war, the results being the same in either case. I was one of those skeptics about the coming together of the two, but I confess that the results have so far been very positive.

Now having said that, I should like to add that good times like bad times do not last forever. This convergence of interest among the two is not going to last very long. It means that in practical terms we must make the best of the situation now. We must seize this opportunity to solve as many regional problems, and regional crises in the world as possible.

We should acknowledge one fact: the Council has functioned the way it has primarily because of the efforts of the United States. It is the US that has mobilized the Council and the international community. And there is a perception that the US is building an influence disproportionate to its economic power. But the US is the only country that has the military capability to launch the operations that the international community has launched in the Gulf. So while you may think about bringing about some institutional changes for reforms in the Security Council, I doubt if we can really tinker with the Charter, because any proposal which would amount to an amendment to the Charter will open up Pandora's box.

**Amre Moussa:** I don't think that it is too early in the morning to be the Devil's Advocate. I will be the Devil's Advocate now. I believe that the UN renaissance is a false renaissance. What

Council has become possible because of the convergence of interests of the US and the permanent members – especially the two most important of them. And this is not only with



has happened in the Security Council in the last few months was the result of growing US influence, of being the only superpower, as Ambassador Gharekhan has said, and had it not been for that, the Security Council would have been paralyzed. Second: the reactivation of the Security Council was and still is connected to one issue – that is the Gulf. When you move from the Gulf to any other issue, the Palestinian issue for example, or any other that the United States does not believe is urgent, you will find the Security Council returning to the very poor performance of the last few years. It is a new reality that the UN is acting when the US wants it to act. Perhaps it is not so black and white, but this is, *grosso modo*, the reality.

I don't think the United Nations has really come back to what was meant by the founding fathers or by the Charter. One of my colleagues said, in his analysis of the situation, that the Security Council is becoming the political arm of US foreign policy, as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are considered the economic arm of US policy, and an aid to the military arm of US policy. Is this true? I don't believe that. But there are certain indications that the Security Council is performing, because of the United States, in the same direction. This might be beneficial later on, because once the wheel has started moving, perhaps the Security Council will move in a more positive and less double standard, less selective way.

**Thomas Franck:** If it was Devil's Advocate time I think it is also cup half full time. I think it depends on what your standard of comparison is. Yes, the United States exercised a lot of leverage and played politics very hard to keep a voting majority together on the Security Council, and build a coalition of forces against Iraq.

This was not the way people in San Francisco thought the world would respond to an act of aggression by one country against a neighbour. But it was infinitely better than anything the UN could have conceived of being able to do from 1946, all the way to six months ago. It is just incomparably better than that. It is true that the US was

lead dog but then it was always intended that some countries were going to have to do more of the fighting, and therefore would have to have more of the responsibility in the Security Council. What is striking is the fact that the United States was willing to do a number of things which most hawks in Washington thought were logistically, strategically and militarily unwise, including the 15 January deadline, in an effort to engage the political machinery that is represented by the Security Council.

There is nothing magic about the Security Council, it is just a place where some kind of systemic politics gets played out. In that process, the power of those other players – including the non-aligned bloc, and the Soviet Union and China – is certainly magnified compared to the same kind of situation without that

machinery. The machinery has in fact diluted rather than strengthened the United States as sole player, and that is all to the good.

Now to go on to the question raised by the chair: the founders had in mind exactly what you suggested, that is Article 43, plus the staff committee machinery. But a certain amount of this is a constitution that we are interpreting, and constitutions develop through usage and the UN Charter is no exception. With that rather liberal construction of the parameters of the constitutional instrument one has to review the way in which these Articles have evolved. Since nobody entered into any agreements with the Security Council – for obvious reasons, during the Cold War – to commit forces to collective security operations, two things happened: one of them was, in effect, the invention of the famous Chapter 6½ for which Brian takes

much blame, responsibility and praise. Six and a half has been one of the extraordinary achievements of a period of virtual stasis in the UN system. So that is part of why the cup is at least half full.

In addition, at least in the otherwise pretty systemically unsatisfactory example of Korea, the system did invent a way of activating a very rudimentary, very unsatisfactory – but the amazing thing was that it was there at all – international force. And so we have a kind of Article 42½ now which is somewhere between the power of the Security Council to authorize members to do things, and the failed Article 43 which is intended to result in a series of Treaties in which forces are dedicated to decisions of the Security Council.

The ultimate and more desirable pattern for the use of collective security machinery would be if we could gradually develop a preventive force that would discourage the kind of miscalculation that Hussein has made, by there being a ready-made force consisting primarily of countries other than the superpowers. There I think I would go back to the Urquhart formula for peace keeping.

**Wood:** It is very interesting to see in the discussion in our country around the current crisis that the evolution of peacekeeping had become identified, in very large chunk of the public mind with

## INSIDE THE UN CHARTER

**Chapter VI** of the UN Charter, titled *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*, deals with the UN's role in investigating international disputes and recommending solutions to the parties involved. Chapter VI also gives UN member states the right to bring a dispute to the attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council.

UN "peacekeeping" operations, of the sort in which Canada has traditionally participated, are not enforcement actions as envisaged in Article 42. Peacekeeping is carried out with the consent and cooperation of the parties concerned, and aims to achieve its objective through impartial supervision of cease-fires, truce or armistice agreements and troop withdrawals. "Chapter 6 and a half" is not a change in wording of the Charter, but effectively an improvisation on the existing Charter to allow for the undertaking of peacekeeping operations.

**Chapter VII**, entitled, *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*, deals with the "collective security" and enforcement role of the Security Council in maintaining or restoring international peace and security in the event the Council determines that such a threat exists.

**Article 41** gives the Council the power to impose non-military measures on parties involved, such as economic and trade sanctions. It is this article which was invoked in the days and weeks immediately following Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. In the event that such actions are inadequate to restore international peace and security, **Article 42** provides for the Council to take,

*such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade or other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations.*

In the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Article 42 was invoked on 29 November 1990, as Resolution 678.

**Articles 43 through 47** provide for members of the UN, at the request of the Security Council, to enter into agreements with the Council to make available armed forces, assistance, and facilities in order to carry out the restoration of peace and security. Plans for the use of the armed force are to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of a "Military Staff Committee" described in Article 47. Since the founding of the UN, action has never been taken by the Security Council to implement Articles 43 through 47. □

the security functions of the UN. When collective security, as envisaged in the Charter, was actually put into operation, there was a lot of shock and horror in many quarters to say – “we never thought it was about this.”

**Enid Schoettle:** It is not only Canada that has that point of view. There is great concern in a number of the non-permanent five countries that they are reluctant to make commitments of forces under Chapter VII provisions, without any sense of how it is going to materialize without the protection of veto. So I suspect that the Canadian view is rather widely shared.

**Gharekhan:** I am not sure that the non-aligned countries would be enthusiastic to enter into any agreement with the Security Council to give troops to be used for the national interests of the veto powers. The five permanent members, because of their veto, would not agree to any operation which goes against their interests. I am not sure that India – well I am sure that India – would not wish to make any troops available, the deployment of which India would have no control over. Troops which would be used, as Amre Moussa said, as an instrument of US foreign policy.

In this Gulf Crisis, the US was able to use the Security Council because the situation is so blatantly obvious. Here is a clear case of aggression by one country against another. And there was an international consensus that, yes, this is absolutely wrong and must be reversed. I must compliment the US in the professional way in which they went about mobilizing in-

tion to use the UN as an instrument of foreign policy. The intention is very clear.

**Urquhart:** I very much agree that the use of the word renaissance is extremely premature. I also very much distrust the now very fashionable use of the phrase “New World Order.” I think that everything, almost, has to be done before we can begin to justify either of those phrases. It is absolutely true that the Iraq-Kuwait crisis is unique in its clarity. Except for Iraq’s attack on Iran – about which incidentally the Security Council, in one of its lowest moments did absolutely nothing.

It isn’t really a bureaucratic or an organizational problem, early warning and preemptive action. I spent some forty years in the UN with various Secretaries General trying to alert the Council in advance to things that were obviously going to happen. The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 for example, even the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Lebanese Civil War – on all of those occasions the Council was totally resistant to preemptive action of any kind. They didn’t want to attract trouble. ORCI [Office for Research and Collection of Information] – it was set up after I left, I was always against it – is a very large bureaucratic organization. It doesn’t address the real problem. The real problem in getting the Security Council to be a sort of preventive system is the attitudes of governments. For various

reasons of their own they mostly don’t want to try to take action before something happens.

It is very nice now for the United States to say that we are planning a new world order; it just happens to suit them extremely well. What happens if something happens somewhere else which doesn’t suit them that well?

One of the difficulties of the Security Council is that the different elements of its functioning have always been separated up to now. There is the diplomatic side, then there is so-called peacemaking – people like the Secretary General and others trying to exercise good offices in different disputes. Then there is peacekeeping, and then there is collective action. And they have always been kept very separate, particularly peacekeeping and collective action, for good political reasons. Now there is no reason.

I submit that a system would consist of a combination of those four main activities so

that one supplements the other. For example, if a peacekeeping operation gets run over by a government, like for example the peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon did in 1982, in the mandate of that peacekeeping operation that should automatically trigger collective action from the Security Council. Then peacekeeping would not be just this very decent bunch of chaps in blue helmets behaving extraordinarily well in difficult situations. If they got trampled

## “The Security Council is becoming the political arm of US foreign policy, like the IMF and the World Bank.”

on, they would become a tripwire. Until you get governments prepared to consider that kind of thing there isn’t any point in talking about a renaissance or new world order. Peo-ple are talking nonsense at the moment. Especially these very sort of upbeat notes emanating from Washington – it just isn’t true.

**Wood:** The Devil’s Advocacy said there’s more hierarchy than ever, and that you don’t just have permanent members, you have one super permanent member, and then you have all the rest in varying categories. But I haven’t heard anybody say it is time to open up the Charter again and try for a less hierarchical structure.

**Moussa:** This would come automatically if the debate is open and we enter a really sincere debate on this issue. Then we might reach that point. But we have to bear in mind that many countries, the small countries in particular, Third World countries in their entirety, are against opening the Charter for amendment – for fear of dropping certain principles, of certain guarantees, that are there and we might not be able to reach a consensus on those principles again. So opening up the Charter is a very serious, very dangerous, operation.

On the question of preventative action, what about Article 99 – the right of the Secretary General to call a Security Council meeting whenever he considers that there is a threat to international peace and security? If the Secretary General got information, solid information, from the United States, from the Soviet Union, from France, from whoever, that secret services have determined that forces of Iraq are moving in a way that they might be attacking

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played out.”

ternational support – very reluctantly in some country’s cases. But I doubt whether the US would be able to use the Council as an instrument of its foreign policy in other situations where the case is not so obvious. But I do agree that the US would want to use the Security Council. Les Aspin [Chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee] said just three days ago, in the *Washington Post*, that one of the things that should come out of the Gulf War is that the US should be in the posi-



Kuwait, would the Secretary General intervene at this point, on the strength of Article 99?

**Urquhart:** Article 99 is a rather a two-edged weapon, and that is the reason why it has been used so sparingly. Because the trouble with Article 99 is if you use it and absolutely nothing happens, you are making it worse rather than better. Hammarskjöld, who was supposed to be more dashing than the others, only used it over the Congo in 1960. And he only invoked it after getting all of the members of Council to a luncheon and saying to them, over the soup, look boys this is a terrible situation. If I invoke Article 99 are you prepared to do something about it, and they all said yes, including the Soviet Union, incidentally. Waldheim invoked it over the American hostages in Iran, with absolutely no effect whatsoever. The real problem with Article 99 is not the existence of a threat to international peace and security, so much as getting the Security Council to follow up on it.

The Secretary General can be extremely influential – provided he has international stature – in unexpected situations as a warning. After all, everybody knew about Iraq and Kuwait, they [Iraq] nearly took it in 1971 – it wasn't a new problem. So if the Secretary General had invoked Article 99 I wonder what would have happened – not much I think. It just happened to suit everybody not to pay any attention to it, and everybody got it wrong.

**Franck:** There is an unexamined and partially true assumption here that the future of a sovereign independent Kuwait is somehow top priority for the United States and at the bottom of everybody else's list. And that somehow this has been sold to everybody else by a shrewd bunch of horse traders in the Security Council. I just don't believe that that's correct. Most African and a goodly number of Asian states feel intense interest in the matter of sanctity of boundaries, however irrational, however drawn by whatever heinous colonial forces. The sanctity of those boundaries is of a direct practical importance to those countries. I don't believe that in fact it took a lot of selling to get the principle across or that those countries think that this is all a terrific ploy simply to keep the price of oil down. That undersells the precedential value of what's happening here. And because it has this larger precedential value, perhaps that's my lawyer's perspective, and that an important legal issue is at stake, the world will be different when we come through this.

If this operation fails it is quite clear that the United States will never get involved in another one and there will be many wars over

many boundaries, because it will have become clear that the international system is incapable of stopping a stronger state from redressing what it perceives to be historic grievances against weaker neighbours. If it succeeds there will be some momentum to discourage that kind of activity. The question then is whether it can in some way be institutionalized through the framework of the UN.

I don't exclude the possibility of some kind of reform in the structure of the Security Council. Even at the depth of the Cold War we were able to amend the Charter to bring about an enlargement and some transformation of the membership of the Security Council. It is not totally unrealistic to think of the Japanese proposal, to add five more permanent members without giving them a veto. But it ought to be imagined in terms of what would make the institution more legitimate.

**Olivia Ward:** I was just going to follow up on what Brian had said about the difficulty of getting the Security Council to take action. In the past, there were very few media representatives hanging around the UN. I was there from time to time in the last two years and I saw tremendous apathy. I was able to alert my organization to the fact that some important things do happen, and ought to be happening, even if they're not. One year ago, when I came down to cover Central America, I found that during a daily briefing the room was maybe a third full, now it is standing room only. So I really think that the media climate is so right now, that should some early warning group within the United Nations go directly to the media, call regular press conferences or irregular ones when they have something to say, and say, alert, eyes up, today we have a major an-

“The Iraq-Kuwait crisis is unique in its clarity, except for Iraq's attack on Iran, about which the Security Council did absolutely nothing.”

nouncement for you. Just put across the information, leave it with the media, and then say to the Security Council, fine if you don't want to take it up, it will be in the *New York Times* on the front page tomorrow.

**Wood:** Brian will remember when there was a great deal more attention of the media on this place, and in some ways it is again. Everyone who has been watching the system for a long time would say this does reflect an important shift of attention and opportunity that has to be captured because it could slip again. Is it an appropriate thing to ask about other machinery as well – the danger of overloading the Security Council. Now that it has finally been asked to do some of the work it was intended to do, you don't want to throw everything at it all at once. Regional systems [Chapter VIII] were envisaged in the Charter.

**Moussa:** The regional systems which started around the end of WWII, are moving steadily to be something of a bust – they are not functioning well. The Arab League, for example, did not perform the functions that were intended in its creation. In terms of peace and security in the region, the Arab League hasn't played any role. Perhaps recently on the question of Lebanon, but it came too late – so many years after the beginning. What is the role of the OAS – the Organization of the American States – vis-à-vis the major problems that we have seen from Grenada to Panama to Cuba, let alone the economic and social problems of Latin America? Move to the OAU, the Organization of African Unity – it suffers from the same defects.

There is a new development emerging with the CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe]. But it is in Europe, where it is highly advanced in coordination – it is an industrial society where many of the small matters which we consider big in the Third World have been relegated to the back burner. So the CSCE would be a new form of regional organization for security, economic and social matters. It is a looser kind of organization.

It might not be an organization at all; it is a conference by rule of consensus.

**Urquhart:** I don't know about this CSCE business – it sounds so plausible when one says it. The CSCE seems to be a state of mind rather than an organization. It is a state of mind which has fitted in remarkably well with historical developments in the European area. If you were to try to do something like that in the Middle East region, I can't envisage quite how it would get going. There isn't a common state of mind.

**Wood:** It is worth remembering that the CSCE started in the midst of a conflictual relationship that it was intentionally designed to bridge. There was competition over the agenda, one side was insisting that human rights be a large part of the agenda and the other saying that

the recognition and inviolability of borders be another. And direct security issues, even confidence and security building measures, were late in the game. So it is not only when things are better that you can do it.

**Franck:** I was going to say in response to Brian, that a state of mind is the only state worth a damn.... You can't talk about regional organizations, a lot of these are regional organizations only by the wildest stretch of the imagination. Any regional organization that includes Turkey and British Columbia obviously is a funny kind of regional organization, and any regional organization that includes Turkey and Ireland, or Malaysia and Egypt is a funny kind of regional organization. The notion has gotten rather diffuse and it is much more important to talk in terms of interest groupings.

Moreover, the OAU has not been useless. The Chad-Libya dispute, which I am currently involved in, was brought to the International Court by pressure by the OAU. Neither the Libyans nor the Chadians thought that this was their preferred way of achieving a satisfactory outcome, and it was eventually the OAU that prevailed – an agreement to go through a year of negotiation and if that failed there was to be result certain in the International Court. So there is a kind of ethos in the OAU which is not nothing.

**Ward:** I would like to put a question to Ambassador Moussa because I think the answer might not be too optimistic. There is much talk that at the end of the Gulf conflict there must be some kind of regional, not only peacekeeping, but perhaps arms control planning. What would you think the prospects are for an effective arms control plan?

**Moussa:** Well, thank you for this very complicated question. Any weapons control, disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has to include all countries, particularly Israel. We cannot, even now, agree with the opinion that Iraq, within the framework of its conflict with Kuwait, be subjected to certain arrangements for the limitation of or elimination of or supervision of its arms, chemical or biological or whatever – while leaving Israel outside of any control system. The region should be declared free from weapons of mass destruction. So any system there has to include nuclear weapons, which means Israel has to adhere to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

**Ward:** Israel is nowhere close to accepting such a thing, but what do you think the climate of opinion is within the Arab states?

**Moussa:** Perhaps you are reading between the lines; that there are certain Arab countries, small countries, that do not really care about what Israel has now, they have Iraq in mind. But if you go deeper, a security system there cannot be established without the participation of Israel, without control over Israeli arms. If you want a viable system you cannot exclude anyone of the major powers in the area – Arab, Persian, Turkish or Jewish.

**Ward:** So really you are saying that after the Gulf conflict is settled there can be no arms control arrangement in that area unless there is an International Conference to settle these other issues.

**Moussa:** Yes, because Israel will not, and other Arabs might not, be able to sit around the same table to discuss weapons control without solving the Palestinian problem. But I would add a note here that it is not without "solving" the

tremely important relationship with Mahmoud Fawzi, [Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister from 1953 to 1962] in Egypt. He had a very important relationship with Mike Pearson and with Nehru, and he operated on the basis of a very constant and detailed personal correspondence with a number of leaders in what you are calling middle powers. It certainly was one of the most important supports he had. I think it is a concept you can use, provided you don't formalize it.

**Moussa:** I believe this idea should be reactivated and very soon, at the moment when this "new world order" is very much talked about and when it's no longer a bi-polar system. It is one superpower with other big powers behind it, and then the Third World. What is the North anyway? It is the five biggest or seven richest or twelve European states, and the South is totally devoid of superpowers or centres of power. So some of us came up with the idea of middle powers – that between North and South has to be India and Egypt and Brazil and Argentina and Indonesia, as responsible countries, to bridge the two worlds. Just imagine the Council in 1990, when this Gulf problem erupted, if the middle powers had been even more fully represented. It might have been a different and very responsible discussion.

## **"Permanent members have vested interests in not rocking the boat – not least the British and the French, who are likely to fall out."**

Palestinian problem, but without starting the process. Once you start a viable peace process, this would allow the discussion of weapons systems and other things.

**Wood:** Is there a special responsibility for what one can loosely call middle powers? There was a lot of discussion, at the time of the writing of the Charter, about Security Council non-permanent membership? The concept of some special responsibilities of a group of states, apart from the permanent members, runs into some philosophical difficulty with the assumption of sovereign equality of all other members.

**Urquhart:** This was an extremely important, though not formalized view, in the previous period of considerable success of the UN which was the Hammarskjöld period. Hammarskjöld operated throughout the world through a very close, almost personal, relationship with what I think you call middle powers. He had an ex-

**Urquhart:** The real trouble in the UN is to get a serious discussion going on basic subjects, which will actually have some effect. Let us suppose for a moment that this is a historical turning point – everybody keeps telling us it is – then I think it is terribly important to have that serious discussion, and I don't think you will get it started with the remaining superpower or any of the other permanent members of the Security Council. They all have a rather important vested interest in not rocking the boat and maintaining the status quo – not least the British and the French, who if they rock the boat are likely to fall out. On the other hand, there are the middle powers, which I call the sensible countries. They were once mobilized by one very remarkable person with extraordinary success. This was the basis of everything that Hammarskjöld did. And it actually had some quite abiding institutional consequences.

There is now quite a considerable group of sensible countries which is extremely interested in really reforming the organization and its leadership. It has grown up in the last year, and they are a group of very intelligent, active, permanent representatives, of whom we have two here today.



I don't know whether it is possible to start this kind of conversation on the issues we were talking about here today. I maintain that if you don't do that, there is going to be a huge element of fraud in all the self-congratulations about what is happening in the UN now. We are going to get into the next crisis just as unprepared as we were for this one. It is not good for the United States to be out front on all these things. The other side of that is that if the United States isn't out front, nobody is, and therefore you have a whole lot of things which are simply left.

**“Most African and Asian states feel intense interest in the sanctity of boundaries, however irrational, however drawn by heinous colonial forces.”**

**Wood:** You've said sensible countries enough times, that I have to stress that some of us analyze this as being a situation where you have countries which have enough human capabilities that they can muster an appreciation and some leverage and some influence. They tend to have enough interests internationally, that their vital stakes are in play, but of course they cannot have any illusion that most of the time they can handle them unilaterally. Therefore, they are bound to multilateral cooperation from a self-interested point of view.

**Schoettle:** Not every middle-range power has always met the higher standard of being a sensible power. A very important definitional, operational requirement is that the middle power, in order to be sensible, has to undertake to bury its interests in these larger multilateral arrangements. Because it is precisely some of the middle powers, the larger ones, that have also had the capacity within their own regions to act as regional hegemony. One has to describe the set in terms not only of abstract population, but also in terms of behaviour.

**Franck:** That is what I would say in favour of the Japanese proposal, which is the expansion of the Council to bring those countries in on a permanent basis, albeit without a veto. But bear in mind that the French and the British haven't used their vetoes for twenty-five years or so now. It has been a very long time since France, China, and Britain have exercised a sole vote against to kill a resolution. They have not formally crossed the route, that is not to say they will never do it, but they really go out

of their way not to do it. That is another example of amendment through practice rather than an amendment through formal reopening of the Charter. So these are the legitimacy factors to be thought of in terms of broadening the Council in a formal structural way. I realize that is not at all what Brian had in mind. His point was that the best way to achieve this was by a dynamic system of consultation.

What's to be said against it, is that the present system has plenty of leeway to make the middle powers *primus inter* their particular *pares* and that is the blocs. The bloc system to a large extent now makes very little sense. If

you're Czechoslovakia it makes no sense for you to be in a bloc with Albania and Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. And Czechoslovakia did in fact try to get out. They formally made an attempt to join the Western Europeans and others, and were quietly told, no we don't want you in

our bloc, stay in your bloc, you can do more good there and also you can have more good there. It is a point which I think they now understand. Czechoslovakia could be quite influential as an Eastern European country because Eastern Europeans still have their two members of the Security Council and various other proportionate participation in other bodies of the UN system.

The present system makes for a kind of a consultation process, which does not work very well, but at least has a potential for working better. That is, if Nigeria were always on the Council, there would be no need for Nigeria to consult and try to develop an African consensus. Now whether the Nigerians are on the Council or not, they enjoy a degree of importance that is concomitant with their power within the African bloc. Oddly enough, when they are off the Council they are more powerful than they look. When they are on the Council they are less powerful than they look because they can't simply cast a vote off the tops of their heads. They must – as the Canadians have formulated, vote as you please, but vote in good company. And the good company requires a certain amount of consultation. It would be a pity if that were lost.

**Urquhart:** One of the reasons that the international system and UN doesn't evolve in a

very striking way is an extraordinary lack of intellectual input or curiosity. There have been very few new ideas put into the UN since the Charter was written. The debate in the UN on its future is incredibly arid and not very interesting. That is something which the countries like Canada could do a great deal about. After all, you have in most of these countries, institutions which actually think about these kinds of things. It is time for an infusion of ideas and also an effort to bring the thing up to date a little. The UN in many respects is in the Middle Ages still, it is pre-industrial. And it is very frustrating if you work there.

**Franck:** One of the problems with the way the UN system is set up is that it manifests the Thatcher syndrome: the more successful it becomes the more you have a machine in operation which is removed from any kind of direct public accountability. And absent any direct public accountability, the public imagination is not going to be particularly fired. Somehow the UN has to get its roots into the political soil of the constituent parties of the system. In a recent paper I wrote, the most bizarre and imaginative thing that I could suggest was an elective second chamber in the General Assembly – directly elected, much like the Strasburg Parliament. That would certainly interest the Toronto newspapers if you had people running for the General Assembly.

**Urquhart:** There is a two-dimensional quality about the UN which is extremely deadening. It is predominantly an inter-governmental organization. “We the people” appears once in the Charter then vanishes totally – bye bye, after the first words and not mentioned again. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to bring life into this organization. It isn't just

**“Somehow the UN has to get its roots into the political soil of the constituent parties of the system.”**

“the people” either because the truth of the matter is that the forces that are going to shape the future are not controlled by governments anymore. They are controlled, if at all, by private industry, scientists, transnational corporations, the media, communications. It is a very, very complicated subject, extremely easy to raise, and incredibly difficult to do something about.

# STILL AT YEAR ZERO

*Optimism that Cambodia's ordeal can at last be ended  
is hard to come by.*

BY GÉRARD HERVOUET

THE CAMBODIAN ACTORS SEEM TO REPEAT SCENES ENDLESSLY from a tragedy that intertwines unbearable memories of the Khmer Rouge repression with hopes for better days to come. The conflict drags on, and prospects for a settlement slip away each time they come within reach. Is it fate? – perhaps. Are Cambodians resigned to it? – clearly not.

The plethora of initiatives and counter-proposals, and the diplomatic circumlocutions surrounding the Cambodian problem, are so complex that even well-informed observers can be misled. Without recapitulating the entire chain of events since the quasi-failure of the August 1989 Paris conference, a few key points in the affair, since 5 June 1990, do bear closer scrutiny.

This was the day the Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, and the former head of state, Prince Sihanouk demonstrated in Tokyo, their ability to blow simultaneously hot and cold on the hopes they had raised when they signed an entente. Both had agreed to a cease-fire or, more specifically, to the recognition of the need for "voluntary restraint to the use of force by all Cambodian parties." Hostilities were to cease before the end of July.

Moreover, the communiqué stated that a Supreme National Council (SNC) – vested with Cambodia's sovereignty during the transition period – would consist of "an equal number of representatives of both parties." Sihanouk proposed that the government side have six representatives, the Son Sann opposition faction three, and the other three would be reserved for his own party, the National United Front For An Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia – FUNCINPEC. Euphoria was short-lived, however, since the Khmer Rouge did not attend the proceedings, and so shortly after, Sihanouk and Hun Sen agreed that the war would probably continue.

After the fifth meeting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (hereafter "the Five") in Paris, on 16 and 17 July, the US government announced that it would no longer recognize the coalition government of Cambodia, set up in 1982 as an unlikely alliance between the various factions fighting the regime in Phnom Penh: the Khmer Rouge, Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk. This decision marked a watershed in US policy in South-East Asia, especially since it came with a US proposal to open dialogue with Vietnam and send humanitarian aid to Cambodia.

DESPITE SURPRISE EXPRESSED BY MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH East Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc – the chief architects of this alliance – the international community heralded the US decision. Like the Americans, they had come to realize that the previous policy had favoured the most powerful member of that coalition, the Khmer Rouge, and increased the risk of its returning to power.

On 28 August, after much bargaining and consultation, the Five agreed on the substance of a document entitled: "A Framework For a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict." The agreement states that Cambodia should be placed under UN supervision.

It defined the terms and conditions for the establishment of the Supreme Council, and laid down the military arrangements for the transition period leading up to free elections. The Five also undertook to guarantee the security of a neutral Cambodian state, and to this end, the Soviet Union and China agreed to stop supplying weapons to the government of Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge respectively.

In Jakarta on 9 and 10 September, the Cambodian factions accepted the document prepared by the Five for the UN. Most importantly, they appeared to acquiesce in the plan's description of the structure and functions of the SNC. As an indication of their resolve to transcend historical antagonisms, the parties agreed on five central points:

- The SNC is the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which throughout the transitional period, the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia is embodied;
- the SNC is composed of representative individuals with authority among the Cambodian people and reflecting all shades of opinion among them;
- the SNC will represent Cambodia externally and occupy the seat of Cambodia at the United Nations, in the UN specialized agencies and in other international institutions and international conferences;
- the SNC at the time of signature of the comprehensive settlement will delegate to the UN all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive agreement, including those relating to the conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant aspects of the administration of Cambodia;
- all decisions of the SNC will be made by consensus among its members.



Geoff Githner

ALL PARTIES AT THE JAKARTA MEETING ACKNOWLEDGED that a peaceful settlement was within their reach. Even the leader of the Khmer Rouge declared that "a significant step towards peace ha[d] been taken," adding that the Khmer Rouge was "wholeheartedly" in support of the plan. Hun Sen, for his part, declared that the document was "the best that we've ever produced."

But once again, initial enthusiasm was dampened by the inability of the twelve delegates to the SNC to choose a chair. With six members from the opposition and six from the Phnom Penh government, there was a lot at stake. While it appeared that Sihanouk might become the thirteenth member and chair, Hun Sen proposed that the Prince would be acceptable as chair only if he occupied one of the six seats allotted to the opposition, or if a seventh representative from the government side was added. Regardless of the outcome, there would be deadlock.

This bickering over numbers underscores the deep mutual suspicions evident from the start of the transition period. Because of the wrangling over the chair, the first meeting of the National Council in Bangkok from 17 to 19 September was a failure. But the very next day in New York, the Security Council accepted the framework agreement formulated by the Five at the end of August, and adopted it as resolution 668. The Security Council specifically urged the opposing factions to proceed as quickly as possible with the election of a chair.



The UN plan was finalized during the seventh meeting of the Five on 15 and 16 October, and at a meeting held in Jakarta (at which the Cambodian factions were not present) in November. A comprehensive scheme for the implementation of a peace settlement, it proposes: the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia (UNTAC); defines the agency's mandate; outlines conditions for a cease-fire, for free elections and for repatriating refugees; and lays down fundamental principles for a new Cambodian constitution.

On 21 and 22 December in Paris, the two co-chairs of the Paris Conference on Cambodia (France and Indonesia) hosted a meeting of the members of the SNC and of the United Nations to formally adopt the plan. The three opposition factions accepted "most of the fundamental points," but the Phnom Penh government voiced strong reservations on three items: demobilization of military forces, disarmament and, in its words, the "mention of the genocide" perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1978.

AT THE RISK OF OVERSIMPLIFYING A COMPLEX DOCUMENT, there are a few central elements of the plan worth highlighting: it is, first of all, a precarious and delicate structure, held together with very elaborate diplomatic language, which creates the illusion of reconciling all parties to the dispute. While the agreement is the product of considerable efforts on the part of the international community, it will succeed only to the extent that the same sizable resources are applied to carrying out its many detailed provisions.

The whole structure depends on Cambodians ironing out their differences, and on the future of the Supreme National Council. And in turn, an effective SNC under an impartial Chair is necessary for productive and credible collaboration with UNTAC. The interminable disagreements about the SNC and inability to pick a chair, deprive the country of representation in the United Nations, where its seat remains vacant.

During negotiations, all sides seem to have taken it for granted that harmony was achievable. However, since the meeting in Paris at the end of December, the representatives from Phnom Penh have once again voiced reservations. These lingering concerns may seem only technical, but they raise fundamental issues. The Hun Sen government insists that somewhere in the final agreement, there should be mention of the Khmer Rouge genocide. More than a matter of principle, such a clause leads to the following question: how can one allow the perpetrators of genocide to participate in a government or take part in elections held under the supervision of the United Nations? On this point, Hun Sen was very specific:

Despite the participation of the Khmer Rouge in the SNC, our official position remains unchanged: in whatever case, in whatever solutions, there must be a guarantee for the non-return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.

Other fundamental questions concern the thorny issues of the demobilization and disarmament of existing military and guerilla forces. The UN plan is quite explicit on these points, outlining a step-by-step process that can be adjusted as circumstances warrant. Nevertheless, the end of hostilities depends on the good will of the parties involved. The plan dictates that upon signing a final agreement, each party would provide UNTAC with a comprehensive and detailed list of its military equipment, bases, weapons caches, etc. All troops would have to report – together with weapons, ammunition and other equipment – to designated assembly areas from which they would be escorted to camps, demobilized and returned to civilian life. Hun Sen's reluctance on this particular point is understandable:

It is easy to disband Cambodian government troops ... but can anyone provide a sure answer that this is the same with Pol Pot troops and their weapons, and those of Pol Pot's allies in the Dangrek mountains or in the jungles? No one can give this answer. In this case, do not try to disband government troops because this would pave the way to the Pol Pot regime's return.

It would be naive to deny that the Phnom Penh regime has legitimate fears. The UN plan can certainly be improved upon, but the ability of the different factions in finding common ground has been overrated. Unfortunately, the Cambodians' implacable hate is deeply rooted, and there are no indications that this will change.

The Khmer Rouge constitute an enormous stumbling block. Cautious and clever, they play the UN card in order to achieve new respectability. They no longer want to be called Khmer Rouge, but rather "Democratic Kampuchians." And with elections looming on the horizon, they have attempted to recast their image into that of a nationalist party. They have drawn up a constitution, and set up a judicial system and a police force to administer the territory under their control. They court the peasantry by playing up the strong anti-Vietnamese feelings that run through the country, and "democracy" is being tried out in some of their refugee camps in Thailand.

The Khmer Rouge undoubtedly represent a real threat. Kept in check for the moment by the Phnom Penh government, there are widespread fears that the Hun Sen regime could be weakened or even shattered by the presence of the UN transitional authority.

All this is happening as if the solution to Cambodia's internal problems no longer depended on external realities. The unanimity of the Five and the acquiescence of the states in the region would seem to support this. Yet, the Chinese government has yet to indicate its real designs – this despite a certain rapprochement with Vietnam, and reassuring noises about cutting off military aid to the Khmer Rouge.

Hanoi remains Phnom Penh's most faithful ally. Vietnamese troops have repeatedly crossed the border to join in the government's sporadic skirmishes with the Khmer Rouge. Thailand – in accordance with ASEAN's policies – is playing a patient game that gives it control, not only over the supply of Chinese weapons, but also over the Khmer Rouge guerillas in the refugee camps – and those of the other two guerilla factions as well.

OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PASSIVELY WAIT ON the sidelines for Cambodia's factions to work out a compromise, betrays an indifference to the fate of this small country – one of the ten poorest in the world. While China and Vietnam are still very much involved, neither can be really trusted, since neither has gone through a *perestroika* comparable to that of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. The bitterness of their rivalry is matched only by the decrepitude of their regimes. It is hard to imagine leaders as politically ossified as these questioning their own determination to fight it out to the last Cambodian.

The international community could still bring pressure to bear on both Hanoi and Beijing to obtain – *prior* to the signature of any internal agreement in Cambodia – a commitment not to intervene. In the meantime, the task of rebuilding Cambodia has to begin. Massive international assistance remains, for the time being, the only way of dealing with the great social and economic disparities which fuel the cause of the Khmer Rouge.

It is possible to help the Cambodian people reestablish an infrastructure that will ensure their survival, without endorsing, at the diplomatic level, the current Phnom Penh government. Such assistance could work both to validate the UN plan and reassure the leaders in Phnom Penh. Assuming the international community is not overwhelmed by indifference, what with the Cambodian conflict relegated to the back pages because of the Gulf War, one can imagine a kind of Marshall Plan supported by the nations of the Pacific Rim. Current attempts to bring structure and stability to this rapidly expanding region of the world would be enhanced by a concerted and united effort in Cambodia.

# FROM BUST TO BOOM

*The Gulf War threatens to re-kindle international arms sales.*

BY CHRIS SMITH

**T**HE GULF WAR HAS EMERGED AT A CRUCIAL juncture for the international political system and the global trade in arms.

The short-lived post-Cold War, pre-Gulf War era presented nations with a rare but brief opportunity to consider how best to exploit a new and less threatening security environment. However, any positive outcomes are undoubtedly threatened by a major war, the technical and political lessons of which will be closely watched.

The coalition forces cannot lose the war – in the coming months Saddam Hussein will be forced out of Kuwait, his capacity to wage war will be destroyed and he is unlikely to survive the political chaos and disintegration in Iraq that will result. Yet, pundits are already questioning the allies' ability to win the peace – a goal more important than a return to the *status quo ante*.

Over the past fifteen years, Arab and Israeli forces have been allowed to increase their military capabilities to awesome levels by playing off the Soviet Union against the United States, by manipulating the divisions between Western allies, notably West Germany, France and the United States, and by individual firms exploiting loopholes in national controls over defence exports. Partly as a result, regional security problems and power struggles have assumed new dimensions since the 1973 Yom Kippur war – conventional forces are much stronger and long-range missiles have been acquired, as may have chemical and nuclear weapons to go with them.

A REDUCTION OR STABILIZATION OF MILITARY capability is pointless on its own, particularly if, by definition, it is imposed from the outside. President Jimmy Carter attempted and failed to achieve this in the late 1970s when he pledged that the US would not be the first country to introduce new technologies into volatile areas. There is simply too much economic and political pull within the Middle East, too many new suppliers outside Europe and North America, and national controls over defence sales remain too weak. Clearly, reducing or controlling military capability in this region can only come through altering patterns of both supply and demand.

While much may change in the future, there are already signs that arms sales will retain their primary role in Middle Eastern affairs. The Pentagon has already laid contingency plans to increase the military capability of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, together with an allied peacekeeping force if Saddam Hussein is only partially defeated.<sup>1</sup>

The inevitable surge in the future demand for defence equipment throughout the Middle East will have mixed fortunes for the major suppliers. While California and Massachusetts quietly rejoice, a recent French report has claimed that "we will soon be reduced to gathering the crumbs swept aside by our trans-atlantic allies."<sup>2</sup> In particular, the *Patriot* anti-missile missile and the *Tornado* ground-attack aircraft have both performed extremely well.

As with the French *Exocet* anti-ship missile following the Falklands War, "combat proven" status works veritable wonders for future sales. On Wall Street, the price of a share of Raytheon, the manufacturer of the *Patriot* missile, rose \$ 4.50 the first trading day after its initial combat success, and export orders for the *Patriot* are expected to reach \$ 2 billion next year. Similarly, the *Tomahawk* cruise missile now has a new lease on life.<sup>3</sup> Destined for cancellation in 1992 prior to the war, production will now presumably be extended. The success or failure of the *Challenger* tank in the ground war will likely decide whether Britain remains a tank producer in the future.

During a period when the international defence market is severely depressed, when oil costs look set to rise above pre-2 August invasion levels to cover the costs of both war and peace, and when the main combatants will be looking to arms exports to reduce the economic costs of rearmament, the temptation to continue to use military means to suppress political problems will be strong.

IN LATE 1989, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV DID MORE than allow the liberation of Eastern Europe, he

also threw in the Soviet towel and with it, most political claims to superpower status. These actions brought a collapse of the contest which had determined the shape of the post-WWII world. The benefits of a new era of détente have been quick to manifest themselves, particularly in Europe. Nuclear and conventional arms control, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany and additional opportunities to exploit the Single European Act have opened a new and promising chapter in European history and, potentially, for the Third World as well.

SOUTH ASIA AND PARTS OF AFRICA HAVE ALSO benefitted; in mid-1990, growing tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir failed to develop into a full-scale conflict in part because both superpowers decided that armed conflict was in the interests of neither. While regional, ethnic and religious problems persist and are invariably exacerbated by failures in economic development, the new emphasis on resolving conflicts and a tendency on the part of the major powers to avoid meddling in the internal affairs of weaker countries for Cold War purposes is a significant and positive change.

On defence questions, equally profound changes are on the horizon. In Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States there is a growing acknowledgement that distinct political and fiscal limits have been reached regarding what had been an open-ended commitment to the pursuit of advanced military technology. The end of the Cold War offers an opportunity to pursue both the conversion of defence production and the partial dismantling of national defence bases.

Although the French remain somewhat equivocal, most European defence enterprises now recognize that the long-term future lies in cost sharing and co-production arrangements. Prior to and during the build-up to the Gulf conflict, the US Congress was busy cutting billions out of the US defence budget in a desperate effort to address the nation's economic problems, most notably the federal deficit. Much the same was true in the Soviet

1. For Your Eyes Only, 24 December 1990.

2. Defence Marketing International, 16 November 1990.

3. The Independent, "US Defence Industry on a High," 26 January 1991.



Union, although the conversion of weapons production has faltered of late.

While these changes taking place throughout the Northern industrialized nations had yet to extend to new approaches to the international arms trade as a whole, changing patterns of demand for weapons did suggest that progress might be attainable in the future. So too had the United Nations adopted a fresh approach in this quarter, the first sign of the new concern being the convening of expert committees and academic conferences on greater transparency in the international arms trade.

PRIOR TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, declining oil prices had depressed the arms market throughout the Middle East, although demand was still high in relation to other parts of the Third World – witness the scale of the multi-billion dollar *al Yamamah* deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia involving the sale of *Tornado* and *Hawk* aircraft, and other military equipment and facilities. Through the Gulf Cooperation Council, several oil-rich states such as Oman and Saudi Arabia had begun a process of rationalizing their weapons procurement to avoid duplication and waste.

On the other hand, poorer Third World countries had started to discover that the attainment of a broad and multi-faceted military capability was impossible without vast quantities of foreign exchange increasingly available only to oil-producing states and certain newly-industrialized countries like South Korea. Pakistan, for example, realized that the American commitment to economic and military aid was far from open-ended once the Soviets quit Afghanistan. And India's rampant defence spending through the 1980s petered out prematurely, creating large gaps in defence capability and, more recently, led to a government defence review. In the case of India, the lesson was simple – a major arms build-up which dwarfed even the Saudi effort in recent years, could not be sustained with only three weeks foreign exchange in the bank.

Equally significant, defence sales to Latin America have been exceptionally depressed, only partly because of growing indigenous weapons production capabilities. Indeed, in recent years, the most promising location for arms sales has been the Far East. Against this backdrop of rising external debt, global recession and post-Cold War politics, the international arms market was set for further retrenchment.

THE GULF WAR THREATENS TO CHANGE ALL THIS as armed forces and governments draw their own conclusions from unfolding events. At the political level, the resolve on the part of the US to avoid another Vietnam has led to a most dev-

astating example of overwhelming military intervention – during the first two days of the war, the allied forces dropped as many bombs on Iraq as the Anglo-American air forces did on the city of Dresden in the closing weeks of the Second World War. The relative impotence of Iraq will provide a sombre lesson for other aspiring Third World powers, such as India and Iran, which possess similar military capabilities.

Finally, the Gulf crisis will have a more subtle and long-term effect upon the international system. Prior to the attack on 17 January, the voices in favour of alternative security regimes – “non-provocative defence” and “defensive defence” – were beginning to make headway in Europe, both intellectually and politically, even among professionals. However, the initial allied success in the Gulf is a powerful endorsement of advanced military technology and its ability to delay the commitment of troops on a large scale and reduce collateral damage in the form of civilian deaths.

EQUALLY IMPORTANT, AND EVEN TO THE SURPRISE of the allied commanders, the technology is functioning well in hostile conditions. Although the central mission may not have been achieved in the expected fashion, even the military commanders have appeared a little surprised at the relative lack of technical failure. Hitherto, many of the arguments in favour of alternative defence regimes had used the limitations and shortcomings of advanced military technology as a major argument against gold-plating and the type of military industrial practice which sent prices soaring and returned only marginal increases in defence capability. However, the low-level attacks performed by *Tornado* aircraft, the accuracy of the *Patriot* missiles, and the superb quality of intelligence gathering and targeting, will do much to mute the Luddite view of modern military technology.


One can hope, however, that there will be much to gain from this dialectic, not least at the level of practical policy formulation. Much of the alternative defence debate always appeared in the shape of unreal policies geared to defeat – the idea being to leave a country's borders open to invasion and ensuring that the negative aspects of territorial occupation outweighed the possible gains.

THE GULF WAR IS SURELY A TURNING POINT in the history of the region for all concerned. Following Iraq's defeat, the international system, in facing up to the demand side of the problem, must force itself to resolve, or at least regulate, in tandem with Israel and the Arab states, the ongoing political crisis in the region. This peace process can only begin if Israel and the United States accept the inevitability of a regional peace conference which includes on

the agenda the Palestinian question and Israel's de facto borders. Thereafter, whatever fragile consensus emerges will also require a regional arms control regime to ensure its survival.

It is difficult to be sanguine about the future following a war which was made inevitable by a complete lack rather than a failure of foreign policy. If this approach comes to define the future of the region, the Middle East will remain unstable, volatile and heavily armed. Certainly, a kind of negative peace may prevail and this would be good news for the major arms producers and exporters.

Elsewhere, however, the associated effects would be catastrophic. Rising oil prices, a higher US deficit, increased arms imports and declining foreign aid – Britain has already refused to provide extra aid to the Sudan because of the costs engendered by the Gulf crisis – will exacerbate economic problems in Latin America, Sub-Continental Africa and South Asia. The price as measured in failed economic development and rising political tensions will be severe. In the future, subtle or blunt defence planning may prevent another war in the Middle East. However, a “no war, no peace either” situation may exacerbate conflicts and crises in other regions of the world. □



# LAST BEST HOPE FOR PERU?

*Peru's new president takes on the country's three-headed scourge of cocaine, corruption and a decade of vicious insurrection.*

BY SHARON STEVENSON

**F**OR A MULTITUDE OF HISTORICAL REASONS PERU IS AN ECONOMICALLY, morally, and socially sick nation – and the new President, Alberto Fujimori, knows it. Corruption has been bred within incoherent, debilitated national institutions and fattened on dollars generated by the illegal drug trade. The greatest challenge to Fujimori is the reform of government: making it a constructive and just force in people's lives. He must convince Peruvians to help their government go after narcotrafficking, insurgents and the corruption which permeates all.

The hidden weapon in Peru's drug war is political will or rather, lack of it. The major foreign player, the United States, accuses Peru of not demonstrating the political will to fight America's number one problem, drugs. The US, still under the shadow of Vietnam, shows no political will to get involved with what Peruvians see as their number one problem: a two-headed insurgency, fought by the Khmer Rouge-like *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) and the Castroist Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA), both of which flourish in the coca growing areas.

After his inauguration in July 1990, Fujimori, born in Peru of Japanese parents and nicknamed the "Karate Kid," came out swinging. He lambasted the Catholic church for its resistance to birth control, and lashed out at the justice system, calling its seat the "Palace of Injustice," and its judges "jackals." After four years of self-imposed isolation and disastrous economic policies directed by the outgoing President, Alan Garcia, Fujimori initiated a gruelling austerity programme to stabilize the economy and reinsert Peru into the international financial community.

Garcia had left behind a bankrupt treasury and a "narcoeconomy," where coca exports bring in an estimated US \$1 to 2 billion in uncontrolled and untaxed revenues (legitimate exports from Peru in 1989 were \$3.5 billion), resulting in a distorted economy and wreaking havoc with the dollar exchange rate. The fight against drugs and subversion had taken a back seat.

PERU IS THE SUPPLIER FOR SOME SIXTY PERCENT OF THE COCA PLANT leaves<sup>1</sup> which feed the US cocaine habit and increasingly that of Europe. The Upper Huallaga valley in northeastern Peru became notorious in the early 1980s. It produces the finest quality coca plants and became the distribution and business centre for flying out cocaine to Colombia. It also became the anti-drug operations headquarters financed by the US which had funded several years of low-level interdiction and the physical eradication of coca plants in the Upper Huallaga. In 1989, agents of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the anti-drug police they advise set up a new base there and expanded their operations.

The US drug policy in Peru, which even knowledgeable sources admit is in "tatters," has been based in self-delusion and fear: self-delusion that they can cut off the drug supply without getting involved in Peru's main problem, a gruesome subversion, and fear that doing so would in-

volve the US in "another Vietnam" or even El Salvador. However, in refusing to meet the wrenching complexity of Peru's coca growing regions head on, the current US see-no-hear-no-speak-no-counterinsurgency attitude runs against both Peruvian and American interests.

In September 1989, President Bush and the US Congress unilaterally decided that Andean countries should receive military aid for the drug fight – \$35.9 million was set aside for Peru. The programme was designed to entice its armed forces into doing "something" in the drug fight – "isolating" the Huallaga by cutting the flow of coca products, and the chemicals necessary for processing them, by land, river and air.

Although the Peruvian constitution forbids the armed forces to fight drugs – nominally a police matter – naval and air forces can justify anti-drug operations to reestablish Peruvian control over its own riverways and airspace. The US Congress and administration wedded themselves to the politically safe, if twisted, logic that the army could, in the words of US spokespersons in Lima "provide security for anti-drug operations" in the valley, but would only "control" and keep the two armed guerrilla movements there off balance. In fact, by law, the funds allocated could only be used for counternarcotics purposes, and against subversion only where allied with narcotrafficking.

*SENDERISTAS*, HOWEVER, ARE NOT JUST "NARCO-TERRORISTS." THEY ARE dedicated revolutionaries whose primary objective is the political takeover of Peru. The organization has, indeed, received a great funding boost in the last two years through its protection racket with narcos and the "war taxes" they impose on coca growers and anyone else they can intimidate. And increasingly, there are indications *Sendero* would like to take over the distribution system itself.

Typically, they establish their political dominance in "liberated" areas with a "bad-guy, good-guy" approach in which they brutally torture and slaughter anyone who resists them or represents the capitalist system. They often force villagers to turn their children over to the guerrilla army, then offer a "justice" system, to control stealing and adultery. They also appoint ruling "delegates" and "committees" at gunpoint.

Alberto Fujimori, an agronomist and university professor who came from nowhere to win the presidency last year, is no political fool. Like his predecessor, he refused to sign the military aid agreement with the US before the deadline, and so forfeited the \$35.9 million. He was being pushed into accepting American aid which would exacerbate an already militarized counterinsurgency strategy, without providing the carrot for what counterinsurgency experts call "the other war" – the war for hearts and minds. American aid with no coordinated, political, economic, social and psychological effort, would only inflame nationalist anti-American sentiment exploitable by the insurgency, leading Peru into its own disastrous Vietnam or El Salvador.

Fujimori's greatest battle will be to reconstitute his government's moral legitimacy in the eyes of Peru's rural, peasant population – largely Andean and Amazonian peoples who have historically been abandoned

1. For millennia, *Erythroxylum coca* has been an integral part of the lives of Quechua and Aymara speaking communities in Peru and Bolivia. The coca leaf is chewed routinely by millions of people in the Andes and Amazonia to suppress the sensations of hunger, thirst and fatigue. The leaf also fulfils medicinal and religious purposes.



by the white coastal government. Reacting to US charges that Peru was soft on drugs for not accepting the aid, Fujimori replied unequivocally,

For us, narcotrafficking is a cancer and we want to eradicate it. But we want the law enforcement aspect to be approached in a global context, taking into consideration the concrete possibilities of the farmers in the present coca zones and the potential to develop economic alternatives.

FUJIMORI TOOK THE INITIATIVE, WEAVING TOGETHER THREE STRAINS OF experience into the "Fujimori doctrine." He was closely advised by Hernando de Soto, the flamboyant director of the private Institute for Liberty and Democracy, and author of a best-seller, *The Other Path*, an analysis of Peru's vast informal, grey-market economy.

First, the coca farmers would no longer be regarded as criminals for growing coca, they would have legal title to the land – an idea well-received in Washington. The second element recognizes the need to get better prices for producers of legal crops by clearing away bureaucratic hassles, as well as the state and oligarchical monopolies on export markets.

This emphasis on the *campesinos* right to participate in crop-substitution came from Iban De Rementaria, an idiosyncratic, shaggy, grey-haired Frenchman, who worked with the United Nations crop-substitution programme in the Upper Huallaga valley. The UN programme encourages *campesinos* to form grassroots organizations based on community production committees. Such organization makes agricultural technical help easier to administer and, more importantly, gives uneducated farmers in a virtually lawless area the strength to defend themselves from unscrupulous leaders of the cooperatives which market their crops.

The third and most influential part of Fujimori's programme comes from General Alberto Arciniega, a full-speed ahead army officer, appointed by Alan Garcia in March 1989 to clean up subversion in the valley. Arciniega settled his headquarters in what he labelled "the worst of the worst," the town of Uchiza, a major hub of subversion and narco-distribution, where he lived in a bare room in a small army post. "If it can be done in Uchiza, it can be done anywhere," he said.

His was a classic counterinsurgency policy. He hit the guerrillas hard, based on intelligence provided by a populace won over to his side in part because he stopped the eradication of coca plants. But he also preached that the *campesinos* had to look to their future. "Coke is a fad," he said; they needed to switch over. He persuaded the UN to do a soil study with some 5,000 farmers and convinced them that cash crops and agro-industry would offset the gradual loss of coca. He also made it clear that when there was an economically viable alternative to coca, the coca fields of those those who did not switch would be subject to eradication.

THE BRAIN TRUST FOR FUJIMORI'S DOCTRINE IS THE INDEPENDENT AUTONOMOUS Commission for Alternative Development charged with designing a drug policy from which to negotiate with the US and other countries interested in contributing to the drug fight. Creating the right mix of economic development, anti-drug and anti-subversion elements in the integrated policy will be a major challenge if Peru hopes for US funding. While the Bush administration has come around to accepting the need for development to offset the coca, most US officials are still dubious about working with the *cocaleros* (coca farmers) on crop substitution for fear of being tainted by association with "criminals" who only want to get the DEA off their backs.

The *cocaleros*, for their part, say they are not against interdiction, but they resent the anti-drug police who they assert steal dollars in house-to-

house searches. The head of the Uchiza *cocaleros*, twenty-three year old Cesar Valdizan, says, "We aren't against [the police] fighting narco-trafficking, but let them fight the *firmas* [the narco-trafficking organizations] ... not the people who produce the coca." An agronomist who has worked with the *cocaleros* agrees; there must be a stick along with the carrot. "You have to have serious, selective, effective law enforcement [against the narcos] parallel to any alternative development."

The *campesinos* also say they are willing to switch crops because they are fed up with the violence. The majority of the long-time residents and the new "coca-rush" immigrants from all over Peru, endure pressures from a bewildering mix of "interests." Where there is coca (and narcos), there are guerrillas – and common thieves posing as guerrillas, as police and as soldiers – US-funded anti-drug police, US-trained anti-subversion police, miserably-paid and corrupt military officers, and perhaps those most abhorred by *campesinos*, national investigative police who routinely rob them, they say.

Corruption may well be the Achilles heel of any drug strategy in Peru. An anti-corruption campaign is set to begin in March to unblock bureaucratic bottlenecks which frustrate people into offering bribes to get through the system. The question is whether the campaign will be able to reach into the security forces. At least one US official has issued a veiled threat to a military officer that the defoliators will

have their way in Peru if nothing is done about the army letting Colombian planes land at municipal airports and protecting them at clandestine airstrips in the valley. At the time of this writing, US participation in a Support Group<sup>2</sup> to help Peru pay its IMF obligations, was in effect being held hostage to Peru's acting concretely to control the drug traffic at legal airfields.

In the emergency zones awash with coca dollars, the meagre salaries of the police and military literally force them to steal in order to live. The going "bail" for a captured guerrilla in the Huallaga is \$1,000, half goes to the head of the police and the rest to the prosecuting attorney. A top army general makes only \$230 a month, and commanders receive the price of a beer in town to feed one soldier for a day. A few honest military men are deeply concerned about the extent of corruption, "If we do something about corruption, I think we could wage a very effective war against *Sendero*," said one.

FUJIMORI HAS SHOWN HIS GOOD INTENTIONS TO REINSERT PERU INTO THE international financial system, and to insist on a realistic, integrated fight against terrorism and drugs – one that will be expensive by any measure. In July 1989, the Group of Seven Declaration of Paris urged greater emphasis on bilateral and United Nations programmes for the conversion of illicit cultivation in the producing countries. In February 1990, at the meeting of Andean presidents in Cartagena, Colombia, George Bush agreed that developing economic alternatives to coca was important. But virtually nothing has been done to help coca farmers.

The international community will have to summon its own political will to look honestly at the complexity of Peru's symbiotic scourges of coca, subversion and corruption and decide whether it is worth the risk to go beyond symbolism and lend a significant hand – in time.

2. According to the Peruvian embassy in Ottawa, industrialized countries are coming together to raise the \$800 million bridge loan necessary for Peru's eligibility for further IMF loans. The US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Spain are said to be part of this incipient group, the UK having withdrawn.



Shiraz Haniffa

IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR — ALMOST trite to say — that the post-War order of almost a half century has crumbled. Less clear is the shape of the new order replacing it. Much less clear again is the thinking that will underlie that order.

What have been the orthodox post-WWII Canadian perceptions? The Americans and Russians are strong. Japan and Europe (and Canada) are weak. The United States is our friend; the USSR is our enemy. Military force is the currency of world politics. Soviet expansionism and nuclear war are the major threats, thus NATO is essential. Europe and Germany are and will be, for a long time, divided. The Third World is poor and weak. And the UN is needed but ineffective.

Thus, the essential goals of Canadian foreign policy, it could be said, were to keep the Yanks friendly, the Russkies away, the defences up (as much as possible), the troops in NATO, the UN operating, the peacekeepers standing by, and the foreign aid flowing (but not too freely). With these basic policies the Canadian public, for the most part, concurred. The question is whether they still do. Or is there any evidence of a new thinking about the new order?

THE CONVENTIONAL SCHOLARLY (AND OFFICIALS') WISDOM IS THAT MOST people pay little attention to international relations, have relatively little understanding of these events, and could care less. One possibility, then, is that the Canadian public has been largely tuned out and their attitudes are currently not much different than they have been for decades, at least not yet.

Another possibility is that conceptual order has been replaced by disorder. Even in less extraordinary times, most people find the buzz of events in world affairs a trifle confusing. But the recent blitzkrieg of peaceful change has not only out-paced our policies but over-run our psychological defences. The Berlin Wall is opened overnight. Soviet policy seems to shift daily. Iraq, a far-away country smaller than Canada, suddenly becomes the focus of concern in the world. The thinking of the mass public, perhaps no less than that of foreign policy elites, is thus perhaps in understandable disarray.

The annual public opinion surveys of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, now dating back four years, provide a rich basis for evaluating whether consistency prevails, confusion now reigns, or a new coherence is emerging.

Polls from the early 1970s show a solid majority of Canadians regarded the USA as the strongest country militarily and economically. About the same number still regard the United States as the strongest military power, but only about half as many choose the USA as the strongest country in economic terms today.

In contrast, while only one in six (15%) pointed then to Japan as the strongest economic power, a majority (50%) now regard it as such. The

## CIIPS PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

1990

# OLD THINKING NEW THINKING

*Canadian opinions in the  
dangerous, topsy-turvy world of the  
post, post-War period.*

BY DON MUNTON

European Community comes in a distant third at 11%. Significantly, most Canadians now also regard economic factors as more important than military ones in the exercise of national power.

CIIPS SURVEYS SINCE 1987 HAVE tracked warming perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Those with considerable or great confidence in the ability of the US to deal wisely with world problems increased from 37% in 1987 to 47% in 1988 to 67% in 1989, and now amount to fully 75% of Canadians. Canadians' confidence in their southern neighbour was thus higher in fall 1990 than at any time since the early 1970s, but may well have suffered because of American pursuit of the Gulf War.

Those with considerable or great confidence in the USSR rose steadily from only 28% in 1987 to 42% in 1988 to 52% in 1989 and to 62% in 1990. This is almost certainly a record high level of

confidence in Soviet policies internationally, but is not entirely unprecedented. While Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms have undoubtedly done much to improve Western publics' perceptions of the Soviet Union in recent years, the USSR image among Canadians has only in the past eighteen months surpassed that held in the early 1970s, around the time of the first US-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

No major country, including the USSR, is regarded by more than one in four Canadians as a military threat. While five years ago 40% agreed that the USSR was "an expansionist power that threatens Western security," only 5% do so now.

On the other hand, two countries stand out in Canadians' minds as serious economic threats. One is the United States, named by no less than two out of three (68%). The other is Japan, named by almost as many (65%). A unified Germany was named as an economic threat by fewer than these two but by more than any other source (43%). Perceiving the US as an economic threat to Canada may seem inconsistent with the high levels of confidence in the US noted earlier, but is not. Canadians, or at least the roughly half of them who are neither consistently negative nor consistently positive in their perceptions of the US, apparently have confidence in American ability to deal with world problems, but, at the same time, apprehensions about *bilateral* Canada-US economic relations.

CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR WAR IS DOWN. In 1987, prior to the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty and the warming in US-USSR relations, one in two Canadians (55%) perceived much danger of nuclear war. Only one in three (33%) do so now.

On the other hand, perceptions of the danger of "world war" are relatively high; indeed, they seem as high as those of the early 1960s. Four in ten respondents (41%) to the present survey believed, in the month following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that there was much danger of a world war. (This concern undoubtedly increased in the subsequent months of speculation about a direct military conflict with Iraq. Canadian attitudes to specific wars in which Canada has participated, including the Gulf War, are explored on page 16.)

*The 1990 public opinion survey, as those from 1987 through 1989, was designed by Don Munton and Institute staff, funded by the Institute, and carried out in September and October 1990. 1,275 people responded to the questionnaire, an overall response rate of 62%. The margin of error with samples of this size is approximately  $\pm 3\%$ , 95 times out of 100.*



While the possibility of a war remains real for many, the anticipated cause of such a war has shifted radically in the last few decades. Today, the vast majority of Canadians (69%) think a world war would be caused by countries other than the USSR or US; less than one in four (23%) thought so in a 1961 Gallup poll. Only 2% now believe a war would come about as a result of Soviet action. Thirty years ago, the figure was 41%. By contrast, more, although only about one in seven (13%), currently expect the US to be the cause.

When asked last year, the month before the Berlin Wall was opened, whether the Cold War was over, few Canadians (6%) were so optimistic. After a dramatic year of events in Eastern Europe, significantly more are optimistic (21%) but most remain cautious. Fully two-thirds (66%) say that the Cold War is lessening but not over.

CANADIANS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUGGESTED THAT THE greatest military threat to world peace is either the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller countries or a regional conflict, most likely in the Middle East. Thus, many Canadians would not have been surprised either by the outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf or by speculation that such conflicts might involve nuclear or non-conventional weaponry.

Canadians are changing their conceptions of security threats. As first demonstrated in last year's CIIPS poll, these threats now feature environmental and economic problems as well as more traditional military threats.

When asked to rank five major environmental issues (global warming, toxic waste, acid rain, ozone depletion, and water pollution) in terms of seriousness as international problems, the CIIPS respondents did not come up with a clear top priority. Two issues, however, did stand out. Almost one in three (30%) pointed to depletion of the ozone layer as the most serious. In second spot was the pollution of lakes and oceans (24%). Further back were toxic waste (16%), global warming (15%), and acid rain (12%).

The Canadian public has clearly begun to re-think their country's NATO commitment. For the first time in recent decades, support for NATO has plunged dramatically. On the October 1989 CIIPS survey more than one in two (52%) ranked Canada's continued membership in NATO as very important. Only one in every three (32%) now give it a very important rating. In short, there has been a 20-point drop in the perceived salience of the alliance.

While this drop might be explained as a response to the decline of the old Soviet threat, the effort to reform the Soviet Union along liberal democratic and free market lines, the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, and the expectation of the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the extent of the drop is all the more striking in that it precedes any notable public discussion of this issue.

Declining support for NATO force commitments appear to be part of a general decline in the importance afforded the alliance. A slim majority of Canadians (50%) still supports keeping Canadian forces in Europe at their present levels. But the number who would reduce the size of those forces has roughly doubled since last year. In the 1989 CIIPS poll, only 10% favoured a reduction (of unspecified size). The proportion is now 21%. In 1989, 14% favoured outright withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe. Now 20% favour it.

The post Cold War shift from East-West matters and military "solutions" has notably not prompted greater interest in solving North-South problems. The importance for Canada of providing aid to developing countries has slumped; while 39% rated it very important on a 1984 External Affairs survey, only 22% do so now. A similar decline has occurred on the priority for "helping reduce hunger and poverty around the world"; those giving a high ranking have dropped from 62% (on a 1985 Decima survey) to 41% now.

In contrast to the declining importance of aid, Canadians continue today to afford roughly the same priority as in 1984 to such commitments as participating in the United Nations and in UN peacekeeping efforts, perhaps a reflection of concerns about the Gulf conflict. Also, in contrast, almost nine in ten (87%) rate protecting Canada's oceans and offshore resources as very important.


Canadians' opinion has not been inert. Nor is it incoherent and confused. The incredible international events of the late 1980s have clearly and already had a significant impact on the thinking of the Canadian public.

CANADIANS APPEAR TO PERCEIVE A WORLD IN which the superpowers are becoming less dominant and more cooperative; those with burgeoning economies like Japan are assuming greater importance (and becoming economic threats); military force is playing less of a role; NATO's future is uncertain; the Cold War, if not over is at least on the wane; the dominant conflicts are North-South rather than East-West; and instability and militarism in the Third World are emerging as serious international, not just regional, problems, as are such global ecological issues as depletion of the ozone layer. In short, Canadians see themselves entering a more complex, multipolar and interdependent world.


Is there an overall pattern to the policies Canadians want in response to this new order? At the risk of being both simplistic and speculative, the thrust seems to be toward withdrawal rather than greater involvement. A growing mood among Canadians may be to turn away not only from the problems of Europe, which have been solved, but also from those of the Third World, which seem insoluble, and to harbour our own resources and address our own problems.

### CANADA AND THE US

*Considerable or great confidence in the ability of the US to deal wisely with world problems:*



*Regard the US as a serious threat in the next ten years:*



### CANADA AND THE WORLD

*Very important for Canada to:*



**C**ANADA'S WARS HAVE NEVER been wildly popular affairs. Duty has called, but more clearly in some cases, such as World War II, than in others. In the present Gulf War the call is less clear than perhaps ever before.

The British Empire war in South Africa against the Boers, from 1899 to 1902, divided francophones and anglophones deeply and bitterly. Historian C.P. Stacey describes English Canadians as "for practical political purposes ... a bloc in favour of the war." But there were, he notes, significant pockets of resistance outside Quebec at a time when imperial sentiment was perhaps at its peak.

As the 1914 European crisis deepened, the cabinet of Conservative prime minister Robert Borden assured London that "if unhappily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve." When war came, the prime minister recorded in his diary that there was "great excitement in all Canadian cities. Crowds on streets cheered me." There was surely some enthusiasm and excitement, but there was not unity of resolve.

Enlistment figures show the war was much more popular in English Ontario and in British Columbia than in relatively non-British Saskatchewan or in francophone Quebec. Veterans and others now recall more a sense of duty than of enthusiasm. Their country and the Empire needed them; thus many went. But from Quebec and many rural areas of Canada, many did not. Conscription, protests and a crisis election followed.

There was perhaps less debate about fighting Hitler. The most astonishing fact about the public opinion studies which were born during World War II is that none apparently asked Canadians whether they supported it. Whether such questions were not permitted or were deemed inappropriate, one did not talk about them. The Canadian Gallup organization, established in 1941, polled throughout the rest of the war but never once reported on support for it.

THE PUBLIC WAS ASKED, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER they thought Canada was "doing all it could to help win the war" (most did, throughout), whether they personally "could be of more use to [the] country" if they did some other work (more did than not), and if Germany's civilian population should be bombed (most approved). Perhaps the closest to a measure of support is found in a 1942 poll when 86 percent of Canadians rejected the idea of negotiating a status quo peace with Hitler.

The pattern suggests consistent and strong support, but not unanimity, especially from Quebec. The fears were clear although some-



# FROM PAARDEBERG TO THE PERSIAN GULF

## *Canadians' Opinions About Canada's Wars*

times exaggerated. In July 1945, three months after Hitler had in fact committed suicide, Gallup asked if Canadians thought he was dead; almost 60 percent did not.

The closest historical parallel for Canada's Gulf War involvement is undoubtedly the Korean War. An act of aggression was followed by an American-led response with political support marshalled through the United Nations. When Canadians were polled just after the war broke out in June 1950, only 13 percent opposed US action. On the other hand, 23 percent opposed Canada sending equipment, and an additional 16 percent disapproved of sending troops – a total of almost 40 percent at a time when few did not believe in stopping communism.

A year or so after the Korean War had stalemated around the old boundary line, 40 percent agreed it had become an "utterly useless war" and about 30 percent thought Canada's involvement had been a mistake. One in every two said it had not been. Presumably some thought worthwhile the original objective of resisting aggression against South Korea but looked on the current fighting as pointless.

The current war against Iraq has profoundly divided Canadians. Not only are opponents more numerous, they are also more vociferous. Most Canadians support sending forces to the Persian Gulf, according to an Angus Reid poll series. The level of support has varied, however, from 69 percent in September, soon after Ottawa's decision, down to 60 percent in December as the UN-imposed 15 January deadline approached, and then up to 75 percent after the US-led coalition air attacks began. Some observers credited this post-outbreak rise to skilful war news management by a special government task force; it is more likely a reflection of a modest-sized and natural

"rally-round-the-troops-and-flag" feeling.

Two points bear emphasis. First, support for Canadian involvement in the Gulf is, in fact, higher than these figures imply. When the Reid poll differentiated between Canadian forces actively fighting against Iraq, taking a solely defensive role, and being withdrawn, less than 10 percent opted for withdrawal. Clearly, half or more of those opposed to the August decision to send Canadian forces do not now want that decision reversed.

Second, many Canadians are clearly saying that UN sanctions enforcement was one thing, going to war against Iraq is another. Polls consistently show only about a third support Canadian troops going into battle. As the government was cautiously, but steadily

scaling up the Canadian forces' fighting role through December and January, there was no evident increase in public support for going into combat. In contrast, American public support for carrying the fighting to Saddam Hussein has jumped in recent months.

At the same time, most Canadians (73%) in January supported President Bush's decision to use force to get Iraq out of Kuwait. This level of approval is, of course, partly support for a war, but is also a reflection of unusually high Canadian trust in the president (shown in CIIPS polls) and a traditional deference toward our neighbour and ally.


WARS DO NOT GAIN IN POPULARITY WITH TIME. If the ground struggle in the desert becomes a stalemated carnage, the present level of support for the fighting, by American or Canadian forces, is almost certain to decline. Fighting on and on without prospect would only confirm the strong belief of most Canadians (reflected in CIIPS polls) that military force rarely achieves political solutions.

Duty still calls, but is this Canada's war? Just as opponents of earlier conflicts saw them as British wars, opponents already see the Gulf War not as Canada's or the UN's, but as America's. And the more American generals go on TV and the less one hears of the United Nations, the more this will become, in the minds of more Canadians, America's war. The Gulf conflict might have been not only a test case of the UN, but also the first test case of Canadians' new sense of a duty, of a willingness to support true collective security and forge a new world order. Instead, and unfortunately, it is becoming yet another test of familiar sense of duty, of Canadians' willingness to support old friends, right or wrong.

– DON MUNTON



## DEFENCE NOTES



### Satellite Reconnaissance and the Gulf War

Over the past twenty-five years both the Soviet Union and the United States have come to rely increasingly on satellite reconnaissance for strategic warning and assessment of the size and character of a ballistic missile attack. Other satellites play a key part in communications and navigation. Both countries have also used satellites to monitor military deployments and verify compliance with arms control agreements. In the Gulf, a variety of advanced US satellite systems are being used to assess damage, provide intelligence on Iraqi military activities, and give warning of attacks by mobile Iraqi *Scud* missiles.

Initial detection of *Scud* launches has been the responsibility of the United States Air Force Space Command, operating at least two satellites equipped with infra-red telescopes. These satellites have been manoeuvred into geosynchronous orbits to permit maximum viewing of *Scud* firing points. Some sources indicate that the rotation of the telescope permits viewing of Iraq every twelve seconds, a time lag which would be decreased if more than one satellite is involved. Although the infra-red telescopes were designed to detect and image the much larger heat plumes from Soviet ICBMs, they appear to be able to both detect and provide approximate tracking data for the relatively short-range *Scuds*.

At the outset of the Gulf War, warning data from the satellites was transmitted both to a ground station at Alice Springs, Australia, and Space Command Headquarters at Colorado Springs. After analysis at both locations, trajectory and impact data was then sent

via satellite communications to *Patriot* batteries in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Out of a total *Scud* flight time of six to seven minutes, the determination of the impact area took 120 seconds, and the alerting of the defences another two to three minutes, thus providing at first around ninety seconds notice to the defending *Patriot* batteries. Subsequently, Air Force Space Command has been able to directly link the detection satellites with the *Patriot* batteries, thus extending the warning time to between four and five minutes.

The United States was reported also to have repositioned advanced reconnaissance satellites to view Iraq and Kuwait. One of these, the *Lacrosse*, produces imagery using radar rather than visible light photography, and is capable of all-weather imagery. Several "Keyhole" satellites are also in place, which are able, in theory, to identify objects about six inches in size.

Together with navigation and communications satellites, these space-based systems give the US and its coalition partners a decisive intelligence and battlefield advantage. Aerial reconnaissance and targeting have also involved the most advanced US systems. At the end of January, two advanced target selection aircraft were also en route to the Gulf. The E-8A Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) is designed to detect low-flying helicopters, surface ships and tanks at a range of 200 kilometres and to direct attacks by friendly aircraft.

The enormous advantage conferred by satellite systems, however, has raised broader questions about access to satellite intelligence. Canada is in a special situation because our participation in the NORAD combat operations centre at Colorado Springs provides access to some but not all data from US military satellites. Others are not so fortunate.

The Europeans, for example, are overwhelmingly dependent on the US for satellite intelligence, but have been reluctant to fund the deployment of an independent system. Recent proposals for a satellite system owned and operated by a consortium of news and media outlets may also be reinforced by the decision of the French commercial SPOT satellite system to withhold photographs of Kuwait and Iraq. In addition, the increasing reliance on satellite systems indicates the military value of anti-satellite weapon systems, which are not currently constrained by arms control agreements and are relatively easily deployed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

### Patriots and Star Wars

Close on the heels of the *Patriot* successes in the Gulf War, on 29 January, the US Department of Defense conducted a successful test of an anti-ballistic missile. The interceptor – the Exo-atmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor System (ERIS) – was fired from Kwajalein Island in the Pacific and intercepted a *Minuteman* dummy warhead about 160 kilometres into space. Although there is very little connection between the task of the *Patriot* and that of ERIS – an intercontinental ballistic missile flies about five times faster than the *Scud*, and the reentry vehicle presents a much smaller target – it seemed clear that together the twin successes would provide a boost to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). This appeared to be confirmed in President Bush's State of the Union message on 31 January, when he called for renewed emphasis on SDI research aimed at protection against small-scale ballistic missile attacks "no matter what the source." As opposed to the massive strategic exchange which a full-blown ballistic missile defence would be required to defeat, a number of prominent spokesmen in the US

have proposed that SDI concentrate on a limited protection against accidental launch or "third party" attack. About twenty nations are expected to have ballistic missiles by the turn of the century.

### Renewal of NORAD

With attention focussed on the Gulf War, the impending renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement has received relatively little attention in Canada and none in the United States. However, there may well be a new development to add to the agenda. In late January, US media reports, subsequently confirmed by officials from Canada's Department of External Affairs, indicated that the Pentagon is considering a drastic restructuring of its major military commands. One consequence of this would be the disbandment of the current Unified Space Command, of which NORAD is one element, and its replacement by a "strategic force command." This would combine the surveillance assets and interceptor defences, to which Canada contributes under the NORAD agreement, and the offensive forces now under Strategic Air Command (SAC). If the restructuring proceeds, the place of Canada in such a revised command system would be the subject of considerable discussion and debate.

### Old But Useful Ships

Despite their age, the three Canadian naval vessels in the Gulf made their mark before hostilities began. More than twenty-five percent of all naval interceptions to enforce sanctions were carried out by the Canadian vessels. Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Canadian commander of the Naval Task Group has been responsible for the coordination of allied combat logistic supply ships, and controls the allied destroyers and frigates designed to protect the supply ships. □

– DAVID COX

## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### The Gulf War

The outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf on 17 January was preceded by intense diplomatic activity both inside and outside the UN. On 27 October, Soviet ambassador Yuli Vorontsov told the Security Council that a special envoy from his country was in Iraq and that there were great hopes for the success of his mission and a peaceful solution to the crisis.

During the same meeting, the Kuwaiti representative told the Council of Iraqi human rights violations in his country. He demanded that those involved be tried in the future as "war criminals." The Council took no action aimed at laying the groundwork for a tribunal, but on 29 October the Security Council adopted resolution 674 which stated that Iraq is liable for loss, damage or injury caused to foreign nationals and corporations in Kuwait. Resolution 674 invited member states to collect information regarding claims against Iraq with a view to establishing future arrangements for restitution or financial compensation.

On 27 November, Kuwait presented testimony of atrocities it said were committed by Iraqi troops against its citizens. The following day, the Council unanimously condemned Iraq's attempt to alter Kuwait's demographic composition by destroying its civil records. Britain charged Iraq with attempting to destroy the national identity of Kuwait. By adopting Resolution 677, the Council also voted to authorize the Secretary-General to take custody of a computerised copy of certified population records that had been

smuggled out by the Kuwaiti resistance.

On 29 November, the Council adopted the most momentous resolution of the crisis. Resolution 678 authorized the use of "all necessary means" in order to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Twelve countries voted in favour, Cuba and Yemen were against, and China abstained.

Sponsored by Canada, France, Rumania, the USSR, the UK and the US, the document gave Iraq "one final opportunity" – until 15 January – to comply. Further underlining the historic nature of the resolution was the presence of the foreign ministers of thirteen out of the fifteen nations represented on the Council, including External Affairs Minister Joe Clark.

During his speech to the Council, Clark touched on an issue that had dogged the Persian Gulf crisis – the need to find a solution to the Middle East problem. The issues had become intertwined after Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein directly linked a withdrawal from Kuwait to an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. The linkage was strongly opposed by the US which argued that to accede would merely reward Iraq's aggression.

Clark noted that one of the consequences of the Gulf crisis could be a "window of opportunity" to solve other regional problems:

If we can sustain our collective determination, then a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, which Canada views as necessary and urgent, may be within our grasp. This is a matter than can only be addressed, however, separately from the current crisis.

However, both Hussein and events in the region kept bringing the two issues together. On 7 November, the Council met to consider recommendation by the

Secretary General that a meeting of the high contracting parties to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War be held to discuss what additional measures could be taken as a result of Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories. Israel opposed such a meeting.

On 9 November, the Observer for Palestine played a videotape of the violence at the Temple Mount (al Haraam alShareef) on 3 October, and said it proved contrary to claims by Israel that Israeli lives were threatened by Palestinians – the opposite had been true. He argued that the action by Israeli authorities was premeditated and aimed at causing a large number of Palestinian casualties.

On 16 November, non-aligned members of the Council introduced a draft resolution that proposed convening an international Middle East peace conference. The draft sparked intense and protracted negotiations. Throughout, the US was at pains to avoid using its veto and thereby alienate Arab members of the international coalition arrayed against Iraq. On the other hand, it did not want to anger Israel by seeming to endorse an international conference, a move it also feared would be seen as caving in to Iraqi demands.

The Council voted on 8, 10 and 12 December to defer a vote on a draft resolution calling for an international conference. Finally, on 20 December, after a series of exhausting rounds of negotiations, the Council unanimously adopted a diluted version of the original draft calling on the Secretary General "to develop further the idea" of convening a meeting of the signatories of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Resolution 681, made no mention of an international conference. However, in a symbolic gesture, the US agreed to have the president of the Council read a non-binding statement that such a conference, "at an appropriate

time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict."

### Final Canadian Initiative

The Cyprus issue, dominated Canada's final efforts on the Council. On 14 December, the Council voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for six months – Canada abstained. The vote was a reflection of Canadian frustration that UNFICYP's expenses were paid by voluntary rather than assessed contributions. In a statement to the Council, Canada said that this had resulted in a number of countries failing to volunteer money, and troop-contributing countries like Canada were left to carry an inordinately heavy share of the costs. Since 1964, the cost of UNFICYP had totalled an estimated \$ 2 billion and that 149 men and women had died in the service of the UN in Cyprus.

A draft resolution calling for assessed contributions was presented to the Council but both France and the USSR were said to oppose the draft. On 21 December, the Council unanimously adopted a watered-down resolution in which it agreed to "examine" the costs and problems of financing and report back by 1 June on alternative arrangements which "could" include the use of assessed contributions.

In a final speech to the Council, Yves Fortier expressed regret that some permanent members (the Soviet Union, France) had threatened to veto the original draft resolution and that the final resolution did not solve the problem.

December 31 saw the end of Canada's two-year term on the Security Council.

– TREVOR ROWE



## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### The Gulf War

The prospect of war in the Persian Gulf absorbed much of Parliament's attention to peace and security issues during the autumn. On 25 October, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark told the House of Commons, that while the government preferred offensive action against Iraq to have UN Security Council endorsement, lack of unanimity in the Council would not restrain Canada from joining in a show of force. Opposition parties immediately labelled Clark's words inflammatory. NDP Leader Audrey McLaughlin suggested that the Minister's statements could "have serious consequences for the safety of Canadians being kept hostage in Iraq." The same week an additional 250 Canadian Forces communications and command specialists were dispatched to the Gulf region to support the UN-sponsored embargo against Iraq, raising the total number of Canadian personnel there to 1,700.

On 19 November, an informal delegation of MPs visited Baghdad in a personal appeal for release of the Canadians. Initially, the government opposed the idea, but ultimately a Conservative Member, Robert Corbett, was permitted to join Liberal Lloyd Axworthy and Svend Robinson of the NDP in the unofficial mission. Their task proved frustrating and often tedious, but it did result in the announcement on 28 November, that five of the forty-five hostages would be released.

Joe Clark began an official visit to the region on 23 November. He stopped in Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel (where meetings were arranged with both government and Palestinian leaders). The Min-

ister reported briefly on his trip to the House on 28 November as part of a more comprehensive speech moving a resolution in support of UN efforts to ensure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In the lengthy debate which ensued, both the Liberals and NDP offered amendments opposing the use of force against Iraq, at least (in the Liberals' case), until further consultation with Parliament. The emergency debate came on the eve of an emergency UN Security Council session on 29 November (where Joe Clark represented Canada), which authorized (Resolution 678) the use of whatever means were necessary to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

Resolution 678 was subsequently endorsed by the House of Commons the same day (29 November) by a vote of 111-82, over strong objections from both opposition parties. One of their principal concerns was that Parliament should be consulted about any decision by the government to participate in offensive military action.

On 10 December, Mr. Clark appeared before the House External Affairs Committee. He indicated that the government would carry out "the speediest possible consultation with Parliament with regard to any development." The Minister also allowed that "there are a series of issues that have been made more urgent by Iraq's act of war against Kuwait." These included the type of regimes in many of the states of the Arab world, extraordinary differences in income between the poorest and the richest people in the region, competition among different rulers for leadership of the Arab world, and the question of the Palestinians. But he rejected any precise linkage between the crisis and the Palestinian question.

Parliament adjourned on 19 December until 18 February. As the deadline for Iraqi compliance with UN Resolution 678 drew closer, the Cabinet's special new "war committee" decided to reconvene

Parliament for an emergency session on 15 January. The Prime Minister immediately moved, "That this House reaffirms its support of the United Nations in ending the aggression by Iraq against Kuwait."

The lengthy debate which followed featured the first appearance in the Commons since his December by-election win of Liberal Leader Jean Chretien. On 15 January, he proposed an amendment by adding to the final phrase of the government's resolution: "through the continued use of economic sanctions, such support to exclude offensive military action by Canada at this time." More significantly, Mr. Chretien declared that the minute war broke out, Canadian troops should be called back – that they were there only to enforce the embargo. The following day, his predecessor as Leader, John Turner, argued strongly in the House that Parliament had a duty to support the UN resolutions and, therefore, the resolution the government had proposed.

Immediately before Mr. Turner spoke on 16 January, both the Liberal and NDP amendments to the government's original resolution were defeated. The NDP had proposed a sub-amendment to that of the Liberals which deleted all the words after the word "sanctions" and substituted: "such support to exclude the involvement by Canada in a military attack on Iraq or Iraqi forces in Kuwait." The NDP sub-amendment was defeated 210-39, with the Liberals voting against it, while the Liberal amendment was defeated 134-116.

The debate reflected an intense and somber consideration of the issues. It continued through the actual outbreak of hostilities on 16 January at 7 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. In the evening session, following remarks by the Prime Minister acknowledging the latest development, Mr. Chretien announced that "all Canadians have the obligation to stand united

under the circumstances" in backing up the Canadian troops. He was followed by NDP Leader Audrey McLaughlin who also indicated support for the troops, but insisted that they should only be used in humanitarian actions and not in combat.

In a 22 January vote on the government's main motion, almost all of the Liberal MPs were in support, while almost all of those opposed were NDP members. They were joined by four Liberals, three Bloc Quebecois MPs and an independent – the motion passed by a vote of 217-47.

### Committee Work

The House Defence Committee issued a report on 8 November entitled, *Maritime Sovereignty*, which recommended the government purchase conventionally-powered submarines and install sonar sensors in Arctic waters to help guard Canada's northern sovereignty. The NDP's defence critic, John Brewin, questioned the need for submarines, suggesting instead that Canada lease submarines from another country, pending a full review of future defence needs.

The House of Commons External Affairs Committee struck a Sub-Committee in the fall, under the chairmanship of Walter McLean, to consider the question of the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement between Canada and the United States, which expires in May 1991. Irreconcilable differences prevented both the Sub-Committee and the full Committee from concluding a report about the period and terms of a renewal. The only recommendation made to the government concerned the need for a comprehensive public review of Canada-US defence cooperation in the first two years of any renewal period.

— GREGORY WIRICK

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Global Weapons Summit

In separate speeches on 8 February dealing with the post-war period in the Gulf, Prime Minister Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Clark called for the UN to convene a "Global Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction." Its purpose would be "to mobilize political will and to re-energize international efforts" already under way to prevent the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons, and delivery systems. The summit would seek to produce a "comprehensive programme of action" under which "individual proliferation concerns [would] be addressed in those multilateral forums set up to deal with them."

Among specific measures called for were: an early commitment by NPT signatories to its indefinite extension in 1995; formal reaffirmation by the nuclear weapon states of their commitment to pursue further nuclear disarmament measures; expanded participation in the current Missile Technology Control Regime, to include the USSR and others, while expanding its guidelines to include missiles with smaller payloads and longer ranges; enhancing the provisions of the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention; a commitment by members of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude negotiations on a global Chemical Weapons Convention by the end of 1992; expanding the membership of the "Australia Group" of states controlling exports of chemicals that can be used to produce chemical weapons; action on an information exchange system to promote the "transparency" of conventional arms transfers; and a commitment by the CFE signatories "to ensure that arms affected

by the accord are not exported to regions of tension."

### Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

As expected, a CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November. Negotiated in only twenty months, it has been described by a senior US official as "the most ambitious arms control treaty ever concluded." Under its terms, within forty months of entry into force (ten days after ratification by all twenty-two parties), the total number of tanks on each side (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) is to be limited to 20,000; armoured combat vehicles to 30,000; artillery, 20,000; combat aircraft, 6,800; and attack helicopters, 2,000. Overall, more than 50,000 weapons in these categories will have to be destroyed or converted to "non-military" purposes, most of these by the USSR and its former allies.

Critics have charged the USSR with violating the spirit of the Treaty by shifting tens of thousands of such weapons east of the Ural mountains, outside the geographic zone covered by the agreement, just prior to its signature. Both Soviet and Western officials explained that much of the transfer was accounted for by previously announced unilateral and bilaterally negotiated Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. According to the chief US negotiator, then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze gave assurances that the bulk of the equipment withdrawn prior to the Treaty's signature would be destroyed or converted. However, new disputes arose almost immediately after the official data exchange on 18 November. The US and its NATO allies have charged the USSR with under-reporting its equipment holdings as of that date by 20,000 or more; identifying less than half the number of military sites to be inspected than had been indicated earlier (which affects the number of inspections

it would be obliged to accept); transferring undeclared weapons outside the region after the Treaty was signed, contrary to its terms; and seeking to exempt three regular Army divisions by designating them as units of naval infantry, which the West insists are still covered by the Treaty.

American officials have made it clear that they will not submit the Treaty for Senate ratification until the disputes over data and interpretation have been settled. The parties have a period of ninety days after signature in which to "readjust" the data they have submitted.

The CFE Treaty provides for follow-on negotiations leading up to the March 1992 Helsinki Review Conference of the CSCE. Known as CFE-1A, these negotiations, intended to focus on personnel limitations and the details of an aerial inspection regime, began in Vienna on 29 November.

A new agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe was also signed at the Paris Summit in November. Building on the notification measures and information exchanges required by the 1986 Stockholm Accords, the new agreement adds provisions for annual information exchanges on troop strength and major weapon systems down to the level of brigade or regiment, the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems, and military budgets; and a "consultation and cooperation" mechanism for "unusual military activities." Despite the long-standing insistence of the Eastern and non-aligned states, it did not include CSBMs for independent naval and air exercises.

### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Senior US and Soviet officials continued to report progress on outstanding START issues in the lead-up to a "ministerial meeting" between Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State Baker in Houston on 10 and 11 December. After the

meeting, it was reported that only technical verification issues remained. President Bush announced "great progress" on the Treaty and declared his hope that it would be signed at a US-Soviet presidential summit in Moscow on 11 February. However, after the surprise resignation of Mr. Shevardnadze, the beginnings of a Soviet crackdown in the Baltic republics, and the resumption of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, doubts arose over whether the START Treaty (said to amount to 500 pages) would be ready for signature in time, and whether the summit would be held at all.

In Washington on 28 January, the new Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State Baker announced that the summit was to be postponed to a later date, sometime before 30 June. The announcement cited the Persian Gulf war and unfinished business in the START agreement as reasons for the postponement.


### PTBT Amendment Conference

A conference to convert the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty into a Comprehensive Test-Ban (CTB) was held in New York from 7 to 18 January. The three depositary states (the US, UK, and USSR) were forced to convene the conference after being requested to do so by a third of the 117 parties to the Treaty, even though two of them (the US and UK) currently oppose negotiations on a CTB and enjoy a veto over any amendment of the earlier agreement. In the end, the conference approved by a vote of 74-2-19 (with Canada abstaining), a "draft decision" mandating the President of the Conference to "conduct consultations with a view to ... resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time." However, since the US made it clear that it would not attend such a follow-on conference, it is unlikely that it will ever be held.

— RON PURVER



## REVIEWS



### Official Secrets: The Story Behind the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service

Richard Cleroux

Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990.  
321 pp., \$25.95 cloth

It is now almost seven years since Canada embarked on a painful and controversial policy to reorganize its security services dealing with counter-espionage and counter-terrorism. The reorganization was painful because the RCMP, until 1984 combining regular police work with counter-intelligence, resented the diminution of its mandate when the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) was created as a separate agency. It was controversial because the powers given to CSIS appeared to many to threaten the rights of Canadian citizens by giving sweeping powers of investigation to the new agency.

A book which promises to tell the story behind the first six years of CSIS, therefore, is in principle a welcome contribution to a subject which goes to the heart of democratic government. Unfortunately, the actual story told by *Official Secrets* offers only brief glimpses of mainly trivial issues in the life of CSIS. Balancing the temptation to obtain a corporate hotel rate against the probability of running into all the other agencies taking advantage of hotel discounts should no doubt occupy somebody's time, but this and similar issues, such as where to park CSIS vehicles in Toronto, is unlikely to rivet the attention of either the John Le Carré fan or the reader concerned about the abuse of governmental powers.

To recognize the dilemma faced by the author, a book which focusses on CSIS' conduct of operations is certain to run straight into

the fetishism with secrecy in which, by virtue of their mandate, all security service are allowed to indulge. The strength of the book, therefore, is that, on the basis of limited and sometimes dubious sources, Mr. Cleroux has been able to raise some individual cases which may give the reader a sense of the murky side of "national security."

He describes in some detail, for example, the case of Patrick Chang, a Taiwan businessman in Ottawa acting, with the tacit consent of the Canadian Government, as an unofficial consul for Taiwan. According to Cleroux, Mr. Chang organized excellent swan trips for Tory caucus members to Taiwan and South Korea, only to be rewarded for his generosity with an abrupt refusal to extend his visa. A national security risk, or a risk of public scandal to the Tory hierarchy? Once CSIS invokes national security there is little or no scope for outsiders to challenge the evidence.

Cleroux attempts to base his book on a series of such exposés. The limits of his knowledge and evidence, however, suggest that short of the emergence of a bona fide deep throat in CSIS, we would be better served by analyses which do not depend on exposés. In particular, the institutional watchdog of CSIS, the Security and Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), has signalled many issues which are only fleetingly dealt with in this book.

One of the most fundamental is the representativeness of CSIS. Would it be so easy for CSIS to blunder into special investigations of "native activism" if Canada's native communities were fairly represented in the ranks of CSIS. Would the bizarre preoccupations of the secret service with sexual behaviour continue if its members more accurately represented the accepted range of Canadian values and behaviour? And as security threats to Canada change, is CSIS sufficiently flexible in attitudes

and orientation to shift its focus of operations? The answers to such questions cannot be found in this book. The episodes discussed, however, may encourage others to continue watching Canada's security service. — *David Cox*

*Mr. Cox is a member of the faculty of political studies at Queen's University and regular contributor to Peace & Security.*

### The Burning Season: The Murder of Chico Mendes and the Fight for the Amazon Rain Forest

Andrew Revkin

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990.  
317 pp., US\$19.95 cloth

Chico Mendes did not want to die. He always said "living people achieve things — corpses, nothing." Sadly, his death proved him wrong. The murder of Chico Mendes focussed even more world attention on the Amazon rain forest and the need to protect it. World attention and powerful allies were not enough to protect Mendes from a bandit's bullet — but they did help him accomplish some of his goals, posthumously. In a powerful book that combines excellent science reporting with good storytelling, author Andrew Revkin tells us that Mendes wasn't always comfortable in the role that environmentalists cast for him, that of the Amazon's chief ecologist. Reeling under the pressure of frequent death threats, Mendes once protested that he was not trying to save the Amazon because they were the "lungs of the world," but "because there are thousands of people living here who depend on the forest — and their lives are in danger every day."

Revkin, senior editor of *Discovery* magazine, writes of the confluence of world events that brought a single man to international attention — a man who didn't start out to change the world, but did. Mendes was a *nordestino* — his grandfather moved the family from northeastern Brazil to the Amazon in 1925 to harvest rubber, hoping, like thousands of others, to better his life. Within a few decades a

culture evolved among the rubber tappers, and with it, a fierce loyalty to the trees and the ecosystems they support.

Mendes received an unconventional education when in 1956 he met a Marxist who was hiding out in the Amazon to avoid persecution from Brazil's rightist rulers. Mendes went on to organize the rubber tappers for better pay, and later, fought hard to protect them and their trees from outlaw ranchers who were razing the forest at an alarming rate. Brazil's jungles began to resemble the wild west, and the ranchers might have won had it not been for the powerful allies Mendes made outside the country. They helped him convince the world that the interests of the rubber tappers, and its indigenous forest dwellers, coincide with the interests of people everywhere.

Like Mendes, Revkin fell in love with the Amazon — a wonderland where twenty percent of all bird species in the world hang out, where a single tree harbours 1,500 species of insects, and where fish actually swim among the treetops during the rainy season. These are good reasons for saving the Amazon rain forest, but there's much more. A view of the Earth from the space-shuttle *Discovery* in 1988 confirmed what scientists feared most, that the demise of the Amazon trees presaged the world's demise.

Revkin warns us that Brazil doesn't want the Amazon to become a "green Persian Gulf," protected as though a resource of the US and Europe. Instead, he suggests, international efforts must be directed towards helping Brazil's poor achieve a better standard of living, without sacrificing the Amazon in the process. That's the cause Mendes died for. — *Marie Wadden*

*Ms. Wadden is a writer and broadcaster based in St. John's, Newfoundland. Her book on the Innu of Labrador will be published in 1991 by Douglas & McIntyre.*

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



### Research Fellows

In June and October 1989, the Board of Directors adopted a medium-term plan whereby the Institute would concentrate its work programme in six defined areas: *the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Canadian defence and security policy; measures for strengthening international systems of peace-keeping, peacemaking and peace-building; regions of conflict and potential conflict; Arctic security and cooperation; and new approaches to international security.* Institute staff continue to monitor other areas within the mandate, and programmes to respond to research and public discussion initiatives from other organizations have been maintained at the same levels as in the past.

During 1990, the Institute engaged in an intensive search for research staff who would take responsibility for these areas. As of 2 January 1991, all new Research Fellows were in place:

**Mark Heller** is Senior Research Fellow and Research Coordinator. Educated in Political Science and Economics at the University of Toronto, Dr. Heller also holds an MA in Middle Eastern Studies and a PhD in Political Science from Harvard University. He is on leave from Tel Aviv University, where he is Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. In 1986-87, he was visiting Associate Professor of Government and Research Fellow at Cornell University, and in 1982-83, a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. Dr. Heller specializes in foreign policy and security studies, with particular reference to the Middle East.

**Shaukat Hassan** holds a Masters degree from the University of Colorado and a PhD in International Relations from Australian National University. He arrived at CIIPS in early January from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London where he wrote a forthcoming *Adelphi Paper* on environmental issues and security in South Asia. His area of concentration at CIIPS is new challenges to international security including environmental, ethnic and other sources of conflict.

**Ross Mallick** arrived in the fall to work in the field of regional conflicts and their resolution. Dr. Mallick, who has an MA from York, an M.Litt in Politics from Oxford and a PhD in Political Science from Cambridge, has special expertise in South Asia as well as in problems of development.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the particular area of expertise of **Jean-François Rioux**. He holds an MA in Political Science from Université Laval and has a PhD pending from Carleton University. His doctoral dissertation concentrated on the question of nuclear proliferation and Canadian foreign policy between 1943 and 1990. Between 1983 and 1990, Mr. Rioux was a lecturer at the University of Ottawa and at Carleton, and in the Department of Public Administration at the Université du Québec à Hull.

**Karen Ballentine**, who holds an MA from Carleton University in Soviet and Eastern European studies, joined the Institute in the fall, shortly after her return from a special study programme in Estonia.

She is a specialist on issues of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. She is also working on questions related to the reduction of the military-industrial sector in the Soviet economy.

The new research team joins research staff members who will concentrate their work on a number of areas. **Roger Hill** is working primarily on Canadian defence and security policy. **Ron Purver** concentrates on arms control and disarmament issues, and focusses on security and cooperation in the Arctic as well as on naval arms control. **Deirdre Collings** has primary responsibility for the Institute's project on Lebanon, and also monitors other conflicts in the Middle East. **Robin Hay** is concentrating on new institutions for peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

There are now three part-time visiting Fellows in residence. For the 1990-91 academic year, **Ron Fisher** from the University of Saskatchewan, is at Carleton University part-time and at the Institute two days a week. He remains responsible as editor of a book on the Cyprus conflict, and will arrange a series of seminars on developments in the field of conflict studies and conflict resolution. **George Lindsey** is undertaking a study on the qualitative dimensions of arms control. **Fr. William Ryan S.J.**, recently completed his term as secretary of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, prior to which he was Jesuit Provincial for Upper Canada and formerly Director of the Center of Concern in Washington, DC. He

will be at the Institute part-time looking at the role of religion in conflict and conflict resolution.

### Board of Directors

On 14 January, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable **Joe Clark**, announced the appointment of five Directors to the seventeen-member Board of Directors of the Institute. The new directors are:

**Robert Cameron**, Ottawa. Mr. Cameron joined the Department of External Affairs in 1947 and retired in 1985. He held a variety of positions, including that of Ambassador to Poland and Yugoslavia. He was Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1980-83, during which time he was responsible for international security and arms control affairs.

**André Donneur**, Montreal. Dr. Donneur is a Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. He has a PhD from l'Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales in Geneva. He specializes in international relations and has written on Canadian foreign and defence policy.

**Hélène Pichette**, Montreal. Ms. Pichette is head of the news section at Télé-Métropole, with primary responsibility for the principal newscast. During 1988-89, she held a Southam Fellowship at the University of Toronto, and prior to that was a producer for Radio Canada's *Le Point*.

**Betty Plewes**, Ottawa. Ms. Plewes served with CUSO in Nigeria and in Zimbabwe, and held a number of positions in Ottawa with the organization, most recently that of manager of programme operations.

**Gen. Gérard Thériault**, Ottawa. General Thériault is president of AEG Canada, a position he has held since 1987. He joined the RCAF in 1952 and served in many capacities in the Canadian Armed Forces. In 1983, he was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff, a position he held for three years before he retired in 1986. □

### Peace and Security Competitions Fund Procedures and Deadlines

*The Fund allocates contributions semi-annually. Contact the Fund for a copy of updated criteria and application forms. Please note the following deadlines:*


30 June for an October decision

30 November for a March decision

Peace and Security Competitions Fund  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7



## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Arab Distortions and Zionist Propaganda

The "Letter from Hebron" (Autumn 1990) was Orwellian propaganda which turned black into white and victim into murderer. With Jean-François Lépine serving as Middle East correspondent for the CBC and SRC, it is not surprising that some Canadians have a distorted and hostile picture of Israel.

There are no Israelis in his letter; only Arabs and their all-too-familiar myths and distortions. The suffering of the Arab residents is skillfully reported, but nowhere do we see the anti-Israeli hatred and racism which fuels the *intifada* or the cries of "death to the Jews" which none who pass near Hebron and the rest of the West Bank can escape. Mr. Lépine's Arab informants apparently did not see fit to tell him that Jews have lived in Hebron for three thousand years, sharing the holy sites with the Moslems, or that this unprotected community was cruelly massacred by Arab mobs in 1929.

The Israeli military is portrayed as being "armed to the teeth" and the source of all evils, but Mr. Lépine does not seem to know that this army is sitting in Hebron because the Palestinians and their Arab allies sought and continue to seek to destroy the Jewish people in their historic homeland. The Arabs, including the residents of Hebron, enthusiastically support Saddam Hussein and his threats to "incinerate half of Israel." If Mr. Lépine read or understood Arabic, he would know that the PLO, which has very wide support in Hebron, has declared that it has

not abandoned its policy of destroying Israel in stages. If they have a state, it would become a staging ground for Iraqi troops in a new and deadly war against Israel.

For Mr. Lépine, the Israeli efforts to limit terror may be "routine stupidity," but one doubts that he would have the same view if he were on the receiving end of these weapons. For some reason, the number of Arabs who have been murdered by other Arabs in the name of the *intifada* is also not discussed.

The source of the tragedy of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the suffering of both peoples is not found in the absurd myth of a "mighty Israeli army" trampling on innocent Arab victims. Israel is a tiny country, facing a number of Arab states, armed with an arsenal of thousands of tanks, missiles, and chemical weapons, financed by billions of dollars in oil revenues. Rather, the tragedy is the result of the continued Arab belief that they can eliminate the Jewish people and the State of Israel. Militarily defeated, the Arabs now conduct their war through the press and with propaganda, hoping to isolate and weaken Israel.

The tragedy is compounded by the unwillingness of the Arabs to admit their past mistakes, including the refusal to compromise, or to accept the legitimacy of Jewish claims to a piece of the Land of Israel. Finally, the violence is encouraged by the eagerness with which many in the media take up the Arab cause, spreading their propaganda and their racist hatred.

Publication of propaganda as "Letter from Hebron" damages the prospects for peace. It demonstrates to Israelis that the rest of the world is eager to believe anti-Israeli lies and distortions, and that international fora will con-

tinue to be biased and unable to play a useful role in ending this terrible conflict.

Gerald M. Steinberg, Bar Ilan  
University, Ramat Gan, Israel

I was surprised to see Jim Lederman making the statement (Winter 1990/91):

The latter argument [the Palestinians being against the American double standard of supporting Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza while opposing Iraq's similar conquest of Kuwait] made little impression on the Israelis who recalled that they did not launch the war that led to the capture of the West Bank.

It has been lately made repeatedly by Zionist propagandists in North America, and goes unchallenged. It suffers from only one flaw, the facts.

It is not even controversial that it was Israel which attacked Egypt in 1967. On Monday 5 June, waves of Israeli bombers and fighters launched an attack on Egyptian air fields virtually destroying the entire Egyptian Air Force, while it was still on the ground. Israel's ground forces then marched into Sinai and the Gaza strip. This took place to thwart the planned meeting between President Johnson and the Egyptian Vice-President Mohieddin, intended to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Jordan and Syria, which had a mutual defence pact with Egypt, joined in the war after Egypt was attacked, much as Britain and France went to war in 1939, after Germany attacked their ally Poland.

Ismael Zayid, M.D.,  
Dalhousie University, Halifax

### Who Called the Troops Out When?

Your last issue (Winter 1990/91) seems to me to be in error regarding the use in 1970 of the Armed Forces and the National

Defence Act. Jane Boulden states that in (October) 1970, the Armed forces were not called in by the civilian authorities under the National Defence Act. She is mistaken. I was at the time Chief of Staff (Administration) for Mobile Command in Saint-Hubert and had received the request from Quebec under that very Act shortly after it arrived in our offices. I sent it immediately to my commanding officer, but not without reading it first to ensure it complied with the requirements of the Act. It was signed by Jérôme Choquette, presently mayor of Outremont, and then the Attorney General for the province of Quebec.

As for the proclamation of the War Measures Act mentioned by Ms. Boulden, this occurred a couple of days later. Provincial and municipal police forces as well as the RCMP, implemented the measures taken thereafter; the Armed forces were not involved in any way.

As your publication is intent on being thorough, I feel a clarification on this matter would be appropriate in a future issue.  
Marcel Richard, Brig.-Gen. (Ret.),  
Quebec

### Editor's Note:

The correspondent is substantially correct, and Peace & Security regrets any confusion created by imprecise wording in our last issue. In 1970, the use of the armed forces to aid the civil power and the invoking of the War Measures Act were two separate events. The request for aid under the powers of the National Defence Act was made by the government of Quebec on 14 October 1970. On 16 October, the government of Canada invoked the War Measures Act.

## FROM THE DIRECTOR

*Debating war and peace, morality and order*



**W**E ARE BACK INTO THE UGLY, PRIMITIVE business of war. Every thinking person is grappling with revulsion, horror and bitter disappointment – the end of the Cold War had led us all to hope for better. In open societies, people are also wrestling openly with agonizing questions about the lead-up to war, its conduct and termination, and its aftermath.

In all decency, Canadians should begin by recognizing that while this is the first time that we have been at war in nearly forty years, much of the planet has suffered devastating conflict over that same period, at immeasurable human, economic and ecological cost. Even in the present conflict, the direct exposure of Canadians is limited. Our sheltered position should lead Canadians to exercise humility in our debate of the issues involved.

Our national debate since 2 August has done us no credit as a people. Some critics believe that they have seen a “bloodlust” unleashed, although by the standards of past conflicts, this has so far been quite muted in Canada. From the other side of the debate, critics of the coalition’s policies and Canada’s support, have widely been portrayed as merely emotive or viscerally anti-American, when in fact, the critics and the criticisms cover a wide spectrum.

**N**O ONE WAS READY FOR THIS CRISIS, EXCEPT possibly Saddam Hussein who triggered it. Nevertheless, few could argue that the post-Cold War world could simply have ignored such a frontal challenge to the most basic rule of international order – the non-acquisition of territory by force. But from the earliest days of August, too much of the public discussion focussed on side issues: other violations had gone unchecked in the past; the Kuwaiti regime was more plutocratic than democratic; the borders in question were “unnatural”; the outside world had armed Saddam Hussein; or that the world’s stake in the region’s oil supply somehow invalidated the world’s concern for order.

Worst of all, there was a gut reaction of many North Americans, Europeans and Japanese, that the conflict had nothing to do with us.

The growth of interdependence in recent decades should have led to a strengthening of the sense of collective security, yet somehow the idea of a responsibility of all nations to come to the aid of one that is a victim of aggression seemed to have fallen into disuse. The debates of the 1930s were replayed as though the Second World War and the UN had never happened.

We have all seen that when the international community, through the UN Security Council, is faced with a case of clear-cut aggression, it can set in motion machinery which – though long unused – amounts to a policing process with teeth. At the penultimate stage of this path toward military enforcement, the imposition of non-military sanctions, there was a widespread perception that these were “soft” measures, in contrast with military action. Comprehensive sanctions are coercive measures one step short of war, and are designed to hurt, frequently without discriminating between the guilty and the innocent.

The argument can be made that non-military sanctions should have been allowed to run much longer, but no one can claim that there was any assurance that by themselves they would work, or that the sanctions or the coalition would not be broken. Thus a judgement had to be made, for good or ill, and it was made most – under the authority of the UN Security Council – by those who had contributed most to confronting the aggression.

**O**NE CAN PROPERLY QUESTION THE JUDGEMENTS or tactics of the decision-makers, but one cannot legitimately assume that they were insensitive to the moral weight and the competing moral claims in their decisions. Those who criticize the UN’s approach of confronting Saddam Hussein because it has led ultimately to large-scale hostilities, are possibly not conscious how deeply held is the moral conviction, on the other side, against sacrificing small states to aggressors.

None of this holds, of course, if one is an absolute pacifist and would not countenance the use of force under any circumstances, against any threat, and under any auspices. However, such absolute pacifists are obliged to distinguish themselves from others who oppose involvement in this particular war on other bases.

Of the four broad types of pacifists identified by Elise Boulding, the three groups other

than the “absolutists” are deeply torn by this war. The “internationalists” have long recognized the enduring reality of lawlessness and aggression, and have called only for the exercise of legitimate restraining force under the auspices of the UN. While the prior arrangements necessary to follow the Charter’s procedures to the letter were not in place in this case, the world has come closer than ever before. The anti-war persons who oppose only some wars, see in this case that the Baghdad regime began the aggression, and refused to reverse it. They also see Saddam’s appalling record of internal and external brutality. Some can advance extenuating arguments, but many cannot. Finally, there are those pacifists who refuse personal involvement in war on grounds of conscience, but acknowledge the legitimacy of democratic governments, and so accept alternative service. This option has not yet arisen on any scale in this war, although some seem to prescribe that Canada as a nation adopt a similar kind of “non-combatant” status. This raises entirely different issues.

**A**LL MEMBER STATES OF THE UN ARE BOUND by international law to apply non-military sanctions against Iraq, and the progression of coercive measures toward military compellence is clear in the Charter. As a respected member of the Security Council, Canada was directly involved in each decision. Conscious of the need to avoid abdicating the UN’s work to any one power, Canada was one of those nations that chose to send its ships to participate directly in enforcing the sanctions – in effect, an act of war – as authorized by the Security Council.

Canada then sent its fighter squadron to help protect the ships enforcing sanctions, and those aircraft have since been authorized to help protect other enforcement actions by the coalition. The debate over “offensive” and “defensive” roles is irrelevant in any war zone. It is the capabilities of the Canadian aircraft and their crews that shape what they do.


Canada can play a full role in efforts to bring hostilities to an end, and in post-war peacekeeping and reconstruction, as well as new cooperation and security arrangements in the region. Baghdad’s attacks on the UN testify that in the eyes of the violators, and their few supporters, the law and all its agents are now suspect. But for the rest of the world, there is an unprecedented consensus on which we can and must build for the future.

– BERNARD WOOD



## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

Guerre et paix, moralité et ordre



**N**OUS VOILÀ REVENUS DANS L'AFFREUX CON-

texte primitif de la guerre ! Tout être pensant éprouve répugnance, horreur et déception amère : la fin de la Guerre froide nous avait fait entrevoir des perspectives meilleures. Dans les sociétés libérales, on s'interrogeait ouvertement et avec angoisse sur ce qui a conduit à la guerre, sur la façon dont elle est menée et dont elle se terminera, et sur ses conséquences.

Les Canadiens et Canadiennes doivent tout de même reconnaître que, même si c'est la première fois en près de quarante ans que leur pays est en guerre, maints endroits de la planète ont subi des conflits dévastateurs au cours de la même période : sur les plans humain, économique et écologique, le coût en a été incalculable. Même dans le conflit actuel, la menace pesant directement sur le Canada est limitée. Leur position privilégiée doit inciter les Canadiens à faire preuve d'humilité quand ils discutent des questions en cause.

Le débat national que nous avons tenu depuis le 2 août ne nous fait pas honneur. Certains observateurs ont cru voir une soif de sang se manifester, bien que, d'après les normes établies lors de conflits antérieurs, ce phénomène ait été relativement restreint chez nous. Quant à eux, ceux et celles qui ont décrit les politiques de la coalition et l'appui accordé par le Canada ont été largement décrits comme étant émotifs ou profondément anti-américains, alors qu'en fait, ces opposants offrent un vaste éventail d'opinions.

**P**ERSONNE NE S'ATTENDAIT À CETTE CRISE, SAUF peut-être Saddam Hussein, qui l'a provoquée. Néanmoins, on aurait dû mal à faire valoir que le monde d'après la Guerre froide aurait pu tout simplement fermer les yeux sur une violation aussi flagrante de la règle la plus fondamentale de l'ordre international, soit celle qui interdit de s'approprier un territoire par la force. Mais dès les premiers jours d'août, le débat public a par trop porté sur des questions secondaires : d'autres violations avaient eu lieu impunément dans le passé ; le régime koweïtien était plus démocratique que Saddam Hussein ; les frontières contestées n'étaient pas « naturelles » ; le monde extérieur avait armé pour le monde les approvisionnements de pétrole autre le souci de préserver l'ordre.

Américains, Européens et Japonais se sentaient incertains que le conflit ne les concernait en rien.

Le sentiment d'interdépendance, qui avait grandi au cours des dernières décennies, aurait dû entraîner un renforcement du sens de la sécurité collective ; pourtant, sans que l'on sache trop comment, l'ensemble des nations a semblé oublier la responsabilité lui incombant de prêter main-forte à l'une d'elles tombée sous les coups d'un agresseur. Les débats des années 1930 ont repris, comme si la Seconde Guerre mondiale et l'ONU n'avaient jamais existé.

Nous avons tous constaté que, quand la collectivité internationale, par l'intermédiaire du Conseil de sécurité, se trouve en présence d'un cas d'agression pure et simple, elle peut mettre en marche des mécanismes qui, même s'ils n'ont pas servi depuis longtemps, s'assimilent à un processus de maintien de l'ordre avec un certain moralisme. Les sanctions globales correspondent à des mesures de coercition très voisines de la guerre, et elles visent à faire mal, souvent sans distinguer entre le coupable et l'innocent.

On pourrait faire valoir que les sanctions non militaires aident à être appliquées plus longtemps, mais personne n'aurait pu garantir qu'elles auraient produit à elles seules les résultats escomptés, ni qu'elles n'auraient pas été entraînées à des hostilités de grande envergure, ne conduisant à des hostilités de grande envergure, ne se rendant sans doute pas compte de la profonde conviction morale animant leurs adversaires qui refusent de sacrifier les petits États à la convulsivité de leurs agresseurs.

**O**U LES TACTIQUES DES DÉCIDEURS, mais personne n'est autorisé à supposer que ceux-ci n'ont pas pris en compte la dimension morale du dilemme et les divers arguments moraux ayant pesé dans la balance. Ceux qui reprochent à l'ONU d'avoir affronté Saddam Hussein, parce que cette démarche a conduit à des hostilités de grande envergure, ne se rendent sans doute pas compte de la profonde conviction morale animant leurs adversaires qui refusent de sacrifier les petits États à la convulsivité de leurs agresseurs.


Rien de tout cela ne vaut, bien sûr, aux yeux du pacifiste inconditionnel qui n'approuve jamais le recours à la force, peu importe la nature de la menace ou le drapage sous lequel sont enroblés les troupes. Cependant, ces pacifistes sont obligés de se distinguer d'autres qui s'opposent pour des motifs différents à toute participation à cette guerre. Elise Boulding désigne quatre types de pacifistes : mis à part les inconditionnels, les trois autres groupes sont profondément divisés par cette guerre. Les « internationalistes » reconnaissent depuis longtemps l'existence persistante de

La anarchie et de l'agression, et ils ont préconisé un recours limité et légitime à la force sous la gouverne de l'ONU. Les mécanismes nécessaires pour que l'on suive à la lettre la procédure établie par l'ONU n'étaient pas en place cette fois-ci, mais le monde n'a jamais respecté d'aussi près le libellé de la Charte.

Les pacifistes qui ne s'opposent qu'à certaines guerres ont vu ici que le régime Hussein avait bel et bien porté le premier coup et qu'il avait ensuite refusé de faire marche arrière. Ils sont aussi au courant des effroyables actes de brutalité commis par le dirigeant irakien tant dans son pays qu'à l'étranger. D'aucuns évoquent des arguments attentionnés, mais beaucoup en sont incapables. Enfin, il y a des pacifistes qui refusent, pour des motifs de conscience, de participer personnellement à la guerre, mais ils reconnaissent la légitimité des gouvernements démocratiques et ils acceptent par conséquent de jouer un autre rôle. Cette option ne s'est pas encore manifestée dans cette guerre, bien que certains semblent la Charte est très claire quant à la gradation des mesures de coercition vers le recours à la force militaire. En sa qualité de membre respecté du Conseil de sécurité, le Canada a participé à la prise de chaque décision. Conscient de la nécessité de ne pas laisser à une seule puissance le soin de faire tout le travail de l'ONU, le Canada a compté parmi les pays qui ont choisi d'envoyer des sanctions (cela équivaut, en fait, à un acte de guerre), conformément aux directives du Conseil de sécurité.

Le Canada a ensuite dépêché un escadron d'avions de chasse pour aider à protéger les navires appliquant les sanctions, et depuis, il a autorisé le déploiement de ces appareils pour protéger d'autres opérations menées par la coalition. Le débat sur les rôles « défensifs » et « offensifs » est hors de propos dans toute zone de guerre. Ce sont les capacités des avions et des équipages canadiens qui déterminent leurs rôles.

Le Canada peut s'affirmer pleinement dans tout effort fait pour mettre fin aux hostilités, puis, après la guerre, pour voir au maintien de la paix et de la reconstruction, ainsi qu'à la mise en place de nouveaux mécanismes régionaux de coopération et de sécurité. Les alliés de Bagdad contre l'ONU attestent qu'aux yeux des agresseurs et de leurs partisans peu nombreux, la loi et tous les agents du monde, il existe un consensus sans précédent qui doit nous servir de fondement pour l'avenir. □



Arabes, déformation des faits et propagande sioniste

J'ai été étonné de voir que Jim Lederman avait fait la déclaration suivante (Hiver 1990-1991) : «Ce dernier argument (le fait que les Palestiniens étaient contre les Américains qui appliquaient deux poids deux mesures en appauvrissant Israël malgré l'occupation de la Cisjordanie et de Gaza, mais en s'opposant à l'occupation du Koweït par l'Irak) n'a guère convaincu les Israéliens qui ont rappelé qu'ils n'avaient pas commencé la guerre qui s'était soldée par la prise de la Cisjordanie.»

Cette affirmation a été maintes fois reprise en Amérique du Nord par les tenants de la propagande sioniste et elle n'est récusée par personne. Elle n'a qu'un seul défaut : elle est contraire aux faits.

On ne conteste même pas que c'est Israël qui a attaqué l'Égypte en 1967. Le 5 juin de cette année-là, des vagues de bombardiers et de chars israéliens se lancèrent à l'attaque des terrains d'aviation égyptiens et détruisaient au sol la quasi-totalité des forces aériennes égyptiennes. L'armée israélienne envahissait ensuite le Sinaï et la bande de Gaza. Ces opérations visaient à compromettre la rencontre que devait tenir le président Johnson et le vice-président égyptien Moubarak pour parvenir à un règlement négocié.

La Jordanie et la Syrie, liées à l'Égypte par un pacte de défense mutuelle, entrèrent en guerre après que l'Égypte eut été attaquée, un peu comme la Grande-Bretagne et la France étaient entrées en guerre en 1939 après l'attaque de leur allié, la Pologne, par l'Allemagne.

Ismaïl Zayid, MD  
Université Dalhousie, Halifax

Propagande digne d'Orwell, la «Lettre de Hébron» (Automne 1990) transforme le mal en bien et la victime en meurtrier. Avec Jean-

François Lépine comme correspondant de la CBC et de la Société Radio-Canada au Moyen-Orient, il n'est pas surprenant que certains Canadiens aient une image déformée et défavorable d'Israël. Il n'est pas fait mention d'Israéliens dans sa lettre ; on n'y parle que d'Arabes, des faits qu'ils défendent et de leurs mythes bien connus. Les souffrances des résidents arabes sont habilement décriées, mais pas un mot sur la haine et le racisme anti-israéliens qui alimentent l'infidélité pas plus que sur les cris de «mort aux Juifs» que quiconque passait près de Hébron et du reste de la Cisjordanie ne peut pas ne pas entendre. Apparemment, les informateurs arabes de M. Lépine n'ont pas jugé bon de lui dire que les Juifs vivent à Hébron depuis trois mille ans, qu'ils partagent les lieux saints avec les Musulmans, ni que cette cruellement massacrée par les foules arabes en 1929.

Les forces israéliennes sont décrites comme étant «armées jus-qu'aux dents» et présentées comme la source de tous les maux, mais M. Lépine semble ignorer que si cette armée se trouve à Hébron, c'est parce que les Palestiniens et leurs alliés arabes ont cherché, et cherchent encore, à détruire le peuple juif dans un pays qui est sa patrie depuis toujours. Les Arabes, y compris les résidents de Hébron, soutiennent avec enthousiasme Saddam Hussein qui menace d'«incendier la moitié d'Israël». Si M. Lépine lisait ou comprenait l'arabe, il saurait que l'OLP, qui bénéficie d'un large soutien à Hébron, a déclaré qu'il n'a pas renoncé à détruire peu à peu Israël. Si l'on donnait à l'OLP un État, celui-ci deviendrait une zone de rassemblement des troupes israéliennes qui pourraient alors entreprendre une nouvelle guerre à mort contre Israël.

Pour M. Lépine, les efforts faits par les Israéliens pour limiter la terreur ne sont peut-être que «bêtise routinière», mais il changerait sans doute d'opinion si c'était contre lui que ces armées étaient dirigées. Par ailleurs, mais il ne dit pas pourquoi, il ne parle pas non plus des nombreux Arabes qui ont été assassinés par d'autres Arabes au nom de l'infidélité.

Quand et par qui la Loi sur la défense nationale a-t-elle été invoquée ?

Votre dernière livraison (Hiver 1990-1991) contient ce qui me semble être une erreur à propos des Forces armées et de la Loi sur la défense nationale en octobre 1970. Jeanne Boulden dit qu'en (octobre) 1970, votre dernière livraison contenait ce qui me semble être une erreur à propos des Forces armées et de la Loi sur la défense nationale en octobre 1970.

Les articles de propagande tels que la «Lettre de Hébron» comprennent les perspectives de paix, le reste du monde est prêt à croire les contre-vérités et les mensonges internationaux continueront d'être partiels et incapables de jouer un rôle utile pour mettre fin à ce terrible conflit.

Cette tragédie est aggravée par la réticence des Arabes à admettre leurs erreurs passées et, notamment, par leur refus d'accepter un compromis ou de reconnaître la légitimité des revendications des Juifs sur une portion de la terre d'Israël. Enfin, l'empressement avec lequel, dans ces médias, de nombreuses personnes embrassent la cause arabe en répandant leur propagande et leur haine raciste.

Ce n'est pas dans le mythe absurde d'une «puissante armée israélienne» qui foulerait aux pieds d'innocentes victimes arabes que l'on trouvera la cause du conflit tragique opposant Arabes et Israéliens et l'origine des souffrances de ces deux peuples. Israël est un petit pays qui fait face à de nombreux millions de chars, de missiles et d'armes chimiques payé à même les milliards de dollars des recettes du pétrole. Il serait plus juste de dire que cette tragédie vient du fait que les Arabes ont toujours cru qu'ils pourraient anéantir le peuple juif et l'État d'Israël. Vaincus militairement, les Arabes font maintenant leur guerre par la presse et la propagande, en espérant ainsi isoler et affaiblir Israël.

Bar Ilan, Kamat Gan, Israël  
Gerald M. Steinberg, Université

Note de la rédaction : Notre correspondant a en grande partie raison, et nous déplorons la confusion créée par l'imprécision du texte paru dans notre dernier numéro. En 1970, le recours aux Forces armées pour prêter main-forte aux autorités civiles et la mise en œuvre de la Loi sur les mesures de guerre ont été deux événements séparés. L'appel à l'aide lancé par le gouvernement du Québec en vertu de la Loi sur la défense nationale a eu lieu le 14 octobre 1970. Le gouvernement canadien a invoqué la Loi sur les mesures de guerre le 16 octobre. □

Marcel Richard, Brig.-Général (Ret.)  
Québec


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1970 les Forces armées ne sont pas intervenues à la suite d'une demande des autorités civiles en vertu de la Loi sur la défense nationale. Elle fait erreur. À l'époque, j'étais le chef d'état-major (administrateur) des Forces mobiles, à Saint-Hubert, et j'avais reçu la demande du Québec conformément à la même Loi peu après sa réception à mon commandant dans les meilleurs délais, mais non sans la lire et m'assurer qu'elle était conforme aux exigences de la Loi. Elle l'était et était signée par M. Jérôme Choquette, aujourd'hui maire d'Outremont, mais alors Procureur général de la province de Québec. Quant à la proclamation de la Loi sur les mesures de guerre dont parle Mme Boulden, elle a eu lieu à peu près deux jours plus tard. Ce furent les forces policières provinciales et municipales ainsi que la GRC qui appliquèrent les mesures prises ensuite, et les Forces armées n'eurent rien à voir avec ces dernières.

Vu la rigueur que vise votre publication, je crois qu'une mise au point à ce sujet dans une prochaine livraison serait à propos.



## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Chargé(s) de recherche

En juin et octobre 1989, le con-

seil d'administration a adopté un

plan à moyen terme en vertu duquel

l'Institut axera son programme de

travail sur six thèmes précis : la

non-prolifération des armes de des-

truction massive ; la politique du

Canada en matière de défense et de

sécurité ; les mesures à prendre

pour renforcer les régimes inter-

nationaux de maintien, d'établisse-

ment et d'édification de la paix ; les

régions de conflit et de conflit po-

lentiel ; la sécurité et la coopération

dans l'Afrique ; et les nouvelles

voies à suivre pour garantir la secu-

rité internationale. Le personnel

de l'Institut continuera de se renseil-

guer sur d'autres thèmes relevant

du mandat, et il poursuivra comme

dans le passé les programmes vou-

lus pour répondre aux efforts de

recherche et aux débats publics

amorçés par d'autres organismes.

En 1990, l'Institut a entrepris

des recherches intensives pour trouver

des chercheurs(e)s qui s'occuperaient

d'étudier ces thèmes. Le 2 janvier

1991, tous les nouveaux chargé(e)s

de recherche avaient pris leurs

fonctions.

Mark Heller est chargé de re-

cherche principale et coordonnateur

de la recherche. Il a fait des études

en sciences politiques et écono-

miques à l'Université de Toronto et

il détient aussi une maîtrise en étu-

des sur le Moyen-Orient, ainsi qu'un

doctorat de l'Université Harvard en

sciences politiques. Il est en congé

de l'Université de Tel Aviv, où il est

agréé de recherche principal au

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

En 1986-1987, il a été maître de

conférences en études gouvernement-

ales et chargé de recherche à l'Uni-

versité Cornell ; en 1982-1983,

il a fait un stage au Centre des af-

aires internationales de Harvard.

M. Heller est spécialiste de la poli-

tique étrangère et des questions de

sécurité, et il mène particulièrement

l'accent sur le Moyen-Orient.

Shaukat Hassan détient une ma-

îtrise de l'Université du Colorado et

un doctorat en relations internatio-

nales de l'Université nationale de

l'Australie. Il est arrivé au début jan-

vier de l'International Institute for

Strategic Studies, à Londres, où il a

personnel de recherche existant qui

fera porter ses efforts sur divers sec-

teurs. Roger Hill s'intéresse surtout

à la politique du Canada en matière

de défense et de sécurité. Ron

Purver concentre ses efforts sur la

limitation des armements et le dé-

sarmement, sur la sécurité et la

coopération dans l'Afrique ainsi

que sur la limitation des armements

postes, dont celui d'ambassadeur du

Canada en Pologne et en Yougos-

lavie. Il a été sous-secrétaire d'Etat

adjoint aux Affaires extérieures de

1980-1983, période où il s'occupait

des questions intéressant la sécurité

internationale et la limitation des

armements.

André Donneur, de Montréal,

M. Donneur est professeur de scien-

ces politiques à l'Université du

Québec à Montréal. Il détient un

doctorat de l'Institut universitaire

des hautes études internationales

(Genève). Il est spécialiste des rela-

tions internationales et il a publié

des documents sur la politique

étrangère et la politique de défense

du Canada.

Hélène Pichette, de Montréal,

Mme Pichette dirige le service des

nouvelles de Télé-Métropole, et elle

s'occupe surtout du principal bul-

letin de nouvelles. En 1988-1989,

elle a bénéficié d'une bourse Sou-

tham à l'Université de Toronto ;

auparavant, elle a été réalisatrice de

l'émission *Le Point* diffusée sur les

ondes de Radio-Canada.

Betty Plewes, d'Ottawa,

Mme Plewes a servi au sein de

CUSO au Nigéria et au Zimbabwe,

et elle a occupé divers postes à

Ottawa dans cet organisme ; plus

récentement, elle a été gestionnaire

des programmes.

Le général Gérard Thériault,

d'Ottawa. Le général Thériault est

président d'ABG Canada, poste

qu'il occupe depuis 1987. Il s'est

détenu de nombreux postes au sein

des Forces canadiennes. En 1983,

il a été nommé Chef de l'état-major

de la Défense et il s'est acquitté de

cette charge pendant trois ans, soit

jusqu'en 1986, année où il a pris

sa retraite. □

### Concours «Paix et Sécurité» : procédure et échéancier

Le Fonds pour les Concours «Paix et Sécurité» attribue une aide financière deux fois par année. Prière de communiquer avec le Fonds pour obtenir l'ensemble des critères mis à jour et des formulaires de demande. Prière de prendre note des échéances suivantes :

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

le 30 novembre, pour la sélection de mars

Concours «Paix et Sécurité»  
360, rue Albert, bureau 900  
Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

of Concern à Washington (D.C.).

Haut-Canada et Directeur du Centre

il a été Provincial des Jésuites du

catoliques du Canada ; auparavant,

créateur de la Conférence des évêques

terminer son mandat en tant que se-

frère William Ryan (S.J.) vient de

étude sur les dimensions qualitatives

George Lindsey entreprend une

l'évolution des études en politolo-

livre sur le conflit chypriote et orga-

misera une série de colloques sur

semaine. Il dirige la rédaction d'un

et il est à l'Institut deux jours par

l'Université Carleton à temps partiel

de la Saskatchewan travaille à

1990-1991, Ron Fisher (Université

Au cours de l'année universitaire

chercheurs associés à temps partiel.

Il y a maintenant à l'Institut trois

d'édification de la paix.

de maintien, d'établissement et

surtout sur les nouvelles institutions

Moyen-Orient. Robin Hay se penche

de près d'autres conflits sévissant au

concernant le Liban et elle suit aussi

principalement du projet de l'Institut

navals. Deirdre Collings s'occupe

que sur la limitation des armements

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# CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



## Sommet mondial sur les armements

Dans deux discours différents prononcés le 8 février sur l'après-guerre du Golfe, le premier ministre Mulroney et le ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, ont exhorté l'ONU à convoquer un « Sommet mondial sur les instruments de masse » afin de mobiliser ainsi la volonté politique et de relancer les efforts internationaux déjà entrepris pour prévenir la prolifération des armes conventionnelles et celle de leurs vecteurs. Le sommet aurait pour objectif d'élaborer un programme d'action complet en vertu duquel on établirait des tribunes multilatérales pour examiner les divers problèmes de prolifération.

Parmi les mesures particulières proposées, citons les suivantes : exhorter les signataires du TNP à soutenir sans tarder sa prorogation indéfini en 1995 ; solliciter de la part des États dotés d'armes nucléaires une réaffirmation formelle de leur engagement à rechercher la mise en oeuvre d'autres mesures de désarmement nucléaire ; encourager d'autres pays à adhérer au Régime de contrôle des technologies appliquées aux missiles (RCTM) ; rendre plus efficace la Convention de 1975 sur les armes biologiques ; inciter les membres de la Conférence du désarmement à s'engager à une clôture, d'ici la fin de 1992, les négociations sur une convention complète et détaillée sur les armes chimiques ; précéder l'accroissement du nombre de membres du Groupe de l'Australie pour limiter l'exportation de produits chimiques susceptibles de servir à la fabrication d'armes chimiques ; favoriser la mise en oeuvre d'un système d'échange d'informations dans le domaine des transferts d'armes ; et proposer que les signataires du Traité sur les FCE s'engagent « à faire en sorte que les armes visées

## Le Traité sur les forces armées conventionnelles en Europe (FCE)

Comme on s'y attendait, un Traité sur les FCE a été signé à Paris le 19 novembre. Il n'aura fallu que vingt mois pour le négocier ; un haut fonctionnaire américain a d'ailleurs dit de ce document que c'était l'accord de limitation des armements le plus ambitieux jamais conclu. En vertu du Traité, dans les quarante mois qui suivront son entrée en vigueur (soit dix jours après sa ratification par les vingt-deux parties), le nombre total de chars de part et d'autre (OTAN et Pacte de Varsovie) doit tomber à 20 000 ; celui des véhicules blindés de combat, à 30 000 ; celui des pièces d'artillerie, à 20 000, et celui des avions de combat et des hélicoptères d'attaque, à 8 000 et à 2 000 respectivement. En tout, pour tout, plus de 50 000 armes de ces catégories devront être détruites ou converties à des usages « non militaires », dans la plupart des cas, par l'URSS et ses anciens alliés.

Des observateurs ont accusé l'URSS d'avoir violé l'esprit du Traité en ramenant des dizaines de milliers de systèmes d'armement à l'est de l'Oural, soit en dehors de la région géographique visée par l'accord, juste avant sa signature. Des porte-parole de l'URSS et de l'Occident ont précisé que la majeure partie de ces transferts étaient attribuables au fait que l'URSS avait déjà annoncé des retraits de troupes d'Europe de l'Est en vertu de décisions unilatérales et d'accords bilatéraux négociés. Selon le négociateur en chef des États-Unis, M. Edouard Chevardnadze, alors ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, avait garanti que la plus grande partie du matériel retiré avant la signature du Traité serait détruit ou converti. Cependant, de nouveaux différends se sont faits jour presque immédiatement après l'échange officiel de ratifications le 18 novembre. Les États-Unis et leurs alliés de l'OTAN ont accusé l'URSS d'avoir rayé de ses inventaires plus de 20 000 éléments à cette date ; d'avoir désigné moins de la moitié des emplacements militaires à inspecter par rapport à ce qui avait été indiqué antérieurement (cela influe sur le nombre d'inspections qu'elle serait obligée d'accom-

## Les pourparlers sur la réduction des armements stratégiques

Des hauts fonctionnaires américains et soviétiques continuaient d'évoquer les progrès accomplis vers le règlement de questions litigieuses relatives au START, tandis qu'approchait la date d'une réunion entre le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, Edouard Chevardnadze et son homologue américain James Baker, à Hounston, les 10 et 11 décembre. Après la réunion, il fut annoncé qu'il ne restait plus à régler que des questions techniques intéressant la vérification. Le président Bush fit savoir que de « grands progrès » avaient été accomplis et il exprima l'espoir que le Traité serait signé au sommet présidentiel de Moscou, le 11 février. Cependant, après la démission soudaine de M. Chevardnadze et avec le début de la répression soviétique dans les républiques baltes et des hostilités dans le golfe Persique, on a commencé à douter que le Traité START (qui compterait 500 pages) serait prêt à temps, voire, que le sommet aurait effectivement lieu.

A Washington, le 28 janvier, le nouveau ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Alexandre Bessmertnykh, et le Secrétaire d'État américain, M. James Baker, ont annoncé que le sommet serait reporté et qu'il se tiendrait d'ici le 30 juin. Pour expliquer cette décision, ils ont cité la guerre du Golfe et la nécessité de régler certains détails afférents à l'accord START.

Une conférence, dont l'objet était de transformer le Traité de 1963 sur l'interdiction partielle des essais d'armes nucléaires (PTBT) en une interdiction complète des essais (ICE), a eu lieu à New York du 7 au 18 janvier. Les trois États depositaires (URSS, Royaume-Uni et Royaume des Pays-Bas) ont été obligés de convoquer la conférence, après qu'un tiers des 117 parties au Traité l'eurent demandé, même si Washington et Londres s'opposent actuellement à la tenue de négociations sur une ICE et sur toute modification de l'accord sur toute modification de l'accord.

Les pays de la région de la signature du Traité et contrairement aux termes de ce dernier ; et d'avoir cherché à exclure trois divisions de l'Armée régulière en les désignant comme étant des formations d'infanterie navale, lesquelles sont visées par le Traité aux dires de l'Occident.

Les porte-parole américains ont bien précisé que le Traité ne sera pas déposé devant le Sénat aux fins de ratification, tant que les litiges au sujet des données et de l'interprétation du libellé n'auront pas été réglés. Les parties ont quatre-vingt-dix jours, à compter de la signature du Traité, pour « rectifier » les données qu'elles ont soumises.

Le Traité sur les FCE prévoit la tenue de négociations de suivi devant aboutir à la Conférence d'examen de la CSCE, qui est censée avoir lieu à Helsinki en mars 1992. Ces pourparlers, appelés « FCE 1A » et axés principalement sur la limitation des effectifs en personnel et sur les détails d'un régime d'inspections aériennes, ont commencé à Vienne le 29 novembre.

Un nouvel accord sur les mesures propres à accroître la confiance et la sécurité (MPACS) en Europe a été signé au sommet de Paris en novembre. Aux mesures de notification et aux échanges d'informations existants par les Accords de Stockholm (1986), le nouvel accord ajoute des dispositions concernant les échanges annuels de renseignements sur les principes de systèmes d'armes jusqu'au niveau des brigades no des régiments, sur le déploiement des gros équipements et armements, et sur les budgets militaires ; est également prévue l'adoption d'un mécanisme de consultation et de coopération en ce qui regarde les « activités militaires inhabituelles ». Les pays de l'Est et les États non alignés réclamaient depuis longtemps des MPACS relatives aux manœuvres navales et aériennes indépendantes, mais l'accord reste muet sur ce sujet.

## Conférence d'amendement du PTBT

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## La guerre du Golfe

novembre, les libéraux et les démocrates ont proposé des amendements qui réglaient l'usage de la force contre l'Irak, du moins tant que le parlement n'aurait pas été consulté de nouveau (proposition des libéraux). Le début d'urgence a lieu la veille d'une réunion extraordinaire du Conseil de sécurité le 29 novembre (à laquelle M. Clark a représenté le Canada, réuni au cours de laquelle le Conseil a autorisé (résolution 678) l'utilisation de tous les moyens nécessaires pour obliger l'Irak à se retirer du Koweït. La Chambre des communes a appuyé la résolution 678 plus tard le même jour (29 novembre) par 111 voix contre 82, malgré les protestations énergiques des deux partis d'opposition. L'un des principales préoccupations de ces derniers était que le gouvernement doit consulter le parlement avant de décider de participer à une action militaire offensive.

Le 10 décembre, M. Clark a comparu devant le Comité des affaires extérieures de la Chambre. Il a indiqué que le gouvernement consultait le parlement le plus rapidement possible au fur et à mesure des événements. Il a également admis que diverses questions avaient été rendues plus urgentes du fait de l'occupation du Koweït par l'Irak, notamment : la nature des régimes arabes, les disparités extraordinaires existant entre les revenus des plus pauvres et ceux des plus riches dans la région, la concurrence que les différents dirigeants se livrent pour dominer le monde arabe, et la question palestinienne. Mais il a rejeté l'idée d'un lien précis entre la crise du Golfe et le problème palestinien.

Le 19 décembre, le parlement s'est ajourné jusqu'au 18 février. Comme l'échance donnée à l'Irak pour se conformer à la résolution 678

Pendant l'automne, la perspective d'une guerre dans le Golfe a attiré pratiquement toute l'attention du parlement lorsqu'il s'agissait de la paix et de la sécurité. Le 25 octobre, le ministre des Affaires extérieures, M. Joe Clark, a informé la Chambre des communes que le gouvernement préférait qu'une action défensive contre l'Irak soit approuvée par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, mais qu'une absence de limite n'empêcherait pas le Canada de participer à une démonstration de force. Les partis d'opposition ont immédiatement qualifié les propos de M. Clark d'incendiaires. Le chef du NPD, Mme Audrey McLaughlin, a estimé que les déclarations du Ministre pourraient avoir de graves conséquences pour la sécurité des Canadiens et des Canadiennes gardés en otage en Irak. La même semaine, 250 autres militaires canadiens spécialisés des communications et du commandement ont été dépêchés dans le Golfe pour appuyer l'embargo des Nations Unies contre l'Irak, faisant ainsi passer les effectifs canadiens présents dans la région à 1 700 membres.

Le 19 novembre, une délégation non officielle de députés s'est rendue à Bagdad pour demander la libération des otages canadiens. Intéressamment, le gouvernement a rejeté l'idée, mais, en fin de compte, le député conservateur Robert Corbett a reçu l'autorisation de se joindre au libéral Lloyd Axworthy et au démocrate Svend Robinson pour effectuer la mission non officielle. La tâche s'est avérée déprimante, souvent ennuyeuse, mais le 28 novembre, les autorités irakiennes ont annoncé que cinq des quarante-cinq otages seraient libérés.

Le 23 novembre, M. Clark a entamé une visite officielle dans la région. Il s'est rendu en Turquie, en Jordanie, en Égypte et en Israël (où il a rencontré des dirigeants tant

## Activités des comités

Le 8 novembre, le Comité de la défense de la Chambre des communes a publié un rapport intitulé *La souveraineté maritime*, qui recommandait au gouvernement d'acheter des sous-marins à propulsion conventionnelle et d'installer des capteurs sonars dans les eaux arctiques pour aider à préserver la souveraineté du Canada dans le Grand Nord. Le critique du NPD en matière de défense, M. John Brown, a remis en question la nécessité d'acquiescer des sous-marins et il a proposé plutôt que le Canada en loue un autre pays en attendant que ses besoins en matière de défense soient complètement examinés.

À l'automne, le Comité des

— GREGORY WIRICK

proche, le nouveau «comité spécial de guerre» du cabinet a décidé de convoquer à nouveau le parlement le 15 janvier pour une session d'urgence. Le premier ministre a immédiatement proposé que la Chambre sanctionne de nouveau les mesures prises par les Nations Unies pour mettre fin à l'agression de l'Irak contre le Koweït. Au cours du long débat qui a suivi, on a noté les interventions du chef libéral, M. Jean Chrétien, qui se présentait pour la première fois aux Communes depuis son élection en décembre. Le 15 janvier, M. Chrétien a proposé un amendement en ajoutant à la dernière phrase de la résolution gouvernementale les termes suivants : «par le biais de la continuation des sanctions économiques ; cet appui exclut une action militaire offensive de la part du Canada pour le moment». Qui plus est, M. Chrétien a déclaré que, si la guerre éclatait, il faudrait immédiatement rapatrier les soldats canadiens qui n'étaient dans le Golfe que pour veiller à l'application de l'embargo. Le lendemain, son prédécesseur à la tête du Parti libéral, M. John Turner, a soutenu fermement en Chambre que le parlement a le devoir d'appuyer les résolutions de l'ONU et, partant, la résolution proposée par le gouvernement. Le 16 janvier, immédiatement avant l'intervention de M. Turner, les amendements proposés par les libéraux et les non-démocrates ont été rejetés. Le NPD avait proposé un sous-amendement à celui du Parti libéral, éliminant tous les mots après le mot «sanctions» et les remplaçant par «un tel appui exclut la participation du Canada à une attaque militaire contre l'Irak ou contre les forces irakiennes au Koweït». Le sous-amendement a été rejeté par 210 voix contre 39, les libéraux ayant voté contre. L'amendement libéral, quant à lui, a été rejeté par 134 voix contre 116. Le débat témoignait d'un examen intense et sombre des questions en cause. Il s'est poursuivi après le début des hostilités, le 16 janvier à 19 heures, heure normale de l'Est. Pendant la séance du soir, après que le premier ministre eut pris des dernières nouvelles, M. Chrétien a annoncé que «tous les Canadiens et Canadiennes ont l'obligation de rester unis en cette circonstance».



# À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



## La guerre du Golfe

Le début des hostilités dans le Golfe le 17 janvier a été précédé d'une intense activité diplomatique tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur des Nations Unies. Le 27 octobre, l'ambassadeur soviétique, M. Yuli Vorontsov, a informé le Conseil de sécurité qu'un envoyé spécial de son pays se trouvait en Irak et qu'il y avait bon espoir qu'il réussit dans sa mission et que l'on trouvait une solution pacifique au conflit.

Au cours de la même réunion, le représentant du Koweït a fait état de violations des droits de la personne auxquelles l'Irak se livrait dans son pays. Il a exigé que les coupables soient jugés à l'avenir comme des «criminels de guerre». Le Conseil n'a pris aucune mesure pour jeter les bases d'un tribunal, mais, le 29 octobre, il a adopté la résolution 674 stipulant que l'Irak était responsable des pertes, blessures ou dommages infligés aux ressortissants et intérêts étrangers au Koweït. Cette résolution invitait les pays membres à réunir des informations sur les revendications contre l'Irak en vue de prendre des dispositions dans l'avenir pour la restitution des biens ou l'obtention d'une compensation financière.

Le 27 novembre, le Koweït a présenté un témoignage sur les atrocités qui, selon lui, avaient été commises par les soldats irakiens contre des Koweïtiens. Le lendemain, le Conseil a unanimement condamné la tentative faite par l'Irak de modifier la composition démographique du Koweït en détruisant les registres civils de ce pays. La Grande-Bretagne a accusé l'Irak d'essayer de détruire l'identité nationale du Koweït. En adoptant la résolution 677, le Conseil a également voté pour autoriser le Secrétaire général à prendre la garde d'une copie informatisée de registres.

Toutefois, tant le président Hussein que les événements survenus dans la région ne cessaient de corrompre le lien existant entre les deux questions. Le 7 novembre, le Conseil s'est réuni pour étudier une recommandation du Secrétaire général invitant les hautes parties contractantes de la Quatrième Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en

tres démographiques certifiées que le 29 novembre, le Conseil a adopté la plus importante résolution relative à la crise. Il s'agit de la résolution 678 qui autorisait l'usage de «tous les moyens nécessaires» pour obliger l'Irak à se retirer du Koweït. Douze pays ont voté pour, Cuba et le Yémen ont voté contre, et la Chine s'est abstenue.

Le document était parvenu par le Canada, la France, la Roumanie, l'URSS, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis et il donnait à l'Irak une «dernière chance» de céder ; jusqu'au 15 janvier. Pour souligner le caractère historique de la résolution, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de treize des quinze pays représentés au Conseil de sécurité étaient présents, y compris le ministre canadien, M. Joe Clark.

S'adressant au Conseil, M. Clark a abordé une question omniprésente dans la crise du Golfe, c'est-à-dire la nécessité de trouver une solution au problème du Moyen-Orient. Cette question a été liée au conflit à partir du moment où le président irakien, Saddam Hussein, a déclaré que l'Irak ne se retirerait du Koweït que si Israël quitte les territoires occupés. Les États-Unis se sont énergiquement opposés à cette idée, estimant que l'accepter reviendrait à récompenser l'Irak pour son agression.

M. Clark a souligné que la crise du Golfe pourrait offrir une occasion de régler d'autres problèmes dans la région :

Si nous pouvons maintenant noter la détermination collective, nous pourrions peut-être alors trouver une solution juste, complète et durable au conflit israélo-arabe.

La résolution 681 ne mentionne aucunement la conférence internationale. Néanmoins, dans un geste symbolique, les États-Unis ont accepté que le président du Conseil invitat le Secrétaire général à éduquer le projet initial, qui a adopté à l'unanimité une version négociations épuisantes, le Conseil le 20 décembre, après une série de conférences internationale. Enfin, la résolution 681 ne mentionne la Convention de Genève.

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Le 9 novembre, l'observateur représentant la Palestine a montré un film vidéo sur la violence survenue à la colline du Temple (al Haram al Charaf) le 3 octobre. Selon lui, le film infirmait les déclarations israéliennes selon lesquelles les Palestiniens avaient alors mené la vie d'Israéliens ; en fait, c'est le contraire qui s'était produit. Il a enfin dit que l'action des autorités israéliennes avait été préméditée et qu'elle avait visé à faire un grand nombre de victimes palestiniennes.

Le 16 novembre, les membres non alignés du Conseil de sécurité ont soumis un projet de résolution proposant la convocation d'une conférence internationale sur la paix au Moyen-Orient. Cette proposition a suscité des discussions intenses les membres arabes de la coalition internationale déployée contre l'Irak. D'autre part, ils ne voulaient pas essayer la colère d'Israël en dominant l'impression d'appuyer une conférence internationale, geste qui aurait pu faire croire qu'ils cédaient aux exigences de l'Irak.

Les 8, 9 et 10 décembre, le Conseil a décidé de reporter un vote sur un projet de résolution relatif à une conférence internationale. Enfin, le 20 décembre, après une série de conférences internationale, le Conseil a adopté à l'unanimité une version négociations épuisantes, le Conseil le 20 décembre, après une série de conférences internationale. Enfin, la résolution 681 ne mentionne la Convention de Genève.

Le 31 décembre, le mandat de deux ans du Canada au Conseil de sécurité a pris fin. □

— TREVOR ROWE

La question de Chypre a dominé les derniers efforts du Canada au Conseil. Le 14 décembre, ce dernier a voté pour prolonger de six mois le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre (UNFICYP) ; le Canada s'est abstenu. Par cette abstention, il exprimait sa déception parce que le financement de l'UNFICYP se faisait au moyen de contributions volontaires au lieu de contributions mises en recouvrement. Dans une déclaration adressée au Conseil, le Canada a estimé qu'à la suite de cet état de fait, certains pays ne contribuent plus, et des pays donateurs comme lui se retrouvaient avec un fardeau excessivement lourd.

Depuis 1964, l'UNFICYP a coûté 2 milliards de dollars environ, et 149 hommes et femmes sont morts au service de l'ONU à Chypre.

Un projet de résolution réclamant l'établissement de contributions mises en recouvrement a été pré-senté au Conseil, mais la France et l'URSS s'y seraient opposées. Le 21 décembre, le Conseil a adopté à l'unanimité une résolution diluant les problèmes relatifs au financement de la Force et de présenter, avant le 1<sup>er</sup> juin, des solutions de

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
— TREVOR ROWE

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La reconnaissance par satellite et la guerre du Golfe

Au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années, l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis en sont venus à compter de plus en plus sur les satellites de reconnaissance pour l'alerte stratégique et l'évaluation de l'ampleur et de la nature de toute attaque de missiles balistiques lancée contre eux. D'autres satellites constituent des maillons clés dans les réseaux de communications et de navigation. Les deux pays ont également utilisé des satellites pour surveiller des déploiements militaires et vérifier l'observation d'accords sur la limitation des armements. Dans le Golfe, la coalition recourt à divers satellites américains perfectionnés pour évaluer les commandages, recueillir des renseignements sur les activités militaires irakiennes et donner l'alerte en cas d'attaque par missiles militaires irakiens *Scud*. C'est le *Space Command* de l'Aviation militaire américaine qui a été chargé de détecter la mise à feu des engins *Scud*, grâce à au moins deux satellites munis de télescopes infrarouges. Ces satellites ont été placés sur orbite géosynchrone pour avoir le meilleur point de vue possible sur les lieux de lancement des *Scud*. D'après certaines sources, la rotation du télescope permet de balayer l'Irak toutes les douze secondes, délai qui lui serait possible de réduire en employant plus d'un satellite. Les télescopes infrarouges ont été conçus pour détecter et reconnaître la signature thermique beaucoup plus considérable des ICBM soviétiques, mais ils semblent pouvoir aussi repérer les *Scud* à portée relativement courte, et fournir des données approximatives sur leur trajectoire. Au début de la guerre du Golfe, les satellites communiquaient l'alerte tant à une station terrestre installée à Alice Springs, en Australie, qu'au quartier général du *Space Command* à Colorado Springs. Une fois l'analyse faite aux deux endroits, les données sur la trajectoire et le point d'impact étaient

Les Européens, par exemple, dépendent beaucoup des États-Unis

gation et de communications, ces systèmes spatiaux jouent aux Etats-Unis et à la coalition un avantage décisif en matière de renseignement et de tactique. On s'est aussi servi de moyens aériens américains pour la reconnaissance des objectifs spatiaux et la désignation des objectifs. A la fin de janvier, deux avions performants de détection d'objets étaient en route pour le Golfe. Le Radar interarmes de surveillance et d'attaque E-8A (J-STARS) est conçu pour repérer à 200 kilomètres de distance les hélicoptères volant à basses altitudes, les navires et les chars de combat, et pour diriger contre eux des avions amis.

Les satellites à cependant suscité de nombreuses questions plus vastes au sujet de l'accès aux renseignements ainsi recueillis. Le Canada bénéficie d'un traitement spécial, car, du fait de sa présence au centre des opérations de combat du NORAD, à Colorado Springs, il a accès à certaines des données obtenues grâce aux satellites militaires américains. Mais nous n'ont pas la même chance. Les Européens n'en ont aucune.

à quatre ou cinq minutes. Les États-Unis auraient par ailleurs déplacé des satellites de reconnaissance perfectionnés pour pouvoir observer l'Irak et le Koweït. L'un d'eux, le *Lacrosse*, produit des images au moyen d'un radar au lieu d'utiliser la photographie dans le visible, et il peut donc prendre des clichés par tous les temps. Plusieurs satellites *Keyhole* sont également déployés et ils sont en théorie capables d'identifier des objets ne mesurant pas plus de six pouces. Combinaisons aux satellites de nav-

transmises par satellite aux batteries de *Danior*. Le temps de vol d'un *Scud* est de six à sept minutes : il fallait au début 120 secondes pour calculer les coordonnées de la zone d'impact, et de deux à trois minutes pour alerter les systèmes de défense, ce qui laissait environ quatre-vingt-dix secondes aux batteries de *Danior* pour intercepter les engins ennemis. Par la suite, le *Space Command* a réussi à relayer directement les satellites de détection aux batteries de *Danior*, ce qui a porté la période d'interception

On nous soumet donc de part en part deux documents nouveaux émanant de l'Initiative de défense stratégique (IDS). Voilà qui a traversé clairement du discours prononcé par le président Bush le 31 janvier, quand il a préconisé de mettre de nouveau l'accent sur la recherche d'objets, dans le cadre de l'IDS, à pour-  
suivre la protection contre les attaques de moindre envergure par les missiles balistiques, quelle qu'en soit l'origine. Écartant la perspective d'une alliance stratégique massive qu'un système complet de défense antimissiles balistiques devrait bloquer, divers porte-parole connus aux États-Unis ont proposé que le pays se concentre plutôt sur l'acquisition d'une protection contre les lancements accidentels aux

Peu après les premières « vic-toires » remportées par les engins *Parot* dans la guerre du Golfe, le ministre américain de la Défense a effectué avec succès, le 29 janvier, l'essai d'un missile anti-missile baptisé « L'intercepteur » — le système d'interception exoatmosphérique des véhicules de rentrée, ou ERISS — à été lancé de l'île Kwajalein dans le Pacifique et a intercepté une ogive fautive *Minuteman* à environ 160 kilomètres dans l'espace. Il existe très peu de rapport entre le rôle du *Parot* et celui de l'ERIS : en effet, un missile balistique inter-continental vole environ cinq fois plus vite que le *Scud*, et le véhicule de rentrée constitue une cible beaucoup

## Les *Patriot* et la Guerre des étoiles

pour ce qui est des renseignements glanés par satellite, mais ils hésitent à financer le déploiement d'un système indépendant. En outre, la décision de l'entreprise française *SPOT* de ne pas divulguer les photographies du Koweït et de l'Irak pourrait bien renforcer les propositions récentes favorisant la mise en orbite d'un satellite que posséderait et exploiterait un consortium de médias. Par ailleurs, on compte de plus en plus sur les satellites, ce qui souligne la valeur militaire des armes anti-satellites, lesquelles ne sont actuellement visées par aucun accord de limitation des armements. Les Etats-Unis et l'URSS déploient actuellement de telles armes sans trop de difficulté.

La reconduction de l'accord  
du NORAD

raques déclenchées par une « tierce partie ». On s'attend à ce qu'une vingtaine de pays soient munis de missiles balistiques d'ici la fin du siècle.

L'attention de tous étant tournée vers le golfe Persique, la reconduite prochaine de l'Accord sur la défense aérospatiale du continent nord-américain a relativement suscité peu d'intérêt au Canada, et elle est passée complètement sous silence aux États-Unis. Cependant, il pourrait bien y avoir des surprises. À la fin de janvier, des rapports émanant des médias américains, rappellent que les porte-parole du ministère canadien des Affaires étrangères ont par la suite confirmés, ont révélé que le Pentagone envisage une réforme importante de ses grands commandements militaires. Il en résulterait notamment la dissolution de l'actuel *Unified Space Command*, dont le NORAD fait partie, et son remplacement par un «commandement des forces stratégiques». Pareille mesure regrouperait les systèmes de surveillance, les moyens d'interception, auxquels le Canada contribue en vertu de l'accord du NORAD, et les forces offensives relevant maintenant du *Strategic Air Command* (SAC). Si la restructuration a lieu, le rôle du Canada au sein d'un tel réseau revêt de commandements alimentaires certainement des débats animés.

## Des navires vétustes, mais utiles

de l'actuel *Unified Space Command*, dont le NORAD fait partie, et son remplacement par un «commandement des forces stratégiques». Partelle mesure reconnaîtrait les systèmes de surveillance, les moyens d'interception, auxquels le Canada NORAD, et les forces offensives relevant maintenant du *Strategic Air Command* (SAC). Si la restructuration a lieu, le rôle du Canada dans le réseau révisé de commandement s'alimenterait certainement des débats actuels.

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La reconduction de l'accord du NORAD

- DAVID COX

navires de guerre canadiens déployés dans le Golfe ont démontré leurs capacités avant le début des hostilités. En effet, ils ont à leur crédit plus de 25 p. 100 de toutes les interceptions navales exécutées en vertu du régime des sanctions. Depuis l'éclatement de la guerre, le commandant canadien du groupe-ment opérationnel naval s'est chargé de coordonner les mouvements de tous les navires de ravitaillement alliés (soutien logistique au combat) ; il dirige par ailleurs les destroyers et frégates alliés ayant pour mission de protéger les navires de ravitaillement.





importance est d'autant plus remarquable qu'il s'est produit avant même que cette question ait fait l'objet de débats publics sensibles.

Le déclin du soutien accordé aux forces de l'OAN semble correspondre au déclin général de l'importance concédée à l'Alliance. Une faible majorité des Canadiens (50 p. 100) reste favorable au maintien aux niveaux actuels des forces canadiennes stationnées en Europe. Mais le nombre de ceux qui voudraient réduire la taille de ces forces a pratiquement doublé depuis l'année dernière. Au cours de l'enquête de 1989, 10 p. 100 seulement des répondants étaient partisans d'une réduction (d'une amplitude non précisée). Cette proportion est maintenant de 21 p. 100. En 1989, 14 p. 100 étaient en faveur d'un retrait total ; ils sont maintenant 20 p. 100.

IL EST REMARQUABLE DE CONSTATER QUE LE CHANGEMENT INTERVENU APRÈS la Guerre froide, en ce qui concerne les affaires Est-Ouest et les « solutions » militaires, n'a pas suscité un intérêt accru pour la recherche de solutions aux problèmes Nord-Sud. Le sondage d'accord de l'aide aux pays en développement déclarait que c'était une question très importante, lors d'un sondage réalisé en 1984 par les Affaires extérieures, il n'y en a plus que 22 p. 100 maintenant à être de cet avis. Le même déclin s'est produit au sujet de la contribution à apporter pour réduire la faim et la pauvreté dans le monde ; le nombre de ceux qui plaçaient cette question parmi les grandes priorités du moment est passé de 62 p. 100 (lors d'un sondage Decima de 1985) à 41 p. 100 aujourd'hui.


Par contraste avec l'importance moins grande accordée à l'aide extérieure, les Canadiens continuent d'attribuer à peu près la même priorité qu'en 1984 à des engagements tels que la participation à l'ONU et aux opérations de maintien de la paix, ce qui est peut-être une façon d'exprimer leur inquiétude à propos de la guerre du Golfe. Par contraste également, près de neuf répondants sur dix (87 p. 100) réservent une place très importante à la protection des océans du Canada et des ressources situées au large de ses côtes.

L'opinion des Canadiens n'est pas une marque d'immobilisme. Ce n'est pas non plus une opinion incohérente ni confuse. Il est évident que les événements incroyables qui se sont produits à la fin des années 1980 à l'échelle internationale ont déjà eu une incidence considérable sur l'opinion du public canadien.

LES CANADIENS ET CANADIENNES, SEMBLER-IL, considèrent que, dans le monde actuel, les préoccupations ne jouent pas un rôle aussi prépondérant qu'autrefois et qu'elles couvrent davantage entre elles : les pays dont l'économie est en expansion, comme le Japon, tiennent une plus grande importance (et consistent une menace sur le plan économique) ; les forces militaires ne jouent plus un aussi grand rôle ; l'avènement de l'OTAN est incertain ; la Guerre froide, si elle n'est pas terminée, est, en tout cas, moins intense ; les principaux conflits ont lieu entre le Nord et le Sud plutôt qu'entre l'Est et l'Ouest ; l'instabilité et le militarisme qui régnaient dans le tiers-monde apparaissent comme de graves problèmes internationaux et non pas simplement régionaux, et il en va de même de questions écologiques de l'intérêt mondial telles que la dégradation de la couche d'ozone, par exemple. Bref, la population canadienne se voit au seuil d'un monde plus complexe, multipolaire et interdépendant. Les politiques sont évaluées par les Canadiens pour faire face à cet ordre nouveau obéissant-elles à un plan d'ensemble ? Au risque de paraître simplistes et de nous adonner à des suppositions, disons que la tendance semble être au retrait plutôt qu'à une participation accrue. Les Canadiens ont peut-être envie de se détacher non seulement des problèmes européens, qui ont été résolus, mais aussi de ceux du tiers-monde, qui semblent insolubles, de garder leurs ressources et de s'occuper de leurs propres problèmes.

## LE CANADA ET LES ÉTATS-UNIS

*Une grande confiance ou confiance considérable en l'habileté des États-Unis à s'occuper prudemment des problèmes mondiaux :*




*Au cours des dix prochaines années, les États-Unis représenteront une menace :*



## LE CANADA ET LE MONDE

*Il est très important que le Canada :*



l'Irak, que le risque d'une guerre mondiale était grand. (Cette inquiétude s'est sans doute aggravée dans les mois suivants, lorsqu'on se demandait si un conflit direct avec l'Irak était possible. On trouvera à la page 16 une étude sur l'attitude adoptée par le public canadien envers les guerres auxquelles le Canada a participé, et notamment envers la guerre du Golfe.)

Même si la possibilité d'une guerre reste bien réelle pour beaucoup de gens, les causes probables d'un tel conflit ont radicalement changé au cours des dernières décennies. Aujourd'hui, la grande majorité du public canadien (69 p. 100) estime qu'une guerre mondiale serait provoquée par d'autres pays que les États-Unis ; moins d'une personne sur quatre (23 p. 100) était de cet avis lors d'un sondage Gallup en 1961. Deux pour cent seulement des personnes interrogées croient maintenant qu'une guerre pourrait être la conséquence d'une initiative soviétique. Il y a trente ans, ce chiffre était de 41 p. 100. Par contraste, davantage de personnes pensent maintenant que les États-Unis en seraient la cause, bien que ce ne soit qu'une personne sur sept (13 p. 100) environ.

Lorsque, l'année dernière, au cours du mois ayant précédé l'ouverture du mur de Berlin, on demandait aux Canadiens si la Guerre froide était finie, peu d'entre eux étaient aussi optimistes (6 p. 100). Après une année fertile en événements dramatiques en Europe de l'Est, un nombre sensiblement plus élevé se déclarait optimistes (21 p. 100), mais la plupart restent persuadés que la Guerre froide n'est pas terminée.

Ces dernières années, les Canadiens ont consommé déclaré que la plus grande menace militaire contre la paix dans le monde était soit la prolifération des armes nucléaires dans les petits pays, soit un conflit régional. L'idée que les Canadiens et Canadiennes se font des menaces contre la sécurité est en pleine évolution. Comme l'a révélé pour la première fois le sondage effectué l'année dernière par l'Institut, ils mentionnent à présent les problèmes environnementaux et économiques, aussi bien que les menaces plus classiques d'ordre militaire.

Quant on leur avait demandé de classer, en fonction de leur gravité, cinq grands problèmes internationaux ayant trait à l'environnement (réchauffement de la planète, déchets toxiques, pluies acides, dégradation de la couche d'ozone et pollution de l'eau), les répondants n'avaient pas indiqué clairement qu'elle était la principale priorité ; deux problèmes, cependant, avaient été mis en relief. Une personne sur trois (30 p. 100) avait désigné la dégradation de la couche d'ozone comme étant le problème le plus grave. En second lieu venait la pollution des lacs et des océans (24 p. 100), puis les déchets toxiques (16 p. 100), le réchauffement de la planète (15 p. 100) et les pluies acides (12 p. 100).

DE TOUTE ÉVIDENCE, LE PUBLIC CANADIEN A commencé à repenser à l'engagement pris par son pays envers l'OTAN. Pour la première fois depuis des dizaines d'années, le soutien accordé à l'OTAN a diminué d'une façon spectaculaire. Au cours de l'enquête effectuée par l'ICPSI en octobre 1989, plus d'un Canadien sur deux (52 p. 100) avait déclaré qu'il était très important que le Canada reste dans l'OTAN. À présent, un sur trois seulement portance accordée à l'Alliance s'est traduite par une chute de vingt points dans les sondages. Bien qu'il soit possible d'expliquer ce recul par le déclin de la vieille menace soviétique, la démocratie libérale et de l'économie de marché à l'État soviétique, l'effondrement des régimes communistes d'Europe de l'Est et la disparition attendue du Pacte de Varsovie, son



institut canadien pour  
la paix et la sécurité internationales

L SEMBLE MAINTENANT EVIDENT que l'ordre qui a régné pendant près d'un demi-siècle a disparu. Moins claire, en revanche, est la forme du nouvel ordre qui va le remplacer. Et beaucoup moins claire encore est la philosophie qui fondera cet ordre. Quelle était donc l'opinion tradi-

Canadiens après la guerre ? Les Américains et les Russes étaient froids. Le Japon et l'Europe (et le Canada) étaient faibles. Les États-Unis étaient nos amis : l'URSS était notre ennemi. La politique mondiale était fonction des forces militaires. L'expansionnisme soviétique et la guerre nucléaire constituaient les principales menaces : l'OTAN était donc indispensable. L'Europe et l'Allemagne étaient divisées et le restaient encore longtemps. Le tiers-monde était pauvre et faible. L'ONU était nécessaire mais impuissante.

politique étrangère canadienne visant essentiellement à conserver l'amitié des Américains, à tenir les Russes à l'écart, à ne pas baïsser la garde du pays (dans la mesure du possible), à garder ses troupes dans l'OTAN, à soutenir l'ONU, à être prêt à assurer le maintien de la paix et à poursuivre l'aide extérieure (mais pas trop). La majorité des Canadiens et Canadiennes s'occupaient aux grandes lignes de cette politique. La question qui se pose maintenant est de savoir s'ils sont toujours d'accord, ou si il existe une divergence que le nouvel ordre des choses a inspiré une pensée originale. Avec leur sagesse officielle, les experts et les hauts fonctionnaires essaient de la plupart des gens ne s'intéressent guère aux relations internationales, comprennent relativement mal les événements mondiaux et ne s'en soucient pas. Il est donc possible que la population canadienne ait été en grande partie décomectée et que son attitude actuelle ne diffère pas beaucoup de celle qu'elle a été pendant des décennies ou, tout au moins, pas encore. Il est également possible que l'ordre imaginé ait fait place au désordre. Même lorsque l'époque n'est pas si extraordinaire, la plupart des gens trouvent que quelque peu déstabilisant le foisonnement des événements qui surviennent sur la scène mondiale. Mais la série de changements pacifiques intervenus récemment a révélé non seulement que nos politiciens étaient dépassés, mais que nos défenses psychologiques s'étaient effondrées. Le mur de l'Berlin disparaît en une nuit; la politique soviétique semble changer d'un tour à l'autre; l'Irak, un pays éloigné, plus petit que le Canada, devient quelquefois le point de mire du monde entier. On comprend, dans ces conditions, pourquoi l'opinion du public, tout autant peut-être que celle des experts en politique étrangère, est en plein désarroi.

Il est également possible que l'ordre magique ait fait place au désordre. Vient lorsque l'époque n'est pas si extraordinaire, la plupart des gens trouvent quelque peu décevant le foisonnement des événements qui surviennent sur la scène mondiale. Mais la série de changements pacifiques intervenus récemment a révélé non seulement que nos politiques étaient dépassées, mais que nos défenses psychologiques s'étaient effondrées. Le mur de Berlin disparaît en une nuit; la politique soviétique semble changer d'un jour à l'autre; l'Irak, un pays éloigné, plus petit que le Canada, devient soudainement le point de mire du monde entier. On comprend, dans ces conditions, pourquoi l'opinion du public, tout autant peut-être que celle des experts en politique étrangère, est en plein désarroi.

LES SONDAGES D'OPINION EFFECTUÉS CHAQUE ANNÉE PAR L'INSTITUT CANADIEN

Pour la paix et la sécurité internationales (il en est maintenant à son quar-tième) nous fournissons une moisson de données qui permettent de savoir la logique l'emporte, si c'est la confusion qui règne, ou si le nouveau système actuel présente une certaine cohérence.

Les sondages du début des années 1970 révélaient qu'une grande majorité des Canadiennes et Canadiennes considéraient les États-Unis comme le pays le plus puissant du monde sur les plans militaire et économique. Ils sont tous à peu près avariés à penser que les États-Unis sont la puissance militaire la plus forte, mais seulement la moitié de notre population déclare maintenant que c'est le pays le plus fort sur le plan économique.

Par contraste, une personne sur six (15 p. 100) désignait alors le Japon comme étant la puissance économique prépondérante, mais une majorité de

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Les Canadiens et Canadiennes considèrent les États-Unis comme le pays où ils peuvent aller pour faire leur service militaire et économique. Ils sont toujours à peu près aussi enclin à penser que les États-Unis sont la puissance militaire la plus forte, mais seulement la moitié de notre population déclare maintenant que c'est le pays le plus fort sur le plan économique. Par contraste, une personne sur six (15 p. 100) désignait alors le Japon comme étant la puissance économique prépondérante, mais une majorité de

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personne de l'Institut, il finança par ce dernier. Il a été réalisé en septembre et en octobre 1990. Au total, 275 personnes ont répondu au questionnaire, soit un taux de réponse de 62 p. 100. Avec des échantillons de cette taille, la marge d'erreur est, 95 fois sur 100, d'environ 3 p. 100 dans un sens ou dans l'autre.

# CHANGER SON FUSIL D'ÉPAULE

*L'opinion canadienne dans l'«après-après-guerre».*

PAR DON WUNTON

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LE SONDAGE D'OPINION REALISE PAR L'INSTITUT

personnes (50 p. 100) est maintenant de cet avis. La Communauté européenne vient loin derrière en troisième place (11 p. 100). Il est révélateur de constater que la plupart des Canadiens et Canadiennes estiment que les facteurs économiques sont plus importants que les facteurs militaires dans l'exercice du pouvoir national.

Les enquêtes effectuées par l'Institut à partir de 1987 montrent que les sentiments ressentis à l'égard des États-Unis et de l'Union soviétique sont devenus plus chaleureux. La proportion des personnes ayant très confiance, ou grande confiance, dans la capacité des États-Unis de régler judicieusement les problèmes mondiaux est passée de 37 p. 100 en 1987 à 47 p. 100 en 1988, puis à 67 p. 100 en 1989; elle représentait actuellement 75 p. 100 des Canadiens au moins. Le taux de confiance accordé par ces derniers à leur voisin du Sud était ainsi plus élevé en août 1990 qu'à n'importe quel moment depuis le début des années 1970, mais il est possible qu'il ait quelque peu souffert de l'engagement des États-Unis dans la guerre du Golfe.

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canadienne

«après-guerre».

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ÉPAULE

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ALISÉ PAR L'INSTITUT

1987, avant la signature du Traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI) et le réchauffement des relations américano-soviétiques, un Canadien sur deux (55 p. 100) estimait que le danger de guerre nucléaire était élevé. Il n'y en a plus maintenant qu'un sur trois (33 p. 100). D'un autre côté, un nombre relativement élevé de personnes estiment qu'il existe un risque de guerre mondiale; elles sont, en effet, aussi nombreuses qu'au début des années 1960. Quatre répondants au présent sondage sur dix (41 p. 100) estimaient, dans le mois suivant l'invasion du Koweït par

M. Fujimori a pris l'initiative en combinant trois types d'expérience pour

en faire la «doctrine Fujimori». Il a été conseillé de près par M. Hernando de Soto, qui dirige l'Institut privé pour la liberté et la démocratie et a publié un ouvrage à succès intitulé *The Other Path*, qui analyse la vaste économie informelle qui est le marché gris au Pérou.

PREMIÈREMENT, LES CULTIVATEURS DE COCA NE SÉRIERAIENT PLUS CONSIDÉRÉS comme des criminels parce qu'ils cultivent du coca. La terre leur appartiendrait légalement (une mesure approuvée à Washington).

Deuxièmement, on recommanderait d'obtenir de meilleurs prix pour les cultures licites en éliminant les tracaseries bureaucratiques et les monopoles étatique et oligarchique exercés sur les marchés de l'exportation. On doit cet accent mis sur le droit des *campesinos* à participer à la substitution des plantes à M. Ibán De Remencan, un Français qui a collaboré au programme des Nations Unies sur la substitution des plantes dans la haute vallée de la Huallaga. Ce programme encourage les *campesinos* à créer des organismes de base populaire autour des comités communitaires de production. De tels organismes facilitent l'administration, l'assistance technique agricole et, ce qui est plus important, ils offrent à la force de se défendre contre les dirigeants sans scrupules des coopératives qui commercialisent leurs produits. Comparativement, le programme de substitution de plantes géré par les États-Unis dans la Huallaga n'a jamais prospéré. À la fin de 1989, un haut responsable de la *US Agency for International Development* s'est vanté d'avoir aidé six agriculteurs seulement dans la région, tandis que l'ONU travaillait avec quelque 3 500 *campesinos*.

La troisième (et la plus impressionnante) partie du programme de M. Fujimori a été conçue par le général Alberto Arciniega, un officier très dynamique nommé par M. Alan García en mars 1989 pour mater la subversion dans la vallée. M. Arciniega a établi son quartier général dans ce qu'il appelle «le pire du pire», c'est-à-dire la ville d'Uchiza, un grand centre de subversion et de distribution de drogues, où il occupait un petit poste militaire. «Si on peut réussir à Uchiza, on peut réussir n'importe où», disait-il.

Il avait une politique anti-insurrectionnelle classique. Il infligeait des coups durs aux guérilleros grâce aux renseignements fournis par une population Mais il professait également que les *campesinos* devaient penser à leur avenir. «Le coca est une mode», disait-il. Il fallait cultiver autre chose. Le général Arciniega les Nations Unies d'effectuer une étude des sols avec quelque 5 000 agriculteurs, et il les a convaincus que les cultures marchandes et l'agro-industrie compenseraient la disparition progressive du coca. Il a également précisé que lorsque le coca serait remplacé par une solution de recharge économiquement viable, les agriculteurs qui n'auraient pas procédé à la substitution des plantes verraient leurs champs de coca détruits.

Le maître d'œuvre de LA DOCTRINE FUJIMORI EST LA COMMISSION AUTO-NOME pour un autre développement, organisme indépendant chargé de concevoir une politique antidrogues qui servirait de base à la négociation avec les États-Unis et d'autres pays désireux de participer à la lutte antidrogues. Pour obtenir un financement américain, le Pérou devra réaliser un tour de force dans l'élaboration de sa politique : concilier judicieusement le développement économique, la lutte contre les drogues et la lutte contre la subversion. Bien que l'administration Bush ait fini par accepter la nécessité de développer d'autres cultures pour éliminer le coca, la plupart des dirigeants américains sont toujours réticents à collaborer avec les *cocaleros* (les cultivateurs de coca) en matière de substitution de cultures, car ils craignent de leur crédibilité en s'associant à des «criminels» dont le seul souci est de débarrasser de la DEA.

Pour leur part, les *cocaleros* ne se disent pas contre l'interdiction, mais ils en veulent à la police antidrogues qui, selon eux, volent de l'argent lors des perquisitions domiciliaires. Le chef des *cocaleros* d'Uchiza, M. Cesar Valdivazo, âgé de 23 ans, déclare : «Nous ne reprochons pas à la police de lutter contre

le trafic de stupéfiants, mais elle doit s'attaquer aux *fijinas* (aux organisations responsables du trafic) et non aux cultivateurs de coca.» Cet avis est partagé par un agronome ayant travaillé avec les *cocaleros*.

Les *campesinos* ajoutent qu'ils veulent pratiquer la substitution des cultures parce qu'ils en ont assez de la violence. La plupart des résidents de longue date et les nouveaux immigrants venus de toutes les régions du Pérou pendant la «ruée vers le coca» subissent des pressions de la part d'un ensemble abrutissant d'«intérêts». Là où il y a du coca (et des «marcos»), il y a des guérilleros (et des voleurs qui se font passer pour des guérilleros), des policiers et des soldats), la police antidrogues financée par les États-Unis, la police anti-subversion formée par les États-Unis, des officiers militaires très mal payés et corrompus et la police nationale d'enquête qui les vole fréquemment (disent-ils) et que les *campesinos* abhorrent sans doute le plus. La corruption pourrait bien être le talon d'Achille de toute stratégie antidrogues au Pérou. Une campagne anti-corruption débutera en mars pour débloquer les goulots d'étranglement bureaucratiques qui frustrent les gens et pour pousser à offrir des pots-de-vin pour se frayer un chemin dans le système. La question est de savoir si cette campagne pourra atteindre les forces de l'ordre. Au moins un fonctionnaire américain a proféré une menace voilée à l'endroit d'un officier militaire, en déclarant que des défoliants seront utilisés au Pérou si rien n'est fait pour empêcher l'armée de laisser les avions colombiens attirer dans les aéroports municipaux et de les protéger sur les pistes d'atterrissage clandestines de la vallée. Au moment où nous rédigeons ces lignes, les États-Unis ont effectivement suspendu leur participation à un groupe de soutien visant à aider le Pérou à honorer ses obligations envers le FMI (Fonds monétaire international), afin d'inciter ce pays à prendre des mesures concrètes pour combattre le trafic de la drogue dans les aéroports légaux. Dans les zones d'urgence inondées de dollars provenant du commerce de coca, les policiers et les militaires, qui ont des soldes de misère, sont obligés de voler pour survivre. Dans la vallée de la Huallaga, la «caution» de libération d'un guérillero capturé est de 1 000 \$ ; la moitié de cette somme est versée au chef de la police et le reste au procureur de la poursuite. La solde mensuelle d'un grand général d'armée s'élève à 230 \$ seulement, et les commandants reçoivent le prix d'une bière en ration quotidienne d'un soldat. Quelques militaires honnêtes sont profondément préoccupés par l'étendue de la corruption : selon l'un d'eux, «si nous combattons la corruption, je pense que nous pourrions combattre très efficacement le *Sendero*.»

AU COEUR D'UNE RÉCESSION ÉCRASANTE, M. FUJIMORI A MONTÉ QU'IL VEUT vraiment réintégrer le Pérou au sein du système financier international et mettre l'accent sur la nécessité d'une lutte réaliste et intégrée contre le terrorisme et les drogues, lutte qui sera forcément coûteuse. En juillet 1989, dans la Déclaration de Paris, le Groupe des sept a préconisé que l'on ramène les programmes bilatéraux et ceux des Nations Unies pour remplacer les cultures illicites dans les pays producteurs. En février 1990, lors de la réunion des présidents des pays andins à Carthagène (Colombie), M. George Bush a avoué qu'il était important de trouver des solutions de rechange économiques au coca, mais presque rien n'a été fait pour aider les producteurs de cette plante. La communauté internationale devra faire appel à sa propre volonté politique pour examiner honnêtement la complexité des niveaux symbiotiques que sont au Pérou le coca, la subversion et la corruption, et pour décider si ça vaut la peine de dépasser les gestes symboliques pour accorder une aide substantielle — à temps.

1. Pendant des millénaires, l'Erythroxylum coca a fait partie intégrante de la vie des communautés parlant le quechua et l'aymara au Pérou et en Bolivie. Des millions de gens mâchent couramment la feuille de coca pour ne pas sentir la faim, la soif et la fatigue. Cette feuille est aussi utilisée à des fins médicinales et religieuses. 2. D'après l'ambassade du Pérou à Ottawa, un groupe de pays industrialisés est en train de se constituer pour offrir au Pérou un prêt relais de 800 millions de dollars qui rendra admissible aux prêts du FMI. Les États-Unis, le Canada, le Japon, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Espagne seraient membres de ce groupe naissant ; la Grande-Bretagne s'est retirée. 3. SECURITE PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ



Benoît Lacroix



# LA DERNIÈRE CHANCE DU PÉROU ?

Le nouveau président du Pérou s'attaque aux trois fléaux que sont la cocaïne, la corruption et une décennie de violentes insurrections.

PAR SHARON STEVENSON

OUR UNE MULTITUDE DE RAISONS HISTORIQUES, LE PÉROU EST UN PAYS malade sur les plans économique, moral et social, et le nouveau président, M. Alberto Fujimori, le sait. La corruption s'est installée dans des institutions nationales incohérentes et exsangues et elle s'est allentée de dollars provenant du trafic de la drogue. Le plus grand défi qui attend M. Fujimori est la réforme du gouvernement qu'il doit

changer en une force constructive et juste. Il doit convaincre les Péruviens d'aider leur gouvernement à combattre le trafic de narcotiques, les insurgés et la corruption généralisée.

Dans la guerre antidrogues que mène le Pérou, l'arme secrète est la volonté politique, ou plutôt l'absence de celle-ci. Les États-Unis, principaux acteurs étrangers dans cette guerre, accusent le Pérou de ne pas avoir la volonté politique de lutter contre le problème numéro un de l'Amérique, c'est-à-dire la drogue. Encore haïties par le Vietnam, les États-Unis s'efforcent actuellement la volonté politique de s'attaquer à ce que les Péruviens considèrent comme étant leur principal problème : une insurrection biciphale menée par le *Sendero Luminoso* (Sentier lumineux), organisation semblable à celle des Khmers rouges, et par le mouvement révolutionnaire castroïste *Inpac Amuru* (MRTA) ; japonais et surmomme le « Karaté Kid », s'est lancé dans un violent réquisitoire. En effet, il a sévèrement critiqué l'Eglise catholique pour sa résistance à la limitation des naissances, et il a justifié l'appareil judiciaire, qualifiant ces deux organisations prospères dans les zones de production du coca. Après son investiture en juillet 1990, M. Fujimori, né au Pérou de parents japonais et surmomme le « Karaté Kid », s'est lancé dans un violent réquisitoire.

M. Garcia avait laissé derrière lui un pays en faillite et une « narco-économie » dont les exportations de coca génèrent des recettes non contrôlées et non taxées d'environ un à deux milliards de dollars US (en 1989, les exportations légales du Pérou s'élevaient à 3,5 milliards de dollars), ce qui a déformé l'économie et détreillé complètement le taux de change du dollar. La lutte contre les drogues et la subversion passait au second plan.

Le Pérou FOURNIT ENVIRON 60 p. 100 DES FEUILLES DE COCA QUI ENTRENT dans la fabrication de la cocaïne consommée aux États-Unis et de plus en plus en Europe. La vallée de la haute Huallaga, située au nord-est du pays, est devenue célèbre au début des années 1980. Elle produit le coca de la meilleure qualité et est devenue le centre de distribution et de commercialisation d'où la cocaïne était exportée par avion vers la Colombie. La région est aussi devenue le quartier général des opérations antidrogues financées par les États-Unis. Pendant plusieurs années, ces derniers avaient financé des missions d'interdiction à faible intensité et la destruction physique de plantes de coca dans la haute vallée de la Huallaga. En 1989, les agents de la *Drug Enforcement Administration* (DEA) des États-Unis et la police antidrogues qu'ils conseillaient y ont établi une nouvelle base et ont intensifié leurs opérations.

Au Pérou, la politique antidrogues des États-Unis, que même des sources bien informées considèrent comme étant « un peu lambeaux », a été fondée sur l'illusion que la peur, l'illusion que l'on peut éliminer l'offre de drogues sans s'attaquer au principal problème du Pérou, à savoir une subversion épouvantable. Pour qu'en s'y attaquant, les États-Unis s'engageraient dans

de regarder en face la déchirante complexité des régions péruviennes pro-

«un autre Vietnam» ou même El Salvador. Cependant, en refusant


«Pour nous, le trafic de narcotiques est un cancer, et nous voulons l'éliminer. Mais nous voulons qu'en appliquant la loi, on prenne en compte le contexte global, c'est-à-dire les possibilités réelles des agresseurs dans les zones où l'on produit actuellement du coca et la possibilité d'élaborer d'autres options économiques.»

«judiciaire» pour faire échec au vol et à l'adulter.

M. Alberto Fujimori, agronome et professeur d'université venu de nulle part pour accéder à la présidence l'année dernière, n'est pas politiquement fou. Comme son prédécesseur, il a refusé de signer l'accord d'aide militaire avec les États-Unis avant l'échec de l'opération, perdant ainsi les 35,9 millions de dollars que ceux-ci lui destinaient. On l'incitait à accepter une aide américaine qui exacerberait une stratégie anti-insurrectionnelle déjà militarisée, et ce, sans lui fournir de «carotte» pour ce que les spécialistes de la contre-insurrection appellent «l'autre guerre», celle des cœurs et des esprits. Sans mesures coordonnées sur les plans politique, économique, social et psychologique, l'aide américaine ne ferait qu'enflammer les sentiments anti-américains des nationalistes.

Le plus grand défi de M. Fujimori consistera à rétablir la «légitimité morale» de son gouvernement aux yeux de la population rurale et paysanne. Ragrant aux accusations des États-Unis qui estimaient que le Pérou était complaisant en matière de drogues pour n'avoir pas accepté l'aide proposée, M. Fujimori a répondu sans équivoque :

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James Muegel

raindre à trouver une solution ou du moins un ré-  
gime régional de limitation des armements.  
IL EST DIFFICILE D'AVOIR CONFIANCE EN L'AVENIR  
après une guerre devenue inévitable à cause  
de l'absence totale de toute politique étrangère  
et non de l'échec d'une telle politique. Si l'on en  
vient à déterminer l'avenir du Moyen-Orient dans  
cette optique, la région restera fragile, instable  
et lourdement armée. Bien sûr, une sorte de  
bonne nouvelle pour les gros producteurs et  
exportateurs d'armes.  
Alléguons, toutefois, les effets conjugués de cette  
situation seraient catastrophiques. La hausse des  
prix du pétrole, l'augmentation du déficit améri-  
cain, l'accroissement des importations d'armes et  
le ralentissement de l'aide étrangère (la Grande-  
Bretagne a déjà refusé de fournir une aide supplé-  
mentaire au Soudan à cause des frais engendrés  
par la crise du Golfe) sont autant de facteurs qui  
vont exacerber les problèmes économiques en  
Amérique latine, dans le sous-continent africain  
et en Asie du Sud. Le prix à payer à l'aune de  
l'échec du développement économique et de l'ac-  
croissement des tensions politiques sera lourd.  
À l'avenir, on pourra peut-être, grâce à une plani-  
fication habile ou dure en matière de défense,  
empêcher une nouvelle guerre au Moyen-Orient.  
Toutefois, dans une situation où il n'y aurait  
rien qu'un peu sursis de l'absence relative de de-  
fenses de techniques. Jusqu'ici, les participants des  
régimes de recherche étaient nombreux  
à invoquer surtout les limites et les défauts de  
la technologie militaire de pointe pour dénoncer  
les «duretés» et le genre de pratiques de l'indus-  
trie militaire propres à faire grimper les prix,  
mais sans produire plus qu'un accroissement  
marginal du potentiel de défense. Pourtant, les  
attaques à basse altitude lancées par les avions  
*Tornado*, la précision des missiles *Parrot* et la  
qualité extraordinaire des dispositifs de collecte  
d'information pour occulter l'opinion des «lud-  
distes» face à la technologie militaire moderne.  
On peut espérer, toutefois, qu'il y aura beau-  
coup d'avantages à retirer de cette dialectique,  
dont le moindre ne sera pas la formulation d'une  
politique réalisable. Jusqu'ici, le débat sur les  
régimes de substitution en matière de défense  
s'est en grande partie toujours traduit par des  
politiques chimériques axées sur la défaite, l'idée  
étant de laisser les frontières d'un pays ouvertes à  
l'invasion et de s'assurer que les aspects négatifs  
de l'occupation du territoire l'emporteraient sur  
les avantages possibles.

La guerre du Golfe marque à coup sûr un tour-  
nant dans l'histoire de la région pour tous les in-  
térêts. Après la défaite de l'Irak, le système  
international devra, au moment où il affrontera le  
problème sous l'aspect de la demande, se con-

Enfin, la crise du Golfe exercera un effet plus  
subtil et à plus long terme sur le système inter-  
national. Avant l'attaque déclenchée le 17 janvier,  
les participants des autres régimes de sécurité («la  
défense» et la «défense» et la «défense» et la  
«défense») commençaient à se faire entendre en Eu-  
rope, à la fois sur le plan intellectuel et politique,  
même parmi les professionnels. Cependant, les  
premiers succès des alliés dans le Golfe avais-  
sent le recours à une technologie mili-  
taire de pointe, qui se révèle être apte à retarder  
l'engagement de troupes à grande échelle et à  
réduire ainsi le nombre des victimes civiles.

À l'échelle mondiale et une politique de fin de  
guerre froide, le marché international des armes  
ne pouvait que subir de nouvelles compressions.  
La guerre du Golfe menace de modifier tout  
cela au fur et à mesure que les forces armées et  
les gouvernements en viennent à tirer leurs pro-  
pres conclusions des événements actuels. Au plan  
politique, la résolution prise par les États-Unis  
d'éviter un nouveau Vietnam a mené à une inter-  
vention militaire écrasante d'un type on ne peut  
plus dévastateur : pendant les deux premiers jours  
de la guerre, les forces alliées ont déversé autant  
de bombes sur l'Irak que les forces aériennes  
anglo-américaines sur la ville de Dresde dans les  
dernières semaines de la Seconde Guerre mondi-  
ale. La faiblesse relative de l'Irak va faire  
réfléchir d'autres puissances ambitieuses du tiers-  
monde, telles que l'Inde et l'Iran, qui possèdent  
un potentiel militaire comparable.

La situation en Union soviétique, sauf que la  
conversion de la production d'armements  
marquait le pas ces derniers temps.  
Bien sûr, il aurait encore fallu que les change-  
ments s'opèrent dans les pays industrialisés du  
Nord se concrétisent par de nouvelles démarches  
à l'échelle du commerce international des ar-  
mes tout entier, mais le changement des ten-  
dances de la demande en matière d'armements  
laisserait déjà espérer des progrès dans l'avenir.  
Ainsi les Nations Unies avaient, elles aussi,  
adopté une autre optique de ce côté-là, le premier  
indice de leurs nouvelles préoccupations étant  
la convocation de comités d'experts et la tenue  
de conférences spécialisées sur les moyens  
d'accroître la transparence dans le commerce  
international des armements.  
Avant l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak, le marché  
des armements était languissant dans tout le Moyen-  
Orient à cause de la baisse des prix du pétrole,  
quoique la demande eût continué à être forte com-  
parée à d'autres parties du tiers-monde — comme  
entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Arabie saoudite  
pour les missiles *Tornado* et d'autres équipements et installa-  
tions. Par l'intermédiaire du Conseil de coopéra-  
tion du Golfe, plusieurs pays riches en pétrole, tels  
que l'Oman et l'Arabie saoudite, avaient entrepris  
de rationaliser leur approvisionnement en armes  
afin d'éviter le double emploi et le gaspillage.  
Par ailleurs, les pays pauvres du tiers-monde  
avaient commencé à se rendre compte qu'il était  
impossible d'acquiescer un potentiel militaire vase-  
et varié sans disposer de grosses quantités de de-  
fenses étrangères, lesquelles étaient de plus en plus  
souvent à la seule disposition des États produc-  
teurs de pétrole et de certains pays nouvellement  
industrialisés, tels que la Corée du Sud, Le Pa-  
kistan, par exemple, comptant, une fois que les  
Soviétiques eurent quitté l'Afghanistan, que l'en-  
gagement pris par les États-Unis en matière d'aide  
économique et militaire était loin d'être illimité.  
Et les dépenses effrénées faites par l'Inde en  
matière de défense tout au long des années 1980  
s'arrêtèrent prématurément, laissant de larges  
brèches dans le potentiel militaire, ce qui incita,  
plus récemment, le gouvernement à se livrer à un  
réexamen de sa politique de défense. Dans le cas  
de l'Inde, la leçon n'était pas compliquée : un  
accroissement de l'arsenal militaire si important  
qu'il en éclipsait même celui de l'Arabie saoudite  
de ces dernières années ne pouvait se poursuivre  
avec, en tout et pour tout, trois semaines de  
disponibilités en devises étrangères à la banque.

LE ETAT ÉGALEMENT SYMPTOMATIQUE QUE LES



# DE LA DISETTE À L'ABONDANCE

La guerre du Golfe risque de relancer les ventes d'armes

aux pays du tiers-monde.

PAR CHRIS SMITH

**L**A GUERRE DU GOLFE EST SURVENUE À UN moment critique pour le système politique international et le commerce mondial des armes. La brève période qui s'est écoulée entre la fin de la Guerre froide et le début de la guerre du Golfe a donné aux nations l'occasion rare mais éphémère de s'interroger sur les meilleurs moyens de tirer profit des nouvelles conditions de sécurité moins menaçantes. Mais tout résultait tant soit peu positif est incontestablement menacé à présent par une guerre d'importance, dont les enseignements techniques et politiques devront être suivis de près.

Les forces de la coalition ne peuvent perdre la guerre — dans les mois qui viennent, Saddam Hussein sera chassé du Koweït, il verra son potentiel de guerre détruit et il aura peu de chances de survie au chaos et à la désintégration politiques qui en résulteront en Irak. Pourtant, les profits de la politique mettent déjà en doute l'aptitude des alliés à gagner la paix — un but plus important encore que le retour au *status quo ante*. Au cours des quinze dernières années, les forces arabes et israéliennes ont pu librement augmenter leur potentiel militaire jusqu'à un niveau impressionnant en jouant la carte soviétique contre la carte américaine, en provoquant des dissensions entre les alliés occidentaux, en particulier l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, la France et les États-Unis, et en profitant, par l'entremise de sociétés agissant individuellement, de tous les créneaux existant dans les contrôles nationaux des exportations de défense. C'est en partie à cause de cela que, dans cette région, les problèmes de sécurité et les luttes pour le pouvoir ont pris une nouvelle dimension depuis la guerre du Yom Kippour en 1973 — les forces conventionnelles sont beaucoup plus puissantes et il y a maintenant des missiles à longue portée et peut-être même des armes chimiques et nucléaires qui peuvent y être associées.

Il ne sert à rien de réduire ou de stabiliser le potentiel militaire en tant que tel, surtout si, par définition, cette action s'exerce de l'extérieur ; le président Jimmy Carter s'y était employé, sans succès, à la fin des années 1970, en promettant que les États-Unis ne seraient pas le premier pays à introduire des technologies nouvelles dans des régions fortement instables. Il y a une trop grande aspiration économique et politique au Moyen-Orient, un trop grand nombre de nouveaux fournisseurs en dehors de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord, outre le fait que les contrôles exercés par les nations sur les ventes pour la défense con-

tinuent à être trop faibles. Dans cette région, le seul moyen de réduire ou de contrôler le potentiel militaire consiste visiblement à modifier les tendances de l'offre et de la demande. Bien que l'avenir nous réserve sans doute beaucoup de changements, il y a déjà des indices montrant que les ventes d'armes vont continuer à jouer un rôle primordial dans les affaires du Moyen-Orient. Le Pentagone a déjà établi des plans d'urgence pour accroître le potentiel militaire du Koweït, de l'Arabie saoudite et des États du Golfe et installer une force interalliée de maintien de la paix, au cas où Saddam Hussein ne serait que partiellement vaincu.<sup>1</sup>

CETTE POUSSÉE INÉVITABLE QUE VA CONNAÎTRE LA demande en matériel de défense dans tout le Moyen-Orient ne sera pas aussi bénéfique pour tous les gros fournisseurs. Tandis que la Californie et le Massachusetts s'en réjouissent tranquillement, la France, elle, a récemment fait savoir qu'elle en serait bientôt réduite à ramasser les miettes laissées par ses alliés d'Orient-Atlantique.<sup>2</sup> La palme revient tout partiellement au missile antimissiles français *Exocet* après la guerre des Malouines, dès que l'un matériel fait ses preuves au combat, l'effet qui en résulte sur les futures ventes est véritablement miraculeux. À Wall Street, le cours d'une action de Raytheon, le fabricant du *Patriot*, a gagné 4,50 \$ à la cotation qui a suivi le premier succès de ce missile au combat, et les exportations du *Patriot* devraient atteindre 2 milliards de dollars l'année prochaine. Il en va de même du missile de croisière *Tomahawk* qui repart maintenant pour un nouveau bail.<sup>3</sup> Alors qu'avant la guerre il était prévu de le supprimer en 1992, on va sans doute maintenir en prolonger la fabrication. Quant à la question de savoir si la Grande-Bretagne va rester ou non un producteur de chars, ce sera également le succès ou l'échec que connaîtra le *Challenger* dans la guerre terrestre qui en décidera. En des temps où le marché international de la défense est dans le marasme, où le prix du pétrole dépasse sans doute son niveau d'avant l'invasion du 2 août afin de couvrir les frais engagés par la guerre comme pour la paix, et où les principaux combattants vont se tourner vers les exportations d'armes en vue de réduire les coûts économiques du réarmement, la tentation sera forte de continuer à employer des moyens militaires pour supprimer les problèmes politiques. A la fin de 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev a fait plus que permettre la libération de l'Europe de l'Est, il a également jeté dans le ring la serviette soviétique, et avec elle la plupart des préférences politiques à un statut de superpuissance. Il a de ce fait mis fin au combat qui avait façonné le monde au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les bienfaits de cette nouvelle ère de détente n'ont pas tardé à se manifester, surtout en Europe. La limitation des armements nucléaires et conventionnels, la désintégration du Pacte de Varsovie, la réunification de l'Allemagne ainsi que de nouvelles occasions de mettre à profit l'Acte unique européen ont inauguré un nouveau chapitre plein de promesses pour l'histoire européenne et le tiers-monde. Ces bienfaits ont également refléchi sur l'Asie du Sud et sur certaines parties de l'Afrique ; au milieu de 1990, si les tensions croissantes entre le Pakistan et l'Inde au sujet du Cachemire n'ont pas dégénéré en conflit d'envergure, c'est en partie dû au fait que les deux superpuissances avaient jugé qu'un conflit armé n'était dans l'intérêt d'aucune des parties. Bien qu'il continue à y avoir des problèmes régionaux, ethniques et religieux, invariablement exacerbés par les échecs en matière de développement économique, il y a eu un changement symptomatique et positif, à savoir la préférence nouvellement accordée au règlement des conflits et la tendance qu'ont les grandes puissances à s'abstenir de toute intervention dans les affaires intérieures des pays plus faibles pour les besoins de la Guerre froide.

POUR CE QUI EST DE LA DÉFENSE, ON VOIT POINdre l'horizon des changements tout aussi profonds. L'Europe, l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis admettent de plus en plus que la recherche d'une technologie militaire avancée, qui avait été jusqu'à l'objet d'un engagement illimité, a maintenant atteint des limites politiques et fiscales distinctes. La fin de la Guerre froide offre l'occasion de procéder à la fois à la conversion de la production de défenses et au démantèlement partiel des bases de la défense nationale. Quoique les Français continuent à avoir une apparence aux accords de partage des coûts et de co-production. Avant le conflit du Golfe et pendant le renforcement des forces militaires en

1. For Your Eyes Only, 24 décembre 1990.  
2. Defence Marketing International, 16 novembre 1990.  
3. The Independent, «US Defence Industry on a High», 26 janvier 1991.

Ce texte, révisé et adopté le 26 novembre à Paris par les Cinq, c'est, au moment de la rédaction du présent article, le projet le plus définitif destiné à couvrir tous les aspects d'un processus de paix au Cambodge. Il formule des propositions pour établir l'Autorité provisoire des Nations Unies au Cambodge (APRONUC), précise les conditions du cessez-le-feu, celles des élections et du rapatriement des réfugiés, et il énonce les principes d'une nouvelle constitution du Cambodge.

Enfin, les 21 et 22 décembre 1990, les deux co-présidents de la Conférence de Paris sur le Cambodge (la France et l'Indonésie) convoquent les membres du CNS et un représentant des Nations Unies pour faire adopter le document du 26 novembre. Les Cambodgiens des trois mouvements de résistance ont accueilli «la plupart des points fondamentaux», mais le gouvernement de Phnom Penh a émis de fortes réserves à propos de trois questions : celle de la démobilisation, celle du désarmement des forces en présence, et celle de «la mention du génocide» perçue par les Khmers rouges lorsqu'ils étaient au pouvoir (1975-1978).

SANS ÊTRE EN MESURE DE PROCÉDER ICI À UNE ANALYSE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE et annexe par annexe du Plan de paix des Nations Unies, il importe, en simplifiant à l'extrême, d'en extraire quelques éléments clés. Le Plan offre en effet une synthèse fragile visant, par des formulations diplomatiques très élaborées, une illusoire réconciliation de toutes les parties au Cambodge. Il constitue une proposition acceptable dans la mesure où la communauté internationale est prête à l'appuyer par des moyens considérables.

Tout l'édifice repose sur la nécessité pour les Cambodgiens de s'entendre entre eux en premier lieu. Cette entente est fondamentale ; elle est indispensable pour que le CNS devienne, sous l'autorité d'un président impartial, un organisme efficace. L'autorité du CNS est aussi nécessaire dans la mesure où cet organisme est appelé à travailler en étroite collaboration avec l'APRONUC et où il doit, de ce fait, en garantir le bon fonctionnement et la crédibilité. Enfin, la permanence de la mésentente au sein du CNS et l'incapacité de s'entendre sur la présidence privent le Cambodge de sa représentation aux Nations Unies où son siège est désormais vacant.

Dans l'état actuel des négociations, toutes les parties ont agi en tenant pour acquis ou en faisant semblant de croire que le postulat de l'harmonie retrouvée entre Cambodgiens était envisageable. Or, depuis la réunion de Paris des 21 et 22 décembre 1990, les représentants de Phnom Penh ont réitéré leur scepticisme. Les points d'achoppement sont très circonscrits, mais ils touchent des questions de fond. Le gouvernement Hun Sen soutient que figure quel que part dans le document «la mention du génocide». Cette exigence va bien au-delà d'une question de principe, car, si elle était admise, on pourrait légitimement se poser la question suivante : comment tolérer que les auteurs d'un génocide participent au pouvoir et se présentent à des élections, de surcroît sous les auspices des Nations Unies ? Sur ce point, Hun Sen a été précis en déclarant dernièrement : «En dépit de la participation des Khmers rouges au Conseil national suprême (CNS), notre position officielle demeure la même : quel que soit le cas, quelles que soient les solutions, il importe fondamentalement de garantir que le régime génocidaire de Pol Pot ne revendra jamais au pouvoir.»

ES AUTRES POINTS FONDAMENTAUX TOUCHENT AUX QUESTIONS difficiles de la démobilisation et du désarmement des forces en présence. Le document des Nations Unies est assez précis et il établit des opérations par étapes distinctes, ce qui permet des ajustements possibles à chacune d'entre elles. Il reste que la fin des hostilités relève de la bonne volonté des parties. Le document postule, dès la signature du règlement final, un accord de toutes les parties pour fournir à l'APRONUC toutes les informations sur les dispositifs militaires, bases, caches d'armes, etc... Les parties s'engagent également à ce que toutes leurs forces se présentent avec leurs armes, munitions et équipements dans des aires de regroupement d'où elles seront escortées vers des cantonnements avant d'être démobilisées et retournées à la vie civile. Sur cette question, l'opposition de Hun Sen, on l'aura compris, est évidente, et il précisait sa pensée en déclarant : «... Il est facile de dissoudre les troupes gouvernementales cambodgiennes... mais peut-on garantir hors de tout doute qu'il en sera de même des troupes de Pol Pot et de leurs armements, et de celles de ses alliés cachées dans la chaîne des Dangrek ou dans la jungle ? Personne ne peut répondre à cette question. Par conséquent, n'essayez pas de dissoudre les troupes gouvernementales, car cela favoriserait le retour du régime de Pol Pot.»

Il resterait naïf de ne pas accorder une crédibilité certaine aux appréhensions du régime de Phnom Penh. Le document des Nations Unies est certes per- fectible mais ses auteurs pêchent encore par un excès de confiance dans la capacité des factions de trouver un terrain d'entente. Malheureusement, les factions demeurent figées dans leurs dissensions, leurs antagonismes his- toriques et leur haine implacable, et rien ne laisse entrevoir une modification de leurs attitudes respectives.

Les Khmers rouges demeurent une force incontournable ; prudents, avisés, ils jouent actuellement la carte des Nations Unies et s'emploient à se donner une respectabilité nouvelle. Ainsi, ils ne veulent plus qu'on les appelle les Khmers rouges mais plutôt les «démocrates kampuchéens» : ils se préparent à des élections démocratiques et envisagent de changer de nom pour devenir un parti nationaliste. Ils ont une constitution, un système judiciaire et une police pour administrer les territoires qu'ils contrôlent. Leur stratégie vise les masses paysannes et l'exploitation des sentiments anti-vietnamiens. Ils testent actuellement le «jeu» de la démocratie en l'appli- quant dans certains de leurs camps en Thaïlande. Ils représentent, on ne peut le nier, une force réelle que seul le pouvoir de Phnom Penh est actuelle- ment en mesure de contester. On peut comprendre dès lors les craintes de Hun Sen de voir son régime affaibli ou démantelé, comme le craignent certains observateurs, par la présence d'une Autorité provisoire des Nations Unies.

OUT SE PASSE DESORMAIS COMME SI LA SOLUTION AUX PRO- blèmes internes du Cambodge ne dépendait plus des éléments extérieurs. L'unanimité des Cinq, et la caution des États ré- gionaux devraient le confirmer. Or, rien n'est encore tout à fait assuré puisque le gouvernement chinois, malgré un certain rapprochement avec le Vietnam et des déclarations apaisantes sur la fin de son aide militaire aux Khmers rouges, n'a pas encore convenu les observateurs du caractère définitif de ses intentions. Hanoi demeure par ailleurs le soutien le plus fidèle et le plus sûr de Phnom Penh. À l'occasion des combats sporadiques qui se poursuivent, quelques unités vietnamiennes reviennent de temps en temps donner un coup de main aux troupes gouvernementales. Quant à la Thaïlande, tout en se conformant aux politiques de l'ASEAN, elle joue un jeu patent et subtil qui lui permet de contrôler sur son territoire non seulement l'acheminement des armes chi- noises mais aussi la présence des Khmers rouges dans les camps de réfugiés et celle des membres des deux autres factions.

Attendre passivement que les factions cambodgiennes parviennent à un compromis n'est une solution que dans la mesure où elle traduit l'indif- férence ou le calcul stratégique pour affaiblir encore plus ce petit pays qui figure parmi les dix États les plus démunis du globe. La Chine et le Vietnam sont encore des acteurs fondamentaux. Leurs bonnes intentions demeurent toujours quelque peu illusoirs, car aucun de ces deux pays n'a entrepris une *perestroïka* ni des changements comparables à ceux intervenus en Union soviétique ou dans les pays d'Europe de l'Est. L'appréhension de leur rivalité est aussi grande que la désillusion de leur régime politique, et l'on a peine à imaginer que les dirigeants actuels, pétrifiés dans des comportements traditionnels, puissent comme par enchantement remettre en question leur détermination à affronter par Cambodgiens interposés.

Il reste que la communauté internationale pourrait faire pression encore sur Hanoi et Beijing afin de leur arracher un engagement de non-intervention qui soit *préalable* à la signature d'un accord entre Cambodgiens. Dans l'in- tervalle, il convient d'entreprendre la reconstruction du Cambodge. Une aide importante demeure le seul moyen pour réduire les inégalités sociales que les Khmers rouges exploitent et continueront d'exploiter. Aider la popu- lation cambodgienne à retrouver une infrastructure minimale de survie n'équivaut pas nécessairement à la reconnaissance diplomatique du gou- vernement de Phnom Penh. Cette aide peut être conçue comme un moyen d'assurer le bien-fondé du Plan de paix des Nations Unies et de rassurer les dirigeants de Phnom Penh.

Enfin, si l'indifférence de la communauté internationale ne l'emporte pas et si la crise du Moyen-Orient ne relègue pas le Cambodge aux oubliettes, le conviendrait d'imaginer une sorte de plan Marshall qui serait mis en place par les États du Bassin du Pacifique. Dans les efforts actuels déployés pour structurer, institutionnaliser et stabiliser mieux encore une région du monde en plein essor économique, une action concertée à l'endroit du Cambodge représenterait une première contribution à la sécurité régionale.



# CAMBODGE :

## UNE PAIX ENCORE INACCESSIBLE

*Le rythme du processus de paix au Cambodge décourage l'optimisme et contredit les scénarios les plus documentés.*

PAR GÉRARD HERVOUET

ES ACTEURS CAMBODGIENS SEMBLENT RÉPÉTER INASSAUBLEMENT

ment les mêmes scènes d'une tragédie où s'entrecroisent les souvenirs de l'insupportable épreuve imposée par les Khmers rouges et les espoirs de jours meilleurs. Le conflit n'en finit plus de s'achever, et les perspectives d'un règlement s'éloignent aussitôt qu'on les sent à la portée des bonnes volontés.

Fatalté ? Peut-être. Résignation, certainement pas ! À en juger par la multiplication des initiatives et des actions, la gestionnaire diplomatique à propos du Cambodge est devenue si complexe que l'observateur même assez averti risque à tout moment l'égarement sur une fausse piste.

Sans reprendre la chronologie au lendemain du demi-échec de la Conférence de Paris sur le Cambodge en août 1989, c'est à partir du 5 juin 1990 que l'on procédera à une brève récapitulation des événements. À cette date, le premier ministre du Cambodge Hun Sen et le prince Sihanouk, réunis à Tokyo, illustrèrent leur capacité de souffler en même temps le chaud et le froid sur les espoirs que pouvaient faire naître l'entente qu'ils venaient de signer. Les deux acteurs cambodgiens avaient en effet conclu un cessez-le-feu, ou plus exactement un accord sur la nécessité «d'une retenue volontaire de l'usage de la force par toutes les parties cambodgiennes». L'arrêt des hostilités devait intervenir avant la fin-juillet. Le communiqué précisait aussi que le Conseil national suprême (CNS) — organisme dépositaire de la souveraineté du Cambodge pendant la période de transition — comporterait «un nombre égal de personnalités des deux parties». Sihanouk envisageait six membres pour le gouvernement actuel du Cambodge, trois membres pour la faction de Son Sann et les trois autres pour son propre parti, le Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif (FUNKINPEC). L'enthousiasme fut de courte durée, puisque les Khmers rouges s'étaient tenus à l'écart de cette entente. Peu de temps après, Sihanouk, comme Hun Sen, convinrent que la guerre allait continuer.

À l'issue de la cinquante-neufième rencontre des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité (C-59) les 16 et 17 juillet à Paris, le gouvernement américain annonça, le lendemain, qu'il ne reconnaissait désormais plus le gouvernement de coalition du Cambodge formé en 1982 par le prince Sihanouk. Le geste constituait un revirement considérable de la politique américaine puisque, dans le même temps, les États-Unis proposaient l'ouverture d'un dialogue avec le Vietnam et l'envoi d'une aide humanitaire au Cambodge.

Malgré la surprise des pays de l'ASEAN (Association des États de l'Asie du Sud-Est), principaux instigateurs de cette coalition, la communauté internationale appuya le geste américain, consciente comme lui que l'attitude antérieure du gouvernement de Washington favorisait les Khmers rouges, soit la faction la plus forte de la coalition, et qu'elle risquait de faciliter son retour au pouvoir à Phnom Penh.

Après de multiples tractations et consultations, les Cinq adoptèrent le 28 août 1990, un document substantiel intitulé : «Une formule-cadre en vue d'un règlement politique complet du conflit cambodgien». Le document définissait les modalités d'établissement du CNS, précisait les dispositions militaires de la période transitoire, avant la tenue d'élections libres ; les Cinq s'engageaient aussi à garantir la sécurité d'un Cambodge neutre. À cette occasion, l'Union soviétique et la Chine convinrent de cesser de fournir des armements, la première au gouvernement de Phnom Penh, et la seconde, aux Khmers rouges.

John G. Parnham

OUTRES LES PARTIES PRÉSENTES À DJAKARTA EN CE DÉBUT DE septembre furent unanimes à convenir qu'un véritable espoir de paix était désormais à portée de la main. Même le leader des Khmers rouges affirma qu'«un grand pas vers la restauration de la paix avait été effectué» ; il ajoutait que les Khmers rouges acceptaient «sans réserve» le Plan de paix adopté. Hun Sen pour sa part déclara aussi que «le document signé était le meilleur qu'on ait jamais produit».

Une fois encore, l'excès d'enthousiasme fut cependant très vite tempéré par l'incapacité des douze membres à s'entendre sur le choix d'un président pour le CNS. Avec six membres provenant de la résistance et six autres du gouvernement de Phnom Penh, la présidence devenait un enjeu de taille. Alors qu'on semblait s'être mis d'accord sur la possibilité que Sihanouk devienne le treizième membre comme président, Hun Sen proposa que le prince assume la présidence à condition qu'il remplace un des six membres de la résistance ou encore à condition que l'on ajoute un représentant de Phnom Penh, soit un quatorzième membre. Dans les deux cas, l'équilibre demeurait soit à six de part et d'autre, soit à sept. Bien entendu, la querelle des nombres soulignait l'acuité des méfiances réciproques dans l'appréhension d'une période de transition.


La question de la présidence fit échouer la première rencontre du CNS, convoquée à Bangkok, du 17 au 19 septembre. Le lendemain, à New York, le Conseil de sécurité acceptait les grandes lignes d'un règlement-cadre défini par les Cinq à la fin du mois d'août et adoptait la résolution 668. Celle-ci exhortait notamment les factions à s'entendre plus vite sur la nomination du président. À l'occasion d'une septième réunion des Cinq les 15 et 16 octobre, puis d'une rencontre les 9 et 10 novembre à Djakarta (à laquelle n'assistaient pas les factions cambodgiennes), on mit la dernière main au document des Nations Unies. Dans l'interim, l'Assemblée générale avait approuvé le Plan de paix, le 15 octobre.

Quelques jours plus tard, à Djakarta, les 9 et 10 septembre 1990, les factions cambodgiennes acceptèrent dans son intégralité le document des Nations Unies préparé par les Cinq. Plus important encore, elles parurent accepter toute la structure du Conseil national suprême et ses fonctions. À ce propos, elles convinrent des cinq points suivants qui, on le crut un moment, exprimaient à l'époque leur volonté de se situer désormais au delà des antagonismes historiques :

- le CNS représente le seul organe légitime et la seule autorité consacrant, pendant toute la période de transition, l'indépendance, la souveraineté et l'unité du Cambodge ;
- le CNS est formé de personnes ayant de l'autorité au sein du peuple cambodgien et représentant tous les courants d'opinion ;
- le CNS représentera le Cambodge à l'extérieur et il occupera le siège de ce dernier aux Nations Unies, dans les organismes spécialisés de l'ONU, et dans d'autres institutions et conférences internationales ;
- au moment de la signature de l'accord complet, le CNS déléguera à l'ONU tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour en garantir l'application intégrale ;
- tous les aspects pertinents de l'administration du Cambodge ;
- toutes les décisions du CNS seront prises par consensus entre ses membres aux aspects pertinents de l'administration du Cambodge ;

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Par contre, s'ils ne s'y mettent pas, personne d'autre ne le fait, et toutes sortes de problèmes restent sans solution.

**M. Wood :** Vous avez parlé plusieurs fois de pays «raisonnables», et je désire souligner que certains d'entre nous en déduisons qu'il y a des pays dotés de ressources humaines suffisantes pour pouvoir acquérir une certaine reconnaissance

## «La plupart des pays africains

et asiatiques sont viscéralement attachés à leurs frontières, fusseent-elles arbitraires, fusseent-elles tracées par d'abominables puissances coloniales.»

et exercer une certaine influence. Ils ont assez d'intérêts sur la scène internationale pour que leur avenir même soit en jeu, mais ils ne peuvent évidemment pas se faire d'illusions quant à leur capacité de se charger de tout unilatéralement. Ils sont donc obligés d'envisager une coopération multilatérale pour protéger ces intérêts.

**M. Schoellé :** On ne peut pas dire que toutes les puissances moyennes ont toujours satisfait aux critères de la définition de ce qu'est un pays «raisonnable». En effet, un aspect très important de cette définition et du comportement d'un pays raisonnable correspond à sa capacité de faire laire ses intérêts dans le contexte de cette vaste coopération multilatérale. Certaines puissances moyennes, les plus grandes, ont justement été capables de jouer un rôle de meneur dans leurs régions respectives. Il faut non seulement envisager la scène en fonction d'une population abstraite, mais aussi en fonction du comportement.

**M. Frank :** C'est ce que je dirais pour appuyer la proposition du Japon, qui préconise la participation permanente de ces pays au Conseil, sans droit de veto, toutefois. Il ne faut pas oublier, cependant, que depuis maintenant vingt-cinq ans environ, ni la France, ni l'Angleterre n'a exercé son droit de veto. Il y a très longtemps que la France, la Chine ou l'Angleterre a opposé seule son veto à une résolution. Sans affirmer pour autant qu'elles n'y auront jamais recours, pré-telle démarche, et elles font vraiment l'impossible pour l'éviter. C'est là un autre exemple remarquablement officiel de la Charte. Voilà donc les facteurs de légitimité qu'il faut considérer si l'on veut élargir la structure officielle du Conseil. Ce n'est évidemment pas du tout ce que Brian avait en tête : selon lui, un système de consultation dynamique aurait représenté la meilleure façon d'y parvenir.

En revanche, la structure actuelle permet aux puissances moyennes de devenir des *primus inter*

*pares*, par l'intermédiaire des blocs. Le système des blocs, en grande partie, n'a pas grand bon sens actuellement. Il n'est pas logique que la Tchécoslovaquie forme un bloc avec l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et l'Union soviétique. Elle a, de fait, tenté de s'en retirer. Elle voulait se joindre aux pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest et à d'autres, mais on lui a fait comprendre qu'elle n'était pas la bien-venue, que rester dans son propre bloc était plus

Après tout, il y a dans ces pays des institutions le Canada pourrait améliorer énormément. L'Organisation est incroyablement aride et dénuée d'intérêt. Voilà une situation que des pays comme le Canada pourraient améliorer énormément.

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**M. Frank :** L'un des problèmes qui surgit dans une structure comme celle de l'ONU tient au fait que le syndrome Thatcher s'y manifeste : plus elle connaît de succès, plus elle prend les caractéristiques d'une machine qui ne rend plus compte directement au public. Privez le public de ce contact, et son esprit imaginaire ne s'en trouve pas particulièrement éveillé. L'ONU doit trouver un moyen de prendre racine dans la politique des parties qui la constituent. Dans un des mes écrits récents, j'ai laissé flotter mon imagination et j'ai proposé la création d'une deuxième chambre de membres élus directement par l'Assemblée générale, comme le Parlement de Strasbourg. Que des personnes cherchent à se faire élire à l'Assemblée générale, voilà qui retientrait certainement l'attention des journaux torontois !

Le système actuel offre un certain cadre de consultation qui ne fonctionne pas très bien, mais qui peut au moins être amélioré. Par exemple, si le Nigéria siègeait toujours au Conseil, n'aurait pas besoin de tenir des consultations pour essayer de réaliser un consensus africain. A l'heure actuelle, qu'il fasse partie du Conseil ou non, le Nigéria jouit d'une certaine importance qu'il s'ajoute à son pouvoir au sein du bloc africain. Ce qui est étrange, c'est qu'il est plus puissant qu'il n'y paraît quand il ne siège pas au Conseil. Il a moins de pouvoir qu'on ne le croit

## «D'une manière ou d'une autre, l'ONU doit prendre racine dans le contexte politique de chacun des pays qui la constituent.»

lesquelles il est si difficile d'insuffler de la vie dans cette organisation. On ne peut plus parler simplement des «peuples», car à vrai dire, les forces qui vont façonner l'avenir échappent à la maîtrise des gouvernements. Si elles sont effectivement gouvernées, c'est par l'industrie privée, les médias et les services de communications. C'est une question extrêmement complexe et facile à soulever, mais incroyablement difficile à résoudre.



**M. Frank :** J'allais justement dire en réponse à Brian qu'un état d'ame est le seul Etat qui valie

nales, pour bon nombre d'entre elles, il faut beaucoup d'imagination pour les qualifier de

régionalistes. Toute organisation qui s'intitule ainsi et qui comprend la Turquie et la Colombie-

Britannique est manifestement une drôle d'organisation régionale, et on peut en dire autant de

laide, ou la Malaisie et l'Égypte. La notion d'organisation régionale s'est diluée. En fait,

communauté d'intérêts. En outre, l'OUA ne s'est pas révélée inutile.

Le conflit entre le Tchad et la Libye, dont je m'occupe actuellement, a été soumis à la Cour

internationale grâce aux pressions exercées par l'OUA. Ni les Libyens ni les Tchadiens n'est-

maint que c'était la façon idéale de trouver une solution mutuellement satisfaisante à leur dif-

férend. C'est finalement la proposition de l'OUA qui a prévalu, puisque les parties ont accepté de

révoquer pendant une année, puis, en cas d'échec, de s'en remettre au jugement de la Cour inter-

naionale. Il y a donc dans l'OUA une sorte de force, ce qui n'est pas négligeable.

**Mme Word :** J'aimerais poser une question à

Monseigneur l'Ambassadeur Moussa,

encore que je redoute une

réponse assez pessimiste. Il

est beaucoup question du

fait qu'une fois la

guerre du Golfe ter-

minée, il faudra plant-

fier non seulement des

opérations de maintien de

la paix, mais peut-être aussi une

limitation des armements. À votre

avis, quelles sont les chances de voir ce

genre de plan réussir ?

**M. Moussa :** Eh bien, merci de me poser une ques-

tion si épineuse. Tout accord relatif à la limitation

des armements, au désarmement ou à la non-

prolifération des armes nucléaires doit engager

tous les pays, et notamment Israël. Nous ne

l'Israël, en raison du conflit qui l'oppose au

Koweït, soit soumis à certaines obligations

comme de limiter ou d'éliminer ses armements

chimiques, biologiques ou autres ou encore qu'il

doive se soumettre à une supervision à ce propos,

alors qu'Israël ne subit aucune forme de con-

trôle. Toute espèce d'armements de destruction

massive devrait être bannie de la région. Tout

système de non-prolifération doit donc viser les

armes nucléaires, de manière qu'Israël soit tenu

de se conformer au Traité sur la non-prolifération

des armes nucléaires.

**Mme Word :** Israël est tout prêt à accepter

cela, mais quelle est, selon vous, la tendance de

l'opinion dans les États arabes ?

**M. Moussa :** Peut-être l'isoz-vous entre les lignes

que certains pays arabes, de petits pays, qui ne

se soucient pas vraiment de ce que possède pré-

sentement Israël, sont préoccupés par le cas

de l'Irak. Cependant, si vous poursuivez votre

sans la participation d'Israël, sans un contrôle

des armements que ce pays possède. Pour qu'un

système soit viable au Moyen-Orient, aucune

de ses principales puissances, arabe, perse, turque

ou juive, ne peut en être exclue.

**Mme Word :** Ce que vous dites, en fait, c'est

qu'une fois la crise du Golfe terminée, il ne

pourra y avoir d'accord de limitation des arme-

ments dans la région si l'on ne convoque pas une

conférence internationale pour régler les autres

problèmes.

**M. Moussa :** En effet, Israël refusera certainement

et les États arabes probablement de s'asseoir

autour d'une même table pour parler de limitation

des armements, si le problème palestinien n'est

pas réglé, que dis-je, si l'on a pas au moins

engagé un processus de règlement de la question

palestinienne. Une fois un processus de paix

viable amorcé, on pourra commencer à discuter

des systèmes d'armements et d'autres sujets.

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du Conseil ont intérêt à ne pas faire de vagues (surtout les

Anglais et les Français, qui risquent de perdre leur

place privilégiée). »

**M. Wood :** Les puissances que l'on qualifie assez

librement de moyennes ont-elles une responsabi-

lité particulière à assumer ? À l'époque de la

rédaction de la Charte, la question des membres

non permanents du Conseil de sécurité avait été

longuement débattue. L'idée qu'un groupe

d'États, autres que celui des membres perma-

M. Mousa : Les systèmes régionaux qui sont nés vers la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale sont voués à une sorte de hasco, tellement ils fonctionnent mal. La Ligue arabe, par exemple, n'a pas rempli les fonctions pour lesquelles elle a été conçue. Pour ce qui est de la paix et de la sécurité régionales, elle n'a joué aucun rôle. Peut-être, cependant, à propos du Liban, elle a joué un rôle, et si longtemps après le début de la guerre civile. Quel est le rôle de l'Organisation des Etats américains (OEA), par rapport aux grands problèmes que nous avons connus de la Grande au Panama en passant par Cuba, sans parler des problèmes économiques et sociaux accusés de l'Amérique latine ? Quant à l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine, l'OUA, elle pâtit des mêmes défauts.

Il y a du nouveau avec la CSCE (la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe). Mais le changement se produit en Europe, où la coordination est quasiment au point, où nous avons beaucoup de petits problèmes que nous estimons énormes dans le tiers-monde et sont relégués au second plan. Donc, la CSCE serait une nouvelle forme d'organisation régionale pour ce qui trait à la sécurité, à l'économie et au domaine social. Ce serait, en fait, une organisation plus souple. En fait, on pourrait même ne pas parler de tout d'organisation, puisque il s'agit d'une conférence régit par le consensus de ses participants.

M. Urquhart : Pour ce qui est de la CSCE, je ne sais pas. Cependant, cela paraît tellement plausible. La CSCE semble tenir plus de l'état d'esprit d'une organisation, et d'un état d'esprit qui est tombé à point nommé, étant donné les événements historiques survenus en Europe. Si nous devons essayer de procéder de manière similaire au Moyen-Orient, je ne peux guère imaginer comment cela se passerait, car il n'existe pas, dans cette région, d'état d'esprit commun.

M. Wood : Nous n'oublions pas que la CSCE a commencé ses travaux au coeur de rapports conflictuels qu'elle était censée apaiser. Son ordre du jour a été discuté, un camp insistait pour que les droits de la personne y occupent une part importante ; l'autre, pour que l'on traite surtout de la stabilité. Quant aux questions de sécurité à proprement parler, et aux mesures propres à accroître la confiance et la sécurité, il n'en a été question que plus tardivement. Par conséquent, ce n'est pas seulement quand la situation s'améliore que l'on peut engager des discussions.

as joué par une victoire de la coalition, l'aver-  
nisement découragera quiconque serait tenté  
d'imiter Saddam Hussein. La question sera alors  
de savoir s'il est possible d'institutionnaliser, par  
le biais de l'ONU, la réaction mondiale.  
Je n'exclus pas la possibilité de reformer plus  
ou moins la structure du Conseil de sécurité.  
Même au cœur de la Guerre froide, nous avons  
pu modifier la Charte pour élargir la composition  
du Conseil et lui apporter quelques transforma-  
tions. Il n'est pas totalement irréalisable de réfléchir  
à la proposition japonaise, qui est d'ajouter cinq  
membres permanents qui n'auraient pas de droit  
de veto. Cependant, il faudrait surtout songer à ce  
qui renforcerait la légitimité de ce Conseil.

« Le conflit Irak-Koweït est d'une clarté singulière, mais on ne peut pas en dire autant de l'attaque irakienne contre l'Iran, à propos de laquelle le Conseil de sécurité n'a absolument rien fait. »

pose dans l'article 99, c'est que si vous l'utilisez  
tation au lieu de l'ambassadeur, M. Hammarskjöld,  
qu'on estimait plus dynamique que les autres, ne  
l'a utilisée que dans le cas du Congo en 1960. Il ne  
l'a invoqué qu'après avoir invité tous les mem-  
bres du Conseil à un déjeuner au cours duquel  
il leur a dit, au moment du potage : Messieurs,  
voici une situation terrible. Si j'invoque l'arti-  
cle 99, êtes-vous prêts à agir ? Et tout ont ac-  
quiescé, y compris l'URSS, soit dit en passant.  
M. Waldheim y a recouru à propos des otages  
américains en Iran, sans le moindre succès. Le  
vrai problème en ce qui concerne l'article 99, ce  
n'est pas tant l'existence d'une menace contre  
la paix et la sécurité internationales que d'amener  
le Conseil de sécurité à intervenir.

Le Secrétaire général peut être très influent  
(pourvu qu'il ait une stature internationale)  
dans des situations inattendues qui nécessitent  
de formuler un avertissement. Tout le monde con-  
naissait le conflit entre l'Irak et le Koweït, car  
le premier a failli envahir le second en 1971  
(problème n'est donc pas nouveau). Par con-  
séquent, si le Secrétaire général avait invoqué  
l'article 99, je me demande ce qui se serait passé  
(pas grand-chose, à mon avis). Cela arrangerait  
entièrement la situation, et tout le monde a eu tort

pose dans l'article 99, c'est que si vous l'utilisez



membres permanents ne cautionneraient pas une opération contraire à leurs intérêts, je doute aussi que l'Inde, ou plutôt, je suis sûr que l'Inde n'aimerait pas mobiliser des troupes qu'elle ne contrôlerait pas et qui seraient utilisées, comme l'a dit M. Mousa, comme un instrument de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis.

Dans la crise du Golfe, les Etats-Unis ont pu utiliser le Conseil de sécurité parce que l'agression était tout à fait flagrante. De toute évidence, c'est un cas d'agression d'un pays par un autre. La communauté internationale a unanimement estimé que cet acte était absolument

repréhensible et qu'il fallait donc y remédier. Je dois féliciter les Etats-Unis pour la manière professionnelle dont ils ont mobilisé l'appui international (avec beaucoup de réticence dans le cas de certains pays). Mais je me demande si les Etats-Unis pourraient utiliser le Conseil de sécurité comme instrument de leur politique étrangère. L'intention est tout à fait claire.

M. Urquhart : Je suis entièrement d'accord : l'emploi du mot «renaissance» est fort prématuré. En outre, je me méfie beaucoup de l'usage, actuellement très à la mode, de l'expression

## « Le Conseil de sécurité n'a rien de magique, c'est tout simplement un endroit où se joue une espèce de politique systémique. »

pakistanaise de 1965, la crise des missiles à Cuba, et même la guerre civile au Liban : à toutes ces occasions, le Conseil n'a pas voulu prendre de mesure préventive. Il ne voulait pas de problèmes. Le BRCI (Bureau de recherches et de collecte des informations) (créé après mon départ, et auquel je me suis toujours opposé) est un

de maintien de la paix ne serait plus seulement un groupe de soldats aimables et coiffés de casques bleus qui se comportent extraordinairement bien dans des situations difficiles. Si on leur marchait sur les pieds, on risquerait gros. Tant que les gouvernements ne seront pas prêts à étudier ce genre de questions, il est inutile

## « Le Conseil de sécurité est en train de devenir le bras politique de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis, tout comme le FMI et la Banque mondiale »

très gros organisme bureaucratique qui n'aborde pas le vrai problème. En ce qui concerne la transformation du Conseil de sécurité en un système préventif, le vrai problème, c'est l'attitude des gouvernements. Pour diverses raisons, la plupart d'entre eux ne veulent pas agir avant que les événements se produisent.

Il est très facile pour les Etats-Unis de dire que nous sommes en train de préparer un nouvel ordre mondial ; mais, comme par hasard, cet ordre-là leur convient très bien. Que se passerait-il si un événement survenait ailleurs qui ne les arrangeait pas tant que cela ?

M. Wood : Les avocats du diable ont dit qu'il y a plus de hiérarchie que jamais, et que tous les membres permanents ne sont pas égaux ; qu'en fait, il y a un super membre permanent, et que tous les autres se rangent ensuite dans diverses catégories. Mais je n'ai entendu personne dire qu'il est temps de rouvrir la Charte pour essayer de définir une structure moins hiérarchique.

M. Mousa : Cela se produirait automatiquement si le débat était ouvert et si nous débattions sincèrement de la question. Alors, nous y parviendrions. Mais nous ne devons pas oublier que bien des pays, et surtout les petits pays, nous les avons du tiers-monde, sont opposés à ce qu'on ouvre de nouveau la Charte pour l'amender : ils craignent l'élimination de certains principes, de certaines garanties qu'elle comporte : ils redoutent que nous ne soyons plus capables de parvenir à un consensus sur ces principes. Par conséquent, la réouverture de la Charte est une opération très grave et très dangereuse.

Pour ce qui est de l'action préventive, que prévoit l'article 99 (qui donne au Secrétaire général le droit de convoquer une réunion du Conseil chaque fois qu'il considère que la paix et la sécurité internationales sont menacées) ? Si le Secrétaire général avait obtenu des informations, des informations fondées, de la part des Etats-Unis, de l'URSS, de la France ou de toute autre source, selon lesquelles des services secrets avaient établi que les forces irakiennes se déplaçaient de façon à attaquer le Koweït, le Secrétaire général serait-il intervenu à ce point, en invoquant l'article 99 ?

L'un des problèmes du Conseil est que les différents volets de son fonctionnement ont toujours été séparés jusqu'à présent. Il y a un volet diplomatique, puis ce qu'on appelle des missions de maintien, puis ce qu'on appelle leurs bons offices d'autres personnes d'offrir leurs bons offices dans divers conflits ; ensuite, il y a le maintien de la paix et enfin, l'action collective, que l'on a toujours bien séparés, surtout en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix et l'action collective, et ce, pour des raisons politiques. Maintenant, il n'y a aucune raison qui tienne.

Je pense qu'un système consisterait à combiner ces quatre activités principales de façon qu'elles soient complémentaires. Par exemple, si un gouvernement empêche sur une opération de maintien de la paix, comme c'était le cas pour les forces de l'ONU au Sud-Liban en 1982, cela devrait déclencher automatiquement une action collective de la part du Conseil de sécurité. Alors, une force

«nouvel ordre mondial». Je crois que tout, ou presque, reste à faire avant que nous puissions donner un sens à ces deux termes.

Koweït est d'une clarté singulière. Sauf l'attaque de l'Irak contre l'Iran, face à laquelle le Conseil de sécurité, soit dit en passant, a choisi de ne rien faire, dans l'un de ses moments les moins glorieux.

Les pré-allocations et les actions préventives ne posent pas réellement un problème de bureau-cratie ou d'organisation. J'ai passé quelque quarante années à l'ONU avec divers secrétaires généraux qui essayaient d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur des événements qui, manifestement, se préparaient. Par exemple, la guerre indo-

soûtable) pour l'utilisation d'un mécanisme de sécurité collective consistant à constituer progressivement une force préventive qui décongestionnerait quiconque de faire le genre de mauvais calcul que Saddam Hussein a fait. Ce serait une

M. Wood : Il est très intéressant de constater que, dans notre pays, une grande partie de la population confond l'évolution du maintien de la paix et les fonctions de sécurité de l'ONU. Quand on a effective- ment mis en oeuvre la sécurité collective telle qu'elle est définie dans la Charte, beaucoup ont été choqués et horrifiés : « nous n'avions jamais imaginé que cela se passerait ainsi ».

M. Gharekhan : Je doute que les pays non alignés veuillent conclure un accord quelconque avec le Conseil de sécurité pour lui fournir des troupes qui seraient utilisées pour défendre les intérêts des puissances détentrices du droit de veto. À cause de ce droit, les cinq

## AU COEUR DE LA CHARTE DE L'ONU

le chapitre VII, intitulé Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de l'acte d'agression, porte sur la «sécurité collective» et sur le rôle du Conseil de sécurité international dans les cas où le Conseil de sécurité constatait l'existence d'une menace contre la paix.

et d'entreprendre, au moyen de forces aériennes, navales ou terrestres, toute action qu'il juge nécessaire au maintien ou au rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Cette action peut comprendre des démonstrations, des mesures de blocus et d'autres opérations exécutées par des forces aériennes, navales ou terrestres, restes de membres des Nations Unies.

les articles 43 à 47 prévoient que, sur l'invitation du Conseil de sécurité, les membres des Nations Unies s'engagent à mettre à la disposition du Conseil les armées, l'assistance et les installations nécessaires au rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité. Les plans pour l'emploi de la force armée sont établis par le Conseil de sécurité sur l'aide du «Comité d'entraînement» décrit à l'article 47. Le Conseil de sécurité n'a jamais mis les articles 43 à 47 en application depuis la fondation des Nations Unies. □

M. Thomas Frank : On a parlé de l'avocat du diable ; moi, je parlerai de coupe à mortie pleine. A mon sens, tout dépend de vos critères de comparaison. Oui, les Etats-Unis ont exercé beaucoup de pressions et ont pesé de tout leur poids politique pour conserver une majorité des voix au Conseil de sécurité et constituer une coalition de forces contre l'Irak.

du 15 janvier).  
Le Conseil de sécurité n'a rien de magique : c'est tout simplement un endroit où se joue une espèce de consensus, la puissance des pays non alignés (notamment les pays non membres du 15 janvier).  
Les armées et de la sécurité n'a pas de rôle à jouer.



# «UN» NOUVEL ORDRE MONDIAL, PLUSIEURS DEFINITIONS

Le sens à donner au «nouvel ordre mondial» et le rôle qu'y jouera l'ONU sont loin de faire l'unanimité.

## TABLE RONDE

### LES MEMBRES DU GROUPE

THOMAS FRANK  
est professeur de droit et directeur du  
Center for International Studies  
Oxford University Press, un livre intitulé  
The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations.

C. R. GHAREKHAN

est représentant permanent de  
l'Inde à l'ONU. Son pays vient  
d'entamer un mandat de deux ans  
au Conseil de sécurité.

AMRE MOUSSA

est représentant permanent de  
l'Égypte à l'ONU.

ENID SCHOETLE

est le directeur du Programme des  
affaires internationales à la  
Ford Foundation (New York).

BRIAN URQUHART

est chercheur invité à la  
Ford Foundation (New York).  
Il a été sous-secrétaire général de l'ONU  
pour les affaires politiques spéciales.

OLIVIA WARD

est journaliste au Toronto Star.  
Elle est spécialiste de l'ONU et des  
questions internationales.

crise du Golfe, mais remonte à bien avant, au moment où les deux superpuissances ont com-  
mencé à collaborer. Vous vous souviendrez d'un  
beaucoup de pays non alignés regardaient d'un

La table ronde a eu lieu le 23 janvier, à New  
York. Elle était présidée par M. Bernard Wood,  
Directeur général de l'Institut canadien pour la  
paix et la sécurité internationale.

M. Bernard Wood : Sans plonger dans les événe-  
ments d'aujourd'hui, je voudrais faire un pas en  
arrière pour examiner l'évolution du rôle du Con-  
seil de sécurité et de l'ONU en matière de paix  
et de sécurité. Dans quelle mesure les activités  
actuelles de l'ONU sont-elles conformes à  
l'esprit de la Charte ? En outre, devons-nous  
envisager de mettre en place l'autre mécanisme  
prévu par la Charte pour appuyer le Conseil ?  
Devons-nous avoir un comité d'état-major en-  
tièrement opérationnel ? Et devons-nous mettre  
sur pied une force permanente de manière qu'en  
cas d'autres crises où l'agression serait aussi  
flagrante que cette fois, nous puissions appliquer  
les dispositions de la Charte une à une, puisque  
toute l'infrastructure serait en place ?

M. Brian Urquhart : On a beau parler énormément  
de la renaissance de l'ONU, en réalité, nombre  
de ses mécanismes sont aux oubliettes depuis  
quarante ans. De plus, on a accordé beaucoup  
aux préparatifs que l'on est censé faire en vue de  
son application qu'à tout autre chapitre. La crise  
actuelle l'a démontré on ne peut plus clairement.  
Une fois que nous en serons sortis, il sera ex-  
cess de se considérer comme un dernier recours  
ou un fillet de sécurité pour essayer de devenir  
un mécanisme systématique de maintien de la  
paix et de la sécurité internationales.

M. C.R. Gharekhan : À mon avis, nous devons  
tous reconnaître que c'est grâce à la convergence  
des intérêts des États-Unis et de ceux des mem-  
bres permanents, surtout des deux plus impor-  
tants d'entre eux, qu'on a pu réactiver le Conseil  
de sécurité. Cette convergence ne date pas de la

Nous devons reconnaître un fait : c'est essen-  
tiellement grâce aux efforts des États-Unis que  
le Conseil a fonctionné comme il l'a fait. Ce sont  
les États-Unis qui ont mobilisé le Conseil et la  
communauté internationale. D'aucuns pensent  
que les Américains sont en train d'acquiescer une  
influence disproportionnée par rapport à leur  
puissance économique. Mais ils sont les seuls  
capables de lancer les opérations que la commu-  
nauté internationale a engagées dans le Golfe.  
Par conséquent, même si l'on envisage de pro-  
céder à des réformes institutionnelles au sein du  
Conseil, je doute que nous puissions vraiment  
remanier la Charte, car toute proposition qui  
équivaldrait à un amendement ouvrirait la boîte  
de Pandore.

M. Amre Moussa : Je vais jouer l'avocat du diable.  
Je crois que la renaissance de l'ONU est une  
fausse renaissance. En effet, ce qui s'est passé  
au Conseil de sécurité au cours des derniers mois  
était le résultat de l'influence croissante des  
États-Unis, qui restent la seule superpuissance,  
comme l'Ambassadeur Gharekhan l'a dit. Si  
tel n'avait pas été le cas, le Conseil aurait été  
paralysé. Deuxièmement, la réactivation du  
Conseil a été et demeure liée à une question :  
celle du Golfe. Quand on passe de la crise du

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L'opinion des Canadiens et Canadiennes sur les guerres livrées par leur pays.

Gérard Hervouel est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université Laval, à Québec, et directeur d'*Études internationales* ; Chris Smith est chercheur à l'*Institute of Development Studies*, à l'Université du Sussex ; Sharon Stevenson est rédactrice pigiste à Lima (Pérou), et elle fournit souvent des articles au magazine *Time* et au *Miami Herald* ; Don Munton est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique à Vancouver.

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
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Bureau de rédaction :

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David Cox

Charlotte Gray

Modeline Poulin

Redacteur en chef :

Michael Bryans

Redactrices en chef adjointes :

Veronica Bourdoff, Hélène Somson

Redacteur de la chronique

des livres français :

Joelwyn Coulton

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Larry Miller

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Institut  
canadien pour  
la paix et  
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internationales

360, rue Albert  
Bureau 900  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
Canada K1R 7X7  
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Prudent vis-à-vis cet état de fait et il  
affirme qu'il est nécessaire pour les  
résultats des quatre dernières années  
et il établit des comparaisons. Il e  
intéressant de noter que beaucoup  
de Canadiens et de Canadiennes (q  
«change leur fusil d'épaule» quant  
l'opinion qu'ils ont de l'OTAN et e  
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M. Munton fait état de toutes les  
guerre auxquelles le Canada a pa  
ticipé, de Paardeberg en Afrique c  
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guerre du golfe Persique. Le pup  
canadien n'a jamais vraiment mor  
tré beaucoup d'enthousiasme pou  
la guerre dans le passé. Et c'est  
encore le cas pour la guerre du  
Golfe qui a profondément secoué  
l'opinion canadienne.

— Hélène Samis

Comment envisager le monde  
une fois que tout se sera «lassé»  
au Moyen-Orient? Et quel rôle  
jouera l'ONU dans tout cela?  
Voilà quelques-unes des questions  
auxquelles tentent de répondre six  
experts qui ont participé à une table  
ronde organisée par l'Institut à New  
York, le 23 janvier dernier.  
Le processus de paix au Can-  
bodge ne fait plus la une des jour-  
neaux depuis quelques mois. C'est  
le creux de la vague. Gérard  
Hervouet affiche un optimisme très

Dans le présent article de Paix et  
son quatrième sondage d'opinion.  
en novembre 1990, les résultats de  
la sécurité internationale a publié,  
L'Institut canadien pour la paix et  
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La corruption, la cocaïne et de  
violentes insurrections. Voilà trois  
fléaux avec lesquels doit compter  
le nouveau président du Pérou,  
M. Fujimori. Celui-ci n'est cepen-  
dant pas le dernier venu. Il a élaboré  
un plan qu'il entend mettre en ap-  
plication pour sauver le Pérou.

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## L'HEURE EST GRAVE

ON POURRA-T-ELLE  
RELEVER LES DÉFIS QUI  
L'ANNONCENT?

Une table ronde  
internationale :  
Thomas Franck  
C.R. Gharakhan  
Amre Moussa  
And Schoettle  
Brian Uryuhart  
Olivia Ward



Gérard Hervouet  
La paix est-elle  
possible au  
Cambodge?  
Chris Smith  
Les ventes  
d'armes et la  
guerre du Golfe.  
Sharon Stevenson  
La dernière chance  
du Pérou?  
Don Muntion  
L'opinion  
canadienne  
sur le monde et  
la guerre.  
Bernard Wood  
Guerre et paix,  
moralité et ordre.

Dans le présent numéro :



CANADIAN  
INSTITUTE FOR  
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SECURITY

# PEACE & SECURITY

CAI  
JPS  
- P27

## STATE BREAKING, NATION BUILDING

### ENDURING LEGACIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Roundtable

Mark Heller

Shireen Hunter

Shahat Korany

Janice Gross Stein

Jeremy Paltiel  
China and world  
order.

Tamar Hermann  
Lonely doves  
in Israel.  
Vera Murray  
Letter from  
Bucharest.

Keith Krause  
Gun control  
for the world.

François  
Lafrenière  
Politics in high  
places.

Jane Boulden  
Arms reduction  
deal of the century.  
Bernard Wood  
An admiral jumps  
ship.

Also in this issue:

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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



When reading this issue's cover story, the roundtable on the consequences of the Persian Gulf War, it is useful to register the way in which the French equivalents of the English words "nation" and "state" perform differently when compared to their English counterparts. Check *Oxford*, and you will find these two words are essentially synonymous. Check *Robert*, and you will discover that the first three definitions of *nation* have no formal political, legal or juridical meaning at all – instead *nation* refers to: a group of individuals of common origin; a large

group of people who are conscious of their own unity and want to live together; and finally and simply, "people" or the people. *État* is the word for country and state defined by politics and borders.

The *State Breaking, Nation Building* title for our roundtable emerged quite unexpectedly from the central and recurring theme of the discussion. The war in the Persian Gulf and its tragic after-effects, have underscored the widening gap between the rewards and responsibilities we confer on countries, and the feeble attention given to groups (*nations* or *peuples*) that aren't lucky enough, numerous enough or powerful enough to have a state to call their own.

Such are the advantages of having a state, that peoples and nations will go to almost any length, including violence on a large scale, to get one of their own, or keep an "enemy" from getting one for itself. And then there are the terrible costs the world occasionally, but regularly, imposes on stateless peoples.

In the world we currently run, being a country is about the only way to be a player, or for peoples to keep themselves safe. It is the

most exclusive club membership on earth, and at the moment, it is really the only way we know to organize things. As our roundtable illustrates, there are hints, some reassuring and others definitely not, that these cosy club rules have almost run their course.

Also in this issue, **Jeremy Paltiel** looks at the Persian Gulf War from the perspective of China's leaders; **Tamar Hermann** answers the question, "whatever happened to Israel's peace movement?"; **Keith Krause** describes the many obstacles in the way of slowing the global trade in military hardware; **François Lafrenière** reports on electioneering in the Himalayas; **Jane Boulden** leads us through one of the most complex (twenty-two countries and a mountain of documents) and elegantly simple (saw the barrel off that tank) arms control agreements ever reached; **Vera Murray** visits Bucharest and describes the grim handiwork of the late, unlamented Nikolai Ceausescu; and finally, **Bernard Wood** writes about an admiral's resignation and the need for a Canadian defence policy.

— Michael Bryans

Canadian  
Institute for  
International  
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360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
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Canada K1R 7X7  
Telephone (613) 990-1593  
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**The Norad Renewal Issue.** Report of the Special Panel to the Sub-committee of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade considering the question of renewing in May 1991 the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement. Working Paper 33, 65 pages, March 1991.

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**Jeremy Paltiel** is associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, specializing in East Asian politics, and is currently visiting professor at Carleton University; **Keith Krause** is associate professor of political science at York University in Toronto and author of *Arms and the State*, forthcoming from Cambridge University Press; **Jane Boulden** is an independent researcher and writer based in Kingston; **Tamar Hermann** is visiting research fellow at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University; **François Lafrenière** is a former researcher at CIIPS and is currently a development consultant based in Nepal; **Věra Murray** is Moscow correspondent for *L'Actualité* magazine.

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# STATE BREAKING, NATION BUILDING

## Enduring Legacies of the Persian Gulf War

### ROUNDTABLE

#### THE PANELISTS

##### MARK HELLER

is Senior Research Fellow and Research Coordinator at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. He is on leave from Tel Aviv University where he is Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. He is author most recently of, *Between Old Thinking and New: The Changing Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, (Westview, forthcoming).

##### SHIREEN HUNTER

is Deputy Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. She is author most recently of, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade* (IUP, 1990).

##### BAHGAT KORANY

is Professor of Political Science at Université de Montréal. He is principal contributor to and editor of, *How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World* (Westview, 1986).

##### JANICE GROSS STEIN

is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto and co-author (with Richard Ned Lebow) of the Institute Occasional Paper, *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?*.

*This roundtable is based on a discussion held in Ottawa on 15 April. The moderator was Michael Bryans, Editor of Peace&Security magazine.*

**Michael Bryans:** First question: once we are out from under the noise of the past six months, what will look special ten years from now? What will be unique about what has happened since August?

**Shireen Hunter:** There are bound to be some significant internal changes, and that would apply to all of the countries in the Persian Gulf region. One of the things that determines how this whole situation is going to look in ten years is the uncertainties that exist in regard to the Soviet Union. Some countries, I am thinking mostly of Iran and Turkey, are going to be extremely vulnerable to changes in the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Union is going to last in the way it is currently structured.

If the disintegration of Soviet empire happens rapidly and in a less orderly fashion, I frankly do not exclude territorial and linguistic, or ethnic realignments in that region. It is not a foregone conclusion that there is never going to be Kurdish state. What is going to happen with the Soviet Azerbaijan, for example? Is it going to go to Turkey, Iran? Are they going to have irredentist claims towards Iran?

**Bryans:** So you are talking about new borders?

**Hunter:** Drawing new borders may cause tremendous disruption, but there are certainly going to be different economic, political, linguistic realignments. Ideally, the region should go the road of federalism, and then gradually towards regionalism, otherwise we are going to have wars from the Caucasus all the way to South Asia.

**Mark Heller:** There is a story about a visit of a French delegation to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. They were taken around to meet their counterparts and they asked who in the Academy was responsible for researching the

French Revolution and were told that there was nobody who did it. The French were astonished and said well why is this, this is a major historical event. And the Chinese said, well, not enough perspective yet.

If we think back to 1981, which wasn't such a long time ago, the Gulf area and the Middle East as a whole did not look all that different than they do now in terms of basic forces at work. If we want to get a sense of where things are tending, we have to think in longer terms, and about the socio-economic trends, that eventually may express themselves in political terms.

The regimes on the Arab side of the Gulf, in particular, are increasingly out of joint with the nature of social and economic change. The kinds of societies that exist there are no longer accurately reflected in these regimes. But at what point the disjuncture becomes intolerable is very difficult to predict.

If I try to think of the consequences of developments in the last ten or fifteen years, the crudest way to sum it up is that was a tremendous waste of opportunity for fundamental processes of state building and nation building, and economic and social modernization. Partly because of the distractions of politics, and especially wars – the Iran/Iraq war and the Gulf War – there was a tremendous waste of resources caused particularly by an over-reaching in the realm of Arab nationalism, which resulted in the case of Iraq, in its virtual destruction.

I would expect that in the next ten years we will have seen a relative strengthening of the non-Arab forces on the periphery of the Gulf, the resurgence of Iran, possibly the emergence of Kurdistan, and quite probably the re-emergence of Turkey as a major actor in the Middle East, at the expense of the Saudis and the Iraqis.

**Bahgat Korany:** Let me look at some trends that I think we have to watch closely. One is the



erosion of the Arab system. A watershed event in the last thirty or forty years was the distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs. The battle around the Baghdad Pact was over that. The pact was organized by Britain and the US, and was centred on Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and one Arab country, Iraq. There was a coup d'état in Iraq in 1958, and the first act of the new government in Baghdad was to withdraw from the Pact. From there on, there was a distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs in the Middle East.

There was another important change about twenty years later – Sadat's peace with Israel. That was the first breach in the distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs in the Middle East. For the first time a big Arab state said there is peace, there are diplomatic relations.

Then towards the end of the period there was the Iranian revolution, with a huge impact on Arab masses. And some started looking to Teheran as the new model of the future. With the Iraq/Iran war, some Arab countries took the side of Iran against an Arab brother, a further erosion of the distinction between the Arabs and non-Arabs. What Mark was saying about the rise of non-Arabs – Turkey, Iran and the their role in the Gulf – shows the further erosion of this distinction. We are reverting to a Middle Eastern system rather than just an Arab system. And the rise of Islamic militancy tends in the same direction – eroding the distinction.

The second trend which consolidates this tendency, is that for the first time there are threats to Arab countries from other Arab countries. Before this, the military threat was either Israeli or from Western countries. Kuwait had to ask non-Arabs to help it against Arabs.

A third trend is what I call the rise of civil society. People use the term "democratization," and I think that is a bit misleading. I would call it pluralism within Arab society. In the last few years we had the omnipresence of the state; the state was too strong. And the debate we see about the status of the royal family in Kuwait and the possibility of enlarging the political elite, is part of the price of civil society.

**Janice Stein:** What is unique about this war, is that it was the world's leading military power that organized the coalition forces from a very weak economic base, and was not able to fund the war that it organized. Those who are powerful in the military sense, which is the traditional way we've looked at power in the Middle East, are quite different from those who are economically strong.

There is one state that had the potential to be both. Had it had a different system, it might have been Iraq. But that opportunity has been lost. Egypt which is a potential military power, has a weak economy. Israel has a fundamentally weak economy. Those whose prospects are best economically, however, can never exer-

cise the kind of military power in the region which will enable them to set the agenda.

Historically, when we look back at earlier periods when there has been this disjunction between economic and military power, those are usually very dangerous times. I would suspect that it would be more dangerous in the Middle East, than in the international system. In the Middle East, the use of force is still a legitimate instrument, unlike among the global industrialized powers.

Why I'm pessimistic about the future is that one of the ways that these two systems will be

## TO THE EXTENT THIS WAR WAS FOUGHT TO PRESERVE STATE SOVEREIGNTY, IT MAY BE A HISTORICAL CURIOSITY.

connected will be through the export of arms to the Middle East. And this is particularly useful for the US and for other economies that are not as strong. It's not the Japanese who are likely to be the major arms exporters in the next ten years. It is the weaker industrialized economies that are likely to get tangible benefits from a Middle East that is unstable, and in which there are real security fears. I would expect that the Middle East over the next ten years is going to be the region for weapons proliferation.

There are social and economic reasons for the strength of the state in the Arab Middle East in a time of social engineering. While political currents are working in favour of pluralism, or of a larger number of voices that are authentic and find some institutional way to be heard, that kind of proliferation of weapons strengthens the state at the hands of civil society. To the extent that the state is strengthened relative to civil society, and you have at the same time pent up political pressure to find legitimate avenues for political expression, what you get is pressure from below, which exacerbates these kinds of insecurities and instabilities.

**Hunter:** Bahgat's distinction between the Arab and non-Arab actors in the Middle East was a bit too stark. The Middle East system has always been interactive, and the countries on the periphery, if you want to call it that – like Iran and others – have, at least indirectly, been major players in Arab politics. Look, for example, at the alliance of convenience between the Saudis and the Iranians against Nasser of

Egypt. They didn't particularly like one another, but Iran was brought in to be a counterweight to Egypt, and now Egypt is trying to be a counterweight to Iran.

There has been a kind of romanticization of the fact that Arabs don't invade Arabs, but Arabs have used military force against one another. For example, Egyptian involvement in the Yemen civil war was a major military expedition. You have had Libyan and Egyptian wars, and Morocco and Algeria fighting in Sahara.

As far as the resurgence of non-Arabs, the whole notion of Iran re-emerging is a little bit like Islam reviving. Islam was never dead to revive, and Iran was always there.

I would submit that during the 1980s, even though weakened as far as the impact on the underlying forces of the region were concerned, it was much more significant simply because it was acting in a broad Islamic context. Although Iran may be emerging as an actor internationally, Iran may be going back and becoming much more Iranian, and hence its environment of activity is becoming much more limited. I believe that Iran has been traumatized in many ways by the reaction of the rest of the Islamic and, certainly, Arab world.

**Bryans:** It has been evident in writings over the past year – like the "Roots of Moslem Rage" in *Atlantic* magazine – that some people believe there is a fundamental conflict between the West and the Arab world, the West and the Islamic world. Is there such a thing as an Islamic world, or an Arab world, that is in conflict with the West, and is that even a sensible way to think about it?

**Korany:** One Arab state swallows another Arab state and says it does not exist any more. This is the first time. How will this affect relations between Arabs or Moslems, and non-Arabs? There was a distinction before, *we* and *they*, which is no longer applicable, because some of *we* can be a threat, and we can count on some of them to help us.

Islam and the West is a perennial battle. One of the prevalent theories in the region about the origins of the Gulf War – a conspiracy theory – is that the whole thing was a trap, by the imperialist powers, to finish off the important regional power that could reach the West and Israel. The sequel to the conspiracy theory is that now that Iraq is finished, the West is going after the next regional power, which is Syria, in order to maintain its domination of the region. People are very selective in the data they choose to confirm their point of view.

Some people feel that Hussein is the Third World voice against the return of imperialism. This might be justified or not, but people act not on the situation as it is, but on how they define it. Perceptions here are very important, and I feel that the gulf between Islamic

countries and the non-Moslems has increased after the Gulf War.

**Heller:** I certainly agree that Islam is viewed as some kind of identity delimiter in relations between Islamic peoples and non-Islamic peoples. But I'm very skeptical that it goes very much beyond that in terms of either a determinant, or a predictor of political behaviour. The most salient divide sometimes appears in the case of a direct conflict or clash between a non-Islamic society and an Islamic civilization, in which case, the natural impulse is for other Moslems to feel sympathy or solidarity on primordial grounds. But very rare are cases in which that ultimately determines the kinds of policies that governments of Islamic countries pursue. I would go further and say that it is not even a reliable indicator of sentiment among Islamic publics.

In fact, in extreme cases we can see the most anomalous kinds of behaviour, at least at the popular level, in which other kinds of considerations of identity or other kinds of social cleavages will lead to precisely the opposite kind of behaviour that you would expect if you were judging solely on the basis of Islam. The events of the last few weeks tend to confirm this. Iraqi Kurds would feel much less solidarity with the ostensibly Islamic government in Baghdad, though they themselves are Moslems, than with non-Moslem powers in the area or further afield who might be useful in promoting their immediate objectives.

A most graphic example, and I don't know how much of this is information or disinformation, is the picture of Iraqi Shia begging the US armed forces to stay in the territory of Iraq to protect them from the government of Iraq. I wonder if the processes that we are seeing lately are not accelerating the movement in the opposite direction, that if in some indefinite time in the future Islam will be of no more psycho-political relevance than the concept of Christendom – which at one point in the middle ages meant something, and means nothing any more.

Bahgat is absolutely right that the uniquely unequivocal character of Iraqi behaviour with respect to Kuwait, and the total defeat that resulted from it, leads to the discrediting of what could have been termed the integrationist impulse of pan-Arabism, over the last thirty or forty years. We were talking before about the contradiction between state and civil society. The dominant ideology in the region, since the collapse of the Ottoman empire, has been the denial of the sovereignty of the individual, the denial of the legitimacy of the autonomy of the part against the whole. There may be incipient signs that the integrationist impulses are also coming under challenge.

The impact of the international system, wittingly or unwittingly, is to retard or stop whatever devolutionary processes may be taking place within states. It does it by strengthening the institutions of the state as against the individual or sub-sectors of society. It does it in the intellectual sense through the dominant myth of the international order, which is the primacy of state sovereignty. I think the myth of state sovereignty, and the way that it is manifested in international law and in the performance of international institutions such as the United Nations, creates an intellectual and institutional strength for states against societies which they would not otherwise be able to sustain in a different kind of world.

**Stein:** What was unique about this war if you look at it with proper historical perspective, may be that it was a war fought to defend the principle of state sovereignty. And that wasn't only important to the Arab governments, it was important to almost all governments in the Third World who face similar kinds of problems. That is an important part of the explanation for why it was possible to assemble an international coalition.

On the relationship between Islam and the West, from inside the Middle East, one of the really crucial questions over the next decade is what the appropriate models of social and economic change within each state are going to be. In the post-war period in the Middle East, there have been different kinds of experiments

## IT IS A LONG TIME SINCE ANYONE SERIOUSLY BELIEVED HE COULD BUY ENDURING POLITICAL INFLUENCE BY TRANSFERRING WEAPONS.

and they reflected what was happening in the international system. In the fifties, the Nasserite experiment was enormously attractive, not only in the Arab Middle East but in other parts of the Third World as well. It reflected both an attempt to build the state, not only to strengthen it against internal society, but also to engage in social and economic engineering.

For reasons that are not relevant here, that experiment was discredited. The prior experiment that Nasser discredited – and we forget this – was the so-called Western liberal model which had an earlier run in the thirties. The third interesting experiment, and that is why it was

so powerful and its impact went far beyond Iran itself, was an attempt in Iran to create an Islamic revolution, which was a social and economic revolution, as well as a political revolution.

So what are the alternatives? Where do we look inside the Middle East, for models of social and economic change? It is not only external aid that strengthens the state, the state plays a role which is built-in, to the extent that there are fundamental economic problems, which only the state is capable of addressing. That is in conflict with, what I call, the state breaking, nation building tendency – which we face in Canada.

To the extent that this may have been a war which was fought to preserve state sovereignty, it may be a historical curiosity. The war ended by the UN taking action with respect to the Kurds, no matter how limited or circumscribed. That was unprecedented. So the war may have started with one overarching principle, but the end is just as interesting as the beginning.

It is not only that these state breaking impulses are going to conflict with established state structures, but they are up against absolutely crucial and tough processes of how social and economic change is going to be managed. That is where Saddam Hussein touched a very important cord, on the issue of redistribution of wealth. But who redistributes wealth? States – both externally and internally.

**Hunter:** My sense is that the traditional unitary, centralized Jacobin sort of state will eventually have to change in the Middle East, if it is going to succeed. For Iraq to remain Iraq it will have to try to accept diversity and perhaps a loose confederation. Maybe Iran will have to have similar things in place among certain parts of the population.

**Stein:** What Shireen's just been saying and what I have been arguing is a reflection of two broad tendencies in global and international systems. On one hand you see a move toward federation. But what do you see in central Europe? State breaking, which is a result of nationalism from below, the destruction of state structures.

**Bryans:** Lurking off-stage in this conversation and over the last eight months, is Israel. Where are these state breaking, nation making forces there? Or is Israel a special case?

**Korany:** When you discuss with Moslems and say to them, we are in the twentieth century, you can't just look at everything as a function of a religion which was established in the seventh century, they'll usually point to Israel, and Judaism as a religion. If you have a religious basis on one side, you can't deny it to the other. From this point of view, what we do with the Palestinian issue will determine a lot about the



strengthening or weakening of Islamic groups within various states.

**Bryans:** Why is the disposition of the Palestinian question so determinant on how the religious question will work itself out?

**Korany:** Because for many Moslems the question is still between Jews and Moslems.

**Heller:** It is not a religious prism when they talk about Jews and Moslems. It is the same kind of identity delimiter that we were talking about before, a communitarian boundary, if you will. It has nothing to do with the religious content of the state, or of state legislation, or legitimacy of boundaries. Jews is another way that people in the Middle East refer to Israelis. I have the same difficulties Michael does in understanding the reasoning behind the statement that the disposition of the Palestinian issue will determine the relative success or failure of Islamic movements in the Arab world.

**Korany:** The importance of the Palestinian issue is that it brings within its confines many things at the same time. Certainly for some Islamic militants it is a religious issue, Jews and Moslems. But the Palestinian issue is considered, also, as a remnant of the colonial issue: Israel as part of the West and, in fact, almost a plot of the West – here, again, the conspiracy theory. But an issue which will come up again and again, and which could endanger many of governments in the Gulf, is that of double standards. Once you have been so strict in applying international law and UN resolutions, you can't be selective.

**Stein:** The Palestinian issue is salient because it involves the intersection of so many of the themes that we have already talked about. There is the religious dimension of it. The second is the association of the colonial past. That is the historic way that issue was interpreted in the Arab Middle East. The Iraqi/Kuwaiti conflict is interesting in that respect, because what was affirmed here were colonially drawn borders, and that is when the we/they distinction broke down. It was the explicit acknowledgment in the Arab Middle East that colonial borders are legitimate. The process of drawing them was not legitimate, but their existence is now legitimate. They are not open for change, irrespective of how they were drawn. So in a curious way the colonial association might recede in the next decade.

The third way that this is an important issue and has to play into Arab politics is in the state breaking/nation building perspective. To the extent that we are talking about broader processes in the Arab world which are going

to legitimate nationhood, even if they are not co-determinous with state boundaries, the Palestinian issue and the relationship between Israeli nationalism and Palestinian nationalism flows very much into that debate.

The double standard issue I would turn on its head. It is a double-edged sword, a problem for the whole Arab Middle East, and it is a litmus test. What are the standards for dealing with national minorities across state boundaries in the Middle East generally? That issue has never been on the agenda in the post-war period, other than in the Palestinian case. It will now be on the agenda.

## WHAT WAS UNIQUE ABOUT THIS WAR WAS THAT THE WORLD'S LEADING MILITARY POWER WAS NOT ABLE TO FUND THE WAR...

**Korany:** Can the Helsinki model [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE] be applied to the Middle East? Can we go beyond the state and try to organize democratic transformation and human rights and all of that?

**Stein:** Helsinki did not talk directly at all about changes in the forms of government. It raised the question on a wholly different issue – the level of human rights, dissent against established governments, and the extent that you extend these to cultural rights and to the tolerance of minorities. In retrospect, I suspect that Helsinki had enormous impact on what we are currently seeing in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, because it was approached that way. The logical conclusion down the historical road was fundamental political change. To put the form of government at the top of the agenda, is to put the cart before the horse. The issue is, in fact, individual rights against the state, and cultural rights for minority groups.

**Heller:** It would be naive to insist on institutional forms of the liberal democratic state. The problem, as I said, was that since the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the idea of the sovereignty of the individual and the autonomy of the part from the whole has not had legitimacy in much of Middle Eastern political thought. No one would ever accuse the Ottoman empire of having been a liberal democratic state. But it did create much more manoeuvre room for individuals and for autonomous cultural or

communitarian groups than have ever existed in post-colonial states in the Middle East.

**Bryans:** One observation that one can make about how the process has unfolded in the last eight months is that the system and the various parts of it, whether it is the coalition or the UN, seemed to be pretty good at protecting nation states from each other and protecting state sovereignty. But as we've seen from particularly egregious examples of the past – whether it is the Holocaust or the Cambodians against the Khmer Rouge, and we now see it with the Kurds, and then there are some examples that are not quite so sharp, such as the Palestinians and the

Israelis – the system is very bad at protecting people from their governments.

The UN club has always said state sovereignty is supreme and everything else is sacrificed to that. So the

Kurds have no voice. Is there something positive that can come out from all of this that can begin to help people that don't have a seat in this club of nation states?

**Heller:** It is not just starting now. It is not by accident that Bahgat pointed to Helsinki as some kind of seminal breakthrough, because there was a process there of enshrining the legitimacy of discussions about human rights within somebody else's state, as a beginning of the kind of delegitimization of this notion that state sovereignty is the ultimate value of the system. The same thing happened, incidentally, with respect to South Africa. If we had been playing by the rules, which say that you don't interfere in somebody else's internal affairs, there could never have been any kind of international action against South Africa, but there was. The problem is that there are more discouraging precedents about failure to do anything in the most atrocious cases.

**Hunter:** I had my UN years, and sat in on innumerable sessions of human rights commissions and the sub-committee on the protection of minorities, and what have you. I saw the cynicism of the great powers. There are some rules and regulations in regard to gross and systematic violations of human rights. After Halabja [the Kurdish town subject to gas attack by the government of Iraq in 1988], there was a motion in the human rights commission to do something against Iraq, and I have to say, shamefacedly, that the US government prevented that. Over the years, human rights have been basically used as a political propaganda tool. I saw this during the Carter administration when I was at the UN. It was done by putting pressure on the Soviets. Every time you are against some country you say they are abusing human rights. We don't need to change the Charter, we have to put our money where our mouth is. Apply these existing principles and strengthen the UN system.

**Stein:** One would expect, following Shireen's analysis, that one would have seen almost no action with respect to the Kurds – given the anticipated American desire to end the war neatly in a military context and ignore the wider political ramifications. One would have expected that it would play into domestic American public opinion which has always emphasized, "bring the boys back home."

What happened, in fact, is that the administration was overwhelmed by public opinion in the United States, responding to visual images of Kurds, pushing the administration into a position that the administration had no intention of taking. I don't care what we call it, or whether it comes from England or from the US, when you talk about safe havens or enclaves or whatever the euphemisms are, it does, in fact, involve intervention in Iraq's internal affairs.

**Bryans:** What is going to be the role of arms sales in the near and medium-term future, and what do you make of the argument that it is people's insecurity and the fact that they want to fight wars that makes them buy weapons?

**Heller:** I might be wrong, but I don't know of a single case in which somebody was forced to buy weapons he did not want to buy, where the supplier said you take these guns or I will shoot you. The basic point is true that the arms trade is essentially demand-driven. However, that is not to say that certain suppliers, most suppliers I guess, have not played into the demand or made it easier to satisfy than it would otherwise have been, for purposes related to their own strategic or commercial interests. I think the strategic interests in the post-Cold War era may be diminishing. There may be a few diehards in the Stavka of the Red Army or in the KGB or somewhere in the State Department, but by and large, it is a long time since anyone seriously believed he could buy enduring political influence by transferring weapons.

If anything, the commercial interests in recent years have intensified and may intensify even more, if and when the CFE agreements [conventional force agreements in Europe] ever get implemented. Therefore, there will be strong commercial pressures in most of the arms exporting countries to respond to the demands generated by regional conflicts, and particularly to the effective demand generated by the money available. Of course, the effective demand is still greatest in the Middle East, although there are some resource constraints tied to the price of oil in the last couple of years. But even that is not likely to prove an insuperable obstacle if they get some creative financing packages together. Therefore, to think that you can achieve any kind of effective

results by waiting for change in the demand side is absolutely utopian. The only way to have any effect at all is from the supply side.

**Stein:** Mark put it all far too politely for purposes of this discussion. The demand side is huge and enduring, and it is on two levels. One is the security threats that each government perceives from another, and that will endure for the foreseeable future. But that is not the only purpose for arms transfer. It relates to all the other issues that we talked about, it is the state versus society too, which is the hidden agenda in a lot of this.

Now on the supply side, what do we see? If we assume that the transition in the Soviet Union works under optimistic assumptions, and the fragmentation is limited rather than extensive, the major source of hard currency for the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future will be CFE-related products that are no longer useful. And the major place to send them will be to regions like the Middle East where there is an enduring demand. The Soviet Union has diamonds, oil and used tanks.

There is an autonomous independent benefit for the Western world to sell to the Middle East. Saddam Hussein was not a Soviet creation, despite a great deal of the myth making that went on in Western capitals. Much of what he got,

## ...WE AND THEY, IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE. SOME OF WE CAN BE A THREAT, AND WE CAN COUNT ON SOME OF THEM TO HELP US.

and much of what was most lethal, was supplied by Germany, and France, and paid for by Saudi Arabia. Those dynamics are going to continue.

In terms of delivering political outcomes in the Middle East, the capacity of the US is no greater than it ever has been – despite a lot of the rhetoric that we are hearing. To the extent that the US continues to stay involved, a primary instrument of that involvement will be military sales. It is therefore going to be impossible to get an effective suppliers' agreement, when you build in all these factors. The future is frightening.

**Korany:** I don't believe the whole idea, floated at the end of the Gulf War, about arms control in the region. Events now confirm this. You have lots of stocks that are now not used at the end of the Cold War and you have to sell them somewhere. Second, there are economic needs,

France and Great Britain, their economies are based on arms sales to the Middle East – the Middle East takes about sixty percent of all arms imported to the Third World. They are demand-driven in the following sense: arms races are not the cause of wars, they are symptoms of conflicts. As long as the bases for arms purchases are not treated, people will go through the black market. They will use all means to violate agreements for arms control even when these agreements can be reached.

**Hunter:** A footnote about the nature of governments in the Middle East. Most Middle Eastern countries are, in one form or another, military regimes. And the military is self-perpetuating. So we cannot say it is only conflict and that it has nothing to do with the development of huge military establishments. When you strip them, both Turkey and Egypt are basically military governments; the military determines what goes on. Syria has a military-run government.

The US and other governments' influence is basically with the military, and they have to keep their clients happy. Turkey wants to have an indigenous military industrial complex, and they are defining their relationship, and the health of the relationship, in terms of the willingness of US to give them the kind of sophisticated arms they want. Egypt wants more arms. And obviously if they get them then there is a dynamic interaction, other countries are also going to get them. The militarization of many regimes in the Third World is a spur to the arms race.

**Bryans:** Switching the subject once again, I am personally interested in this because we published an article by one of the people around the table two issues ago, which dealt with the run-up to the Gulf War, and Ambassador April Glaspie, and her contradictory testimony. I am wondering what the state of the art of revisionist history is about the run-up, and who did what to whom?

**Heller:** Diplomats' accounts to their own foreign offices of what they said do not always and necessarily reflect what they said. It is an ex post facto reconstruction of a conversation. The original analysis [of Glaspie's pre-war conversation with Hussein] is consistent with the whole tone of the American appeasement of Saddam Hussein for several years before.

I think it is a non-argument, but at the more general level I think what we are seeing is the acceleration of history writing. Because normally we get a conventional wisdom and then four, five, six years down the line we get the rise of the revisionist school and then another four or five years down the line after that, we get the dialectical synthesis. This has all happened within six weeks.



**W**HEN THE BERLIN Wall collapsed in late 1989, taking the Warsaw Pact with it, China was in the international doghouse because of the Tiananmen massacre. China's leaders warned Western countries that they needed China's friendship more than they appreciated, so with the Gulf crisis came an opportunity for China to recoup some lost international stature. By supporting American-led actions in the UN Security Council, China regained access to World Bank loans, saw an end to European Community sanctions, and went ahead, more or less unhindered, with secret trials of the democracy activists.

The "new world order" is, however, not entirely to Beijing's liking.

In the first place, the end of the Cold War has dissolved the "strategic triangle" within which Beijing has routinely manoeuvred. China is used to leaning towards one superpower or another in order to assure her own security and evade capture by any one bloc. While the Bush administration has been extraordinarily sensitive to Beijing – for the sake of maintaining close ties, the US has sidestepped its own policies stemming from the events of 4 June – China's role in the current Middle East crisis has been marginal.

Beijing has a few interests in the region. Not only did it supply arms to Iraq (as well as to Iran, Saudi Arabia and now Syria), but in recent years, Iraq was the principal purchaser of Chinese construction labour for its military and civilian infrastructure. China lost billions of dollars in hard currency because of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and is now unlikely to recover debts dating back to the Iran-Iraq war. However, Beijing's most important misgivings stem from the strategic implications that flow from the war.

BEIJING MAY HAVE OBTAINED CONCESSIONS IN RETURN FOR ITS SUPPORT IN the UN and abstention on the all-important resolution 678, but it did not gain in the long run. Beijing clearly preferred a peaceful "Arab" solution to the crisis, and while urging Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, it continued to express this preference even after the coalition assault began in January. Now China faces the alarming prospect of a "Pax Americana" – a triumphant United States as sole superpower overshadowing any distinctive "Third World" perspective in world affairs.

Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen, during a recent visit to Europe, emphasized China's self-styled role as "the world's largest developing country," and analyzed the Gulf crisis in terms of the North-South problems which the Cold War had obscured. Deng Xiaoping has publicly blamed the US for the disturbances at Tiananmen. He reportedly exclaimed, "we did nothing at all to you, and look what you did to us." In his mind, a Pax Americana will inevitably put even greater pressure on China's socialist system.

As vindication of their own steadfast opposition to the democracy activists, he and his colleagues seized upon Mikhail Gorbachev's rightward shift in domestic policy. As one Communist Party document put it, the violent unrest and evolution of some socialist countries further proves that the decisions and measures taken in our country to suppress the counter-revolutionary rebellion in 1989 were totally correct."

With Gorbachev placing limits on reform, they see him as a more reliable ally in the strategic competition. China has offered the Soviet Union a large commodity loan valued at one billion Swiss Francs. This deal sends desperately needed Chinese foodstuffs and consumer goods to the Soviets. In return, the USSR is ready to sell China Sukhoi-27

# BEIJING SAILS INTO ADVERSE WINDS

*Beijing's aging leadership is not pleased  
with the United States' triumph in  
the Persian Gulf.*

BY JEREMY PALTIEL

fighter aircraft. In addition to upgrading defence capabilities, the sale symbolically challenges the Americans, who, after Tiananmen, suspended an earlier agreement to provide advanced avionics for Chinese military aircraft.

A steady stream of high-ranking Soviet officials has visited Beijing in recent months. In February, Gorbachev dispatched Deputy General-Secretary of the Communist Party, Vladimir Ivashko to Beijing. The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin, visited Moscow in return. Chinese Premier Li Peng expressed his "sincerest hopes" for the

stable development of the USSR in another meeting with a Politburo member, and finally on 1 April, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh announced, with some satisfaction, that Sino-Soviet relations were now "completely normalized." To underscore this new degree of cooperation, in early May, Dimitry Yazov made the first visit in nearly thirty years of a Soviet Minister of Defence to the People's Republic.

China's recent refusal to cooperate with Hong Kong over building a new airport, and a truculent attitude towards American concerns over China's massive trade surplus, signal a hardened attitude towards the West. According to Mao Zedong's theory of contradictions, the US now represents the greater threat to Chinese interests, a perspective which would make a united-front strategy with the Soviets appropriate. Efforts at rapprochement with Moscow can also be seen as an attempt by China to preserve the socialist "community of nations."

THE OVERWHELMING DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING THE USSR, and China's own latent instability, could well make these moves irrelevant. China faces not only an ascendant US, but also the rising strength of Japan. While Chinese policymakers might hope that US-Japan trade frictions will preoccupy the two economic giants to China's advantage, they must be concerned about Japanese efforts to establish Asia as its own sphere of economic influence. For this reason, even the prospect of a smaller Soviet Union or a revived Russia will not derail improvements in Sino-Russian relations.

Under former External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, Canada cautiously accepted a longstanding Soviet initiative for creating an Asia-Pacific security system – a project towards which the US is lukewarm at best. Exploratory talks on the issue were held in Victoria in April. The Japanese have made it clear that they want no part of such an arrangement, and Soviet "new thinking" has yet to find favour in Tokyo. Gorbachev's long-anticipated visit to Japan in April, ended without agreement over outstanding territorial disputes. China was not displeased by this eventuality, since it will remain a privileged locus for Japanese investment, while retaining a pivotal political and security role between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Opposition to hegemony is a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. When the sovereignty of Kuwait was at issue, China was cooperative at the UN. However, the prospect of a new American pre-eminence alarms her much more. Mao Zedong preferred chaos over order, and the aging rulers in the Forbidden City will reject the "new world order" also. From where they sit, a divided world still provides the best security for China and for themselves.

# GUN CONTROL FOR THE WORLD

*All through history, efforts at controlling which countries get which weapons have failed. What do we have to do to get it right?*

BY KEITH KRAUSE

IN THE WAKE OF THE CARNAGE OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, POLICY makers, scholars and journalists are debating how to control the global trade in weapons. The dispute turns on differing views of the fundamental nature of international politics. On one hand, those in the "never again" tradition proclaim the birth of a "new world order" that will address the underlying factors believed to have caused or exacerbated the conflict. On the other, pessimists see the reassertion of American global ascendancy and the resort to military means to resolve conflicts as illustrating the "same old anarchy."

From the US administration, contradictory signals mirroring both positions have emerged. Secretary of State James Baker argued in early February for "much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons" into the Middle East. But in March, the White House made public its intention to sell US \$18 billion of weapons to its Persian Gulf allies, and to use Export-Import Bank credits to finance arms exports around the world.

The Canadian position has at least the virtue of greater consistency. Both Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and former Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark argued during and after the war that "the world must learn from this war that an unrestricted arms trade in this region is no longer acceptable," and coupled these views with a concrete proposal for a "world summit on instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction."

But are we likely to see the successful control of the diffusion of modern weapons? Are these efforts sincere, or merely a means for governments to satisfy the public unease over the arms trade in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war? Several international initiatives to control the arms trade were already receiving attention behind the scenes, and have now become more prominent. A new international non-governmental agency, "Armswatch," is being established in Europe to monitor and publicize the arms trade. This fall, the United Nations will release a proposal to increase the "transparency" of arms exports. And the US Office of Technology Assessment is studying the diffusion of military technologies and military production.

THESE INITIATIVES AND DIPLOMATIC ENERGY OR GOODWILL ALONE DO NOT guarantee success. With more than \$40 billion in arms being traded each year between almost fifty suppliers and more than a hundred recipients, the scale of the required efforts is vast. Controls on the arms trade will ultimately succeed only if they take into account the forces that lead states to buy and sell weapons and weapons-producing technologies.

There are good reasons to be gloomy over the prospects for successful control of the arms trade. The US continues to use arms transfers to friendly states as a foreign policy tool, as evidenced by the proposed \$18 billion sale, and the Soviet Union sees arms sales as one of its new sources of hard currency. Lesser producers, such as Britain and France, rely on exports to keep their defence industries at the technological forefront (up to half of the arms produced in both countries in the 1980s were exported), and producers in the developing world such as South Korea are eager to expand exports for their industries' survival.

Arms recipients too have shown little interest in restrictions, seeing such efforts as another bid to freeze a global distribution of military power which runs against them. Although eighty percent of the weapons traded *between* states go to the developing world, it "consumes" no more than twenty percent of the roughly \$280 billion of annual world weapons production. Most military hardware is produced by the US, USSR, UK, France and other major powers for their own forces.

It is not surprising then that controlling the arms trade without controlling arms production and procurement is seen by the developing world as hypocritical discrimination against states unable to produce arms for themselves. Overcoming this perception, therefore, requires that control measures be rooted in recipient states' own interests in managing or resolving their conflicts.

THE HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE ARMS TRADE REINFORCES A pessimistic view. As far back as Charlemagne, rulers have tried to prohibit or restrict the export of weapons that could be used against them, almost always to no avail. In 1574, Queen Elizabeth I of England ordered arms exports to be halted after it was pointed out that the export of English cannon meant that "yor enimie is better furnished with them than or own country ships ar." Heavy fines were imposed for unauthorized exports, but the trade continued.

In the late nineteenth century, the European colonial powers sought via the Brussels Act (1890) to restrict the flow of weapons into Africa, in order to preserve their political and military control. But again, arms continued to be sold throughout Africa wherever commercial and political advantages outweighed immediate dangers.

Twentieth century initiatives have enjoyed equally little success. Between World Wars I and II, the League of Nations launched comprehensive multilateral negotiations to reduce the arms trade. Conspiracy theories about the role of shady arms dealers in triggering wars in the Balkans and elsewhere fuelled public sentiment against the arms trade, but governments could not agree on concrete measures. All that was accomplished was the establishment of a short-lived (and highly inaccurate) voluntary register of the trade in arms and ammunition.

The most recent attempt at control, the American-Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CATT), foundered on growing superpower suspicion and competition in the developing world in the late 1970s. Although ambitious, CATT did not address specific regional concerns, did not engage other major producers, and did not involve recipient states. The eight-year long Iran-Iraq war virtually eliminated all talk of partial controls on the arms trade, and was a bonanza for smaller arms producers willing to supply the weapons that major producers were (at least initially) reluctant to sell.

If new attempts to control the arms trade are to succeed, lessons must be extracted from this history of failure. The most prominent lesson seems to be that the problem must be broken into more manageable pieces. There are three strategies to accomplish this:

Concentrate on specific regions or sub-regions that are excessively over-armed and conflict-prone. Although the Middle East stands out (the



Persian Gulf alone accounted for almost one-quarter of global arms transfers between 1980 and 1988), it is not the only region that suffers from the burden of armaments. Military spending and arms acquisitions in Central America and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have also outstripped the economic resources of states and fuelled regional conflicts.

Control can mean *regulation* as well as *restraint*. Regulation acknowledges the legitimate security requirements of recipients, and the dependence of some suppliers on exports either as a tool of foreign policy or to maintain defence industries for national security reasons. Recipients unwilling to forego advanced weapons permanently may be amenable to medium-term regulation in the interests of regional security.

Focus on preventing the spread of destabilizing or costly weapons systems into specific areas of the globe. It matters little to Peru if Saudi Arabia acquires more F-16 fighters, as long as its neighbours do not! Several high profile modern weapons, such as cruise missiles, advanced multi-role fighters (such as the F-15 or MiG-29) or sophisticated main battle tanks (such as the M-1) are not now in wide circulation, and steps to keep them out of particular regions might be more acceptable to both recipients and suppliers. The perilous state of most developing world economies offers a unique opportunity, as simple penury forces states to consider alternatives to continued arms buildups as a means to guarantee national security.

WHILE EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE PROLIFERATION OF HIGH-PROFILE WEAPONS such as ballistic missiles or chemical and nuclear weapons are well advanced, an exclusive focus on these exceptionally frightening weapons would be a mistake. In the long run, it is probably more important to control "ordinary" conventional weapons: tanks, aircraft, and helicopters are capable of wreaking immense destruction all on their own.

A more troubling future problem is the diffusion of technologies for producing arms. Today, eight developing world states can build fighter aircraft, six can make main battle tanks, and six can manufacture military helicopters. Up to fifteen states in the developing world may be able to produce missiles by the year 2000. Between ten and twenty-five states possess chemical weapons. Most of these weapons are not at the forefront of modern technology, but producers of them could well upset any future control arrangements.

Most arms producers in the developing world have had their ability to import arms restricted at some point: India and Pakistan during their clashes in the 1960s and early 1970s; China after its break with the Soviet Union; Brazil during the late 1970s; Israel after the 1967 war, and South Africa under the UN embargo. Iraq, after its embargo experience in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war, launched a multi-billion dollar effort to produce its own ammunition, artillery, ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. It would be a bitter irony if attempts to control the arms trade merely resulted in a vast expansion of arms production in the developing world.

Controlling the diffusion of arms-producing technologies is much more difficult. As far back as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, England and the Italian city-states tried to control the diffusion of new technologies for manufacturing cannon by restricting the migration of skilled workers. Today, technology is transferred not by migration, but through license and co-production arrangements with major producers willing to trade away their technological monopoly in order to win the contracts they need to sustain their defence industries. Controls on technology transfers have had mixed success, however, in part because it is often impossible to distinguish between civilian and military technologies.

At least one good precedent exists for efforts to control the diffusion of arms producing technologies: the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime. It began with seven Western states agreeing to restrict exports

of technologies that could be used to produce ballistic missiles, and now includes sixteen states.\* It is an informal agreement, requiring only the coordination of national policies. It does not contain demanding verification or reporting requirements. Unfortunately, it neither includes all possible suppliers of ballistic missile technology (the most notable omissions being the Soviet Union, China, Brazil and North Korea), nor involves recipient states; it is thus only a partial model to follow. But its rapid expansion in membership and the informal agreement of states such as Sweden to follow its guidelines are hopeful signs for future efforts.

CANADIAN INITIATIVES TO CONTROL THE ARMS TRADE HAVE BEEN somewhat quixotic. Although Canada may export up to two billion dollars worth of arms (mostly components) each year, more than eighty percent of this goes directly to the US. This low level of participation in the global arms market allows Canada to pursue a relatively restrictive export policy while maintaining a defence industry.

But as a consequence, Canadians do not always take seriously the motives driving states to export or acquire weapons, and often promote technical or apolitical solutions that ignore these powerful political or economic considerations.

Supplier-only controls, or efforts to subject the arms trade to more public scrutiny (via a UN register), must be coupled with attempts to address the regional conflicts that ultimately fuel Third World arms races. The link between arms control and the


underlying conflicts or insecurities, so clear in the East-West context, is at work just as much elsewhere in the world.

Certainly pious pronouncements against the arms trade or for increased transparency of exports will not alone win points among friends and allies, as suggested by President George Bush's public rebuff, during his March visit to Ottawa, of the Canadian initiative for a weapons summit. Canada cannot single-handedly spearhead such major international initiatives, but it can pursue more limited initiatives in fora such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN and the Missile Technology Control group to expand or enhance the scope of existing measures. In every case, the guiding principle should be to promote actions that will be effective and cumulative, not merely to settle for cosmetic gestures that reap diplomatic brownie points.

Further, Canada needs to link its efforts to control the arms trade with its broader involvement in peacekeeping and conflict management around the world. Certain regions are thus more appropriate foci for Canadian initiatives: Central America because of geographic proximity; the North Pacific because of concerns with stability and arms buildups in the region; Sub-Saharan Africa because of Canada's position within la Francophonie and the Commonwealth.

None of these efforts will eliminate the commerce in weapons. The arms trade is a consequence of the "self-help" nature of international politics: states see themselves locked into a permanent struggle to survive or improve their position in the global hierarchy. This can only change if there are alternative means to achieve security. Regulation of the arms trade could at least help create a space in which these means can flourish.

\* For more on this subject see Marie-France Desjardins, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation," Background Paper 34, CIIPS, Ottawa, September 1990.



# SALVAGING A SWEET DEAL

*Were the Soviets trying to cheat on the European arms control treaty? Does it matter?*

BY JANE BOULDEN

**O**F ALL THE SYMBOLS OF THE NEW Europe, one with some of the most tangible and immediate consequences will be the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, codifies the new military reality in Europe by requiring the two military alliances\* to destroy some fifty thousand pieces of heavy military hardware. However, the treaty was in trouble almost before the ink was dry because of what appeared to be Soviet efforts to evade the full consequences of its terms.

Since the signing, doubts about Soviet behaviour over the treaty have become so serious that they have brought activity in almost all other areas of arms control to a standstill, and threaten the agreement itself. The Bush administration decided to postpone sending the treaty to the US Senate for ratification – an essential step before its terms are put into effect – and Canada and other NATO countries made joint and individual formal protests to the Soviet Union about its actions.

In an effort to overcome the potentially fatal problems, in March, George Bush initiated a private exchange of letters with Mikhail Gorbachev which could lead to a compromise solution for resolving the difficulties. At the time of writing, what remains is for Gorbachev to indicate Soviet acceptance of the terms, and to guarantee that his military establishment will abide by them.

THE IRONY OF THIS DEAL, IF INDEED IT COMES off, is that it would see the United States and the North Atlantic alliance acquiescing – with some appropriate compensatory movement by the Soviets – to precisely the type of behaviour that ten years ago would have vindicated the most alarmist fears put about by the Reagan administration concerning Soviet trustworthiness. But the reality is that the treaty is too good

for the West and for NATO, to allow it to collapse without exhausting all efforts to save it – even if this involves accepting questionable Soviet behaviour as a *fait accompli*.

The CFE Treaty requires NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to reduce their conventional armaments in five categories of weapon systems: tanks, artillery pieces, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It does not restrict the numbers of soldiers or other military personnel. In February 1990, before the treaty was signed, the US and the Soviet Union had agreed at an arms control meeting in Ottawa to limit their armed forces to 195,000 each in central Europe.

HOWEVER, AS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TREATY progressed, it became clear that the agreed number was simply too high: the Soviet Union was in the process of withdrawing virtually all of its troops from Eastern Europe anyway; and for budgetary and other reasons, the US would soon be well below that number as well. As it became increasingly probable that the two sides would be unable to agree on new personnel limits in time for the November deadline for completing the CFE treaty, they agreed in September that the personnel issue would be put aside for another time. So troop limits, along with aerial inspection measures, are to be negotiated in what is now known as CFE 1A – so called to indicate that these measures were really intended to be part of the CFE treaty.

The treaty operates as follows: the overall ceilings on the five categories of equipment apply to the two alliances (although the language of the treaty refers to “groups of states parties”). There are also sub-ceilings which establish certain regional limits and which ensure that no one state will maintain an overwhelming percentage of the forces allotted to each alliance as a whole. The treaty affects a geographic zone which is referred to as “Atlantic to the Urals.” This includes a portion of the Soviet Union extending as far east as the Ural mountain range, and all of the territory of the European alliance members (with the exception of a small portion of Turkey). US and

Canadian forces in Europe are subject to the terms of the Treaty but their national territories are not.

Both sides must reach the agreed levels forty months after the treaty enters into force. All equipment in the zone as of 19 November 1990, the date of signature, is subject to the terms of the treaty, wherever the equipment might be located after that date. The day before the signing, all countries involved exchanged thick packages of data with each other – providing information on the types, numbers, location, and technical specifications of equipment and their associated military units, within the zone. Exchanges like these will continue over the life of the treaty to monitor the reductions, and later to maintain the agreed limits on numbers.

According to very specific methods established in the treaty, equipment in excess of the agreed limits must be destroyed or converted to other purposes. A variety of options for carrying out the destruction are available. For example, tanks can be destroyed by severing specified key parts, by deforming them according to established procedures, or simply by blowing them up – again only according to methods established in the Treaty which, in the latter case, even specifies where in the tank the explosive charge should be placed. All destruction and conversion of equipment can be observed and inspected by other parties to the treaty.

IT IS THE SHEER SCALE OF THE REDUCTIONS THAT makes the treaty so valuable to the West. The Soviet Union will be required to reduce its equipment holdings by twenty-six percent or 18,840 pieces. Other Warsaw Pact members will reduce their equipment by an additional 18,223 pieces or almost forty-two percent. Following the reunification of Germany, East German equipment now counts as part of the West's inventory, so NATO will eliminate 13,586 pieces of equipment or almost fifteen percent. But without counting East German holdings, NATO reductions would be on the order of just under five percent.

The problems that arose to threaten all this have to do with Soviet behaviour in three areas.

\*Although the Warsaw Treaty Organization will formally cease to exist, for the purposes of the treaty former WTO states will be treated as a group and will jointly and separately continue to be bound by the terms of the treaty.



Prior to the signing of the Treaty in November, it became evident that the USSR was transferring large numbers of tanks and other equipment beyond the Ural mountains. While not strictly speaking a violation, the action quickly generated concern about Soviet intentions, specifically those of the Soviet military establishment.

The Soviet government said the transfers were part of previously announced planned withdrawals from Eastern Europe and that much of the equipment was slated for destruction. The US, too, has removed equipment from Europe which it planned to destroy, and has also moved equipment and troops from Europe to the Persian Gulf. However, in contrast to the Soviets, the Americans said that all of this equipment will be counted against the treaty ceilings.

The second area of concern surfaced after the initial exchange of data. The information provided by the Soviet Union differed significantly from US intelligence estimates of Soviet holdings: the Soviets' numbers were much lower than expected in each category. Subsequent revisions to US estimates brought the differences down to more reasonable levels, although they did not eliminate discrepancies.

PROBLEMS WITH DATA SETS OF THIS KIND ARE not unusual and the treaty gives states ninety days to correct their initial submissions – Germany and the UK have also submitted such corrections. However, in conjunction with the large-scale transfer of equipment out of the zone, the Soviet submission came as a particular shock to the West, indicating that total Soviet reductions would be on the order of three to four times less than preliminary NATO estimates in January 1990. A number of Western government officials involved in the treaty process have speculated that the data submitted by the Soviet Union was based on the levels it expected to be able to achieve – but that for various reasons failed to meet – by 19 November or by the beginning of the initial inspections.

Where the agreement threatened to come

unstuck was over the question of treaty interpretation: dubbed a "treaty-buster" by some. The Soviet Union has recategorized three motorized rifle divisions, previously under the jurisdiction of the army, as naval coastal defence units and claim that

the equipment associated with these units is not "treaty-limited-equipment" (TLE) subject to the numerical restrictions in the treaty.

Similarly, the Soviets claim that equipment held by the Strategic Rocket Forces and naval infantry divisions are not subject to the treaty's terms. The equipment now claimed to be outside the limits includes an estimated 800 tanks, 900 armoured combat vehicles and some 800 artillery pieces – with some estimates putting the total number of pieces at 3,500.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION CENTRES ON Articles II and III, which provide definitions of terms used in the treaty, and establish the rules for counting pieces of military hardware. Article III outlines the only instances in which equipment within the zone may be exempt from the treaty's ceilings. The view held by other governments is that all equipment (as defined by Article II) within the zone of application, is subject to the limits of the treaty, with the specific exceptions outlined in Article III. Article III does not give naval forces an exemption. Alone in its position, the Soviet Union argues that the treaty can indeed be interpreted as excluding these forces.

This final matter led to the postponement of the ratification process in the US and put other arms control negotiations on hold. The Soviet Union has been so intransigent on this question that their behaviour suggests that it is not treaty interpretation which is at issue, but rather that the Soviet military has simply decided not to give up those forces. There are several possible motives for Soviet actions.

The Soviets may be seeking to avoid the high cost of destroying the equipment, or, for domestic political purposes of saving face, they may be trying to minimize the political impact of dramatically disproportionate reductions. In addition, during the negotiations the Soviet Union sought NATO agreement to allow equipment to be converted to civilian or paramilitary use rather than destroyed outright. NATO aversion to this idea (although the West eventually agreed to limited arms conversion) may have

prompted the Soviets to begin moving the equipment to avoid its demolition.


More ominously, it is evident that there is a split between the political and military elements of the government. The Soviet military has made it clear that it believes that Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign Ministry have simply given up too much in negotiations with the West. One Soviet diplomat stated that the decision to move equipment beyond the Ural mountains was taken by military authorities and "came as a surprise to us diplomats." Other diplomatic observers have speculated that the event was one of the contributing factors in Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's decision last December to resign.

This experience makes clear that the internal problems in the Soviet Union are extensive enough to affect the arms control process. In this instance, the Soviet Union has interpreted the treaty to its own advantage, and played fast and loose along the margins of the agreement. The US attempt to salvage the treaty by developing a compromise solution, which at least in part accepts some of these Soviet actions, is exceptional, but then so are the circumstances.

WHEN THE TREATY EVENTUALLY ENTERS INTO force, NATO will not only benefit from Warsaw Pact reductions, it will also gain an ability to monitor conventional Soviet military activity in an "on-site," close-up way that has been impossible heretofore. In the bargain, the US and the West are helping to shore up Gorbachev at a time of great domestic crisis by accepting certain actions of the Soviet military as water under the bridge, thereby avoiding a messy dispute which would cast a pall over arms control talks at all levels.

Even if the attempt at compromise succeeds, the treaty will not yet be out of the woods. Before entering into force, it will need to pass through the very difficult ratification processes in the US and the Soviet Union – not to mention all the other signatories. Even then, and especially in light of its difficult start in life, its ultimate success will depend on strict compliance by all parties.

The advantages of the treaty, considerable as they are, will not sustain indefinitely a willingness in the West to accept Soviet behaviour that skirts the edges of legality. A healthy and successful life for CFE may depend as much on internal events in the USSR, as on international desire to see the treaty through.



# ISRAEL'S PEACE MOVEMENT, DOWN BUT NOT OUT

*Internal squabbling, wavering policies and a severe identity crisis have robbed Israel's peace activists of much of their influence during the Palestinian Intifada.*

BY TAMAR HERMANN

THERE IS SOLID HISTORICAL EVIDENCE THAT PEACE MOVEMENTS TEND to stay silent or even fall into disarray in times of war. Israel played only a passive role in the Persian Gulf war, during which the Israeli peace movement seems to have almost faded away. Iraqi missiles aimed at civilian targets and the ensuing Palestinian applause sharply increased the collective Israeli sense of vulnerability and stirred a general rallying around the flag.

Israel's peace activists were not oblivious to these events. After long, difficult years of dissent, many now seem eager to carve out a place for themselves within the national consensus. However, this "homecoming" was only in part fostered by the war. The drive to return to the national fold is rooted mainly in the growing frustration of many peace activists over their apparent, albeit perhaps unavoidable, failure to meet the challenge of the *Intifada*.\*

The Israeli peace movement emerged as a mass campaign in the late 1970s and peaked, in terms of participation and perceived effectiveness, between 1982 and 1984, when it led the protest against the Lebanon War. It has since consisted of one large organization – Peace Now – and a growing number of small, even tiny, groups. However, the hard core of the movement never exceeded 500 to 750 activists, and even the more optimistic estimates put the number of supporters at around 150,000.

Despite these relatively small numbers, the movement had high visibility. Intensive and generally positive media coverage magnified the movement's size and impact in the eyes of supporters and rivals alike. Moreover, the movement's socio-demographic composition located it quite close to the centre of power – most groups being dominated by young, highly educated, middle-class, Jewish, urban people of European origin. In the Israeli context, this is a profile which offers a promising entrée into the political arena.

Thus the Israeli peace movement in general, and Peace Now in particular, had considerable potential for making a political breakthrough. Yet, by the time the *Intifada* broke out in December 1987, it was already clear that this potential had not been realized. By the mid-1980s, powerful centrifugal forces left it ailing and divided along the margins of the national consensus, and it was unable to fulfill its natural mission as an emissary between Israelis and Palestinians.

THE MOVEMENT'S FAILURE TO MOBILIZE PUBLIC SUPPORT, ITS LACK OF INFLUENCE with those in the decision-making apparatus who could help change official Israeli policy and its inability to maintain credibility with the two sides or to reduce the mutual violence, can be attributed to the following factors, in ascending order of importance:

First, peace activists, no less than other Israelis, were caught off guard by the outbreak of the *Intifada*, as well as by its intensity and endurance. Despite warnings as early as the late 1960s, by some leaders of early

peace groups, of the perils of a prolonged occupation of the territories and the consequent consolidation of a Palestinian national identity, the actual event revealed the gap between the intellectual expectation of such an uprising and the genuine tactical surprise Palestinians achieved.

While the issue of the historical clash between the aims of the Zionist movement and Palestinian national interests had been the focus of heated debates in Peace Now and other groups since their emergence, it took about six months for the movement to respond to the new situation. Even then, it offered neither innovative insight into the problem nor an elaborated plan for peace. Most of the peace movement's actions were restricted to protests against the harsh measures taken by the military. The same tired slogans which had been used against the first Likud prime minister, Menachem Begin, a decade before, were aimed at Labour's Yitzhak Rabin, minister of defence in the National Unity government. The few efforts to present new peace agendas, the manifesto formulated by the radical Red Line group, for example, were too intellectual and impractical in character to be productive.

SECOND, POLITICAL ACTIVISM OUTSIDE THE OFFICIAL PARTISAN CHANNELS has never been a popular way of operating in Israeli politics. Many Israelis have come to regard antiwar demonstrations and petition drives, like those initiated during the Lebanon War, as showing a lack of patriotism and civil responsibility. These negative images were reinforced by the more radical peace factions' advocacy of the individual's right to refuse military service in the West Bank and Gaza, or to take any part in the suppression of the uprising. Such calls provoked public outcry by explicitly contradicting most Israelis' sense of basic civic obligation to take part in the defence of the nation, regardless of personal political convictions, and threatened to undermine the whole movement's status, as a legitimate participant in the national security debate.

The largest part of the movement had already reduced its own options by declaring more than once that despite its rejection of official policies it stood essentially on the same side of the barricades as the Israel Defence Forces. Actions which implied confrontation with the soldiers were in effect, declared off-limits. The question of what actions could be taken without undermining this basic claim to patriotism became more acute as Palestinians turned more violent and the military response harsher.

Third, far from contributing to a consensus within the peace movement regarding its ultimate goals and tactics, the escalation of violence during the *Intifada* brought in its wake new internal dissension. Dozens of new peace groups formed, each advocating a slightly different solution to the Palestinian problem. Radical groups like There is a Limit, Women in Black, Stop the Occupation, and Red Line advocated civil disobedience and the boycott of products manufactured by the West Bank settlers – provocative tactics that yielded minimal results, but which aroused sharply negative public reaction. Peace Now, which had struggled to sustain its public legitimacy by following a relatively moderate course – for example, by refraining, until late 1988, from openly

\* Editor's Note: *Intifada* is most often translated from the Arabic as "uprising," although it literally means "shaking up." As a discrete event, the Palestinian *Intifada* is generally understood to have begun in December 1987 as a series of spontaneous disruptions which spread from refugee camps in the Gaza Strip across the West Bank, in the wake of the violent deaths of one Israeli and four Palestinians in Gaza.



advocating the creation of a Palestinian state – was accused by the more radical factions of being too soft on the security establishment.

Peace Now struck back by portraying the radicals' moves as unrealistic and, indeed, counterproductive as far as the goal of mobilizing public support for a compromise was concerned. This internal strife severely eroded the leading status of Peace Now, which had most of the material resources, as well as the best network of external contacts, both inside Israel and abroad. In sum, factionalism hindered the peace activists' effort to offer a viable alternative policy, wasted energy and detracted generally from the movement's credibility as a rational and effective force.

Fourth, the peace movement was caught between the conflicting expectations of Jews and Arabs. The Israeli Jewish public demanded that the activists' primary loyalties be clearly expressed. Peace activity was tolerated only if the movement declared itself an integral part of the Israeli collective and subordinated any other interests to the national consensus. Open identification with the Palestinian cause was considered disloyal or even treasonous.

Palestinians, for their part, expected too much from the peace movement. They underestimated the effect on peace activists of the pressure to submit to the national consensus, and failed to see where the movement's fundamental loyalties actually lay. The more moderate Palestinian leaders in the West Bank, with whom the movement had carried on a prolonged dialogue, became increasingly impatient with its hesitation and apparent hyper-cautiousness. The peace movement, in turn, found it difficult to deal with the Palestinians' silence that followed terrorist acts.

Palestinians were also disappointed by the refusal of most peace groups to support their demand for a total and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, and for the immediate creation of a fully sovereign Palestinian state.

Moreover, many Palestinians anticipated that the *Intifada* would spark a huge wave of protest within Israel, similar to that during the Lebanon War – an expectation that came to nothing.

In the beginning, Palestinians ascribed the restrained support of their potential Israeli allies to the relatively few Israeli casualties and the fact that the confrontation was confined to the occupied territories. Eventually, however, they realized that the major reason for the limited protest was that for Israelis, the Palestinian issue strikes at the very core of the Israeli state, and that stronger action would threaten their connection to the national consensus. Thus Palestinians – like the Israeli mainstream – asked that the peace movement take a clear stand. Since the vast majority of the movement's activists considered themselves to be Zionists first, even if they rejected the majority view of the Palestinian problem, there was really only one side they could choose.

FIFTH, THE ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT FOUNDERED ON THE ROCKS OF ITS own self-image. Comparing the worldviews of the Israeli peace movement to those of its Western counterparts is misleading. The core themes of Western peace activism: post-materialist counter-culture, anti-statism, environmentalism and anti-nuclearism do not play a major role in Israel. Neither are internationalist and pacifist convictions to be found on the Israeli agenda. Peace – which in the Israeli context means the absence of war – although desirable per se, is advocated by most Israeli peace activists primarily for its anticipated contribution to the security and the well-being of the nation – core beliefs which do not differ significantly from those of the political mainstream.

Moreover, like the largest segment of the Israeli body politic, the peace movement argues for political realism and simultaneously claims to be guided by universal moral principles. While its members reject

several of the main tenets on which official foreign and security policies are based – the portrayal of the Israeli-Arab conflict as a zero-sum game, the fundamental imperative for Israel to maintain extensive territorial security margins and the perception that Israel's room for manoeuvre is perilously small – the peace movement seems nevertheless incapable of cutting the cord which connects it to the political mainstream. It remains torn between its powerful need to belong and a sincere desire to change the gloomy reality.

THE STRENGTH OF THIS PRIMORDIAL ATTACHMENT IS REFLECTED IN THE highly emotional reactions of some of the movement's prominent figures to the escalation of Palestinians' anti-Israeli attitudes following the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis. Knesset Member Yosi Sarid, regarded by many as the personification of the movement, responded sharply to Palestinian support of Saddam Hussein, indicating that he would not be available for further dialogue in the near future. His statement regarding this turnaround goes a long way to explaining the movement's ambivalence towards the Palestinians:

I don't feel betrayed or cheated, for I never believed in them.... What I did believe was that they had reached a sufficient level of maturity to understand where their own interest really lay.... I thought that through a rather painful process they had realized that it was in their own interest to accept and recognize the existence of the state of Israel.... What actually happened was that they acted in total contradiction to their own fundamental cause and by doing so caused all of us enormous damage.... By their senseless, nasty behaviour they turned the wheel back to where it had been ten or twenty years ago.<sup>1</sup>

Sarid's new position was given lot of attention, but was not embraced by all peace activists. Shulamit Aloni, a politician also associated with the movement, dismissed Sarid's argument and encapsulated the peace movement's central dilemma:


Why should I be disappointed with the Palestinian posture? Have I done something for them? The Israeli Left is nothing if not an integral part of the Israeli government, of the establishment.... We tried to raise a moral voice. We were the opposition, asked questions and tried to change the agenda. We shouted and inquired.... However, de facto we accomplished nothing.

The government has continued to dominate the territories,

to ignore human rights there, to destroy and to kill, and we are part of that because we did not rebel. We are law-abiding citizens. We serve in the army. We do not break the law which prohibits meetings with PLO officials. Therefore we are part of it. The Palestinians owe us nothing. There has been no love affair between us. I have always said that they are the enemy, and it is with the enemy that one should talk.<sup>2</sup>

Despite a political impact which is considerably reduced, Israel's peace movement lives on. Long periods of hibernation and even silence are typical for social movements in general and peace movements in particular. Discrete events, like Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel or the 1987 Lebanon War, are more likely than prolonged phenomena, like the *Intifada*, to stimulate a resurgence. But even in its present condition, the peace movement presents a visible challenge to the prevailing security ethos, and invests the domestic political debate with real content. Its repeated denunciation of atrocities and official misconduct continues to highlight the moral dilemmas presented by Israel's ongoing occupation.

1. Cited in Gideon Levi. "Yosi Sarid Is Attacking," Haaretz, 24 August 1990. [In Hebrew, author's translation.]  
2. Cited in Tom Segev. "No One Should Look For Shulamit Aloni," Haaretz, 24 August 1990. [In Hebrew, author's translation.]



Berita Eisenstein

N INDIA, THEY HAD GANDHI, and now, at last, it's our turn with Ganesh Man Singh," cried out a very excited, elderly Nepali when on 9 April 1990, a large, rejoicing crowd flowed onto *Durbar Marg* (The King's Alley) in the country's capital. This celebration in the sunny streets of Kathmandu followed days of twenty-four-hour curfews, and marked the end of several weeks of tension and violence between Nepal's popular movement in favour of a multiparty system, and the government. Following the fatal shooting of dozens of protestors by the armed forces, the monarch of the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, King Birendra, proclaimed only hours later and in the same location, the legalization of the country's political parties, abolished more than twenty-five years earlier.

Ganesh Man Singh, the respected and venerable leader of the Nepali Congress Party (NCP), has been perceived by many as the political soul of the multiparty movement. While clearly affiliated with the NCP, Ganesh Man Singh has always endeavoured to stay clear of partisan electoral dealings, struggling only against the "opponents of democracy."

The open, multiparty election of 1959, the only one in Nepal's history, brought the NCP to power and B. P. Koirale, its leader at the time, headed His Majesty's government for eighteen months. In 1960, King Mahendra, father of the present king, repudiated the multiparty system, threw out the government, and replaced it with a non-party regime, the *Panchayat*. A Sanskrit word that literally means "council of five members," village *Panchayats* were created as local instruments of government through which the palace could secure its control of the country. In 1980, a referendum with results that favoured maintaining this setup, led to accusations of vote-rigging from various quarters. And it was this same corrupt regime which collapsed under popular pressure in the spring of 1990.

INSPIRED IN PART BY THE SUCCESS OF SIMILAR MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN Europe, the clandestine political parties of Nepal launched their combined action in February 1990. Clashes, first with the police, and then with the armed forces, became more widespread. The movement now has forty-three official martyrs, and the government is completing its investigations into other disappearances and deaths which occurred during that period.

A few days after the legalization of political parties, a caretaker government was formed, whose main task was to submit a proposal for a new constitution and to organize elections. As was the case with Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, most of the ministers, including the prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, had spent years in prison.

The constitutional changes finally accepted by the king are regarded by the various political parties as a big step towards democracy. The new constitution explicitly stipulates, among other things, that Nepal's constitutional monarchy is a multiparty system. Although some leftist parties would have preferred a completely secular state, the nation, with a population of close to twenty million, remains a "Hindu Kingdom" (King Birendra is regarded as the reincarnation of Vishnu, a Hindu deity). All religious faiths are tolerated, but active promotion of religious conversion is an offence.

The king retains his power to dissolve parliament in an emergency, and although formally the army answers to a National Defence Council, as a practical matter, it owes its allegiance to the palace. Most Nepalis seem satisfied with the new constitution, although for some it does not go far enough towards a complete guarantee of freedom of expression. "A good constitution, but there is room for improvement," is the way the English-language Kathmandu magazine *Himal* put it.

# POLITICS IN HIGH PLACES

*The people of Nepal go to the polls, and hope democratic government will improve their lives.*

BY FRANÇOIS LAFRENIÈRE

Despite being implicated in the violent events of early 1990, the monarchy has regained some support, although its grip on legitimacy remains tenuous. The hostile, anti-monarchy slogans heard during the weeks preceding Birendra's legalization of political parties, have disappeared. While anti-monarchism still runs strong in various leftist factions, the major parties are aware of the King's popularity, particularly among rural people.

The symbol of unity in this Himalayan country of diverse

ethnic and linguistic groups, Nepal's monarchy sees itself as the guardian of Hinduism, and the protector of the country's sovereignty. The palace has accused various political parties of being too open to the political machinations of Nepal's two giant neighbours – the NCP towards India, and the various communist parties towards China. Since Nepal is dependent on vital trading links with India, it is under constant political and economic pressure from its southern neighbour, which opposes any rapprochement with China.

THE WHOLE COUNTRY WAS CAUGHT UP IN THE LONG-AWAITED 12 MAY election. It is Nepal's urban dwellers from the Kathmandu Valley – less than ten percent of the population – who constitute the majority of the pluralist movement's militants. Few of the remote villages are accessible by road, so parties sent "recruiters" on foot. The canvassing efforts created deep divisions within very small communities, and it was not unusual to find peasants holding several different party membership cards.

The solidarity of the many and various parties during their underground struggle disintegrated rapidly during the months following their legalization, with each trying to put distance between itself and potential rivals. The United Left Front, having first cooled its relationship with the NCP, broke into some ten different communist factions, dominated by the *Male* party. The NCP headed the caretaker, multiparty government, and has within its ranks numerous former elected representatives including some who were opposed to the *Panchayat* regime. The government that fell in 1990 also created a new bloc, the National Democratic Party, which in turn split into two factions. The most important of the regional parties is probably the *Terai* which contests the legitimacy of any central government in Kathmandu.

THE BIGGEST SURPRISES IN THE ELECTION RESULTS THEMSELVES WERE NCP's surprisingly poor showing in Kathmandu – the current caretaker prime minister and NCP leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai lost his own seat – and the more or less complete rout of the factions representing the old *Panchayat* regime. The NCP did win a slim majority in parliament and will likely form the government. The communist *Male* party captured the next largest number of seats.


As for the patriarch Ganesh Man Singh, he opted not to run for parliament, but his wife and son both did in Kathmandu under the NCP banner, and both lost to communists. This now, somewhat tarnished family: has become the target of satirical cartoons portraying them as "father of democracy, mother of democracy, son of democracy."

The non-elected, caretaker government had been rendered practically ineffective because of its temporary nature. With the election over, the promise of real change, which lies invariably with the new government, has created expectations for economic development, nutrition, health and education that will be difficult to meet. Most Nepalis, without really knowing what the changes should be, are convinced that they will lead to better times.



## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### *Of Resigning Admirals and the Challenge of Making Defence Policy*



SOMETHING HAD TO GIVE – WHAT WITH THE protracted stresses and strains on Canadian defence policy since the publication of the White Paper of 1987. Now the very public resignation of Vice-Admiral C.M. Thomas, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, has brought some of the issues into the headlines, though it has not illuminated them all.

For those of us who have pressed for some time for an in-depth public debate of defence policy issues, the current openings should be constructively developed. We certainly hope that the government will not try again to design the “mother of all White Papers” – a fifteen or twenty-year plan, with elaborate re-equipment schemes costing many tens of billions of dollars. Annual White Papers, on the model now used by many other countries, would reduce the paralyzing enormity of the decision-making, and allow enough flexibility for the inclusion of major equipment purchases, along with adjustments to the policy framework.

The central issues now at stake relate to the role of the Canadian armed forces in the international security environment. The fact that that environment is no longer “dominated by the rivalry of East and West,” as it was still (erroneously) assessed in the 1987 White Paper, in no way diminishes the importance of maintaining a coherent defence policy. To the extent that there is any substantial, direct military threat to Canadian territory, of the sort that is the primary defence problem for most countries, the United States can be expected to defend against it as an extension of its own vital security interests. The main territorial defence questions for this country remain how, and how far, to cooperate in this continental effort.

Since 1939, however, Canadians and their governments have rejected a narrow territorial view of Canada's vital security interests, and accepted that these require our military participation in collective security and collective defence operations – those of the United Nations and NATO respectively. This philosophy was extended with the innovation of peacekeeping, of which Canada was one of the main architects and remains one of the most important participants. While the military dimensions and demands of NATO are declining substantially, UN

peacekeeping operations will continue to be needed. New forms of collective security and enforcement actions are more likely after the precedent of the action against Iraq. In addition, armed forces are called upon to play other roles, such as aid to the civil authorities in maintaining law and order, responding to natural disasters, or participating in coastal and airspace surveillance against violations of Canadian regulations on fisheries, pollution, immigration, contraband, narcotics, and so on.

When all this is added up, Canada appears transformed from a fortunate middle power relieved of the most compelling demands of military defence, to one faced with a range of serious military challenges, none of which embody the urgency of immediate national survival. In less happy lands, dire circumstances have the effect of simplifying the military choices. Complicating our task even further are the lead- and lag-time problems of acquiring major pieces of military equipment, and the politics of regional distribution of bases and expenditures – factors which are more sensitive than ever in the current, parlous state of the Canadian federation.

DEFENCE IS STILL A MAJOR ITEM IN THE “Discretionary” portion of federal expenditures, so we need to look at how much Canadians spend on defence, and what they spend it on. As the military historian, Desmond Morton recently pointed out:

Canadians are reminded so often of their meagre defence that they are surprised to find themselves, at \$12 billion, the sixth biggest military spender in NATO. For a little less money, as General Gerry Thériault argues, the Dutch get a well-equipped army corps, a small modern navy and a respectable little air force. Canadians get the best-paid, most rank-inflated military organization in the alliance.

Procrastination on defence issues is no longer an option. Amputations, rather than more dieting, are now inescapable, although the easiest answers are probably wrong. “Time to get out of Europe” would be just as foolish a slogan as “steady as she goes” – what with our troops sitting on a central front that no longer exists. American soldiers will almost certainly continue to be stationed in Europe to guarantee extended deterrence through NATO, so even a token Canadian military presence could yield some of the disproportionate political and diplomatic benefits that were long claimed for our larger contributions in the past.

These forces should probably no longer try to claim instant readiness for high-intensity

warfare. A nucleus left on the ground for potentially larger deployments might now be the appropriate commitment. Canada could pursue some special “niches” – for example, small numbers of military personnel in Europe focussed on verification of arms control agreements, and possibly even training and preparation for such peacekeeping functions as might emerge from the embryonic security frameworks being explored at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

THE SIZE OF THE REGULAR ARMY IS LIKELY TO be reduced. The debate in the Thomas/de Chastelain correspondence about an “expeditionary force” will need to be clarified. What sizes and types of formation can Canada realistically plan on fielding internationally, with which weapons, and with what scale of transport capacity? To what extent will this capability also serve varying levels of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and domestic requirements? How will the regular force and reserve resources be meshed, and what will it cost? Contrary to some widespread assumptions, neither lighter, air-transportable military formations, nor reliance on reserves, are necessarily cheaper options than what we do now, especially in the short term.

As for the maritime and air forces, there are basic debates about roles and equipment to be resolved. Admiral Thomas' letter expressed special concerns about the navy, focussing primarily on the extraordinarily long acquisition cycles for warships, and the need to invest today in equipment that might be needed fifteen or twenty years from now. This, just at a time when the first of Canada's six new frigates are coming into service. However, a simplistic and emotional debate about “blue water” and “coastal” navies is not going to satisfy taxpayers who want some reasonable explanation of the tasks for which the capabilities are supposed to be needed.

Canadians cannot have, will not pay for, and probably do not want the “balanced,” “combined arms” capabilities of a major military power. But going back to basics does not necessarily mean a narrow view of Canadian territorial defence – we are no more an isolated “fire proof house” than we were in the 1920s. In defence, as in many other issues, a new policy will require a much tougher approach to general economies, hard choices among competing possibilities, and some astute assessment of the appropriate niches for the Canadian military effort.

– BERNARD WOOD

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Conventional Forces in Europe

The dispute over the terms of the CFE Treaty, signed last November, continued to cast a pall over arms control negotiations during the period under review. Three issues stood out:

(1) concern by the West (as well as Asian states) over the last-minute Soviet shift of tens of thousands of pieces of "treaty-limited equipment" (TLEs) east of the Urals, to escape destruction under the Treaty;

(2) discrepancies between Western intelligence estimates and data provided by the USSR concerning equipment left behind in the zone of reductions. These discrepancies were said to have been "considerably reduced" as a result of revised intelligence estimates and new Soviet figures, however; and

(3) most important, Soviet claims that some 5,457 pieces of equipment were exempt from the Treaty limits because they had been "re-subordinated" to "coastal defence" or belonged to naval infantry, strategic rocket forces, or civil defence units. All twenty-one of the other CFE signatories insist that, under Article III of the Treaty, all ground-based equipment (with certain specified exceptions) is included, regardless of the military service to which it belongs.

In mid-February, President Bush reportedly offered a compromise whereby the Soviets, without disavowing their interpretation of the agreement, would conform to the numerical limits stipulated by the West. At first, the Soviets had offered only a pledge not to increase their naval ground weapons any further. Later, they reportedly offered to withdraw about half of the weapons in dispute, those associated with their "coastal defences."

In early April, after several letters between Bush and Gorbachev,

the American leader reportedly accepted a Soviet offer to withdraw the "coastal defence" weapons east of the Urals and destroy an equal number of older weapons there, but insisted that the naval infantry weapons be included as well, and that any destruction of the equipment outside of Europe be subject to Western inspection. The West would not require the destruction of some 1,700 TLEs in the Strategic Rocket Forces and civil defence units, or formal Soviet renunciation of its interpretation of the Treaty.

On 25 April, after meeting Secretary of State Baker at a resort in the Caucasus, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh announced that the dispute had been settled and an American official confirmed that "the main obstacle" had been removed, apparently by Soviet agreement to include naval infantry equipment. However, the news proved premature, as it was reported on 7 May that Gorbachev would send General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, to Washington in an attempt to resolve the dispute. [For more on the CFE agreement, see page 10.]

### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

For over a year, it has been reported that only relatively minor "technical" issues stood in the way of a START Treaty. However, neither side has appeared willing to make the necessary compromises to achieve final agreement. Meanwhile, in mid-March, the Bush Administration made it clear that it would not conclude a START Treaty until the CFE dispute had been settled. At the same time, it rebuffed Soviet overtures for another superpower summit until a START Treaty was ready to sign.

In Congressional testimony shortly after resigning as chief US START negotiator, on 17 April, Ambassador Richard Burt identified five outstanding issues: (1) the verification of heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles,

where the Soviets are concerned about a perceived US ability to quickly "break out" of the Treaty's limits; (2) monitoring and inspection of facilities for the production of mobile missiles, of greatest concern to the US; (3) the non-denial of missile test data, on which details remain unresolved; (4) the definition of a "new missile," with the US emphasizing the need for a "very clear demarcation between a new system and an old," so that a missile with only slight modifications could not escape the warhead limits placed on it; and (5) the question of "downloading," or permitting each side to reduce the number of warheads on a given type of missile, to reduce their concentration and thus, by making them less vulnerable, enhancing stability.

Burt characterized these as "second order but important issues" that could be solved "in the near future." To do so, he said, would "require some concessions on both sides." Fearing that increased Soviet military influence might enable the USSR to continue modernizing its nuclear forces at a time when the US was cutting back, he called for START to be "put back on the front burner."

### Disarming Iraq

The UN's Gulf ceasefire resolution of 3 April, formally accepted by Iraq three days later, called for the "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" of all of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 km, and any nuclear weapons or "nuclear weapons-usable material," as well as research, development, support or manufacturing facilities for such weapons. In addition, all states were instructed to prevent the supply of any other types of weapons, military training, and related technical support services to Iraq, subject to review after 120 days, "taking into account Iraq's compliance with this resolution and general progress towards

the control of armaments in the region." Finally, Iraq undertook not to "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction or associated materials and facilities in the future.

As required by the resolution, Iraq on 18 April submitted information acknowledging that it possessed fifty-two ballistic missiles and fifty-three warheads, including thirty chemical ones; and large stocks of chemical weapons, including over 10,000 rocket and artillery shells and aerial bombs, and over 1,000 tons of nerve and mustard gas. It denied, however, that it had any biological or nuclear weapons or related items; and insisted that it was not engaged in nuclear weapons production, that all of its nuclear materials were already under international safeguards, and that all of its "peaceful" nuclear research and development facilities had been destroyed in Allied bombing. Iraq's accounting was immediately and widely denounced as incomplete and inadequate.


On 22 April, in response to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demand for further details on its nuclear programme, Iraq revealed what was described by an American official as "an extraordinarily detailed account of the status, location and amount of all of the enriched material." It also revealed a number of nuclear research installations and stocks of fissile materials unknown to the West. However, the list was still criticized as incomplete for failing to include nuclear weapons development laboratories such as one at al Qaqaa.

Under the terms of the UN resolution, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar will appoint a Special Commission to carry out on-site inspection of Iraqi biological, chemical and missile capabilities and oversee their destruction. The IAEA is to inspect nuclear facilities and dispose of all nuclear weapons-usable materials. □

— RON PURVER



## DEFENCE NOTES



### Post-Gulf War Defence Policies

The stunning success of the US-led coalition forces in the Gulf War has resulted in a number of national reappraisals of defence policy. In France, officials as well as defence critics have acknowledged that the war revealed the limitations of French ability to deploy conventional forces armed with sophisticated weapons in regional conflicts. In particular, Defence Minister Pierre Joxe publicly recognized the overwhelming dependence of the French forces on US intelligence: "It was the United States that provided — when and how it chose to — the most important information that we needed to prosecute the war."

The French have only one dedicated military satellite, and it cannot send detailed photographs to ground in sufficient time to provide immediate support to field commanders.

For satellite intelligence, the British forces appeared to rely entirely on the US. Despite favorable comparisons with the French performance, UK Minister of Defence Tom King announced that the British review of defence policy, *Options for Change*, would be placed on hold pending an assessment of the war.

In Washington, the exuberant response to military victory has not changed the long-term plan to reduce the size of the military. By 1995, the Army will comprise 18 divisions as compared to 28 in 1990, and the Air Force will be reduced from 36 to 26 fighter wings. These planned reductions are accompanied by a series of programme cancellations which include the Navy A-12 stealth fighter, and the decommissioning of two battleships, the Wisconsin and the Missouri, both of which saw service in the Gulf.

Despite the reductions, in testimony to Congress, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney has emphasized the need for US forces to be able to respond rapidly to "short-notice regional crises and contingencies that threaten US interests." In doing so, it is likely that considerable attention will focus on the advantages provided by military satellites. During the Persian Gulf War, US forces relied heavily on satellites designed to monitor Soviet territory for communications, warning of Scud attacks, and target locations (See *Defence Notes*, Spring 1991).

In the future, it appears that the new emphasis on regional conflict will be accompanied by the development of smaller, lighter satellites offering more flexibility and finely-tuned capabilities in support of expeditionary forces. These satellites will provide tailored intelligence analysis to field commanders, facilitate ground communications between different units even when they are in close proximity to each other, and incorporate further improvements to the Global Positioning System (GPS) which will not only allow ground units to precisely fix their own positions, but provide targeting data for precision-guided weapons and pinpoint accuracy to field artillery.

### A Canadian Admiral Resigns

In late April, it became evident that the long-awaited revision to the 1987 Defence White Paper had not awaited the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. On 24 April, Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas, head of Maritime Command and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, submitted his resignation some months in advance of his planned retirement. In a letter to Chief of the Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, and in subsequent statements to the press, Thomas took issue with the fifteen-year defence plan apparently submitted to the federal cabinet for approval in February, but not yet approved.

Thomas' letter of resignation, and de Chastelain's reply, referred frequently to the proposal before cabinet. The implication from the letters is that among the recommendations made were the following: the re-equipping of "an expeditionary force brigade group" (the nature and composition of which was not specified) as a "priority investment"; by indirect references in Thomas' letter and the response from de Chastelain, the long-term development of naval forces to comprise twelve new frigates, four modernized Tribal-class destroyers, and an unspecified number of corvettes as a substitute for future batches of the frigates (corvettes were not explained in the correspondence, but are normally patrol ships smaller and less capable than frigates); the twelve mine-sweepers promised to the Navy Reserve; and a "modest" conventional submarine replacement programme "within a few years."

Thomas' principal objections to this policy centred on the submarine and corvette programmes. The proposal to buy corvettes, he wrote, was "a wrong and expensive choice of less capable surface ships," and the delay in the submarine programme meant that Canada was surrendering its sovereignty over the undersea water space surrounding its territory. Thomas argued that the priority given to a new expeditionary brigade group was misguided, and called for a public debate on defence policy.

In his reply, which was supported by new Defence Minister Marcel Masse, de Chastelain took strong exception to Thomas' dismissal of the proposed new brigade group. In an unusual acknowledgement that the 1987 White Paper was "out of step with changing geopolitical circumstances and unaffordable," he argued that "we must offer the Government the broadest possible range of military options" to meet future security requirements. Specifically, de Chastelain noted that the Navy would receive forty percent of capital expendi-

tures over the fifteen-year period as compared to thirty-three percent for the Air Force and twenty-seven percent for the Army.

Implying that the funding base for the fifteen-year programme would follow the pattern of the last several years (suggesting, therefore, that planning is based on a constant defence budget with no after-inflation increases in defence spending), de Chastelain noted that the programme placed before cabinet was deemed to be ninety-five percent fundable over the planning period. An essentially zero-growth defence budget was reflected in the 1991-92 Main Estimates released in February. Excluding special funding for the Gulf task force and the Oka crisis, defence spending increased by a nominal five percent over the 1990-1991 budget, indicating a more or less constant budget after inflation.

### NORAD Renewal, Intermittent Radars

Whatever the future of the Canadian Navy, the Air Force will continue to operate within the framework of the North American Aerospace Defence Command. On 19 April, the government announced that the NORAD Agreement will be renewed for a further five-year period at the time of its expiry on 12 May.

Future North American radar surveillance, however, will need to make do with considerably reduced services from two OTH-B (over-the-horizon backscatter) radars, which the contractor, General Electric, turned over to the US Air Force in 1990 at a cost of \$1.2 billion. After an initial, controversial decision by the Air Force to dismantle, "pack and store," the radars, in early April, a compromise was reached. The East Coast OTH-B in Maine will be operated for forty hours each week (hostile aircraft will need to guess which forty hours), and the West Coast facility will be turned off and maintained by a skeleton crew.

— DAVID COX

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### The Post-Gulf War World

The Gulf War moved to a speedy conclusion. Within six weeks of the opening of offensive military operations by the multinational coalition arrayed against Iraq, US President George Bush ordered their suspension on 27 February, declaring Kuwait liberated and Iraq's army defeated. On 3 March, Iraq accepted the UN Security Council resolution setting conditions for a permanent ceasefire.

The House of Commons adjourned on 22 January, following the vote in favour of the government's motion to support the United Nations "in ending the aggression by Iraq." It returned on 25 February, but in the meantime a specially-struck joint committee of the House Standing Committees on External Affairs and National Defence met regularly to hear from relevant Ministers and officials on the conduct of the war. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark appeared on 29 January and again on 6, 13, 21 and 22 February, while National Defence Minister Bill McKnight appeared on 31 January and on 12 and 20 February.

On 12 February, the government's proposal for a UN-sponsored global summit on "Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction" was passed to the UN Secretary-General. It was also discussed at some length the following day during Mr. Clark's appearance before the House joint committee.

On 6 March, Joe Clark tabled in the Commons and at the UN, Canada's first annual report on exports of military goods, fulfilling a commitment the Minister had made in a speech to the UN

General Assembly in September 1990, in which he emphasized the importance of making arms transfers and procurement as transparent as possible.

Mr. Clark visited Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Kuwait and the United States in the immediate aftermath of the war, reporting to the House on his trip on 15 March. He also briefed the House External Affairs Committee about the trip on 21 March. Mr. Clark viewed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as central to peace and security in the region and stressed that the next six to twelve months would be "a critical time in determining whether the war with Iraq will go down in history as the key that opened a whole new era in the Middle East."

Mr. Clark also briefed the House Defence Committee on 20 March on the government's arms trade proposals. There he admitted that officials had some reservations about the Canadian proposal for a world summit and described the reactions of other major powers on the UN Security Council as "skeptical." However, the Minister described Liberal External Affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy as "far too gloomy and far too alarmist" when the latter depicted a "re-igniting of the arms race in the Middle East."

### Rule Changes in Parliament

Parliament adjourned 12 April after passing a bill which amended the House rules by limiting MP's speeches to fifteen minutes (instead of twenty), cutting forty days from the Commons calendar and increasing the parliamentary work week by five hours. In addition, the bill restructured Commons committees by dividing the twenty Standing Committees into five envelopes: management (three committees); human resources (nine, including Employment and Immigration as well as Aboriginal Affairs); natural re-

sources (four, including Environment); economic (five, including External Affairs and International Trade); and departmental (five, including National Defence and Veterans Affairs). Each envelope will contain two Legislative Committees which can be asked by the government to review legislation.

The House was called back in third session with a Speech from the Throne on 13 May.

### Cabinet Changes

On 21 April, the Prime Minister announced a major shuffle of his cabinet. Among the more significant changes were the following: Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs since 1984, became Minister responsible for Constitutional Affairs and President of the Privy Council; Toronto area MP Barbara McDougall, took over External Affairs, leaving her previous portfolio of Employment and Immigration to Bernard Valcourt of New Brunswick; Michael Wilson left Finance to become Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, as well as Minister of International Trade; Jean Charest returned to the cabinet as Minister of the Environment; and Marcel Masse, long time Communications Minister, took over as Minister of National Defence.

### Committee Reports

On 21 March, the House External Affairs Committee presented its seventh report, which it adopted from its Sub-Committee on International Debt chaired by Walter McLean. The report, *Unanswered Questions/Uncertain Hopes*, appeared in Issue 105 of the regular proceedings of the Committee. Its subdued appearance belied a forthright rebuke to the government's November 1990 response to the Sub-Committee's earlier June 1990 report, *Securing Our Global Future* - "the response is dispiriting in its approach, especially in what it has evaded or managed not to say ... the Com-

mittee's recommendations are mostly rejected without any alternative initiatives being proposed in their place." It called on the government to bring forward bold and creative proposals on debt relief measures for lesser developed countries, "similar in political energy" to the Prime Minister's involvement in the Children's Summit and his proposal for a world summit on the arms trade.

On 25 March, the House of Commons Environment Committee under the leadership of its chairperson, David MacDonald, presented its third report to the House on global warming. Entitled *Out of Balance: The Risks of Irreversible Climate Change*, the report made some twenty-five recommendations, intended to change Canadians' views about "life as usual" which the report characterized as "much less efficient, more wasteful and more expensive than it need have been...." Among the recommendations: i) that immediate action be taken by Canada to reduce substantially the rate of greenhouse gas emissions, such that a twenty percent reduction in human-sourced carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2005 (compared to the 1988 level of emissions) would be the government's minimum interim objective; ii) that Canadian energy policy-making has, as its most immediate focus, the more efficient and conserving use of energy; iii) that the government use environmental considerations as a filter for its foreign aid and trade initiatives; iv) that the Auditor-General, working with the Departments of Environment and Finance, establish an environmental audit function to assure that all federal departments and agencies have implemented environmental assessment processes, and to monitor the effectiveness of environmental programmes. □

- GREGORY WIRICK



## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### The Persian Gulf War

On 11 April, the president of the Security Council handed a letter to Iraq's ambassador to the UN officially announcing a ceasefire in the Persian Gulf War. While the letter marked the formal end of hostilities, diplomats with an eye to history, were divided on the issue of the specific date that the conflict came to an end. Some argued that the ceasefire began on 27 February, when US President George Bush ordered his forces to halt their rout of Iraqi troops.

But other diplomats argued that the ceasefire formally took hold on 4 April, when the Council adopted Resolution 687, which laid out the conditions for an end to hostilities. Among other things, Resolution 687 called on Iraq to agree to destroy its chemical, biological weapons as well as most of its ballistic missiles. Iraq was also ordered to agree to:

the creation of a demilitarized zone along the 1963 boundary between Iraq and Kuwait; the creation of a fund to compensate those who suffered losses as a result of its 2 August invasion of Kuwait. The fund would be financed by appropriating an annual share of its oil revenues, the precise amount to be determined by the UN Secretary-General; renounce any attempts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction whether chemical, biological or nuclear. In return, while not ending sanctions, the Council allowed Iraq to import food and essential materials, a decision that would be reviewed every sixty days.

In a speech to the Council, Iraq's ambassador reacted angrily to the solution and said his country reserved the right to seek reparations of its own for the destruction wrought by the allies. He accused allied forces of indiscriminately

bombing military and civilian targets saying that 88,500 tons of explosives had been dropped on Iraq – the equivalent of “seven atomic bombs.”

A majority of the Council supported the adoption of Resolution 687, with Cuba against, and Ecuador and Yemen abstaining. In a speech that reflected the views of many, the Soviet delegate said that the international community had learned a bitter lesson similar to that of the 1930s, when an unchecked aggressor had seized one small nation after another. Resolution 687, he said, was a test of the new system of international relations, and in adopting it, the Council had proved its ability to restore international peace and security.

The adoption of Resolution 687 was preceded by intense diplomatic activity in order to force Iraq to acquiesce to allied and Security Council demands. Even before hostilities ended, the international coalition, as well as Iraq and its allies, had been in competition to secure the upper hand in the propaganda war.

On 13 February, the Council voted to meet privately to hear statements on the Gulf conflict. The procedural vote was a victory for US diplomacy which was concerned that a public discussion of the bombing campaign and a non-aligned proposal to order a ceasefire could embarrass Arab allies in the international coalition.

The minutes of the meeting were released twenty-four hours later. During the meeting, Philippe Kirsch, the acting Canadian ambassador, summarized Canada's position by saying that “the disappointing and painful recourse to force was the result of reaching the limits of diplomacy. The continuing recourse to force is clearly authorized by the legal and moral authority of the Security Council.”

The meeting was also remarkable for the shrill tone of some discussion, as well as for the personal animosities that had developed among Council members

during the months leading up to the conflict. Iraq's representative dismissed the meeting as “a private session for liars, pygmies and hypocrites.” In one of the most vicious personal attacks heard in the Council, he referred to Kuwait's ambassador as “the pygmy who sits to my right.”

The ambassador of Zaire subsequently objected to the use of “pygmy” as a pejorative term. He noted that his country counted a population of 400,000 pygmies and “I should like to say that pygmies are fully-fledged human beings and cannot be treated in a discriminatory fashion because of their size.”

Continuing the diplomatic pressure on Iraq, on 2 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 686, with Cuba voting against, and China, India and Yemen abstaining. The document demanded that Baghdad implement all of the Council's twelve previous resolutions passed against it. Resolution 686 also demanded that Iraq rescind its annexation of Kuwait; accept liability for losses caused to individuals, corporations or countries as a result of its invasion; release all detainees and return all stolen Kuwaiti property.

On 3 March, just days after hostilities ended, the Council called on the sanctions committee to act promptly on requests for humanitarian assistance stemming from the war. It also dispatched a mission to the area to assess humanitarian needs.

On 20 March, Under-Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari reported that the war had relegated Iraq to a “pre-industrial age” and warned of “cataclysmic” conditions. He called for urgent humanitarian aid. In a separate report on Kuwait, he noted that the government appeared to be making progress in providing for basic needs and restoring essential services.

On 5 April, the Council adopted Resolution 688 demanding that Iraq end its repression of the Kurds

and other civilian groups inside Iraq. Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe voted against, while China and India abstained. All five of these countries argued that the resolution amounted to meddling in Iraq's internal affairs and, as such, was a violation of the UN charter. Resolution 688 also called on the Secretary General to “use all the resources at his disposal” to address the needs of the refugees.

On 29 April, the Council issued a “solemn appeal” for assistance to twenty-one countries affected by sanctions against Iraq. While the Council called for a positive response, it did not specify what this should be.

### Other Council Business


On 22 January, the Council urged the parties to the conflict in Liberia to continue to respect the ceasefire there and to cooperate with the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States to restore peace and security. In a statement by the president, the Council also appealed for humanitarian aid for Liberia.

On 30 January, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for six months. The next day it renewed the mandate of the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) until 28 February after which it was disbanded.

On 27 March, the Council agreed to “deplore” the Israeli expulsion of four Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. It also said it was “gravely concerned” by the deteriorating situation in the territories.

On April 29, the Council adopted Resolution 690, which established the UN mission for a referendum in Western Sahara. The operation is another reflection of the UN's reactivated role in peacekeeping. The effort will cost \$200 million and involve close to 3,000 military and civilian personnel. As in most other major peacekeeping operations, a prominent role was reserved for Canada.

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



"Encouraging public discussion" about issues of international peace and security is a major part of the mandate of the Institute, and indeed, the justification for a good deal of its work. Publications, relations with the media, joint projects with other organizations, all fall within that general rubric. One audience receives particular attention – high school teachers and students – from one staff member – **Bradley Feasey**.

In early 1987, the Institute brought together a group of teachers, trustees, officials and members of non-governmental organizations, all of whom were involved in education, to discuss the demands which were being placed on the education system with regard to peace and security issues. What emerged from the discussion was a consensus that there was an increasing requirement for teachers to deal with these issues, and yet a corresponding lack of materials designed with young people and students in mind.

Because the Institute has expertise on many of these matters, it seemed logical to try to fill the gap. We were, and are, conscious that, as a federal Crown Corporation, we should not become involved in curriculum development: what we could do, however, was look at existing provincial curriculum guidelines, and within them, produce materials which would be useful for students and teachers. The nature of our areas of expertise – arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution – suggested a concentration at the high school level.

Bradley Feasey, a staff member at the Institute, began this work and has brought to it both an understanding of the issues and

an ability to communicate, on paper and orally, with high school teachers and their students. A fortunate coincidence brought us in touch with **Geoff Irvine**, a history teacher in the Carleton school board and author of an Ontario sociology text and whom we were able to engage on contract.

Together they wrote the *Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security*. The primary goal of the book is to provide students with a base of knowledge in the field of international peace and security which will help them to understand and interpret the many disparate pieces of information to which they are exposed. To do this, the information and lessons in the book are organized around three broad categories: foreign policy, security and international conflict. In each case, the authors have tried to impress upon the readers that the subjects are often contentious and that there are varying points of view on them. They have also sought to illustrate that the policies pursued in Canada and elsewhere are the result of decisions influenced by perception, priorities and values.

Because history and social studies – the courses where the subject matter of the *Handbook* is most appropriate – are not compulsory in all jurisdictions after a first course in high school, the authors geared the book to that level.

The *Handbook* is written with the needs of busy teachers in mind. Each topic is accompanied by strategies for the teacher as to how the topics might be introduced, presented, discussed and evaluated. The format allows it to be used as a whole, or in portions, selected by concept, individual topics or readings.

The first draft of the *Handbook* was written during 1987. It was field tested in a number of schools, and introduced to a group of teachers at a conference at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in the spring of 1988. A selected group of field testers met at the Institute in June 1989, and final revisions were completed in the following months. The present document is dated June 1990, with a French language version to be available in 1991.

The loose-leaf format allows

### The Teachers' Handbook on Peace and Security

*"there was an increasing requirement for teachers to deal with these issues, and a corresponding lack of materials designed with young people and students in mind"*

#### Peace and Security Competitions Fund Procedures and Deadlines

*For the semi-annual competitions with deadlines of 30 June and 30 November, 1991 and 30 June, 1992 the Fund will be interested in receiving applications to support projects that would make thoughtful contributions to issues related to international peace and security on the 125th anniversary of Confederation in 1992. It is our understanding that Canadians will be invited by Parliament to reflect in their various fields on the record of opportunity and achievement in that record and on challenges for the future.*

30 June for an October decision

30 November for a March decision

Peace and Security Competitions Fund  
360 Albert, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

#### Back issues of P&S on microform

Back volumes of this publication are available in microform (film or fiche). For further information, contact Micromedia Limited, 158 Pearl Street, Toronto, Ontario. M5H 1L3. Tel. 416-593-5211. 1-800-387-2689.



additions and revisions, as necessary. Since we decided to concentrate on concepts, with discrete facts used for illustration, the Handbook remains current despite the monumental changes which have taken place in international relations since the book was conceived.

Distribution of the *Handbook* (it sells for \$35.00) is handled through the Institute, and as more and more teachers know of it, demand is increasing. Bradley Feasey gives workshops at professional development days and at conferences organized by teachers and students. The Institute is inserting customized guides for the use of the *Handbook* in each province. So far we have completed the Ontario and Manitoba guides, and have commissioned others.

In 1992, we will begin a "Teacher-Fellow Programme" which will generate new classroom resources on an annual basis. The Institute will solicit proposals from teachers across Canada, examine each, choose a winner and bring the winner to Ottawa to work with Institute staff for several weeks during the summer. When the project is completed, the Institute will publish and distribute it, thereby providing fresh and innovative classroom resources.

Each week for twenty-six weeks a year, 130 high school students from across the country, arrive in Ottawa to spend a week together at the Terry Fox Centre as part of a programme called "Encounters with Canada." The Centre, a project of the Council for Canadian Unity, offers lectures, tours, theatre, recreation, discussion and debate. For the past four years, the Institute has sponsored, designed and presented a three to four hour session, each week, on issues of international peace and security. Bradley Feasey is the key staff person involved, and almost every week he spends time at the Terry Fox

Centre assisting in the discussion, debate or research being undertaken on international issues. During the winter of 1991, we amended the programme to take account of the Persian Gulf crisis and war. Bradley and **Rychard Brûlé** of the Institute's Peace and Security Competitions Fund, gave presentations on the war, students split up into groups for what were apparently spirited discussions, and resumed in plenary for reports.

High school students and teachers are the primary target audience of several other joint projects of the Institute – undertakings or programmes which we co-sponsor and/or organize in co-operation with external groups, and which are the primary responsibility of **Jill Tansley**. In May 1989, we co-sponsored a conference on peace and security education for teachers and students with Henson College at Dalhousie University; during 1989 and 1990 we undertook, with the London Regional Art Gallery and Historical Museum, a programme for students based on a retrospective of war entitled "Lest We Forget"; from 1988 to 1990 we contributed to the "Science for Peace" section of Expo-sciences, a pan-qubécoise science fair for students organized by the Conseil de développement du loisir scientifique.

Work with teachers and students builds the base of wider knowledge and understanding of issues of international peace and security – essential prerequisites for an informed public discussion. As students grow to adulthood in the interdependent world of the 1990s and beyond, their ability to understand the global dimensions of their world will figure prominently in their actions and reactions. □

— NANCY GORDON

### Barton Awards Programme

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security recently awarded nine scholarships (\$14,000) and two fellowships (\$30,000) to Canadians who wish to further their studies in the areas of international peace and security. These Awards are given annually under the Barton Awards programme of the Institute, named in honour of its first Chairman, William H. Barton, the distinguished former Ambassador to the United Nations in New York and Geneva.

The Award recipients come from different disciplines and will pursue a variety of studies.

#### Fellowship Recipients:

**Simon W. Dalby** is a resident of Vancouver, B.C. A Ph.D. graduate of Simon Fraser University, he will be conducting research at the Simon Fraser University's Centre for International Studies concentrating on the environmental dimensions of international security in the Pacific.

**Elaine M. Holoboff**, from British Columbia, will be completing her Ph.D. degree at King's College, University of London, England before commencing her post-doctoral research on Soviet security policies in a post-Cold War Europe. She will be conducting this research through York University in Toronto.

#### Scholarship Recipients:

**Stephen H. Baranyi** is from Toronto, Ontario. He is enrolled in Ph.D. studies at York University in Toronto, and is conducting field research in Latin America. His research is on the dialectics of defence development in Panama, 1968–89.

**Jean-François Bergeron** is a native of Quebec City, Quebec. He is pursuing his Ph.D. in Political Science at Laval University. He is concentrating his research on political transition and democratisation in South Africa as a result of political change under the leadership of F.W. deKlerk.

**Andrea Chandler** is from Halifax, Nova Scotia. She is pursuing her Ph.D. in Political Science at Columbia University in New York. Her dissertation research is on post-revolutionary statebuilding and the politics of border control in the Soviet Union.

**Garth Barclay Davis** of Vancouver, British Columbia will be pursuing studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. He intends to carry out independent research on Canada and security in the North Pacific with a review of threat analysis and policy prescriptions for the 1990s.

**Marie-France Desjardins** is from Montréal, Québec. She is continuing her Ph.D. studies with the Department of War Studies at King's College of the University of London, England. She is conducting research on confidence-building measures in Europe.

**Olgia Hlinovsky** from Hull, Québec, is a Ph.D. candidate in the Sociology Department at the Université de Montréal. For her dissertation research she is doing an analysis of war from a political perspective within society.

**Markus Ludwig Kreuzer** of Vancouver, British Columbia, is pursuing Ph.D. studies in the Political Science Department of Columbia University in New York. His dissertation research analyzes how the competitive process induced by political institutions constitutes a distinctly democratic contribution to the resolution of conflicts.

**David R. Mutimer** of Antigonish, Nova Scotia, is completing his Ph.D. in Political Science at York University in Toronto. His thesis topic is on the emerging new European security order as a study in international change.

**Ian Rowlands** is a native of Ottawa, Ontario. He is pursuing his Ph.D. in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research is on the effect of global environmental change on international relations, especially with regard to international cooperation and conflict in relation to ozone layer depletion and global warming.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Questionable and Condescending

Your spring issue of *Peace & Security* contained a few questionable assessments of recent alternative defence debates. For one, Chris Smith argued in "From Bust to Boom" that "much of the alternative defence de-

bate always appeared in the shape of unreal policies geared to defeat – the idea being to leave a country's borders open to invasion and ensuring that the negative aspects of territorial occupation outweighed the possible gains." But Smith should recognize that this idea of leaving a country's borders open to invasion is unique to the field of civilian-based defence. It is not an idea shared in the field of non-provocative defence or defensive defence where numerous models entail border defence as well as defence in depth.

Moreover, whereas Smith alleges that the use of advanced military technology is downplayed in the work on alternative defence, in fact, many models actually place a premium on the use of light, mobile, precision-guided munitions and sophisticated air defences. Smith applauds the success of the Tornado aircraft and the Patriot missile systems for muting what he describes as this Luddite view. But the Tornado ran into a few troubles (four out of the seven planes lost went down in the first four days of the air war) and Patriot is a defensive system – a success that will inevitably be used to support the case for defensive defence. In short, it appears that Smith hasn't done his homework and his portrayal of a promising field can be seen as a condescending caricature.

Another amazing claim is found in Bernard Wood's "Debating war, peace, morality and order." He writes that "the debate over offensive and defensive roles is irrelevant in any war zone. It is the capabilities of the Canadian aircraft and their crews that shape what they do." Yet surely Wood recognizes the importance of political control and military restraint (even in war zones). Iraq was wise enough to avoid the use of chemical weapons; the Americans wisely avoided the use of nuclear weapons; and Canadian officials could have easily stipulated that the CF-18s were to remain on defensive missions flying combat air patrols over the Gulf.

The CF-18 is capable of both offensive and defensive operations but that doesn't mean it has to be used for both. Moreover, contrary to what Wood writes, it was hardly our aircraft or crews that determined Canada's military response; it was our government. And, as strange as the decision was to begin bombing missions in the last week of the war, few Canadian officials would countenance simply giving free reign to military and technological determinism in the field.

We can expect to hear a range of interpretations on the lessons of this war. Chris Smith's analysis leads to the conclusion that the Gulf War will help to justify business-as-usual and the demand for a wide range of advanced weapons to fight the wars of the future. On this point, Smith may be correct; some governments will resort to the old methods. However, in a recent statement to the Standing Committee on National Defence, Joe Clark wisely noted that the option to this grim scenario will be to promote military restraint, arms transfer restraint and defensive defence at lower cost. The Secretary of State for External Affairs recognizes that the choice is clear.

It may be, as Bernard Wood writes, "that our national debate since the 2 August has done us no credit as a people." Then again, the problem here may be simply one of perspective and perceived relevance. From another perspective, it is now encouraging that only a very few peace and security institutes consider the alternative defence debates to be irrelevant.

*H. Peter Langille, Ottawa*

### The Role of the Media in International Conflict

What did the Gulf War teach us about the power of the media? What was the relationship between journalists and the military? Between journalists and politicians and diplomats? What makes one war news and not another? Are journalists in danger of becoming part of a conflict?


These are some of the questions which will be addressed at a two-day conference sponsored by the Institute featuring many respected speakers from the media, military, government, and academe. Confirmed speakers include:

- Aileen McCabe**  
Southam News
- Colin MacKenzie**  
*Globe and Mail*
- Jim Travers**  
Southam News
- Akiba Cohen**  
Hebrew University  
of Jerusalem
- Florian Sauvageau**  
Université Laval
- Joe Schlesinger**  
CBC
- Jean Pelletier**  
*Journal de Montréal*
- William Solomon**  
Rutgers University
- Jeremy Kinsman**  
Department of  
External Affairs
- John Honderich**  
*Toronto Star*

Date: 12 and 13 September 1991  
Location: Chateau Laurier  
Hotel, Ottawa, Canada  
Fee: \$80.00  
Further information:  
Canadian Institute  
for International Peace  
and Security  
360 Albert Street, Suite 900  
Ottawa, Canada, K1R 7X7  
Phone – 613-990-1593  
Fax – 613-563-0894



## REVIEWS



### On A Hinge of History

Ivan L. Head

Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  
1991, 229 pp., \$35.00, cloth

Ivan Head has been a force in the way Ottawa thinks about international matters since he became Pierre Trudeau's special advisor on foreign affairs in 1970. In 1978, he was appointed president of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) – a crown corporation with the mandate of “assisting developing countries in utilizing science and technology.”

Pierre Trudeau's first foreign policy speech as prime minister was written by Head and presaged many of the themes of this volume. “Never before in history has the disparity between the rich and the poor, the comfortable and the starving, been so extreme,” Trudeau said. “The name of peace is development.”

*On A Hinge of History* is an examination of the “global disequilibria and the resulting mutuality of vulnerability of societies in both the industrialized and developing regions of the world.” While Head recently left IDRC, the book is also the result of an institutional effort by IDRC. The author credits about a dozen senior scholars from across the country for their contribution to the research project that gave rise to the book, but does not indicate who contributed how much to which part, or provide many details about the nature and goals of the research. This ambiguity about the book's origins and purposes is no doubt at least partly responsible for its uneven quality. What Head does convincingly redecorate the mental stage on which international politics has

been played out for two generations. Rich industrialized peoples have been obsessed with East-West relations to the point where they have been blinded to what has really been going on around them. With the East-West struggle now off the agenda, they now have the opportunity to see clearly. One way Head forces the reader into this mental adjustment is by eschewing words like “Third World” and “developing country” – with all their judgemental, even racist baggage – in favour of “north” and “south.”

Head presents striking descriptions, metaphors, and statistics as he works his way through the international debt, agriculture, trade, environmental, demographic, and institutional crises:

the circle of denuded landscape around many African villages ... has a radius of 7 kilometres ... the distance that a person can reasonably walk in quest of firewood and return in a single day.

The [World] Bank's definition of the phrase [‘absolute poverty’] is so shocking as to remove it from the personal experience of virtually every single person in Canada. To exist in absolute poverty is to be so calorie-deficient that one lacks the energy needed to work.

[In the period 1955 to 1987] the global increase in world trade was 600 percent in real dollar terms. The [forty-five small low-income countries most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa] increased their exports by only 12.7 percent.

Given the credentials of the author, and the acknowledged institutional backup, *On A Hinge of History* ought to be a singular contribution to the knowledge and understanding of global economics and north-south politics. The compelling and very difficult question, after forty-five years of tragically bungled efforts with foreign aid and various experiments in development is: what are the overarching principles and models which emerge from this long experience that can help everyone move for-

ward? Here, at the pragmatic, public policy end of the problem, Head's book offers very little.

The language of the two final chapters which deal largely with the politics of the issue is vague, soft and overblown: “A new outlook is needed, one more subtle and all-embracing than in the past. A new form of social contract is required, one based on scientific reality and tempered by humanitarian constants.” Avoided entirely is serious grappling with some of the dilemmas which paralyze international and domestic systems.

One such puzzle is the conflict between individual and collective social needs. How do you get large numbers of people to do what they know they should do, but cannot or do not because for each individual making the decision the apparent costs are too high? We know that our future as comfortable northerners is inextricably tied to the welfare of southerners and that our personal patterns of consumption are destroying the planet. Yet, this knowledge is not, in itself, a guide to action.

The Leninists grabbed on to this puzzle from the wrong end by discarding liberal notions of individual good and imposing onerous collective rules on personal conduct. The Marxist experiment is now finally discredited, but then what to do? The poignancy of this key dilemma facing the management of human economic activity has been articulated by economist Fred Hirsch:

Individuals can perceive a need for themselves and their fellows and yet have no rational basis to act on it in isolation ... collective means may be necessary to implement individual ends ... [and] ... thought control remains the most horrifying threat in the collectivist intrusion. Yet if individual orientation is outside our area of influence, we are left with an impasse. We know what needs to be done and cannot or dare not do it.

Any writer taking on a subject like this starts with a serious handicap: most people likely to read this book, know the role the affluent and indifferent north has played in creating our current difficulties. What they don't know, and therefore, what is much more useful to explore, is what to do about it – a vastly more difficult exercise. Head tells us that his book is about “ethics” as a survival tool and “the obligation of one generation to the next.” It is not a “doomsday message,” he writes. However, the most effective and affecting parts of *On A Hinge of History* are the descriptions of our impossible mess.

As for ethics, they are an essential but insufficient condition for understanding where to go next.

– Michael Bryans

Mr. Bryans is editor of *Peace & Security*

### BRIEFLY NOTED

#### The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World

Peter Dobell, editor

Toronto: James Lorimer, 1991, 166 pp.,  
\$19.95 paper

This volume is the distillation of a three-day conference held in Ottawa in November 1990 which brought many of the best Soviet political scientists and economists together with an equally high-powered group of Western experts on the USSR. Major topics include: the development of civil society; the making of a market economy; cooperation in the Arctic; the utility of Western economic assistance; and implications for the world of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Among the conference participants were: Georgy Arbatov, Vladimir Popov, Andrei Kokoshin, Franklyn Griffiths, Martin Walker, Jacques Lévesque, and Irwin Cotler. (The Institute for Peace and Security was a co-sponsor of the conference on which this volume is based.)

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* “Livres” section.

## LETTER FROM BUCHAREST BY VĚRA MURRAY



**Despite the putrid stench of tear gas,  
I could not take my eyes off the spectacle  
unfolding below: on one side, police armed  
with shields, standing motionless in close order.**

On the other, slogan-chanting demonstrators provoking them with rude gestures or attempting to put flowers down the backs of their uniforms. The situation is volatile. Suddenly, orders are given, and for a few minutes the crowd is shoved and jostled, then hit with electric cattle prods. No one really seems to get hurt, and then it starts all over again.

This sort of demonstration seems to define the current Romanian regime. It is April – just a few days after the visit of French President, François Mitterrand who thereby becomes the first head of state to effectively endorse those in power here – and this team which has a reputation to defend, has not quite succeeded in shaking off old repressive habits. The regime symbolizes, beyond question, the end of Ceausescu, but not the end of communism.

The throngs of students who went into the streets during Mitterrand's visit carried banners with very direct messages: "Mitterrand, your presence legitimizes this criminal regime!", "Long live François Marchais!"\*, "We haven't enough money to throw eggs at you!", and, alluding to the Romanian head of state, Ion Iliescu: "We don't want a bolshevik president anymore!"

The Romanian revolution of 1989, though initiated by the people, was soon engulfed in lies and pretence. Iliescu, an old communist, came to power through palace intrigues, and not on the basis of the popular uprising which moved us all on television. He has since then put himself, "above the law, by sending the miners in to brutally disperse the student demonstrators in Bucharest." These are the

words of Doina Cornea, one of the best known dissidents during Ceausescu's time, and who today is part of the opposition to the current regime.

The demonstration I can see from my balcony, marks the first anniversary of the seizing of University Square by the students on 22 April 1990. Fifty-three days later on 13 June, the government brought in trainloads of miners to Bucharest – good workers prepared to beat up a few intellectuals – to clean the place up.

### **These children are the product of the government's campaign against birth control – the most monstrous brainwave of the "genius of the Carpathians"**

The president of the students' union, Marian Munteanu, who was roughed up by the miners and arrested in June, claims that he is still followed, that his phone and apartment are bugged, and that his entire family receives frequent threats. How does he hope Romania's future will unfold? Coming from a student, his reply underscores the fact that the Balkans are a separate world which Westerners have for forty years quite wrongly placed in the same mental compartment as central European countries. "The best regime for Romania is a constitutional monarchy led by King Michael," he says. The old king lives in exile in Switzerland.

Hundreds of people converge on University Square in the early afternoon for the demonstration of 22 April. An immense cross made of flowers lies on the ground in commemoration of those who died during the revolution, and for those wounded in the many demonstrations which have since taken place

here. Groups of people are in lively debate all around the Square.

Some take advantage of the situation to do a little black market business. I see several people selling disposable syringes – in a country where the incidence of AIDS among infants is very high because of reusable needles, the disposable ones are worth their weight in gold. A line of flowers strewn on the ground forms the limit beyond which a group of policemen already waits. Two old men stand on guard close to the line with baguette sticks in place of rifles.

Three weeks ago prices went up two to three hundred percent. A litre of milk now costs 10 lei, a kilo of boneless beef, 270 lei: the average wage is 3,500 lei and in-

unemployment could reach half a million this year, out of a population of twenty-five million. The trade unions claim there are one and a half million people out of work.

Every day, scores of children spend the night in the Bucharest's main railway station, Gara de Nord, on cardboard mattresses; they represent a tiny fraction of the 130,000 children abandoned since Ceausescu's demise. They survive by panhandling and prostitution, and cushion themselves against the hunger and cold by sniffing glue. These children are the product of the government's campaign against birth control – the most monstrous brainwave of the "genius of the Carpathians" – which led to the disappearance from the market of all contraceptive devices, and made abortion a criminal offence.

Since last autumn, hundreds of Western couples have arrived to adopt children. They often "buy" directly from parents in the most deprived rural areas in the north where large families are still commonplace. A rabble of shady intermediaries makes a fortune in this trade.

Romania has received very bad press in the last year: the betrayal of the revolution, Iliescu's repressive measures and now the trafficking in babies. Many intellectuals I talked with in Bucharest consider international criticism of what has happened since Ceausescu unfair. They say the government has passed at least two "very valuable" laws on land reform and privatization. "The trouble is, because Iliescu is so identified with the previous regime, the changes are difficult to judge," they lament. "Romania faces an arduous task ahead," concludes one. "Nowhere else in this part of Europe has communism left such deep spiritual wounds."

*Věra Murray is the Moscow correspondent for the Québec magazine L'Actualité.*

*Translation by Veronica Baruffati*

\* The real Marchais, Georges, is the head of the French Communist Party.

\*\* On the black market the lei trades at about 200 for 1 US dollar.





**Malgré les relents de gaz lacrymogène  
qui montent jusqu'au balcon de ma  
chambre, à l'hôtel Intercontinental, je**

**continue à regarder le fascinant spectacle.**

Des policiers armés de boucliers, en rangées serrées, restent immobiles pendant de longs moments, tandis qu'en face d'eux, des manifestants scandent des slogans, gesticulent devant eux, ou essaient de glisser des fleurs dans le revers de leurs uniformes. La provocation dure à n'en plus finir. Tout à coup, l'ordre est donné d'intervenir : pendant quelques instants, la foule est poussée et frappée de coups de matras faisant voler des éclats de verre. Les manifestants se font blesser, mais ils ne voient jamais personne se faire blesser vraiment. Puis, tout recommence, la manifestation me semble être à l'image du régime roumain actuel. En ce mois d'avril 1991, quelques jours à peine après la visite de François Mitterrand, premier chef d'Etat occidental à cautionner ainsi l'équipe au pouvoir, cette dernière a une réputation à protéger, mais elle n'arrive pas vraiment à se défendre des habitudes de répression du passé. Elle symbolise, certes, la chute de Ceaurescu, mais non pas la chute du communisme.

Les étudiants de Bucarest, qui étaient très nombreux à sortir dans la rue à l'occasion de la venue du président français, ont porté des pancartes qui ne pouvaient être plus explicites : « Mitterrand, la présence légitime du régime criminel », « Vive François Marchais », « On n'a pas assez de tric pour vous envoyer des oeufs ! » et, en faisant allusion au chef de l'Etat roumain, Ion Iliescu : « Nous ne voulons plus de président bolchevique ! ».

La révolution roumaine, comme l'histoire nous le montre, est arrivée au pouvoir par une suite du soulèvement populaire dont les images nous avaient tellement émus à la télévision. Depuis, il s'est « mis hors la loi en envoyant les mineurs disperser brutalement les manifestants étudiants à Bucarest ». Ces paroles émanant de la plus

La manifestation que j'observe de mon hôtel est une commémoration du premier anniversaire du début de l'occupation de la Place de l'Université par les étudiants, le 22 avril 1990. Cinqante-trois jours plus tard, le 13 juin, le gouvernement faisait venir à Bucarest des trains entiers de mineurs – de bons travailleurs prêts à tabasser quelques intellectuels – pour « nettoyer » la place. Marian Munteanu, président de la Ligue des étudiants, passé à tabac par les mineurs, puis déchu en juin dernier, dit qu'il est encore suivi et placé sur table d'écoutes et que tous les membres de sa famille reçoivent

**«Le meilleur régime pour la Roumanie,  
dit Marian Munteanu,  
serait une monarchie constitutionnelle  
dirigée par le roi Michel.»**

Certains en profitent pour faire du marché noir. Je vois plusieurs individus vendant des serpillères jetables : dans ce pays où il existe chez les enfants de nombreux cas de Sida dus à l'emploi de seringues non stériles, cet article se vend à prix d'or. De l'autre côté de la Place, une ligne formée également de fleurs, marque la limite au-delà de laquelle attend déjà un groupe de policiers. Deux vieux montent la garde près de la ligne, avec des bouts de baguette en guise de fusil. Trois semaines se sont écoulées depuis l'entrée en vigueur des hausses de prix de 200 à 300 p. 100. Un litre de lait coûte maintenant 10 lei\*, et un kilo de boeuf sans os, 270 lei : le revenu mensuel moyen est de 3 500 lei et l'on s'attend à ce que l'inflation atteigne cette année 150 p. 100. Le montant mensuel d'une pension de retraite ne suffit plus pour acheter une paire de chaussures. Le ciel de Bucarest est obscuré par des centaines d'énormes oiseaux noirs, des grues qui ne bougent ja-

mais, symboles de la folie architecturale de Ceaurescu. Le Palais du peuple, un des bâtiments dignes du pire mégalomanie du monde, construit dans un pays au bord de la disette, est terminé de l'extérieur, ainsi qu'une partie de la avenue de la Victoire du socialisme, large de 120 mètres, qui y mène. Au-delà, se trouve un immense quartier fantôme avec des fondations déjà creusées, d'autres complètement debout, mais avec des fenêtres cassées et les portes arrachées. Selon les statistiques officielles, la construction a reculé de 28 p. 100 dans le pays depuis la révolution, et le produit national brut a chuté de 10 p. 100. Le nombre de chômeurs pourrait atteindre 500 000 cette année pour

*\* Il faut environ 200 lei pour acheter 1 \$ US sur le marché noir.*

**LETTRE DE BUCAREST** PAR VERA MURRAY

25 millions d'habitants : les syndicaux eux avancent le chiffre de 1,5 million.

Tous les jours, plusieurs dizaines d'enfants passent la nuit à la Gare du Nord de Bucarest, couchés par terre sur des morceaux de carton ; c'est là une infime partie des 130 000 enfants que l'on dit abandonnés dans le pays depuis la chute de Ceaurescu. Ils survivent en menant une existence de rue, et ils se protègent contre la faim et le froid en remuant des émanations de vertis. Ces enfants sont le produit de la politique nataliste de contrainte, la plus monstrueuse des inventions du «génie des Carpates». Dans le cadre de cette politique, les produits de contraception disparurent du marché, et l'avortement devint un acte criminel.

Depuis l'automne dernier, des centaines de couples occidentaux arrivent en Roumanie pour adopter des enfants, qu'ils «achètent» sous-vent directement chez les parents, nées du nord du pays, où les familles continuent à être très nombreuses. Une faune d'intermédiaires gagnent un pécule dans ce commerce.

La Roumanie a en effet très mauvaise presse depuis un an : la révolution, les méthodes répressives d'Iliescu et, maintenant, le trafic de le changement.

«La Roumanie, m'a dit en conclusion l'un d'eux, a devant elle un chemin particulièrement ardu à parcourir : nulle part ailleurs dans cette partie de l'Europe, les blessures à l'âme laissées par le communisme ne sont aussi profondes.» □

*Vera Murray est correspondante du magazine québécois L'Actualité à Moscou, et elle s'est rendue en*







## Programme des prix Barton

L'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales a récemment offert neuf bourses d'études (14 000 \$) et deux bourses de recherche (30 000 \$) à des candidats ou candidates qui désirent poursuivre leurs études dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Ces bourses sont accordées chaque année dans le cadre du programme des prix Barton de l'Institut, ainsi nommé en l'honneur de William H. Barton, ancien ambassadeur éminent auprès des Nations Unies, à New York et à Genève.

Les titulaires de ces bourses se spécialisent dans différentes disciplines et ils/elles feront de la recherche dans divers domaines.

### Titulaires des bourses de recherche

**Simon W. Dalby** habite à Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique) et est titulaire d'un doctorat de l'Université Simon Fraser. Au Centre des études internationales de cette université, il fera des recherches sur les dimensions environnementales de la sécurité internationale dans le Pacifique.

**Elaine M. Holoboff**, de la Colombie-Britannique, terminera son doctorat au King's College de l'Université de Londres (Angleterre) avant de commencer des recherches à l'Université York (Toronto) sur les politiques soviétiques de sécurité dans l'Europe d'après la Guerre froide.

**Stephen H. Baranyi** est originaire de Toronto (Ontario). Il est inscrit au programme de doctorat de l'Université York (Toronto) et fait actuellement une étude sur le terrain en Amérique latine. Ses recherches concernent la dialectique de l'évolution panaméricaine en matière de défense, de 1968 à 1989.

**Jean-François Bergeron** vient de Québec (Québec) et fait actuellement son doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Laval. Ses recherches sont axées sur la transition politique et la démocratie, soit que les changements politiques réalisés sous la direction de F. W. de Klerk ont entraînés en Afrique du Sud.

**Andrew Chindler** est originaire d'Halifax (Nouvelle-Écosse). Elle fait son doctorat en sciences politiques à l'Université Columbia (New York). Sa thèse doctorale porte sur l'édification de l'État soviétique après la révolution, et sur les politiques de l'URSS en matière de surveillance des frontières.

**Guth Barclay Davis**, de Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique), poursuivra ses études à la *School of Advanced International Studies* de la *Johns Hopkins University*, à Washington. Il a l'intention de faire des recherches sur le Canada et la sécurité dans le Pacifique Nord et d'y inclure une analyse des menaces et des recommandations en matière de politiques pour les années 1990.

**Marie-France Desjardins** est originaire de Montréal (Québec). Elle fait son doctorat au département de politique de l'Université de Londres (Angleterre) et des recherches sur les mesures propres à accroître la confiance entre les pays européens.

**Oleg Hinnovsky de Hill** (Québec) est candidate au doctorat au département de sociologie de l'Université de Montréal. Sa thèse portera sur l'analyse du phénomène guerre à partir de la dimension politique de la société.

**Markus Ludwig Kreuzer**, de Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique), fait son doctorat au département de sciences politiques de l'Université Columbia (New York). Dans sa thèse, il étudie comment la concurrence suscitée par les institutions politiques contribue, de façon ponctuelle et démocratique, au règlement des conflits.

**David R. Muttimer** (Nouvelle-Écosse) complètera son doctorat au département de sciences politiques de l'Université York à Toronto, par une étude sur l'émergence d'un nouvel ordre mondial.

**Ian Rowlands** est originaire d'Ottawa (Ontario). Il fait son doctorat en relations internationales à la *London School of Economics and Political Science*. Ses recherches portent sur les changements environnementaux à l'échelle mondiale et plus particulièrement sur la coopération internationale qui s'amorce pour régler les conflits possibles engendrés par la dégradation de la couche d'ozone et le réchauffement de la planète.

modifié le programme pour prendre en compte la guerre du golfe Persique. Bradley et Rychard Brulé (Fonds «Paix et sécurité» de l'Institut) ont fait des exposés sur la guerre, puis les élèves se sont divisés en groupes pour mener des discussions (amtiées, à ce que l'on dit), avant de se réunir en plénière pour présenter leurs comptes rendus.

Plusieurs autres projets conjoints de l'Institut sont eux aussi destinés principalement aux élèves et aux professeurs du secondaire; ce sont des entreprises ou des programmes de l'Institut ou organisés par les professeurs de l'extérieur et qui relèvent surtout de *Jill Tansley*. En mai 1989, l'Institut a parrainé, avec le Collège Henson de l'Université Dalhousie, une conférence sur l'éducation concernant la paix et la sécurité, à l'intention des professeurs et des élèves. En 1989 et 1990, l'Institut a réalisé, avec la *London Museum*, un programme qui a permis aux élèves une rétrospective sur la guerre; il s'intitulait «*Less We Forget*». En 1988, 1989 et 1990, l'Institut a contribué au volet de «La science au service de la paix» dans le cadre d'Expo-sciences, une exposition scientifique panquébécoise s'adressant aux élèves et organisée par le Conseil de développement de l'Institut.

En travaillant ainsi avec le personnel enseignant et étudiant, l'Institut accroit la connaissance et la compréhension des questions relatives à la paix et à la sécurité internationale; or, ce sont là des thèmes d'un débat public sérieux dans le domaine. À mesure que les élèves grandissent et deviennent des adultes dans le monde interdépendant d'aujourd'hui et de demain, leur aptitude à comprendre les dimensions planétaires de leur monde déterminera fondamentalement leurs actions et leurs réactions. □

— NANCY GORDON

besoins. Étant donné que nous avons mis l'accent sur les concepts, des faits ponctuels étant employés pour illustrer, le *Prix* demeure d'actualité en dépit des profonds changements survenus dans les relations internationales depuis sa conception. La distribution du *Prix* (il se vend 35 \$) se fait par l'intermédiaire de l'Institut; plus les professeurs sont mis au courant de son existence, plus la demande augmente. Bradley Feasey donne des ateliers dans le cadre des journées de perfectionnement professionnel et de conférences organisées par les professeurs et les élèves. L'Institut a mis au point des guides adaptés à chaque province sur la façon d'employer le *Prix*. Les guides destinés à l'Ontario et au Manitoba sont terminés, et d'autres sont en cours de préparation.

En 1992, l'Institut lancera un programme d'association avec le personnel enseignant, afin de promouvoir chaque année de nouveaux documents didactiques. L'Institut accueillera des propositions auprès des professeurs à l'échelle du pays, et les examinera toutes, il en choisira une et fera venir l'auteur à Ottawa pour qu'il ou elle travaille avec son propre personnel pendant plusieurs semaines au cours de l'été. Une fois le projet terminé, l'Institut en publiera et en diffusera les résultats pour offrir ainsi aux écoles de la documentation pédagogique nouvelle et novatrice.

Pendant vingt-six semaines de l'année, 130 élèves du niveau secondaire venus des quatre coins du pays viennent à Ottawa passer une semaine ensemble au Centre Terry Fox, dans le cadre d'un programme appelé «Rencontres Canada», à la faveur duquel le Conseil pour l'Unité canadienne offre des exposés, des visites guidées, du théâtre, des activités récréatives, des discussions et des débats. Depuis quatre ans, l'Institut prépare et présente chaque semaine une séance de trois à quatre heures sur des questions relatives à la paix et à la sécurité internationale. Bradley Feasey est le membre divoi de notre personnel dans ce

programme; presque chaque semaine, il se rend au Centre Terry Fox où il participe à la discussion, au débat ou aux recherches menées sur des questions internationales.

Pendant l'hiver de 1991, l'Institut a



## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



«Encourager la discussion pu-

bliques» des questions relatives à la

paix et à la sécurité internationales

constitue un volet important du man-

dat de l'Institut. En fait, c'est la jus-

tification d'une grande partie de ses

travaux. Les publications, les rela-

tiens conjoints avec d'autres

organismes, voilà autant d'aspects

qu'il faut classer sous ce grand titre.

Un groupe du public reçoit une at-

tention particulière d'un membre

de notre personnel, notamment

Bradley Feasey; il s'agit des élèves

et des enseignantes et enseignants

des écoles secondaires.

Au début de 1987, l'Institut a

rassemblé des enseignants, des ad-

ministrateurs d'écoles, des represen-

tants de commissions scolaires et

des membres d'organismes non

gouvernementaux pour discuter

avec eux de ce que l'on attendait du

système éducatif relativement

aux thèmes de la paix et de la secu-

rité. Tous ont alors convenu que le

personnel enseignant se devait de

plus en plus d'aborder ces questions

en classe, mais qu'il manquait de

documentation conçue expressément

pour les jeunes et les élèves.

Comme l'Institut possède des

compétences dans les domaines en

question, il semblait logique pour

lui de tenter de remédier aux lacunes.

L'Institut savait (et il en est toujours

conscient) qu'en tant que société de

la Couronne, il n'était pas autorisé à

intervenir dans l'élaboration des po-

grammes d'études; mais il pouvait

examiner les lignes directrices régis-

sant les programmes provinciaux

existants et produire, en fonction

des paramètres y étant énoncés, de

la documentation utile aux élèves et

aux enseignants. Vu la nature de nos

domaines de compétence (le désar-

memment, la limitation des arme-

ments, la défense et le règlement

des conflits), il convenait de mettre

l'accent sur le niveau secondaire.

Bradley Feasey, membre de l'Ins-

titut, a amorcé le travail et il a fait

prévoir d'une compréhension des

questions et d'une aptitude à com-

muniquer, tant par écrit que verba-

ment, avec les enseignants et avec

leurs élèves. À la faveur d'un

heureux concours de circonstances,

nous sommes entrés en rapport avec

Geoff Irvine, professeur d'histoire

à la Commission scolaire de Car-

leton et auteur d'une monographie

en sociologie (Ontario). Nous avons

pu l'embaucher à contrat.

Ils ont tous les deux rédigé le

*Précis de l'enseignant et de l'en-*

*seignante sur la paix et la sécurité.*

L'ouvrage vise principalement à

fournir aux élèves des connaissances

de base dans les domaines de la paix

et de la sécurité internationales, de

manière à les rendre capables de

comprendre et d'interpréter la multi-

tude d'informations leur étant trans-

mises. Pour atteindre cet objectif,

les auteurs ont réparti l'information

et les leçons sous trois grandes

rubriques : la politique étrangère,

la sécurité, et les conflits internatio-

naux. Dans chaque cas, ils se sont

efforcés de faire comprendre aux

lecteurs que les sujets sont souvent

interliés et qu'il existe divers points

de vue les concernant. Ils se sont

aussi soucés de montrer que les po-

litiques du Canada et d'autres pays

résultent de décisions prises en

fonction de certaines perceptions,

Comme l'histoire et les sciences

humaines (cours auxquels la matière

est la plus pertinente).

Comme il s'agit d'un classer à

feuilles mobiles, on peut apporter des

changements et des ajouts selon les

besoins.

La première ébauche du *Précis* a

été rédigée en 1987. Elle a été mise

à l'essai dans diverses écoles et

présentée à un groupe d'enseignants

et de conseillers, pendant une con-

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### Concours «Paix et Sécurité» : procédure et échéancier

Pour les compétitions dont les dates limites seront les 30 juin et 30 novembre 1991

et le 30 juin 1992, le Fonds éducatif en partenariat avec le Comité canadien de la Paix et la Sécurité internationale lors de la célébration du 125<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de la Confédération en 1992. Nous croyons qu'à cette occasion, les Canadiens et Canadiennes seront invités par le Parlement à réfléchir, dans leurs champs d'activités respectifs, sur leurs réalisations et sur les défis que présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre  
le 30 novembre, pour la sélection de mars  
Concours «Paix et Sécurité»  
360, rue Albert, bureau 900  
Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

### Numéros antérieurs de P&S sous microforme

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# A L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



La guerre du Golfe

Le 11 avril, le président du Conseil de sécurité a remis à l'ambassadeur d'Irak auprès des Nations Unies une lettre annonçant officiellement un cessez-le-feu dans la guerre du golfe Persique. Même si cette lettre marquait la cessation officielle des hostilités, les diplomates étaient divisés, du point de vue historique, sur la date précise à laquelle les armes sont tombées. Certains prétendaient que le cessez-le-feu est entré en vigueur le 27 février, lorsque le président américain, M. George Bush, a commandé à ses forces de mettre un terme aux opérations qui avaient entraîné la déroute écrasante des troupes irakiennes.

Selon d'autres diplomates, toutefois, l'arrêt des combats est officiellement intervenu le 3 avril, lorsque le Conseil a adopté la résolution 687, qui précisait les conditions d'un cessez-le-feu. Conformément à cette résolution, l'Irak devait, entre autres, accepter de détruire toutes ses armes chimiques et biologiques, de même que la plupart de ses missiles balistiques. L'Irak devait, en outre :

- créer une zone démilitarisée le long de la frontière établie en 1963 en l'Irak et le Koweït ;
- créer un fonds destiné à indemniser les personnes qui ont subi des pertes résultant de l'invasion du Koweït. Le fonds serait alimenté moyennant un prélèvement annuel sur les revenus pétroliers de l'Irak, dont le montant exact serait déterminé par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies ;
- renoncer à toute tentative visant à acquérir ou à fabriquer des armes de destruction massive, qu'elles soient chimiques, biologiques ou nucléaires. Sans pour autant lever les sanctions, le Conseil, en concertation, lui permettrait d'imposer les dépenses et matériels essentiels, décision qui serait révisée tous les soixante jours.

Dans un discours devant le Conseil, l'ambassadeur irakien a exprimé son mécontentement concernant la résolution, et il a déclaré que son pays se réservait le droit de réclamer

des dédommagements pour les destructions que les forces alliées lui ont infligées. Il a accusé ces dernières d'avoir bombardé, sans discernement, des cibles militaires et civiles, et il a ajouté que 88 500 tonnes d'explosifs avaient été larguées sur l'Irak, soit l'équivalent de «sept bombes atomiques».

La résolution 687 a été adoptée par la majorité des membres du Conseil ; Cuba s'est prononcé contre. L'Équateur et le Yémen se sont abstenus. Dans un discours qui rejeta l'option de nombreux commentateurs, le délégué soviétique a déclaré que la communauté internationale a tiré de cette guerre une leçon pénible, semblable à celle des années 1930, lorsque l'on avait laissé un agresseur s'emparer d'un petit pays après l'autre. La résolution 687, a-t-il ajouté, mettrait le nouveau système de relations internationales à l'épreuve et, qu'il était capable de rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Une activité diplomatique intense a précédé l'adoption de la résolution 687 pour forcer l'Irak à se plier aux demandes des alliés et du Conseil de sécurité. Même avant la fin des hostilités, la coalition internationale, ainsi que l'Irak et ses alliés, avaient tenté de prendre le dessus dans la guerre de propagande.

Le 13 février, les membres du Conseil ont décidé par un vote de se réunir à huis clos pour entendre des déclarations sur la crise du Golfe. Cette décision représentait une victoire pour la diplomatie américaine. Les États-Unis craignaient, en effet, qu'un débat public sur les bombardements et une proposition des États non alignés à l'ordonner un cessez-le-feu puissent placer les alliés arabes dans une situation embarrassante.

Le processus verbal de cette réunion a été rendu public vingt-quatre heures plus tard. On y a appris que M. Philippe Kirsch, ambassadeur du Canada par intérim, avait résumé la position du Canada en déclarant que les limites de la diplomatie ayant été atteintes, le recours à la force, si venu inévitable, et que le Conseil de sécurité était clairement investi de l'autorité juridique et morale pour autoriser ce recours à la force.

La réunion s'est caractérisée, en outre, par le fait que la force n'était pas nécessaire.

La résolution 688 a été adoptée par la majorité des membres du Conseil, il a parlé du «régime» les membres aient été témoins au personnel les plus vicieuses dont hypocrisie». Dans un des attaques privées pour mentes, pygmées et kien a qualité la réunion de «séance cède le conflit. Le représentant irakien a fait remarquer que son pays compte 400 000 pygmées, et que ce sont des êtres humains à part entière qui ne doivent pas être traités de façon discriminatoire en raison de leur taille.

Le Conseil de sécurité a continué d'exercer des pressions diplomatiques sur l'Irak en adoptant, le 2 mars, la résolution 686. Cuba s'est prononcé contre ; la Chine, l'Inde et le Yémen se sont abstenus. Aux termes de cette résolution, Bagdad devait se plier aux douze résolutions déjà adoptées contre elle.

En vertu de la résolution 686, l'Irak devait, en outre, annuler son annexion du Koweït, accepter la responsabilité des pertes subies par les particuliers, les entreprises et les États à cause de l'invasion irakienne, libérer tous les prisonniers et restituer au Koweït tous les biens volés.

Le 3 mars, quelques jours seulement après la cessation des hostilités, le Conseil a demandé au Comité des sanctions de répondre sans tarder aux demandes d'aide humanitaire qu'a engendrées la guerre. De plus, il a envoyé une mission sur place pour évaluer les besoins dans ce domaine.

Le 20 mars, le sous-secrétaire général, M. Martti Ahtisaari, a déclaré que la guerre avait ramené l'Irak à l'état préindustriel, et que la situation risquait d'atteindre des proportions «cataclysmiques». Il a demandé l'envoi de secours humanitaires d'urgence. Dans un autre rapport sur le Koweït, il a souligné que les efforts du gouvernement pour faire face aux besoins fondamentaux et rétablir les services essentiels semblaient en bonne voie.

Le 5 avril, le Conseil a adopté la résolution 688 exhortant l'Irak à exercer à l'égard des réfugiés et d'autres groupes civils à l'intérieur de ses frontières.

Le 29 avril, le Conseil a lancé un «appel solennel» pour que l'on vienne en aide aux vingt et un pays touchés par les sanctions prises contre l'Irak. Il espérait une réaction favorable, mais il n'a pas donné de précisions à cet égard.

Le 22 janvier, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté la résolution 687, qui précisait les conditions d'un cessez-le-feu et d'un respect de la liberté à continuer dans le conflit libyen à continuer.

Le 30 janvier, le Conseil a prolongé le mandat de la Force intermédiaire des Nations Unies au Liban (FINUL). Le lendemain, il a prolongé celui du Groupe d'observation militaires des Nations Unies en Iran-Irak (GOMNUI) jusqu'au 28 février, après quoi ce groupe a été dissout.

Le 27 mars, le Conseil a convenu de «débloquer» l'expulsion, par Israël, de quatre Palestiniens des territoires occupés. En outre, ses membres se sont dits extrêmement inquiets de la détérioration de la situation dans les territoires.

Le 29 avril, le Conseil a adopté la résolution 690, qui prévoit l'établissement d'une mission de l'ONU, à l'occasion d'un référendum, qui aura lieu au Sahara oriental. Cette opération est un autre exemple dans le maintien de la paix. Cette entreprise coûtera 200 millions de dollars et nécessitera la participation de près de 3 000 militaires et civils. Le Canada sera appelé à y jouer un rôle prédominant, comme dans la plupart des grandes opérations de maintien de la paix.

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## Le monde au lendemain de la guerre du Golfe

déroulée à un rythme essouffant. À peine six semaines après le début des opérations militaires offensives déclenchées par la coalition multinationale, les forces israéliennes ont délogé les combattants de la résistance à Gaza. Les opérations ont été menées par la force, sans négociation préalable, et ont entraîné la mort de milliers de civils. Les opérations ont été menées par la force, sans négociation préalable, et ont entraîné la mort de milliers de civils.

internationale contre l'Irak, le président des États-Unis, George Bush, en ordonnant l'interruption le 27 février, en déclarant que le Koweït était en sécurité dans la région dépendant d'Aux yeux de M. Clark, la paix et la

désormais libre et que l'armée irakienne était vaincue. Le 3 mars, l'Irak acceptait la résolution par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité de l'Onu demandait l'arrêt immédiat de la guerre avec l'Irak à venir.

« L'ONU fixait les conditions d'un cessez-le-feu permanent. La Chambre des communes avait suspendu ses travaux le 22 janvier. Le 20 mars, M. Clark a témoigné

après le vote qui avait autorisé le gouvernement à appuyer les Nations Unies désireuses de mettre fin à l'agression de l'Irak. Elle a repris armes. Il a alors admis que des rapts

ses travaux le 25 février, mais entre-temps, un comité spécial mixte ré- Affaires existantes et de la Défense et il a qualifié des « exceptions » les

Le 12 mai 1998, le Conseil d'Etat a rendu son avis sur le projet de loi relatif à la réforme de la justice. Le Conseil d'Etat a exprimé ses réserves sur certains points, mais a également souligné les progrès réalisés par le Gouvernement. Le Conseil d'Etat a également souligné que le projet de loi est conforme à la Constitution.

secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, Lloyd Axworthy, lui a répondu par une lettre datée du 22 février, tandis que son collègue, le ministre de l'Industrie, lui a écrit le 29 janvier, puis les 3, 13 et 21 février.

Bill McKnight, a fait de même le 13 janvier et les 12 et 20 février. L'attaque de la Défense nationale, de 1970, avait été sonnée par son retour au Canada à travers le 12 février et le 20 février.

Le Parlement a entendu, le 12 avril, après avoir adopté un projet de loi qui modifie le Réglement de la Chambre en

instrument de guerre et les armes  
de destruction massive», M. Clark a  
le nouveau abordé cette proposition  
de la Chambre et la Chambre et  
en rétranchant quarante  
jours au calendrier de la Chambre et  
de vingt) la durée des discours des  
membres à quatre heures (au lieu  
de six).

Le 6 mars, M. Clark a déposé à la Chambre et à l'ONU le premier rapport annuel du Canada sur les droits de l'homme.

Le lendemain, devant le Comité mixte de la Chambre, M. Clark a déposé un rapport sur le rôle des comités des Communes ont été restructurés, de sorte que les vingt comités normaux ont été réduits à

Comptes permanents sont maintenant répartis en cinq groupes : gestion (tous comités) ; ressources humaines (neuf comités, y compris

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généralistes (sont) : ressources naturelles (quatre, dont l'Environnement) ; affaires économiques (cinq, y compris les Affaires extérieures et le Commerce extérieur ; et affaires ministérielles (cinq, dont la Défense nationale et les Affaires des anciens combattants). Chaque groupe comprendra deux comités législatifs, auxquels le gouvernement pourra demander d'examiner des documents de loi.

La Chambre a été convoquée pour une troisième session avec le discours du trône prononcé le 13 mai.

## Remanagement ministériel

ment ministériel important. Ainsi, Joe Clark, secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures depuis 1984, devient ministre chargé des Affaires

constitutionnelles et président du Conseil privé : Barbara McDougall (député de la région de Toronto), le remplace aux Affaires extérieures

et laisse le portefeuille de l'Emploi  
et de l'Immigration à Bernard  
Valcourt, du Nouveau-Brunswick ;  
Michael Wilson, autrefois aux

Finances, devient ministre de l'Industrie, de la Science et de la Technologie et ministre du Commerce extérieur : Jean Charest revient au

cabinet en qualité de ministre de l'Environnement, et Marcel Masse, qui a été longtemps ministre des Communications, passe à la

## Rapports des comités

laïques extérieures (Communes) a

Walter McLean. Le rapport intitulé «Questions sans réponse, espoirs incertains» a paru dans le feuillet 105

une allure discrète, il critiquait sévèrement la réponse que le gouvernement avait donnée en novembre 1990 à son rapport de 1989.

ore 1990 a son rapport de juin 1990, qui s'intitulait « L'avenir du monde et les intérêts du Canada dans le dossier de l'endettement du tiers-

monde». «La réponse est décourageante, surtout par son caractère

Le 25 mars, le Comité de l'en-

ronnement (Communes), sous la présidence de David MacDonald, a déposé son troisième rapport en Chambre. Celui-ci portait sur le

réchauffement de la planète et s'ins-  
tituait « En rupture d'équilibre : le  
risque de changements climatiques  
irréversibles » ; il contenait environ

vingt-cinq recommandations qui visaient à modifier l'attitude indifférente des Canadiens et Canadiennes, attitude qui les conduit à mener

une vie bien moins efficace, bien plus coûteuse et bien moins économique qu'elle pourrait l'être. Parmi les recommandations figurent les

suivantes : i) que le Canada prenne immédiatement des mesures pour réduire sensiblement le taux d'émission des gaz causant l'effet de serre

de manière qu'une réduction de 20 p. 100 des émissions de CO<sub>2</sub> de source humaine (comparativement au niveau de 1988) d'ici l'an 2005,

constitue l'objectif provisoire minimal du gouvernement; ii) que la politique énergétique du Canada mette l'accent en priorité sur une

utilisation plus efficace et plus économique de l'énergie : iii) que le gouvernement lie son aide ex-


au dossier environnemental de ses partenaires ; iv) que, de concert avec les ministères de l'Environnement et des Finances, le V&A

ficateur général procède à des vérifications environnementales pour garantir que tous les ministères

et organismes fédéraux mettent en oeuvre des procédés d'évaluation environnementale, et pour contrôler l'efficacité des programmes

— GREGORY WIRICK  
environnementaux.

# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



## Politiques de défense de l'après-guerre du Golfe

Les succès étonnants des forces de la coalition que dirigeaient les États-Unis pendant la guerre du Golfe ont incité de nombreux pays à réévaluer leur politique de défense. En France, les dirigeants comme les critiques ont reconnu que la guerre avait mis en lumière la capacité limitée du pays de déployer des forces classiques munies d'armes hautement performantes. Plus particulièrement, le ministre de la Défense, M. Pierre Joxe, a reconnu publiquement que les opérations des forces françaises avaient dépendu énormément des services de renseignement américains. Selon lui, ce sont les États-Unis qui ont produit, au moment de la guerre, les renseignements les plus indispensables à la poursuite de la guerre.

Les Français ne possèdent qu'un satellite à la disposition de la guerre. Les Français ne possèdent qu'un bal (GPS) qui, en plus de permettre aux unités terrestres de calculer précisément leurs propres positions, fournit des données sur les objectifs vers lesquels on lancera les armes à guidage de précision et des renseignements d'une grande exactitude à l'artillerie de campagne.

**Démision d'un amiral canadien**  
À la fin avril, il est devenu évident que la révision tant attendue du Livre blanc de 1987 sur la défense s'était opérée avant que l'on connaît l'issue de la guerre du Golfe. Le 24 avril, le vice-amiral Charles Thomas, Chef du Commandement maritime et vice-chef de l'état-major de la Défense, a remis sa démission, quelques mois avant la date prévue de son départ à la retraite. Dans une lettre au Chef de l'état-major de la Défense, le général John de Chastelain, le général Thomas a déclaré qu'il fallait donner au gouvernement le plus d'outils militaires possibles pour répondre aux besoins de sécurité. Le général de Chastelain a précisé que sur une période de quinze ans, 40 p. 100 des dépenses en capital

Chastelain faisaient fréquemment allusion à ce plan. Toutes deux traitaient de certaines des recommandations qu'il contenait : le rééquipement d'une «groupe-brigade expéditionnaire» (dont on ne précise ni la nature ni la composition) en tant que «investissement primordial»; l'expansion à long terme des forces navales, sous-entendue dans la lettre de l'amiral Thomas et dans la réponse du général de Chastelain, comprennent l'acquisition de douze nouvelles frégates, de quatre destroyers de classe *Tribal* modernisés et d'un nombre inconnu de corvettes que l'on construirait au lieu de frégates dans l'avenir (les corvettes ne sont pas décrites dans les lettres, mais il s'agit habituellement de navires de patrouille plus petits que les frégates et possédant des capacités moindres que celles-ci), et de douze dragueurs à mines promis à la Réserve navale, ainsi qu'un «modeste» programme de remplacement des sous-marins classifiés «ici quelques années».

Les principales objections de l'amiral Thomas concernant cette politique portaient sur les sous-marins et les corvettes. D'après sa lettre, l'achat de corvettes côtières et ne représenterait pas un choix judicieux, puisque les capacités de ces bâtiments de surface sont limitées. En outre, en retardant le programme d'acquisition de sous-marins, le Canada renoncerait à sa souveraineté sous les mers baignant son territoire. L'amiral Thomas a ajouté que la décision d'accorder la priorité au groupe-brigade expéditionnaire était mal à propos, et il a demandé la tenue d'un débat public sur la politique de défense.

Dans sa réponse, que le nouveau ministre de la Défense, M. Marcel Masse, a sanctionnée, le général de Chastelain a vivement dénoncé les propos de l'amiral Thomas sur le nouveau groupe-brigade. Reconnaissant d'une façon inattendue que le Livre blanc de 1987 était dépassé par rapport à l'évolution de la conjoncture géopolitique et que sa mise en œuvre côtière trop cher, il a déclaré qu'il fallait donner au gouvernement le plus d'outils militaires possibles pour répondre aux besoins de sécurité. Le général de Chastelain a précisé que sur une période de quinze ans, 40 p. 100 des dépenses en capital


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**Renouvellement de l'accord du NORAD, et radars à fonctionnement intermittent**  
Quelles que soient les perspectives d'avenir de la Marine canadienne, l'Aviation, elle, continuera de fonctionner dans le contexte du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD). Le 19 avril, en effet, le gouvernement a annoncé que l'accord du NORAD serait renouvelé pour une période de cinq ans à partir de sa date d'expiration, soit le 12 mai. Pour la surveillance radar de l'Amérique du Nord, toutefois, il faudra s'accommoder des services considérablement réduits de deux radars *OTH-B* (radars transhorizon à rétrodiffusion troposphérique), qui ont été cédés à l'Aviation américaine pour la Société *General Electric* pour la somme de 1,2 milliard de dollars en 1990. La décision initiale de l'Aviation américaine, qui a soulevé la controverse, était de les démanteler, mais au début avril, on en est arrivé à un compromis. *OTH-B* de la côte est, installé au Maine, ne fonctionnera que quatre heures par semaine (aux pilotes ennemis de deviner quelles seront ces heures?), et les installations de la côte ouest seront fermées et entretenues par un personnel réduit au strict minimum.

David Cox



# CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



## Les forces conventionnelles en Europe

À cause du différend relatif au lit-belle du Traité sur les FCB (signé en novembre dernier), les négociations sont demeurées dans l'impasse au cours de la période à l'étude. Trois questions ont dominé :

(1) l'Occident (et des pays asiatiques) s'inquiète du fait que l'URSS a transféré, à la dernière minute, des dizaines de milliers d'éléments visés par le Traité (EVT) à l'Est de l'Oural pour éviter de les détruire en vertu du Traité ;

(2) il existe des divergences entre les estimations des services de renseignement occidentaux et les données fournies par l'URSS sur l'équipement laissé dans la zone où les réductions doivent s'opérer. Toutefois, ces divergences auraient été éliminées pour la plupart après la révision des estimations occidentales et des chiffres soviétiques ; et

(3) élément capital, l'URSS prétend qu'environ 5 457 éléments d'équipement ont été exemptés des limites établies par le Traité, parce qu'elle les avait réaffectés à la «défense côtière», ou parce qu'ils appartenaient à l'infanterie navale, à la Force de fusées stratégiques ou aux unités de défense civile. Tous les vingt et un autres signataires du Traité soulignent le fait qu'en vertu de l'article III du Traité, tous les équipements terrestres (à quelques exceptions près) sont assujettis à ce dernier, quelle que soit l'arme à laquelle ils appartiennent.

À la mi-février, le président Bush aurait proposé un compromis qui permettrait aux Soviétiques de respecter les limites numériques fixées par l'Occident sans pour autant renier leur interprétation de l'accord. Initialement, l'URSS s'était seulement engagée à geler le nombre de ses armes navales basées à terre. Plus tard, elle aurait offert de retirer presque la moitié des armes faisant l'objet du litige, c'est-à-dire celles des unités «défenses côtières». Au début d'avril, après avoir échangé plusieurs lettres avec M. Gorbatchev, le président américain aurait accepté une proposition soviétique visant le retrait des armes de «défense côtière» basées à l'Est de l'Oural et aussi la destruction d'un nombre égal d'armes plus vieilles dans cette région. M. Bush aurait toutefois insisté pour que les armes d'infanterie navale soient également touchées par ces mesures et que toute destruction d'équipement effectuée en dehors de l'Europe fût assujettie à une inspection par l'Occident. En échange, celui-ci n'obligerait pas l'URSS à détruire quelque 1 700 EVT dans la Force de fusées stratégiques et les unités de défense civile, ni à renoncer officiellement à son interprétation du Traité.

Le 25 avril, après s'être réuni avec le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. James Baker, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Bessmertnykh, a annoncé que le litige avait été réglé, et un porte-parole américain a confirmé que le «principal obstacle» avait été levé, apparemment parce que l'Union soviétique avait accepté d'inclure l'équipement d'infanterie navale. Cependant, l'information s'est avérée prématurée, car, le 7 mai, on a appris que M. Gorbatchev enverrait le général Mikhail Moiseyev, Chef de Grand état-major soviétique, à Washington pour tenter de résoudre le différend. Pour en savoir plus sur l'accord sur les FCB, prière de lire les pages 10 et 11.]

## Pour parler sur la réduction des armes stratégiques

Depuis plus d'un an, on dit que seuls des détails «techniques» empêchent la signature d'un accord START, mais aucune des parties ne semble disposée à faire les compromis nécessaires pour conclure une entente finale. En ce temps, à la mi-mars, le gouvernement américain a fait savoir clairement qu'il ne pourrait pas ratifier START tant que le différend sur les FCB ne serait pas réglé. Parallèlement, il a repoussé l'invitation soviétique à tenir un autre sommet des superpuissances et il a bien précisé qu'une telle réunion n'aurait pas lieu tant que la signature d'un traité START ne serait pas imminente.

Témoignant devant le Congrès peu après avoir démissionné de ses fonctions de négociateur en chef du START pour les Etats-Unis, l'ambassadeur Richard Burt a défini cinq des questions encore en suspens :

(1) la vérification du nombre des bombardiers jourds et des missiles de croisière air-sol, domaine où les Soviétiques craignent que les Etats-Unis soient capables de «dépasser» rapidement les limites fixées dans le Traité ; (2) la surveillance et l'inspection des usines de missiles mobiles, aspects qui préoccupent beaucoup les Etats-Unis ; (3) l'acceptation des données relatives aux essais de missiles, questions dont les détails ne sont toujours pas réglés ; (4) la définition du terme «nouveau missile», une distinction très subtile entre ce que sont un nouveau système et un ancien, afin de s'assurer que les missiles n'ayant subi que de légères modifications demeurent assujettis aux limites touchant le nombre de têtes explosives qu'ils peuvent emporter ; et (5) la possibilité de permettre à chaque partie de réduire le nombre d'ogives montées sur un type de missile donné afin d'en réduire la concentration et de promouvoir ainsi la stabilité en rendant les missiles moins vulnérables.

Selon M. Burt, ce sont là des «questions de second ordre, mais qui sont importantes» et que l'on pourrait résoudre «dans un avenir proche». L'ancien négociateur craint que l'influence croissante des militaires soviétiques permette à l'URSS de poursuivre la modernisation de ses forces nucléaires au moment même où les Etats-Unis réduisent les leurs ; il préconise, par conséquent, que l'on redonne la priorité au START.


## Le désarmement de l'Irak

La résolution de l'ONU sur le cessez-le-feu dans le Golfe, adoptée le 3 avril et acceptée officiellement par l'Irak trois jours plus tard, prévoit la destruction ou la neutralisation de nombreux éléments militaires de pays, notamment toutes les armes chimiques et biologiques, les missiles balistiques ayant une portée supérieure à 150 km, et toutes les armes nucléaires ou tout matériel susceptible d'entrer dans la fabrication d'engins nucléaires, ainsi que toutes les installations de recherche, toutes les installations de stockage des armes biologiques et chimiques et à celui des missiles, et elle en supervisera la destruction. L'AIEA inspectera aussi les installations nucléaires et détruira toutes les matières susceptibles de servir à la fabrication d'armes nucléaires. □

Le 18 avril, conformément à la solution de l'ONU, l'Irak a fourni des renseignements confirmant qu'il possède vingt-cinq missiles balistiques et cinquante-trois têtes explosives (dont trente chimiques), ainsi que d'importants stocks d'armes chimiques, y compris plus de 10 000 roquettes, obus d'artillerie et bombes aériennes, et plus de 1 000 tonnes de gaz imbrutables. Toutefois, il a nié détenir des armes nucléaires, que tous ses matériels nucléaires étaient déjà assujettis aux garanties internationales, et que toutes ses installations de recherche et de développement respectif étaient en matière nucléaire avaient été détruites par les bombes alliées. Les complaisances irakiennes à été im-médiatement et largement déqualifiées, comme étant incomplètes et fausses. Le 22 avril, répondant à l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) qui exigeait des détails supplémentaires sur son programme nucléaire, l'Irak a fourni ce qu'un porte-parole américain a décrit comme étant un rapport extrêmement détaillé sur l'état, l'emplacement et la quantité de toute la matière enrichie. Il a également révélé l'existence de centres de recherche nucléaire et de stocks de matières fissiles que l'Occident ne connaissait pas. Une fois plus, la liste a été jugée incomplète, car elle ne comprenait pas les laboratoires de mise au point d'armes nucléaires, comme celui d'Al Qadafi. Conformément à la résolution de l'ONU, le Secrétaire-général, M. Javier Pérez de Cuellar, formera une commission spéciale qui inspectera sur place les capacités irakiennes à fabriquer des armes biologiques et chimiques et à celui des missiles, et elle en supervisera la destruction. L'AIEA inspectera aussi les installations nucléaires et détruira toutes les matières susceptibles de servir à la fabrication d'armes nucléaires. □

## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

*De la démission d'un ami à la définition d'une politique de défense.*



AVEC TOUTES LES PRESSIONS QUI PESAIENT SUR

la politique de défense canadienne depuis la parution du Livre blanc en 1987, quelque chose de nouveau finit par arriver. La démission très publique du vice-amiral C. M. Thomas, vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense, a porté certaines questions à la une des journaux, mais il en reste d'autres dans l'ombre.

Ceux et celles d'entre nous qui, depuis un moment, réclament un débat public en profondeur sur la politique de défense pensent qu'il faudrait saisir de façon constructive les ouvertures actuelles. Il est, en tout cas, à espérer que le gouvernement n'essayera pas une fois encore d'élaborer le Livre blanc par excellence : à savoir : un plan d'étalement sur quinze à vingt ans, avec des programmes de dotation en équipement compliqués, obtenant des dizaines de milliards de dollars. Des livres blancs annuels, établis sur le modèle de ceux qu'utilisent bien des pays à présent, ramèneraient à plus justes proportions un processus décisionnel paralysé par ses propres données. Par ailleurs, ils seraient assez souples pour qu'on y inscrive des grands achats d'équipement et que l'on puisse recycler le cadre stratégique.

Les questions clés soulevées aujourd'hui tout en haut au rôle des forces armées canadiennes dans le contexte de la sécurité internationale. Ce contexte n'est plus «dominé par la rivalité entre l'Est et l'Ouest», comme on l'avait estimé (à tort) dans le Livre blanc de 1987, mais il n'en demeure pas moins important de conserver une politique de défense cohérente. Si une menace militaire importante, d'un type posant un problème de défense mondial pour la plupart des pays, visait directement le territoire canadien, on peut s'attendre que les États-Unis interviendraient dans la mesure où, par extension, les intérêts vitaux de leur sécurité seraient eux-aussi menacés. Pour notre pays, il y a tout de même un problème de défense à l'échelle continentale et dans quelle mesure.

Depuis 1939, cependant, les Canadiens et leurs gouvernements rejettent une définition étroitement territoriale des intérêts vitaux de la sécurité du Canada et ils l'ont acceptée. L'idée que ceux-ci nous obligent à participer militairement à des opérations de sécurité collective, avec les Nations Unies, et à des opérations de défense elles-mêmes collectives, avec l'OTAN. Cette philosophie s'est étioffée avec l'apartition des missions de maintien de la paix, dont le Canada a été l'un des principaux architectes et ont il reste un des participants les plus importants. Si les dimensions et les exigences militaires de l'OTAN diminuent considérablement, en revanche, il continuera d'avoir besoin des missions de

maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. Avec le précédent créé par l'opération contre l'Irak, il est plus probable que l'on verra apparaître de nouvelles formes de sécurité et d'actions coercitives collectives. En outre, les armées sont appelées à jouer d'autres rôles, comme d'aider les autorités civiles à maintenir l'ordre public, intervenir au lendemain de catastrophes naturelles, ou participer à la surveillance côtière et aérienne visant à faire respecter les règlements canadiens sur les pêcheries, la pollution, l'immigration, la contrebande, les narcotiques, et ainsi de suite.

De tout cela, il ressort que de puissance moyenne privilégiée déchargée des obligations les plus contraignantes de la défense militaire, le Canada est transformé en puissance moyenne confrontée à une série de graves défis militaires, dont aucun ne constitue cependant un danger immédiat pour la survie nationale. Dans des contextes moins heurteux aux prises avec des situations extrêmes, les choix militaires sont simplifiés. Les délais d'exécution et les problèmes de temps morts qui accompagnent les grands achats d'équipement et la politique de la répartition régionale des bases et des dépenses, facteurs plus délicats que jamais dans l'état précaire actuel de la fédération canadienne, compliquent davantage encore notre tâche.

La DÉFENSE OCCUPANT TOUJOURS UNE PLACE IMPORTANTE dans la part «discrétionnaire» des dépenses fédérales, il nous faut voir combien les Canadiens dépensent pour la défense et de quelle manière ils dépensent cette somme. Comme l'historien militaire Desmond Morton le faisait remarquer dernièrement :

On leur parle si souvent des maigres moyens alloués à la Défense que les Canadiens sont surpris quand ils découvrent qu'avec un budget de 12 milliards de dollars, leur armée est au sixième rang des pays de l'OTAN pour ce qui est des dépenses militaires. Avec un peu moins d'argent, comme le fait valoir le général Gerry Thériault, les Hollandais ont un corps d'armée bien équipé, une marine modeste mais moderne et une petite force aérienne respectable. Les Canadiens ont l'organisation militaire la mieux payée, la plus encombrée de grades de l'Alliance. Il ne nous est plus possible de remettre à plus tard les questions de défense. Le régime sec ne suffit pas, il va falloir procéder à des amputations, bien que les réponses les plus simples ne soient sans doute pas les meilleures. Il serait aussi bête de proclamer qu'il est temps de quitter l'Europe que de vouloir garder le même cap. L'Europe qu'il faut alors de nos soldats postés sur un front central qu'il n'existe plus ? Il est presque certain que des troupes américaines resteront stationnées en Europe pour assurer une dissuasion militaire canadienne, même symbolique. Étendue par le biais de l'OTAN, donc une présence militaire canadienne, nous aurons longtemps réclamer dans le passé pour des contributions plus importantes.

Il EST PROBABLE QUE L'ON RÉDUIRA LES EFFECTIFS de l'Armée régulière. Le débat dans la corresponsabilité entre MM. Thomas et de Chastelain sur un «corps expéditionnaire» devra être clarifié. De quel nombre de soldats le Canada peut-il envisager d'engager au niveau international, avec quelles armes et avec quels moyens de transport ? Comment combinerai-je les ressources de l'Armée régulière et de la réserve, et qu'en coïncitera-t-il ? Contrairement à des idées reçues très répandues, pas plus des formations militaires plus légères, ne constituent des options nécessairement moins onéreuses que ce que nous avons à l'heure actuelle, notamment à court terme.

Quant aux forces maritimes et aériennes, leurs rôles et leur équipement soulèvent des débats fondamentaux au fond desquels il nous faudra aller. Dans sa lettre, l'amiral Thomas exprimait des inquiétudes particulières au sujet de la Marine, notamment sur les processus extraordinairement longs qui caractérisent l'acquisition de bâtiments de guerre, et sur la nécessité d'investir aujourd'hui dans du matériel dont on pourrait avoir besoin d'ici quinze à vingt ans. Or, ces propos viennent au moment même où le Canada met en service la première des six nouvelles frégates commandées. Les contribuables ne se satisfont pas d'un débat simpliste et émonuant sur des marines «hauturières» ou «côtières».

Les Canadiens ne peuvent se doter des mêmes capacités d'armement «équilibrées» et «combinaisons» qu'une grande puissance militaire. Ils ne peuvent pas pour se les procurer, et ils n'en veulent probablement pas. Cependant, revenir à l'état sentiel ne signifie pas forcément adopter une vision étroite de la défense territoriale canadienne, car nous ne sommes plus la maison isolée «à l'épreuve du feu» que nous étions dans les années 1920. En matière de défense, comme dans beaucoup d'autres domaines, pour appliquer une nouvelle politique, il faudra aborder avec beaucoup plus de fermeté l'économie en général, les choix difficiles à faire entre des possibilités concurrentes, et évaluer judicieusement les directions dans lesquelles il convient d'engager l'effort militaire canadien.

— BERNARD WOOD



# LA POLITIQUE EN HAUT LIEU

Les sujets du royaume du Népal vont aux urnes.

PAR FRANÇOIS LAFRENIÈRE

ES INDÉS ONT EU GANDHI, maintenant, avec Ganesh Man Singh, c'est enfin notre tour, s'est écrit dans un anglais ardu un vieux Népalais, gémissant et criant parmi la foule en lèsses qui enivraissait *Durbar Marg* (l'avenue du Roi) à Katmandou, le 9 avril 1990. Après plusieurs semaines de tension et de violence entre les manifestants du mouvement pour le multipartisme et les forces de l'ordre, y compris plusieurs jours de couvre-feux complets, c'était la célébration de la victoire dans les rues enssoleillées de la capitale népalaise.

Quelques heures auparavant, après une fusillade par l'armée qui avait fait plusieurs dizaines de morts parmi les manifestants sur la même *Durbar Marg*, le monarque du royaume hindou du Népal, Birendra, avait annoncé la légalisation des partis politiques, illégaux depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans. Quant à Ganesh Man Singh, il était le vénérable et respecté chef du *Nepali Congress Party* (NCP), perçu par la plupart comme étant l'âme politique du mouvement pour le multipartisme. Bien que toujours clairement associé à un parti, Ganesh Man s'est efforcé de demeurer à l'écart des trébuchements électoraux partisanes, ne luttant que contre les «adversaires de la démocratie».

La seule élection multipartite de l'histoire du Népal, celle de 1959, avait mené le NCP et son chef de l'époque, B.P. Koirala, à former le gouvernement de sa majesté pendant dix-huit mois. Le roi Mahendra, père de l'actuel monarque, avait par la suite répudié le multipartisme, pour finalement le remplacer par un régime sans partis, dit *panchayat*, au début des années 1960. En samskrit, le mot *panchayat* signifie littéralement «conseil composé de cinq membres». Les *panchayats* villageois ont été créés comme instruments de gouvernement locaux par le biais desquels le palais s'assurait le contrôle du pays. En 1980, les résultats d'un référendum (qui favorisait le régime sans partis) ont suscité des accusations de fraude de la part des partis et c'est ce même régime corrompu qui est tombé sous la pression populaire le 8 avril.

S'inspirant en partie des succès de mouvements semblables en Europe de l'Est, les partis politiques népalais, clandestins ont lancé leur action concertée en février 1990. Les heures avec la police d'abord, puis avec l'armée, sont allées en augmentant ; même après la victoire du multipartisme, le nouveau gouvernement a dû maintenir les couvre-feux (nourcimes) dans la capitale pendant plusieurs jours. Il y a maintenant quarante-trois martyrs officiels du mouvement, et le gouvernement est à compléter les enquêtes relatives à d'autres personnes disparues ou tuées durant la même période. Quelques jours après la légalisation des partis politiques, un gouvernement intérimariste a été formé et il a reçu pour principale tâche de proposer une nouvelle constitution et d'organiser des élections. Comme dans le cas de Havel en Tchécoslovaquie, le plupart des ministres, y compris le premier ministre Bhatterai, avaient fait de longs séjours en prison. Les changements constitutionnels qui ont finalement été acceptés par le palais sont perçus par les divers partis comme un pas très important vers la démocratie. La nouvelle constitution stipule entre autres que la monarchie constitutionnelle du Népal est une démocratie multipartite : l'État de près de 20 millions d'habitants demeure un «royaume hindou» (le roi Birendra se voulant une réincarnation du dieu Vishnou). Chacun est libre de pratiquer sa propre religion, mais il est toujours interdit de promouvoir la conversion religieuse ; certains partis de gauche auraient préféré un État népalais complètement sécularisé.

Le roi conserve le droit de dissoudre le parlement en cas d'urgence et l'armée, bien qu'elle relève officiellement du Conseil de défense nationale, lui reste fidèle dans les faits. Le nouveau constitution semble satisfaire la majorité des Népalais, encore qu'aux yeux de certains, elle ne garantisse pas suffisamment une totale liberté d'expression. Pour reprendre la formule du magazine de langue anglaise de Katmandou *Himal*, c'est une bonne constitution, mais elle pourrait être meilleure. Bien que mise en cause durant les événements violents du début de 1990, la monarchie a depuis repris auprès de l'opinion publique, une légitimité très fragile. On n'entend plus de slogans hostiles au roi, comme c'était le cas lors de la dernière élection.

cas dans les semaines ayant précédé la déclaration de Birendra qui légifera les partis politiques. La majorité des Népalais voient dans la monarchie un élément indispensable à l'unité du Népal. La gauche compte toujours des factions antimonarchistes mais la plupart des grands partis constatent que la monarchie demeure populaire au Népal, surtout chez les populations rurales qui forment plus de 90 p. 100 de l'électorat. Symbole d'unité dans ce royaume himalayen morcelé suivant les ethnies et les groupes linguistiques la monarchie du Népal se veut protectrice de la religion hindoue, mais aussi garante de la souveraineté des deux géants que le Népal a comme voisins. Le *Nepali Congress* était accusé d'être trop près des Indes, et les différents partis communistes, d'être trop influencés par la Chine. Comme il dépend de son voisin du Sud pour son commerce international, le Népal doit sans cesse subir les pressions politico-économiques des Indes qu'irrite tout rapport commercial sino-népalais. Ce sont les populations urbaines (moins de 10 p. 100 des Népalais) de la vallée de Katmandou qui constituaient le gros des forces du mouvement populaire. À quelques semaines du 12 mai 1991, date des premières élections multipartites depuis celles de 1959, le pays tout entier était en proie à une fièvre électorale. Les «recruteurs» des divers partis sillonnaient à pied les villages isolés de ce pays où une toute petite fraction de la population peut être rejointe par la route. Il n'était pas rare de voir des paysans dénicher des cartes de partis différents. Le processus démocratique s'est heurté à un passé électoral sans pluralisme politique. Dans bien des cas, les cavaliers politiques ont provoqué des divisions profondes au sein de toutes petites localités.

La solidarité qui avait lié les divers partis durant la lutte clandestine s'est rapidement effritée dans les mois qui ont suivi, chacun voulant se distancer d'un éventuel rival électoraleux. Le *United Left Front*, par exemple, après s'être premièrement éloigné du *Nepali Congress*, s'est morcelé et compte une dizaine de factions communistes différentes, dominées par le *Male Nepali Congress* est à la tête du gouvernement intérimariste multipartite et il a intégré dans ses rangs nombre d'anciens élus (y compris des critiques du régime *panchayat*). Le régime déchu a lui aussi produit un nouveau parti politique, le *National Democratic Party* ; déjà en proie à des luttes internes, il s'est scindé en deux factions. Il existe également plusieurs partis régionaux, dont le plus important est sans doute celui du *Terai* qui conteste le pouvoir central de Katmandou. Chaque parti est représenté par un signe qui lui est propre (soleil, arbre, etc.), pour faciliter la publicité électorale et le processus de vote chez la population, en grande partie analphabète. Pour ce qui est des résultats mêmes des élections, les principales surprises en ont été le score étonnamment maigre réalisé par le NCP dans la capitale, et en outre le score des résultats mêmes des élections, les principales surprises

Quant au patriarche Ganesh Man Singh, il a choisi de ne pas se présenter aux élections législatives, mais sa femme et son fils, qui s'étaient présentés à Katmandou sous la bannière du NCP, ont tous deux perdu face à des candidats communistes. Cette famille à l'image quelque peu ternie est maintenant et le fils de la démocratie. Les changements que devra inévitablement apporter le nouveau gouvernement susciteront de nombreux espoirs. Il ne sera pas facile de faire face à une population qui réclame les fruits promiss de la démocratie (développement économique, alimentation, santé, éducation) sans trop savoir ce qu'ils devraient être, mais en les assimilant avant tout à une amélioration du niveau de vie. □


maintenant de larges zones lampous ; et la marge de manoeuvre du pays est tant capable de couper le cordon ombilical qui le relie au courant politique dominant. Il reste déchiré entre son irrésistible besoin d'appartenance et son désir sincère de changer la somme réalité.

La force de cet attachement capital est perceptible dans les réactions émi-nemment émotives de certaines figures de proue du mouvement face aux attitudes de plus en plus anti-islamiques des Palestiniens après le déclen-chement de la crise du Golfe. M. Yosi Sarid, député de la Knesset, que beaucoup considèrent comme l'incarnation du mouvement, a violemment critiqué les Palestiniens pour leur soutien à Saddam Hussein et a fait savoir qu'il ne renouvellerait pas de sitôt le dialogue avec eux. Pour justifier ce re-virement de situation, il s'est efforcé d'expliquer l'ambivalence de son mouvement vis-à-vis des Palestiniens :

« Je ne me sens ni trahi, ni dupé, parce que je n'ai jamais cru en eux... Ce que je croyais, c'est qu'ils avaient atteint un degré de maturité suffisant pour comprendre où sont réellement leurs intérêts... Je pensais qu'après avoir traversé une période plutôt difficile, ils s'étaient rendus compte qu'ils avaient intérêt à accepter et à reconnaître l'existence de l'Etat hébreu... En fait, ce qui s'est passé, c'est qu'ils ont agi en totale contra-diction avec leur cause fondamentale et, ce faisant, ils nous ont fait choir, même de tort à tous... Par leur comportement insensé et dangereux, ils nous ont ramené dix ou vingt ans en arrière !

La volée-façade de M. Sarid a défrayé la chronique, mais nous les pacifistes ne l'ont pas suivi. Mme Shulamit Aloni, femme politique également proche du mouvement, a rejeté l'argument de M. Sarid et résumé le dilemme des

serais-je déçu par la position des  
Qu'a-t-il fait pour eux ? La  
israélienne n'est qu'une partie inté-  
rieure du gouvernement israélien, de l'or-  
dable... Nous avons essayé de faire  
entendre la voix de la morale. Nous  
avons l'impression que nous avons posé  
ces questions et essayé de modifier le  
programme... Mais, en réalité, nous  
n'avons rien accompli.  
Le gouvernement a continué  
de dominer les territoires, d'y  
bâter les droits de la personne,  
d'y détruire et d'y tuer ; et nous  
sommes complices, parce que  
nous ne nous sommes pas ré-  
voltés. Nous sommes pas ré-



Maître tous les facteurs qui contribuent à réduire considérablement l'incidence politique du mouvement pacifiste israélien, celui-ci continue à vivre. La vie des mouvements sociaux en général, et celle des mouvements pacifistes en particulier, est souvent marquée par de longues périodes d'hibernation et même de silence. Des événements ponctuels comme la visite de M. Sadate en Israël ou la guerre du Liban en 1987 sont plus susceptibles de favoriser une résurgence du pacifisme qu'un phénomène prolongé comme l'*Intifada*. Quoi qu'il en soit, même dans sa situation actuelle, le mouvement pacifiste constitue majoritairement un défi à l'«obsession «sécuritaire» dominante et il donne de la substance au débat politique national. En dénonçant continuellement les atrocités et la mauvaise conduite des autorités, il continue à mettre l'accent sur les dilemmes moraux que l'occupation des territoires pose à Israël. □

<sup>24</sup> Cite dans un article de Gideon Levi, intitulé «Yosi Sardi Is Attraction», Haaretz, 24 août 1990, [En hébreu : citation traduite par l'auteur].  
<sup>25</sup> Cite dans un article de Tom Seggev, intitulé «No One Should Look For Shulamit Aloni», Haaretz, 24 août 1990, [En hébreu : citation traduite par l'auteur].

*Peace Now* a riposté en taxant ces actions de manque de réalisme et en les accusant d'empêcher, en fait, de mobiliser la population autour d'une solution de compromis. Ce conflit interne a rarement terni le rôle dirigeant de *Peace Now*, qui disposait pourtant de la plupart des ressources matérielles et du meilleur réseau d'appuis extérieurs, tant en Israël qu'à l'étranger. En somme, à cause de cette division, les pacifistes n'ont pas pu offrir de solution de rechange viable sur le plan politique : ils ont gaspillé leur énergie et terni, de façon générale, la crédibilité de leur mouvement en tant que force raisonnable et efficace.

Quatreièmement, le mouvement pacifiste s'est trouvé pris entre les attentes des Juifs et celles des Arabes. La population juive a exigé qu'il dise clairement à qui il allait sa loyauté première. En effet, les activités pacifistes n'étaient ni juives que si le mouvement du même nom se déclarait partie intégrante du peuple israélien et si le subordonnait tout autre intérêt au consensus national. Toute identification partielle à la cause palestinienne était considérée comme deloyale, voire assimilée à une trahison.

Les Palestiniens, quant à eux, ont trop attendu du mouvement pacifiste. Ils ont sous-estimé le poids des pressions exercées sur ses membres pour les rallier au consensus national, ce qui les a empêché de voir quelle était réellement l'allégeance fondamentale de leur mouvement. Les dirigeants palestiniens les plus modérés de Cisjordanie, interloqués de longue date du mouvement, se sont de plus en plus impatientés face à l'hésitation et l'extrême prudence des pacifistes. Pendant ce temps, ces derniers comprenaient mal le silence des Palestiniens après des actes terroristes.

Les Palestiniens ont également été déçus de voir que la plupart des groupes pacifistes refusaient de les appuyer dans leur demande de retrait total et inconditionnel d'Israël de Cisjordanie et de Gaza, et de création d'un état palestinien indépendant. En outre, nombre de Palestiniens pensaient que l'*Intifada* déclencherait dans l'Etat hébreu une immense vague de protestations, semblable à celle soulevée par la guerre du Liban, mais il n'en fut rien. Au début, ils ont attribué la tiédeur de l'appui de leurs alliés israéliens potentiels au fait que le soulèvement faisait relativement peu de victimes juives et que les affrontements n'avaient lieu que dans les territoires occupés. Toutefois, ils ont fini par se rendre compte que les manifestations n'ont pas pris l'ampleur escomptée parce que, pour les Israéliens, la question palestinienne touche au cœur même de l'Etat hébreu, et qu'une action plus énergique de leur part aurait compromis leur adhésion au consensus national. Les Palestiniens, comme la plupart des Israéliens, ont donc demandé que le mouvement pacifiste exprime clairement sa position. Etant donné que la grande majorité des pacifistes se considèrent d'abord comme israéliens, même en rejetant l'opinion majoritaire sur la question palestinienne, ils ne pouvaient guère réagir autrement qu'ils n'ont fait.

CINQUÈMEMENT, LE MOUVEMENT PACIFISTE ISRAËLIEN S'EST EMPÊTRÉ DANS les contradictions de sa propre image. Il est trompé de vouloir comparer sa vision du monde à celle de ses homologues occidentaux. En effet, les principaux thèmes du pacifisme occidental (la contre-culture post-matérialiste, l'anti-étatisme, l'écologie et l'anti-nucléaire) sont secondaires en Israël. De même, il ne faut pas s'attendre à retrouver les convictions internationales et pacifistes. S'il est vrai que la paix qui, dans le contexte israélien, signifie l'absence de guerre, est souhaitable en tant que telle, il n'en demeure pas moins que la plupart des pacifistes israéliens la prônent parce qu'elle contribuera, selon eux, à la sécurité et au bien-être de la nation, et ce sont là des convictions profondes qui ne sont pas si différentes de celles de la majorité des Israéliens.

De plus, à l'instar de la classe politique israélienne dans sa majorité, le mouvement pacifiste est partisan du réalisme politique, tout en se réclamant des principes moraux universels. Même si ses membres rejettent plusieurs des grands postulats qui sous-tendent les politiques officielles en matière de diplomatie et de sécurité (ex. : dans le conflit israélo-arabe, il y aura toujours un gagnant et un perdant ; pour sa sécurité, Israël doit absolument



# LE MOUVEMENT PACIFISTE

## ISRAËLIEN N'EST PAS ENCORE K.O.

Même par des querelles intestines, des politiques boiteuses, et une grave crise d'identité, le mouvement pacifiste israélien a perdu beaucoup de son influence pendant l'Intifada palestinienne.

PAR TAMAR HERMANN

Forces qui, avaient-ils prévu, consolideraient le nationalisme palestinien ; mais l'Intifada a révélé le fossé qui sépare l'attente intellectuelle d'un tel

soutièvement du véritable effet de surprise réussi par les Palestiniens.

De fait, la question de l'incompatibilité historique entre les objectifs du mouvement sioniste et les intérêts nationalistes des Palestiniens a été au

centre de débats houleux au sein de *Peace Now* et d'autres groupes pacifistes dès leur création. Le mouvement pacifiste a mis quelque six mois à

réagir à la nouvelle situation ; et même alors, il n'a rien dit de nouveau sur le problème et n'a pas proposé de plan de paix structurel. Pour l'essentiel, le

mouvement s'est contenté d'organiser des manifestations contre les mesures draconiennes prises par l'armée. Il a repris contre M. Yitzhak Rabin, ministre

travailliste chargé de la Défense au sein du gouvernement d'unité nationale, les mêmes slogans employés dix ans plus tôt contre le premier

ministre conservateur (Likoud) M. Menachem Begin. Les quelques initiatives destinées à présenter de nouveaux plans de paix, comme le manifeste

rédige par le groupe *Red Line*, étaient trop abstraites et irréalistes pour être

fructueuses.

Deuxièmement, en Israël, le militarisme politique hors des partis officiels n'a jamais été un moyen d'action prisé. Bon nombre d'Israéliens ont

fini par considérer les manifestations et les campagnes de pétitions contre la guerre (par ex., celles lancées pendant la guerre du Liban) comme des preuves

d'antipatriotisme et d'irresponsabilité civile. Ces images négatives ont été

renforcées par l'attitude des factions pacifistes plus radicales qui défendaient le droit de tout Israélien à refuser de faire son service militaire en

Cisjordanie et à Gaza et à participer à la répression de l'Intifada. Une telle

attitude allait manifestement à l'encontre de ce que la plupart des Israéliens considèrent comme un devoir civique fondamental, à savoir : participer à la

défense du pays que soient les convictions politiques de chacun. Elle a suscité la colère de la population et a failli mettre en péril la participation

légitime de tout le mouvement au débat sur la sécurité nationale.

En outre, le mouvement a dans sa majorité, réduit ses propres options en déclarant plus d'une fois que, malgré le rejet des politiques officielles, il

defend essentiellement la même cause que l'armée israélienne. Autrement dit, il exclut toute confrontation avec les soldats. Quant à la question de

savoir quelles actions pouvaient être entreprises sans saper cette affirmation fondamentale du patriotisme des pacifistes, elle s'est posée avec de plus

en plus d'acuité à mesure que le mouvement palestinien s'est ancré dans la violence et que la réaction des militaires s'est durcie.

Troisièmement, loin de contribuer à un consensus sur les objectifs et les stratégies ultimes du mouvement pacifiste, l'escalade de la violence durant

*l'Intifada* a entraîné de nouvelles dissensions internes. En effet, des dizaines de nouveaux groupes pacifistes se sont formés, chacun d'eux préconisant une solution légèrement différente de celle des autres à la question

palestinienne. Des groupes radicaux tels que *There is a Limit*, *Women in Black*, *Shop the Occupation* et *Red Line* ont prôné la désobéissance civile et le boycottage des produits fabriqués par les colons de Cisjordanie. Ces tactiques de provocation ont eu des résultats minimes, mais ont suscité une

réaction nettement négative au sein de la population. *Peace Now*, qui s'était efforcé de préserver sa légitimité aux yeux du public en adoptant une ligne

relativement modérée (par ex., jusqu'à la fin 1988, il s'est abstenu de préconiser la création d'un Etat palestinien), a été accusé par les factions plus

radicales de trop ménager les forces de l'ordre.

'HISTOIRE LE PROUVE IRRÉFUTABLEMENT. LES MOUVEMENTS PACIFISTES ont tendance à rester silencieux ou même à sombrer dans le désarroi en temps de guerre. Bien qu'Israël n'ait joué qu'un rôle passif dans la guerre du golfe Persique, son mouvement pacifiste semble s'être

pratiquement évanoui au fil des hostilités. Le lancement de missiles irakiens sur des cibles civiles israéliennes et la réaction des Palestiniens, qui ont ap-

plaudi Saddam Hussein, a exacerbé le sentiment collectif de vulnérabilité

Ces événements n'ont pas échappé aux pacifistes. Après de longues et

dures années de dissidence, beaucoup d'entre eux semblent maintenant

guerre n'est que l'une des raisons du retour au bercail de ces « enfants

égares ». Cette volonté de rentrer dans le giron national s'explique essen-

tiellement par la frustration croissante que les pacifistes ressentent face

à leur incapacité apparente, quoique inévitable sans doute, de relever le défi

de l'Intifada.

Le mouvement pacifiste israélien, lancé comme une campagne de masses

à la fin des années 1970, a atteint son apogée en termes de participation et

d'efficacité perçue entre 1982 et 1984 en menant les manifestations contre la

guerre du Liban. Depuis lors, il est composé d'un grand faction, *Peace Now*,

et d'un nombre croissant de petits groupes. Cependant, le mouvement n'a

jamaï compté plus de 500 à 750 inconditionnels et, même les observateurs

les plus optimistes estiment le nombre de ses partisans à environ 150 000.

Malgré ces chiffres relativement modestes, le mouvement s'est retrouvé à

l'avant-scène grâce à d'autres facteurs. En effet, en couvrant sans cesse ses

activités, et généralement sous un éclairage positif, les médias en ont fait

une organisation plus puissante qu'elle ne l'était, tant aux yeux de ses parti-

sans que de ses rivaux. De plus, sa composition socio-démographique le

situe assez près du centre du pouvoir. En effet, la plupart des groupes paci-

listes sont dominés par de jeunes Juifs citadins, très instruits, de classe

moyenne et d'origine européenne, profil qui, dans la société israélienne,

prédispose à une belle carrière politique.

Ainsi, le mouvement pacifiste israélien en général et *Peace Now* en parti-

culier réunissent toutes les conditions pour faire une percée politique.

Néanmoins, quand l'Intifada a éclaté, en décembre 1987, il était déjà évi-

dent qu'ils n'avaient pas réalisé leur potentiel. Vers la mi-1980, de puis-

santes forces centrifuges ont fragilisé le mouvement et l'ont divisé en marge

de consensus national, et il s'est trouvé incapable de jouer son rôle naturel,

à savoir : servir d'intermédiaire entre les Israéliens et les Palestiniens.

L'INCAPACITÉ DU MOUVEMENT À MOBILISER UN SORTIR POPULAIRE ET À

obtenir l'aide de décideurs susceptibles de contribuer au changement de la

politique officielle d'Israël et à maintenir sa crédibilité dans les deux camps

ou à y atténuer la violence peut s'expliquer par les facteurs nommés par

premièrement, les pacifistes, tout comme le reste des Israéliens, ont été

groupe pacifistes avaient déconseillé une occupation prolongée des terri-

stite et sa durée. Dès la fin des années 1960, certains dirigeants des premiers

grupos pacifistes avaient déconseillé une occupation prolongée des terri-

\*Note de la rédaction : Intifada est le plus souvent traduit par « soulèvement », bien

qu'en arabe, le mot signifie littéralement « l'envie ». On considère généralement qu'en

tant qu'événement distinct, l'Intifada a commencé en décembre 1987, par des troubles

qui ont éclaté spontanément dans des camps de la bande de Gaza avant de gagner


ceux de Cisjordanie au lendemain de la mort violente d'un Israélien et de quatre

Palestiniens à Gaza.

Fait plus inquietant, il est évident, à voir l'attitude générale de l'URSS, que les politiciens et les militaires ne font pas bon ménage au sein du gouvernement soviétique. L'amée a bien fait comprendre qu'à son avis, M. Gorbatchev et le ministre des Affaires étrangères ont cédé sur trop de points dans les négociations avec l'Occident. Un diplomate soviétique a déclaré que la décision de faire passer une partie de l'équipement de l'armée cdt de l'Oural à été prise par des responsables militaires et qu'elle a surpris les diplomates. Pour d'autres observateurs des milieux diplomatiques, cette décision expliquerait en partie la démission, en décembre dernier, de M. Chevardnadze de son poste de ministre des

CET EPISODE MONTRÉ CLAIREMENT QUE LES PRO-blèmes internes de l'Union soviétique ne sont pas ceux qu'on avait des incidences sur le processus de limitation des armements. Dans le cas présent, l'URSS a interprété le Traité à son avantage et elle a voulu jouer sur deux tableaux. Les efforts déployés par les États-Unis pour sauver le Traité en élaborant une solution de compromis, qui avalués en partie du moins le comportement de l'URSS ont un caractère exceptionnel, mais les

Si l'on arrive à un compromis, le 1<sup>er</sup> traité ne sera pas pour autant sauvé. Avant d'entrer en vigueur, il faudra qu'il franchisse avec succès toutes les étapes des difficiles processus de ratification



En outre, les Soviétiques affirment que le matériel de la Force de fusées stratégiques et des divisions d'infanterie de marine n'est pas visé par le Traité. L'équipement qui se trouve maintenant hors de la zone comprend, estime-t-on, 800 chars, 900 véhicules de combat blindés et quelque 3 500 le nombre total de pièces passées de l'autre côté de l'Oural.

Le problème de l'interprétation porte essentiellement sur les articles II et III, qui définissent les termes employés dans le Traité et établissent les règles de décompte du matériel militaire. L'article III précise les seuls cas où les plafonds fixés par le Traité ne visent pas certains matériels se trouvant dans la zone. D'après les autres pays, tout le matériel (défini à l'article II) se trouvant dans la zone d'application entre dans les catégories limitées, hormis pour les exceptions mentionnées à l'article III. Or, les forces navales ne figurent pas parmi ces exceptions. Seule l'Union soviétique fait valoir qu'il est possible d'interpréter le Traité comme les excluant de son champ d'application.

Ce dernier point a eu pour conséquence de repousser le processus de ratification aux États-Unis et de suspendre les autres négociations sur la limitation des armements, mais les Soviétiques sont restés absolument intransigeants. Leur attitude donne à penser que ce n'est pas l'interprétation du Traité qui est en question, mais que tout simplement, l'armée soviétique a décidé de ne pas renoncer à ces forces, ce qui pourrait s'expliquer par diverses raisons.

Il se peut que, confronté à une terminologie inadmissible, les Soviétiques cherchent à éviter de très coûteuses destructions d'équipement. Ou, peut-être, pour sauver la face au niveau national, ils essaient de minimiser l'incidence de réductions excessivement disproportionnées. En outre, pendant les négociations, l'URSS a cherché à obtenir de l'OTAN la possibilité de convertir du matériel pour l'utiliser à des fins civiles ou paramilitaires plutôt que de devoir tout détruire d'emblée. C'est peut-être le refus catégorique de l'OTAN (encore que l'Occident ait fini par accepter la conversion d'une quantité limitée de matériel militaire) qui a incité les Soviétiques à déplorer une partie de leur équipement pour éviter d'avoir à le détruire.

plement parler d'une violation, cette opération a  
 vite suscité de l'inquiétude quant aux intentions  
 de l'URSS et notamment des autorités militaires.  
 Le Kremlin a déclaré que les transferts fai-  
 saient partie de retards d'Europe de l'Est prévus  
 et préalablement annoncés et qu'une bonne partie  
 de l'équipement allait être détruite. Les États-  
 Unis ont eux aussi craint d'Europe du matériel  
 placé dans des troupes d'Europe du matériel  
 soviétique. Cependant, à l'inverse des Sovie-  
 tiques, les Américains ont annoncé qu'il prendrait  
 des termes du Traité relativement aux plafonds  
 prescrits.

Il n'est pas inhabituel de rencontrer des problèmes accorde quatre-vingt-dix jours aux États pour recevoir les chiffres initialement fournis. Ainsi, l'Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne ont corrigé leurs données de départ. Cependant, en ce qui concerne le transfert massif de matériel hors de la zone, les chiffres présentés par l'URSS ont été largement supérieurs les Occidentaux, car il y apparaissait qu'en tout, les réductions soviétiques se montaient de trois à quatre fois inférieures à ce que l'OTAN avait prévu dans ses premières estimations de janvier 1990. Plusieurs des représentants des gouvernements qui ont participé à l'Union soviétique ont fourni des données fondées sur les avis qu'ils pensaient, à tort, pouvoir atteindre avant le 19 novembre au avant que les premières inspections commencent.

« L'armée de l'air est une armée de défense coûteuse, mais elle affirme que l'équipement de ces unités n'est pas dans le matériel militaire par le Traité MLT, c'est-à-dire soumis à des restrictions numériques aux termes du Traité.

LA QUESTION DE L'INTERPRÉTATION DU TRAITE  
 risque d'être fort épineuse, au point que pour cer-  
 tains, elle pourrait le «saboter». L'Union sovié-  
 tique a reclassé et rebaptisé trois divisions



# SAUVER UN ACCORD PRECIEUX

*Les Soviétiques essayaient-ils de tricher dans l'application du Traité sur la réduction des forces conventionnelles en Europe ? Et est-ce important ?*

PAR JANE BOULDEN

Après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, les deux parties disposent de quarante mois pour se conformer aux plateaux convenus. Tout l'équipement trouvant dans la région, visée au 19 novembre 1990, date de la signature, est soumis aux termes du Traité, où qu'il se trouve après cette date. La veille de la signature, tous les pays concernés ont échangé d'abord des dossiers contenant des informations sur les types et le nombre de pièces, sur l'endroit où elles étaient, ainsi que des précisions techniques s'y rapportant et le nom des unités les utilisant à l'intérieur de la région. Des échanges de ce genre se poursuivront tout au long de l'application du Traité afin de pouvoir vérifier

Sur la base des méthodes définies dans le Traité, l'équipement venant en sus des limitations convenues doit être détruit ou converti pour servir à d'autres fins. Les parties peuvent procéder de diverses façons pour les destructions. Par exemple, les chars peuvent être détruits en supprimant des parties essentielles désignées, en les déformant selon des méthodes établies ou simplement en les faisant exploser, ici encore selon des méthodes définies dans le Traité qui, en dernier cas, précise même où la charge explosive devrait être placée dans le char. Les autres parties au Traité sont en droit d'assister à toute destruction ou conversion de matériel et d'inspecter le matériel détruit ou converti.

C'EST L'AMPLEUR MÊME DES RÉDUCTIONS QUI REND le Traité si précieux pour l'Occident. L'Union soviétique devra réduire son arsenal de 26 p. 100, naturellement dit de 18 840 pièces. En tout, les autres membres du Pacte de Varsovie diminueront le Depuis de 18 223 pièces, soit de quelque 42 p. 100. L'arsenal est-allemand compte comme nous l'avons dit de 11 586 pièces, soit presque 15 p. 100. Si l'OTAN ne comptait pas le matériel est-allemand, l'OTAN ne se débarrasserait en fait que d'à peine 5 p. 100 de son équipement.

Les problèmes qui risquent de menacer le Traité portent sur l'attitude soviétique dans trois domaines. Avant la signature du Traité en novembre, il est devenu évident que l'URSS transférerait un grand nombre de chars et d'autres pièces de l'autre côté de l'Oural. Sans qu'il s'agisse à pro-

Aux termes du Traité sur les FCE, l'OTAN et l'Organisation du Pacte de Varsovie doivent ré-  
duire leurs armements conventionnels dans cinq  
catégories de systèmes d'armes (les chars, les  
pièces d'artillerie, les véhicules de combat blindés,  
d'assaut), mais les effectifs (soldats et autres  
personnels militaires) ne sont pas limités. Avant  
la signature du Traité, en février 1990, au cours  
d'une rencontre à Ottawa portant sur une autre  
proposition relative à la limitation des armements, les États-Unis et l'URSS avaient décidé  
de placer sur le plateau de la région de la capitale  
des escadrons de chars et de véhicules blindés  
et de les faire passer à l'arrière-plan. Les  
effectifs des unités de chars et de véhicules  
blindés ont été réduits de 10 à 15 %.

D'OUTRE, PLUS LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LE TRAITE  
avancées, plus il est devenu évident que le pla-  
fond convenu était trop simplement trop élevé.  
De toute façon, l'Union soviétique avait déjà  
commencé à retirer d'Europe de l'Est pratique-  
ment toutes les troupes qu'elle y stationnait. Par  
ailleurs, pour des raisons nettes autres budgétaires,  
les Etats-Unis n'allait pas tarder à tomber eux  
aussi bien en-dessous du chiffre arrêté. Quand  
il se sera devenu de plus en plus improbable que les  
deux pays se mettent d'accord sur de nouvelles  
limitations des effectifs pour le mois de novem-  
bre, c'est-à-d. à temps pour la conclusion du Traité,  
la partie on ne décide, en septième, que la ques-  
tion serait réglée ultérieurement. Par conséquent

Le Traité se présente comme suit : les plaidos d'engénieurs des cinq catégories d'équipement s'appliquent aux deux alliances (même si le Traité existe également des plaidos intermédiaires qui fixent certaines limites régionales et qui garantissent qu'aucun Etat ne s'arrogera un pourcentage croissant des forces allouées à chaque alliance.

selon l'expression consacrée, de « l'Atlantique à l'Oural ». Cela comprend une portion du territoire soviétique délimitée à l'Est par la chaîne de l'Oural, et tout le territoire des pays de l'alliance européenne (à l'exception d'une petite partie de

E TOUTS LES SYMBOLES DE LA NOUVELLE Europe, le Traité sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe (FCE) sera parmi ceux qui auront les conséquences les plus tangibles et les plus immédiates. Signé à Paris le 19 novembre 1990, ce traité codifie la nouvelle réalité militaire européenne en exigeant des deux alliances\* qu'elles détruisent quelque 50 000 pièces d'équipement militaire lourd. Cependant, à peine l'ence des signatures avait-elle séché que des problèmes ont surgi, car les Soviétiques tentaient apparemment de contourner certains points du texte.

Depuis le 19 novembre, les doutes quant au

devenus tels que, dans pratiquement tous les autres domaines de la limitation des armements, les négociations sont au point mort et que le Traité lui-même est menacé. Le gouvernement Bush a décidé de remettre à plus tard la présentation du Traité au Sénat américain pour ratification, étape essentielle avant que ses termes soient en vigueur, et le Canada et d'autres pays de l'OTAN ont protesté officiellement auprès de l'individu, pour lui reprocher ses actions. Au mois de mars, pour essayer de surmonter George Bush a commencé à échanger des lettres avec Mikhail Gorbachev, à titre privé, afin de trouver une solution de compromis permettant

son presse, M. Gorbatchev doit encore préciser si le Kremlin accepte les conditions les garantissant les autorités militaires soviétiques les respectent.

Le paradoxe de cet accord, s'il se concrétise, c'est qu'en contrepartie d'un geste compensatoire suffisant des Soviétiques, les Etats-Unis et l'Atlantique de l'Atlantique Nord y approuveraient le type même de comportement qui, il y a dix ans, aurait déclenché les craintes les plus alarmistes du gouvernement Reagan quant à la fiabilité de l'URSS. En vérité, cependant, le Traité est trop beau pour que l'Occident et l'OTAN le laissent passer sans avoir tenté pour le garantir.

même si cela signifie enfiévrer un comportement irrépressible des Soviétiques.

ce n'est pas la seule région qui souffre à cause des armements. En Amérique centrale et en Afrique subsaharienne, les dépenses militaires et l'acquisition d'armes épuisent les ressources économiques des États, tout en attirant les conflits régionaux.

Contrôler peut signifier réglementer et limiter. Par la réglementation,

on reconnaît les besoins légitimes des bénéficiaires en matière de sécurité et le fait que certains fournisseurs dépendent des exportations, parce qu'ils

sont un instrument de leur politique étrangère ou qu'elles leur servent à combattre des industries de défense nécessaires à leur sécurité nationale. Les

bénéficiaires peuvent se laisser tenter par une réglementation intermédiaire, s'il en va des intérêts de la sécurité régionale.

Prévenir avant tout la prolifération dans certaines régions du monde de systèmes d'armes déséquilibrés ou coûteux. Peu importe au Pérou que

l'Arabie saoudite acquière plus de chasseurs F-16, du moment que ses propres voisins andins n'en font pas avant ! Plusieurs armes modernes de haut

de gamme, comme les missiles de croisière, les chasseurs polyvalents de pointe (le F-15 ou le MIG-29,

chars de combat perfectionnés (tels que le M-1) ne sont pas encore largement distribués de nos

jours. Il est donc possible que les bénéficiaires comme les fournisseurs

acceptent plus facilement des mesures visant à les interdire dans des régions économiques. En raison de l'état critique dans lequel se trouvent la plu-

part des économies des pays en développement, c'est le moment idéal pour tenter d'imposer de telles mesures, puisque la simple pénurie contraint les

États à envisager d'autres solutions que de gonfler constamment leurs arsenaux pour garantir leur sécurité nationale.

LES EFFORTS DÉPLOYÉS POUR LIMITER LA PROLIFÉRATION DES ARMES DE HAUT

de gamme comme les missiles balistiques ou les armes chimiques et nucléaires portent déjà des fruits, mais ce serait une erreur de se concentrer exclusive-

ment sur ces armements effrayants. À long terme, il est probablement plus important de limiter les armements conventionnels «ordinaires». En effet, à

un autre problème troublant se posera à l'avenir, celui de la diffusion des techniques permettant de fabriquer des avions de combat six, des chars

de combat et six, des hélicoptères à usage militaire. En outre, l'ici à l'an 2 000, il se pourrait que quinze pays en développement soient en mesure de

produire des missiles. De dix à vingt-cinq pays posséderont des armes chi-

miques. La plupart de ces armes ne sont pas ultra-modernes, mais leurs pro-

ducteurs pourraient fort bien contrecarrer toute disposition future visant la

limitation des armements.

La plupart des producteurs d'armements du tiers-monde se sont vus un

jour limiter leurs possibilités d'importer des armes. Cela a été le cas de

l'Inde et du Pakistan pendant leurs affrontements des années 1960 et du

début des années 1970 de la Chine, après sa rupture avec l'Union soviétique

du Brésil, à la fin des années 1970 d'Israël, après la guerre de 1967 et de

l'Afrique du Sud, en vertu d'un embargo décrété par l'ONU. L'Irak, après

avoir subi un embargo dans les premiers temps de sa guerre contre l'Iran,

est bien plus difficile. Aux XVe et XVIe siècles déjà, l'Angleterre et les

États italiens ont essayé de limiter la diffusion de nouvelles techniques

relatives à la fabrication de canons en réduisant la liberté de déplacements

des ouvriers qualifiés. Aujourd'hui, ce ne sont pas des ouvriers qualifiés qui

communiquent les techniques au fil de leurs migrations, mais les grands


producteurs disposés à renoncer à leur monopole technologique pour em-

porter des contrats dont ils ont besoin pour alimenter leurs industries de dé-

fenses, en cédant des licences et en concluant des accords de co-production. Ces restrictions imposées aux transferts de technologie connaissent un suc-

ces mitigés, cependant, en partie parce qu'il est souvent impossible de faire

la part du civil et du militaire dans les techniques en question.



James Vothall

Il existe au moins un précédent positif dans les efforts pour limiter la diffusion des techniques de production des armements, à savoir : le Régime de contrôle des techniques relatives aux missiles (RCTM) de 1987. Au départ, ce sont sept pays occidentaux qui sont convenus de restreindre les exportations de techniques relatives aux missiles (RCTM) de 1987. Le RCTM est un accord sans caractère officiel qui engage uniquement à la coordination des politiques nationales. Il ne prévoit pas que l'on puisse exiger des vérifications ni que l'on rende compte de ses activités. Malheureusement, il ne re-

groupe pas non plus tous les fournisseurs possibles de techniques relatives aux missiles balistiques (les plus grands absents étant l'Union soviétique, la

Chine, le Brésil et la Corée du Nord) et les pays bénéficiaires n'y participent pas. Ce n'est donc un modèle à suivre que partiellement.

LES INITIATIVES CANADIENNES VISANT LA LIMITATION DU COMMERCE DES AR-

mements sont assez châtinières. Bien qu'il arrive au Canada d'exporter

jusqu'à 2 milliards de dollars d'armement (des composants essentiellement) par an, plus de 80 p. 100 de

ces exportations se font à destination des États-Unis. Cette faible participation au

marché mondial des armements permet au Canada de poursuivre une poli-

tique d'exportation assez restrictive tout en conservant une industrie de

défenses. Cependant, il en découle que le Canada ne prend pas toujours

au sérieux les raisons qui poussent les États à vendre ou à acheter des

armes, ce qui l'amène à prêter des solutions techniques ou apolitiques

ne tenant aucun compte de considérations politiques ou économiques

extrêmement importantes.

Parallèlement aux limitations exercées chez les fournisseurs, ou aux

mesures visant à rendre le commerce des armes plus transparent (par le biais

d'un registre de l'ONU), il faut s'efforcer de régler les conflits régionaux

qui, finalement, alimentent la course aux armements dans le tiers-monde.

Le lien entre la limitation des armements et les conflits ou les situations

d'insécurité sous-jacentes, si évident dans le contexte Est-Ouest, existe tout

autant ailleurs dans le monde.

Assurément, les déclarations pieuses contre les ventes d'armes ou pour

une transparence accrue des exportations ne suffiront pas à convaincre amis

et alliés, comme on l'aura compris à la réaction du président Bush qui, au

cours de sa visite à Ottawa, en mars dernier, a rejeté la proposition canadi-

enne d'un sommet sur les armements. Le Canada ne peut à lui seul mener

des campagnes internationales d'une telle envergure. En revanche, il peut

continuer d'occuper plus modestement au sein d'instances comme la Con-

férence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, les Nations Unies et le

Groupe de contrôle des techniques relatives aux missiles pour étendre ou

approfondir le champ des mesures existantes.

Le Canada doit jumeler ses efforts visant à limiter le commerce des arme-

ments avec son engagement plus vaste dans les opérations de maintien de la

paix et dans la gestion des conflits autour du monde. Ainsi, certaines régions

se prêtent mieux aux initiatives canadiennes : l'Amérique centrale, à cause

de sa proximité géographique le Pacifique Nord, car notre pays s'inquiète

de sa stabilité et du gonflement des arsenaux dans la région et l'Afrique

sub-saharienne, parce que le Canada appartient à la Francophonie et au

Commonwealth.

Aucun de ces efforts n'éliminera les ventes d'armes. Ce commerce est

une conséquence du «chacun pour soi» qui caractérise la politique interna-

tionale. Les pays luttent sans cesse pour survivre ou pour gravir des éché-

lons dans la hiérarchie mondiale. Seule une sécurité définie autrement

permettra de changer cet état de fait. Une réglementation du commerce des

armements contribuerait au moins à créer un espace dans lequel la nouvelle

sécurité pourrait s'épanouir.

\* Pour de plus amples détails sur le sujet, voir Marie-France Desjardins, «La

prolifération des missiles balistiques», Exposé no 34, ICPSI, Ottawa, septembre 1990.



# POUR UN MONDE SANS ARMEMENTS

Tout au long de l'Histoire, les efforts déployés pour contrôler quels pays se procuraient quelles armes ont échoué. Que devons-nous

faire pour enfin réussir ?  
PAR KEITH KRAUSE

Les bénéficiaires de ces armements ne manifestent guère d'intérêt pour des restrictions, car pour eux, les efforts déployés se résument à une nouvelle tentative pour gérer une répartition mondiale de la puissance militaire. D'une part, les tenants du traditionnel «jamais plus» proclament la naissance d'un «nouvel ordre mondial» qui règlera les problèmes sous-jacents qui ont, semble-t-il, provoqué le conflit. D'autre part, les pessimistes estiment que la réaffirmation de l'ascendant qui exerce les États-Unis sur le monde et le recours à la force armée pour régler les conflits illustrent la «même vieille anarchie».

Le gouvernement américain prend des positions ou des décisions contradictoires. D'un côté, le secrétaire d'État, M. James Baker, a prôné «des restrictions beaucoup plus sévères sur les exportations d'armes» à destination du Moyen-Orient. Malgré cela, au mois de mars, la Maison Blanche a annoncé son intention de vendre pour 18 milliards de dollars d'armement à ses alliés du golfe Persique et d'utiliser des crédits bancaires d'import-export pour financer ses ventes d'armes autour du monde.

La position canadienne a au moins la vertu d'être plus conséquente. Le premier ministre, M. Brian Mulroney, et l'actuel ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Joe Clark, ont tous deux affirmé pendant et après le conflit que «le monde devait tirer de la guerre du Golfe la leçon suivante : un commerce des armes sans frein dans cette région n'est plus acceptable, à quoi ils ont ajouté une proposition concrète de «Sommet mondial sur les instruments de guerre et sur les armes de destruction massive».

Pourtant, arrivera-t-on à maîtriser la diffusion des armements modernes ? Plusieurs initiatives internationales visant à limiter ce commerce, qui étaient déjà discutées en coulisses, sont évoquées plus ouvertement aujourd'hui. Un nouvel organisme international non gouvernemental, *Armswatch*, est mis sur pied en Europe pour surveiller les ventes d'armes et les rendre publiques. Cet automne, les Nations Unies divulgueront une proposition visant à accroître la «transparence» dans les exportations d'armements. Par ailleurs, le Bureau des évaluations technologiques américaines, l'*Office of Technology Assessment*, étudie en ce moment la façon dont se fait la diffusion des technologies militaires et de la production d'armements. Ces initiatives, cette énergie diplomatique, cette bonne volonté ne sauraient à elles seules garantir la réussite de l'entreprise. Face à un commerce au chiffre d'affaires dépassant 40 milliards de dollars par an, que se partageant une cinquantaine de fournisseurs et qui intéresse plus de cent acheteurs, les efforts demandés sont immenses. En définitive, on ne parviendra à limiter la vente d'armements qu'en prenant en compte les forces productives d'armements.

Il y a de bonnes raisons d'être pessimiste quant aux chances d'une vraie limitation du commerce des armements. Les États-Unis continuent d'utiliser les transferts d'armes vers des pays amis comme instrument de politique étrangère, comme le prouve la vente de 18 milliards susmentionnée, et l'Union soviétique considère les ventes d'armes comme une de ses nouvelles sources de devises fortes. Des producteurs moins, comme la Grande-Bretagne et la France, comptent sur les exportations pour aider leurs industries de défense à rester à l'avant-garde de la technologie (près de la moitié des armes produites dans ces deux pays dans les années 1980 ont été exportées), et les producteurs des pays en développement tels que la Corée du Sud entendent augmenter leurs propres exportations pour assurer la survie de leurs industries.

Au vu des résultats obtenus jusqu'ici lorsqu'on a essayé de limiter les ventes d'armes, on a de quoi être plus pessimiste encore. Déjà, au temps de Charlemagne, les souverains essayaient, en vain, d'interdire ou de limiter l'exportation d'armes qui pouvaient servir contre eux. En 1574, la reine Elizabeth I d'Angleterre ordonna que l'on mette un terme à l'exportation d'armes après qu'on lui eut fait remarquer qu'en exportant des canons anglais, les navires de Sa Majesté se trouvaient face à un ennemi mieux équipé qu'ils ne l'étaient. Malgré les lourdes amendes infligées aux contrebandiers, les exportateurs ont continué leur trafic.

À la fin du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, les puissances coloniales européennes ont tenté, par le biais de la «règle» de Bruxelles (1890), de limiter l'afflux d'armes en Afrique afin de préserver leur mainmise politique et militaire sur ce continent. Malheureusement, la encore, on a continué d'y vendre des armes tant que les avantages commerciaux et politiques l'emportaient sur les dangers immédiats. Au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, les tentatives se sont révélées aussi peu fructueuses. En fait, le dernier essai en date pour limiter les ventes d'armements, à savoir : les négociations américano-soviétiques sur les transferts d'armes conventionnelles (NPTAC), a échoué dans les années 1970 sur la méfiance croissante des superpuissances et sur la compétition qu'il se livrait dans le tiers-monde. La guerre que se sont livrée l'Iran et l'Irak pendant huit ans a pratiquement relégué aux oubliettes tous pourparlers visant à imposer une limitation partielle du commerce des armements et, pour les plus petits producteurs prêts à fournir les armes que les grands rechignaient à vendre (au début, du moins), elle a été une aubaine.

Si l'on veut que de nouvelles tentatives aboutissent, il faut tirer les leçons de cette succession d'échecs. La toute première semble être qu'il faut scinder le problème en parties moins inextricables. Pour cela, on dispose de trois stratégies simples :

Se concentrer sur des régions ou des sous-régions particulières qui sont surarmées à l'excès ou sujettes à des conflits. Bien que l'on pense aussitôt au Moyen-Orient (à eux seuls, les pays du golfe Persique ont absorbé presque le quart des transferts d'armements mondiaux entre 1980 et 1988).

Il n'y a rien de surprenant alors à ce que le tiers-monde voie dans la limitation du commerce des armes, sans limitation de leur production et de leur acquisition, une discrimination hypocrite contre les États incapables de produire leur propre armement. Pour qu'il change d'avis, il faut donc que les mesures prises tiennent fondamentalement compte des intérêts mêmes des États bénéficiaires à gérer leurs conflits ou à les régler.

# BEIJING NAGE À CONTRE-COURANT

Le triomphe des Etats-Unis dans le Golfe est loin de  
plaire aux dirigeants vieillissants de Beijing.

PAR JEREMY PATIEL

prête à lui vendre des avions de combat Sukhoi-27. Outre qu'il améliore la capacité militaire de la Chine, ce marché fait un pied de nez aux Américains qui, après les manifestations de la place Tian'an-men, ont suspendu un accord conclu plus tôt en vertu duquel ils auraient fourni des éléments de technique d'aviation à la Chine pour son aviation militaire. Divers dirigeants soviétiques haut placés se sont rendus à Beijing au cours des derniers mois. En février, M. Gorbatchev y a envoyé le sous-secrétaire général du Parti communiste, M. Vladimir Iavashko. Le secrétaire général du Parti communiste chinois, M. Jiang Zemin, est allé à Moscou à son tour. A l'occasion d'une autre réunion avec un membre du Politburo, M. Li Peng, premier ministre de la Chine, a dit entretenir «les espoirs les plus sincères» concernant le développement stable en URSS ; enfin, le 1<sup>er</sup> avril, le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Bessmertnykh, a annoncé avec une certaine satisfaction que les relations sino-soviétiques étaient désormais «complètement normalisées». Pour souligner cette nouvelle étape de coopération, M. Dimitri Yartov, ministre soviétique de la Défense, s'est rendu en République populaire au début de mai : c'était la première fois en près de trente ans que le titulaire de ce poste effectuait une visite officielle en Chine.

LE FAIT QUE LA CHINE A RÉCEMMENT REFUSÉ DE COOPÉRER AVEC HONG-KONG pour constituer un nouvel aéroport et qu'elle a adopté une attitude agressive face aux préoccupations des Etats-Unis concernant son énorme excédent commercial révèle un durcissement de sa position envers l'Occident. Selon la théorie des contradictions de Mao Ze-dong, les Etats-Unis représentent maintenant la menace la plus importante pour les intérêts chinois et c'est pourquoi il conviendrait que la Chine et l'URSS tassent front commun. Les efforts de la Chine pour se rapprocher de Moscou peuvent aussi être perçus comme une tentative en vue de préserver la «communauté des nations socialistes».

Les immenses difficultés intérieures qui accablent l'URSS et l'instabilité latente de la Chine pourraient bien rendre ces mesures superflues. Non seulement les Etats-Unis connaissent un regain de popularité, mais le Japon gagne en puissance économique. Tout en espérant que le désaccord opposant ces deux géants économiques servira leurs intérêts, les technocrates chinois doivent se préoccuper des efforts que le Japon déploie pour faire de l'Asie sa propre sphère d'influence économique. C'est pourquoi même la perspective d'une Union soviétique plus petite ou d'une Russie revivifiée n'entravera pas l'amélioration des relations sino-soviétiques.

Sous M. Joe Clark, ancien ministre des Affaires extérieures, le Canada a prudemment accepté un projet soviétique de longue date visant à créer un régime de sécurité pour l'Asie-Pacifique, projet qui plait plus ou moins aux Etats-Unis. Des pourparlers préliminaires sur la question ont eu lieu en avril, à Victoria. Les Japonais ont bien précisé qu'une telle entreprise ne les intéressait absolument pas, et la «nouvelle philosophie» soviétique n'a pas encore gagné la faveur de Tokyo. En avril, la visite tant attendue de M. Gorbatchev au Japon s'est terminée sans qu'un accord ait été conclu pour mettre fin aux conflits territoriaux qui opposent toujours ces deux pays. La Chine n'était pas fâchée de la tournure des événements, car elle demeure un lieu privilégié pour les investissements japonais tout en conservant un rôle central, entre l'Union soviétique et le Japon, sur la scène politique et dans le domaine de la sécurité.

L'opposition à l'hégémonie constitue une des pierres angulaires de la politique étrangère chinoise. Lorsque la souveraineté du Koweït était en jeu, la Chine s'est montée coopérative à l'ONU. Toutefois, elle s'inquiète beaucoup plus à l'idée d'une nouvelle prééminence des Etats-Unis. Mao Ze-dong prêterait le chaos à l'ordre et, dans la Cité interdite, les dirigeants vieillissants rejeteront, eux aussi, le «nouvel ordre mondial». Pour la Chine et pour eux, c'est encore un monde divisé qui procure la plus grande sécurité.

nouveau solliciter des prêts auprès de la Banque mondiale et profiter de

elles s'est permis, sans trop d'opposition, d'intenter secrètement des procès contre les apôtres de la démocratie. Le «nouvel ordre mondial», d'ailleurs, ne plait pas tout à fait à Beijing. Tout d'abord, la fin de la Guerre froide a dissous le «triangle stratégique» sur lequel Beijing avait pris l'habitude de manoeuvrer. La Chine a toujours tendance à partager l'opinion de l'une ou l'autre des superpuissances tierces. Malgré la considération extraordinaire dont le gouvernement de Bush a fait preuve à son égard (les Etats-Unis ont fait exception aux armes à la Syrie), mais encore, au cours des dernières années, l'Irak était le principal acquéreur de travailleurs de la construction chinois pour l'érection de ses infrastructures militaires et civiles. La Chine a perdu des milliards de dollars en devises fortes en raison des sanctions imposées contre l'Irak, elle ne recouvrera vraisemblablement pas les créances qui datent de la guerre.

CHINE A PEUT-ÊTRE OBTENU DES CONCESSIONS EN CONTREPARTIE DE L'APPUI qu'elle a accordé aux Nations Unies et de son abstention au moment du vote de la très importante résolution 678, mais à long terme, elle n'a rien gagné. Le préféral manifestement un règlement pacifique que «arabe» de la crise du Koweït, elle a continué d'exercer cette préférence, même après que la coalition a déclenché l'offensive en janvier. Aujourd'hui, la Chine s'alarme, face à une éventuelle «Pax americana», conjoncture où une seule superpuissance triompherait, les Etats-Unis, éclipseant toute possibilité d'une perspective «tiers-mondiste» distincte dans les affaires mondiales.

au cours d'une récente visite en Europe, le ministre chinois des Affaires étrangères, M. Qian Qichen, a souligné le rôle unique que la Chine joue dans le monde en tant que «plus grand pays en développement», et il a analysé la crise du Golfe en parlant des problèmes Nord-Sud que la Guerre mondiale avait obscurcis. M. Deng Xiaoping a blâmé publiquement les Etats-Unis pour les événements de la place Tian'anmen. Il se serait écrit : «regardez ce que vous nous avez fait, à nous qui ne vous avons rien fait.»

considère qu'une *Pax Americana* asservira inévitablement le régime politique chinois à des pressions plus fortes encore. L'objectif de la politique intérieure de Mikhail Gorbatchev, selon un document officiel, est de ne pas provoquer le mouvement vers la fin de légitimer leur opposition farouche aux activistes pro-mocratiques, ses collègues et lui ont invoqué le mouvement vers la

port de la politique intérieure de Mikhail Gorbatchev. Selon un document officiel, est de ne pas provoquer le mouvement vers la fin de légitimer leur opposition farouche aux activistes pro-mocratiques, ses collègues et lui ont invoqué le mouvement vers la

ORSQUE LE MUR DE BERLIN s'est écroulé à la fin de 1989, l'important avec lui le Pacte de Varsovie, la Chine n'était pas bien vue par la communauté internationale suite au massacre de la place Tian'anmen. Les dirigeants chinois ont averti l'Occident que l'Occident ne devait pas intervenir de leur pays (il était plus évident qu'il ne le pensait. La crise du Golfe a alors donné à ce l'occasion de reprendre un peu l'importance qu'il avait perdue sur la scène internationale. En ayant les interventions proposées par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, les Etats-Unis, la Chine pouvait

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...ils veulent faire la guerre ?

puisque, dans ce contexte, c'est d'amener

commerce des armes.  
Et qu'observe-t-on du côté de l'offre ? Si nous

La vente d'armes au Moyen-Orient comporte pétrole et des chars de combat d'occasion.

l'army » : je ne crois pas en la théorie qui avait cours à la fin de la guerre du Golfe au sujet de la limitation des armements dans la région. Les événements ne donnent maintenant raison. La fin de la Guerre froide a rendu inutiles d'immenses stocks d'armements : il faut bien les vendre quelque part. En deuxième lieu, il y a des besoins

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même s'il est possible d'en conclure.

structures militaires. Quand on y regarde de près, la Turquie et l'Égypte sont en fait des gouvernements militaires ; les militaires y décident du

« Je crois que tu s'agit d'un faux argument. Sur un plan plus général, nous assistons, je crois, à une redynamisation accélérée de l'Histoire. Normalement, la croissance démographique s'impose d'abord, puis de quatorze à six ans plus tard, l'école révisionniste entre en scène et, finalement, quatre ou cinq ans après, on a droit à la synthèse dialectique. Dans ce cas-ci, dialectique trahit.

Byrons : Ce que l'on peut dire sur l'évolution du processus au cours des huit derniers mois, c'est que le système et ses diverses composantes – que ce soit la coalition ou l'ONU – semblent très bien réussir à protéger les États-nations l'un contre l'autre et la souveraineté nationale. Mais comme des exemples particulièrement frappants l'ont montré dans le passé – je songe ici à l'holocauste, rouges, et aujourd'hui, aux Kurdes, et il existe d'autres exemples moins évidents tels que le dossier israélo-palestinien – le système protège très mal les individus contre leur gouvernement. L'ONU a toujours affirmé la primauté de la souveraineté de l'État : nous doit lui être sacrifiée. Par conséquent, les Kurdes ne peuvent se faire entendre. Des mécanismes émaneront-ils de tout cela qui n'aiteront un tant soit peu les entités qui n'appartiennent pas à ce club des États-nations ?

**Heiler** : De tels mécanismes existent déjà depuis un certain temps. Ce n'est pas accident que M. Koranyi a dit de la conférence d'Helsinki qu'elle avait marqué un tournant dans l'Histoire, car les participants ont cherché alors à consacrer la légitimité des discussions portant sur le statut des droits de la personne dans d'autres pays : cette conférence a amorcé la délégitimation de la notion voulant que la souveraineté de l'Etat l'emporte sur tout. Soit, dit en passant, le même processus s'est opéré au sujet de l'Afrique du Sud. Si le monde avait respecté les règles, lesquelles disent qu'aucun Etat ne peut s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures d'un autre pays, aucune action internationale n'aurait jamais pu être menée contre l'Apartheid, mais tel ne fut pas le cas. Il y a eu des précédents plus déconcertants au sujet de l'impérialisme de l'ère qui nous concerne, que ce soit dans les cas les plus atroces, c'est la que réside le problème.

Hunter : J'ai travaillé longtemps à l'ONU et j'ai siégé à d'innombrables séances de la Commission des droits de l'homme, du Sous-comité de la protection des minorités, et de je ne sais plus quoi encore. J'ai été témoin du cynisme des grandes puissances. Il existe des règles au sujet des violations flagrantes et systématiques des droits de la personne. Après le massacre d'Halabicha (la ville kurde contre laquelle le gouvernement irakien lançait une attaque au gaz en 1988), une motion fut présentée à la Commission des droits de l'homme pour qu'elle sevrise contre l'Irak : je dois dire à ma grande honte que le gouvernement américain s'y est opposé. Au fil des années, les droits de la personne ont fondamentalement servi d'instrument de propagande politique. J'en ai été témoin pendant les années Carter, quand j'étais à l'ONU. On exerçait des pressions sur les Soviétiques. Chaque fois que l'on voulait dénoncer un pays, on disait qu'il violait les droits de la personne. Il n'est pas nécessaire de modifier la Charte : il nous suffit de passer aux actes et d'appliquer tout simplement les principes existants et de renforcer le système de l'ONU.

Stein : D'après l'analyse de Mme Hunter, il n'y avait pas lieu de s'attendre à grand-chose en

Stein : D'après l'analyse de Mme Hunter, il n'y avait pas lieu de s'attendre à grand-chose en

lisme israélien et nationalisme palestinien acquiescent beaucoup de pertinence dans le débat. Quant à la question des normes ambivalentes, prenons-la par l'autre bout ! C'est un couteau à double tranchant, un problème pour tout le Moyen-Orient arabe, un test décisif. Quelles normes Appliqui-t-on face aux minorités nationales chevauchant les frontières des Etats, dans l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient ? Ce problème n'a jamais figuré à l'ordre du jour après la guerre, en dehors du vicaire palestinien. Il y sera désormais inscrit. Qu'advient-il des Kurdes qui, de toute évidence, constituent une nation mais dont le territoire couvrent les frontières de plusieurs Etats ?

CE QUI EST UNIQUE AU SUJET  
DE CETTE GUERRE C'EST QUE  
LA PREMIERE PUISSANCE MILITAIRE  
DU MONDE N'A PAS PU  
FINANCER LA CAMPAGNE QU'ELLE  
METTAIT SUR PIED.

**Korany** : Le modèle d'Helsinki (Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe – CSCE) peut-il s'appliquer au Moyen-Orient ? Peut-on dépasser la notion d'Etat et tenter d'organiser des transformations démocratiques, de faire valoir les droits de la personne, et le reste ?

Stein : À Helsinki, on n'a jamais parlé directement des changements dans les formes de gouvernement. On y a posé la question indirectement, en énonçant un autre problème : l'importance des droits de la personne, la remise en cause des gouvernements établis, et la mesure où il faut protéger aussi les droits culturels et tolérer les minorités. En rétrospective, le processus d'Helsinki a influé beaucoup sur ce qui se passe maintenant en Europe. Au fil de l'histoire, il devait aboutir à des changements politiques fondamentaux. Inscrire la forme de gouvernement au sommet de l'ordre du jour, c'est placer la charnière devant les boeufs. Les droits culturels des minorités, tels sont les axes véritable du problème.

**Heller :** Il serait naïf d'insister sur les formes institutionnelles de l'Etat démocratique libéral. Comme je l'ai déjà dit, le problème tient au fait que, depuis l'effondrement de l'Empire ottoman, on a rendu illégitime dans la majeure partie du Moyen-Orient la notion de la souveraineté de l'individu et celle de l'autonomie de la partie par rapport au tout. Personne n'oserait décrire l'Empire ottoman comme ayant jamais été un regroupement d'Etats démocratiques libéraux. Mais il a effectivement amélioré le statut de l'individu et des groupes culturels ou «journéristes» autonomes plus que ne le fit n'importe quel Etat post-colonial du Moyen-Orient.

Bryans : Pourquoi la solution à la question palestiniennne influera-t-elle tellement sur l'issue que connaîtra tout le débat religieux ?

«Heller : Il ne s'agit pas d'un prisme religieux quand on parle des Juifs et des Musulmans. C'est ce qui fait le même paramètre d'identité que celui dont nous parlions antérieurement, une frontière communautaire, si l'on veut. Cela n'a rien à voir avec la peur religieuse de l'Etat ou de la législation tribarbare, ni avec la légitimité des frontières. Pour les habitants du Moyen-Orient, les mots «Juifs» et «Israéliens» sont synonymes. J'ai du mal, cependant, à comprendre le fondement de l'étonné voulant que la solution donnée à la question palestinienne déterminera le degré de pacifisme ou d'échec des mouvements islamiques dans le monde arabe.

forany : La question palestinienne est importante parce que elle réunit de nombreux éléments, entre juifs et Musulmans constitue certes un problème religieux. Nous obliions pas, cependant, que la question palestinienne évoque aussi l'époque coloniale, ou Israël était perçue comme un élément de l'Occident, voire comme la concrétisation d'un complot de l'Occident ; nous revenons ici à cette théorie du complot. Par ailleurs, une autre question se posera tant et plus dans l'avenir et elle consiste de mettre de nombreux gouvernements au Golfe en péril ; il s'agit de l'application de normes ambivalentes. Le monde ayant désormais appliqué avec une extrême rigueur le droit international et les résolutions de l'ONU, il devra user des mêmes critères dans tous les cas venir.

main : La question palestinienne retient l'atten-  
 tion parce qu'elle intègre un grand nombre des  
 mêmes dimensions religieuses, et on l'associe égale-  
 ment au passé colonial. On évoque ici la manière  
 dont la question a toujours été interprétée dans le  
 Moyen-Orient arabe. Le conflit irako-koweïtien  
 représente de l'intérêt à cet égard, car il a confirmé  
 l'existence de frontières tracées à l'époque colo-  
 niale : c'est là que la distinction faite entre «eux-  
 la nous» s'est effondrée. Le Moyen-Orient arabe  
 a reconnu explicitement la légitimité de ces fron-  
 tières. Le processus par lequel elles furent tracées  
 était pas légitime, mais leur existence l'est  
 maintenant. Il n'est pas question de les modifier,  
 ne importe la façon dont elles ont été établies.  
 Une curieuse manière, par conséquent, l'asso-  
 ciation coloniale pourrait bien s'atténuer au cours  
 de la prochaine décennie.





jamais dans la région de la puissance militaire

Si l'on songe aux périodes antérieures où a

existé pareille disjonction de la puissance écono-

mique et militaire, on constate que ce furent des

des Arabes ont effectivement usé de la force les

uns contre les autres. Ainsi, l'Égypte a envoyé

un corps expéditionnaire important au Yémen

pendant la guerre civile qui déchirait ce pays.

La Libye et l'Égypte se sont fait la guerre, et le

Maroc et l'Algérie ont combattu l'un contre

l'autre dans le Sahara.

Pour ce qui concerne la «renaissance» des non-

Arabes et toute la notion de la ramontée iranienne,

elles s'apparentent un peu à la revivification de

l'Islam. Celui-ci n'est jamais mort, et l'Iran

n'a jamais disparu de la carte. Pendant

les années 1980, même si, affaibli, il

n'a pu influencer autant sur les forces

sous-jacentes de la région, l'Iran a mené

une action beaucoup plus importante qu'on

le croit, du seul fait qu'il agissait dans un

vasse contexte islamique. L'Iran s'affirme peut-

être maintenant comme un intervenant de calibre

international, mais il se pourrait qu'il se retourne

plus sa propre identité : dès lors, les cadres de

son activité se redéfinissent sensiblement. A mon

avis, l'Iran a été traumatisé de bien des façons

par la réaction du reste du monde islamique et

certainement par celle du monde arabe.

Bryans : D'après certains écrits de l'année

«*Rois of Moslem Rages*» paru dans le magazine

*Atlantic*), il est évident que certains croient en

l'existence d'un conflit fondamental entre l'Occi-

dent et le monde arabe, et entre l'Occident et

l'univers islamique. Est-ce que vraiment il y a un

monde musulman, ou un monde arabe, en conflit

avec l'Occident ? Et est-ce en fait la une façon

sensée de poser la question ?

Korany : C'est la première fois qu'un Etat arabe

s'empare purement et simplement d'un autre pays

arabe et déclare que celui-ci a cessé d'exister. Com-

ment cela va-t-il influer sur les relations entre non-

Arabes et Arabes ou Musulmans ? Auparavant, il

y avait une distinction à faire (*umr* et *non*), mais

elle ne vaut plus, car certains d'entre «non»

comptent sur l'aide de certains d'entre «non».

Si l'on songe aux périodes antérieures où a

existé pareille disjonction de la puissance écono-

mique et militaire, on constate que ce furent des

épisodes très dangereux. Je dirais qu'une telle

conjonction risque d'être plus dangereuse au

Moyen-Orient qu'ailleurs dans le système inter-

national. Au Moyen-Orient, le recours à la force

constitue encore une solution légitime, contraire-

ment à ce qui est le cas entre les puissances

industrialisées de la planète.

L'évent ne m'inspire pas confiance, notam-

ment parce que le lien entre ces deux mondes

est très lâche.

Si l'on jette sur cette guerre un

éclairage historique approprié,

on voit que sa particularité

tient au fait qu'elle avait pour

objet la défense du principe

de souveraineté nationale.

s'établir par l'entremise des exportations

d'armes vers le Moyen-Orient. Ce sera là un

débouché particulièrement profitable pour les

Etats-Unis et d'autres économies plus ou moins

solides. Ce ne seront sans doute pas les japonais

qui exporteront le plus d'armes au cours des dix

prochaines années, mais plutôt les pays industria-

lisés plus faibles, susceptibles de tirer des avan-

tages concrets d'un Moyen-Orient instable où

existent de véritables craintes au chapitre de la

sécurité, craintes que cette disjonction de la puis-

sance économique et militaire intensifiera en

au cours des dix prochaines années, la région par

excellence pour la prolifération des armes.

Des éléments socio-économiques expliquent la

force de l'Etat dans le Moyen-Orient arabe, en

cette époque de manipulation des structures so-

ciales. Les courants politiques favorisent le plu-

ralisme ou la montée d'un plus grand nombre de

voix authentiques trouvant des moyens insti-

tionnels pour se faire entendre, mais ce genre de

prolifération des armes renforce l'Etat aux dépens

de la société civile. Avec une pareille évolution

des choses — et en même temps les mouvements

politiques réprimés cherchent des moyens d'ex-

pression légitimes, la pression s'intensifie depuis

la base, ce qui aggrave encore plus l'insécurité

et l'instabilité.

Un autre changement important se produisit

arabes et non-Arabes au Moyen-Orient.

Il y eut un moment où l'on fit une distinction entre

le nouveau régime de Bagdad

et le régime du pacte. Ce fut à partir

empire de se retirer du pacte.

Le coup d'Etat dans ce dernier pays en 1958, et à

n et un pays arabe, nommément l'Irak. Il y eut

avec Israël. C'était la première violation du

non-Arabes au Moyen-Orient. Pour la pre-

mière fois, un grand Etat arabe disait la

possibilité et nouait des relations

politiques avec un pays non arabe.

Puis, vers la fin de la période survint

l'évolution iranienne, qui eut d'énor-

les répercussions sur les masses arabes.

certains virent en Téhéran le nouveau

modèle de l'avenir. Pendant la guerre irano-

iranienne, des pays arabes prirent parti pour l'Iran

contre un frère arabe : autre érosion de la dis-

inction entre Arabes et non-Arabes. Ce que

l'Heiler disait au sujet de la montée des non-

Arabes (la Turquie et l'Iran) et de leur rôle dans

le Golfe confirme ce phénomène d'érosion. On

vient à un système moyen-oriental au détriment

une structure simplement arabe. Et la montée

du militarisme islamique va dans le même sens :

Une seconde réalité renforce cette tendance :

la première fois, des pays arabes sont me-

acés par d'autres nations arabes. Auparavant, la

tenace militaire venait d'Israël ou de pays oc-

cidentaux. Le Koweït a dû faire appel à des

non-Arabes pour se défendre contre des Arabes.

Un troisième phénomène s'exprime dans

exemple, un peu rompu et mon avis, du moi-

de la société civile, et pluralisme, dans la so-

ciété arabe. Au cours des dernières années, l'Etat

arabien présent ; il était trop fort. Et le débat

si s'amorce au sujet du statut de la famille

oyale au Koweït et de la possibilité d'élargir les

payer pour instaurer une société civile.

ette guerre, c'est que les forces de la coalition

nt été organisées par la première puissance mili-

ture du monde, à partir d'une base économique

si faible, et que cette même puissance n'a pas

financer la campagne qu'elle mettait sur pied.

Moyen-Orient, ceux qui détiennent la force

litaire, critère traditionnel de mesure du pou-

ur dans cette partie du monde, ne sont pas du

ent ceux qui possèdent la puissance économique.

Un Etat aurait pu dominer sur les deux plans, à

avoir l'Irak, s'il s'était doté d'un régime diffé-

venant une puissance militaire, mais son écono-

est est faible. Israël possède une économie fon-

mentalement faible, lui aussi. Ceux dont les

arabe, tout au moins indirectement. Songeons,

sont intervenus beaucoup sur la scène politique

des écrivains, tels que l'Iran et d'autres aussi,

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# ÉCLATÈMENT DES ÉTATS, GÈNÈSE DES NATIONS, Les sèquelles de la guerre du Golfe

## LES MEMBRES DU GROUPE

MARK HELLER

*est chargé de recherche principal et coordonnateur de la recherche à l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationale. Il est en congé de l'Université de Tel Aviv, où il est chercheur associé principal au Centre d'études stratégiques Jaffar. Un ouvrage de lui paraîtra bientôt chez Westview sous le titre Between Old Thinking and New: The Changing Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.*

SHIREEN HUNTER

*est directrice adjointe du Programme d'études moyen-orientales au Center for Strategic and International Studies, à Washington (D.C.). Elle vient de publier Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, chez IUP, en 1990.*

JANICE GROSS STEIN

*est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de Toronto et elle a publié, avec Richard Ned Lebow, le Cahier de l'Institut intitulé «La dissuasion: analyse des paramètres de réussite».*

**Mark Heller :** Laissez-moi vous raconter une petite anecdote. Une délégation française visitait l'Académie des sciences en Chine. On présentait aux Français leurs homologues chinois, et les

*Le présent article résume les propos tenus au cours d'une discussion qui a eu lieu à Ottawa le 15 avril. Michael Bryans, rédacteur en chef du magazine Paix et Sécurité était alors l'animateur.*

**Michael Bryans :** Première question : une fois que tout le brouhaha des six derniers mois se sera éteint, qu'est-ce qui nous paraîtra unique au sujet de ce qui s'est passé depuis le mois d'août ? Dans dix ans d'ici, qu'aurons-nous retenu de particulier au sujet de cette époque ?

**Shireen Hunter :** Des changements internes importants se produiront certainement, et ce, dans tous les pays de la région du golfe Persique. Les incertitudes relatives à l'Union soviétique compteront parmi les facteurs qui détermineront le jour sous lequel on percevra toute cette situation dans dix ans. Certains pays, et je songe surtout à l'Iran et à la Turquie, seront très vulnérables face aux changements survenant en URSS. Je ne pense pas que l'Union soviétique subsistera dans sa forme actuelle.

**Sil :** la désintégration de l'empire soviétique se produira rapidement et d'une manière plus ou moins ordonnée, il ne faut pas exclure, à franchement parler, des réajustements territoriaux et ethnolinguistiques dans la région. Rien ne dit qu'il n'y aura pas un jour un Etat kurde. Qu'advendra-t-il, par exemple, de l'Azerbaïdjan soviétique ? Le territoire passera-t-il à la Turquie, ou à l'Iran ? Présentera-t-il des revendications irrédentistes à l'Iran ?

**Bryans :** Il y aurait donc de nouvelles frontières ? **Hunter :** La création de nouvelles frontières risquerait de provoquer de graves bouleversements, mais il y aura certainement des réajustements économiques, politiques et linguistiques. Idéalement, la région devrait opter pour le fédéralisme, puis évoluer peu à peu vers le régionalisme. Autrement, des guerres éclateront du Caucase jusqu'en Asie du Sud.

Français demandèrent qui, à l'Académie, menait les recherches sur la Révolution française. «Perdonnez-moi, leur répondit-on. «Mais pourquo, rétorque, leur répondit-il. Il s'agit là d'un grand événement historique. » Et les Chinois de dire : «Nous n'avons pas encore assez de recul pour bien le faire ! » Rappelons-nous 1981 : ce n'est pas très loin encore, et la région du Golfe (ou l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient) n'était pas très différente de ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui pour ce qui concerne les principales forces à l'oeuvre. Afin d'avoir une idée de la direction dans laquelle les choses évoluent, il nous faut réfléchir à plus long terme et aux tendances socio-économiques qui pourraient un jour s'exprimer dans l'équation politique. Du côté arabe du Golfe, en particulier, les régimes sont de plus en plus déphasés par rapport aux changements socio-économiques. Ils ne sont pas très fidèles au reflet fidèle des sociétés existantes. Il est cependant très difficile de prédire à quel moment cette asymétrie deviendra intolérable. Si j'essayais de résumer les conséquences des développements survenus au cours des dix ou quinze dernières années, je dirais tout simplement ceci : le monde a raté des chances inouïes de mettre à profit les processus fondamentaux d'édification nationale et de modernisation socio-économique. En partie à cause de tout le tohu-bohu politique, et en particulier des guerres (la guerre irano-irakienne, puis la guerre du Golfe), des ressources incroyables ont été gaspillées par les apôtres inconditionnels du nationalisme arabe, ce qui, dans le cas de l'Irak, a entraîné la destruction du pays.

**Au cours des dix prochaines années, nous assisterons à un renforcement relatif des forces non arabes dans la périphérie du Golfe, au redressement de l'Iran, et peut-être même à l'émergence du Kurdistan. Il est fort probable également que la Turquie réintégrera un rôle de taille au Moyen-Orient aux dépens des Saoudiens et des Irakiens.**

**Baghat Korany :** Examinons certaines tendances importantes, à mon avis. Tout d'abord, l'érosion

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Jeremy Palliel est maître de conférences en sciences politiques à l'Université de l'Alberta à Edmonton; est spécialiste de la politique en Asie de l'Est et il est actuellement professeur invité à l'Université d'Arleton; Keith Krause est maître de conférences en sciences politiques à l'Université York, à Toronto, et il est l'auteur de l'ouvrage *Arms and the State*, qui doit bientôt paraître sous les presses de l'Université de Cambridge; Jane Bouden est chercheuse et rédactrice pigiste basée à Kingston; Tamar Hermann est chargée de recherche invitée au *Center of International Studies*, à l'Université Princeton; François Lafrenière était autrefois chercheur à l'ICPSI et il est maintenant coopérant au Népal; Vera Murray est correspondante du magazine *L'Actualité* à Moscou.



Bureau de rédaction :

Nancy Bordon, Présidente

David Cox

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Redacteur en chef :

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des livres français :

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Traitement de texte :

Veronica Suarez

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Beaucoup d'entre a coulé au

sujet de la guerre du golfe Persique

et beaucoup d'entre couler en-

core ! Quelques semaines après la

fin des hostilités, le comité de ré-

duction de Paix et Sécurité a réuni

un groupe d'experts afin de discuter

de l'avenir du Moyen-Orient. Ces

derniers ont abordé les questions

liées aux rapports entre pays

arabes et pays non arabes et entre

le monde islamique et l'Occident,

aux importations d'armes dans

la région, aux Palestiniens, et à

l'éclatement de l'Etat au profit de

l'édification des nations.

médiaire entre les Israéliens et les

continue de jouer son rôle d'inter-

la guerre du Golfe, ce dernier

israélien ? Reste silencieux pendant

Il existe un mouvement pacifiste

est une « très bonne affaire ».

l'explique Jane Bouden, le Traité

soviétique, car pour eux, comme

irrégulières commises par l'Union

sont prêts à passer l'éponge sur les

Europe (FCE). Mais les Américains

sur les forces conventionnelles en

au chat et à la souris avec le Traité

Les Etats-Unis et l'URSS jouent

le commerce des armements.

Le commerce des armements

d'armes, mais on peut réglementer

ne pourra éliminer les ventes

titier des léçons de ces échecs. On

soient couronnées de succès, il faut

veut que de nouvelles tentatives

Keith Krause affirme que, si l'on

d'armes de divers pays ont échoué.

employés pour surveiller les achats

choses ! Dans le passé, les efforts

Cette fois, faisons bien les

angulaires de la politique étrangère

chinois.

Jeremy Pattiel, l'opposition à

de Moscou, car, comme le souligne

semble maintenant se rapprocher

par suite de la victoire militaire

regain de popularité des Etats-Unis

part, se réjouissent fort peu du

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o in this issue:

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
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## NOTE FROM THE EDITOR



At first glance our two lead articles by **Desmond Morton** and **Lawrence Freedman** would seem to have little in common. One is wholly devoted to Canadian concerns with fashioning a defence policy when there is a dearth of both money and identifiable enemies; the other leads the reader through the complex (and acronym-ridden) terrain of Europe's half dozen or so multilateral organizations, and how they might be used to cope with Europe's dramatically redefined security problem. Yet, these writers are in fact dealing with different parts of the same puzzle: what do governments do when the essential

principles that have guided their international policies for forty-five years vanish almost overnight? As Professor Freedman writes, NATO planners without a sense of Soviet power "would become wholly disoriented."

Both of the lead articles in this issue of *Peace&Security* were written before August's momentous events in Moscow, yet the coup and its aftermath only add to their relevance. As this issue goes to press there are startling announcements from various corners of the Soviet Union almost hourly. Some, like the implosion of the Soviet Communist Party, the mass secession by republics from the Union, and the wholesale purge of the upper echelons of the Soviet armed forces, would lead one to suspect that NATO's bureaucrats are going to be needing new compasses sooner rather than later. Others, like the disturbing dictatorial streak that some observers see in Russia's president Boris Yeltsin, and that scary, and unverifiable story that the Soviet Union's nuclear missile launch codes went astray during the coup, would seem to lend weight to Desmond Morton's contention that the best defence policy is one that expects the unexpected.

Also in this issue: **Thomas Weiss** runs down a list of contenders for the UN's top job and wonders if there isn't a better way to choose Secretaries-General; Ottawa political writer **Charlotte Gray** reassesses some of the domestic soul-searching about war and peace that went on through the Persian Gulf crisis; **Paul Marantz** explains the motivations for the abortive putsch in Moscow and how the grey men who launched it helped accelerate precisely those changes they sought to avoid; Middle East analyst and frequent commentator on various Canadian media throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, **Janice Gross Stein**, contributes the first of what we hope will be a series of essays by different writers in *Peace&Security* weighing the long-term implications of this conflict; **Michael McIvor** writes of his experience covering the ongoing famine emergency in Sudan for CBC Radio; **Rychard Brûlé** tells us what is supposed to happen – before the end of 1991 if luck holds – to finally end the drawn-out conflict over the future of Western Sahara; and **Gabrielle Mathieu** sets out the crowded agenda for La Francophonie's next summit meeting in Paris in November. – **Michael Bryans**

Canadian  
Institute for  
International  
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360 Albert Street  
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**Lawrence Freedman** is professor at the Department of War Studies, King's College London; **Charlotte Gray** is Ottawa editor for *Saturday Night* magazine and a member of the *Peace & Security* editorial board; **Paul Marantz** is professor of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver; **Michael McIvor** is based in London and is senior European correspondent for the CBC National Radio News; **Desmond Morton** is a military historian and principal of Erindale College, University of Toronto; **Janice Gross Stein** is professor of political science at the University of Toronto; **Thomas G. Weiss** is associate director of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.

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# DEFENCE POLICY FOR A NICE COUNTRY

*With truly impressive consistency, defence policy makers in Canada get their futures wrong.*

BY  
DESMOND  
MORTON

THE RESIGNATION OF VICE-ADMIRAL CHARLES Thomas last spring told Canadians what a few nervous defence insiders had known for months: Ottawa was again in the throes of making defence policy – a trying experience for its primary victims, those who have chosen careers in the Canadian Forces.

It is hardly more reassuring for the rest of us. As of June 1991, the government is claiming its post-Cold War peace dividend. Whether all three services share comparable cuts or, as Admiral Thomas argues, the navy and air force survive at the expense of the army, the government is bent on drastic savings. The army, in particular, could lose its expertise in armoured warfare and in modern artillery. Where, after all, would such expertise, and the costly equipment it entails, be used? Where will we use the patrol frigates or the CF-18s? Even thinking about such possibilities is an activity fit only for wild-eyed warmongers.

The answer, of course, is that we don't know – but then we never do. Forecasting is a key skill in defence policy and a rare one, as authors of Perrin Beatty's blueprint discovered. The 1987 White Paper assured Canadians that we would still be toe-to-toe with the Warsaw Pact's huge tank armies well past the year 2000 and that we desperately needed nuclear-powered submarines to join the hunt for future unfriendly *Red Octobers*. By 1989, that seemed like ancient history. But who, in June of 1990, predicted that a quarter of the army would spend the summer camped around Montreal or that Canadian ships and CF-18s would be engaged in a full-scale war in the Persian Gulf?

WITH TRULY IMPRESSIVE CONSISTENCY, DEFENCE POLICY makers in Canada get their futures wrong. However, the thinkers of 1987 can also ease their chagrin by discovering how short-sighted were their predecessors. In 1949, the highly intelligent Brooke Claxton insisted that home defence would be the most probable role of Canada's defenders. The army was re-equipped to drop on Soviet lodgements in our Arctic. Within months we had sent ships and troops to Korea. By 1951, we were dispatching soldiers, fighter squadrons and every weapon we could spare to defend Europe. Paul Hellyer's 1964 white paper put peacekeeping first; Donald MacDonald, eight years later, put it last. In neither case were the results any different.

Our distant ancestors were no smarter. Until late August 1939, no one predicted that Canada would go to war to save Poland and only Winnipeg's J.W. Dafoe even dared to suggest that it might be a good thing. In July 1914, Toronto's *Globe* sternly warned Canada to look to its defences – against communicable diseases from the United States. Three weeks later, the Great War began. To be fair, staff officers in the Militia Department had a mobilization

scheme in their usual stack of plans. Sam Hughes, their redoubtable minister, tore it up and proceeded on his old wild intuition.

Even more important than bad guessing is the fact that Canadians have never paid a price for our mistakes. Not since 1814 has Canada been invaded, pillaged or even seriously threatened. We have no Pearl Harbour, no Rotterdam, no Blitz in our collective subconscious. The awful paradox for those of us who desperately believe in preparedness is that our scoffing enemies have been right. Canada's defence policies, politically-driven and dreadful as they are, have been a brilliant success. Even when we went to war in 1914, and 1939 and 1950, our allies bore the heat of battle until we had recruited, trained and equipped our forces. We blame the British for Hong Kong or Dieppe.

FUTURES GROW OUT OF THE PAST BUT THEY DON'T necessarily resemble them. A post-Cold War world is already more complex for Canada than the bi-polar world of 1987. Conceivably, it is even more dangerous. The notion of the US as an all-powerful arbiter of world peace ignores the profound limits of American economic and military power. The idea that the USSR is finished as a major power is a comparable self-deception.

Instead of the prudently-managed confrontation of two super-powers with attendant allies, we now live in a multi-polar world. Instead of the Middle East as uncontested winner in the instability sweepstakes, we face a smorgasbord of real and potential conflicts from the troubled frontiers of the USSR the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and the restless nations of South-East Asia.

This matters to a Canada that depends utterly on world trade for its standard of living. It also matters to the people of an increasingly multicultural country, reinforced by refugees from every troubled corner of the globe. Far from forgetting their homelands, Canada has always been populated by people who expect their adopted country to get involved – British ethnic loyalty made Canadians answer "Ready, Aye Ready," in 1914 and 1939. If Canadians really don't care about this world, why were we in the Gulf?

Canadians also face the horrid prospect of domestic conflict – further Okas promised by Canada's First Nations and the lurking possibility of civil disorder if

*Canada's defence policies,  
politically-driven and dreadful as they  
are, have been a brilliant success.*

Confederation shatters. While Canadians are nearly unanimous in rejecting force as an option in their future, there is enough intransigence in national attitudes to make explosions a frightening likelihood. As last summer revealed, the Canadian Forces are a last resort that can get involved very quickly. Setting aside the nightmare of civil war, we need to remember that the October Crisis of 1970 never pitted French against English but a democratically elected government against murderous fanatics.

Predicting specific scenarios is a mug's game. A country that buys more insurance than any other should understand that you don't pay premiums only



because *The Journal* interviewed a pyromaniac the night before. Whatever our misgivings about prophecy, defence policy cannot be for the here and now. Time matters in war and peace; officers and troops take years to train; modern weapons systems take decades to build or procure. Virtually every ship, plane or vehicle the Mulroney government has so far handed over to the armed forces got its start under the Trudeau government. The high-tech wizardry of the 1991 Gulf War was conceived in the 1970s.

THE FUTURE IS UNKNOWNABLE, BUT WE must prepare for it with billion-dollar decisions. Hidden in the Pearkes Building, a new defence policy takes shape. One prediction alone is safe: it will deliver savings to the federal treasury. It is hard to argue with Admiral Thomas that keeping approximately forty-four bases in the wrong places is a contribution to regional economic equalization, not to national defence. But is it necessary to agree with him that proficient ground forces with up-to-date equipment can be written out of Canada's foreseeable future?

Though Tories in opposition used to emphasize that Canada's defence effort ranked down with Iceland and Luxembourg, current rhetoric puts the stress on the fact that at \$12 billion a year, we are about the fifth or sixth biggest military spenders in NATO. Much of the money is devoted to politically-convenient bases, using defence contracts to create jobs and votes, and paying more generals than we had in the Second World War.

One result is an old-fashioned inter-service battle. While Admiral Thomas and General De Chastelain helped make the debate a little more public, the details remain shrouded – ominous to those who care about defence and absurdly irrelevant to the rather larger group of Canadians who do not. Admiral Thomas insists that we preserve our navy and air force at the expense of bases and the army; the soldierly Chief of the Defence Staff apparently favours all three services sharing reductions in the name of balance, flexibility and the unpredictable.

WHAT NO ONE SAYS IS THAT THE THREAT OF domestic disorder gives the army pride of place in any new defence policy. While highly-trained, tightly disciplined soldiers would be needed in any public order emergency – and ill-trained militia could only aggravate the crisis – neither politicians nor generals want to contemplate an army that resembles Mexico's or Guatemala's: fit to intervene against rural guerillas or urban insurrection. Instead, the army pleads for continued "real soldiering" with tanks and artillery.

Competing services need only ask where the war will be and for what cause young Canadians would die. Armies mean bloodshed, and Canada sent no troops to the Persian Gulf. If every CF-18 dispatched to the region had been blown out of the sky by the Iraqis, twenty-four Canadians would have died – a small price for a good day's fighting by an armoured brigade group.

## *A post-Cold War world is already more complex for Canada than the bi-polar world of 1987. Conceivably, it is even more dangerous.*

The sailors have been luckier or more cunning than the soldiers. Its worn-out state is national knowledge. Its dozen splendid new patrol frigates may each cost as much as Montreal's "Big O" but they are also a significant source of Quebec jobs. The Persian Gulf War showed how proudly and bloodlessly such modern warships might have represented Canada. That such conventional surface vessels may be too slow and vulnerable for any future naval warfare is a heresy that drives admirals apoplectic, as do questions about the relevance of such ships to our three-ocean frontier. Is it a common sense of claustrophobia that banishes that short-lived but best of solutions, the nuclear-powered subs of 1987?

Luckiest of all is the air force, its backbone of CF-18 fighter aircraft acquired, still youthful and now proven in action. Since Mackenzie King, politicians have liked the air force and believed themselves modern-minded as they echoed the claims of its enthusiasts. Now larger by far than its sister services, its survival sure, it can be arbiter of the fate of its rivals.

BUT IS THE ALTERNATIVE REALLY TO CANNIBALIZE one service to spare the others? Are there not other answers, all the more valid for being unthinkable? Admiral Thomas raised the issue of the number of bases, most of them small, jerry-built towns with roads, sewers and aging buildings. How many such towns, with their commanders and administrators and maintenance crews do we really need? The answer would come from anguished politicians. Are jobs in key constituencies really a defence responsibility?

Must we periodically gear up to build a few warships or could we buy them from our major allies with fast delivery at forty to sixty percent less cost? Must we always have Canadian-made bullets and shells and service-pattern trucks costing eighty to one-hundred percent more than imports? Why not be highly

selective in the defence industries Canada fosters in peacetime?

It is easy to lecture politicians. The Canadian Forces have found their own way to comfort themselves. We may not have money for tanks or even for sufficient rifles but there was no delay in creating a divisional headquarters and then a range of regional headquarters. Each was an opportunity to add a major-general and

an accompanying hierarchy. Rank inflation spreads. What other defence force boasts more corporals than privates?

Rank proliferation, we are told, is vastly worse in the civil service. Good people need an incentive to remain for a full career. But why persuade them to stay to age fifty-five? Why not seek faster promotion and a flatter hierarchy by routinely ending most military careers at age thirty plus? How many

men and women over that age could, in any case, endure the strain of modern combat? An outflow of trained veterans would meet the greatest need of Canada's reserves, and they would also be fit and qualified, with a little specialized training, for a host of civilian careers. Thousands of first-rate people would no longer have to be kept in expensive storage, waiting for their pensions. This would save money.

CANADA IS NOT REALLY SUCH A CHEAPSKATE IN defence spending, but do we get value for money? The Dutch have as many planes and warships as we do, all of them modern, and almost twice as much of an army – at half the cost. They do not do it with low pay. Surely we, too, could do better, without slashing already limited effectives or wiping out expertise it takes decades to develop – and months to lose.

Canada's defence problems are not new. In 1873, Lt. Col. Henry Fletcher, the governor-general's secretary, offered the young Dominion of Canada his best wisdom on the making of defence policy. There were, he suggested, three elements in the equation: money, manpower and preparedness. The answer to any two questions resolved the third. Recognizing that Ottawa had set \$1 million as its limit for defence, Fletcher urged that Canada maintain only as many troops as could be made efficient for the money. Politicians, of course, spread the cash over 40,000 militia who often could train every other year. The rewards were political; votes repaid militia pay. In different guises, Fletcher's equation still defines defence policy in a country whose need for military force is as recurrent as it is unpredictable. □

# WAKING UP TO REALITY IN POST- REVOLUTION EUROPE

BY  
LAWRENCE  
FREEDMAN

THE WARSAW PACT IS A THING OF THE PAST; THE Soviet Union has lost control over its former satellites; Germany is united with NATO; the Iron Curtain has been dismantled. The suddenness of this process has caught many by surprise, and many of the attitudes and institutions left over from the Cold War remain in place. As a result, much of the current debate about security and defence in Europe concerns how best to adapt these to the new situation. Upheavals throughout much of the old communist world are dramatically redefining Europe's security problem.

The phrase "instability in Eastern Europe" has come to be used as a shorthand to cover all the less welcome political consequences of the 1989 revolution. The decline of Soviet power means that Central and Eastern Europe can breathe again, but it has also made possible a revival of nationalist and ethnic antagonisms. These were once stifled by the dead hand of communism, along with enterprise and free expression, but are now being aggravated by the dire economic legacy of state socialism.

The challenge for post-revolution Europe has been described in terms of deflecting these negative tendencies by accentuating the pluses of liberal democracy and market economics. In case this fails, much diplomatic activity has been devoted to revamping the institutions and designing new procedures to manage conflicts. At the time of writing, all this is being put to the test in Yugoslavia. Thus far, the experience has been salutary.

Until this real test, the debate itself was rather bewildering because so much of it was focussed on the capacity of institutions developed to perform specific functions in one set of circumstances to perform quite different functions in much changed circumstances. In the past, the field was dominated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It still has the only serious integrated military organization and is the one best able to draw on North American power.

NATO'S CURRENT STRATEGY REVIEW STILL ASSUMES that the most serious problem with which member states could expect to cope would be a Soviet attempt to regain its former military influence in Europe. There is no doubt that Soviet military power remains substantial and will be so for some time. But whether the USSR has any interest in military adventurism beyond its borders must be doubtful when it faces so many internal challenges.

Exactly how this will look in five years (by which time all Soviet forces should have withdrawn, including from Germany) is hard to say, but the current period may be very transitional. NATO still tends to describe its role with concepts derived from the past, and without any sense of Soviet power its planners would become wholly disorientated.

The Alliance now expects that it will have considerable warning of any reassertion of Soviet strength. This means that it can cut existing force levels substantially and rely on the warning time to reconstitute them in an emergency. Because it is so geared to the Soviet threat, NATO is not obviously appropriate to lesser threats or to those beyond the European continent. Western leaders are anxious that direct military action be very much a last resort in all future crisis management and, despite talk of the organization becoming more "political," it is only really of relevance when military cooperation has become necessary. It provides the basis for developing common command and control procedures, and the much wider familiarization that comes through inter-operability of equipment and exercises.

ONE AREA WHERE NATO HAS DUCKED A CENTRAL ROLE is in providing security guarantees to former members of the Warsaw Pact who still judge themselves vulnerable to a reassertion of Soviet strength, but are not part of any functioning collective security organization. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in particular, have made little secret of their desire to join NATO. So far, closer cooperation has been agreed with liaison offices and membership of the non-governmental North Atlantic Assembly, which now meets with twenty-two rather than sixteen countries. Beyond this, NATO is unwilling to go because it does not want to be committed to particular states in all their conflicts with neighbours. Neither does it want to appear to be ganging up in a provocative manner on the Soviet Union. New security guarantees must of necessity affect the disposition of military forces, including moving both the forward line of defence and the nuclear umbrella eastward.

NATO is endeavouring to ease the risks for the newly democratizing states left in limbo by this judgement by insisting that it would not remain "indifferent" if they were threatened. Attempts are being made to define the basic principles which would serve as a stimulus to intervention, and in practice it is hard to see how NATO could avoid acting in the event of a gross act of aggression.

At first, the East Europeans invested much greater hopes in another institution, the Conference on Security and Co-

operation in Europe (CSCE). This still brings in the Americans and, indeed, everyone else. Albania has marked the end of its isolation by joining, and recently CSCE pro-

cedures have been revamped to allow it to respond to emergencies. It provides a mechanism in which force levels, and even military doctrines, might be discussed. But its decision-making depends largely on unanimity and therefore it cannot serve as a means

*"Instability in Eastern Europe"  
is shorthand for all the less  
welcome political consequences of  
the 1989 revolution.*



by which Europe as a whole can impose its will on one recalcitrant member. It may provide a forum in which agreements cobbled together elsewhere can be endorsed, as well as facilities for private conciliation, but it is unlikely to have much impact on the management of crises. The Yugoslavian crisis erupted as the new procedures were being settled, and occasioned the CSCE's first, unfortunately not very influential, statement.

At times of crisis, especially when based on a challenge to the norms of the international community, such as Saddam Hussein-type aggression, then well-placed would be the United Nations with its clear decision-making mechanisms in the Security Council and the mandatory nature of the measures that can flow from its decisions. The UN even has its own Military Staff Committee, although this remains dormant, and was not employed during the Gulf war. However, it is not an institution to which Europeans naturally look to solve their problems. It may have a role in some parts of the European periphery but to the extent that many of the key developments directly involve the Soviet Union – which is probable – then the Security Council could well be paralyzed because of the USSR's veto.

THE MAIN FEATURE OF THE ALTERNATIVES IS entrained in Western Europe. The Western European Union (WEU) has always been a transitional body – initially, after the war, as a means of demonstrating the resolve of Western European countries to defend themselves in order to convince the United States to come and help them. Then, in 1954, it provided an ingenious method of allowing West German rearmament by ensuring that reassuring limits were put on its future capability. Over time, Germany's rehabilitation rendered these limits unnecessary and the WEU became irrelevant. It was "revived" in the mid-1980s as a means of developing a strategic view for Western Europe, distinct from that of the United States.

While the WEU always had a military focus, it has never had a military organization, and its distinctive strategic view has rooted firmly in the context of an Atlantic Alliance. It has more legitimacy for some European countries than NATO and it has a less restrictive geographical frame of reference, but it is unlikely to become a free-standing institution in its own right. One problem is its membership which excludes some members of both the European Community (EC) and NATO, such as Norway and Turkey.

It is only being spoken of now as a "bridge" between NATO and the European Community or – for those anxious to see a separate European identity – the basis of the EC's military arm. This, however, raises the central problem

of any European defence identity: with a much reduced Soviet threat, it is possible to imagine Western Europe having sufficient front-line forces, but it is impossible in the foreseeable future for Europe to be able to cope with anything more than the most minor military operations without the support of American military logistics and intelligence.

Despite this basic constraint, there is a strong push among some European states, and

## *Difficulties with conflict in modest-sized Yugoslavia, bring home the potential of the problems with upheaval in the Soviet Union.*

especially the European Commission, for the Community to complete its project by taking on the full attributes of a sovereign state with its own foreign and defence policy. It is important not to underestimate the pressures reinforcing European co-operation. Practical decisions on new structures are seen as statements about the role of Europe in defence arrangements as well as the nature of future crisis management.

It is the economic magnetism of the Community which is most critical because it draws non-members towards it. Through grants and loans, association agreements and promises of eventual membership, the Community can play an integrative role throughout Europe. One difficulty, however, is that with each expansion of membership, those still excluded can feel more isolated. Another problem is that those anxious to push forward fastest with proposals for political union fear that this "deepening" process will be undermined by the extra complexities resulting from the further "widening" that comes from taking in new members.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE IS AN ECONOMIC dimension to managing crises, there is a natural Community role. This inevitably spills over into the political and even military arena, as can be seen in the case of Iraq. However, the Community is only one of a number of institutions available for the management of security problems, and the more prominent the military dimension of the crisis, the less likely the EC is to be chosen.

In cases where a military response remains unlikely, the Community is emerging as the natural leader in European crisis management, because of its economic strength and because it has effective decision-making mechanisms.

Member governments are in regular touch with each other – there are high-level meetings of one sort or another almost weekly – and this facilitates coordination. A common Community policy now tends to be implemented through the "troika" system. This brings together the foreign ministries of the past, current and next Presidents of the European Council (the Presidency changes every six months), the supreme political body in the Community.

In the case of Yugoslavia at the end of June, it was the troika which took the lead in trying to achieve a ceasefire and encourage a constitutional settlement. The mixed success of the effort indicated a number of problems with this sort of crisis diplomacy that need to be resolved if Community efforts are not to meet with regular frustration. Any serious engagement in these complicated affairs cannot take place from a distance: it must be constant and based on a keen understanding of the nature of the crisis. It is tempting, as happened with Yugoslavia when the stress was placed on national unity above all, to forge consensus statements on the basis of wishful thinking rather than an informed grasp of local political realities.

THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS ARE MUCH greater if the Community activates itself while the crisis is still simmering and before it boils over. There was an abundance of evidence that Yugoslavia would explode at the end of June 1991, yet the international community remained curiously impassive during this process and only switched to emergency mode when violence erupted. As a result, in addition to the resolution of the existing political dispute, the Community faced the extra challenge of arranging a ceasefire in the face of a confusing and vicious situation. The difficulties of coping with conflict in a modest-sized country such as Yugoslavia bring home the potential scale of the problems if the next test-case turns out to be internal upheaval within the Soviet Union.

Europe now often appears to be looking for a balance of institutions to replace a balance of power, with institutions prospering to the extent that they can persuade countries to surrender national sovereignty. In practice, it is much more complex. The rich institutional framework can be reworked in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the crisis, and how this is done depends on governments. Though policy outputs increasingly come through trans-national institutions – because most problems are too substantial for individual countries to manage on their own – the main inputs still come from governments. Because there are a variety of choices, governments will decide in practice and through crisis, their preferred institutions.

# ROUND UP THE USUAL SUSPECTS

*Regardless of who gets named new head of the United Nations, the selection process for Secretary-General is in need of a radical overhaul.*

BY THOMAS G. WEISS

**B**ASEBALL TEAMS CHANGE THEIR MANAGERS with some frequency as losing records embarrass owners and ultimately disgruntle supporters. In contrast, the United Nations is "on a roll," but it will change its chief executive officer, after two successive five-year terms on 31 December.

His successor will inherit an organization whose renaissance could hardly have been imagined, let alone predicted, when Javier Perez de Cuellar assumed the leadership mantle. The rebound is even more spectacular in light of the financial nadir of the mid-1980s that almost destroyed the UN secretariat's morale and largely negated its ability to function.

The most important parts of the altered international landscape are political attitudes in East and West. After four decades of open hostility, or at best indifference, the sea change in the Soviet Union's attitudes toward world affairs and its born-again enthusiasm for the United Nations has been particularly dramatic. In the United States, successive Republican administrations have moved from "UN-bashing" to actively embracing the world organization when ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. And the Third World, which began the decade by lamenting a lack of superpower enthusiasm for international institutions, can be heard these days in many quarters complaining that the UN is now frequently a fig-leaf for Washington's policies.

IN SPITE OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S RHETORIC, A "new world order" based on "the rule of law" is hardly imminent. Although an ideal collective security system envisaged by the UN Charter's architects is not feasible in the next decade, UN peace and security networks have become purposeful and effective. As the collegiality of the Security Council has increased steadily since 1987, influential and active governments have been paying more attention to this international safety net.

The United Nations has, in fact, moved to the centre of the security debate. It is now a plausible policy option even for the great powers, rather than a pipe-dream for fuzzy-

headed idealists or an afterthought when bilateral policy has foundered. While the economic and social organizations of the UN system play mainly a hortatory role and are ignored by governments large and small, there are a host of developmental and environmental challenges or catastrophes on the horizon. The world organization will certainly be called upon to play a more visible and crucial role in problem solving as the global community gropes toward the 21st century.

PREVIOUS HEADS OF THE UNITED NATIONS system have been three neutral Europeans (Trygve Lie from Norway, Dag Hammarskjöld from Sweden, and Kurt Waldheim from Austria), an Asian (U Thant from Burma), and a Latin American (Javier Perez de Cuellar). In light of the new demand for its services, the sixth UN Secretary-General must be exceptionally well-equipped – intellectually, constitutionally, morally – to take the helm of one of the world's more unmanageable vessels.

De Cuellar's heir will be the critical appointment of the 1990s. Yet, the international community has made no systematic effort to identify the most outstanding individual. To date, only candidates themselves and some of their governments are actively lobbying to secure a nomination. One list of candidates is said to include upwards of thirty-five names. As elsewhere in the UN system, geographical origins have come to take precedence over more mundane concerns, such as competence. And it is supposed to be "Africa's turn."

Yet, the numerous African candidates are generating little enthusiasm. Five were officially endorsed by African heads of state and government in early June. They include governmental ministers (Bernard Chidzero of Zimbabwe), an ex-president (Olesegun Obasanjo from Nigeria), UN officials (Kenneth Dadzie, the Ghanaian Secretary-General of UNCTAD, and James O.C. Jonah, a UN Under-Secretary-General from Sierra Leone), and the head of a non-governmental organization (Olara Otunnu, the Ugandan president of the International Peace Academy). However a new candidate has emerged receiving initially favourable re-

actions in New York diplomatic circles: Egypt's deputy prime minister, Boutros Boutros Ghali.

Other contenders from developing countries are also mentioned with some frequency: Tommy Koh (former UN ambassador from Singapore), Ali Alatas (Indonesian Foreign Minister), and Sadruddin Aga Khan (former High Commissioner for Refugees and present head of operations in the Persian Gulf).

British tabloids have speculated about Margaret Thatcher's availability, and interest in a national from a Security Council permanent member has been fuelled by Eduard Shevardnadze's remark that he would consider the post. Traditionally, neutral European countries furnish candidates. Martti Ahtisaari from Finland, who heads the UN's administration and oversaw the independence process in Namibia, has been joined by a quasi-neutral, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. And now with the end of the Cold War, a national from a strong NATO country is not necessarily excluded from the race; so Canada's Joe Clark and Maurice Strong have also surfaced as contenders.

IN SPITE OF THE FLURRY OF NAMES, THERE HAS been far too little soul- and cv-searching to identify the best candidate for the globe's toughest job. While some UN ambassadors have met informally in New York, there is nothing resembling a search committee which would not only actively seek out candidates but also vet the professional and personal qualities of nominees. The hardest runners are, in fact, self-declared candidates.

Brian Urquhart – former UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs – has quipped that more time, resources, and energy are spent by the Ford Foundation in selecting a junior officer than by the international community in choosing its Secretary-General. Certainly a search to fill a major university chair or senior administrative appointment involves far more extensive publicity, interviewing, and consideration of a potential candidate's intellect and character.

What has happened over the past forty-six years to allow the choice of the United Nations



Secretary-General to degenerate into such a charade? The selection has always been determined by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The idea of a more popular election by the General Assembly was rejected at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and again at San Francisco in 1945. The General Assembly has served as a rubber-stamp, in keeping with the language of Charter article 97 that the "Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

Clearly, a viable candidate must have the support of the major powers to do the job. And so given the harsh realities of the Cold War, the great powers settled for the lowest common denominator. In order to avoid a veto, the most important part of a prospective candidate's *curriculum vitae* became credentials as a presentable diplomat who would make no waves; and a secondary notion concerned rotation of the post among regions. Of course, some of the permanent five developed other criteria; for instance, Paris has always insisted that candidates be reasonably fluent in French.

HAMMARSKJÖLD SOMEHOW SLIPPED BETWEEN the cracks and astonished the permanent five; he was supposed to be a non-political technocrat from the Marshall Fund, but ended up as the most dynamic of the five individuals who have occupied his post. Nonetheless, in selecting secretaries-general, there has been too little consideration of leadership qualities or management skills. The 1971 appointment of Waldheim, and his routine reappointment in 1976, provide *prima facie* evidence of egregious oversight. The selection process has come to be characterized by disinterest and by inadequate consultation and research; it needs a radical overhaul.


Major corporations, newspapers, and universities seek the best men or women available as chief executive officers. The upheavals in international politics in the last few years are making it increasingly evident, even to governments, that the interests of UN member states, individually and collectively in the long run, would also be better served by forceful leadership than politically acceptable mediocrity.

The post-Cold War era means that many obstacles which had hitherto impeded or prevented the effectiveness of international institutions are vanishing. After some four-and-a-half decades of limping, the prospects for vigorous strides toward multilateralism are brighter than at any time since World War Two. There is opportunity for vigorous international leadership.

The Charter itself is vague about qualifications, stating in articles 100 and 101 that the Secretary-General and staff members "not seek or receive instructions from any authority external to the Organization" and reflect "the highest standards of efficiency, competence

and integrity." But the system needs more specific guidance. It is time to seek a candidate for the top job who is highly literate, culturally sensitive, autonomous and creative, who has convictions, dynamism, and also a good dose of common sense.

What are the main elements of the job description? The central preoccupation – both when the Charter was drafted and today – is international peace and security. The UN's involvement in conflict management, stimulated by the burgeoning demand for UN military services beginning in 1988, was boosted by the Gulf War. The range of tasks emerging for the UN's agenda from the crisis in the Persian



Gulf include coercion, the forcible delivery of humanitarian relief, the administration of a war reparations fund, and destroying Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons capacities. They erode the shibboleth of national sovereignty enshrined in article 2(7) of the Charter. Whereas the traditional interpositional and buffer-force peacekeeping operation of the past required an executive of detachment, caution, and tact, the tasks that are now on the horizon require more vision and daring.

Moreover, the UN Secretary-General must be a vocal advocate of human rights and educate the public about development and environmental matters. Making better use of the United Nations as "bully pulpit" to embarrass and cajole governments also necessitates someone with vision and a penchant for risk-taking. In addition to managing the global agenda, the Secretary-General needs to manage an increasingly large and complex bureaucracy, an army of blue-helmeted soldiers, and a legion of researchers, technicians, and humanitarians.

THERE IS A CRYING NEED TO LOCATE A FIRST-class administrator who can find new ways to create synergy among inchoate organizations of the so-called UN "family" of specialized agencies (FAO, WHO, ILO, etc.). These reflect a sectoral approach to the world when increasingly the international system requires more

global and synthetic approaches to problem solving. Further, the growing number of non-governmental organizations active in the same sectors need to work in harmony with the United Nations system.

A central challenge for the next UN CEO will thus be to make better use of an extremely decentralized system of international governance. "Coordination" and "comparative advantage" are theoretical concepts that hardly exist in practice. For example, it is hard for a seasoned observer even to master the acronyms of the host of governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental agencies actively responding to a natural disaster in Bangladesh or a man-

made catastrophe in Kurdistan. Efforts are made at present not only by governments without much reference to other governments, but also by United Nations organizations without reference to other parts of the UN or non-governmental system. This must change.

Admittedly, the post of Secretary-General may actually be three or four jobs. While no single individual may be adequate to perform all the tasks, the choice of a person who is not even the best candidate for any one of them, which result the present process of selection guarantees, is unacceptable.

THERE IS NOW SPECULATION IN NEW YORK that Perez de Cuellar might consider a shortened additional term, say a year or two. While the incumbent himself has reiterated that he intends to step down, it would be difficult to reject a unanimous appeal to stay on from the five permanent members. France has always been his strongest backer, and more recently the Soviet Union and China have made positive noises about his accomplishments.

This interim solution would in fact be quite sensible if, as a *quid pro quo*, the Security Council were to establish an independent search committee who would seriously look for an autonomous and creative man or woman to do the job. Many often forget that the practice of running for the secretary-generalship as one were a politician running for parliament in the West only began with Waldheim. In fact, the best person may be involved in other work and not have the time or inclination to lobby for the position. Almost certainly the best person would not be actively running his or her own campaign.

It is high time for the United Nations to broaden the talent pool beyond the usual governmental suspects who are well-connected in New York. The person could well be an African. But far more important than geographical origins should be old-fashioned competence and qualifications: a fearless, outspoken, and articulate champion of international peace and justice with dignity, a professional and a leader for the future. □

# HOME GROWN SKIRMISHES: CANADA AND THE WAR

*The fighting is over, but arguments about how the Persian Gulf war got started, and Canada's role in it, go on.*

BY CHARLOTTE GRAY

CANADIAN FORCES MAY ALL BE SAFELY HOME FROM THE MIDDLE East by now, but according to Canada's peace activists, the war in the Persian Gulf is not over. "Over a thousand people are still dying every day," proclaimed an appeal dropped through my mailbox in July. "There are no missiles or bombs – and the victims are not soldiers. They are children." The appeal came from the Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a group that hit the news last spring with a sit-down protest by local physicians outside the Canadian Forces recruiting office in Hamilton, and an impassioned speech in Toronto by Nobel Laureate Dr. John Polanyi against the use of force.

By and large, the position adopted by CPPNW was the mushy middle ground of last spring's peace activism: a distaste for the bulldozing speed of Canadian government involvement (and for the Prime Minister's eagerness to shadow US actions), without a rigorous examination of the alternatives. "We didn't say that the use of force is never justified," explains Bill Singleton, executive director of CPPNW. "Our position was that, in this case, the scale of damage produced by a war would be so great, there was no way that the medical profession could cope with it. It's no pleasure to have been proven right."

In fact, the Gulf War provoked an intellectual crisis for many peace lobbyists. They differed amongst themselves on the appropriate response from the international community to a ruthless dictator, and on how Canada should position itself before and after the war. Ironically, there is more unanimity today, as they review events in the Middle East from the safe haven of officially-declared peace.

Post mortems on the conflict by critics like Singleton share an "I told you so" edge. With Saddam Hussein still in Baghdad, Iraq in ruins and Kuwaiti oilfields in flames, they argue that war achieved nothing. Each succeeding report of renewed Middle East arms sales or famine in Iraq re-ignites a moral certitude that had been shaken by the reality of Hussein's cruel ambitions.

THE DISARRAY OF CANADA'S PEACE MOVEMENT DURING THE CRISIS WAS hardly surprising, given its heterogeneous make-up. Some groups seek a radical restructuring of society, others search for progress in arms control and disarmament through established institutions. There is the turn-the-other-cheek pacifism of Mennonites and Quakers, reflected in the positions of Project Ploughshares (a broadly-based peace group sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches since 1976). Then there is the feminist rejection, by the Voice of Women, of the patriarchal values of military alliances in particular and governments in general.

Many of the groups come under the umbrella of the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA): a national coalition founded in 1985 which consists of 300 organizations (including labour and women's groups) and thousands of individuals. About seventy percent of the rank and file are women, a factor which is not reflected at the executive level.

Parallel to but independent of the peace movement are various think tanks, such as the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD) and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS).

These public policy research institutes bristle at the label "peace lobbies," because of the ideological freight it carries. Nevertheless, their mandate is to help mould public opinion on the need for international security and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

They fed into the public debate last spring because their regular, formal briefings received better media coverage than ragtag demonstrations outside government offices. They helped shape public opinion – and public opinion helped shape policy. "The peace movement *per se* had little influence on ministers," a senior official at the Department of External Affairs told me, "but public opinion polls had a significant impact."

GIVEN THE JUMBLE OF INTERESTS AND INTENTIONS, IT WAS PREDICTABLE that the Gulf crisis highlighted the divisions within a movement in which idealism, legalism, internationalism and kneejerk anti-Americanism burn like unreliable propane jets. "For weeks," recalls Thomas Homer-Dixon, coordinator of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, "many of us walked around feeling personally sick. We didn't come to our positions flippantly."

Despite his own impeccable credentials within the peace movement (he was a vociferous opponent of the US invasions of Grenada and Panama), Professor Homer-Dixon found himself a hawk among campus doves when he reluctantly concluded that force was the only recourse when dealing with a malevolent tyrant like Hussein.

We only had choices between terrible options. I didn't believe that sanctions could achieve peace without horrible human suffering. If Saddam Hussein had been allowed to continue, it is highly likely that he would have used nuclear weapons against Israel. I therefore felt that the wisest choice was the use of force as quickly and decisively as possible.

Last spring, however, the most audible voices from the peace movement were those which condemned the Persian Gulf War. And their loud condemnations helped electrify – albeit temporarily – a movement that was collectively running out of power. By mid-1990, trendier causes (campaigns to free Mandela or save the rain forest) had elbowed the peace movement out of the public eye. "But the Gulf refocused us on the issue of war itself," explains Singleton. At a February conference of the CPA in Montreal, leaders of peace groups from all over Canada united to lobby against the war. "Finally," said classical pianist Pierre Jasmin, a long-time separatist who is president of the Quebec group Artists for Peace, "Canadians and Québécois agree on something. Peace."

WHILE THE GULF WAR GALVANIZED THE PEACE MOVEMENT, PEACE activists did not produce solutions to the fundamental issue in the crisis: how the international community should deal with oppressive and dangerous dictators. This was partly because everything happened too fast. People accustomed to thinking in terms of East-West conflict struggled to adapt their intellectual analyses to a different context. Moreover, little leadership was given by the most visible spokespeople on the issues.

The absence of informed discussion was deplored by various analysts. "The Parliamentary debate was particularly unimpressive. Before



war began, it was very partisan: then the Liberals switched to an after-the-fact endorsement of Canadian action. This was a contrast to Washington, where all the principled positions were genuinely explored," comments David Leyton-Brown, a member of the Centre for International and Strategic Studies at York University.

In mid-January, Bernard Wood, director of CIIPS, made the same point to a parliamentary committee: "I would have to fault the government for not doing more to clarify the choices and provide the opportunities for debate; and fault the opposition (parliamentary and otherwise) for focussing on peripheral questions and, in the end, trivializing issues of war, peace and collective security."

Principles of collective security, however, don't turn the crank of many peace activists, who are leery of lofty debates between powerful players on the "New World Order." "The Gulf crisis made me realize some of the fundamental assumptions of the left," reflects Homer-Dixon. "Particularly that the powerful are automatically assumed to be morally wrong, and the people at the bottom of the hierarchy are righteous."

Some activists vented their distrust of what Doug Roche, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, called, "the combat culture." Roche defines this culture as one in which "military spending is used to maintain the industrialized states' control over the exploitation of the world's resources, technology and capital." Roche's refrain throughout the crisis was "we cannot let the militarists take over Canadian policy."

TWO MAIN THEMES EMERGED FROM THIS BABBLE OF REVULSION TOWARDS the hostilities, and Canada's role. The first focussed on the ethics of violence: the second revolved around the efficacy of international institutions.

"Our analysis," explains Project Ploughshare's Ernie Regehr, who comes from a Mennonite background, "is based on the notion of what constitutes a 'Just War'." Just War theory allows for the use of military violence against an aggressor, so long as the risk of civilian death and damage is restricted. "But our conclusion was that, given the level of destruction that modern warfare produces, and the inability to distinguish between civilian and military targets, modern war as a deliberate, chosen policy has become unacceptable."

In theory, Project Ploughshares members accepted police action to enforce economic sanctions, for example, and therefore supported those Canadians in the Gulf whose job was to monitor sanctions. But in practice, their "Just War" analysis meant that the sanctions could only be enforced by surveillance, not military action. This logic would have paralyzed coalition partners in cases of blatant sanctions-busting. "If the non-military sanctions proved unenforceable," says Regehr, "then you've lost the fight anyway. Wholesale sanctions-busting would have proved that there was no consensus among coalition partners to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait."

For many observers, Project Ploughshares' objections to the Gulf War were agonizingly impractical, however, Regehr's arguments – sanctions, yes: war, never – had considerable appeal to Canadians who distrusted Washington's motives. Explains Leyton-Brown, "It was not simply anti-Americanism. Many people were suspicious of the use of US military techniques, and its attempted domination of the third world to protect its oil interests. You heard a lot of statements from this group to the effect that if Kuwait didn't have oil, the US wouldn't be there."

ANOTHER BLOC WITHIN THE PEACE MOVEMENT ARRIVED AT ITS SUSPICION of US actions via a different route. This group included some of the self-styled Pearsonites who, since the early 1950s, have lobbied for a more effective UN. "These people," explains Leyton-Brown, "had argued throughout the Cold War that superpower polarity could be reduced if collective security mechanisms were allowed to work." For some UN supporters, the Gulf War was the UN's finest hour, but other internationalists argued that the war had triggered a wrenching distortion of the UN Charter. They were concerned that Canada's involvement would prejudice its historic role as an international peace-keeper.

Both groups laid claim to the legacy of Lester Pearson, a squabble which prompted Geoffrey Pearson to remind *Globe and Mail* readers that his father could be as tough-minded as required. "L.B. Pearson believed that the Charter system of collective security required the Security Council to act against aggression by force ... the Canadian presence improves our diplomatic leverage where it counts. L.B. Pearson would surely have taken maximum advantage of that fact."

Geoffrey Grenville-Wood, president of the United Nations Association in Canada, initially regarded the Gulf War as a golden opportunity for the UN, after decades of benign neglect. For the first time ever, in August 1990, the Security Council was unanimous. Its members agreed that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was wrong, and the US State Department appeared eager to let the UN flex its muscles. Grenville-Wood watched with pleasure as the UN, baby step by baby step in its series of resolutions, put economic sanctions in place, with back-up military support.

But there were doubts about whether participants were following the UN Charter sufficiently faithfully. Who was actually running the show? "It was true that there was no UN integrated military command structure in place before the crisis began," explains Grenville-Wood, "but surely it should have been possible to put one together?" When an additional 250,000 US troops flew to Saudi Arabia in November, Grenville-Wood started to publicize his misgivings. And when Resolution 678 was passed in late November, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to liberate Kuwait if Iraq had not withdrawn its troops by the deadline of 15 January, Grenville-Wood argued vigorously in a letter to Joe Clark, that this put the UN "at grave risk."

The UNA supported the use of sanctions, but deplored the rush to aggression before the effect of sanctions had been evaluated. Grenville-Wood avoids accusing the US of outright manipulation of the UN, but admits, "There was no question that Security Council votes were obtained through some pretty heavy-hitting from the US and the UK." As a result of these misgivings, Grenville-Wood and the UNA split with the UN line.

HOW MUCH IMPACT ON CANADA'S conduct during the war did these various arguments have? The peace movement's effect was perhaps more evident in government statements on Canada's post-war role, suggests John Lamb, director of the Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "I think that the speeches that Clark and Mulroney made in February, on the need for post-war controls on the arms trade, were a direct response to the public's concern about how this war started in the first place."

Today, despite the efforts of groups like CPPNW to maintain public concern about the Gulf situation, the brief frenzy within the peace movement appears to have abated. "My impression," admits Leyton-Brown, "is that we've returned to the status quo ante." When peace activists had to face a real conflict, involving a ruthless leader with apparently limitless ambitions, their responses did not stretch much beyond a denunciation of war. In the end, opinion polls revealed that the majority of Canadians supported the UN-sanctioned coalition, and were prepared to face the costs of hostilities. Canadian politicians took their cue from the polls, not the placards waved outside their windows.



Brian Hughes

# SOVIET STATE POWER, DOWN FOR THE COUNT

*By bungling their August coup d'état, the plotters will  
accelerate precisely those changes they sought to avoid.*

BY PAUL MARANTZ

**T**HE ATTEMPTED SOVIET COUP WAS MUCH like an earthquake in an active seismic zone: its eruption was a shock, even though the quake itself had long been predicted. Indeed, the coup was a shock precisely because it had been discussed so often without actually occurring – most notably in December 1990 as part of Eduard Shevardnadze's speech resigning as Foreign Minister – that people had become complacent about the powerful subterranean pressures that were obviously building up along well-recognized fault lines.

Since the mid-1980s, a conflict had been intensifying between two antithetical political forces, the reformers who wanted to transform Soviet totalitarianism into a democratic, pluralistic and free-market society; and the ultra-conservatives who were desperate to defend the old order and all the privileges and power that it accorded them.

THIS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE REFORMERS AND the hardliners was grounded in their diametrically opposed world views. The policy of the reformers was built upon several key assumptions and principles:

The Soviet Union's excessive reliance upon military strength ultimately weakens the nation's security. It fuels the arms race, overburdens the Soviet economy, and impoverishes the Soviet people.

The Soviet Union can overcome its present crisis only by moving towards a market economy within the country and toward full integration with the world economy.

The ideological approach to international politics must be abandoned. Capitalist countries should not be regarded as "the enemy." The Soviet Union must end its self-imposed isolation and avail itself of the greatest achievements of world civilization, such as democratic political institutions, legal norms for protecting fundamental human rights, and the free market.

The USSR should recognize the many constraints that limit its global power, and accept a sharply diminished role in the world.

Initially, in the period 1986 through 1988, when Gorbachev first set out the "new thinking" about international politics – a develop-

ment which gave the reformers the political elbow room to elaborate their own more far-reaching ideas – the "old thinkers" were stunned into silence. Life-long habits of obedience to the party line were slow to die among conservative forces within the military and party bureaucracy. However, by 1990, the traditionalists began to challenge the Soviet government's new orientation. The traditionalists disagreed fundamentally with the key tenets of the new thinking. They asserted:

The Soviet Union must not neglect its military power. The Soviet Union can deter an enemy attack and command the political influence it deserves only if its military forces are second to none.

Socialism must be protected against the domestic and foreign foes who would like to see it dismantled. The introduction of a capitalist market would lead to chaos and increased suffering. Rapid integration with the international economic system would allow foreign corporations to buy up the Soviet Union's natural resources and to despoil the natural environment.

There are powerful elements in the United States and other capitalist countries that remain deeply hostile to the Soviet Union. They are intensifying their efforts to subvert the Soviet system. The Soviet people must remain vigilant against foreign intrigues.

The Soviet Union must preserve its status as a great power. Its leaders must not humiliate the nation by abandoning long-time allies and grovelling before the West for foreign loans and aid.

THE JUXTAPOSITION OF TWO STATEMENTS, ONE by reformers and the other by a militant conservative, indicates just how wide the gulf is between these two warring camps. Writing in the August 1989 issue of *International Affairs*, two liberal scholars, Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, forcefully reiterated the reformist agenda:

As to our status in world politics, it is objectively bound to decline irrespective of whether or not we preserve a surplus of nuclear arms. This is because we fall short of a highly developed country on very many

counts, including economic structure, living standards, life expectancy and the environment. Our weakness will come out more and more as the cold war system disintegrates and international relations are demilitarised, with new, non-military components of national power coming to the fore. Of course, we could delay this inevitable process, but hadn't we better give up obsolete symbols of international status and concentrate on catching up with countries which have surpassed us in recent decades?

In contrast, Colonel Viktor Alksnis, who had emerged as one of Gorbachev's most vocal critics, stated:

By cutting the military budget, we're ruining the country. We are now trying to destroy everything that it took us decades to create, everything that we could rightfully be proud of. Whereas we used to be called an "Upper Volta with missiles," soon we'll be called simply an "Upper Volta."

BY MID-1990, IT BECAME FASHIONABLE IN SOME circles in both the Soviet Union and the West to write off Gorbachev and to portray him as a relic of the past who had been overtaken by events and could no longer control the rising tide of popular opposition to the communist system. However, developments in late 1990 and early 1991 demonstrated that this verdict was premature. With the intensification of the battle between the party conservatives on the right and the radical reformers on the left, Gorbachev remained a potent and pivotal force, manoeuvring between these two political camps.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, there has been much discussion of what the West might have done in the past to strengthen the reformist course in Soviet politics and what should be done now to preclude a future coup. Unfortunately, this discussion has been marred by an inadequate appreciation of the primacy that internal forces within the Soviet Union have in determining the politics of that country, and of the consequent difficulty of trying to influence Soviet politics from outside the country. The heated controversy in August over External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall's handling of Canada's response to the coup is symptomatic of this.



Many commentators have argued that the West made a near fatal mistake by not being more forthcoming with massive economic assistance to the troubled Soviet economy. It has even been suggested that Gorbachev's failure to secure Western aid at the July meeting of the seven industrialized nations (G-7) in London severely compromised his domestic standing and made it easier for his conservative opponents to contemplate an armed seizure of power, since they knew that they would not be jeopardizing any substantial aid from abroad.

In reality, the coup was triggered by domestic considerations over which the West had little influence. The attempted military takeover was a desperate last ditch effort by conservatives to defend their crumbling position. They were prodded into action by the frantic fear that the tide of events was moving against them and by the sense that they had to act before their positions were even weaker. Three key developments contributed to the hard-liners growing desperation.

FIRST, IN THE SPRING OF 1991, GORBACHEV once again changed political direction. He began to move away from the conservative course that he had embraced the previous autumn, and he sought active partnership with the reformist forces led by Boris Yeltsin. Elections in June demonstrated the growing power of reformers. Yeltsin received an overwhelming endorsement as president of the Russian republic, prominent democrats were elected as the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad, and the people of Leningrad voted to restore the original name for their city, St. Petersburg, thus choosing to honour the long dead Tsar Peter the Great, rather than the founder of the Soviet state.

Second, Gorbachev belatedly recognized that it was impossible to preserve the Soviet Union in its previous form as a highly centralized state in which all decisions of consequence were made by a handful of officials in Moscow. As a realist with an ever-mobile bottom line, he reluctantly came to the conclusion that the only hope for avoiding the total fragmentation of the Soviet state was to negotiate directly with the leaders of the republics for a loose federation in which there was a major devolution of power to them. Just as Gorbachev had eventually acquiesced in the unification of Germany and the establishment of a multiparty system within the Soviet Union, even though he had strenuously resisted these developments at first, he now reconciled himself to the emergence of a genuine federation of highly autonomous Soviet republics.

Despite all the attention that Western analysts have showered upon the impending Union Treaty as a possible trigger for the August



coup, a third factor may well have been more critical. While it is true that the coup leaders were distressed by what they saw as the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a unified state, and hence as a major world power, they felt more acutely threatened by the direct assault that Boris Yeltsin had launched against the remaining core of the old system, namely the communist party's continued domination of the military, the KGB and the economic bureaucracy.

In mid-July, Yeltsin issued a decree calling for the elimination of communist party cells within all governmental institutions on the territory of Russia. If this decree had been enforced, it would have been a death blow to communist power in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev spoke out in opposition to Yeltsin's decree, but the conservatives were unwilling to rely on him to protect their interests. Their remaining power and all of their still considerable privileges were under assault. The resort to arms was their response.

THE REFORMERS HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED immeasurably by the failed coup. The ignominious defeat of the conservatives constitutes a fundamental turning point in the post-1985 revolution. Gorbachev was returned to office, but the "Gorbachev era" is over. Others, first and foremost Boris Yeltsin, will increasingly set the Soviet political agenda.

The failed coup will accelerate precisely those developments that its plotters sought to avoid: the disintegration of the communist party, the strengthening of the republics, the depoliticization of the military and the KGB, the movement toward a market economy, and the victory of reformist forces in the next round of national elections. Indeed, an unprecedented blow will be struck against the Soviet Union's international might if the growing demand of the republics to control the military forces on their soil is met.

As the formerly autocratic Soviet state weakens, and as the power of an autonomous civil society grows, the ability of the Soviet Union to threaten its neighbours will greatly diminish. The world no longer needs to fear Soviet might; rather it is Soviet weakness – with the threat of chaos, civil war, and potentially hundreds of thousands of Soviet refugees fleeing westward – which constitutes the main danger to international stability.

Ultimately it will be political and economic forces within the Soviet Union which will determine the fate of that country. Feuding democrats, who thus far have been divided into no less than several dozen fractious political parties, will have to mute their differences and unite to form an effective alliance. Political leaders will have to summon up the political will to take the painful and unpopular decision (such as allowing prices to rise and accepting increased unemployment) that are unavoidable if a functioning market economy is to be created.

THE WEST CAN PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE in all this not by doling out billions of dollars, but by assisting those dynamic elements in Soviet society that are actively participating in the construction of autonomous institutions: the emerging economic entrepreneurs, the independent communication media, the evolving organs of local government, the lawyers and judges who are endeavouring to establish the rule of law.

Creative and selective assistance is far more valuable than a cascade of undirected funds. Well chosen aid will pay rich dividends in assisting the bold and courageous struggle that the Soviet people are waging to create a humane and democratic society that can take its place as an honoured and peaceful member of the civilized community of nations.

After six years of tinkering, improvisation and tactical manoeuvring, Gorbachev's attempt to reform the communist system has exhausted itself. The real revolution aimed at totally destroying it has begun. The Soviet Union is now where Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were in the fateful autumn of 1989.

Communism has been vanquished, but the triumph of democracy is by no means assured. The first glorious sprouts of democracy are still fragile and vulnerable. If the collapse of the Soviet economy is not reversed, a "Weimar Russia" may fall victim to demagogic political movements. The forces of intolerance, ethnic violence and xenophobia lurk just beneath the surface of the newly emerging democratic political culture. However, thanks to the bungled coup, the prospects for successful economic and political transformation are now far brighter than they were just a few months ago.

# POST-WAR MYTHS AND POLITICAL ILLUSIONS

*What is remarkable, a year after Iraq's seizure of Kuwait,  
is how much the Middle East after the war looks like  
the Middle East before.*

BY JANICE GROSS STEIN

EVEN THOUGH IT IS STILL VERY EARLY, THE EUPHORIA OF VICTORY surrounding the Persian Gulf war has already created several myths, and elicited some preliminary lessons about the management of international conflict in the post-Cold War era. The lessons are cautionary and disheartening, and the myths misleading.

Two lessons in particular stand out in importance. The first is that "smart" weapons are smart not only because they hit their targets with precision, but because, although they were relatively expensive to make, they reduced the political and human costs of war to the coalition far beyond expectation. Smart bombs, missiles and aircraft brought swift victory with a minimum of military casualties to those who used them. But by reducing the costs of battle, smart weapons also make it easier for great powers to fight conventional wars against middle and smaller powers in the Third World. Accordingly, the easy availability of smart weapons over the next decade may significantly depress the likelihood of the peaceful settlement of a myriad of disputes in the Third World and make some kinds of north-south wars more likely.

Second, the domestic political constraints operating on President Bush during the war, as distinct from the pre-war period, were overestimated. Although the war was electronic, its coverage in the media was not. Largely as a result of what leaders thought they had learned from the Vietnam experience, management of the media and control of information was carefully planned by the Pentagon before the fighting began.

The result was the first radio war in two generations, one where television was largely restricted to "talking heads." This lesson has been well assimilated by military leaders in Washington as well as other Western capitals. In part because the public saw very few images of death and damage in the fighting, Bush conducted the war virtually free of political constraints. Electronic wars with radio coverage make war more rather than less likely as a future instrument of managing conflict.

IN THE VERY EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD, SEVERAL DANGEROUS MYTHS HAVE already achieved wide acceptance. The first and most important is that the orchestration of the war confirms "American hegemony," or the emergence of a "unipolar system" dominated by the United States. Some critics allege that the US, working under the guise of collective security to preserve a hegemonic order, went to war to secure strategic resources in the Persian Gulf and to protect its client regimes. Others insist that the most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity, with the US unchallenged at the centre of world power.\* The first group sees continuity, the second fundamental change in the system, but both agree on the pre-eminence of the United States in the post-Cold War world.

However, such views mistake the shell for the substance. The war occurred under very specific conditions which are not likely to be

replicated in the future. Saddam Hussein was widely feared and hated in his own country and beyond his borders in the Middle East, and although his political agenda received wide support in the Arab world, he had almost no personal constituency. In addition, Iraq sat close to the largest proven reserves of the world's oil, upon which the industrialized economies generally depend. This created a shared perception of threat and common interest among the major powers at the United Nations that was unique. It is inconceivable, for example, that a Syrian invasion of Lebanon, or an attack by Libya against Chad, would evoke the same response.

SOVIET INTEREST IN COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS ALSO extraordinarily high, and in view of its long-standing political and military relationship with Iraq, nothing short of remarkable. Soviet cooperation can be explained in large part by the expectation of its leaders of Western economic and technical assistance critical to the reorganization of the Soviet economy. If a politically weakened President Gorbachev cannot resist the renewed political importance of the military, the KGB, and traditionalist foreign ministry officials, the Soviet "moment" that created the myth of "unipolarity" may well have passed.

Last, the United States from the outset did not expect to pay for the war. Even before the fighting began, Washington exacted financial pledges from the Gulf states for more than half the anticipated cost of the war. Interestingly, the contributions of the strong industrialized economies – Germany and Japan – were small in proportion to the total bill. Without the money provided largely by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the impact on the American budgetary process would have been severe, with real domestic political costs for the Bush administration. But just as it has been able to do with its debt, the United States was able to export most of the costs to those most directly threatened.

These are not the actions of a pre-eminent power. In a unipolar system the single great power is supposed to bear a disproportionate share of the burden in order to persuade would-be free-riders to join; it does not export costs unless it is a power in decline. In short, a historically specific and unique set of conditions permitted the US to engineer a series of steps which were all necessary to move down the path to war. Insofar as all were essential, it is dangerous and misleading to generalize from this single case. The United States did not so much "control" the international agenda as it carefully, and at considerable political risk, crafted a coalition to shape that agenda. The evidence suggests, then, that the role of the US in conflict management in the decade ahead will be conditioned more by its diplomatic and political skills than by its economic and military power.

A SECOND MYTH IS THAT WARS CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN THEIR aftermath, and that imaginative leadership can restructure once-frozen political forces and resolve long-festering conflicts. What is remarkable a year after Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, is how much the Middle East after the war looks like the Middle East before. Though the consequences of war are almost always unpredictable, this war changed little in the polit-

\*Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, 1 (Winter 1990-91).



ical geography other than eliminate Iraq as a threat to its neighbours for the rest of the decade. Of the three principal American political objectives for the post-war period – economic redistribution from rich to poor in the Arab world, expansion of political participation, and a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict – none are likely to be met.

In the matter of redistribution of wealth, Kuwait – the only country with substantial liquid assets – will be fully engaged in political and economic reconstruction. Saudi Arabia, which financed a large part of the war, had to go to the international money markets to raise its share. Iraq will be struggling for the rest of this decade to rebuild its infrastructure and economy. Nor can the oil-producing states anticipate a substantial increase in the price of oil to finance reconstruction. The Arab-Israel conflict, now more than forty years old, has bankrupted the economies of Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, and the Palestinians, and the war in the Persian Gulf has now ruined the Iraqi economy and removed the oil-producing states as potential donors of aid. The prospects for redistribution of wealth between the rich and the poor, and the management of conflict that grows out of inequities of resource ownership, are hardly bright.

ALSO UNLIKELY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IS THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL participation and democratization in the heartland of the Arab Middle East. Limited processes of political reform have begun only in Kuwait and progress is very slow. No such change is likely in Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf states, and Syria. The prospect of political change in Iraq is very remote.

Finally, the war has also made it more, not less, difficult to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It strengthened the existing governments of Syria and Israel, and badly weakened the leadership of the Palestinians. The president of Syria, Hafez-al-Asad, emerged from the war strengthened economically and politically, using the opportunity to consolidate formal control of Lebanon. Syria's troubled economy is also receiving substantial help from Saudi Arabia following Syrian participation in the coalition. Despite declining Soviet military assistance and diplomatic support, Syria today is as capable of shaping the agenda and the terms of Arab-Israeli negotiations as before the war.

In Israel, the war had contradictory consequences. Now that Iraq is no longer in a position to join a coalition against Israel, the only serious strategic threat comes from Syria. Syria is less likely to attack alone than in conjunction with other Arab forces, so a large-scale war involving ballistic missiles and attacks against cities is far less probable than it was a year ago. Israel is therefore relatively more secure.

On the other hand, for Israel the war was a difficult experience. Its civilian population was sent night after night into sealed rooms and forced to don gas masks, bringing back traumatic memories for many. From left to right across the political spectrum, there was a deep reaction against pictures of Palestinians chanting for Saddam Hussein to use chemical weapons against Israel.

The government of Yitzhak Shamir also came out of the war strengthened in Israeli public opinion. He was able to persuade Israelis, under extraordinarily trying circumstances, that restraint in response to missile attacks by Iraq against Tel Aviv was the wisest course of action. Given this surge of public support, it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to persuade the governing coalition of the urgency of concessions to the Palestinians once the bargaining begins.

Palestinians, for their part, face the prospect of a divided and weakened leadership. Yasir Arafat has been crippled in the Arab world by his open

and strong support of Saddam during the war. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and some of the smaller Gulf states were the principal source of funds for the PLO – a flow now cut off and not likely to be renewed as long as Saddam Hussein is in power in Iraq, and Arafat is Chairman. Iraq can no longer provide meaningful support; President Asad of Syria is a long-time personal foe of Arafat; and the leaderships of all the Gulf states are embittered by Arafat's position during the war.

In the Middle East, only Egypt offers lukewarm political endorsement of the PLO. Within the Arab world, Arafat's support is now restricted to North Africa, Yemen, and Libya. It is no coincidence that the government of Lebanon, supported by Syria, finally moved in July to expel PLO armed forces from the south, and to deprive the PLO of its only independent base of operations against Israel.


THE FINAL FACTOR AT WORK AGAINST PROGRESS IN THE PALESTINIAN-Israel conflict is the changed international context. For almost three decades, the Arab-Israel dispute was embedded in the larger Soviet-American contest. The US moved vigorously in the 1970s to manage the conflict in large part because it feared that the dispute could draw it into a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union. As that fear has abated with the changing politics of the USSR, so has the sense of urgency.

The peace process can move forward only if President Bush exploits his unprecedented influence at home and abroad. The President is in all probability a two-term president, relatively immune from domestic political pressures. He thus has the freedom to move forward aggressively, without worrying about the domestic political costs of doing so. The United States is also now in a unique position in the Middle East, with unprecedented influence and unchallenged by the Soviet Union – governments in the region have nowhere else to go. Damascus agreed to attend the regional peace conference promoted by the US largely because Syria had to turn to Washington. President Asad did not want everyone else in the Arab world but Syria to have an open line to Washington once the Soviet line was disconnected, even if temporarily.

IF AND WHEN THE PEACE CONFERENCE CONVENES, SOONER OR LATER THE US will have to force governments and leaders in the Middle East to make tough choices. Whether it will do so is an open question. There is no urgency attached to what will inevitably be a difficult and unpopular task. And even if the US tries vigorously and consistently to resolve the conflict, it will not be enough. Leaders in Israel, among the Palestinians, and among the Arab states must come to the conclusion that despite the painful choices they must make, they have more to lose if the status quo continues into the future. Here too, the prognosis is not bright.

The most tentative yet most revolutionary lesson of the war may lie in the way it ended. The intervention by the international community in the internal affairs of a member state, in response to the creation of massive numbers of Kurdish refugees, is without precedent – Iraq's sovereignty was clearly breached.

Although the intervention grew out of the war, and is therefore historically specific, the response of the international community nevertheless sends a strong message about the acceptable limits of the treatment of minorities in the Middle East. This may be a much more important bellwether of the kinds of international conflict – and solutions – likely to dominate the rest of this decade, than a war launched to defend the principle of state sovereignty and the legitimacy of state borders. □



Bernie Eisenstein

**F**ROM 19 TO 21 NOVEMBER 1991, the Palais de Chaillot in Paris will host the fourth summit of heads-of-state and government of countries which have in common the use of French, otherwise known as la Francophonie. The first such gathering of French-speaking countries took place in Paris in 1986, the second in Quebec in 1987, and the third in Dakar, Senegal in 1989.

However, the idea of la Francophonie is not a new one. Léopold Sédar Senghor, President of Senegal, was the first to advance the idea of a "francophone Commonwealth" in 1962, together with Presidents Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Diori Hamani of Niger. In 1970, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT) was created in Niamey, Niger. Its mandate was to promote multilateral cooperation between member states in the areas of education, training, culture, science and technology, and in doing so bringing the francophone nations of the world closer together. At the present time ACCT has thirty-two member states, seven associate members and two participating governments – Quebec and New Brunswick.

The idea of a "francophone commonwealth" was proposed again in 1975, this time by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. However, there was a stumbling block which prevented a summit being held: the participation of Quebec and the place it would occupy at such a meeting. In 1985, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Quebec Premier Pierre-Marc Johnson signed an agreement on the role the province would play at future summits. The accord divided summit affairs into one of two "baskets" – issues related to cooperation and development, and those of a political and economic nature. The government of Quebec could intervene in discussions on cooperation and development; but when the debate focussed on the world economic and political situation, Quebec would have the status of an interested observer.

### Structure and Functions

There is more to la Francophonie than summit meetings. It embraces many individuals and organizations: the Association of Partially or Entirely French-speaking Universities, the International Association of French-speaking Parliamentarians, the International Association of Francophone Mayors, and the International Council of French-language Radio and Television.

Initially, the summits were organized into five networks or areas of activity: scientific information and technological development, culture and communications, language industries, energy, and agriculture. There are two bodies overseeing these various networks: the International Follow-up Committee, responsible for ensuring that the programmes adopted during the summit are implemented; and the International Preparatory Committee, which is responsible for preparing the next summit and to which subjects for future summit discussion must be submitted. Following the 1989 Dakar meeting, many of the functions of these separate bodies, as well as funding decisions, were integrated into the ACCT.

Since the first summit in 1986, over one hundred projects have been implemented. Most notable among them are the creation of an energy institute in Quebec City and Senghor University in Alexandria; the establishment of television stations TV 5 Canada and TV 5 Europe; the opening of a francophone African centre in Tunis for training students in book publishing and distribution; the first Francophone Games in Morocco in 1989; an international consortium for distance-learning; the establishment of a fund to provide schooling for francophone children; and the creation of a solidarity fund for Lebanon and a similar one for the victims of apartheid.

# LA FRANCOPHONIE A MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATION WITH A FUTURE?

*The future of the Francophone "commonwealth"  
may well ride on the success or failure of  
its next summit meeting.*

Also at the 1989 Dakar summit, the decision was taken to add to the list of areas of concern to the francophone international community. These new fields of activity include education and training, the environment, legal and judicial cooperation, and the holding of ministerial-level conferences on problems common to all member governments. In the opinion of Jean-Louis Roy, Secretary-General of the ACCT, "La Francophonie must become more concrete in what it does" and work in closer cooperation with other international

organizations. Thus the ACCT has established new links with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Secretariat of the World Conference on the Environment and the UN Development Program.

### Agenda For the Next Summit

The fourth summit of la Francophonie was to have taken place this fall in Kinshasa, Zaire. However, in January, Zaire decided to pass on its turn to hold the meeting. The new ambassador of the Republic of Zaire in Canada, Kaweta-Milombe Sampassa, has stated that the decision was forced by the political timetable and not because of reservations expressed by Canada about human rights violations in his country. Nevertheless, certain other countries such as Belgium which had expressed similar misgivings, were relieved that the summit was moved from Kinshasa. However, Zaire remains an active member of la Francophonie, and President Mobutu recently wrote to Ottawa to obtain Canadian assistance in creating a human rights commission in Zaire.

According to Jean-Louis Roy, the next summit is expected to concentrate on issues related to the environment, legal and judicial cooperation and the economy. For its part, Canada wants more emphasis put on political issues: human rights, establishment of the rule of law in Africa, economic development and the environment. At the Dakar meeting Canada submitted a resolution on fundamental human rights, which was adopted unanimously by the other member states. Canada is now proposing the creation of a division within the ACCT secretariat on democracy and human rights, and a declaration on democracy and development will be presented to the Paris summit for approval.

### Future Challenges

La Francophonie is still in the process of consolidation. The Chaillot summit will be a test, for if la Francophonie fails as a french multilateral organization, Roy fears that the role of the french language in the world will quickly diminish. In *Le Droit* of May 1991, Roy stated:

Francophone Africa now has a choice in the alliances it makes. If it is ignored by the French-speaking nations of the North, it may well look elsewhere, to Japan or Germany for example, for the support, assistance and investment its economy needs.

And there are fresh challenges facing la Francophonie. Romania and Bulgaria have asked to be allowed to attend the Chaillot meeting, a prospect that makes certain African countries apprehensive about the redirection of money and resources away from their part of the world. It is also apparent that the whole question of human rights and the process of democratization in a number of African countries may also be a cause of friction. This, despite essentially unanimous agreement that it is up to the African countries themselves to make their own choices and decide how they wish to develop. □

— GABRIELLE MATHIEU

*Gabrielle Mathieu is media relations officer at the Institute.*



**T**HIS LAND, WHICH AT VARIOUS times has been called Spanish Sahara, Western Sahara and the Saharan Democratic Republic, remains virtually unknown to most Canadians. However, some seven hundred Canadian soldiers will find themselves there soon, under United Nations command, working in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards holding a referendum that will determine that country's future.

### Historical Background

During the fifteenth century, Spain colonized the coast of Northwest Africa. Western Sahara officially became a Spanish protectorate in 1884, but the region did not come completely under Spanish control until 1934. Spain negotiated some boundary changes with Morocco following the latter's independence in 1956. In 1957 and 1958, there were uprisings against the Spanish colonial authorities, who (with the help of France) repressed them, and in 1958 Western Sahara became an overseas province of Spain.

In 1963, the UN included the region on a list of colonies entitled to independence. In 1975, Spain accepted the principle of a referendum on Western Sahara's future, but neighbouring Morocco and Mauritania immediately claimed sovereignty over the area. Then in October 1975, the International Court of Justice ruled that Western Sahara had a right to self-determination – the referendum never materialized.

After the so-called "green march" orchestrated by the King of Morocco – 350,000 Moroccan civilians walking into Western Sahara brandishing their national flag and carrying the Koran – and following a tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, the Spanish authorities withdrew in February 1976. The region was subsequently divided in two, with Morocco's troops taking control of the northern two-thirds and the Mauritanian army occupying the south. European colonialism was supplanted by regional expansionism.

On the very day the Spanish left, the *Polisario* front (*Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sanguia el Hamra y Río de Oro*), which since its creation in 1973 had been fighting a guerilla war against the Spanish, announced the creation of the independent and sovereign state of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), with its own government. Mohammed Abdelazziz was appointed Secretary-General of *Polisario* and President of the new republic. Together with Algeria, which at the time was encouraging a number of national liberation movements, *Polisario* denounced the occupation by Morocco and Mauritania. The result was war between Moslem "brothers."

In August 1979, financially drained by the war with the *Polisario* which was consuming sixty per cent of the national budget, Mauritania abandoned all claims to the Western Sahara. Its slice was immediately occupied by Morocco, and during the 1980s, the Moroccan army became enmeshed in a drawn-out campaign against *Polisario*. In an effort to gain the upper hand, Morocco erected an enormous wall of stone and sand 1,600 kilometres in length along the western edge of the region.

Since 1989, fighting has virtually stopped, partly as a result of the weariness felt by both sides, and because of new political developments in the region, especially the creation in 1989 of the Arab Maghreb Union – an economic and trade pact between Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. However, control of the former Spanish Sahara is still a matter of prestige for Morocco's King Hassan, and ceding ground on this issue makes him vulnerable to attacks from his domestic opposition.

### The UN's Task

In 1988, the UN Security Council passed a resolution asking the Secretary-

# WESTERN SAHARA A SETTLEMENT IN SIGHT

*The people of Western Sahara will soon have the opportunity to vote on whether their territory should become an independent state or be absorbed into Morocco.*

General to prepare, in cooperation with the OAU, a report on the holding of a referendum on self-determination by the people of Western Sahara. In June 1990, the parties directly concerned agreed to base the referendum on the 1974 Spanish census of Saharans. A further resolution was adopted by the Security Council supporting the principle of a UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). On 29 April 1991, the Security Council formally created

MINURSO. Its work is expected to last for nine or ten months, with the referendum taking place before the end of December.

The Secretary-General has proposed that the ceasefire – an essential prerequisite both for carrying out the repatriation of legitimate citizens made refugees by the war, and for the election itself – come into effect on 6 September. However, it may not be possible to meet these various deadlines. The UN is behind schedule in selecting countries and individuals for the various contingents. The UN forces are to depart within two months of the referendum, after observing either the withdrawal of the Moroccan troops or the dismantling of the *Polisario* forces, depending on the referendum's outcome.

MINURSO will have four components: the special representative – Johannes Manz from Switzerland – and a staff of forty-nine; a contingent of 1,695 troops; 880 civilians, including police, the commissions responsible for the referendum and identification, and a contingent responsible for repatriation. The military unit will ensure that most of the Moroccan army withdraws, that both Moroccan and *Polisario* troops are confined to barracks during the referendum campaign, and, with the International Red Cross, supervise the exchange of prisoners.

Canada does not recognize the Saharan republic and has remained neutral throughout the conflict. However, it has always supported the mediation efforts of the UN Secretary-General, and has contributed some military personnel and Elections Canada staff to technical missions in the area in 1987 and 1990. For the referendum, Canada will provide a battalion of soldiers, and their commander, Major-General Armand Roy, will head up the MINURSO military forces. Following the success in assisting the UN in Namibia, Elections Canada staff and approximately ten RCMP officers will also be sent. Canada's financial contribution to the mission was set by the UN at US \$ 5.9 million, almost four per cent of the projected operating costs of \$ 166 million.

### Western Sahara's Prospects


The creation of a new micro-state, dependent on phosphate deposits and fishing, might not be the ideal solution from the international community's point of view, but the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara cannot be ignored. Any settlement that is lawful as well as legitimate requires the holding of a referendum. On the other hand, the most practical outcome might be the integration of the region as an autonomous province within Morocco, an idea advanced by King Hassan. This would automatically bring Western Sahara into the Arab Maghreb Union. It is widely hoped a settlement can be reached by the end of the year, since failure to achieve a resolution to the issue by 1992 would likely force a re-opening of the whole agreement and require negotiations between the contending parties to start all over again.

– RYCHARD BRÛLÉ

*Rychard Brûlé is the senior administrator for the "Peace and Security" Competition Fund at the Institute.*

## FROM THE DIRECTOR

### *The Curious Link Between Democracy and Peace*



ONE STRIKING RESULT OF THE WITHERING OF the Cold War has been the flowering of some unabashed utopianism about what can follow. The hardened cynicism of forty-five years of East-West confrontation and mistrust has given way, even in some of the most hawkish quarters, to explicit optimism about the prospects for a wider and more durable "peace." This new world has heard brave visions of "new thinking," a "Common European Home," a world of "cooperative security," a born-again United Nations, and various forms of "New World Order."

The habits of cynicism die hard and the brief experience of the post-Cold War world has already included some major disappointments. As by people who think about international relations dare again to dream about a better world, as they did at the end of each of the two World Wars, it is depressingly clear how much the Cold War retarded the development of serious thinking about how to get there. One indication of this shortcoming was the widespread confusion and misinformation about the rules of collective security and the role of the UN which followed Iraq's war against Kuwait.

An even more revealing echo of past debates about peace has centred on the attempt to understand societal sources of war and their possible remedies. One focus for these inquiries is the link between democratic government inside states and peaceful international behaviour between them. The overturning of undemocratic structures in the communist countries and the parallel emergence among them of more pacific international stances has renewed interest in the democracy-peace linkage. Aggression by the Iraqi dictator, his obvious unconcern for his own peoples' danger and suffering, and the threat of continuing chronic instability among undemocratic countries of the region – including Kuwait – have all led to new questions about whether durable peace can be assured with dictatorial governments.

Such thinking harkens back to some of the more aggressive, proselytic Western rhetoric of the Cold War era, as well as to some of the genuine democratizing and integrating achievements of the Helsinki CSCE process in Europe. At the same time, the winds of democratization

and liberalization in various forms are swirling throughout the world, from Africa to China, and many observers are speculating about the ways in which internal and international improvements might reinforce each other.

Such reflections are seen by some as being very brave and new, but in fact they are only brave. Immanuel Kant, in his *Project for Perpetual Peace* in 1796, laid out sweeping propositions about how "republicanism" and peace would come together:

The republican constitution ... offers the hope for the desired result i.e. perpetual peace ... because when the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide whether there should be war or not, nothing is more natural than that those who would have to decree for themselves all the deprivations of war, will think long before they will begin such an evil game.

Over the decades, this Kantian vision – and some other, more sectarian designs – have been the subject of repeated debate and study. Woodrow Wilson's prescriptions during the "war to end all wars" contained a strong dose of democratic medicine. And John Maynard Keynes' warnings about how the punitive terms imposed on Germany at Versailles in 1919 would cripple that country's ability to develop a stable economic and social order, in turn bringing chaos to all of Europe, proved prophetic.

THE CURRENT SITUATION ARGUES FOR A thoughtful consideration of this tradition, and not just for a triumphalist offensive by missionaries of Western democracy. Kant's proposition that democracies would be inherently more peace-loving states is such an attractive one ideologically that analysts have repeatedly tried to support it by reference to historical experience. They have generally been frustrated. In a recent assessment, two scholars from Rice University concluded that "the results of most [empirical] studies indicate that democracies are no less war-prone than other forms of government." More optimistically, however, they also found that virtually all studies have "noted that, at the dyadic level, democracies simply do not fight one another."\*

The cynic might suggest that the reason for the lack of wars between democracies is that the sample of democratic nations is still too small, but there is probably more to it than that. In pursuing the subject, scholars have opened up some more specific and less rhetorical lines

of thinking, and recognized that no nation's decision on going to war is arrived at through referendum. The democratic influence on these decisions is thus always indirect and always shaped by "decisional constraints" on leaders, some of which may also operate in non-democratic societies. These constraints include: the method of selecting and removing leaders – leaders who are regularly and frequently accountable are likely to be more constrained in launching wars; the nature of political competition – the freedom to organize opposition through formal, institutionalized channels should reduce the society's propensity to war; the degree to which the leader must share decision-making power – the greater the number of individuals, and, especially, institutions that must approve a decision for war, the less likely it may be.

In fact, when they test even these appealing hypotheses against experience, the researchers do not find clear general support for them, and the results even suggest that these democratic constraints may be more influential in curbing major powers than minor ones. And it is worth noting that mass public opinion, particularly whipped on by a jingoistic press, has sometimes pushed less willing leaders down the path to war, as it did in the 1898 Spanish-American War. At least one of the contributors to a recent issue of the journal *Alternatives* – writing on the theme of "The Global Context of Democratization" – purports to have seen somewhat similar processes at work in US decisions in the Persian Gulf.

THE "STRUCTURAL" ANALYSES OF DEMOCRACY and peace thus remain inconclusive, and researchers concerned refer to the work of Michael Doyle on "Liberalism and World Politics" and others, to suggest that it may be more in the political culture of democratic conflict resolution that hope is to be found. For a whole range of excellent human reasons, international as well as domestic, the evidence that democracies seem to be able to avoid fighting each other still lends support to the desirability of fostering more democratic forms of governance.


In the US, some argue that a consensus is emerging to "make the promotion of democracy the central focus of [US] foreign policy." Many countries are glad that the middle powers are available with their own kind of help with democratic change, and many of them have already found their way to the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal.

– BERNARD WOOD

\*Clifton T. Morgan, Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War – So Why Kant Democracies Fight?", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.35, No.2, June 1991.



## DEFENCE NOTES



### Military Lessons of the War

■ In mid-July, the Pentagon transmitted to Congress an interim report on the Persian Gulf War. Amid stories that its writing provoked some hard-fought inter-service fire fights – did the M1A1 tank deserve as much ink as the F-117A stealth fighter? – the report identified some of the weaknesses of Desert Storm, as well as its successes. Some of the latter are well known: high-technology fighters, satellite navigation, communications and intelligence, precision-guided bombs, and the NATO training exercises gave the coalition forces an overwhelming advantage on the battlefield.

On the other hand, the report acknowledges that the circumstances of the Gulf War favoured the coalition. Saudi Arabia provided excellent ports for the military build-up with little or no risk that the Iraqis could interdict supply lines. The five-month lead-up to the beginning of hostilities allowed the coalition to sort out crucial command and control issues. Perhaps most importantly, the open desert terrain was an ideal environment for air operations against the Iraqi army, leading very quickly to a situation in which the Iraqis were cut off from re-supply, and unable to move on the battlefield.

### Gulf Wars and Star Wars

■ While the lessons of the Persian Gulf will undoubtedly lead to many changes in US military planning, ranging from tactical satellites for battlefield commanders to better equipment and training for the removal of old-fashioned mines, some major strategic debates have also emerged from the experience. In early August, Pen-

tagon officials were quoted as suggesting that Iraq might still have two to three hundred Scud missiles. The Pentagon report to Congress acknowledged the great difficulty and cost of locating mobile missiles. And in his preface to the report, Defense Secretary Cheney declared that the Gulf experience reinforced the case for both the B-2 bomber and defence against ballistic missiles.

On 16 July, in a speech in Washington delivered on the same day as the Gulf War report, Cheney repeated his support for the Star Wars project with unusual fervour:

It's absolutely essential that we develop now the capacity to defend ourselves, the continental United States, our troops overseas and our friends overseas against the ballistic missile threat.... I'm convinced we can do it from a technical standpoint. I'm convinced it's an absolutely urgent national security requirement.

Cheney received support from an unexpected quarter, but not possibly of the kind that he wanted. The Senate Armed Services Committee, following a crucial reversal of position by Chairman Sam Nunn and the Democrat majority, declared its support for a limited, ground-based ballistic missile defence. In doing so, the Committee rejected the administration's approach, which is centred on the deployment of a space-based system using swarms of small, "smart" interceptors (Brilliant Pebbles). In theory, Brilliant Pebbles will defeat even a full-scale nuclear attack by intercepting the hostile missiles before they re-enter the earth's atmosphere.

By contrast, the Senate proposes to deploy one hundred ground-based missile launchers in North Dakota, at the location which is a permitted site under the 1972 ABM Treaty. Limiting the deployment to one hundred launchers means that there would be no violation of the ABM Treaty, although Senator Nunn has also proposed that negotiations begin with the Soviet Union to amend the Treaty

in order to permit the deployment of a more extensive system. Compared with the administration's plan, estimated to be ready at the end of the 1990s at a cost of US\$ 40 billion, the Senate proposal would cost US\$ 10 billion and be completed by 1996.

### Flight From Goose Bay

■ Much more so than the space-based Brilliant Pebbles, the deployment of a ground-based missile defence system in North Dakota has important consequences for Canada. Pentagon sources indicate that the minimum area to be defended would reach far into northern Canada, ending around Churchill, Manitoba, while the maximum plausible defended area with only one site could extend far into the Canadian Arctic.

These issues may well be addressed in the long-awaited revision to the 1987 Defence White Paper. In the meantime, public comment on defence issues has focussed mainly on base closings, as regional Members of Parliament from all parties have pleaded with the government to save local bases. In mid-summer, however, as the government continued to be tight-lipped on which bases might be closed, one long-term tenant decided in any case to leave.

In July, the US Air force left Goose Bay, Labrador, casting a long shadow over the future of the historic base. More recently known because of the controversy over low-level flying, Goose Bay was at the centre of the nuclear debates of the early 1960s. As a base already occupied by the US Air Force, and guarding the vital air approaches to the northeast seaboard, Goose Bay was the first US priority for the deployment of air defence nuclear weapons. Canadian archival materials from the Diefenbaker government also indicate that Strategic Air Command wanted to store nuclear bombs at the base for "reflex strikes" – B-52 bombers which would return from their first attacks, reload at

Goose Bay, and take off again for the Soviet Union.

According to official documents obtained by the St. John's *Sunday Express*, in February 1989, the Canadian Government announced new fees for all foreign users of Goose Bay, amounting to a doubling of the charges for the US Air Force to \$ 12.1 million. The latter resisted, and threatened to leave the base, but in May 1990, the Canadian government repeated its position that the US must pay the increased fees. In July 1991, the US Air Force carried out its threat and went home, ending almost fifty years of occupancy. Commenting on the future of the base, Marcel Masse said, "It's not in our mandate to pay for things we don't need ... If the need disappears, the base disappears."

### Canada and NATO

Seeking to define its place in Europe after the Cold War, at the end of May the NATO Ministerial Council announced a drastic downsizing and reorganization of its multinational forces. Troop strength will be reduced by half to approximately 750,000. These forces will be reorganized into seven corps based in western and central Europe, and a rapid reaction force under British command. The rapid reaction force will comprise four divisions, two of which will be British and one American, and be able to respond to a crisis in five to seven days.

The announcement made no mention of the future of Canadian forces in Europe. Speaking in Berlin in early June, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated that Canada's military presence in Europe would be reduced, but added that "Canadian forces will remain as long as there is a residual threat to European and Canadian security here and as long as we are needed and welcome." He gave no hint of the form that a continued Canadian military presence might take.

– DAVID COX

## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Sanctions Against Iraq

As July drew to a close, Iraq continued to dominate the proceedings of the Security Council.

Among other things, the fifteen members of the Council were in the midst of considering a proposal that for the first time would allow Iraq to sell oil. The aim would be for Baghdad, under tightly monitored conditions, to use oil money to pay for urgently needed food on a one-time only basis. The Security Council's sanctions committee had heard from Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who is in charge of UN humanitarian operations in the Persian Gulf area, that Iraq faced a "catastrophe" if food shipments were not urgently authorized.

The proposed resolution would also authorize the Council to take money from oil sales to pay for the scrapping of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, fund the UN commission in charge of determining the final Iraq-Kuwait borders, and compensate those who suffered as a result of the Iraqi invasion.

The issue was also noteworthy because it sparked the first open dissension among the five permanent members of the Security Council. The split involved the US and Britain on one side who insisted that Iraq divulge all its gold reserves before any oil sale was approved, and France which argued it would be impossible to fully verify any information provided by Iraq.

Underlying the debate was Iraq's failure to fully satisfy UN inspectors who were seeking information on Baghdad's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. On 15 July, Rolf Ekeus, the head of the UN Special Commission looking into Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, told of Iraq's attempts to withhold

information and hide equipment for enriching uranium as well as of its earlier denial that a clandestine programme even existed.

On 19 July, the Council was told by Ekeus that Iraq had built and tested a "supergun" capable of delivering nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The gun had been designed by Canadian inventor Gerald Bull. The disclosures confirmed the worst suspicions of some Council members. In Resolution 687 of 3 April, the Council had called for the destruction of any nuclear weapons capability.

In the view of many members, Iraq was often uncooperative, and on 28 June, the Security Council adopted a statement calling on Iraq to grant a UN nuclear inspection team unimpeded access to a site it had been previously prevented from entering. The statement warned that failure to comply would lead to "serious consequences."

The warning was repeated the following month when the five major powers summoned the Iraqi ambassador and told him to provide all relevant information by 25 July. The date passed without any formal Council action, but diplomats noted that the Iraqi request to sell oil to buy food was moving at an extremely slow pace. On 17 June, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 699 which ordered that Iraq should bear the cost of scrapping its weapons of mass destruction, a process estimated to cost about US \$ 200 million.

On the same day, the Council unanimously approved Resolution 700, which outlined a set of guidelines to enforce the arms embargo against Iraq. The resolution proscribed a wide variety of weapons to be sold to Iraq and also included research, development and manufacturing facilities for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and ballistic missiles.

On 20 May, the Security Council set up a compensation fund for payment of claims against Iraq.

Resolution 692, adopted by a vote of fourteen in favour with Cuba abstaining, also created a commission to administer what became known as the United Nations Compensation Fund. Eleven days later (31 May), the Secretary-General, as called for in Resolution 768, made public his suggested "ceiling" or maximum amount of annual Iraqi oil revenues that should be made available to pay those who suffered as a result of its invasion of Kuwait. In a letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General said the amount should not exceed thirty percent. It will be up to the Compensation Commission to determine the final percentage.

### Central America

On 20 May, the Security Council decided to establish an observer mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) with the initial task of monitoring human rights. Adopted unanimously, Resolution 693 was a radical departure for the world body which for the first time in its history, had volunteered to survey the human rights situation of a member state. Some diplomats saw the resolution as a portent for a new and more vigorous UN.

The UN will deploy over 100 civilians and police human rights specialists during the summer to be followed by an additional fifty monitors in the fall. Observers say ONUSAL is expected to change the nature of the ongoing conflict in El Salvador by making both sides more wary about committing human rights abuses. Both sides in the conflict requested the creation of ONUSAL.

On 6 May, the Council extended the mandate of the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) for another six months. ONUCA is charged with observing and reporting on the five Central American governments to ensure that they comply with the peace plan contained in the Esquipulas II agreement, which requires the governments to cease providing aid to irregular forces and insurgent movements operat-

ing in the region, and to prevent the use of their territory for attacks on other states.

### Angola

On 30 May, the Council enlarged the mandate of the Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) responsible for verifying the staged withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country. UNAVEM II is charged with the additional tasks of monitoring the ceasefire worked out between the government of Angola and the insurgent movement UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

### The Middle East

On 24 May, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 694 which deplored the deportation by Israel of four Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. On 18 May, Israel had moved the four from the Gaza Strip to southern Lebanon. The resolution called on Israel to refrain from further deportations and to "ensure the safe and immediate return of all those deported."

On 30 May, the Council renewed for another six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) which has been supervising the ceasefire between Israel and Syria since 1974.

### Cyprus

On 14 June, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 698, which attempts to address concerns by countries like Canada who feel they bear too much of the financial burden of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The document "concludes that a method of financing is needed which will put the Force on a sound and secure financial basis." Resolution 696 was adopted on the same day that the Council extended the UNFICYP mandate for an additional six months. [

- TREVOR ROWE



## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### The al-Mashat Affair

The third session of the 34th Parliament, which had opened on 13 May, adjourned for the summer on 21 June and is scheduled to resume on 16 September. Ottawa was gripped during May and June with the case of Mohammad al-Mashat, the former Iraqi ambassador to the United States, who had landed in Canada on 30 March after receiving permission to immigrate to Canada in a speedy twenty-eight days.

The Government asked the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) to look into the matter. It began hearings on 30 May and received testimony from a wide range of witnesses including several senior cabinet ministers – Constitutional Affairs Minister Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall and Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt among them. The government stated that the former diplomat had entered the country as a result of, in McDougall's words, "a whole series of errors of judgement."

In testimony late in the proceedings, Joe Clark maintained that two officials – his chief of staff, David Daubney, and Raymond Chrétien, the Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs – owed him an apology for their failure to inform him of the controversial case because it might have embarrassed him as External Affairs Minister at the time of an important trip to the Middle East following the end of the Gulf War. Glen Shortliffe, a senior official in the Privy Council Office, revealed that he had called Chrétien into his office on 13 May to endorse a description of events (including an apology to the government) with

which Chrétien disagreed. Chrétien subsequently told the Committee that he had followed all of the correct procedures and had nothing to apologize for.

The inquiry also witnessed public recriminations between Chrétien and de Montigny Marchand, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, two of the most senior public servants in Ottawa; a verbal slanging match between one of the Committee substitutes, John Nunziata, and Paul Tellier, the head of the civil service in his position as Clerk of the Privy Council; and an admission by David Daubney under cross questioning by NDP MP Svend Robinson that he had not understood the importance of a key memo he had received on the case and, therefore, had neglected to inform Mr. Clark about it. Later Daubney told the Committee that he had been singled out to provide "symmetry" – "because Mr. Chrétien had been isolated as an official who made an error in this matter. Given his name and his relationship to the Leader of the Opposition [a nephew], I think there was some symmetry."

In a report released on 20 June the Committee agreed on the need for improved communications "both within and between government departments." It also recommended that the House Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration examine the Immigration Act and Regulations to find ways in the future to avoid the, "evident unfairness associated with Mr. al-Mashat's admission to Canada." Finally, it urged the government to appoint a "high-level task force of retired politicians, public servants, and experts to clarify and foster consensus concerning the meaning of ministerial responsibility..."

Members of Parliament differed sharply about who should be blamed for the imbroglio. The Conservative majority accepted the government's version of events; the Liberals accused various ministers, including the Prime Minis-

ter, of mishandling the case after it became public, while the NDP insisted on the resignations of Clark, McDougall and Valcourt. One Conservative backbencher, Geoff Scott, broke with his party and called for a judicial inquiry into the unanswered questions.

### Arms Exports Bill

Another major controversy in the House in May and June concerned Bill C-6, an act "respecting the exporting, importing, manufacturing, buying or selling of or other dealing with certain weapons." The government introduced the bill on 23 May by way of amending the Export and Import Permits Act and the Criminal Code to permit two Canadian companies to pursue major weapons sales, one to the Netherlands and one to Saudi Arabia.

Diemaco Ltd. of Kitchener is attempting to sell 100,000 C7 automatic rifles to the Netherlands for \$ 120 million, while General Motors of Canada is seeking the sale of 1,117 light armoured vehicles equipped with machine guns for up to \$ 800 million to Saudi Arabia. International Trade Minister Michael Wilson insisted that the legislation did not contradict the government's campaign to restrain the international arms trade following the Persian Gulf War. He indicated that campaign was aimed specifically at "weapons of mass destruction" which would not include automatic rifles and armoured vehicles.

Until then, the Criminal Code made it illegal for automatic weapons to be sold to anyone except Canadian military and police forces. The new provisions establish strict criteria for the sale of weapons to foreign countries. No sales will be permitted to civilians, each sale will be reviewed by the government, and an annual report will be submitted to Parliament. In addition, the government will set up a "control list" of countries that are permitted to buy guns from Canada.

Opposition MPs criticized the new legislation. NDP MP Ian Waddell told the House on 23 May, "Canadians were waiting for a gun-control bill and instead we got a gun-export bill." Liberal MP Warren Allmand proposed two amendments to the bill. One would have required scrutiny by Parliament whenever a country is added to the list of those permitted to buy weapons from Canada. The second would have prohibited the sale of guns to countries involved in armed conflicts or human rights violations.

In the end, however, the government and opposition parties reached a deal which permitted Bill C-6 to pass the Commons and the Senate and receive Royal Assent on the day Parliament adjourned, 21 June. In return for speedy passage, the government promised to suspend all further exports of automatic weapons to the Middle East for the rest of the year and while a special Subcommittee on Arms Exports of the SCEAIT holds hearings on the question. That sub-committee is expected to begin its work as soon as Parliament resumes in the fall.

### Other News

Under the new House rules, Parliamentary Secretaries (PS) to Ministers will now be members of the relevant committees. This will mean, for example, that the newly-named PS to External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall, Benno Friesen, will be a member of the SCEAIT, while Patrick Boyer, the PS to National Defence Minister Marcel Masse, will be a member of the House Defence Committee.

It was also decided before the House adjourned for the summer that two sub-committees of SCEAIT would be established: one, on International Trade, with John Reimer as its chair; the other, on Human Rights and Development, with Walter McLean in the chair. |

– GREGORY WIRICK

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Strategic Arms Reductions Talks

At the Moscow summit on 31 July, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a seven hundred-page START Treaty. The three major outstanding issues had been settled during four days of talks between their foreign ministers in Washington earlier in the month. On "downloading" (reducing the number of warheads per missile), the two sides agreed to a ceiling of 1,250 missile "spaces" on three different missile types (versus the Soviet preference for 2,150 on three types, and the American preference for just 1,000 on one type). On the telemetry issue, the Soviets agreed to provide tape-recorded data from every missile test, not just a limited number. Finally, the two sides settled on 21 percent as the change in throw-weight signifying a new type of missile. The definition of "throw-weight" for this purpose was not agreed until the Bush-Gorbachev meeting in London on 17 July.

START has been hailed as the first arms control agreement to actually reduce, rather than merely limit, the number of strategic nuclear weapons. It sets a ceiling of 6,000 on warheads and 1,600 on delivery vehicles for each side. A sub-ceiling of 4,900 on ballistic missile warheads mandates the elimination of over 7,000 such warheads. The USSR will cut the numbers of its most powerful missile, the SS-18, as well as its overall ballistic missile throw-weight, by 50 percent. The Treaty also includes an unprecedentedly elaborate system of verification, including twelve different types of on-site inspection. However, because it credits bombers with fewer

weapons than they may actually carry, while sea-launched cruise missiles are left out entirely (being limited to 880 by a separate accord), total reductions in the strategic arsenals will be about 15 percent for the US and 25 percent for the USSR, rather than 50 percent as originally intended, over seven years.

### Conventional Forces in Europe

The dispute over the terms of the CFE Treaty, signed last November, was finally resolved by US Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in Lisbon on 1 June. The compromise was formally approved by the other Treaty signatories in Vienna two weeks later. Without accepting the interpretation of its co-signatories that such forces are subject to the Treaty, the USSR agreed that equipment held by its naval infantry and coastal defence units will not exceed the Treaty's ceilings and sub-ceilings, and will not be increased.

The existing equipment will remain, but an equivalent number drawn from ground forces – amounting to 3,738 pieces – will have to be destroyed, modified, or converted to non-military use. Of this amount, 753 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) will be modified and reclassified as combat support equipment, exempt from the Treaty limits. Of the remainder, half will be reduced under normal CFE provisions within Europe, while half will be withdrawn east of the Urals, where an equivalent number of older pieces will be destroyed or converted under less stringent procedures. The 1,701 ACVs assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces will be exempted from the Treaty as internal security forces, although also subject to a no-increase commitment.

The USSR also undertook to destroy or convert 14,500 tanks, ACVs, and artillery pieces that it

had moved east of the Urals before the Treaty was signed (about 25 percent of the total transferred); agreed to provide advance notice of weapons destruction; and declared that "the equipment withdrawn will not be used to create a strategic reserve ... and will not be stored in a way which allows for rapid return to the [Treaty] area." Resolution of the dispute will permit formal ratification of the Treaty and the beginning of substantive "CFE-1A" negotiations focusing on personnel limits and aerial inspection.

### The Middle East

On 29 May, President Bush announced a Middle East arms control proposal including the following elements: (1) an early meeting of the five major arms suppliers in Paris to discuss guidelines for restraining destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons, as well as weapons of mass destruction; (2) a mechanism for supplier consultations, including advance notification of certain sales; (3) a freeze on the acquisition or testing of surface-to-surface missiles, looking toward their ultimate elimination from the region; (4) a ban on the further production or acquisition of enriched uranium and separated plutonium, usable in nuclear weapons; and (5) commitments from all the regional states to sign the emerging Chemical Weapons Convention and to bolster the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Israel immediately objected to the plan on the grounds that it overemphasized weapons of mass destruction, while Arab states complained that it said nothing about Israel's presumed existing stock of nuclear weapons.

The five main suppliers (the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council) met in Paris as planned on 8 and 9 July. They endorsed the Bush proposals, called for the creation of a Middle East "weapons of mass destruction-free zone," and agreed to hold an experts meeting in September before

resuming talks on arms transfer restraints in London in October.

### Short Notes

On 13 May, President Bush announced that the US would drop its previous insistence on retaining a small chemical weapons (CW) stock (2 percent of its current holdings, or about 500 tons) until all CW-capable states had joined a global CW ban, and would also withdraw its previous reservation of the right to use CW in retaliation against an attack in kind. He called on the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament to settle all major issues by the end of this year in order to complete a CW Convention by May 1992.

During a visit by Soviet Chief of the General Staff General Moiseyev in early May, Canada and the USSR signed an agreement on "The Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities." It is designed to avoid incidents arising from one country's armed forces exercising or operating in close proximity to those of the other.

In accordance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the US and USSR destroyed the last of their 2,692 INF missiles in early May.


Zambia, Tanzania, and South Africa have all recently signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while France announced plans to do so. The only remaining non-signatory nuclear-weapon state, China, also indicated that it was "seriously considering" signing.

A proposal long championed by Canada for a UN register of conventional arms transfers was endorsed by the European Council at the end of June, the Paris meeting of the five permanent Security Council members in early July, and the London Economic Summit later that month. Canada was also instrumental in persuading the Berlin meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in June to endorse the idea of greater transparency in arms transfers. □

— RON PURVER



## REVIEWS



### Circle of Fear

Hussein Sumaida with  
Carole Jerome

Toronto: Stoddart, 1991, 305 pp.,  
\$25.95, cloth

### By Way of Deception:

#### A Devastating Insider's Portrait of the Mossad

Claire Hoy and Victor Ostrovsky

Toronto: General Paperbacks, 1991,  
396 pp., \$6.99 paper

### Arms and the Man: Dr. Gerald Bull, Iraq and the Supergun

William Lowther

Toronto: Doubleday, 1991, 298 pp.,  
\$27.50 cloth

☐ The new paperback version of *By Way of Deception* includes an appendix which describes the efforts made by representatives of Israel, legal and otherwise, to prevent publication of this book. The senior Mossad agents who confronted him at his Ottawa apartment, Victor Ostrovsky tells us (by the way, they drove a red medium-sized rental car with Quebec licence plates), had probably only seen the dust jacket. One wonders if the Mossad would have gone through all their subsequent efforts to suppress the book if they'd actually had a chance to read it.

Victor Ostrovsky was born in Canada of an Israeli mother, and served with the Israeli armed forces before joining the Mossad. His message is clear enough and frequently repeated: the Mossad is a law unto itself, out of control, and a menace to democracy in Israel. Unfortunately, the evidence to substantiate these claims is surrounded by endless, largely tedious descriptions of events which have either no great significance or are already very well known.

In the midst of the dross, there are serious issues. The close liai-

son with Danish intelligence services is an embarrassment to Denmark; the discussion of Mossad operations in the United States may not come as a surprise but could hardly be welcomed in Israel. For Canadians who are having difficulty getting a passport, just write to the Mossad – they are said to have one thousand of them, all blank and unused. For the most part, however, Ostrovsky's revelations deal with more mundane matters.

For those who want to brush up on techniques for staking out rendezvous and trailing suspects, an appendix provides detailed instructions. And, of course, beautiful women abound, luring, decoying, and providing brief solace to overstrained agents. For all this, Hoy and Ostrovsky may have the last laugh. After Israel representatives went to court to try to prevent publication of the book, orders for it jumped from the projected 42,000 to over 300,000 in just a few days – better than a Mossad pension.

Those who find Ostrovsky's revelations to be rather thin gruel should not turn too quickly to Carole Jerome's latest Middle East adventure, *Circle of Fear*. The poor soul trapped in the circle is Hussein Sumaida, son of a senior official in Saddam Hussein's government who, by all accounts, is an old pal of the great survivor himself. After an absolutely dreadful childhood coping with his beastly father, and understandably mixed up about his loyalties, Sumaida set out to England to study, where, ever given to quixotic decisions, he decided first to penetrate and inform on Iraqi groups in exile (they were admittedly no more attractive than the bunch he had just left behind.) Tiring of this, he started to work for the Mossad, but then decided that he had better tell Iraq's Mossad (the Mukhabarat) that he was doing this before they found out for themselves. At this point his father was ready to see him off, but

the ever-merciful Saddam intervened, and (what else to do with wayward sons?) gave him a job in Iraqi intelligence.

After many quasi-adventures learning to be an agent, Sumaida decided to abandon both the Mukhabarat and the Mossad, and bolted to Canada, where he has applied for political asylum. Possibly inspired by the jump in sales of *By Way of Deception*, the publishers have pointed angrily to the privileged treatment afforded Mohammad al-Mashat, and demanded equal treatment (or perhaps just bigger sales) for their despondent co-author. They're right, but they're wrong: both of them should be at the bottom of the application list.

William Lowther's study (*Arms and the Man*) of our very own Dr. Gerald Bull tries hard to improve the image of Canada's international villain by portraying him as a complex personality eventually doomed by a combination of personal insecurities, scientific obsession and business naivete. Lowther places great emphasis on Bull's deprived childhood. After the death of his mother, three year-old Gerry lived first with an older sister, and then with relatives who, having won a prize in the Irish sweepstakes, took Gerry to live on an apple farm outside Kingston. Despite Lowther's efforts to find great meaning in all of this, Bull's upbringing and education is not a compelling story. Emerging from the University of Toronto, Bull was no genius, but a bright young man with a passion for ballistics.

Soon afterwards, Bull found himself working for Canada's Department of National Defence, whose officials and scientists he came to despise as stupid and shortsighted. Canadians would surely have warmed to Dr. Bull's big gun if he had continued to present it as the little man's fight against official Ottawa. Unfortunately, he took his designs elsewhere – to the United States, South Africa, a brief stay in prison, China, Iraq –

in fact, to anybody who might have a use for a longer gun barrel and a more effective shell.

Perhaps Bull really did see all of these efforts as mere expedients to help him achieve his real goal – firing satellites into orbit from a super gun. But it is difficult to believe that his increasing entanglement with Iraq was in pursuit of a higher cause. Bull's firm in Brussels, surely the most unsteady merchant of death in the history of the trade, was broke, the Iraqis offered money and first class tickets to Baghdad, Bull was off and running.


Even Bull's assassination was curiously anti-climactic. According to Lowther, the unidentified secret service that did the job (one, incidentally, that seemed very much in control) left endless hints to Bull to cease and desist, practically pleading with him to not make them do it. When it was done, those dull bureaucratic people in Ottawa did little more than raise an eyebrow, while the Belgian police were totally perplexed by a murder which their most illustrious of detectives, Hercule Poirot, would have solved without leaving his chambers.

William Lowther has written an almost interesting book which makes a conscientious effort to present Bull as something of a romantic figure – a Canadian Clyde Barrow in the international world of guns and missiles. Unfortunately, Bull is not up to the character he is asked to play. In the end, he leaves no legacy for his fellow Canadians, but only a footnote. In mid-August UN inspectors in Iraq found little Babylon, the prototype for the biggest gun in the world. They also found 1,481 artillery shells and bombs containing chemical weapons, stocks of poison gases, and, just in case anybody was in any doubt about Iraq's intentions, large quantities of the biological toxin anthrax. Perhaps the unidentified secret service did the right thing after all.

– David Cox

Mr. Cox is a professor of political studies at Queen's University, Kingston.

## NEWS FROM THE INSTITUTE



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- our own computerized database giving subject access to the various materials in the library collection from 1985 on; includes the *Nuclear weapons and arms control bibliography* covering the English-language literature on this subject from 1945 on;

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**tary Industry Database** containing information on Canadian companies' military sales in Canada and abroad;

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- *Peace and security thesaurus*, a classification of over 750 terms in the field.

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The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue studies in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in that area by supporting Canadians and permanent residents who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad or in Canada.

The Institute expects to make eleven awards: two fellowships valued at up to \$30,000 and nine scholarships at up to \$14,000 each. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1992.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents whose experience or academic qualifications enable them to pursue advanced study.

The deadline for applications for the 1992–1993 academic year is 1 February 1992.

For further information and application forms please write to:  
The Barton Awards Programme, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 360 Albert Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

### Peace and Security Competitions Fund Procedures and Deadlines

For the semi-annual competitions with deadlines of 30 November 1991 and 30 June 1992, the Fund will be interested in receiving applications to support projects that would make thoughtful contributions to issues related to international peace and security on the 125th anniversary of Confederation in 1992. It is our understanding that Canadians will be invited by Parliament to reflect in their various fields on the record of opportunity and achievement in that record and on challenges for the future.

30 June for an October decision

30 November for a March decision

Write to: Peace and Security Competitions Fund, c/o CIIPS



## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Drowning in the "realist" mainstream

Though I found both the roundtable on "State Breaking, Nation Building" and "Gun Control For the World" (Summer 1991) generally informative and well-argued, I think that pessimism over the possibilities of arms transfer control was a bit overdone. Rational analysis soon leads to the conclusion that from a global point of view, arms transfers are predominantly a waste of resources, lives and property. From a national standpoint, things look different; each state feels threatened. The problem is how to make states feel safer. This problem has objective (threat) and subjective (perception of threat) sides. It is therefore equally important to work on the reduction of threats, and to work toward changed perceptions of international relations.

One important way to slow arms transfers is by making arms less attractive, and another is to make alternatives, economic development for instance, more attractive. It is here that Keith Krause's article fails. If we consider decision-making about arms, and not simply the mechanics of the international system, we see that there are other roads to arms transfer limitation than the one he outlines. For instance, if development aid is linked to arms purchases, this changes the relative prices of weapons and development, which, under normal circumstances, will have some effect on demand. It is this approach which is currently being discussed at the World Bank and the IMF.

Another consideration has its origin in Kant's "Eternal Peace." Democratic states, and governments which respond to the wishes of their

citizens, might have a different perspective on the relative costs of arms and other goods. Is it not possible, that the limiting of arms transfers is linked to democratization?

Analysis, even if it is devoted to peace and security has to be realistic and avoid wishful thinking. On the other hand, I expect such analyses to search for better solutions, not to drown in the "realist" mainstream.

*Dr. Michael Brzoska  
Institut für Politische Wissenschaft  
Hamburg, Germany*

### No Enlightenment?

In the article on the "Enduring Legacies of the Persian Gulf War," CIIPS drew from only establishment institutions. The result was a foregone conclusion – there would be no enlightenment.

The moderator tried his best. He asked what the war's unique legacy would be. He got marginal replies, with careful avoidance of the real changes. He tried again: is there a fundamental conflict between the Islamic world and the West? Only Korany dealt with this directly in saying the gulf between Islamic and non-Moslem countries has increased. But to tell us why was evidently too dangerous.

It is quite useless for CIIPS to select an establishment panel and then expect its moderator to squeeze from them what they are not programmed to deliver. How about hearing, just once, what a dissident Arab Moslem has to say?

*Boris Aldanov, Ottawa*

### Neither Rank-inflated Nor Austere

Your Summer issue ("From the Director") cited a statement attributed to me by Professor Desmond Morton which is partly incorrect. I have indeed pointed to the Dutch example of forces which are better equipped than ours at two-thirds of the budget, and I have called attention to the very high cost of an all-volunteer force as raised in Canada, with our equipment acquisition practices and excessive infrastructure and other politically

related costs. I have not ever described our forces as rank-inflated; their rank structure is driven by the Canadian Forces own particular mix of activities, roles, geographical spread and required command structure. Besides, why should a standard of austerity be expected of our military that does not apply elsewhere in the federal bureaucratic or political environment?

*Gerard C.E. Thériault, Nepean*

*Editor's Note:* The correspondent's note regarding how he was cited in the summer issue of *Peace & Security* is correct. The mistake is the fault of the editors, and we apologize to Mr. Thériault and to Desmond Morton for it. Mr. Thériault is a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute.

### North Pacific dialogue – who's idea?

Professor Jeremy Paltiel, in "Beijing Sails Into Adverse Winds" (Summer 1991) is mistaken when he states that "Under former External Affairs minister Joe Clark, Canada cautiously accepted a longstanding Soviet initiative for creating an Asia-Pacific Security system ... exploratory talks were held in Victoria in April."

The Canadian initiative for establishing a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) was first introduced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in speeches in Victoria, Tokyo, and Jakarta in July 1990. The NPCSD is not an acceptance of the Soviet "Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk" approach to Asia-Pacific Security. The Soviet initiative includes a call for a Pan-Asia Foreign Ministers Summit Meeting to be held in Vladivostok in 1993, the proposal for USSR-USA-Japan discussions on North-East Asian security issues, and the establishment of a five-nation forum (USSR, USA, India, China and Japan) to discuss Asia-Pacific Security issues.

The Canadian approach to Asia-Pacific security issues rejects the

establishment of unnecessary mechanisms, avoids a bloc approach to security matters, and seeks to develop a "habit of dialogue" among concerned states in the region.

The NPCSD has two tracks – a non-governmental and a governmental element – and focusses on the North Pacific countries of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Canada. Only in [the North Pacific] sub-region, where there is a significant concentration of conventional and nuclear forces, and where growing instability would have an adverse effect on Canada's political, economic, social and environmental interests, is there no multi-lateral forum to allow the timely discussion of policy.

The NGO (non-governmental organization) track of the Canadian initiative is designed specifically to explore issues and prospects for dialogue and to focus knowledge and awareness on the North Pacific. York University organized an international colloquium in Victoria in April to discuss, with academic and other NGO experts, various research approaches to North Pacific security issues.

The official, or governmental, track of the Canadian initiative is an open-ended process intended to explore the merits of establishing a regional dialogue. Such a dialogue must not be the result of an attempt to transplant European models or institutions. The sources of tension and the nature of the regional challenges in the North Pacific do not lend themselves to such an approach. Rather, approaches to enhance stability must accommodate the specific traditions, history and geopolitical dynamics of the region.

*Claude Boucher  
Director of Policy Planning  
External Affairs, Ottawa*

## LETTER FROM SUDAN BY MICHAEL McIVOR



**The temperature hovers around fifty degrees celsius and a *hubbub*, the local name for dust storm, is blowing. We are travelling through northern Kurdufan region from El Obeid to Sodiri on what aid workers here sardonically call "Highway 1."**

In some places it is vague track. More often, there is nothing but drifting sand or rough shale. A companion pulls out his canteen and takes another swig of hot water. Some spills as we lurch and jolt along. "Driving in Sudan," he mutters, "is like riding in a clothes drier with dust blowing in."

By air, it is less than 200 kilometres between El Obeid and Sodiri. By "Highway 1" it is eight back-bruising hours in a four-wheel drive van, not including the time wasted fixing two flat tires, digging out after twice becoming stuck in the sand, and getting seriously lost. In other words, it was a normal trip with an experienced driver. This is the same route emergency food aid must travel to reach the hungry in North Kurdufan.

And it gets worse going west to Darfur region. The paved road built with international aid ends at El Obeid, the capital of Kurdufan. El Fasher, the capital of Darfur is two days further on by rough track. Most people prefer to fly taking the risk that Air Sudan, not so affectionately dubbed, "Air Sometimes," will actually show up as scheduled. It usually doesn't. Sometimes it is days late on domestic routes.

Arriving in El Fasher is to step back in time. There actually is one paved road. But mostly it is dirt street. A few four-wheel drive vehicles are out and about. Almost all of them belong to international aid agencies, the government, army or security police. For the rest, with the disconcerting exception of three or four American cars with '50s fins and chrome, it is donkey power. And the donkeys are slowly dying because of the drought. There are power lines which is a nice Potemkin village touch be-

cause unless one is on the "A" line which runs to the government buildings there is no electricity at all. Just as there are no phones.

El Fasher is the pinnacle of twentieth century technology in Darfur. Outside the capital, it gets primitive, which is why it is a truly awesome task trying to get emergency food aid and seeds to rural areas. Even communication is impossible. The shortwave radios used by foreign construction teams and aid agencies were seized by the security police some months ago. They were convinced the radios were being used for spying. Just what there would be to spy on in rural Darfur defies the imagination.

But the two-year old Islamic fundamentalist military does not like foreigners, especially Westerners. Until late this spring, many aid agencies suffered various types

of harassment. Some, like *Médecins Sans Frontières* in Darfur, gave up and left. In Khartoum, our hotel rooms were searched. Telexes are read by the security police. Many telephones are bugged. Not that it matters; they usually do not work. Sudan is a country that has turned xenophobic at a time when it most desperately needs foreign development assistance. Sudan inherited an underdeveloped but functioning infrastructure when it gained independence from the British in 1956. The trains from Khartoum to Port Sudan, the

country's access to the ocean, used to run twice a day. Now there are fewer than two a week. During the sixteen years of Gaafar Mohammed Numeiri's rampantly corrupt dictatorship, not only was there little effort to expand basic services, what existed was not maintained. "I am afraid the infrastructure of the country has deteriorated very severely over the last seven or eight years," says Abhav Deshoande, the World Bank's representative in Khartoum. "This applies to roads, railways, power, factories, irrigation systems, everything." Deshoande says a World Bank survey found 112 of the 115 bridges on the Port Sudan-Khartoum highway to be unsafe; ninety percent of the emergency food aid moves down that road.

Sudan's Finance Minister, Abdul Rahim Hamdi acknowledges that what he calls "the very pervasive deterioration" continues, and admits, "we need massive economic investment to basically rehabilitate all the infrastructure in the country." To try to attract it, Hamdi has introduced some measures to promote the development of a market economy and to appease the International Monetary

Fund which turned its back on Sudan for failing to come to grips with economic restructuring and debt payments. But there is opposition inside the regime to these policies, especially from hardline fundamentalists. So most businessmen, including many inside the country, do not trust the government and prefer to keep potential investment funds offshore in hard currency accounts. The concerns of donor nations, including Canada, include but go beyond the regime's xenophobia and economics. Khartoum's support of Iraq in the Gulf War angered coalition members including rich, formerly generous, Arab neighbours. Western nations are upset the government will not compromise to end the brutal, debilitating civil war with largely Christian and animist tribes in the South. Of particular concern is its refusal to replace Sharia or Islamic law with a secular code. And the dictatorship's human rights record is worrying. The US Ambassador to Sudan, James Cheek, says the result is "most of the development assistance that used to flow to Sudan has stopped because donors feel that given the policies and attitude of the government, assistance cannot really accomplish much."

Emergency food aid will continue. But without development assistance for roads, irrigation projects, new wells and reforestation, the tragic cycle of drought and famine will continue. Sudan, potentially the breadbasket of East Africa, cannot even cope with its disintegrating infrastructure much less finance anything new.

Such global problems do not feature in Mahava village in northern Kurdufan even though the people here have to live with the consequences. It is a six-hour walk to the nearest water since their well went dry. There is water deeper down but no money to drill for it. And the desert is seeping into the village. "Thirty years ago there were lots of trees," says a farmer pointing to the barren landscape. "I remember seeing deer when I was a boy. Now, if there is a stick on the ground, after a while there will be a small sand dune." There are no funds to plant new trees as a buffer against the desert.

"What will happen to you?" I ask. "I expect one day the sand will drive us from our land." Being landless in Sudan's agrarian, peasant society is tantamount to a death sentence. At the moment there seems no hope of a reprieve. □

Michael McIvor is senior European correspondent for CBC national radio news.

**"I remember seeing deer when I was a boy. Now, if there is a stick on the ground, after a while there will be a small sand dune."**

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## LETTRE DU Soudan

PAR MICHAEL M'LIOR



**La température avoisine les cinquante degrés Celsius et le *hubub*, tempête de poussière, souffle. Nous traversons le**

**Kordofan-Nord.**

Pour nous rendre d'El-Obeïd à Sodiri, nous roulons sur ce que le personnel des organismes de secours baptisé sardoniquement "l'Auto-route n° 1". Par endroits, c'est une vague piste. Le plus souvent, il n'y a que du sable balayé par le vent ou un mauvais chemin en schiste argileux. Un de mes compagnons sort sa gourde et boit une gorgée d'eau chaude. «Conduire au Soudan, mar-monne-t-il, secoué par une embardée, c'est comme d'être enfermé dans un séchoir à linge rempli de poussière.»

«A vol d'oiseau, il y a moins de 200 kilomètres entre El-Obeïd et Sodiri. Par l'«Autoroute n° 1» et en 4x4, il faut compter huit heures de route éreintantes, plus le temps perdu pour réparer deux crevaisons, pour nous désensabler deux fois et pour retrouver notre chemin après Signaions, que les secours alimentaires destinés aux populations ar-famées du Kordofan-Nord doivent passer par là.

Les conditions empirient lorsque l'on se dirige vers l'Ouest, vers la province de Darfour. La route pavée construite avec l'aide internationale s'arrête à El-Obeïd, capitale du Kordofan. El-Fasher, la capitale de la province de Darfour, est encore à deux jours de route par une piste accidentée. La plupart des gens préfèrent prendre l'avion, même si les horraires des vols locaux sont assez fantaisistes. Il arrive que les avions aient des jours de retard sur les lignes intérieures.

Arriver à El-Fasher, c'est faire un bond en arrière dans le temps. Hormis une route pavée, il n'y a que des rues en terre battue. On croise quelques véhicules à quatre roues montées. Tous pratiquement appar-internationale, au gouvernement, à l'armée ou à la police de sûreté. Pour le reste, si l'on excepte la présence de décorations de trois ou quatre voitures américaines des années 1950, la population se dé-place à dos d'âne. Or, les ânes sont en voie d'extinction, à cause de la

sécheresse. Il y a des lignes élecs-triques, ce qui donne un air de vil-lage modeste à la Potemkine, puis-que moins d'être raccordé à la ligne qu'il alimente les bâtiments officiels, on n'a pas du tout d'électricité. Pas de téléphone non plus.

El-Fasher est la tête de pont de la technologie du vingtième siècle dans le Darfour. En dehors de la capitale, tout est plus primitif, ce qui explique pourquoi il est extrême-ment difficile de faire parvenir les secours alimentaires d'urgence et les semences dans les régions rurales. Même les communications sont impossibles. Les radios à ondes courtes utilisées par les équipes de construction et les organismes d'aide étrangers ont été confisquées par les forces de sécurité. Il y a vaincu qu'elles servaient à l'es-pionnage. Quant à savoir ce que le pays a besoin d'une aide économique massive pour au moins remettre en état toute son infrastruc-ture. Pour essayer d'obtenir cette aide, M. Hamdi a introduit quelques mesures visant à favoriser la mise en place d'une économie de marché et à apaiser le Fonds monétaire international, qui a tourné le dos au pays dès lors qu'il s'est montré incapable de restructurer son éco-nomie et de faire face aux échéances de remboursement de sa dette. Ce-pendant, à l'intérieur même du ré-gime, certains, les fondamentalistes purs et durs notamment, s'opposent à ces politiques. En conséquence, la plupart des gens d'affaires, et parmi beaucoup de Soudanais, ne font pas confiance au gouvernement et préfèrent garder à l'étranger, sur capitaux qui pourraient servir à des investissements locaux.

La xénophobie et les méthodes économiques du régime ne sont pas les seules raisons de préoccupation des pays donateurs, dont le Canada, en soutien de l'Irak pendant la guerre du Golfe, Khartoum s'est

## Le Soudan est devenu xénophobe à un moment où il a désespérément besoin de l'aide au développement que les étrangers peuvent lui apporter.

Jour de Khartoum à Port-Soudan, sur la Mer Rouge. Maintenaant, c'est à peine s'il y en a deux par semaine. Pendant les seize années de dicta-ture corrompue de Caafar Mohamed Nemeiry, non seulement on n'a pas fait grand chose pour accroître les services de base, mais ceux qui existaient n'ont pas été entretenus. «Je crains bien que l'infrastructure se soit très gravement détériorée au cours des sept ou huit dernières années», déplore M. Abbar Deshoandé, qui représente la Banque mondiale à Khartoum. Je parle des routes, des chemins de fer, du réseau électrique, des usines, des systèmes d'irriga-tion, de tout.» Selon une étude de la Banque mondiale qu'il cite, 112 des 115 ponts de la route qui relie Port-Soudan à la capitale sont en mauvais état ; or, 90 p. 100 de l'aide alimentaire d'urgence est acheminée par cette route.

Le ministre des Finances du Soudan, M. Abdul Rahim Hamdi, reconnaît ce qu'il appelle «la dette-rotation généralisée» et il admet que le pays a besoin d'une aide économique massive pour au moins remettre en état toute son infrastruc-ture. Pour essayer d'obtenir cette aide, M. Hamdi a introduit quelques mesures visant à favoriser la mise en place d'une économie de marché et à apaiser le Fonds monétaire international, qui a tourné le dos au pays dès lors qu'il s'est montré incapable de restructurer son éco-nomie et de faire face aux échéances de remboursement de sa dette. Ce-pendant, à l'intérieur même du ré-gime, certains, les fondamentalistes purs et durs notamment, s'opposent à ces politiques. En conséquence, la plupart des gens d'affaires, et parmi beaucoup de Soudanais, ne font pas confiance au gouvernement et préfèrent garder à l'étranger, sur capitaux qui pourraient servir à des investissements locaux.


attire la colère des membres de la coalition, entre autres de riches voisins arabes autrefois gencueux. Les pays occidentaux sont contrai-riés que le gouvernement refuse un compromis qui mettrait fin à la guerre civile brutale et déstabilisante animistes du Sud. Ce qui gêne le plus, c'est qu'il ne veut pas rem-placer la Charta, c'est-à-dire le droit de propriété, par un code séculier. En plus, les atteintes aux droits de la personne sont inquiétantes. Pour l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis au Soudan, M. James Check, il en ré-sulte que «l'aide au développement s'est réduite à un mince filet car les donateurs jugent le gouvernement incapable de bouger».

Les envois de secours alimentaires d'urgence continueront, mais sans aide au développement pour construire des routes, pour entre-prendre des travaux d'irrigation, creuser de nouveaux puits et replan-ter des arbres, le cycle tragique de la sécheresse et de la famine conti-nuera lui aussi. Le Soudan, qui pour-rait être le grenier à blé de l'Afrique orientale, ne peut même pas entrec-tenir la désintégration de son infrastruc-ture, et encore moins financer quoi que ce soit de nouveau.

Personne n'a idée de ces prob-èmes internationaux dans le village de Mahara, dans le Kordofan-Nord, même si ses habitants en sup-portent les conséquences. Depuis que leur puits est sec, ils doivent marcher pendant six heures pour at-teindre le point d'eau le plus proche. Il y a une nappe d'eau plus pro-fonde, mais ils n'ont pas les moyens de faire creuser un nouveau puits. De plus, le désert gagne sur le vil-lage. «Il y a trente ans, il y avait beaucoup d'arbres, explique un fer-mier en montrant le paysage désolé. «Quand j'étais enfant, j'ai vu un cerf. Aujourd'hui, s'il y a un bout de bois planté, peu de temps après, il est recouvert par une petite dune.»

Un jour, le sable nous chassera de chez nous», répond-il. Se retrouver sans terre dans la société agraire du Soudan, c'est comme signer son ar-rêt de mort. Pour l'instant, il semble n'y avoir aucun espoir de survis. □

Michael M'lior est principal correspondant européen de la CBC pour le National Radio News.



Noyés dans le courant «réaliste»

Quoique trouvant la table ronde intitulée «Éclatement des États, gé-mèse des nations» et l'article consacré à un «Monde sans armements» (Ét 1991) informatifs et bien argu-mentés dans l'ensemble, le pes-

Si l'on analyse rationnellement la situation, on ne tarde pas à conclure que, d'un point de vue mondial, les transferts d'armements sont surtout

une perte de ressources, de vies et de biens. D'un point de vue national, il en va autrement, puisque tout Etat se sent menacé. Le problème est de savoir comment rassurer les Etats : or, ce problème est à la fois objectif (la menace) et subjectif (la perception d'une menace). Il importe donc tout autant de s'efforcer de réduire les menaces et de parvenir à changer les perceptions des

Un moyen important de ralentir les transferts d'armements consiste

à rendre les armes moins intéressantes ; un autre, à donner des choix, à rendre le développement économique, par exemple, plus attrayant. C'est en cela que l'article de Keith Krause nêche. Si l'on considère les

des décisions prises en matière d'armements, et pas simplement les mécanismes du système international, on s'aperçoit qu'il existe d'autres façons d'arriver à limiter leurs transferts que celle qu'il expose. Ainsi, si l'on

ite aide au développement et achats d'armes, on change les prix relatifs des armes et du développement, ce qui aura, normalement, une incidence sur la demande. C'est cette méthode dont on discute actuellement à la Banque mondiale et au FMI.

Un autre élément renvoie à la «Paix perpétuelle» de Kant. Des États démocratiques et des gouvernements qui répondent aux souhaits de leurs citoyens voient peut-être sous un autre angle le coût relatif des armes et d'autres biens. N'est-il pas possible

die que la limitation des transferts d'armement ait un lien avec la démocratisation ? Les analyses, même consacrées à la paix et à la sécurité, doivent être réalistes et éviter les voeux pieux. Par ailleurs, j'attends d'elles qu'elles cherchent de meilleures solutions et non qu'elles se noient dans le courant «réaliste».

Michael Brzoska  
Institut für Politische Wissenschaft  
Hamburg, Allemagne

L'élite n'éclaire personne  
Pour son article intitulé «Les  
séquences de la guerre du Golfe»  
(Été 1991), l'ICPSI n'a fait appel  
qu'à des membres d'organismes bien  
pensants. Le résultat était à prévoir :  
le lecteur n'a rien appris.  
L'animateur a fait de son mieux.

Il a demandé ce que l'on retiendrait d'unique de cette guerre. Les réponses floues qu'il a obtenues trahissent la volonté du groupe de contourner soigneusement les véritables changements. Deuxième tentative de l'«établissement».

l'Occident et le monde islamique ? Seul M. Korany a répondu directement à cette question en disant que le fossé entre les pays islamiques et les non-musulmans s'était élargi.

Mais il était sans aucun doute trop dangereux d'expliquer pourquoi. On ne pouvait attendre de l'animateur qu'il réussisse à faire dire à des personnes choisies dans l'«établissement» des choses qu'elles ne

musulman arabe ?  
le point de vue d'un dissident  
Boris Aldanov, Ottawa

**pas d'austérité non plus**

un corps d'armée mieux équipé que le nôtre pour un budget correspondant à un tiers du nôtre, et j'ai soutenu que si l'on collait très cher de maintenir une force armée composée exclusivement de volontaires, comme c'est le cas en Israël, avec

en plus nos modes d'acquisition des

lourd et les autres dépenses à équiper nous, l'infrastructure nationale n'a jamais dit que notre armée était composée de gradés, sa structure hiérarchique découle de la diversité de ses activités, des rôles, de l'envergure géographique qui lui sont propres, et du système de commandement requis. D'ailleurs, pourquoi s'attendre à ce que notre armée pratique une politique d'assistance qui nous applique nulle part dans les milieux bureaucratiques et politiques fédéraux ?

*Note de la rédaction* : La remarque de M. Thériault concernant la façon dont ses propos ont été repris dans le numéro de *Paix et Sécurité* est exacte. L'erreur est imputable aux rédacteurs, et nous nous excusons.

Conseil d'administration de l'Institut.  
Morton, M. Thériault est membre du  
d'après de lui et de M. Desmond  
Régime de sécurité  
pour le Pacifique Nord :  
qui en est l'investigateur ?

Le professeur Jeremy Patiel se trompe lorsque, dans l'article intitulé «Beijing nage à contre-courant» (Été 1991), il déclare «Sous M. Joe Clark, ancien ministre des affaires extérieures, le Canada a prudemment

accueille un projet soviétique de longue date visant à créer un régime de sécurité pour l'Asie-Pacifique (...). Des pourparlers préliminaires sur la question ont eu lieu en avril, à Victoria».

fois du projet canadien visant à instaurer un Dialogue sur la sécurité coopérative dans l'Asie-Pacifique (DSCAP) dans les allocutions prononcées par le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à Victoria, à

Tokyo et à Jakarta, en juillet 1990. Le DSCAP ne traduit pas l'acceptation de la vision soviétique dite de «Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk» de la sécurité dans l'Asie-Pacifique. Dans son initiative, Moscou demande une

l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, qui devrait avoir lieu en 1993, à Vladivostok, propose des pourparlers entre l'URSS, les États-Unis et le Japon sur des questions relatives à la sécurité dans l'Asie du Nord-

Est, et souhaite la création d'une

La Chine et le Japon) discuteraient des problèmes se rapportant à la sécurité. Dans l'option qu'elle présente, Ottawa rejette la création de mécanismes inutiles, évite d'aborder les questions de sécurité bloc à bloc, et cherche à nouer entre les États intéressés de la région une « habitude de dialogue ».

Le DSCAP comporte deux volets, l'un gouvernemental, l'autre, non

l'essentiel, et il porte essentiellement sur les régions du Pacifique du Nord, de la Chine, de la République démocratique populaire de Corée, du Japon, de l'Union soviétique, de la République de Corée, des États-Unis et du Canada. Il n'y a que dans la sous-région [du Pacifique Nord], où la concentration de forces con-

ventionnelles et nucléaires est importante, et où une instabilité croissante nuirait aux intérêts politiques, économiques, sociaux et environnementaux du Canada, qu'il n'existe aucune instance multinationale qui puisse dispenser de

Le volet non gouvernemental (celui de organismes non gouvernementaux, dits ONG) de la proposition canadienne est conçu précisément pour étudier dossiers et perspectives

de dialogue, et pour concentrer con-  
naissances et attention sur le Paci-  
fique Nord. L'Université de York a  
organisé un colloque international à  
Victoria, en avril, pour parler avec  
des universitaires et d'autres spé-

Le volet officiel, ou gouvernemental, de l'initiative canadienne est un processus souple dont l'objectif


est d'analyser les mérites de l'ouverture d'un dialogue régional. Ce dialogue ne doit pas résulter d'une tentative de transplantation de modèles ou d'institutions européens. Les sources de tension et la nature

des problèmes régionaux dans le Pacifique Nord ne se prêtent pas à une telle démarche. En fait, il est indispensable d'adapter des méthodes favorisant la stabilité aux traditions et à la dynamique historique et géographique de la région.

Claude Boucher, Directeur  
Planification des politiques  
Affaires extérieures, Ottawa



## NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT



Industry Database, une base de données qui contient des renseignements sur les articles militaires vendus au Canada et à l'étranger par les sociétés canadiennes.

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**plus de 200 périodiques et bulletins de tous les pays, y compris diverses sources médiatiques ; des ouvrages de référence comportant des statistiques à jour, des biographies, des renseignements terminologiques, des cartes, etc. ; des dossiers de presse tirés des principaux journaux canadiens et d'une sélection des grands journaux étrangers sur des problèmes internationaux classés par sujet ; un choix de documents officiels**

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Notre base de données informatisées dominant un accès par sujets aux différents ouvrages de la bibliothèque dont la collection remonte à 1985 ; on y trouve notamment la *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control bibliography* dans laquelle figure la liste des ouvrages parus en anglais sur ce sujet depuis 1945.

L'accès à la *Canadian Military*

Dans le cadre de son programme des «Bourses Barton», ainsi appelé en l'honneur de son premier président, M. William Barton, ancien ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU, l'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à déposer leur dossier de candidature. Le programme est ouvert aux universitaires et aux autres personnes qui veulent entreprendre ou poursuivre des études sur la paix et la sécurité internationales. Il entend favoriser l'accroissement des compétences et des connaissances de haut niveau dans ce domaine, en appuyant les candidats pour la poursuite des études dans des institutions au Canada et à l'étranger. L'Institut compte choisir seize récipiendaires, deux d'entre eux recevront chacun une bourse de «fellow» de 30 000 \$ maximum et les neuf autres bénéficieront chacun d'une bourse d'étude de 14 000 \$ maximum. Un comité de sélection indépendant évaluera les candidatures et rendra ses décisions en mai 1992.

Les candidats(e)s doivent être citoyen(ne)s canadien(ne)s ou immigré(e)s résident(e)s d'expérience ou des compétences universitaires leur permettant de poursuivre des études supérieures.

Les candidatures pour l'année universitaire 1992-1993 doivent

### Programme de bourses Barton

parvenir à l'Institut le 1<sup>er</sup> février 1992 au plus tard. Pour obtenir plus de détails et des formulaires de demande, prière d'écrire à l'adresse suivante :

Programme des bourses Barton, Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, 360, rue Albert, bureau 900, Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

Pour les compétitions dont les dates limites seront les 30 juin et 30 novembre 1991, et le 30 juin 1992, le Fonds étudiant, en particulier, les demandes de contributions reliées à des projets qui pourraient contribuer à une réflexion sur des questions portant sur la paix et la sécurité internationale lors de la célébration du 125<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de la Confédération en 1992. Nous croyons qu'à cette occasion, les Canadiens et Canadiennes seront invité(e)s par le Parlement à réfléchir, dans leurs champs d'activités respectifs, sur leurs réalisations et sur les défis que présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

le 30 novembre, pour la sélection de mars

Concours «Paix et Sécurité», 360, rue Albert, bureau 900, Ottawa (Ontario) K1R 7X7

### Concours «Paix et Sécurité» : procédure et échéancier

#### Heures d'ouverture

Du lundi au vendredi, de 8 h 30 à 17 h

#### Équipements offerts

● Lecteur de microfiches avec imprimante ;  
● Machine à photocopier ;  
● Cabines d'étude pour les recherches sur place ;  
● Base de données directement accessible au public.


#### Publications et brochures

La bibliographie annuelle intitulée *Le Canada, la paix et la sécurité internationales : une bibliographie*, une bibliographie des publi-  
cations canadiennes destinées aux bibliothèques publiques et scolaires, *Le Thésaurus de la paix et de la sécurité*, dans lequel sont classés plus de 750 termes utilisés dans le domaine.

Les «Sources d'information sur la paix et la sécurité», un guide des sources de référence sur le sujet.

La liste des périodiques en bibliothèque.  
La liste des ouvrages acquis chaque mois par la bibliothèque.

## LIVRES



### Compétitivité internationale et

depenses militaires

François Chénais

Éditions Economica, Paris, 1990  
245 pages, 40,95 \$

Dans la collection CPE-Econo-

mie, François Chénais propose un

livre qui aborde les liens existant

entre les grands programmes d'arme-

ment, les dépenses militaires et les

politiques industrielles endossées

par les gouvernements des pays in-

dustrialisés. Dans ce domaine, les

stratégies des différents pays qui

sont confrontées à ces questions sem-

blent diverger en apparence. Cepen-

dant, en rapport avec les sommes

colossales qui sont investies dans la

course aux armements, peu de gou-

vernements utilisent la rhétorique de

la compétitivité internationale pour

légitimer l'allocation de ressources

militaires. Les problématiques amé-

ricaine et françaises sont abordées en

profondeur dans ce livre.

Les trois premiers chapitres sont

consacrés aux États-Unis. Dans le

premier, écrit par Bernard Haude-

ville, il est question de Recherche &

Développement et du rôle de l'État

à la structure industrielle du

pays. Christos Passadacos traite, dans

Serfati), pour ensuite terminer avec

un cas spécifique de l'industrie mili-

taire de ce pays, le Groupe Thomson

(Claude Serfati). Globalement, les

liens très réels qui existent entre la po-

litière note la position de l'industrie

industrielle françaises situent de façon

très positive au début. La recherche

statistique est abondante, bien ex-

pliquée et surtout évoquée de façon

pertinente et elle est bien appuyée par

certaines chapitres plus «théoriques».

Toutefois, l'exercice de comparat-

son entre les États-Unis et la France,

ne repose en aucun cas sur une analyse

systématique entre les deux prob-

lèmes. Peu d'indices sont utilisés

pour évaluer et mesurer les diffé-

rences qui peuvent exister, tant et si

bien que après la lecture de cet ou-

vrage, on fait face à deux recherches

distinctes, artificiellement réunies et

traitées séparément.

Le traitement inégal des différents

chapitres est aussi à noter. Celui de

peut-être le double dessein des au-

teurs : recueillir dans un même livre

deux études qui sont tout au plus

parallèles et dont les contenus gravi-

rent dans une grande problématique

en mal d'hypothèses plus précises.

— France Malais

politique à l'Université du Québec à

Montréal.

L'Armée rouge face à la

perestroïka

Thierry Mallaret et Murielle

Delaporte

Éditions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1991

303 pages, 18,95 \$

L'appareil militaire a longtemps

benéficié d'une situation tout à fait

privilegiée en Union soviétique. Sa

puissance reposait alors essentiel-

lement sur l'absorption d'une part im-

portante des ressources économiques

et industrielles du pays. Dès lors, il

est normal que se pose la question

des répercussions des réformes en-

treprises par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev

sur l'appareil militaire soviétique.

Malheureusement, le livre de Thierry

Mallaret et Murielle Delaporte ne

nous aidera pas beaucoup à cerner

ces répercussions.

L'ouvrage est construit autour des

cinq principales composantes du

système de défense et de sécurité de

l'URSS. Toutefois, contrairement à

ce que le titre laisse entendre, l'ou-

vrage ne touche que partiellement à

l'Armée rouge. Les composantes

qu'aborde les auteurs sont les

suites suivantes : l'infrastructure et la pen-

se militaire, le désarmement et le

contrôle des armements, l'économie,

et les alliances. Le tout est soutenu

par une approche historique qui

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les développements de l'appareil

militaire «à partir de l'histoire et de

l'évolution des structures».

Diverses sections de l'ouvrage

sont consacrées soit aux évolutions

la mécanisation ou l'apparition des

armes nucléaires, soit encore aux

conséquences de la Grande Guerre

mondielle (1939-1945). D'autres

sections classiques sur l'économie du

complexe militaro-industriel ou en-

core sur le pacifisme comme instru-

ment traditionnel de propagande.

Cette grande dépendance des auteurs

face à l'historiographie occidentale,

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cinq principales composantes du

système de défense et de sécurité de

l'URSS. Toutefois, contrairement à

ce que le titre laisse entendre, l'ou-

vrage ne touche que partiellement à

l'Armée rouge. Les composantes

qu'aborde les auteurs sont les

suites suivantes : l'infrastructure et la pen-

se militaire, le désarmement et le

contrôle des armements, l'économie,

et les alliances. Le tout est soutenu

par une approche historique qui

cherche à comprendre et à expliquer

les développements de l'appareil

militaire «à partir de l'histoire et de

l'évolution des structures».

Diverses sections de l'ouvrage

sont consacrées soit aux évolutions

la mécanisation ou l'apparition des

armes nucléaires, soit encore aux

conséquences de la Grande Guerre

mondielle (1939-1945). D'autres

sections classiques sur l'économie du

complexe militaro-industriel ou en-

core sur le pacifisme comme instru-

ment traditionnel de propagande.

Cette grande dépendance des auteurs

face à l'historiographie occidentale,

peut-être le double dessein des au-

teurs : recueillir dans un même livre

deux études qui sont tout au plus

parallèles et dont les contenus gravi-

rent dans une grande problématique

en mal d'hypothèses plus précises.

— France Malais

politique à l'Université du Québec à

Montréal.

L'Armée rouge face à la

perestroïka

Thierry Mallaret et Murielle

Delaporte

Éditions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1991

303 pages, 18,95 \$

L'appareil militaire a longtemps

benéficié d'une situation tout à fait

privilegiée en Union soviétique. Sa

puissance reposait alors essentiel-

lement sur l'absorption d'une part im-

portante des ressources économiques

et industrielles du pays. Dès lors, il

est normal que se pose la question

des répercussions des réformes en-

treprises par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev

sur l'appareil militaire soviétique.

Malheureusement, le livre de Thierry

Mallaret et Murielle Delaporte ne

nous aidera pas beaucoup à cerner

ces répercussions.

L'ouvrage est construit autour des

cinq principales composantes du

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# CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



## Les pourparlers sur la réduction des armements stratégiques

■ Au sommet de Moscou du 31 juillet, les présidents Bush et Gorbatchev ont signé un Traité START long de 700 pages. Les trois grandes questions restées en suspens avaient été réglées plus tôt dans le mois, à Washington, au terme de quatre jours de pourparlers entre leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères.

Pour ce qui est de la réduction des charges, c'est-à-dire du nombre des ogives par missile, les deux parties se sont entendues sur un plafond de 1 250 «têtes» sur trois types de missiles différents (au départ, les Soviétiques soulaient un accord sur 2 150 têtes sur trois types d'engins, alors que les Américains auraient préféré 1 000 têtes sur un seul type de missile), s'agissant de la telle-mentre, les Soviétiques ont accepté de fournir des données enregistrées pour tous leurs essais de missile, et pour un nombre limité d'entre eux. Enfin, les deux parties ont fixé à 21 p. 100 le changement de puissance des lanceurs au décollage à la 17 juillet, que la définition de la MM, Bush et Gorbatchev à Londres, n'est qu'à la rencontre entre

Le différend portant sur les termes du Traité FCB, signé en novembre, a finalement été réglé à Lisbonne, le 1<sup>er</sup> juin, par le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. James Baker, et le ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétique, M. Bessmertnyk. Les autres signataires du Traité ont officiellement approuvé le compromis deux semaines plus tard, à Vienne. Sans accepter l'interprétation de ces signataires, selon laquelle ces forces tombent sous le coup du Traité, l'URSS s'est engagée à ce que le matériel équippant son infanterie de marine et ses unités de défense côtière ne dépassent pas les plafonds de

Le document et à ne pas l'accroître. Elles conserveront le matériel actuel, mais un nombre équivalent de pièces, soit 3 738, seront retirées des forces terrestres pour être détruites, modifiées ou converties pour usage civil. Sur ce total, 753 véhicules blindés de combat (VBC) seront modifiés et reclassés sous l'appellation de matériel de soutien au combat, catégorie non visée par le

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Cependant, étant donné qu'elle

crédite ses bombardiers de moins d'engins qu'ils peuvent en emporter en réalité, et que les missiles de croisière mer-sol ne sont aucune-ment pris en compte (leur nombre est limité à 880 en vertu d'un accord distinct), les Américains réduiront, en définitive, leur arsenal straté-gique d'environ 15 p. 100 et les Soviétiques, le leur, de quelque 25 p. 100, au lieu des 50 p. 100 sur sept ans visés au départ.

Le différend portant sur les termes du Traité FCB, signé en novembre, a finalement été réglé à Lisbonne, le 1<sup>er</sup> juin, par le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. James Baker, et le ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétique, M. Bessmertnyk. Les autres signataires du Traité ont officiellement approuvé le compromis deux semaines plus tard, à Vienne. Sans accepter l'interprétation de ces co-

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## Le Moyen-Orient

Le 29 mai, le président Bush a proposé les mesures suivantes pour une limitation des armements au Moyen-Orient : (1) une première rencontre à Paris des cinq grands fournisseurs d'armements afin de définir des lignes directrices pour restreindre les transferts déséquilibrés d'armes conventionnelles et d'armes de destruction massive ; (2) un mécanisme de consultation entre fournisseurs, et la notification à l'avance de certaines ventes ; (3) un gel de la acquisition ou des essais de missiles sol-sol, avec pour objectif ultime d'en éliminer la présence dans la région ; (4) une interdiction de produire ou d'acquiescer davantage d'uranium enrichi et de plutonium séparé, qui peuvent servir à la fabrication d'armes nucléaires ; et

(5) l'engagement de tous les Etats trop sur les armes de destruction massive. Quant aux Etats arabes, ils se sont plaints qu'il n'y était nullement question du stock d'armes nucléaires que l'on soupçonne les Israéliens de posséder.

Les cinq grands marchands d'armes, qui se trouvent être les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, se sont réunis à Paris les 8 et 9 juillet. Ils ont approuvé les propositions de M. Bush, ont demandé la création au Moyen-Orient d'une «zone libre de toute arme de destruction massive», et sont convenus de réunir des experts en septembre, avant de reprendre en octobre, à Londres, les pourparlers sur la restriction des transferts.

## En bref

Le 13 mai, le président Bush a annoncé que les Etats-Unis n'insis-

restait plus pour conserver un petit

stock d'armes chimiques (AC) (2 p. 100 de son stock actuel, soit quelque 500 tonnes) tant que tous les Etats capables de produire des AC n'auront pas adhéré à une interdiction mondiale des AC, et qu'ils renonceraient à se réserver le droit d'employer des AC en représailles à une attaque chimique. Il a invité la Conférence du désarmement, qui siège à Genève, à régler toutes les grandes questions avant la fin de l'année, de façon qu'une Convention sur les armes chimiques soit prêtée d'ici à mai 1992.

Pendant une visite du chef d'état-major général de l'armée soviétique, le général Moïsseseyev, début mai au Canada, l'URSS et le Canada ont signé un accord sur «la prévention des activités militaires dangereuses». Cet accord vise à éviter des incidents liés aux armes chimiques.

Conformément au Traité sur les forces nucléaires intermédiaires (FNI) conclu en 1987, les Etats-Unis et l'URSS ont détruit les derniers de leurs 2 692 missiles FNI au début du mois de mai.

La Zambie, la Tanzanie et l'Afrique du Sud ont toutes récemment signé le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), tandis que la France a annoncé son intention d'en faire

autant. Le seul Etat possédant les armes nucléaires à ne pas être signataire du TNP, à savoir la Chine, a aussi déclaré qu'elle «envisageait sérieusement» de signer le Traité.

Le Conseil de l'Europe, à la fin juin, les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité réunis à Paris début juillet et le Sommet écono-

mique de Londres, plus tard le même mois, ont approuvé une proposition dont le Canada se fait depuis longtemps le champion, celle d'un registre des transferts d'armes conventionnelles qui serait confié à l'ONU. Le Canada a également con-

tribué à convoquer les ministres des Affaires étrangères de la CSECE assemblés à Berlin en juin de proner une plus grande transparence dans les transferts d'armements. □

— RON PURVER

## EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE

« avoir fait preuve de maladresse après la divulgation de l'affaire, tant que le NPD réclamait avec insistance la démission de MM. Clark et Valcourt et de Mme McDoougall. Un député conservateur sans portefeuille, M. Geoff Scott, a rompu avec son parti et demandé une enquête judiciaire afin que toute la lumière soit faite sur l'affaire.

**Le projet de loi sur les exportations d'armement**

Une autre grande controverse a secoué la Chambre en mai et juin, le C-6 « relatif à l'exportation, à l'importation, à l'achat, à la vente ou à toute autre contrat visant certaines armes ». Le gouvernement a présenté le 23 mai ce projet de loi qui a pour objet de modifier la Loi sur les licences d'exportation et d'importation, et le Code pénal afin que deux des ventes d'armes importantes, l'une aux Pays-Bas et l'autre, à l'Arabie Saoudite.


Diemaco Ltd. (Kitchener) essaie de vendre aux Hollandais 100 000 fusils automatiques C7, ce qui représente un contrat de 120 millions de dollars, alors que General Motors (Canada) essaie elle de vendre aux Saoudiens 1117 véhicules blindés légers équipés de mitrailleuses, ce qui représente un contrat de 800 millions de dollars. Le ministre du Commerce extérieur, M. Michael Wilson, a insisté sur le fait que le projet de loi C-6 n'était pas en contradiction avec la campagne lancée par le gouvernement après la guerre du Golfe pour limiter le commerce international des armes. Cette campagne les armes de destruction massive », catégorie dans laquelle n'entrent pas les fusils automatiques et les véhicules blindés.

Jusqu'à-là, il était illégal, en vertu du Code pénal, de vendre des armes automatiques à quiconque sauf aux forces armées et à la police du Canada. Les nouvelles dispositions établissant des critères stricts concernant la vente d'armes à des civils étrangers. Toute vente à des civils est interdite, chaque vente sera examinée par le gouvernement, et un rapport annuel doit être remis au Parlement. En outre, le gouvernement dressera une « liste de contrôle » des pays autorisés à acheter des armes fabriquées au Canada.

L'enquête a également été l'occasion de récriminations publiques entre deux des plus hauts fonctionnaires d'Ottawa, MM. Chétien et de Montigny Marchand, sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures ; et d'investigations entre un des suppléants du Comité, M. John Nunziata, et M. Paul Tellier, greffier du Conseil privé, c'est-à-dire chef de la fonction publique. En outre, M. David Robinson (NPD), a reconnu ne pas avoir servi le qu'il avait reçue à propos du dossier al-Mashtar, ce qui explique pourquoi il ne l'avait pas transmise à M. Clark. Plus tard, M. Daubney a déclaré au Comité qu'on l'avait choisi pour partager la tâche, « parce que M. Chétien avait été monté du doigt comme étant le fonctionnaire ayant commis une erreur dans cette histoire. Etant donné son nom et son lien de parenté avec le chef de l'opposition — il est son neveu —, je pense qu'on a voulu faire partager la faute. »

Dans un rapport publié le 20 juin, le Comité convenait de la nécessité d'améliorer les communications « tant à l'intérieur des ministères qu'entre les ministères ». Il recommandait également que le Comité du travail, de l'emploi et de l'immigration examine la Loi et les règlements sur l'immigration afin de trouver des moyens d'éviter que se répète « l'insécurité manifestée à l'admission de M. al-Mashtar au Canada. Enfin, il exhortait le gouvernement à constituer un « groupe de travail de haut niveau composé de personnalités politiques et de spécialistes, de fonctionnaires et de spécialistes, en vue de préciser ce que l'on doit entendre par « responsabilité ministérielle » et de rallier un consensus autour de cette définition... »

Les avis divergeaient à la Chambre quant à savoir qui était à blâmer pour l'imbrigoï. La majorité conservatrice acceptait la version gouvernementale des événements ; les ministères, y compris M. Mulroney, Libéraux accusaient différents



**L'affaire al-Mashat**

Le 21 juin, la troisième session de 34<sup>e</sup> législature du Parlement, qui s'était ouverte le 13 mai, a été levée pour l'instant. Les travaux parlementaires reprendront le 16 septembre. En mai et juin, Ottawa a été aux prises avec l'affaire al-Mashat, c'est-à-dire avec le dossier concernant l'arrivée au Canada, le 30 mars, d'un ancien ambassadeur d'Irak aux États-Unis, à qui un visa d'immigrant avait été accordé au terme d'une procédure accélérée de vingt-huit jours.

Le gouvernement a demandé au Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et du commerce extérieur (CPAECB) de la Chambre des communes d'étudier la question. Des audiences ont commencé le 30 mai et de nombreux témoins sont venus déposer devant le Comité, dont plusieurs ministres du Cabinet, à savoir : M. Joe Clark, ministre des Affaires constitutionnelles ; Mme Barbara McDougall, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures ; et M. Bernard Valcourt, ministre de l'Immigration. Le gouvernement a déclaré que l'ancien diplomate était entré dans le pays à la suite de ce que Mme McDougall a qualifié de « toute une série d'erreurs de jugement ».

S'exprimant vers la fin des débats, M. Joe Clark a maintenu que deux fonctionnaires, à savoir : M. David Daubney, son chef de cabinet, et M. Raymond Chretien, le sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures, lui devaient des excuses pour ne pas lui avoir parlé de ce dossier controversé, qui misquait de l'embarrasser alors que, ministres des Affaires extérieures, ils allaient entreprendre, au lendemain de la guerre du Golfe, un important voyage au Moyen-Orient. M. Glen Shortliffe, haut fonctionnaire du bureau du Conseil privé, a révélé qu'il avait appelé M. Chretien à son bureau, le 13 mai, afin de confirmer une description des événements (y compris des excuses au gouverne-



L'affaire al-Mashat

Institut canadien pour  
la paix et la sécurité internationales



# À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



## Sanctions contre l'Irak

Fin juillet, l'Irak était toujours au

coeur des délibérations du Conseil

de sécurité. Entre autres choses, les

quatorze membres du Conseil exami-

naient une proposition visant à au-

toriser l'Irak à vendre du pétrole

pour la première fois depuis la fin

du conflit. Il s'agissait de permettre à

Bagdad d'utiliser des revenus pétro-

liers pour acheter, une seule fois et

sous très étroite surveillance, des

dépenses qui font cruellement défaut

en Irak. Le prince Sadruddin Aga

Khan, qui est chargé des opérations

humanitaires de l'ONU dans le

golfe Persique, venait d'informer le

comité des sanctions du Conseil de

sécurité qu'on allait au-devant d'une

adoption de l'ONU pénétrer

l'Irak de laisser l'équipe d'inspec-

tion nucléaire de l'ONU pénétrer

l'Irak de laisser l'équipe d'inspec-

tion nucléaire de l'ONU pénétrer

l'Irak de laisser l'équipe d'inspec-

15 juillet, Rolf Ekeus, chef de la

Commission spéciale de l'ONU

chargée de trouver les armes de des-

truction massive irakiennes, avait

rapporté que Bagdad essayait de

tenir des informations secrètes et

de cacher du matériel servant à

embûcher l'uranium et rappelé qu'au

début, les Irakiens avaient même

nié l'existence d'un programme

clandestin.

Le 19 juillet, le même M. Ekeus

a déclaré au Conseil que l'Irak

plus tard, comme le prévoyait la ré-

solution 768, le Secrétaire général a

fait savoir quelle part maximale des

revenus pétroliers annuels irakiens

il proposait de destiner au dédom-

agement versé aux personnes qui

avaient souffert à cause de l'inva-

sion du Koweït. Dans une lettre au

Conseil de sécurité, M. Pérez de

Cuellar précisait que cette part ne

devrait pas dépasser 50 p. 100 des-

dis revenus. C'est à la Commission

d'indemnisation qu'il incombera

de fixer le pourcentage en dernier

ressort.

## Amérique centrale

Le 20 mai, le Conseil de sécurité

a décidé de mettre au place une mis-

sion d'observation au El Salvador

(ONUSAL) qui aura pour tâche

initiale de voir dans quelle mesure

les droits de la personne sont res-

pectés. Adoptée à l'unanimité, la ré-

solution 693 marque un revirement

complet de la part de l'organisation

mondiale, puisque pour la première

fois de son histoire, elle se propose

d'étudier la situation des droits de

la personne dans un Etat membre.

Certains diplomates ont vu dans

cette résolution le signe d'une ONU

nouvelle et plus vigoureuse.

Au cours de l'été, les Nations

Unies déploieront plus de 100 civils

et policiers spécialistes des droits

de la personne, qui seront rejoints

par cinquante autres à l'automne.

Selon des observateurs, l'ONUSAL

devrait changer la nature du conflit

salvadorien, car sa présence fera

d'avantage hésiter les belligérants

à violer les droits de la personne.

Les deux parties en présence ont

reclamé la création de l'ONUSAL.

Le 6 mai, le Conseil a prolongé

de six mois le mandat du Groupe

d'observateurs des Nations Unies

en Amérique centrale (ONUCA),

L'ONUCA a pour mission d'obser-

ver les cinq pays d'Amérique

## Angola

Le 30 mai, le Conseil a élargi le

mandat de la Mission de vérification

des Nations Unies en Angola

(MVNUA) chargée de contrôler le

retrait progressif des soldats cubains

du pays. La MVNUA a à desormais

pour tâches supplémentaires de

surveiller le cessez-le-feu conclu

entre le gouvernement angolais et

les insurgés de l'UNITA (Union

nationale pour l'indépendance totale

de l'Angola).

## Moyen-Orient

Le 24 mai, le Conseil de sécurité

a adopté à l'unanimité la réso-

lution 694 par laquelle il déclarait

déployer l'expédition au Sud-Liban

pour Israël, le 18 mai, de quatre

Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza.

La résolution demandait à Israël de

cesser d'expulser des habitants des

territoires occupés et de «garantir

le retour sain et sauf, et immédiat,

de tous les expulsés».

Le 30 mai, le Conseil a prolongé

de six mois le mandat de la Force

des Nations Unies chargée d'ob-

server le désengagement (FNUOD),

qui supervise le cessez-le-feu entre

Israël et la Syrie depuis 1974.

## Chypre

Le 14 juin, le Conseil a adopté à

l'unanimité la résolution 698 visant

à répondre aux questions de pays

comme le Canada qui ont le senti-

ment de supporter une trop grande

part du fardeau financier de la Force

des Nations Unies chargées du

maintien de la paix à Chypre

(FNUC). Le document «conclut

qu'il est nécessaire de définir une

méthode de financement qui don-

nera à la Force des bases financières


solides». La résolution 696, adoptée

le même jour, prolonge le mandat

de la FNUC de six autres mois. □

— TREVOR ROWE

# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



## Les leçons militaires du conflit

■ À la mi-juillet, le Pentagone a transmis au Congrès un rapport provisoire sur la guerre du golfe Persique. Entouré de rumeurs selon lesquelles sa rédaction aurait provoqué de sévères éclats entre services du char *M1A1* méritait-il autant d'encore que le chasseur furtif *F117A* ? — ce rapport cite quelques-unes des faiblesses de l'opération Tempête du désert, mais ses réus-sites aussi, dont certaines sont bien connues. Ainsi, les avions de chasse de haute technologie ; la navigation, les communications et le recueil de renseignements par satellite ; les bombes à guidage de précision ; et les manœuvres d'entraînement de l'OTAN ont donné aux forces de la coalition un avantage écrasant sur le champ de bataille.

Par ailleurs, le rapport reconnaît que la coalition a bénéficié de conditions favorables. L'Arabie Saoudite a fourni d'excellents ports pour le débarquement des forces, et il y avait peu de risque que les Irakiens interdisent le ravitaillement de ses dernières. Les cinq mois précédant le début des hostilités ont permis à la coalition de régler des questions essentielles en matière de commandement et de contrôle. Plus important encore, sans doute, le désert a constitué un terrain idéal pour les opérations aériennes contre l'armée irakienne. En effet, on a pu couper rapidement les Irakiens de leurs postes de ravitaillement et les empêcher, par conséquent, de progresser sur le champ de bataille.

## Guerre du Golfe et Guerre des étoiles

Les leçons du golfe Persique conduisent certes les Américains à revoir de nombreux points de leur planification militaire, des satellites de champ de bataille à des améliorations matérielles en passant par un meilleur entraînement pour le démantage de vieux engins, mais elles ont

aussi soulevé certains débats stratégiques importants. Début août, des fonctionnaires du Pentagone ont encore posé deux à trois cents questions *SCUD*. Dans son rapport au Congrès, le Pentagone reconnaît qu'il est très difficile d'obtenir de localiser des missiles sur rampes mobiles. En outre, dans la préface de ce rapport, le secrétaire à la Défense, M. Dick Cheney, déclare que l'expérience du Golfe confirme la nécessité d'avoir des bombardiers *B-2* et de défense anti-missiles balistiques. Le 16 juillet, le jour même de la remise du rapport, dans une allocution prononcée à Washington, M. Cheney a réitéré avec ferveur inhabituelle son soutien au projet de la Guerre des étoiles. « Il est absolument essentiel, a-t-il affirmé, que nous nous dotions maintenant des moyens de nous défendre, de défendre le territoire des États-Unis, nos troupes outre-mer et nos amis à l'étranger contre la menace des missiles balistiques (...) ». Je suis persuadé que nous en sommes capables techniquement, je suis tout à fait convaincu qu'il n'en va de notre sécurité nationale.

M. Cheney a reçu un appui inattendu, mais différent de celui qu'il aurait souhaité. Après un revirement crucial de son président, M. Sam Nunn, et de la majorité démocratique, le Comité sénatorial des forces armées s'est déclaré favorable à une défense anti-missiles balistiques terrestre limitée. Ce faisant, le Comité a rejeté l'option gouvernementale, qui vise au déploiement d'un système spatial utilisant de petits intercepteurs « intelligents » (*Brilliant Pebbles*). En théorie, *Brilliant Pebbles* fera échouer même une attaque nucléaire massive en interceptant les missiles ennemis avant leur rentrée dans l'atmosphère terrestre.

Pour sa part, le Sénat propose de déployer 100 lance-missiles terrestres dans le Dakota du Nord, à restes dans le Dakota du Nord, à un endroit autorisé en termes du Traité ABM de 1972. Limiter le déploiement à 100 rampes, c'est respecter le Traité ABM, encore que le sénateur Nunn ait proposé d'entamer des négociations avec l'URSS

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en vue d'en modifier la tenue pour pouvoir déployer une plus grande défense. Comparé au programme gouvernemental, qui devrait être terminé à la fin des années 1990, pour un coût de 40 milliards de dollars, le système proposé par le Sénat sera en place d'ici à 1996 et il ne coûterait que 10 milliards de dollars. Plus encore qu'un *Brilliant Pebbles* spatial, l'installation d'une défense anti-missiles terrestre dans le Dakota du Nord a des conséquences importantes pour le Canada. Selon des sources du Pentagone, au minimum, la région défendue, jusqu'au nord du Canada, jusqu'à Churchill (Manitoba) ; au maximum, elle s'étendrait loin à l'intérieur de l'Arctique canadien.

## Les vols de Goose Bay

Il se peut fort que l'on traitera de ces questions dans la révision tant attendue du Livre blanc de la défense de 1987. Entre-temps, le débat public sur les questions de fermeture de bases, alors que des dépôts de bases qui pourraient fermeront n'en disant pas plus sur le nom des bases qui pourraient fermer, un « localitaire » de longue date a décidé de partir quoi qu'il advienne. En juillet, les avions américains ont quitté Goose Bay (Labrador), ce qui fait planer de sérieux doutes sur l'avenir de la base. Plus connue dernièrement à cause des controverses soulevées par les vols à basse altitude, Goose Bay était au centre des débats nucléaires au début des années 1960. Étant donné la situation très stratégique de Goose Bay sur la côte nord-est, les États-Unis, qui y stationnaient déjà des appareils, avaient mis la base en tête de la liste des emplacements où ils déploieraient en priorité des armes nucléaires de défense aérienne. Des documents d'archives canadiens, bakker précisent aussi que le Commandement du gouvernement Diefenbaker, ce qui permettrait aux bombardiers *B-52* de rentrer de leur première attaque, de se réarmer et de s'envoler de nouveau vers l'Union soviétique.

Fin mai, le Conseil des ministres de l'OTAN, qui s'efforce de définir la place de l'organisation dans l'Europe de l'après-Guerre froide, a annoncé une réduction et une réorganisation considérables des forces multinationales. Les effectifs seront diminués de moitié pour être ramportés à 750 000 hommes. Ils seront réorganisés en sept corps basés en Europe occidentale et centrale, plus une force d'action rapide placée sous commandement britannique. Celle-ci comprendra quatre divisions, dont deux britanniques et une américaine, et elle sera capable d'intervenir dans un délai de cinq à sept jours en cas de crise.

Aucune mention n'a été faite de l'avenir des forces canadiennes en Europe. Parlant à Berlin, début juin, le premier ministre Mulroney a expliqué que l'Europe serait réduite, en Canada en Europe serait réduite, en ajoutant toutefois : « Les forces canadiennes resteront aussi résiduelles pour la sécurité européenne et canadienne et aussi longtemps qu'elles seront nécessaires et bienvenues. » Il n'a donné aucune précision quant à la forme qu'une présence canadienne prolongée pourrait prendre.

## Le Canada et l'OTAN

Si le besoin disparaît, la base disparaît. »


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# NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

## Le curieux lien entre démocratie et paix.



ÉVANOUISSEMENT DE LA GUERRE FROIDE A EU

fléunt un utopisme sans borne quant à la suite entre autres effets frappants celui de faire des événements. Le cynisme endurt par quarante-cinq années de confrontation et de méfiance entre l'Est et l'Ouest a laissé place, même dans certains des milieux les plus intransigeants, à un franc optimisme pour ce qui est des perspectives d'une «paix» mondiale plus durable. On a présenté à ce nouveau monde des visions de «nouvelle planète unie par une «sécurité coopérative», de Nations Unies régénérées, et de diverses formes de «nouvel ordre mondial».

Le cynisme est une habitude difficile à vaincre et la brève expérience de l'après-Guerre froide est déjà semée de grandes déceptions. Cependant, internationaux osent de nouveau rêver d'un monde meilleur, comme elles l'ont fait à la fin des deux Guerres mondiales, on s'aperçoit combien, malheureusement, la Guerre froide a retardé la réflexion sérieuse qui permettra d'arriver à ce monde meilleur. Quand l'Irak a attaqué le Koweït, la confusion et la méfiance généralisées que l'on suivit en ce qui a trait aux règles de la sécurité collective et au rôle des Nations Unies sont un des signes de cette carence.

Les efforts déployés pour comprendre les causes sociales de la guerre et leur trouver des remèdes éventuels sont un écho encore plus révélateur de débats passés sur la paix. Le lien qui existe entre les États gouvernés démocratiquement et les relations internationales pacifiques qu'ils entretiennent entre eux constitue un des pôles de cette recherche. Le renversement des régimes autoritaires des pays communistes et l'émergence, parallèlement, de positions internationales plus pacifiques ont ravivé l'intérêt pour le lien entre démocratie et préférence manifeste avec laquelle il expose son peuple à des dangers et aux souffrances, et la menace d'une insupportable endémie dans les pays à régimes non démocratiques de la région, y compris le Koweït, sont autant d'éléments qui amènent à se demander si l'on peut garantir un paix durable avec des gouvernements dictatoriaux.

Cette réflexion renvoie à certains des discours occidentaux les plus agressifs, les plus prosélytiques de la Guerre froide, ainsi qu'à ce que le processus de la CSE, dit d'Helmsinki, a véritablement accompli en Europe en matière de démocratisation et d'intégration. En même temps,

les vents de la démocratisation et de la libéralisation sous diverses formes soufflent sur le monde entier, de l'Afrique à la Chine, et nombre d'observateurs se demandent comment des améliorations intérieures et internationales pourraient se renforcer mutuellement.

D'aucuns considèrent pareilles réflexions comme très hardies et nouvelles, alors qu'en fait, elles ne sont que hardies. Dans son *Projet de paix perpétuelle* écrit en 1796, Emmanuel Kant a exposé des idées fondamentales sur la façon dont «républicanisme» et paix ne feraient plus qu'un : La constitution républicaine (...) offre l'espoir d'atteindre le résultat escompté, à savoir : la paix perpétuelle. (...) parce que, lorsque le consentement des citoyens est nécessaire pour décider si l'on doit ou non faire la guerre, il n'y a rien de plus naturel que de voir ceux qui traitent s'imposer toutes les privations de la guerre réfléchir longuement avant de se lancer dans un jeu aussi diabolique.

Au fil des décennies, cette vision kantienne, et quelques autres idées, plus sectoriales, ont fait l'objet de débats et d'études répétées. Les institutions de Woodrow Wilson pendant la «dérive des démocratiques». Lorsque John Maynard Keynes prévenait que les conditions imposées à l'Allemagne à Versailles, en 1919, risquaient d'empêcher ce pays de se doter d'un gouvernement stable, ce qui, par contre-coup, entraînerait le chaos dans toute l'Europe, il parlait en prophète.

LA SITUATION ACTUELLE APPELLE UNE RÉFLEXION approfondie sur cette tradition, pas uniquement une offensive triumphaliste des missionnaires de la démocratie occidentale. La théorie de Kant, selon laquelle les États démocratiques seraient par essence plus pacifiques, est tellement tentante d'un point de vue idéologique que les analystes ont essayé maintes fois de l'éclairer par des exemples historiques. Dans une analyse récente, deux universitaires de l'Université Rice ont conclu que, d'après les résultats de la plupart des études [empiriques], les démocraties ne seraient pas moins belliqueuses que d'autres régimes. Sur une note plus optimiste, cependant, ils déclarent aussi que, dans pratiquement toutes les études, on remarque qu'au niveau dyadique, les démocraties ne s'entrevoient tout simplement pas.\*

Quelqu'un de cynique estimerait sans doute que l'absence de guerres entre démocraties s'explique par le fait que les nations démocratiques sont en core trop peu nombreuses, mais ce n'est probablement pas la seule raison. À force de se pencher sur le sujet, les universitaires ont développé des raisonnements plus précis et moins rhétoriques, et ils reconnaissent que jamais une décision d'entrer en guerre n'est sanctionnée par un référendum.

L'influence démocratique sur une telle décision que le processus de la CSE, dit d'Helmsinki, a véritablement accompli en Europe en matière de démocratisation et d'intégration. En même temps,

«Lifton T. Morgan, Sally Howard Campbell, War - So Why Kant? Democratic Constraints, and Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, n° 2, juin 1991.

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est donc toujours indirecte et toujours fonction de «contraintes décisionnelles» pesant sur les dirigeants, dont certaines peuvent aussi jouer dans des sociétés non démocratiques. Il s'agit, entre autres, de revocation des dirigeants : en effet, des dirigeants qui sont plus souvent et plus régulièrement tenus de rendre des comptes hésiteront probablement davantage à lancer leur pays dans des guerres ; la nature de la concurrence politique ; la liberté d'organiser une opposition par des voies officielles et institutionnalisées devrait réduire la propension de la société à guerroyer ; et le fait que le dirigeant doit partager le pouvoir décisionnel ; plus le nombre de personnes et, notamment, d'institutions qui doivent approuver une déclaration de guerre est grand, plus le risque de déclencher la guerre est petit.

EN FAIT, QUAND ILS CONFRONTENT CES HYPOTHÈSES à la réalité, les chercheurs ne parviennent pas à les élayer clairement, et les résultats qu'ils obtiennent laissent même supposer que ces contraintes démocratiques peuvent influencer davantage sur les grandes puissances que sur les petites. Par ailleurs, il est intéressant de noter que l'opinion publique, surtout si elle est avertie par une presse chahuvée, a parfois poussé sur le sentier de la guerre des dirigeants hésitants, comme ce fut le cas pour la Guerre hispano-américaine de 1898. L'un des auteurs d'articles publiés récemment dans la revue *Alternatives* sur le thème «Conjoncture mondiale de la démocratisation» laisse entendre qu'il verrait le résultat de processus similaires dans les décisions américaines concernant le golfe Persique. L'Histoire abonde d'exemples de guerres extérieures pour consolider leur position politique intérieure.

Les analyses «structurelles» de la démocratie et de la paix restent donc peu convaincantes, et les chercheurs s'appuient sur les travaux de Michael Doyle sur «Le libéralisme et la politique mondiale pour suggérer que c'est peut-être dans la culture politique du régime démocratique des conflits que réside l'espoir. Le fait que les démocraties semblent capables, pour un tas d'excellentes raisons humaines, tant internes que nationales, d'éviter de se livrer des guerres continue de prouver qu'il est souhaitable de favoriser des formes de gouvernement plus démocratiques.

Aux États-Unis, certains affirment qu'un consensus se dessine pour «réa-ir de la promotion de la démocratie l'axe de la politique étrangère. Beaucoup de pays sont heureux que les puissances moyennes puissent les aider dans leurs changements démocratiques, et nombre d'entre eux s'adressent déjà au Centre pour les droits de l'homme et le développement démocratique de Montréal. □

— BERNARD WOOD

AHARA ESPAÑOL, SAHARA OCCIDENTAL, République arabe sahraïenne démocratique (RASD), que désignant le même lieu, devenu inconnus de la majorité des Canadiens et Canadiennes. Pourtant, plus de 700 de nos soldats s'y retourneront pour participer sous l'égide des Nations Unies (ONU), en collaboration avec l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine (OUA), à la mise sur pied d'un référendum dans ce territoire.

## Historique

Au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle l'Espagne s'est installée sur la côte africaine occidentale. En 1884, elle se rend officiellement maîtresse du Sahara occidental, mais elle ne réussit à s'imposer dans tout le territoire qu'à partir de 1934. Elle négocie quelques ajustements de frontières avec le Maroc dans les années qui suivent l'accession de ce dernier à l'indépendance (1956). Des rébellions ont lieu contre les colonisateurs en 1957-1958, et elles sont suivies d'une répression espagnole. Colonie jusqu'en 1958, le Sahara occidental devient alors province espagnole. En 1963, l'ONU ajoute le territoire à la liste des colonies qui ont droit à l'indépendance. En 1975, l'Espagne accepte le principe d'un référendum sur l'avenir du territoire, mais le Maroc et la Mauritanie en réclament aussitôt la souveraineté. Consultée, la Cour internationale de justice proclame en octobre 1975 le droit du Sahara occidental à l'autodétermination.

Le référendum espagnol n'a pas eu lieu. Après une «marche verte» marocaine (350 000 civils marocains avec Coran et drapeau marocain en main) orchestrée par le roi, et un accord tripartite entre l'Espagne, le Maroc et la Mauritanie, le retrait des Espagnols a lieu le 26 février 1976, et le territoire est alors divisé en deux administrations : marocaine et mauritanienne. Les armées marocaine et mauritanienne prennent la direction, respectivement, des deux tiers nord et du tiers sud du territoire. L'expansionnisme régional remplace dès lors le colonialisme européen.

Le jour même du retrait des Espagnols, le POLISARIO (*Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro*), crée le 10 mai 1973 et qui mène une guérilla contre les Espagnols, annonce la création de l'État libre, indépendant et souverain de la République arabe sahraïenne démocratique (RASD) et la constitution d'un gouvernement du peuple sahraï. Mohammed Abdelaziz est nommé secrétaire général du POLISARIO et président de la RASD. Avec l'Algérie, qui encourage à cette époque plusieurs fronts de libération nationale, le POLISARIO dénonce l'occupation des Marocains et des Mauritanien. La guerre éclate entre «frères» musulmans. En août 1979, financièrement épuisé par les combats contre le POLISARIO qui absorbe 60 p. 100 de son budget, la Mauritanie abandonne toutes ses prétentions sur le territoire du Sahara occidental. La partie mauritanienne est immédiatement réclame et occupée par le Maroc. Le combat pour l'obtention de tout le territoire se fait désormais à deux : le POLISARIO et le Maroc. Durant les années 1980, l'armée marocaine s'enlise dans une longue lutte contre le POLISARIO. Afin de mieux contrôler le Sahara occidental, le Maroc étire une énorme muraille de pierre et de sable tout le long de la côte ouest du territoire, muraille de 1 600 km de long et de trois à quatre mètres de hauteur avec barbelés et toute une panoplie d'équipements. Depuis 1989, les combats ont presque cessé, les deux parties sont épuisées et de nouveaux impératifs régionaux, comme la création de l'Union du Maghreb arabe (UMA) en février 1989, ayant modifié les intérêts de tous les maghrébins. Il n'en reste pas moins que le contrôle du Sahara espagnol est une question de prestige pour le roi du Maroc et qu'il lui est très difficile de reculer sans que l'opposition marocaine ne se serve d'un tel geste pour fomentier la révolte.

## La MINURSO

En 1988, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté une résolution demandant au Secrétaire général de préparer, en collaboration avec l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine (OUA), un rapport sur la tenue d'un référendum relatif à l'autodétermination du peuple du Sahara occidental. En juin 1990, les parties directement visées se sont mises d'accord sur l'idée d'un référendum basé sur

# LE SAHARA OCCIDENTAL

*Sous l'égide de la MINURSO, le peuple sahraoui aura bientôt l'occasion de répondre à la question référendaire suivante : désirez-vous l'indépendance ou l'intégration au Maroc ?*

Le 29 avril 1991, le Conseil de sécurité a décidé de créer la MINURSO afin de surveiller le processus de désarmement des forces du POLISARIO, selon le résultat du référendum. Malheureusement, les échecs ont été nombreux. On tarde à l'ONU à choisir les pays et les personnes qui composeront les divers contingents. La MINURSO sera divisée en quatre parties : d'abord, le représentant spécial (le Suisse Johannes Manz) et son entourage de quarante-neuf fonctionnaires, puis un contingent de 1 695 militaires. Il y aura par ailleurs un contingent civil de 884 personnes, dont des forces de police, la Commission d'identification et la Commission référendaire, et un contingent de rapatriement ; ces trois dernières entités établiront et vérifieront l'identité du corps référendaire et rapatrieront les personnes qui auront droit de vote. Le contingent militaire s'assurera du retrait d'une bonne partie de l'armée marocaine, verra au cantonnement des combattants marocains et du POLISARIO durant la campagne, et supervisera, avec la Croix-Rouge internationale, l'échange de prisonniers.

Le Canada ne reconnaît pas la RASD et est demeuré neutre dans ce conflit. Cependant, il a toujours appuyé les efforts du Secrétaire général et, grâce à quelques militaires et représentants d'Élections Canada, a contribué à certaines missions techniques sur le territoire en 1987 et 1990. Nous fournissons un bataillon de militaires (700) et un commandant (le major-général Armand Roy) qui sera chargé de tout le contingent militaire de la MINURSO. Vu le succès obtenu par les membres de la GRC et d'Élections Canada lors de l'intervention des Nations Unies en Namibie, Elections Canada fournira aussi du personnel de la MINURSO. Il faut aussi s'attendre à ce qu'une dizaine de membres de la GRC y participent également. Notre apport financier a été fixé par l'ONU à 5,9 millions de dollars, soit 3,09 p. 100 du coût prévu de l'opération (166 millions de dollars US). Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (34 millions de dollars US) afin d'aider à ses opérations humanitaires et au rapatriement des réfugiés sahraouis.

## Les perspectives d'avenir

La création d'un nouveau micro-État, qui vivrait surtout de la pêche et des phosphates risque ne pas être la solution idéale pour la communauté internationale, mais peut-on faire abstraction des aspirations légitimes du peuple sahraoui ? La seule solution légale passe donc par le référendum. D'un autre côté, la solution la plus pratique pourrait être l'intégration, d'ailleurs déjà proposé. Cela permettrait aussi au Sahara occidental de faire automatiquement partie de l'UMA.

Un espoir d'enouement pour la fin de l'année, mais des dérapages sont toujours possibles et une remise à 1992 forcera sans doute la réouverture de tout le dossier et la négociation d'une nouvelle entente.

— RYCHARD BRÖLE



# LA FRANCOPHONIE D'OÙ VIENT-ELLE ET OÙ VA-T-ELLE ?

Il est important, pour l'avenir même de la Francophonie, que le prochain Sommet soit une réussite.

Leopold Sédar Senghor, président du Sénégal, a été le premier, dès 1962, à avancer l'idée d'un «Commonwealth francophone», en compagnie des présidents Habib Bourguiba, de Tunisie, et Dion Hamaoui, du Niger.

En 1970, à Niamey au Niger est créée l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (A.C.C.T.). Son mandat est de voir à l'affirmation et au développement d'une coopération multilatérale entre ses membres dans les domaines de l'éducation, de la formation, de la culture, des sciences et de la technologie, et par là au rapprochement des peuples. Elle regroupe aujourd'hui trente-deux Etats membres, sept Etats Associés et deux gouvernements participants (le Québec et le Nouveau-Brunswick).

L'idée d'un «Commonwealth francophone» refait surface en 1975. Elle est reprise et relancée par le premier ministre Pierre Elliott Trudeau. La tenue du prochain Sommet francophone achoppe cependant sur la participation du Québec à un tel Sommet et sur la place que cette province y occuperait. Le 7 novembre 1983, une entente entre le premier ministre Brian Mulroney et le premier ministre du Québec, Pierre-Marc Johnson est signée relativement à la place du Québec dans le cadre d'événements somnités de la Francophonie. Ceci-ci comporterait deux volets : un qui concerne la coopération et le développement, et un autre, de nature politique et économique. Le Québec, présent durant tout le Sommet, peut intervenir lorsqu'il s'agit de quand on parle de la situation politique et économique mondiale.

## La Francophonie et les sommets

La Francophonie, ce ne sont pas seulement les Sommets, c'est une multitude de personnes et d'organisations, telles que l'Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française, l'Association internationale des maîtres francophones et le Conseil international des radios-télévisions de langue française.

Au tout début de l'histoire des Sommets de la Francophonie, ils ont été organisés par l'entremise de cinq réseaux regroupant des spécialistes dans leurs domaines respectifs et provenant de plusieurs pays francophones. Ces domaines sont l'information scientifique et le développement technologique ; la culture et les communications ; les industries de la langue ; l'énergie ; et national du suivi, qui voit au suivi des programmes adoptés lors du Sommet, et le Comité international de préparation des Sommets, qui s'occupe d'organiser le prochain Sommet et auquel les réseaux doivent présenter des propositions pouvant faire l'objet d'études au prochain Sommet. En mai 1989, lors du Sommet de Dakar, il a été décidé de confier à l'A.C.C.T. le mandat de proposer des programmes et des affectations budgétaires et de voir à la gestion d'un fonds multilatéral créé pour financer la mise en oeuvre de projets sanctionnés aux Sommets. L'A.C.C.T. intégrait ainsi son sein les cinq réseaux et devenait l'organe de réflexion du Comité international du suivi et du Comité international de préparation des Sommets.

Depuis la tenue du premier Sommet en février 1986, plus d'une centaine de projets ont été réalisés. Citons notamment la création d'un Institut de l'énergie à Québec et de l'Université Senghor d'Alexandrie ; la mise en place de TV 5 Canada et de TV 5 Europe ; l'ouverture d'un Centre africain francophone de formation à l'édition, à la diffusion et à la distribution du livre à l'Unité et la création d'un Consortium international de formation à distance, d'une Banque internationale d'information sur les Etats francophones, d'un Fonds de scolarisation des enfants francophones, d'un Fonds de soutien à la Francophonie et du Programme en faveur des victimes de l'apartheid. La Francophonie s'est également donné de nouveaux secteurs d'intervention.

## Le prochain Sommet

Initialement, le quatrième Sommet de la Francophonie devait avoir lieu cet automne à Kinshasa au Zaïre. En janvier, ce pays décidait de passer son tour. Selon le nouvel ambassadeur de la République du Zaïre au Canada, M. Kaweta-Milombe Sampaasa, c'est le calendrier politique de son pays qui a été à l'origine de cette décision, et non les réserves exprimées par le Canada par suite de violations des droits de la personne et, plus particulièrement, du massacre par les forces de l'ordre en mai dernier d'étudiants de l'Université de Lubumbashi qui réclamaient plus de démocratie. Néanmoins, certains autres pays, dont la Belgique qui avait soulève des réserves en la matière, ont été soulagés que le Sommet n'ait pas lieu à Kinshasa. Le Zaïre demeure cependant très actif dans la Francophonie et dans l'organisation du prochain Sommet et, récemment, le président Mobutu a écrit à Ottawa afin d'obtenir une aide canadienne pour la création d'une commission des droits de la personne au Zaïre.

## Les perspectives d'avenir

La Francophonie en est encore au stade de la consolidation. Le Sommet de Chailiot constitue une épreuve. S'il y a échec de la francophonie multilatérale, M. Roy craint à terme dans le monde une rapide régression du français qui ne pourrait plus prétendre à un rayonnement international. Dans un article publié dans *Le Droit* du 7 mai 1991, M. Roy affirme que «L'Afrique francophone a maintenant le choix de ses alliances. Si elle est négligée par la communauté francophone du Nord, elle risque d'aller chercher ailleurs, comme au Japon ou en Allemagne, le soutien, l'assistance et les investissements nécessaires pour son économie.»

D'autre part, de nouveaux défis attendent la Francophonie. La Roumanie et la Bulgarie ont demandé l'autorisation d'assister au Sommet de Chailiot. Certains pays africains craignent l'arrivée de pays d'Europe de l'Est au sein de la Francophonie, car ils ne veulent pas qu'une partie des fonds disponibles soit réorientée vers cette région du monde.

Enfin, toute la question des droits de la personne et du processus de démocratisation dans certains pays africains risque également de causer des frictions, même si tous s'entendent pour dire qu'il revient aux pays africains de faire leur propre choix et de décider de leur propre évolution.

— GABRIELLE MATHIEU

Gabrielle Mathieu est agente des relations avec les médias à l'Institut.

Bernice Eisenstein

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L'ancien autocrate soviétique reculant et le pouvoir de la société civile grandissant, l'URSS sera beaucoup moins à même de menacer ses voisins. Le monde n'a plus à craindre la puissance soviétique. Au contraire, c'est sa faiblesse — et le risque de chaos, de guerre civile et de déferlement de centaines de milliers de réfugiés soviétiques en Occident — qui constitue le principal danger planant sur la stabilité internationale. En définitive, ce seront les forces politiques et économiques intérieures de l'Union soviétique qui décideront de son destin. Les démocrates, déjà divisés en des dizaines de partis politiques querelleurs, devront faire leurs dissensions pour former une alliance effective. Les dirigeants politiques devront rassembler tout leur courage politique pour prendre les décisions pénibles, impopulaires (autoriser des hausses de prix et accepter une montée du chômage, par exemple), mais indispensables pour créer une économie de marché. MM. Eltsine et Gorbatchev devront collaborer de façon productive malgré leurs ambitions et leurs points de vue contradictoires.

L'OCCIDENT PEUT JOUER UN RÔLE CONSTRUCTIF dans tout cela, non pas en déversant des milliards de dollars, mais en aidant les éléments dynamiques de la société soviétique qui participent activement à la mise sur pied d'organismes autonomes, c'est-à-dire les nouveaux entrepreneurs, les médias indépendants, les organes gouvernementaux en mutation, et les avocats et les juges qui ne demandent qu'à faire primer le droit. Une aide novatrice et sélective est de loin plus valable qu'une cascade de fonds non dirigés. Une assistance bien choisie sera très fructueuse, car elle contribuera à la lutte couraueuse que le peuple soviétique mène pour créer une société humaine et démocratique qui puisse trouver sa place de membre honore et pacifique au sein de la communauté des nations civilisées.

Après six années de bricolage, d'improvisation et de manœuvres tactiques, la tentative de réformer du régime communiste entreprise par M. Gorbatchev s'est épuisée d'elle-même. La vraie révolution qui vise à détruire totalement le régime communiste, l'Union soviétique se trouve maintenant au point où se trouvait la Pologne, la Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie à l'automne décisif de 1989.

Le communisme a été vaincu, mais le triomphe de la démocratie n'est en rien garanti. Ses premiers bourgeois flamboyants sont encore fragiles et vulnérables. Si la faillite de l'économie soviétique n'est pas jugulée, une «Russie de Weimar» pourrait tomber aux mains de mouvements politiques démagogiques. Les forces de l'intolérance, des violences ethniques et la xénophobie guettent juste sous la surface de la culture politique démocratique naissante. Cependant, grâce au coup d'Etat déjoué, les chances de réussite de la transformation politique et économique sont bien plus fortes maintenant qu'elles ne l'étaient il y a quelques mois à peine. □

Sam Wright



Nombre de commentateurs ont expliqué que l'Occident avait commis un impitoyable quasi-fatal en n'accordant pas d'emblée une aide économique plus massive à une URSS au bord de la faillite. On a laissé entendre qu'enობ-tenant pas l'aide occidentale à la réunion de juillet des sept pays industriels (G7) à Londres, M. Gorbatchev avait sérieusement compromis son image en URSS, voire encouragé ses opposants conservateurs à envisager de prendre le pouvoir par la force, puisqu'en passant aux actes, ils ne remettaient pas en cause une importante aide étrangère.

En réalité, le coup d'Etat a été décisif pour des raisons internes aux-quelles l'Occident ne pouvait pas grand-chose. La tentative de coup d'Etat militaire était un dernier effort infructueux de conservateurs n'ayant plus d'autre recours pour défendre leur position désespérée. Ils ont agi poussés par une peur panique d'être balayés par la marée des événements, et par le sentiment qu'ils devaient faire quelque chose avant qu'il soit trop tard. Trois faits nouveaux ont contribué au désespoir croissant de la vieille garde de Krehlin.

D'ABORD, AU PRINTEMPS 1991, MIKHAIL GORBATCHEV A UNE FOIS DE PLUS CHANGÉ D'ORIENTATION politique. Il a commencé à s'écarter de la voie conservatrice dans laquelle il s'était engagé à l'automne 1990 pour rechercher une collaboration active avec les forces réformatrices dirigées par Boris Eltsine. Les élections de juin ont démontré la puissance grandissante des réformateurs. Boris Eltsine a été porté à la présidence de la République de Russie avec une nette majorité des voix, des démocrates en vue ont été élus maîtres de Moscou et de Leningrad, et la population de cette dernière ville a décidé de lui rendre donc honneur Pierre le Grand, tsar depuis longtemps disparu, plutôt que le fondateur de l'Etat soviétique.

Ensuite, M. Gorbatchev a reconnu, tardivement, qu'il était impossible de préserver l'URSS dans sa forme passée d'Etat fortement centralisé dans lequel toutes les décisions importantes étaient prises par une poignée de fonctionnaires à Moscou. Réaliste face à des objectifs continuellement redoublés, il en est arrivé, à contrecoeur, à la conclusion que le seul espoir d'éviter le morcèlement complet de l'Union soviétique était de négocier directement avec les dirigeants des républiques la création d'une fédération souple dans laquelle une grande part de pouvoir leur serait dévolue. Tout comme il avait fini par donner son assentiment à l'unification de l'Alliance et à l'instauration du multipartisme en Union soviétique, même s'il avait commencé par résister farouchement à ces changements. M. Gorbatchev s'était habitué à l'idée d'une véritable fédération constituée de républiques soviétiques très autonomes.

Les analystes occidentaux avaient certes bien prévu que le tout prochain Traité de l'Union soviétique de déclencher le coup d'Etat auquel on

sa domination.

À la mi-juillet, Boris Eltsine a décrété la disparition des cellules du Parti dans tous les organes gouvernementaux se trouvant sur le territoire de la Russie. Si ce décret était entré en vigueur, il aurait porté un coup fatal au pouvoir communiste en URSS. M. Gorbatchev s'est déclaré opposé au décret de B. Eltsine, mais les conservateurs n'étaient pas disposés à le laisser veiller sur leurs intérêts. On s'attaquait à ce qui leur restait de pouvoir et à tous leurs privilèges considérables. Leur réponse a été de prendre les armes.

LES RÉFORMATEURS SONT SORTIS INFINIMENT renforcés du coup d'Etat avorté. La défaite ignominieuse des conservateurs constitue un tournant fondamental dans la révolution d'après 1985. M. Gorbatchev a retrouvé la présidence de l'URSS, mais «l'ère Gorbatchev» est terminée. D'autres, et en tout premier lieu Boris Eltsine, dièrent de plus en plus les choix politiques soviétiques.

Le putsch raté contribuera à accélérer les changements mêmes que ses instigateurs venaient empêcher, soit la désintégration du parti communiste, le renforcement des républiques, la dépolitisation de l'armée et du KGB, le passage à une économie de marché, et la victoire des réformateurs aux prochaines élections nationales. En fait, si les républiques obtiennent, comme elles le réclament de plus en plus, le contrôle des troupes stationnées sur leur sol, la toute puissance de l'URSS au niveau international sera plus que jamais minée.

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# LE POUVOIR CENTRAL SOVIÉTIQUE K.-O.

En ratant leur coup d'Etat au mois d'août, les conspirateurs accéléreront les changements même qu'ils voulaient empêcher.

PAR PAUL MARANTZ

**L**E COUP D'ETAT MANQUÉ EN UNION SOVIÉTIQUE a fait l'effet d'un tremblement de terre dans une région sismique. On avait beau le prédire depuis longtemps, le choc ressentit n'en a pas été moindre. En fait, le coup de force a été un choc précisément parce que l'on en parlait si souvent sans que rien n'arrive — ainsi, en décembre 1990, M. Edouard Chevardenadze en avait évoqué la possibilité en demis-sionnant de ses fonctions de ministre des Affaires étrangères — que la population avait fini par s'habituer aux pressions souterraines puissantes qui s'accroissent manifestement le long de lignes de failles bien connues.

Depuis le milieu des années 1980, le conflit se durcissait entre deux forces politiques anti-thétiques, à savoir : les réformateurs, qui voulaient transformer le totalitarisme soviétique en démocratie pluraliste doublée d'une économie de marché, et les ultra-conservateurs, qui s'accrochaient désespérément à l'ancien régime et à tous les privilèges et pouvoirs qu'il leur conférait. CE CONFLIT ENTRE RÉFORMATEURS ET CONSERVATEURS TENAIT À DES VISIONS DIAMÉTRALEMENT OPPOSÉES DU MONDE. Les premiers battaient leur politique sur plusieurs hypothèses et principes fondamentaux :

Il fallait cesser d'aborder la politique internationale d'un point d'une idéologique. Les pays capitalistes ne devraient pas faire figure d'ennemis. L'Union soviétique devait mettre fin à l'isolement dans lequel elle-même enfermée et profiter des plus grandes réalisations de la civilisation mondiale, comme les institutions politiques démocratiques, les règles juridiques visant à protéger les droits fondamentaux de la personne et l'économie de marché ; et l'URSS devait reconnaître que de nombreuses contraintes limitaient son pouvoir international et accepter de jouer un rôle bien moindre dans le monde.

Au départ, pendant la période allant de 1986 à fin 1988, lorsque M. Gorbatchev a décidé d'apaiser le monde.

l'URSS ne devait pas négliger sa puissance militaire. Pour être en mesure de repousser une attaque ennemie et d'exercer l'influence politique qu'il méritait, le pays devait posséder la première armée du monde ;

Il fallait protéger le socialisme contre les adversaires intérieurs et extérieurs qui aimeraient le voir démantelé. L'introduction d'un marché capitaliste entraînerait le chaos et accentuerait les souffrances. L'intégration rapide dans le système économique international permettrait à des sociétés étrangères d'acheter les ressources naturelles de l'URSS et de piller son environnement ;

l'URSS devait préserver son statut de grande puissance. Ses dirigeants ne devaient pas humilier la nation en abandonnant des alliés de longue date et en rampant devant l'Occident pour obtenir prêts et aide.

La juxtaposition des deux déclarations, celle de réformateurs et celle d'un conservateur militaire, montre combien le fossé qui sépare ces deux camps adverses est profond. Dans le numéro d'août 1989 d'*International Affairs*, deux universitaires libéraux, MM. Radomir Bogdanov et Andriy Kortunov, rappelaient avec force le programme réformateur :

Quant à notre place sur l'échiquier mondial, elle ne peut, en toute objectivité, que reculer et ce, que nous conservions ou pas un surplus d'armes nucléaires. La raison en est que, sur

bien des plans (structure économique, niveau de vie, espérance de vie, environnement, etc.), nous sommes loin d'être un pays très développé. Notre faiblesse ressortira de plus en plus à mesure que le système mis en place par la Guerre froide disparaîtra, que les relations internationales se démilitariseront et que de nouveaux éléments, non militaires, de la puissance nationale se manifesteront. Évidemment, nous pourrions retarder ce processus inévitable, mais ne ferions-nous pas mieux d'abandonner des symboles désuets du statut international pour nous attacher à rattraper des pays qui nous ont surpassés au cours des dernières décennies ?

À l'opposé, le colonel Viktor Alksnis, qui s'était révélé un des plus farouches adversaires de M. Gorbatchev, déclarait ce qui suit :

En réduisant le budget militaire, nous menons le pays à sa ruine. Nous sommes en train d'essayer de détruire ce que nous avons mis des dizaines d'années à créer, tout ce dont nous pourrions légitimement être fiers. On nous sommait « la Haute-Volta dotée de missiles », bientôt, nous ne serons plus que « la Haute-Volta ».

À la mi-1990, IL ÉTAIT DE BON TON DANS CERTAINS milieux, tant en Union soviétique qu'en Occident, de mettre une croix sur Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, d'en parler comme d'un relique du passé, comme de quelqu'un qui s'était laissé englober par le flot des événements et qui ne pouvait plus maîtriser la marée montante de l'opposition populaire au régime communiste. Cependant, des développements fin 1990 et début 1991 ont prouvé qu'il était prématuré de le condamner ainsi. La lutte entre les conservateurs du Parti, à droite, et les radicaux réformateurs, à gauche, s'intensifiant, le président de l'Union a continué de naviguer entre les deux camps en tenant fermement la barre. À peine le coup d'Etat passé, d'aucuns se demandent ce que l'Occident aurait pu faire pour renforcer le courant réformateur en URSS et ce qu'il devrait faire pour éviter qu'un autre putsch se produise à l'avenir. Malheureusement, ce débat est faussé du fait que l'on ne mesure pas convenablement le poids des forces internes à l'URSS dans le modelage des politiques du pays, ni la difficulté qu'il y a, par conséquent, à essayer d'influer, sur les politiques soviétiques. La controverse passionnée du mois d'août sur la réaction de Mme Barbara McDougall au coup d'Etat est symptomatique de telles erreurs d'appréciation.

étaient véritablement étudiées», commente David Leyton-Brown, membre du Centre for International and Strategic Studies de l'Université York. À la mi-janvier, Bernard Wood, directeur de l'ICPSI, a fait la même remarque devant un comité parlementaire : «Je devrais blâmer le gouvernement de ne pas en avoir fait plus pour clarifier les choix et fournir des occasions de débat, et blâmer l'opposition (parlementaire et autre) qui, à force de se concentrer sur des problèmes périphériques, a fini par banaliser les questions se rapportant à la guerre, à la paix et à la sécurité collective».

TOUTEFOIS, LES PACIFISTES, QUE LES DÉBATS CONDESCENDANTS ENTRE ACTEURS puissants du «nouvel ordre mondial» dégoûtent, ne sont pas des adeptes des principes de la sécurité collective. «La guerre du Golfe m'a fait comprendre certaines des suppositions de la gauche», déclare Homer-Dixon, notamment celle selon laquelle les puissants ont automatiquement tort, par principe, alors que les gens qui sont au bas de l'échelle violent toujours justice. Certains pacifistes ont exprimé leur méfiance pour ce que Doug Roche, ancien ambassadeur du Canada au désarmement, appelait «la culture du combat». Il s'agit, en fait, d'une culture dans laquelle «on utilise les dépenses militaires pour permettre aux États industriels de toujours contrôler l'exploitation des ressources, les techniques de tous jours contrôler le temps de la crise, M. Roche n'a cessé de répéter que nous ne pouvions pas laisser les militaires décider de la politique du Canada. Deux grands thèmes ressortaient de cette répulsion, exprimée pour les hostilités, et le rôle du Canada. Le premier concernait l'éthique de la violence, le second, l'efficacité des institutions internationales. «Notre analyse», explique Ernie Regehr, de Projet Ploughshares, qui est Memnonite, part de ce que l'on estime être une «guerre juste». Elle autorise le recours à la violence militaire contre un agresseur, pour autant que le risque de morts et de dommages civils soit restreint. «Mais nous en sommes arrivés à la conclusion qu'il n'y avait pas de destructions causées par les guerres modernes et l'incapacité de distinguer les cibles civiles des cibles militaires, il est devenu inacceptable de choisir délibérément la guerre comme instrument politique».

En théorie, les membres de Projet Ploughshares acceptaient une intervention politique pour faire appliquer les sanctions économiques, par exemple, il s'agissait donc favorables à la présence dans le Golfe de Canadiens chargés de vérifier que l'on n'entretenait pas les sanctions. En pratique, en revanche, leur analyse de la «guerre juste» signifiait que les sanctions ne pouvaient être appliquées que par le biais d'une surveillance accrue, mais sans intervention militaire. Cette logique aurait paralysé les participants de la coalition en cas de violations flagrantes des sanctions. «S'il s'était avéré impossible de faire respecter les sanctions non militaires», explique Regehr, cela aurait voulu dire que la bataille était de toute façon perdue. Des violations systématiques des sanctions auraient prouvé qu'il n'existait pas de consensus au sein de la coalition pour obliger les Irakiens à rentrer chez eux. Pour de nombreux observateurs, les objections de Projet Ploughshares face à la guerre du Golfe étaient terriblement irréalistes, même si le message clairement transmis par les arguments de M. Regehr — sanctions, oui ; tifs avancés par Washington. Comme l'explique M. Leyton-Brown, «Il ne s'agissait pas seulement d'anti-américanisme. L'utilisation de techniques militaires américaines, et le fait que les Américains essaient de dominer le tiers-monde pour protéger leurs intérêts pétroliers éveillait la méfiance de bien des gens. Beaucoup dans ce groupe affirmaient que, s'il n'y avait pas eu de pétrole au Koweït, les États-Unis n'auraient pas levé le petit doigt».

UN AUTRE BLOC À L'INTÉRIEUR DU MOUVEMENT PACIFISTE EN EST ARRIVÉ PAR un autre chemin : à se méfier des mesures prises par les États-Unis. Ce groupe comprend quelques-uns des émules de Lester Pearson qui, depuis le début des années 1950, font pression pour des Nations Unies plus efficaces. Ces personnes, précises M. Leyton-Brown, ont soutenu pendant toute la Guerre froide que la polarité des superpuissances pouvait être atténuée si l'on laissait les mécanismes de sécurité collective fonctionner. Pour certains participants de l'ONU, la guerre du Golfe a marqué l'heure de gloire de l'Organisation, mais d'autres internationalistes étaient plutôt d'avis qu'à cause de la guerre, la Charte de l'ONU a été gravement délaissée. En outre, des partisans de l'ONU redoutaient qu'en prenant part au conflit, le Canada perde de sa crédibilité en tant que pays participant depuis longtemps aux opérations de maintien de la paix.

Les deux groupes se réclamaient de Lester Pearson, si bien que devant cette querelle, Geoffrey Pearson s'est senti obligé de rappeler, dans le *Globe and Mail*, que son père pouvait se montrer dur si les circonstances l'exigeaient. «L.B. Pearson pensait que le régime de sécurité collective prévu par la Charte supposait que le Conseil de sécurité utilise de la force en cas d'agression (...). La présence canadienne renforce notre poids diplomatique là où il compte. L.B. Pearson aurait certainement tiré le meilleur parti de la chose». Geoffrey Grenville-Wood, président de l'Association canadienne pour les Nations Unies (ACNU), a d'abord vu dans la Guerre du Golfe une occasion en or pour l'ONU, après des années d'indifférence. Pour la toute première fois, en août 1990, le Conseil de sécurité a été unanime. Ses membres sont convenus que l'Irak avait eu tort d'envahir le Koweït, et le Département d'État américain semblait tout disposé à laisser les Nations Unies taper du poing sur la table. C'est avec plaisir que M. Grenville-Wood a regardé l'ONU mettre des sanctions économiques en place, petit à petit, puis les étayer par un soutien militaire.

Cependant, on s'est demandé si les participants suivaient assez fidèlement la Charte des Nations Unies. Qui menait la barque en réalité ? «Il est vrai qu'avant la crise, il n'existait pas de commandement militaire intégré à l'ONU, explique le président de l'ACNU, mais il aurait dû être possible d'en créer un, non ?» Lorsque les États-Unis envoyèrent 250 000 soldats de plus en Arabie Saoudite en novembre, M. Grenville-Wood commença à clamer haut et fort ses appréhensions. Puis, quand fin novembre, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté la résolution 678 autorisant l'emploi de «tous les moyens nécessaires» pour libérer le Koweït si l'Irak n'avait pas retiré ses troupes au 15 janvier 1991, M. Grenville-Wood a écrit à M. Joe Clark pour lui dire sans ambages que cette décision mettait les Nations Unies «en grave danger». L'ACNU appuyait les sanctions, mais déplorait que l'on s'empresse de passer la force avant même d'avoir évalué leurs effets. M. Grenville-Wood évite d'accuser les États-Unis d'avoir carrément manipulé l'ONU, mais pour lui : «Il ne faisait aucun doute qu'Américains et Britanniques devaient user de toute leur influence pour que le Conseil de sécurité vote les résolutions». En raison de ces appréhensions, M. Grenville-Wood et l'ACNU se sont démarqués de la position de l'ONU.

QUELLES INCIDENCES CES DIFFÉRENTES DISCUSSIONS ONT-ELLES EUES SUR LA conduite du Canada pendant la guerre ? Pour John Lam, directeur du Centre pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement, celle du mouvement pacifiste est sans doute plus manifeste dans les déclarations plus dans l'après-guerre. «Je pense, dit-il, que les discours prononcés par MM. Clark et Mulroney en février, sur la nécessité, après cette guerre, de limiter le commerce des armements, répondaient directement aux préoccupations de la population quant à la façon dont ce conflit a éclaté pour aujourd'hui, malgré les efforts de groupes comme le MCPGN pour que le public continue à s'intéresser à ce qui se passe dans le Golfe, la brève trêve au sein du mouvement pacifiste s'est calmée. «À l'impression, reconnaît M. Leyton-Brown, que nous en sommes revenus au *status quo ante*». Quand les pacifistes ont été confrontés à un vrai conflit, dans lequel l'adversaire était un dirigeant cruel aux ambitions apparemment illimitées, ils n'ont rien su faire d'autre, no presque, que de dénoncer la guerre. Pour finir, les sondages ont révélé que la majorité des Canadiens et Canadiennes soutenaient la coalition approuvée par l'ONU et qu'ils étaient prêts à payer le prix des hostilités. La classe politique canadienne a emboîté le pas à la population, elle n'a pas suivi ce que demandaient les pancartes brandies sous ses fenêtres. □





# LE CANADA ET LA GUERRE : JOUTES INTESTINES

Les combats sont terminés, mais les discussions sur la façon dont la guerre du Golfe a commencé et sur le rôle que le Canada y a joué continuent.

PAR CHARLOTTE GRAY

LES SOLDATS CANADIENS SONT PEUT-ÊTRE TOUTS RENTRÉS SAINS ET SAUFS du Moyen-Orient à l'heure qu'il est, mais selon les pacifistes du Canada, la guerre du Golfe n'est pas terminée. «Chaque jour, il meurt encore plus de mille personnes», affirmait un appel agité dans ma

boîte à lettres en juillet. «Il n'y a ni missiles ni bombes, et les victimes ne sont pas des soldats. Ce sont des enfants». L'appel venait des Médecins canadiens pour la prévention de la guerre nucléaire (MCPGN), un groupe qui a fait la une de l'actualité au printemps dernier en organisant, avec ses membres locaux, un *sit-in* devant le bureau de recrutement de l'armée canadienne à Hamilton, et avec un discours passionné contre le recours à la force prononcé à Toronto par le Dr John Polanyi, prix Nobel.

Dans l'ensemble, la position adoptée par les MCPGN était la version fleur bleue du pacifisme du printemps dernier : un dégoût pour l'attitude du gouvernement, qui a forcé tête baissée dans le conflit (et pour l'empressement du premier ministre à embôbler le pas aux Américains), sans examiner rigoureusement les autres solutions possibles. «Nous n'avons pas dit que l'emploi de la force ne se justifie jamais», expliqua Bill Singleton, directeur général des MCPGN. À notre sens, l'ampleur des dégâts aurait été telle dans le Golfe que la profession médicale aurait été incapable d'y faire face. Les faits nous ont malheureusement donné raison».

En réalité, la guerre du Golfe a provoqué une crise intellectuelle dans bien des groupes de pression pacifistes. Ils ne se sont pas entendus entre eux sur ce qu'aurait dû être la réaction appropriée de la collectivité internationale face à un dictateur impitoyable, ni sur la position que le Canada aurait dû adopter avant et après la guerre. Paradoxalement, ils se montrent plus unanimes aujourd'hui alors qu'ils examinent les événements depuis le havre d'une paix officiellement proclamée.

Les autopsies du conflit pratiquées par des détracteurs comme Bill Singleton ont en commun de distiller des «leçons l'avaient bien dit». Pour eux, si Saddam Hussein est toujours au pouvoir, si l'Irak est en ruines et les champs de pétrole du Koweït, en flammes, c'est que la guerre n'a servi à rien. Chaque dépêche qui annonce la reprise des ventes d'armes au Moyen-Orient ou fait état de la famine qui sévit en Irak renforce une certitude morale que la réalité des ambitions cruelles de Saddam Hussein avait ébranlée.

Le désarroi du mouvement pacifiste canadien pendant la crise n'était guère surprenant, étant donné son hétérogénéité. Certains groupes aspirent à un remodelage radical de la société, d'autres souhaitent que la limitation des armements et le désarmement progressent par le biais d'institutions stables. Il y a le pacifisme des Mennonites et des Quakers, qui prône de tendre l'autre joue et qui transparaît dans les positions de Projet Ploughshares (un groupe pacifiste de large assise paraissant par le Conseil canadien des églises depuis 1976). Puis, il y a le rejet féministe, par La Voix des femmes, des valeurs patriarcales que représentent les alliances militaires, notamment, et beaucoup de groupes sont réunis au sein de l'Alliance canadienne pour la paix (ACP), coalition nationale fondée en 1985 qui regroupe 300 organisations (y compris des syndicats et des groupes de femmes) et des milliers de citoyens. Quelque 70 p. 100 des membres sont des femmes, une proportion qui n'est pas respectée dans l'encadrement.

Parallèlement au mouvement pacifiste, mais sans liens avec lui, on trouve différentes cellules de réflexion, comme le Centre pour le contrôle des armements et le désarmement (CCCAD) et l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales (ICPSI). Ces instituts de recherche sur

L'intérêt public se cabre à l'appellation de «lobbies de la paix» à cause des sous-entendus idéologiques. Néanmoins, ils ont pour mandat d'aider à éclairer la population sur la nécessité de la sécurité internationale et du règlement pacifique des conflits.

Au printemps dernier, ils ont alimenté le débat public parce que leurs révisions d'information officielles régulières ont été mieux couvertes par la presse que les manifestations improvisées devant les bureaux du gouvernement. Ils ont contribué à façonner l'opinion publique qui, son tour, a contribué à modeler la politique. «Le mouvement pacifiste en soi a eu peu d'influence sur les ministères, m'a assuré un haut fonctionnaire du ministère des Affaires étrangères, mais les sondages d'opinion ont eu un poids considérable».

Il était prévisible, étant donné la diversité des intérêts et des intentions, que la crise du Golfe ferait ressortir les divisions au sein d'un mouvement où couvent en permanence idéalisme, argutie, internationalisme et anti-américanisme instincitif. «Pendant des semaines, raconte Thomas Homer-Dixon, coordinateur des études sur la paix et les conflits à l'Université de Toronto, beaucoup d'entre nous en étaient malades. Nous n'avons pas défini nos positions à la légère.

Malgré ses propres références impeccables dans le mouvement pacifiste même (il s'est bruyamment opposé à l'invasion de la Grenade et du Panama par les Américains), le professeur Homer-Dixon est devenu faucon au milieu des colombes du campus quand il a conclu, à contre-cœur, que la force était le seul recours lorsque l'on avait affaire à un tyran aussi malveillant que Saddam Hussein.

Nous n'avons le choix qu'entre des options terribles. Je ne croyais pas que les sanctions pouvaient ramener la paix sans d'horribles souffrances humaines. Si l'on avait laissé Saddam Hussein continuer sur sa lancée, il m'a donc semblé que le plus sage était d'employer la force aussi vite et aussi résolument que possible.


Au printemps dernier, cependant, les voix que l'on entendait le plus chez les pacifistes étaient celles condamnant la guerre du golfe Persique. Or, leurs condamnations fracassantes ont contribué à insulter de l'énergie, ne fût-ce que temporairement, à un mouvement qui, dans l'ensemble, s'essouffait. À la mi-1990, des causes plus à la mode, comme les campagnes pour la libération de Nelson Mandela ou pour sauver la forêt tropicale) ont relégué le mouvement pacifiste au second plan. «Mais le Golfe nous a re-centrés sur le problème de la guerre elle-même», explique Singleton. En février, à la conférence de l'ACP à Montréal, des dirigeants de groupes pacifistes du Canada entier se sont unis pour faire pression contre la guerre. Ce qui a fait dire à Pierre Jasmin, pianiste classique, séparatiste de longue date et président du groupe québécois Artistes pour la paix : «Les Canadiens et les Québécois s'engagent enfin sur quelque chose. La paix».

La guerre du Golfe a certes galvanisé le mouvement pacifiste, mais les pacifistes eux-mêmes n'ont pas proposé de solutions au problème fondamental de la crise, à savoir : comment la communauté internationale devrait-elle réagir face à des tyrans dangereux ? Il faut dire à leur décharge qu'ils ont été pris de court. Des gens habitués à penser par rapport au conflit Est-Ouest ont eu du mal à adapter leurs analyses à un autre contexte. De plus, les porte-parole les plus éminents ont peu montré l'exemple en la matière. Divers analystes ont déploré l'absence de discussions éclairées. «Le débat parlementaire a été fort peu convaincant. Avant le début de la guerre, il était canadienne. À Washington, en revanche, toutes les positions raisonnables partisans. Ensuite, les Libéraux ont choisi d'appuyer *à posteriori* l'action

Un des principaux défis que le prochain «pa» des Nations Unies aura à relever consistera à mieux utiliser un système extrêmement décentralisé du gouvernement planétaire. «Coordination» et «avancée comparée» sont deux concepts théoriques qui, en pratique, n'existent point ainsi dire pas. Ainsi, même un observateur aguerri du monde des gouvernements, intergouvernementaux ou gouvernementaux, qui se portent au secours du Bangladesh après qu'une catastrophe naturelle s'est abattue sur le pays ou du Kurdistan, frappé par un cataclysme d'origine humaine. Non seulement des gouvernements déployés en ce moment des efforts sans grande coordination avec d'autres gouvernements, mais des organismes des Nations Unies font la même chose sans se consulter entre eux ni tenir le réseau informé. Il faut que cela change.

De l'avis général, le Secrétaire général accompli en fait à lui seul le travail de trois ou quatre personnes. Il est certes probable que nul ne s'acquitterait convenablement de toutes les tâches, mais il n'en est pas moins inacceptable que l'on choisisse quelqu'un qui n'est pas le plus à même de remplir l'impérative laquelle d'entre elles. Or, c'est ce qui arrivera, inmanquablement, au terme de l'actuel processus de sélection.

ON MURMURE EN CE MOMENT À NEW YORK que M. Pérez de Cuellar pourrait envisager d'accepter un nouveau mandat, plus court, disons d'une année ou deux. Même si l'intéressé lui-même a répété que telle n'est pas son intention, il lui serait difficile de dire non si les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité lui demandaient de rester. La France l'a toujours défendu contre vents et marées et, depuis peu, l'Union soviétique et la Chine font des commentaires positifs sur les résultats qu'il a obtenus. De fait, cette solution provisoire serait assez sensée si, en contrepartie, le Conseil de sécurité créait un comité de recherche indépendant qui se mettrait sérieusement en quête d'un homme ou d'une femme autonome et imaginative capable de prendre la suite de l'actuel Secrétaire général. Beaucoup oublient souvent que se porter candidat à ce poste d'un homme politique briquant un siège parlementaire en Occident ne se pose pas à la manière d'un homme politique. Il est grand temps que les Nations Unies élargissent leurs horizons hors du bassin des habituels candidats gouvernementaux qui ont des appuis à New York. Il est fort possible que l'on choisira un Africain. Cependant, on devrait attacher bien plus d'importance à la bonne vieille compétence et aux qualifications qu'aux origines géographiques et rechercher quelqu'un qui défende la paix et la justice internationales avec dignité, quelqu'un qui n'ait pas peur, qui ne mâche pas ses mots et qui sache s'exprimer, quelqu'un qui monte l'exemple pour demain.



cultivé, ouvert, autonome et créatif, qui ait des conceptions, du dynamisme et aussi une bonne dose de bon sens.

Quels sont les principaux éléments de la destruction de l'ONU à la gestion des conflits, stimulée par une demande croissante de réparations de guerre et la destruction des pour réparations de guerre et la destruction des secours humanitaires, la gestion d'un fonds d'acheminement, même contre le gré de certains, au programme de l'ONU figurent la coercition, des tâches que la crise du golfe Persique a ajoutées à l'acheminement, même contre le gré de certains, s'est accrue avec la guerre du Golfe. Au nombre depuis 1988 d'interventions des casques bleus, s'est accrue avec la guerre du Golfe. Au nombre des conflits, stimulée par une demande croissante de réparations de guerre et la destruction des secours humanitaires, la gestion d'un fonds

capacités d'armements chimiques et nucléaires de l'Irak. Or, ces tâches enlèvent au parassant de la souveraineté nationale énoncée au paragraphe 2 de l'article 7 de la Charte. Alors que les opérations traditionnelles de maintien de la paix, qui consistent à interposer une force lampon un certain détachement, de la prudence et du tact, les tâches qui se profilent aujourd'hui à l'horizon exigent plus de vision et de culot.

DE PLUS, LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DE L'ONU DOIT défendre haut et fort les droits de la personne et il au développement et à l'environnement. Pour les Nations Unies pour embarrasser ou cafoier les gouvernements, il faut aussi quelque un qui voit mieux utiliser la «charnière» formidable qu'offrent au développement et à l'environnement. Pour gérer l'ordre du jour mondial, le Secrétaire général doit aussi gérer une bureaucratie tentaculaire et complexe, une armée de casques bleus et une légion de chercheurs, de techniciens et de membres des sections humanitaires. Il devient urgent de trouver un gestionnaire de premier ordre capable de définir de nouveaux moyens de créer une synergie entre des organisations «impartiales» de la solidarité «amille» des organes spécialisés de l'ONU (FAO, OMS, OIT, etc.). Ceux-ci traduisent une approche sectorielle du monde, alors que le système international réclame, pour la résolution des problèmes, des approches plus globales et synthétiques. De plus, un nombre grandissant d'organismes non gouvernementaux ont des buts et des méthodes d'activités plus précises. Il est temps de chercher pour la plus haute charge un candidat qui soit très

tion a toujours été l'appareil des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité. L'idée d'une sélection plus populaire par l'Assemblée générale a été rejetée à Dumbarton Oaks, en 1944, puis, de nouveau, à San Francisco, en 1945. L'Assemblée générale se contente d'entériner le choix du Conseil, conformément à l'article 97 de la Charte qui précise que «le Secrétaire général sera nommé par l'Assemblée générale sur recommandation du Conseil de sécurité».

De toute évidence, pour faire l'affaire, un candidat doit bénéficier du soutien des grandes puissances. Donc, étant donné les dures réalités de la Guerre froide, les puissances ont opté pour le petit dénominateur commun. Pour éviter un veto, ce sont les références en tant que «diplomate présentable qui ne ferait pas de vagues» qui sont devenues la partie essentielle du curriculum vitae d'un candidat possible, suivie par l'«obligation» de rotation régionale du poste. Bien entendu, certains membres permanents ont établi d'autres critères. Ainsi, Paris a toujours insisté pour que les candidats parlent assez bien français.

M. HAMMARSKJÖLD S'EST FAVORISÉ ET IL A surpris les cinq permanents. En effet, on s'était attendu à un technocrate apollinien, il s'est avéré être le plus dynamique des cinq Secrétaires généraux que l'ONU a eu à ce jour. Néanmoins, dans le choix des candidats, on tient trop peu compte des qualités de dirigeant ou des capacités de gestionnaire des personnes. La désignation de M. Kurt Waldheim en 1971, puis la reconduction de son mandat en 1976 sont la preuve de cette négativité flagrante. Le processus de sélection en est arrivé à se caractériser par un manque d'intérêt et par des consultations et une recherche insuffisantes, au point qu'il faut complètement le revoir.

Les sociétés importantes, les grands journaux, les universités cherchent à recruter les meilleures hommes et femmes pour leurs postes de haute direction. Même pour les gouvernements, il devient de plus en plus manifeste, au vu des bouleversements qui ont secoué la politique internationale ces toutes dernières années, que les intérêts des États membres seraient eux aussi mieux servis à long terme, tant individuelle-ment que collectivement, si les Nations Unies avaient à leur tête quelqu'un de fort plutôt qu'une personnalité acceptable politiquement.

La fin de la Guerre froide signifie que de nombreux obstacles qui avaient empêché les instances internationales d'agir efficacement disparaissent. Après une quarantaine d'années d'alternements, plus que jamais depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, nous avons des chances de nous achever sans choisir une direction internationale vigoureuse. La Charte elle-même est vague quant aux précisions requises, les articles 100 et 101 permettent seulement que le Secrétaire général et le personnel «ne sollicitent ni n'acceptent d'ins-tructions d'aucun gouvernement ni d'aucun autre organisme existant à l'Organisation» et font preuve des «plus hautes qualités de travail, de compétence et d'intégrité». Pourtant, l'ONU a besoin de



# LES DES SONT PIPES

Qui que l'on nomme à la tête de l'ONU, le processus de sélection du Secrétaire général est une mascarade à laquelle il est temps de mettre fin.

PAR THOMAS G. WEISS

LES ÉQUIPES DE BASEBALL ONT TENDANCE À changer de gérants dès qu'une série de défaites embarrasse les propriétaires et finit par agacer les partisans. Aux Nations Unies, tout va bien. Pourant, le 31 décembre, elles vont remplacer leur plus haut fonctionnaire, qui achèvera alors deux mandats consécutifs

Son successeur héritera d'une organisation dont la renaissance semblait inimaginable et, plus encore, imprévisible à l'époque où Javier Pérez de Cuelar, l'actuel Secrétaire général, en a pris le relais. Cette renaissance paraît d'autant plus spectaculaire lorsque l'on sait que la débâcle financière du milieu des années 1980 a failli abattre le moral du secrétariat de l'ONU et l'a pratiquement empêché de fonctionner.

Ce qui a le plus changé sur la scène internationale, ce sont les attitudes politiques à l'Est comme à l'Ouest. Après quatre décennies de franche hostilité ou, au mieux, d'indifférence, le revirement d'attitude de l'Union soviétique en matière de relations internationales et son regain d'enthousiasme pour les Nations Unies sont remarquables. Les États-Unis, après avoir systématiquement dénigré l'ONU par la voix de leurs plus fervents partisans quand il s'agit de mettre un terme à l'agression koweïtienne de Saddam Hussein. Le tiers-monde, enfin, qui a enlaid la décennie en regrettant le manque d'enthousiasme des superpuissances pour les instances internationales, se plaint maintenant dans bien des sphères de ce que l'ONU sert souvent de paravent aux politiques américaines.

MALGRÉ LE DISCOURS TENU PAR LE PRÉSIDENT Bush, le «nouvel ordre mondial» fondé sur la «primaauté du droit» n'est pas pour demain. Même si l'on n'est pas possible de mettre en place dans dix ans à venir le système de sécurité collective idéal souhaité par les architectes de la Charte des Nations Unies, il n'en reste pas moins qu'en matière de paix et sécurité, les réseaux onusiens sont renforcés et sont devenus efficaces. Depuis 1987, la nature collégiale du Conseil de sécurité s'affirmant de plus en plus, des gouvernements influents et actifs prêtent davantage attention à ce fillet de sécurité internationale.

En fait, les Nations Unies sont aujourd'hui au centre du débat sur la sécurité. Il est plausible de sormais, même pour les grandes puissances, de s'appuyer sur elles. Il ne s'agit plus seulement d'utopie de quelques idéalistes rêveurs, ni d'un

dernier recours en cas d'échec d'une politique bilatérale. Certes, les organisations économiques et sociales du système onusien jouent surtout un rôle de meneur de jeu et les États, petits et grands, s'en désintéressent, mais une myriade de défis et de catastrophes pointent à l'horizon du développement et de l'environnement. L'organisation mondiale sera très probablement appelée à jouer un rôle plus visible et essentiel dans le règlement des problèmes en cette époque où la collectivité internationale se dirige à tâtons vers le 21<sup>e</sup> siècle.

JUSQU'ICI, L'ONU A EU POUR SECRÉTAIRES GÉNÉRAUX trois Européens ressortissants de pays neutres (Trygve Lie, Norvégien; Dag Hammarskjöld, Suédois; et Kurt Waldheim, Autrichien), un Asiatique (U Thant, Birman) et un Latino-américain (Javier Pérez de Cuelar, Péruvien). Etant donné que l'on sollicite davantage leurs services, le sixième titulaire du poste devra être doué d'une force intellectuelle, physique et morale exceptionnelle pour prendre la barre d'un des navires les plus difficiles à manoeuvrer du monde.

Le choix du prochain Secrétaire général sera très délicat. Pourant, la collectivité internationale n'a pas fait d'effort systématique pour trouver la personne la plus qualifiée. Pour l'heure, seuls les candidats eux-mêmes et certains de leurs gouvernements battent campagne pour obtenir une investiture. Il paraît qu'une des listes porte au moins trente-cinq noms. Comme ailleurs dans le système des Nations Unies, les origines géographiques ont fini par prendre plus d'importance que des considérations liées à la terre comme la compétence. C'est apparemment «le tour de l'Afrique».

Cependant, les nombreux candidats africains ne suscitent guère d'intérêt. Début juin, cinq d'entre eux ont reçu l'appui officiel de chefs d'États et de gouvernements africains. Entre autres personnes, sont sur les rangs des ministres, anciens présidents, à savoir M. Olesegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), des fonctionnaires de l'ONU, comme M. Kenneth Dadaie, le Secrétaire général de la CNUCED (Ghana) et M. James O.C. Jonah, sous-secrétaire général des Nations Unies (Sierra Leone), et le chef d'une organisation non gouvernementale, M. Olara Ominu, président de l'*International Peace Academy* (Ouganda). Cependant, une nouvelle candidature semble bien accueillie au premier abord dans les milieux diplomatiques new-yorkais, celle du vice premier ministre égyptien, M. Boutros Boutros Ghali.

En outre, on cite assez souvent les noms d'autres candidats de pays en développement, par exemple : M. Tommy Koh, ancien ambassadeur de Singapour auprès des Nations Unies; M. Ali Alatas, ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Indonésie; et Sadruddin Aga Khan, ancien haut commissaire aux réfugiés et actuel chef des opérations dans le Golfe.

La presse populaire britannique s'est intéressée sur la disponibilité de Mme Margaret Thatcher; et l'intérêt pour un ressortissant d'un des États membres permanents a été attisé par une remarque de M. Edouard Chevardnadze, qui a laissé entendre qu'il penserait au poste. Par habitude, les pays neutres européens fournissent des candidats. Le Finlandais Martti Ahtisaari, responsable de l'administration de l'ONU et qui a supervisé l'accession à l'indépendance de la Namibie, a maintenant pour concurrente Mme Gro Brundtland, premier ministre de la Norvège. De plus, avec la fin de la Guerre froide, un ressortissant d'un pays fort de l'OTAN n'est pas nécessairement hors course. En conséquence, on parle aussi de MM. Joe Clark et Maurice Strong, tous deux Canadiens.

MALGRÉ LA PROFUSION DE NOMS, IL Y A EU BIEN trop peu de recherche et de décontrage des curriculum pour trouver le meilleur candidat à l'emploi le plus difficile de la Terre. Quelques ambassadeurs des Nations Unies se sont certes rencontrés officieusement à New York, mais il n'existe aucun comité de recherche qui se mette activement en quête de candidats tout en examinant de très près les qualités professionnelles et personnelles des personnes déjà en lice. Les candidats les plus solides sont en fait ceux qui se présentent de leur propre chef.

M. Brian Urquhart, ancien sous-secrétaire général de l'ONU pour les Affaires spéciales a déclaré, non sans sarcasme, que la Fondation Ford investit plus de temps, d'argent et d'énergie dans le recrutement d'un de ses cadres que la collectivité internationale n'en dépense pour choisir son Secrétaire général. Quand on cherche un professeur pour une chaire universitaire importante pas un fonctionnaire pour un poste élevé, à n'en pas douter, on fait plus de publicité, on organise davantage d'entrevues et on s'interroge plus sur les capacités intellectuelles et sur le caractère des éventuels candidats.

Que s'est-il passé au cours des quarante-six dernières années pour que le choix du Secrétaire général tourne à une telle mascarade? La sélection

Pour les cas où une réaction militaire demeure improbable, la Communauté apparaît comme le choix naturel pour la gestion des crises européennes, en raison de sa puissance économique et de ses mécanismes décisionnels efficaces. Les gouvernements membres se consultent régulièrement, ce qui facilite la coordination. Une politique communautaire commune semble désormais se mettre en place par le biais d'une *noyaka*. Cette dernière réunit les anciens ministres des Affaires étrangères, et les présidents en exercice et à venir du Conseil de l'Europe (le président changeant tous les six mois), qui est l'organe politique suprême de la Communauté. Dans la crise yougoslave de la fin juin, c'est la *noyaka* qui a donné l'exemple en essayant d'obtenir un cessez-le-feu et de renouer un règlement constitutionnel. Le succès mitigé de la démarche révèle un certain nombre de problèmes inhérents à ce type de diplomatie de crise qu'il faut résoudre si l'on ne veut pas voir les efforts de la Communauté régulièrement voués à l'échec. Tout engagerait sérieusement dans ces affaires compliquées ne peut se faire à distance : il doit être constant et suppose une compréhension profonde de la nature de la crise.

IL EST TENTANT, COMME CELA A ÉTÉ LE CAS AVEC la Yougoslavie lorsque l'on a insisté sur l'unité nationale avant toute chose, de forger des déclarations consensuelles reposant sur des vœux pieux plutôt que sur une réelle connaissance des réalités politiques locales. Les chances de réussite sont tellement plus grandes si la Communauté s'active pendant que les crises couvent mais n'ont pas encore éclaté. À la fin de juin 1991 nombreux signes indiquaient que la Yougoslavie allait arriver à ébullition. Pourtant, la collectivité internationale n'a réagi qu'une fois le cycle de la violence enclenché. En conséquence, outre apaiser le différend politique existant, la Communauté a dû trouver le moyen de faire accepter un cessez-le-feu dans une situation confuse et haineuse. Ces difficultés à mettre fin à un conflit dans un pays de superficie aussi modeste que la Yougoslavie ouvre les yeux sur l'ampleur que pourraient prendre les problèmes si le prochain passe-tête à résoudre est un soulèvement interne en URSS.

En ce moment, il semble que l'Europe cherche à remplacer un équilibre des forces par un équilibre des institutions, en faisant prendre à ces dernières une envergure telle qu'elles sauront persuader des pays de renoncer à leur souveraineté nationale. En pratique, les choses sont beaucoup plus complexes. Il y a maintes façons de retisser le riche tissu institutionnel, suivant la nature des crises, or cette tâche dépend des gouvernements. Bien que ce soient de plus en plus les instances transnationales qui donnent des solutions politiques, parce que la plupart des problèmes sont trop importants pour qu'un pays puisse en venir à bout seul, ce sont les gouvernements qui continuent d'apporter les principales idées. Parce qu'il existe plusieurs choix, ces derniers décideront dans les faits et pendant les crises à qui ils préfèrent s'adresser. □

À l'heure actuelle, on n'en parle que comme d'un «pont» entre l'OTAN et la Communauté militaire de la CE. Ce dernier point soulève le problème central de toute identité européenne en matière de défense. En effet, la menace soviétique étant considérablement réduite, on pourrait penser que l'Europe occidentale dispose d'assez de forces pour la ligne de front, mais elle serait incapable, dans un proche avenir, de faire face à autre chose que des opérations militaires routières à l'heure actuelle, on n'en parle que comme d'un «pont» entre l'OTAN et la Communauté militaire de la CE. Ce dernier point soulève le problème central de toute identité européenne en matière de défense. En effet, la menace soviétique étant considérablement réduite, on pourrait penser que l'Europe occidentale dispose d'assez de forces pour la ligne de front, mais elle serait incapable, dans un proche avenir, de faire face à autre chose que des opérations militaires routières à

## L'expression «instabilité en Europe de l'Est» est devenue synonyme des conséquences politiques les moins désirables de la révolution de 1989.

EN PÉRIODE DE CRISE, NOTAMMENT lorsque que ce sont les règles de la collectivité internationale qui sont en péril, comme dans l'agression commise par Saddam Hussein, les Nations Unies seraient bien placées pour intervenir, mais il n'est guère probable qu'elle influe sur la gestion des crises. La crise yougoslave, qui a éclaté au moment où l'on mettait de nouveaux mécanismes en place, a été l'occasion de la première déclaration, malheureusement sans grande portée, de la CSCE.

La Conférence peut, en revanche, servir d'instance où des accords conciliés ailleurs sont avalisés, offrir un cadre à la conciliation privée, mais il n'est guère probable qu'elle influe sur la gestion des crises. La crise yougoslave, qui a éclaté au moment où l'on mettait de nouveaux mécanismes en place, a été l'occasion de la première déclaration, malheureusement sans grande portée, de la CSCE.

La CSCE est une instance au sein de laquelle on peut discuter des efforts, voire des doctrines unanimes. Cependant, ses décisions se prenant à l'unanimité, elle ne peut servir à l'Europe entière à imposer sa volonté à un membre récalcitrant. La Conférence peut, en revanche, servir d'instance où des accords conciliés ailleurs sont avalisés, offrir un cadre à la conciliation privée, mais il n'est guère probable qu'elle influe sur la gestion des crises. La crise yougoslave, qui a éclaté au moment où l'on mettait de nouveaux mécanismes en place, a été l'occasion de la première déclaration, malheureusement sans grande portée, de la CSCE.

BIEN QUE SE CONSACRANT AUX QUESTIONS MILITAIRES, L'UEO n'a jamais eu d'organisation militaire en tant que telle, et son point de vue stratégique distinct s'inscrit indubitablement dans le contexte d'une Alliance Atlantique. Elle a plus de légitimité aux yeux de certains pays européens que l'OTAN et elle est moins restreinte qu'elle géographiquement, mais il est improbable qu'elle devienne une instance à part entière. Entre autres problèmes, des membres de la Communauté européenne (CE) et de l'OTAN, tels que la Norvège et la Turquie, n'en font pas partie.

C'EST LE MAGNÉTISME ÉCONOMIQUE DE LA Communauté qui est essentiel, parce qu'il attire des membres admis, ceux qui sont exclus risquent de se sentir plus isolés. Autre problème, ceux qui tiennent à accélérer le mouvement par des propositions d'union politique redoutent que ce processus d'"approfondissement" soit miné par les complications supplémentaires qui résultent de l'«élargissement» traduisant l'admission de nouveaux membres.

Dans la mesure où la gestion des crises comporte une dimension économique, la Communauté a bien un rôle naturel à jouer. Ce dernier débordement inévitablement sur la dimension politique et militaire, comme on peut le voir dans le cas de l'Irak. Toutefois, on peut aussi faire valoir que la Communauté n'est qu'une des instances capables de gérer les problèmes de sécurité et que plus la dimension militaire est importante, moins elle a de chances d'être choisie.



Le Pacte de Varsovie est chose du passé : l'Union soviétique n'a plus de prise sur ses anciens pays satellites ; l'Allemagne réunifiée fait partie de l'OTAN ; le Rideau de fer a été démantelé. La soudaineté de ce processus en a surpris plusieurs, mais nombre des attitudes et des instances datant de la Guerre froide sont inchangées. Par conséquent, l'essentiel du débat actuel sur la sécurité et la défense en Europe porte sur la question suivante : comment adapter au mieux ces instances à la nouvelle situation ? Les crises qui secouent la plupart des pays de l'ancien monde communiste obligent à reformuler la question de la sécurité européenne.

L'expression « instabilité en Europe de l'Est » est devenue synonyme des conséquences politiques les moins désirables de la révolution de 1989. Le déclin de la puissance soviétique signifie que l'Europe centrale et l'Europe de l'Est peuvent à nouveau respirer, mais il sonne aussi le réveil des nationalismes et des antagonismes ethniques, qui avaient été étouffés par la poignée de fer du communisme, en même temps que la libre entreprise et la libre expression. Cependant, tous deux sont exacerbés aujourd'hui par le terrible héritage économique du socialisme d'Etat.

Le défi pour l'Europe post-révolutionnaire consiste à désamorcer ces tendances négatives en faisant ressortir les aspects positifs de la démocratie libérale et de l'économie de marché. Si cela échoue, une bonne partie de l'activité diplomatique est parallèlement consacrée à la réorganisation des institutions et à la conception de nouveaux mécanismes pour la gestion des conflits. En ce moment même, tout cela est mis à l'épreuve en Yougoslavie et, pour l'instant, l'expérience est saluante. Jusqu'au test yougoslave, le débat était assez décon- certain tant il était, pour l'essentiel, axé sur la capacité d'institutions conçues pour accomplir des fonctions précises dans un ensemble de circonstances données, d'accomplir des fonctions très différentes dans des circonstances bien changées. Dans le passé, l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) tenait le haut du pavé en la matière. Elle continue d'avoir la seule organisation militaire intégrée importante et est la mieux à même de mettre à contribution les deux partenaires nord-américains.

Dans son examen actuel de sa stratégie, l'OTAN part encore du principe que le problème le plus grave que les Etats membres pourraient avoir à affronter serait un sursauf de l'URSS qui chercherait à regagner son ancienne influence militaire en Europe. Il ne fait aucun doute que la puissance militaire soviétique reste importante et le restera pendant quelque temps encore. Quant à savoir si l'URSS a un intérêt quelconque à s'aventurer militairement hors de ses frontières, il est permis d'en douter lorsque l'on voit les nombreux problèmes internes qui l'assaillent. Il est difficile de dire à quoi la situation ressemblera dans cinq ans (alors que toutes les troupes soviétiques auront été retirées, y compris d'Allemagne), mais la période actuelle pourrait être

# QUÉRELLES DANS UNE EUROPE NOUVELLE

L'Europe est aux prises avec les conséquences des révolutions de 1989.

PAR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

## Les difficultés à mettre fin à un conflit en Yougoslavie ouvre les yeux sur l'ampleur que pourraient prendre les problèmes s'il y avait un soulèvement interne en URSS.

très transitoire. L'OTAN a toujours tendance à décrire son rôle avec des concepts issus du passé, et sans référence à la puissance soviétique, ses planificateurs deviendraient totalement désorientés.

L'Alliance s'attend maintenant à être avertie d'amplement à l'avance de tout coup de force soviétique. Ce qui signifie qu'elle peut réduire considérablement ses effectifs actuels et compter sur cet avertissement pour avoir le temps de les reconstituer en cas d'urgence. En étant à ce point axé sur la menace soviétique, l'OTAN n'est pas prête pour des menaces moindres, ou pour des menaces extra-européennes. Les dirigeants occidentaux ne tiennent beaucoup à ce que l'intervention armée directe soit un recours extrême dans toute gestion de crise future et, bien que l'on parle de rendre l'organisation plus « politique », elle n'est vraiment pertinente que lorsque la coopération militaire devient une nécessité. Elle permet de mettre sur pied un commandement et des procédures de contrôle communs, et favorise les plus grandes connaissances qu'entraîne l'interopérabilité du matériel et des exercices.

S'AGISSANT D'OFFRIER DES GARANTIES DE SÉCURITÉ À d'anciens membres du Pacte de Varsovie qui ne se sentent toujours pas à l'abri d'un coup de force soviétique, mais n'appartiennent à aucune organisation de sécurité centrale. La Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie, notamment, ne font guère de secret de leur souhait d'intégrer les rangs de l'OTAN. Pour l'instant, on en est à une coopération plus étroite grâce à des bureaux de liaison et à la participation à l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord (non gouvernementale) qui de seize membres, est passée à vingt-deux. L'OTAN ne veut pas aller plus loin par refus de s'engager vis-à-vis de certains pays pour tous leurs conflits avec des voisins et aussi parce qu'elle ne veut pas créer l'impression qu'elle se ligue de nouvelles garanties en matière de sécurité influenceront négativement sur la disposition des forces armées, entre autres en déplaçant vers l'Est la ligne de défense avancée et le parapluie nucléaire.

L'OTAN s'efforce d'atténuer les risques pesant sur les nouvelles démocraties en assurant qu'elle ne resterait pas « indifférente » si elles étaient menacées. Elle tente de définir les principes fondamentaux dont la transgression déclencherait une intervention et l'on voit mal, en fait, comment elle pourrait éviter d'agir en cas d'acte d'agression flagrant.

Au début, les pays de l'Est investissaient de bien plus grands espoirs dans une autre instance, la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), au sein de laquelle on retrouve non seulement les Américains, mais tout le monde. L'Albanie a marqué la fin de son isolement en intégrant la CSCE et les procédures de





# SAVOIR PRÉVOIR

Ceux et celles qui

décident de la politique

de défense du Canada

semblent faire preuve de

manque de perspicacité.

P A R

D E S M O N D

M O R T O N

**L**A DÉMISSION DU VICE-AMIRAL CHARLES THOMAS au printemps dernier a révélé aux Canadiens et Canadiennes ce que quelques initiés aux questions de défense redoutaient depuis des mois. Ottawa s'attelle de nouveau à la redéfinition de sa politique de défense — moment douloureux pour ses premières victimes, à savoir les personnes qui ont choisi de faire carrière dans les forces canadiennes.

L'affaire n'est guère plus rassurante pour le reste de la population. En juin 1991, la Guerre froide était bel et bien révolue, le gouvernement réclamait son tribut de paix. Que les trois armes subissent des compressions budgétaires comparables ou, comme l'amiral Thomas le fait valoir, que la marine et l'armée de l'air survivent au déclin de l'armée de terre, le gouvernement entend trancheur dans le vif pour réaliser des économies. L'armée de terre, notamment, pourrait perdre son savoir-faire dans la guerre blindée et dans l'artillerie moderne. Où se servirait-on, d'ailleurs, de ce savoir-faire et du matériel coléux qu'il suppose ? Ou utiliserait-on les frégates de patrouille ou les CF-18 ?

La réponse, bien entendu, est que nous n'en savons rien. Savoir prévoir est un atout majeur en matière de politique de défense et un atout qu'on possède rarement comme les auteurs du projet de Fernin Beatty l'ont découvert. Le Livre blanc de la défense de 1987 assurait hautement au Pacte de Varsovie et à ses ennemis armés de blindés bien après l'an 2 000, et que le pays avait désespérément besoin de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire pour participer à l'avenir à la chasse à d'éventuels «Octobre rouge» ennemis. En 1989 déjà, ces affirmations étaient reléguées aux oubliettes. En revanche, en juin 1990, quelqu'un a-t-il prédit qu'un quart de l'armée canadienne tout l'été aux abords de Montréal ou que des navires et des CF-18 canadiens seraient engagés dans un conflit armé dans le golfe Persique ?

AVEC UNE CONTINUITÉ VRAIMENT IMPRESSIONNANTE, ceux qui définissent la politique de défense du Canada se fourvoient. Ceux de 1987 peuvent aussi se consoler en découvrant l'incroyable manque de clarté de leur prédecesseurs. En 1949, le très intelligent Brooke Claxton affirmait que le rôle le plus probable des défenseurs du Canada serait d'assurer la défense du territoire national. L'armée a donc été rééquipée pour repousser les incursions soviétiques dans notre Arctique. Quelques mois plus tard, nous envoyions des bâtiments de guerre en Europe des soldats, des escadrons de chasse et toutes les armes que nous pouvions pour défendre le vieux continent. La défense territoriale est si vite apparue inutile que le pays a même accepté de se départir de ses milices. Dans son Livre blanc de 1964, Paul Hellyer donnait la priorité au maintien de la paix. Huit ans plus tard, Donald MacDonald la classait au dernier rang de nos soucis.

Si nous remontons plus loin dans le passé, leurs prédecesseurs n'étaient pas plus malins. Jusqu'à la fin août 1939, personne n'avait prévu que le Canada entrerait en guerre pour sauver la Pologne et seul J.W. Diefenbaker, en juillet 1914, le *Globe* de Toronto mettait Ottawa en demeure de veiller à nous

## Les politiques de défense du Canada, aussi politisées et terribles soient-elles, se sont avérées brillantes.

défendre... contre des maladies contagieuses «infiltrées» des États-Unis. Trois semaines plus tard, la Grande Guerre éclatait. Pour être juste, disons que des officiers de l'état-major du ministère de la Milice avaient un ordre de mobilisation dans leur habituelle pile de plans. Sam Hughes, leur redoutable ministre, l'a déchiré pour suivre son propre instinct débordant.

Il y a plus important que de mal prévoir. En effet, les Canadiens et Canadiennes n'ont jamais fait les rais de ces erreurs de jugement. Depuis 1814, leur pays n'a pas été envahi, pillé ni même gravement menacé. Nous n'avons ni Pearl Harbor, ni Rotterdam, ni guerre éclair grave dans notre subconscient collectif. Le paradoxe affreux pour ceux d'entre nous qui croient dur comme fer à l'état de préparation, c'est que nos adversaires ont raison de se moquer de nous. Les politiques de défense du Canada, aussi politisées et terribles soient-elles, se sont avérées brillantes. Même lorsque nous sommes battus en 1914, 1939 et 1950, ce sont nos alliés qui ont supporté le poids de la bataille le temps que nous recutions, institutions et équipions nos forces.

Nous faisons porter le chapeau aux Britanniques pour Hong Kong ou Dieppe.

L'AVENIR SE BÂTIT SUR LE PASSÉ, MAIS NE LUI RESSEMBLE PAS FORCÉMENT. Le monde de l'après-guerre froide est déjà plus complexe pour le Canada que ne l'était le monde bipolaire de 1987. Faire des États-Unis l'arbitre tout-puissant de la paix mondiale, c'est refuser de voir les limites profondes du pouvoir économique et militaire américain. Dire que l'URSS n'est plus une grande puissance revient à se voiler la face.

Finie la confrontation prudemment gérée entre les deux superpuissances entourées de leurs alliés respectifs. Nous vivons maintenant dans un monde multipolaire. Le Moyen-Orient n'est plus le vainqueur incontesté des parts d'instabilité. Nous sommes désormais confrontés à une multitude de conflits réels ou potentiels des frontières troubles de l'URSS aux Balkans, de la Corne de l'Afrique aux pays agités de l'Asie du Sud-Est.

C'est important pour un Canada qui dépend fondamentalement du commerce mondial pour assurer son niveau de vie. C'est important aussi pour les habitants d'un pays de plus en plus multiculturel, dont les rangs sont gonflés par des réfugiés venus de toutes les contrées troubles de la planète. Loins d'oublier leur patrie d'origine, ces gens attendent de leur pays d'adoption qu'il intervienne. Après tout, n'est-ce pas par loyauté envers la Grande-Bretagne que les Canadiens ont pris part aux deux Guerres mondiales ? Si le reste du monde

importe vraiment peu aux Canadiens, pourquoi sont-ils allés dans le Golfe ? Les Canadiens et Canadiennes sont également confrontés à l'affreuse perspective de conflits intérieurs, à de nouveaux «Oka» promis par les Premières nations du Canada et à la vague possibilité de troubles civils si la Confédération vole en éclats. Bien que la population canadienne rejette quasi unanimement l'idée de l'emploi de la force, il y a suffisamment de transigence dans les attitudes nationales pour que des explosions soient fort malheureusement possibles. Comme l'a été dernier l'armée canadienne représente un dernier recours rapidement mobilisable. Bâtir des scénarios précis est un jeu de dupes. Un pays dans lequel on s'assure plus que nulle part ailleurs devrait comprendre qu'on ne paie pas de primes uniques

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Lawrence Freedman est professeur au Département de polémiologie du King's College, à Londres ;  
Charlotte Gray est rédactrice à la revue *Saturday Night* et membre du bureau de rédaction de *Paix et Sécurité* ;  
Paul Marantz est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique ; Michael  
McIvor est en poste à Londres, où il est principal correspondant européen de la CBC pour le *National Radio* ;  
News : Desmond Morton est historien militaire et directeur de l'*Erindale College*, à l'Université de Toronto ;  
Janice Gross Stein est professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de Toronto ; Thomas G. Weiss est  
directeur associé du *Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute* de l'Université Brown, à Providence (Rhode Island).

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## MADLY OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS

FORMER USSR'S PARADE OF SOVEREIGNTIES

*By Joan DeBardeleben*

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
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“Madly Off In All Directions,” our lead story this time (with appropriate acknowledgements to Stephen Leacock for the title) is a less starry-eyed appraisal of the USSR’s alarmingly rapid political decomposition than we are used to. Apart from “chaos,” the words used most commonly in association with Soviet events of the last year seem to have been “democracy,” “freedom,” “independence,” “self-determination” — affirmative, hopeful words all of them.

**Joan DeBardeleben** reminds us that like other places in the world, "the people" don't have very much to do with what is going on in several corners of the former Soviet nation. In some cases local members of far-flung bits of the old communist apparatus severed ties with the centre for fear of being dragged down with the Moscow communist party ship after the August coup. Elsewhere, demagogues continue to exploit ancient ethnic fears and widespread deprivation in order to settle scores with enemies new and old.

Then there are the enormous disparities in power and resources between Russia, and the other much smaller republics. In the final days of November, the government of Russia announced that it had given up on trying to pursue economic reform in concert with other republics. "They can get on the train with us or stay behind – it's up to them" was the tone of press reports about how Russian republic negotiators felt about the other eleven. But Russia can afford to play the bully. A year before the coup, a Russian economist, Vassily Silunin, told me in

a voice that left no doubt about how he viewed economic relations between the republics:

All we have to do is look through USSR foreign trade statistics. Half of this profit comes through selling oil – *Russian* oil. The next most important export is natural gas – *Russian* gas. Then there is gold – *Russian* gold. Then wood – *Russian* wood. Until now, all this income from Russian goods has been distributed across the Union.

Ethnic differences aside, the smaller republics are torn between, on one hand, staying in a union and, in DeBardeleben's words, finding "themselves underlings in a revised edition of the former Soviet empire," and on the other, taking the chance that they can make their way in the world on their own. It is still very early days of what will continue to be an intricate political dance among the twelve.

– Michael Bryans

Canadian  
Institute for  
International  
Peace and  
Security

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada K1R 7X7  
Telephone (613) 990-1593  
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Joan DeBardeleben is associate professor at Carleton University's Institute of Soviet and East European Studies; Jocelyn Coulon is international affairs editor for *Le Devoir* of Montreal; David Cox is associate professor of political studies at Queen's University; Gérard Hervouet is professor of political science at Université Laval in Quebec and editor of *Études Internationales*; Jean Pelletier is economics editor for *Le Journal de Montréal* and, during the Iran hostage crisis of 1979 to 1981, was Washington, D.C. correspondent for *La Presse* of Montreal; Richard Steyn is editor-in-chief of the *Johannesburg Star*, Johannesburg, South Africa; Paul C. Warnke is an attorney in Washington, D.C., held senior positions in the US government during the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter, and is a former member of the Institute's Board of Directors.

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*Following the failed coup d'état in the USSR in August, a surge of nationalism swept through the dying empire. By November, all but two of the fifteen Soviet republics declared their independence. Some, like the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Armenia, and Georgia had already asserted their intention to achieve independent statehood before the coup d'état, but from late August until late October, most others joined the independence bandwagon.*

ONLY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND KAZAKHSTAN (where the Russian proportion of the population is nearly as large as the Kazakh) broke the spell, presumably because they would form the core of any new Russian-dominated union. With the old centre defunct, they would in effect only be declaring independence from themselves.


This new wave of independence mania evoked a sense of déjà vu among Soviet-watchers, for in 1989 and 1990, a similar "parade of sovereignties" had marched through the land. But now the republics were not only claiming control over their own affairs, but were, at least ostensibly, asserting their right to full recognition in the international community.

The coup d'état itself was both a response and a spur to this rising tide of nationalism. On the eve of the planned signing of a new union treaty, Gorbachev's disloyal aides took action to block the agreement that would have shifted numerous powers from the centre to the newly-assertive republics. Only five republics intended to sign the new accord on 20 August (the Russian federation, Kazakhstan, Belorussia, Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan), with four others (Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Kyrgystan, and Azerbaidzhan) possibly following in the next month.

THE ORGANIZERS OF THE COUP RIGHTFULLY DISCERNED that 20 August would signify a capitulation of the centre to vital demands from the republics, a process which could easily initiate the withering away of the Soviet state, though hardly in the sense Marx and Lenin had intended. Ironically, the putsch attempt accelerated the very process that the coup-plotters were trying to halt. As one Soviet commentator noted:

If in other countries a putsch usually is a venture of a dozen malefactors who are then put in prison and the old leaders go on living like they did before, the August putsch was unparalleled. Practically all of the union leadership – the coercive structures,... the executive power,... the legislative power,... and party power ... all could simultaneously be charged under various articles of the criminal code.

And when the whole apex of government, consisting either of criminals or of their accomplices, suffers a shattering defeat by the people, such a government cannot hold out. The whole leadership of the government collapses into political non-existence, and out of the



political vacuum arises some other government. It arose, but not as a single government.\*

The coup-plotters' actions revealed the deep corruption, stupidity, and arrogance which governed actions of the central organs; this fuelled the centrifugal forces tearing the union apart. The draft union treaty was scuttled, and by 21 August when the coup flopped, its concessions were already too limited to satisfy even the most acquiescent of republics.

SURVEYING THE MAP, ONE WONDERS WHAT SOME of the republics intended to achieve with their declarations. Could the smaller or less-developed regions really hope and want to stand alone as independent states? Who and what lies behind their grand language? Are these declarations really assertions of national self-determination and popular sovereignty, as we in the West might like to believe? Or are they Janus-faced, with a darker, seamier side as well?

Like everything in the former USSR today, generalizations come hard and are usually wrong. And despite *glasnost*, one must still look beyond the words to discern the true message. The independence declarations above all signify that each former republic must be understood in its own terms. But the meaning of the proclamations varies dramatically from place to place, even if some common tendencies exist.

For the Baltic peoples, the declarations without doubt reflected a genuine resolve to achieve independent statehood, a national yearning ever since the treachery of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 made these nations into pawns of larger forces. On 6 September 1991, the Soviet state itself recognized Baltic independence; the gradual realization of that status will involve a radical rejection of Soviet institutions and communist power. New democratic procedures and institutions

are under construction, and a genuine national and social revolution has occurred over the last two years. To be sure, problems remain, and nationalism's uglier face peaks out at times. For example, will individual rights be as well protected as the collective rights of the newly assertive Baltic peoples? How will national minorities be treated? And how will they respond to new stresses and demands for assimilation?

In mid-September, large numbers of Estonians rallied to protest

## MADLY OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS

*The dark side of the USSR's  
independence bandwagon.*

BY JOAN DEBARDELEBEN

\*Maksim Sokolov, "Slava Bogu, perestroika konchilas. (Thank God, perestroika is over), Kommersant (19–26 August 1991), p. 1.



against proposed legislation which would grant non-Estonian residents the right to choose Estonian citizenship. A group called the Congress of Estonia, which organized the demonstrations, demanded that those who did not hold Estonian citizenship in the interwar period (or have ancestors who did) should have to apply for citizenship. This type of "exclusive" nationalism, even if it does not make its way into government policy, can easily poison the terrain on which new democratic institutions are constructed. It could also trigger large-scale emigration of Russians and other minorities, spreading the tension by intensifying claims to scarce resources in neighbouring countries.

THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC REFORM CAN MAKE inter-ethnic accommodation even more difficult. Construction of large state-owned industrial plants on Baltic territory was commanded by the Stalinist economic machine as it pursued a "big is beautiful" strategy, interconnecting all regions through a network of semi-monopolistic enterprises. These operations injected large numbers of Russians into the Baltic region as the central economic ministries recruited labour power for the new mammoths. The Russian recruits severely diluted the weight of the titular nationality in Estonia and Latvia, fuelling the commitment of the indigenous populations to fiercely resist assimilation to Russian and Soviet culture. In some localities, Russians now form the bulk of the workforce.

As these factories and enterprises are privatized, rationalized, or split into smaller units, unemployment and dislocation of workers are almost certain to occur, and in some regions, Russians will be the main victims. Thus, the hardships of economic reform could themselves be taken as signs of ethnic discrimination and add ethnic strife to the long list of other suffering involved in the economic and political metamorphosis. In the final analysis, however, the Baltic peoples may well be able to manage these collisions with relative civility, as their non-violent struggle for independence over the last two years has already demonstrated. But in some other parts of the former USSR, tensions are already taking or could take on a more aggressive turn.

If the coup's collapse allowed the Baltics to push forth their long-standing claim for independence, the putsch's radical aftermath provided a different motor for other republican leaders to join the independence train. Two developments were of particular importance. First, if the coup's defeat was a victory for Russia, as is so loudly proclaimed both there and abroad, then it almost immediately raised the spectre of a revitalized Russian nationalism taking unpredictable turns. On 26 August, Yeltsin's office warned that border questions

might be re-opened (except with the Baltic states) if more republics pressed their claims for independence. This statement demonstrated that the hero of August could not wear both hats – protector of Russian interests and protector of all of her neighbours.

Furthermore, officials in the Russian government who had proven themselves loyal to the constitution were catapulted into posts at the centre vacated by the coup's accomplices. At first blush, the new post-coup centre looked like a surrogate for the Russian government. Those non-Russian groups that stayed with the union might well find themselves underlings in a revised edition of the former Soviet empire. Moreover, if they didn't join the independence bandwagon, their bargaining power might later be weakened as Russia tried to lure the defectors to rejoin the union.

A second factor frightened some of the more conservative republic leaders (for example in Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan, Tadjikistan, and finally Turkmenistan). The suspension of communist party activities by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies after the coup posed a direct threat to the leaders of these republics, who simultaneously headed the republic communist party organization and the government. Having equivocated or expressed outright support for the coup attempt, these leaders were already on shaky ground following the defeat of the putsch. They tried to save their own political bases by rescuing those same communist organizations and established bureaucracies.

AS THESE LEADERS DONNED THEIR NATIONALIST hats, some quit the party ship; others bailed out into newly-formed parties, republic surrogates for the old communist centre; and some were dumped from power by their parliaments, as their compromising behaviour was too transparent to warrant even minimal credibility. In sharp contrast to the Baltics, here the elite's declared support for independence reflected an attempt to conserve old power relationships, rather than to nurture new ones. The leadership's nationalism had little to do with national self-determination and democracy, and much to do with elite preservation.

In these areas, the social revolution is in its beginning stages or is still to occur, but until then, independence should not be confused either with a clearly conceived strategy for national self-determination or with popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, recent events in Tadjikistan demonstrate that popular protests may force concessions from the communist parties in these republics, but it

is far from clear what the outcome will be. In Kyrgyzstan, in sharp contrast to the other Central Asian republics, a figure outside the party establishment and with good democratic credentials – Askar Akaev – has been president since October 1990; he also distanced himself from the coup attempt from the start.

Developments in Belorussia (which renamed itself the Republic of Belarus on 19 September 1991) represent a more convoluted twist of events. The Belorussian nation, sharing broad historical and cultural features with the neighbouring Russian population, has long been considered by Soviet-watchers to be one of the least likely candidates for serious separatist aspirations. Opposition movements have, until recently, been strongly controlled. However, popular resistance to the prevailing order surged in April 1991, when the central authorities hiked prices in state stores by, on average, 170 percent; supplies didn't increase and wages went up only 60 roubles per month, on an average monthly salary of 300 roubles.

WORKERS IN MINSK, THE BELORUSSIAN CAPITAL, had apparently had enough and demanded new elections in the republic and the resignation of the central government. Alongside the oppositionist Popular Front of Belorussia, the new Minsk Strike Committee broadened the social range of the anti-communist chorus which had been largely based in the intelligentsia. Independence sentiments were strengthened by central mismanagement of the economy; here, as elsewhere, people began to think that they couldn't do much worse than the Kremlin crew, and might do a lot better. The Belorussian government itself began to feel the strain. By the day of the coup, those who had carried communist party cards on the day

of their election (some 85 percent of the parliaments' deputies) were themselves increasingly split over the correct strategy, although the leadership in the parliament was still in party-loyal hands.

When the coup came, the party's central organs expressed support for the Emergency Committee. This made the party's position even more tenuous once the coup collapsed, not only because its leadership was at least passively implicated but also because Gorbachev had ostensibly abandoned ship in resigning as General Secretary. In a desperate move, the Belorussian party leader appealed to the increasingly rebellious parliament to declare independence and thus to decouple the Belorussian party's fate from that of the

*"exclusive"  
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constructed.*

CPSU, which was increasingly under threat from the radical turn of events in Moscow. The anti-communist deputies seized the opportunity, and after making certain conditions they offered support for the proposal.

THE PARTY LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE WON A Pyrrhic victory, for its activities were nonetheless suspended pending investigations, and its property was to be seized. Politics had indeed made strange bedfellows, and the party's gamble in playing the independence card may yet backfire. The declaration of independence represented an ambiguous compromise between the party establishment and the forces of reform. The anti-communist forces turned the last-ditch attempt of the old party structure to protect itself into a mechanism for loosening the grip of central authority. However, real independence does not seem to be on the immediate agenda and the struggle over democracy is still in its beginning stages in the republic. The republic's dependence on suppliers and buyers in the rest of the former USSR helped spur economic discontent but at the same time binds the region to the others. And the continuing burden of the Chernobyl clean-up would make true independence a costly gain. The declaration of independence signals a change in venue for the political battle, but does not assure its final outcome.

Traditional political culture, perceived injustices of the Stalinist system, economic needs, and more contingent twists of events produce a different configuration in each republic. In Georgia, yet another tendency is evident. Here, the former dissident, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was elected president with 87 percent of the popular vote earlier this year, buoyed by strong nationalist and anti-communist sentiments in the republic. His subsequent actions, however, suggest serious deviations from democratic practice.

A 99 percent vote in favour of national independence was reportedly achieved in April 1991, when pressure was exerted on voters by threatening to deny Georgian state citizenship or property rights to the population in regions where the majority voted against independence. Gamsakhurdia's equivocations during the coup and his suppression of opposition after its collapse spurred public demonstrations calling for his resignation. Violent clashes between the government and its detractors have occurred on the streets of the republic capital, Tbilisi. Particularly noxious has been the sometimes violent suppression of demands for autonomy

made by national minorities (for example, the South-Ossetians) residing within Georgia.

A deep-seated national revolution has occurred in Georgia, but social revolution has not yet placed power in the hands of an accountable system of democratic control. Gamsakhurdia and his entourage have expelled the communist model and institutions, but the absence of indigenous democratic traditions and the, at least, short-term dominance of the "exclusivist" variant of nationalism have produced political violence, polarization, and personalistic politics in the wake of the coup.

Ukraine presents perhaps the most difficult case for Western policy-makers. With over 50 million people and territory rich in agriculture and industry, Ukraine is, alongside Russia, the linchpin of the former USSR. Her fate will help shape the destiny of all of her neighbours. A strong democratic groundswell is active in the republic. When the republic's parliament declared independence on 24 August

1991, a popular referendum on the issue was set for 1 December, along with an election for the post of president. (The results of those votes were not available when this issue went to press.)

HOW ONE INTERPRETS THE RESULTS DEPENDS ON a careful assessment of the voting procedure itself. Was the referendum question worded in an unambiguous manner? Was the secret ballot respected? Did all sides have the right to express their views prior to the vote? Was the presidential post contested? To what extent was the favoured candidate (the president prior to the election, Leonid Kravchuk) able to influence the election through his old party connections?

If the vote for independence passes strongly in the Crimea and in the highly Russianized eastern portion of Ukraine, as well as in western Ukraine, where Ukrainian nationalism reigns strong, this will suggest a strong national consensus on the issue. If there are substantial regional differences in the vote, on the other hand, this might indicate that an independent Ukraine could face growing tensions in areas that have substantial Russian and other minorities. A successful independence vote might make the republic's leadership more conciliatory toward economic cooperation with other parts of the former USSR. On the other hand, it could legitimize further resistance to any compromises of Ukrainian economic auton-


omy. Continued resistance to a functioning economic union with other parts of the former USSR could easily contribute to further economic havoc throughout the entire region.

WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE WARY OF quick or easy responses as they weave their way through the complexities of the present war of sovereignties in the former USSR. Historic claims must be carefully assessed, election and referendum processes scrutinized, and the credentials of would-be national spokespersons checked. In addition, the practical consequences of bolstering the independence claims must also be weighed. The Soviet government, however dubious its moral or legal basis, has, since World War II, maintained a sort of international peace in this conflict-ridden terrain of Central Europe and Asia. The costs of that imposed peace must now be borne. Not only was the "peace" forcefully imposed (a non-sequitur perhaps?) but, with it, a silencing of grievances. And when grievances are repressed rather than expressed, prejudices and stereotypes replace dialogue and understanding. Identity may come to be defined in terms of opposition to the other, rather than in self-comprehension. Such delusions and confusions exact a price once controls are lifted.

The floodgates of regional unrest have been thrown open by the final collapse of communist power. The war of sovereignties has already stoked the fires of regional violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Georgia, and elsewhere. And regional unemployment and competition for scarce resources have already produced violent clashes in parts of Central Asia. But even larger problems loom if accommodation is not found between the newly-emergent states. Massive population movements, establishment of new regional dictators, strife in border and mixed-population regions, further dramatic declines in economic well-being, ethnic scapegoating, and regional wars are all possible consequences of failed accommodation.

IN THE FORMER USSR, NEARLY EVERYTHING IS in short supply, including time. We have, over the last few months, witnessed history moving at fast-forward speed; numerous crises must be addressed simultaneously, and leaders in some of the former republics are largely unschooled in processes of negotiation, bargaining, and compromise. Each population group faces a crisis of self-identity which will take time to resolve.

From the international community, skills of peaceable conflict resolution may be a much more vital gift than the plum of diplomatic recognition. A further acceleration of the independence train could itself, in some cases, derail democratization, economic reform, genuine national self-determination, and a true and lasting peace.



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# THE DELICATE BUSINESS OF MILITARY BASE CLOSINGS

**T**HE LONG AWAITED DEFENCE policy review, outlined by the Minister of National Defence, Marcel Masse, on 17 September 1991, included cuts in personnel and operations and maintenance costs. These cuts will make related infrastructure (read bases, training establishments, supply depots, dock yards, etc.) either redundant or unnecessary, and elimination of excess infrastructure will allow budgetary savings which can be put towards a proposed increase in the portion of the defence budget allocated to equipment purchases.

In announcing the changes, Mr. Masse noted that the basic equation was quite simple – to get savings as fast as possible, unnecessary infrastructure should be eliminated immediately. However, Mr. Masse immediately noted that “socioeconomic reality militates against this prospect” and announced that an impartial advisory group would be established to “help formulate a decision-making framework which can be used to rationalize Canada’s defence infrastructure.”

In the past two years, the government has learned that base closings are a highly charged political issue. In 1989, the Department of National Defence (DND) announced that seven bases would be closed and operations would be scaled back at seven others in order to achieve a savings of close to \$3 billion over fifteen years. The announcement generated considerable criticism from communities where base closings would deal a significant blow to the local economy, and the government came under fire for making the decision without giving local communities time to make a case for keeping the base open or to explore alternative measures.

In the summer of 1991, newspaper reports attributed to an unnamed government source said that the government was considering closing five bases. This prompted the communities named to undertake various measures to fight the rumoured cuts. The federal government sought to ease concerns by assuring communities that the economic effects of base closure would be considered and that no decisions would be made until communities had an opportunity to make a case for keeping the bases open.

## Previous Canadian Base Closings

Some seventy facilities have been closed by DND since 1964. The most recent experience has been in closing twenty-four sites associated with the obsolete CADIN/Pinetree radar line. By the end of 1988, eighteen sites had been closed and put to other uses. These included industrial parks, housing complexes, a private school for troubled children, retirement homes, and native training and housing facilities. Of 900 civilian employees, twelve were unable to be placed in other jobs. The process used in carrying out this successful transition was facilitated by local re-use committees which received financial grants from various government programmes associated with industrial and work force development.

## The US Experience – Deciding on Base Closures

For at least a decade, the US has sought to find a decision-making process which avoids unilateral choices by the Pentagon and lengthy battles among Members of Congress trying to protect their own regions from economic dislocation, but which at the same time accepts that base closures are a necessary element of an efficient cost-effective national base structure.

In 1977, the US Congress passed legislation which required Congressional approval of any base closures with 300 or more civilian employees, or any base realignments which affected either 1,000 or half the total civilian employees at the base. It also specifically requires DOD to comply with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. These requirements were so strict that they effectively prevented the closing of bases.

In 1983, the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, recognizing that an efficient process which facilitated cost effective base

closures would contribute to more efficient use of Pentagon funds, recommended that an independent non-partisan commission be established to examine base closings. As a result, the Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Realignment and Closure was established in May 1988. Its first report, issued in December 1988, recommended that eighty-six

installations be closed. The US Department of Defence and the US Congress accepted the commission’s recommendations.

In determining which installations would be closed or realigned, the commission’s primary criteria was the military value of the base. It therefore began with a thorough review of the US military force structure and its requirements and then examined how bases fit into that structure. Other criteria, including local economic effects were considered but the military factors were primary.

The US has continued to use the commission procedure. The Secretary of Defense recommends closures which are then examined by the commission, whose members are appointed by the Administration. The commission then examines the recommendations and makes its own set of recommendations which may differ from those put forward by the Pentagon. Congress and the Pentagon then accept or reject the commission’s recommendations but must do so without changes. If the recommendations are not actively rejected they are considered to be accepted and will be implemented.

## Local Recovery from Base Closures in the US

Since 1961, a US government programme has been in place which seeks to minimize the impact of defence decisions on local communities. This began as the Economic Adjustment Program and in 1970 was transformed into the President’s Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC). The EAC includes representatives of eighteen federal departments and agencies.

The mandate of EAC is to help communities implement strategies for dealing with the effects of base closure or reductions. Under procedures developed by the EAC, the establishment of a local steering council or task force which includes representatives from a wide cross-section of local interests (business, labour etc.) is seen as key to the process. The inter-departmental nature of the EAC allows for ease of access to grants and opportunities available through other government agencies.

According to the US Department of Defense, over a thirty-year period, more than eighty percent of base closure communities have replaced lost civilian jobs and incomes within several years. Between 1961 and 1990, 158,104 civilian jobs replaced 93,424 former civilian defence and contractor jobs associated with the bases.

## Canada’s Advisory Group

Mr. Masse’s appointment of an advisory group on base closings is recognition of the need to de-politicize the process and develop a standard method of dealing with closures. The Minister’s Advisory Group on Defence Infrastructure has three civilian members: Harry Graschuk, a chartered accountant from Alberta, will chair; the other two members are Kathryn M. Bindon, a professor at Memorial University in Newfoundland; and Guy Fournier, a civil engineer from Quebec. The group will, inter alia, set out decision-making criteria, develop a methodology for calculating net cost savings, take into account regional equity and the country’s duality, identify the possible social and economic effects and examine the experience of other governments. It is expected to submit a report by May 1992.

– JANE BOULDEN

*Ms. Boulden is an independent researcher based in Kingston.*

# WHEN TO SPEAK OUT WHEN TO KEEP SILENT

*A journalist who covered the Iran hostage drama eleven years ago wonders whether media reporting in such situations does more harm than good.*

BY JEAN PELLETIER

**H**OSTAGE-TAKING IS POLITICAL BLACKMAIL, and ranks as one of the more primitive and barbaric forms of human conflict. It depends for its effectiveness as a political negotiation tactic on the presence of modern mass media. One must therefore ask if there would be fewer incidents of hostage-taking if members of the media refused to cover them.

The press officer of any foreign ministry would answer yes to this question. He or she would argue that without media, terrorists would lose the very tool that gives them leverage – the ability to turn a given conflict to their advantage through the use of terror. Without mass media, terrorists could not effectively influence the electorate of the hostages' home countries. Without the inquisitiveness of journalists, whose ears are always open for official reactions, hostage-takers would never otherwise get past the front doors of the White House, the Elysée Palace or 10 Downing Street.

It is true that hostage-taking is a last resort. Nonetheless, it is a very sophisticated weapon, all the more horrifying since, thanks to satellites, it reaches millions of "targets" – from ordinary television viewers (and voters) in the comfort of their homes to the most powerful heads of state secure in their bomb-proof "situation" rooms on the other side of the globe.

TO WRITE THE STORY ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING or not? To show the images or censor them? To speak up or remain silent? These are the questions for which there are no easy answers, not to mention ones that apply to all circumstances. Just as it is false to believe that journalists too become "kidnappers" when they report the taking of a hostage, it is also difficult to sustain the notion that they can remain strictly neutral about a given hostage situation when they are at the same time acting as a negotiating channel.

It was the US hostage crisis in Iran from 1979 to 1981 that, in effect, "modernized" hostage-taking – authorities of a nation state chose to hold foreign diplomats in detention in

order to achieve a political end. Iran opted to use a medieval form of blackmail as an instrument of foreign policy. But such a political calculation only made sense if Khomeini's Iran was certain from the outset that the action would have the desired effect on Jimmy Carter's America.

About this, Teheran had no doubts. After all, wasn't the regime of the ayatollahs brought to power thanks to the skilful use of the modern media? Wasn't Khomeini's calculation about the actions of the Shah, once a few gunshots were fired, right as well? The ayatollahs knew in November 1979 that in order get their own way with the United States, they would have to reach into the living rooms of America.

BY INVADING THE US EMBASSY IN DOWNTOWN Teheran and letting the TV reporters and correspondents of all the major networks and newspapers on the planet work their beats essentially without hindrance, they succeeded far beyond their own expectations. In a remarkably short time, traditional diplomacy was supplanted by the video camera; the live correspondent became the chargé d'affaires and the satellite, the only diplomatic channel that mattered.

Images of the American hostages being paraded blindfolded, hands tied, through the streets of Teheran, had a deep and lasting effect on American public opinion. One year later, the power of these images led to the election of a candidate for president – Ronald Reagan – who had but one election promise: "never again."

The US media – especially television – became active accomplices in this game. Ted Koppel is one of the most watched and respected TV journalists today, in the main, because of a nightly programme which got its start in November 1979 – "America Held Hostage." Viewed from the perspective of 1991, this seems an absurd title for a TV programme. It wasn't America, but fifty-three diplomats who were being held hostage.

Nevertheless, Jimmy Carter played the game too, isolating himself in the White House and binding his fate to that of the hostages imprisoned in the basement of the US chancellery in Teheran. Nevertheless, this inane title, no doubt dreamed up by a news editor unable to resist a sensationalist headline, was to become in just a few weeks, an objective description of the American political mood.

FROM THE MOMENT TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY left the field, the media filled the vacuum. Journalists in Khomeini's Iran were to enjoy greater diplomatic immunity than the diplomats themselves. The US electorate, encouraged by an overheated press, began to perceive the crisis as much more significant than it actually was. And whereas the White House should have remained above all the media noise, instead it diminished itself by playing at the same level as the mass media. From that point on, only a successful military intervention could have broken the impasse between Iran and the US, but the attempt that was made ended in disaster on an Iranian desert – the political fate of Jimmy Carter was sealed.

Throughout those long months of the Iranian hostage crisis was the US media right in carrying on as it did? The simple answer is no. First of all, if certain facts had to be reported, this could have been done without all the pathos and hand-wringing. Was it necessary to play up the yellow ribbons, and the drawn-out counting of days, when all the while it was clear there was no imminent solution? Did the press have to indulge in a primitive and offensive demagoguery, effectively making Islam of the 1980s out to be the Bolshevism of the 1950s? Khomeini's Iran was not Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam, yet the hostage crisis became America's second Vietnam.

THIS KIND OF CRITICISM COULD BE HEARD eleven years ago, but it was at the time evidently much better for the networks' bottom line to sensationalize. Jimmy Carter's calculation that if he immersed himself in the crisis, he would better his chances against his Democratic Party rival, Ted Kennedy, encouraged this tendency.



Can one then reasonably argue that if the media had played a more serious and restrained role, the hostage crisis in Iran would have ended differently? I believe the answer is yes. By playing excessively on the feelings of national humiliation, the American media also became hostage to a crisis which they thought they were covering "objectively." The more the press demanded a rapid end to the crisis, the more this played into the hands of the ayatollahs who simply raised the ante. The taking of a hostage is, by definition, a negotiation, and it is in the interest of the kidnapper to control the timing of deadlines. If the media plays along with the giving of ultimata, then they are dancing to the terrorists' tune.

press can only carry out its role if it retains the option to remain silent, to keep "off-the-record" statements secret, to respect confidentiality, to delay the broadcasting of facts under certain conditions. Secrets and silence are part of the journalist's day-to-day work tools; it is naive to pretend otherwise.

WE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE FROM ALL THIS, however, that the media ought to ignore the taking of hostages. Had it not been for the stubbornness of the press in keeping alive the issue of hostages in Lebanon, who knows whether or not governments would have forgotten about them. The search for truth demands caution and a sense of what the boundaries are,

The search for balance between these two formulas must continue. "Live" does not replace research, much less serious reflection. We know that the presence of a video camera can influence the event it is covering, which is why the presence of journalists in the field is still essential – journalists who go beyond merely expanding upon what the camera sees and seriously examine the subtleties missed by the camera.

FINALLY, WE COME TO THE QUESTION OF whether journalists contribute to the resolution of international conflicts or their prolongation. What we can say for certain is that there is no going back to the good old days. The citizen who has had access to a free, high-technology press, capable of relaying events live from the other end of the world, will not be content with only wire services or the radio. To imagine that we can return to the era of totally secret diplomacy, of no information at all, is an illusion. A parallel development is the fact that media is now part of the event – the number of press attachés in governments is proof.

This new dynamic can increase the rapidity with which solutions to problems are found. But perhaps it also serves to multiply the number of crises we have to face. By simplifying the means of mass communication, modern media has given the even most marginal interest groups the opportunity to express themselves. The collapse of the Eastern European bloc would not have been possible without television, facsimile machines, and communications satellites. But at the same time, the Hezbollah terrorists would never have been able to impose themselves on political events without these very same instruments.

Obviously the media must defend its right to know and systematically oppose censorship. But with equal vigour we need also to uphold our obligation to make sound judgements about when to speak up and when to remain silent.

(translation by Veronica Baruffati and Michael Bryans)

JOURNALISTIC ETHICS demand that the press not takes sides when reporting facts and information. They also demand that a certain distance be maintained between journalist and subject. The journalist who allows himself or herself to be used as go-between risks a dangerous compromise. For example, should a TV crew agree to board a plane in which the passengers are being held hostage? What if the hostage-takers then declare that if their message to the world is not broadcast without editing or commentary, a passenger will be executed in front of the cameras?


One can see right away how the original decision by the journalist to participate leads quickly to some very difficult dilemmas. On the other hand, no one can say that in choosing not to get involved, a journalist is helping the hostages either. But we need to be aware from the outset that by taking hostages, modern terrorists also try to take the press hostage as a means to achieve their ends. It is therefore incumbent on the press to resist these efforts. In the case of terrorism, this means that from time to time – and to preserve its professional integrity – the press should adopt a self-imposed silence.

The argument that freedom of the press can only be assured by rejecting all forms of censorship under all circumstances reduces the role of the press to that of mere loudspeaker and transmitter for any and all voices, be they those of murderers, or dictators. As members of the media we should have no illusions; the

but caution and a sense of proportion do not mean only silence and forgetting.

IN THE 1990S, ISSUES SURROUNDING THE role of media in conflict cannot be raised without mentioning Cable News Network (CNN) and the effect it has had on contemporary mass media. While CNN has released televised news from the straitjacket imposed by the US networks' monopoly, the central question posed by its success is whether broadcasting everything live and direct amounts to progress? Just because CNN transmits live, unfiltered and unedited does not mean its news contains more truth than the others.

It is in some ways peculiar that this question still constitutes part of the journalistic debate in the '90s, for it was first raised in 1939 when American radio, notably the CBS network, would air only "live" news broadcasts. CBS maintained that any tampering with the raw information was contrary to its news ethic. Contemporary journalists like Edward R. Murrow and William Shirer argued the opposite. Live broadcasting only made sense if there was still the option to produce edited programmes which permitted a more reflective, measured handling of the news.



Bernice Ferguson

# PUTTING AN END TO BUSINESS AS USUAL

*A former US Assistant Secretary of Defense says the best way to prevent countries from getting their hands on large arsenals is for the leading arms merchants to stop selling them.*

BY PAUL C. WARNKE

THE OVERWHELMING MILITARY VICTORY OF the allied forces in Desert Storm must not be allowed to obscure the policy failure that largely contributed to the creation of the Persian Gulf crisis. Between 1981 and 1988, Iraq acquired some \$48 billion worth of military hardware. "The largest accumulation ever of modern weapons by a Third World country," in the estimation of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

Most of these weapons were sold by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China, who are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This is the same group that thereafter authorized the use of force to expel one of their major customers from Kuwait.

In recent decades, the United States has sought to contain the bitter antagonisms in the Middle East by fostering a delicate balance of power, principally by supplying arms to Israel, Iran and several Arab states. The policy has failed. In 1973, Egypt, Syria and Israel engaged in a brief but bloody conflict. In the 1980s, Iran and Iraq fought a war over disputed boundaries in which Iraq used poison gas and both countries saw the decimation of thousands of their young men.

Also, for many years, the US placed its faith in the Shah of Iran to maintain peace and stability in the Persian Gulf area. I must admit to a degree of complicity in this flawed policy concept because I served in the late 1960s in the administration of President Lyndon Johnson as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, which office had major responsibility for weapons transfers.

THE SHAH OF IRAN WAS ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL customers. American policy-makers saw him as a durable proconsul who would protect Western interests in the Middle East. Every spring, his generals would show up in Washington with their wish-list of military hardware. Working with our counterparts in the Department of State, we would cut back on the list but on the Shah's next visit to Washington he would have dinner with President Johnson and most of the deleted items would be restored.

In the administration of President Richard Nixon, virtually all limits were taken off and the Shah was allowed to buy just about everything he wanted. But his powerful foreign friends couldn't save him from his domestic enemies and his exit from Teheran was followed by the entrance of Ayatollah Khomeini and his virulently anti-Western regime. Together with our allies, we then built up Iraq as a counterpoise to Iran.

Subsequent events have dramatically illustrated that in arming the enemy of your enemy you are not necessarily making a new friend. Instead, the result may be only that subsequent conflicts in an area of heavy arms sales will result in death and devastation exponentially greater than if restraint had been exercised.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR, THE BUSH administration has given mixed signals about its plans for conventional arms sales in the Middle East. Secretary of State James Baker has said that the United States should seek international cooperation "to reduce arms flow into an area that is already overmilitarized." But shortly thereafter the administration told Congress that it was considering selling over \$23 billion of arms in the next year to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Turkey. Moreover, Secretary Baker's deputy, Lawrence Eagleburger, declared during the Gulf crisis: "It is a policy of the United States that our diplomatic posts abroad should support the marketing efforts of US companies in the defense trade arena as in all other spheres of commercial activity." The sad history of overmilitarizing the Middle East apparently will not be allowed to interfere with business as usual.

Accordingly, it seems clear that the proliferation of modern weaponry throughout the Third World is basically a supply-side problem. What is needed is a fundamental reassessment of the policy of seeking stability by heavily arming the potential combatants. It is the responsibility of the major suppliers – Germany and Brazil, for example, along with the five permanent members of the UN Security

Council – to live up to their responsibility to achieve a more secure world by developing strict constraints on arms sales.

THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE LOGICAL TEST CASE, but not the only problem area. Some useful initiatives have been presented. President Bush has called for steps to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction. Among other proposals, he has called for a cut-off of the production and importation of weapons-grade fissionable materials in the Middle East. The proposal should be broadened to make it a global policy. An international treaty commitment should be achieved to end further production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. President Bush has the germ of a good idea. But it is not a new idea, having been put forward by President Eisenhower almost forty years ago.

Some other useful arms control ideas have been advanced. US Senators John Kerry and Hank Brown proposed earlier this year that the President be required to report to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of the House at least sixty days before announcement of an arms sale to the Middle East. A Canadian initiative last February has major merit. The proposal is that the five permanent members of the Security Council agree that weapons sold to the Middle East will never again include those weapons that are limited by the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). That would mean no sales of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. As with a nuclear weapons material cut-off, this inhibition should be given global application.

SUPPLY-SIDE RESTRAINT BASED ON THE DEFINITIONS already worked out by the twenty-two countries that are parties to the CFE Treaty would cover the most destabilizing weapons and would save a lot of negotiating time. It would also prevent a potential unplanned and unfortunate consequence of the Treaty. Since equipment of the types covered by the Treaty can no longer be sent to Europe, much of it might be made available for sale into other



the US strategic nuclear force. For a decade, the US Navy has successfully resisted all efforts to bring sea-based tactical nuclear weapons to the negotiating table. Brushing aside this position, on 27 September Bush announced that the United States would unilaterally denuclearize most of its naval vessels – “the bottom line is that under normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons.”

AS FOR THE LINK BETWEEN NUCLEAR FORCES IN Europe and North America, this was already partly undermined by the growing European concerns about the continued deployment of short-range nuclear weapons in Germany and elsewhere. On 27 September, Bush performed a remarkable turnaround by accepting the long-standing Soviet position and proposing the elimination of about 2,300 ground-based theatre nuclear weapons. The Soviets, Bush said, “should go down the road with us,” meaning that they should dismantle and eliminate “their entire inventory of ground-launched theatre nuclear weapons.” Amen, say those who have been delegated to watch the Beirut docks.

While the Bush proposals of 27 September will certainly attract their critics, it would be foolish not to recognize the break with the past which has now taken place. Will the Bush administration be as keen to undertake further changes which will cut more deeply into the nuclear stockpile? It is here that certain characteristics of the new style will affect both the US moves to come and the interests of its allies, including Canada.

These proposals were not only a departure from the START processes, they were also taken with the minimum of allied contribution. “Consultations” took place just hours before the speech in order to protect its dramatic impact, reinforcing the growing sense that unilateralism is the new style in Washington. Increased impatience with the cumbersome procedures of multilateral alliance diplomacy may now follow, as well as greater indifference to the special pleadings of allies.

IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS convention, for example, the United States has reneged on its previous commitment to a strict verification regime with few signs of embarrassment or respect for those allies, including Canada, who have continued to support the long-standing Western position on intrusive inspection. A similarly unilateral approach may be in the offing with regard to the amendment or abrogation of the ABM Treaty, where the view of allies are unlikely to weigh heavily in future US overtures to the Soviets.

If Canada and other states want to influence changing US approaches to strategic arms control, in the next year it will be necessary to reassess the direction and goals of US policy,

and to identify policies which serve broad national and multinational interests. Some of the leading agenda items are the following:

First, against whom are the post-START 8,000 US strategic weapons now to be targeted? Lacking any more convincing foe, the target is presumably still the Soviet Union, shrunk by the loss of the Baltic states and now further confounded by the emergence of self-declared nuclear-weapon free republics. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, therefore, points up the need to plan for radical reductions in strategic forces to bring them down to around 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade.

The Canadian interest in this process is direct. In his 27 September speech, President Bush also announced that all US strategic nuclear forces would be brought under a single Strategic Command. This is reminiscent of a report in January 1991, confirmed by Canadian officials, that the Pentagon was considering a proposal to combine in one strategic command, the surveillance assets and interceptor forces of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) with the strategic offensive forces of the US air force and navy.

Second, the US Senate has now formally supported the deployment of a ground-based ABM system by 1996, and called for the amendment of the ABM Treaty to permit a country-wide defence. The coverage of the proposed system would include a very large area of Canada, and the ABM system would almost certainly be commanded by the proposed single Strategic Command. It is not too soon, therefore, to ask whether the Senate's ABM system would help the search for very low levels of nuclear weapons, or whether, as many critics contend, the move to deploy ballistic missile defences will lead other nuclear weapons states to respond by increasing their offensive capability.

THIRD, IF EUROPE, NOW SEEKING TO DIVEST itself of nuclear weapons, is no longer the ignition point for a Soviet-American confrontation, the huge remaining strategic arsenals will confront each other, albeit at a very low level of tension, on a transpolar axis. Accordingly, this may be an ideal time to explore the possibilities of pooling radar warning information with a view to making the circumpolar north totally

transparent to all interested parties. This now includes not only Canada and the Scandinavian states, but also the new Baltic states, which, like Canada, will find themselves caught up in strategic nuclear issues as a consequence of their location.

Fourth, Canada should once again address the question of nuclear weapon testing. In his reply to Bush, Gorbachev announced a one-year moratorium on testing at Novaya Zemlya. All of the northern states have a strong interest in supporting this moratorium and preventing the reactivation of an environmentally fragile test site. But there is also a broader interest. A ban on nuclear weapon tests is likely to be just as important at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as it was in 1990, when the inability to agree on this issue ultimately reduced the conference to a stalemate.

THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME IS AT A CRUCIAL stage in its development: the number of its supporters, especially among the declared nu-

clear weapon states and the near nuclear weapon states has never been greater, but the technologies which encourage proliferation are less and less controllable. The Soviet moratorium provides an opportunity to initiate a long-lead approach to the 1995 Review Conference. As a first step, a conference could be called of all the neighbours of the Soviet Union affected by Novaya Zemlya. There would, of course, be a prominent hold-out – the United States. Notwithstanding, there is not only safety, but also effectiveness in numbers.

A circumpolar discussion to consider alternatives to further testing at Novaya Zemlya (if all else fails, why not let the Soviets test in Nevada?) could not be completely ignored in Washington. Half-hearted pleas by Canadian diplomats acting in isolation most certainly will be.

Of course, it is not these proposals that are new, but the political context. On 27 September, President Bush tried to reassert control of the politics of nuclear weapons, but in the light of the ongoing disintegration in the Soviet Union it is not clear that will be able to maintain the familiar nuclear dialogue. Arms control after the coup will not bear much resemblance to the encrusted processes of the past twenty years. The challenge now is to help shape the new agenda, and that can begin by defining the course which will make nuclear weapons increasingly irrelevant.



Kathryn Adams

# REBIRTH OF THE CAMBODIAN NATION

*Accords signed in Paris in October might at long last  
put an end to Cambodia's misery.*

BY GÉRARD HERVOUET

IN A BUDDHIST TEMPLE IN PHNOM PENH TWO PYTHONS WERE OBSERVED, a sign predicting that a king would return. Cambodia clings to symbols and, for the vast majority of Khmers, Prince Norodom Sihanouk embodies the glorious tradition of Angkor. The prophesy of the pythons was borne out by one of the first real consequences of the 23 October 1991 Paris Accords on Cambodia – the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to Phnom Penh.

At an extraordinary congress of the Revolutionary Party of the Cambodian People on 17 and 18 October 1991, the party of the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, chose to reject its old Marxist-Leninist ideology and instead restore basic liberties. The right to free enterprise and a multi-party political system would henceforth be guaranteed. In this context, it is crucial to ask whether the alliance between Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen will survive the planned election campaign, which has, to all intents and purposes, already begun.

The alliance probably will survive because the Khmer Rouge is still the common enemy of Hun Sen's regime in Phnom Penh, of Sihanouk's supporters, and of the third faction fighting for power headed by Son Sann. In its determination to thwart the Khmer Rouge and win the upcoming elections, whatever the cost, the Phnom Penh regime has even repudiated its fundamental ideological principles – a change that was met with approval from Prince Sihanouk who indicated his pleasure that Cambodia was "the first country in Indo-China to be decommunized."

THE HISTORY OF CAMBODIA'S CONFLICT IS TOO COMPLEX TO SUMMARIZE, but it is important to remember that in spring 1991, there seemed to be no real prospect of a settlement. After difficult negotiations, and under pressure from the five permanent members of the Security Council, a "framework agreement" was arrived at in late November 1990, which defined the fundamental principles on which a final settlement might be based.

The document established the composition and structure of a Supreme National Council (SNC) which has an equal number of representatives from each of the three resistance factions, with half its members (six) belonging to the current government. The framework agreement also establishes proposals for setting up the United Nations Provisional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), outlines its mandate, specifies the conditions for a ceasefire, for elections and the repatriation of refugees, and also lays down the principles of a new constitution.

Although unquestionably a positive achievement, the document left at least two problems unresolved: formal mention of the "genocide" committed by the Khmer Rouge after they came to power in 1975, and complex questions relating to the demobilization and disarmament of the forces in being on all sides. But in spite of the fact that a ceasefire has been observed by the four factions since May 1991, little prospect of further progress seemed likely until very recently. A meeting of the SNC in Jakarta in early June ended in failure, underlined by the Khmer Rouge's resistance to extending the ceasefire. One positive feature of the meeting was the evident willingness of Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen to move the settlement process forward without the Khmer Rouge.

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Once again back in Pattaya in late August, SNC members reached agreement on the two important points left unresolved since 1990. With respect to "genocide," the government abandoned its basic requirement which guaranteed "against a return to the practices of the recent past." Even more importantly, the SNC accepted a French proposal advocating the demobilization of seventy percent of the armed forces of each faction, together with their weapons and equipment. And further, that the remaining thirty percent would be concentrated with their weapons, in cantonments under the supervision of the United Nations. The parties also agreed that once both bodies were set up in Phnom Penh, if no consensus could be reached on coordinating specific activities of the SNC and UNTAC, the final decision would be taken by Prince Sihanouk, as President.

PROSPECTS FOR ENDING THE CAMBODIAN WAR, AN INDIRECT RESULT OF East-West, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese confrontations, have benefited from the recent shifts in international power, and basic changes in the course of contemporary history brought about by decomposition of the Soviet empire. The influence exerted by the permanent members of the Security Council has weighed heavily on the various protagonists unyielding positions. In any case, the Five's actions have had a positive influence on China which, in the wake of Tiananmen Square and the international turmoil following the Persian Gulf War, is sorely in need of a boost in credibility.

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In addition to its military responsibilities, UNTAC will supervise the organization and holding of "free and impartial" elections. Planned for the spring of 1993, the Cambodian people will elect a constituent assembly of 120 members to draft and adopt a new constitution. This body will subsequently become a legislative assembly, from which the new Cambodian government will be formed. One of the problems resolved by the Paris accords was the question of voter eligibility. The principal document states:

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
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The commitment of the international community to put an end to Cambodia's misery is unambiguous. And while it may seem a banal idea, it cannot be overstated that much now depends on Cambodians themselves. It is up to them to rebuild their country, and to resist any interference by neighbours, some of whom are all too clearly inclined,

over the medium and long term, to regard a neutral and non-Marxist Cambodia as a threat to their own regimes.

(translation by Sogestran, Jane Boulden and Michael Bryans)



## FROM THE DIRECTOR

*"Smart" sanctions before "smart" weapons*



IN THE POST-BERLIN WALL WORLD, WE WANT not only to push back the threat of nuclear weapons, but also the threat and use of all weapons. So far, both the experience and the outlook are mixed. The UN itself and peaceful approaches to the settlement of disputes have been greatly strengthened. At the same time, a major challenge to order was launched by arms in Kuwait, and was ultimately suppressed by the massive use of ultra-modern weaponry. Some political and military leaders seem ready to opt out of modern arms races, but others feel the need to race harder and faster, and we are still far from gaining acceptable controls on the supply of arms.

Disputes and conflicts will persist and even proliferate, and most of the time, culprits and aggressors will be hard to identify. In these cases, the international community has the duty to help resolve disputes, avert and contain conflicts, observe and monitor truces, and try to promote confidence and cooperation in the place of conflict. There are unparalleled opportunities for the United Nations in peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-building, and Canada is better placed than almost any country to help realize this potential.

When clear aggressors cross borders, or when wrong-doers overthrow elected governments or crush internal minorities, there is unprecedented international will to react with firmness. The immediate call is not necessarily a call to arms – although many call for what they call “peacekeeping forces” in situations which fail the tests for effective peacekeeping – but almost everyone instantly calls for sanctions, as *the* means of pressure, short of armed force.

It is alarmingly clear, however, that the long and heated debates on sanctions against South Africa, Iraq and others have not noticeably improved the quality of policy thinking or public understanding on this “peaceful weapon” in the cause of order. As we grope our way toward some kind of new world order, it is now vital to get a better handle on the use of

sanctions as an instrument of pressure short of military force.

Sanctions have the immediate appeal of “doing something,” or worse, of being seen to do something, in situations which are largely beyond the control of outside actors. This symbolic impact of sanctions, both on the target and sender countries, may actually have some value in itself, but we also need to know whether, and when, these pressures can make a real difference to the offending behaviour of the target authorities.

Last January, the authors of the most comprehensive catalogue of sanctions experience, Gary Hufbauer and his colleagues from the Institute of International Economics in Washington, plunged into the policy debate. On the basis of a probability model derived from 115 cases since 1914, they said there was a virtual certainty that sanctions could reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Common sense now tells most people that such a model must be wrong – Saddam would not have backed down to sanctions.

THIS SUMMER, A VISITING RESEARCHER AND I examined carefully the criteria in the Hufbauer study, and concluded that they gave too little weight to political-behavioural factors.\* When we added two such factors to their twelve, we found that the possibility of predicting the success of sanctions in this wide range of cases was increased by a substantial margin.

First, the judgement of whether a regime that is a target for sanctions is virtually invulnerable to domestic opposition (like Stalin’s USSR, Saddam’s Iraq, or Communist China) is, not surprisingly, a powerful gauge of whether sanctions will change its behaviour. Thus, in circumstances where the pain resulting from outside economic pressures cannot be transmitted to the rulers themselves, the efficacy, morality, and, where possible, the “pinpoint” targeting of such sanctions must be very carefully weighed by those who would impose them.

Second, the judgement of whether the change of behaviour sought by sanctioning countries is of primary or secondary importance to the target regime, has an even more powerful effect on the likely success or failure of sanctions.

Like most of the Hufbauer findings, neither of these relationships is startling in itself, and

the quality of the conclusions coming out of a model depends on the quality of the judgments going in. However, these aids to organized thinking about sanctions can improve on the confused and emotional discussion of the past.

In an important, recent test – Western reactions to the Soviet coup – the wealth of historical experience suggests that this time economic sanctions against the Soviet Union were effective and would have continued to be, as they hardly ever have before. The outcome of this struggle for power and the direction of Soviet society was, of course, mainly determined by internal factors. For once though, a Soviet regime – the short-lived junta – was, and would have remained, vulnerable to domestic opposition from various sources, so that the pain resulting from outside pressures could be felt by the rulers themselves.

Even though the Soviet junta’s stakes in resisting Western pressures were obviously of primary importance to them, the possibility was also there that they would compromise or even retreat in the short term, and the threat of total non-cooperation from the outside world was clearly of substantial, if not decisive, influence. Popular discontent could no longer be totally stifled, nor could alternative power centres or social visions. Even the half-measures of market reform undertaken up till now would have been a beacon of hope in an abyss, and the prospect of serious outside help and integration into the real economy of the world would have remained a compelling vision. In such a medium- to long-term standoff, the withholding of economic cooperation by the West would have been a critical lever for resolving it favourably.

SWEEPING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, EVEN WHEN they can be effective, are still a blunt instrument, and like other weapons, they can cause a great deal of “collateral damage.” Building on the work of Hufbauer and his colleagues have done, in the light of the tests of experience, we may even be able to “target” sanctions much more in the future – to develop “smart” sanctions.

This analysis is an urgent and overdue challenge for those who have a responsibility to select and apply the tools of international pressure. Nor is the better analysis of sanctions beyond the capacity – or the responsibility – of those outside governments who often advocate sanctions so strongly.

– BERNARD WOOD

\*The Institute analysis referred to in this article was carried out largely by Rajeev Dehejia, working with the author.



the US strategic nuclear force. For a decade, the US Navy has successfully resisted all efforts to bring sea-based tactical nuclear weapons to the negotiating table. Brushing aside this position, on 27 September Bush announced that the United States would unilaterally denuclearize most of its naval vessels – “the bottom line is that under normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons.”

AS FOR THE LINK BETWEEN NUCLEAR FORCES IN Europe and North America, this was already partly undermined by the growing European concerns about the continued deployment of short-range nuclear weapons in Germany and elsewhere. On 27 September, Bush performed a remarkable turnaround by accepting the long-standing Soviet position and proposing the elimination of about 2,300 ground-based theatre nuclear weapons. The Soviets, Bush said, “should go down the road with us,” meaning that they should dismantle and eliminate “their entire inventory of ground-launched theatre nuclear weapons.” Amen, say those who have been delegated to watch the Beirut docks.

While the Bush proposals of 27 September will certainly attract their critics, it would be foolish not to recognize the break with the past which has now taken place. Will the Bush administration be as keen to undertake further changes which will cut more deeply into the nuclear stockpile? It is here that certain characteristics of the new style will affect both the US moves to come and the interests of its allies, including Canada.

These proposals were not only a departure from the START processes, they were also taken with the minimum of allied contribution. “Consultations” took place just hours before the speech in order to protect its dramatic impact, reinforcing the growing sense that unilateralism is the new style in Washington. Increased impatience with the cumbersome procedures of multilateral alliance diplomacy may now follow, as well as greater indifference to the special pleadings of allies.

IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS convention, for example, the United States has reneged on its previous commitment to a strict verification regime with few signs of embarrassment or respect for those allies, including Canada, who have continued to support the long-standing Western position on intrusive inspection. A similarly unilateral approach may be in the offing with regard to the amendment or abrogation of the ABM Treaty, where the view of allies are unlikely to weigh heavily in future US overtures to the Soviets.

If Canada and other states want to influence changing US approaches to strategic arms control, in the next year it will be necessary to reassess the direction and goals of US policy,

and to identify policies which serve broad national and multinational interests. Some of the leading agenda items are the following:

First, against whom are the post-START 8,000 US strategic weapons now to be targeted? Lacking any more convincing foe, the target is presumably still the Soviet Union, shrunk by the loss of the Baltic states and now further confounded by the emergence of self-declared nuclear-weapon free republics. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, therefore, points up the need to plan for radical reductions in strategic forces to bring them down to around 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade.

The Canadian interest in this process is direct. In his 27 September speech, President Bush also announced that all US strategic nuclear forces would be brought under a single Strategic Command. This is reminiscent of a report in January 1991, confirmed by Canadian officials, that the Pentagon was considering a proposal to combine in one strategic command, the surveillance assets and interceptor forces of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) with the strategic offensive forces of the US air force and navy.

Second, the US Senate has now formally supported the deployment of a ground-based ABM system by 1996, and called for the amendment of the ABM Treaty to permit a country-wide defence. The coverage of the proposed system would include a very large area of Canada, and the ABM system would almost certainly be commanded by the proposed single Strategic Command. It is not too soon, therefore, to ask whether the Senate’s ABM system would help the search for very low levels of nuclear weapons, or whether, as many critics contend, the move to deploy ballistic missile defences will lead other nuclear weapons states to respond by increasing their offensive capability.

THIRD, IF EUROPE, NOW SEEKING TO DIVEST itself of nuclear weapons, is no longer the ignition point for a Soviet-American confrontation, the huge remaining strategic arsenals will confront each other, albeit at a very low level of tension, on a transpolar axis. Accordingly, this may be an ideal time to explore the possibilities of pooling radar warning information with a view to making the circumpolar north totally

transparent to all interested parties. This now includes not only Canada and the Scandinavian states, but also the new Baltic states, which, like Canada, will find themselves caught up in strategic nuclear issues as a consequence of their location.

Fourth, Canada should once again address the question of nuclear weapon testing. In his reply to Bush, Gorbachev announced a one-year moratorium on testing at Novaya Zemlya. All of the northern states have a strong interest in supporting this moratorium and preventing the reactivation of an environmentally fragile test site. But there is also a broader interest. A ban on nuclear weapon tests is likely to be just as important at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as it was in 1990, when the inability to agree on this issue ultimately reduced the conference to a stalemate.

THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME IS AT A CRUCIAL stage in its development: the number of its supporters, especially among the declared nu-

clear weapon states and the near nuclear weapon states has never been greater, but the technologies which encourage proliferation are less and less controllable. The Soviet moratorium provides an opportunity to initiate a long-lead approach to the 1995 Review Conference. As a first step, a conference could be called of all the neighbours of the Soviet Union affected by Novaya Zemlya. There would, of course, be a prominent hold-out – the United States. Notwithstanding, there is not only safety, but also effectiveness in numbers.

A circumpolar discussion to consider alternatives to further testing at Novaya Zemlya (if all else fails, why not let the Soviets test in Nevada?) could not be completely ignored in Washington. Half-hearted pleas by Canadian diplomats acting in isolation most certainly will be.

Of course, it is not these proposals that are new, but the political context. On 27 September, President Bush tried to reassert control of the politics of nuclear weapons, but in the light of the ongoing disintegration in the Soviet Union it is not clear that will be able to maintain the familiar nuclear dialogue. Arms control after the coup will not bear much resemblance to the encrusted processes of the past twenty years. The challenge now is to help shape the new agenda, and that can begin by defining the course which will make nuclear weapons increasingly irrelevant.



# REBIRTH OF THE CAMBODIAN NATION

*Accords signed in Paris in October might at long last  
put an end to Cambodia's misery.*

BY GÉRARD HERVOUET

IN A BUDDHIST TEMPLE IN PHNOM PENH TWO PYTHONS WERE OBSERVED, a sign predicting that a king would return. Cambodia clings to symbols and, for the vast majority of Khmers, Prince Norodom Sihanouk embodies the glorious tradition of Angkor. The prophesy of the pythons was borne out by one of the first real consequences of the 23 October 1991 Paris Accords on Cambodia – the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to Phnom Penh.

At an extraordinary congress of the Revolutionary Party of the Cambodian People on 17 and 18 October 1991, the party of the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, chose to reject its old Marxist-Leninist ideology and instead restore basic liberties. The right to free enterprise and a multi-party political system would henceforth be guaranteed. In this context, it is crucial to ask whether the alliance between Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen will survive the planned election campaign, which has, to all intents and purposes, already begun.

The alliance probably will survive because the Khmer Rouge is still the common enemy of Hun Sen's regime in Phnom Penh, of Sihanouk's supporters, and of the third faction fighting for power headed by Son Sann. In its determination to thwart the Khmer Rouge and win the upcoming elections, whatever the cost, the Phnom Penh regime has even repudiated its fundamental ideological principles – a change that was met with approval from Prince Sihanouk who indicated his pleasure that Cambodia was "the first country in Indo-China to be decommunized."

THE HISTORY OF CAMBODIA'S CONFLICT IS TOO COMPLEX TO SUMMARIZE, but it is important to remember that in spring 1991, there seemed to be no real prospect of a settlement. After difficult negotiations, and under pressure from the five permanent members of the Security Council, a "framework agreement" was arrived at in late November 1990, which defined the fundamental principles on which a final settlement might be based.

The document established the composition and structure of a Supreme National Council (SNC) which has an equal number of representatives from each of the three resistance factions, with half its members (six) belonging to the current government. The framework agreement also establishes proposals for setting up the United Nations Provisional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), outlines its mandate, specifies the conditions for a ceasefire, for elections and the repatriation of refugees, and also lays down the principles of a new constitution.

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
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The second accord is entitled: "Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia." The length of the title and uses of multiple terms for the same concept are indications of just how conscious its framers are of a grim history which no one can afford to repeat.

The commitment of the international community to put an end to Cambodia's misery is unambiguous. And while it may seem a banal idea, it cannot be overstated that much now depends on Cambodians themselves. It is up to them to rebuild their country, and to resist any interference by neighbours, some of whom are all too clearly inclined,


over the medium and long term, to regard a neutral and non-Marxist Cambodia as a threat to their own regimes.

(translation by Sogestran, Jane Boulden and Michael Bryans)



## FROM THE DIRECTOR

*"Smart" sanctions before "smart" weapons*



IN THE POST-BERLIN WALL WORLD, WE WANT not only to push back the threat of nuclear weapons, but also the threat and use of all weapons. So far, both the experience and the outlook are mixed. The UN itself and peaceful approaches to the settlement of disputes have been greatly strengthened. At the same time, a major challenge to order was launched by arms in Kuwait, and was ultimately suppressed by the massive use of ultra-modern weaponry. Some political and military leaders seem ready to opt out of modern arms races, but others feel the need to race harder and faster, and we are still far from gaining acceptable controls on the supply of arms.

Disputes and conflicts will persist and even proliferate, and most of the time, culprits and aggressors will be hard to identify. In these cases, the international community has the duty to help resolve disputes, avert and contain conflicts, observe and monitor truces, and try to promote confidence and cooperation in the place of conflict. There are unparalleled opportunities for the United Nations in peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-building, and Canada is better placed than almost any country to help realize this potential.

When clear aggressors cross borders, or when wrong-doers overthrow elected governments or crush internal minorities, there is unprecedented international will to react with firmness. The immediate call is not necessarily a call to arms – although many call for what they call “peacekeeping forces” in situations which fail the tests for effective peacekeeping – but almost everyone instantly calls for sanctions, as *the* means of pressure, short of armed force.

It is alarmingly clear, however, that the long and heated debates on sanctions against South Africa, Iraq and others have not noticeably improved the quality of policy thinking or public understanding on this “peaceful weapon” in the cause of order. As we grope our way toward some kind of new world order, it is now vital to get a better handle on the use of

sanctions as an instrument of pressure short of military force.

Sanctions have the immediate appeal of “doing something,” or worse, of being seen to do something, in situations which are largely beyond the control of outside actors. This symbolic impact of sanctions, both on the target and sender countries, may actually have some value in itself, but we also need to know whether, and when, these pressures can make a real difference to the offending behaviour of the target authorities.

Last January, the authors of the most comprehensive catalogue of sanctions experience, Gary Hufbauer and his colleagues from the Institute of International Economics in Washington, plunged into the policy debate. On the basis of a probability model derived from 115 cases since 1914, they said there was a virtual certainty that sanctions could reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Common sense now tells most people that such a model must be wrong – Saddam would not have backed down to sanctions.

THIS SUMMER, A VISITING RESEARCHER AND I examined carefully the criteria in the Hufbauer study, and concluded that they gave too little weight to political-behavioural factors.\* When we added two such factors to their twelve, we found that the possibility of predicting the success of sanctions in this wide range of cases was increased by a substantial margin.

First, the judgement of whether a regime that is a target for sanctions is virtually invulnerable to domestic opposition (like Stalin's USSR, Saddam's Iraq, or Communist China) is, not surprisingly, a powerful gauge of whether sanctions will change its behaviour. Thus, in circumstances where the pain resulting from outside economic pressures cannot be transmitted to the rulers themselves, the efficacy, morality, and, where possible, the “pinpoint” targeting of such sanctions must be very carefully weighed by those who would impose them.

Second, the judgement of whether the change of behaviour sought by sanctioning countries is of primary or secondary importance to the target regime, has an even more powerful effect on the likely success or failure of sanctions.

Like most of the Hufbauer findings, neither of these relationships is startling in itself, and

the quality of the conclusions coming out of a model depends on the quality of the judgements going in. However, these aids to organized thinking about sanctions can improve on the confused and emotional discussion of the past.

In an important, recent test – Western reactions to the Soviet coup – the wealth of historical experience suggests that this time economic sanctions against the Soviet Union were effective and would have continued to be, as they hardly ever have before. The outcome of this struggle for power and the direction of Soviet society was, of course, mainly determined by internal factors. For once though, a Soviet regime – the short-lived junta – was, and would have remained, vulnerable to domestic opposition from various sources, so that the pain resulting from outside pressures could be felt by the rulers themselves.

Even though the Soviet junta's stakes in resisting Western pressures were obviously of primary importance to them, the possibility was also there that they would compromise or even retreat in the short term, and the threat of total non-cooperation from the outside world was clearly of substantial, if not decisive, influence. Popular discontent could no longer be totally stifled, nor could alternative power centres or social visions. Even the half-measures of market reform undertaken up till now would have been a beacon of hope in an abyss, and the prospect of serious outside help and integration into the real economy of the world would have remained a compelling vision. In such a medium- to long-term standoff, the withholding of economic cooperation by the West would have been a critical lever for resolving it favourably.

S WEEPING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, EVEN WHEN they can be effective, are still a blunt instrument, and like other weapons, they can cause a great deal of “collateral damage.” Building on the work that Hufbauer and his colleagues have done, in the light of the tests of experience, we may even be able to “target” sanctions much more in the future – to develop “smart” sanctions.


This analysis is an urgent and overdue challenge for those who have a responsibility to select and apply the tools of international pressure. Nor is the better analysis of sanctions beyond the capacity – or the responsibility – of those outside governments who often advocate sanctions so strongly.

– BERNARD WOOD

\*The Institute analysis referred to in this article was carried out largely by Rajeev Dehejia, working with the author.



## DEFENCE NOTES



### NATO Summit in Rome

Meeting in Rome on 7 and 8 November, the NATO heads of state issued a lengthy communique outlining a "New Strategic Concept" for the alliance. Seeking to respond to the pace of change in Europe, the communique dealt at some length with the unique position of NATO as a security bridge between Europe and North America. "NATO," it commented, "embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe," and it called for "a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America."

Despite this reaffirmation of the inseparable transatlantic link, the Rome meeting took place amidst continuing uncertainty about the full implications of a Franco-German proposal to expand their joint army brigade. In mid-October, Presidents Mitterrand and Kohl wrote to other European leaders suggesting that, as part of a EC treaty on political union, the joint brigade could be expanded to a corps of multinational units under the control of Western European Union. This organization, a leftover from the early 1950s, played little or no role while the threat of a Soviet attack glued the NATO members together, but it has come to the fore as the possible institutional basis for a European security system.

The Rome communique appeared to support this movement, referring to "the process of developing a European security identity," and acknowledging that, with the strengthening of the European pillar, "the European members of the alliance will assume a greater degree of responsibility for the de-

fence of Europe." More informally, however, US leaders do not appear certain about the intentions of France and Germany. President Bush was quoted as saying: "If, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence, the time to tell us is today."

### Nuclear Weapons in Europe

The "New Strategic Concept" added little that was new in describing the previously agreed reorientation of NATO forces towards smaller, more mobile units with greater emphasis on reinforcement. However, following the sweeping measures announced by President Bush on 27 September to withdraw army and navy tactical nuclear weapons, the Rome communique, of necessity, dealt with the place of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. The communique reaffirmed that US dual-capable aircraft, (those able to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons) supplemented if necessary by naval forces, would continue to contribute "sub-strategic" nuclear forces to European defence, thus maintaining the trans-atlantic link to the strategic nuclear forces of the United States.

At the same time, the Rome meeting addressed the question of Soviet nuclear forces, the control of which has become a matter of increasing concern to NATO. Shortly after the August coup, the new Soviet chief of Staff, Vladimir Lobov, insisted that tactical nuclear weapons were under strict control, explaining that key components of the weapons were kept under separate authority and "must be brought together" in order to arm the weapon. Other US reports have suggested that Scud missiles are accompanied by special KGB units holding the warheads in separate trailers. The KGB and the Soviet army have separate command channels, both of which must authorize firing of the missile. Such reassurances notwithstanding, leaders at the Rome summit made clear their concerns about Soviet nuclear weapons. Despite the dissenting

views of France, other NATO countries – including Canada – indicated that future aid to the Soviet Union would be tied to reassurances that all nuclear weapons were under a single authority with satisfactory security procedures.

### Canadian Defence Policy

On 17 September, just four years after the 1987 Defence White Paper promised a major build-up of Canadian forces, Defence Minister Marcel Masse revealed the long-awaited revised plan for the future structure of the armed forces. Mr. Masse refrained from specifically identifying the future threats which the Canadian forces might face, noting instead that the East-West confrontation has given way "to an ill-defined, relatively uncertain situation with respect to possible threats to security and world peace."

Although the statement contained few surprises, a number of key issues were apparently resolved. First, the two Canadian bases at Baden-Soellingen and Lahr in southern Germany will be closed in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Canada will continue to maintain a task force of 1,100 military personnel in Europe, with the location and nature of the force yet to be decided. In addition, Canada will continue the commitment to provide one battalion group to the NATO Composite Force, and will maintain one brigade and two squadrons of CF-18s to be placed at NATO's disposal in the event of a European crisis, and "capable of intervening anywhere in the world."

The Masse announcement also indicated that the Canadian navy will focus its activities more generally on Canadian coastal waters with less emphasis on the specific task of protecting the sea-lines of communication to Europe. Instead of a third batch of six Canadian Patrol Frigates, long-run plans envisage the procurement of six fast patrol corvettes, and twelve coastal

patrol vessels to be operated by the naval reserve and capable of mine counter-measures. The submarine replacement programme appeared to narrowly survive the review, with the promise of "up to three of an eventual six" conventionally-powered submarines.

Unlike the 1987 White Paper, the review offers no specific time frame for the reorientation of the armed forces. Recognizing the reality of the deficit, however, Masse indicated that "over the next few years" the level of defence budget increases would exceed only marginally, if at all, the rate of inflation. In this situation, the key to maintaining an effective military is the percentage of the budget allocated to the procurement of new equipment. The review promised to increase this percentage from 22 to 26 percent in four years, with a "target figure" of 30 percent.

In addition to reducing the overall numbers of military personnel from 84,000 to 76,000, therefore, the statement revealed the military concern that "unnecessary infrastructure [i.e. bases] should be eliminated immediately," but then promptly recognized that "socioeconomic reality militates against this prospect." A review of proposals for base closings is underway. [For more on this subject see page 5]

Among many references which indicated that in the future the forces will be structured primarily for the surveillance and patrol of Canadian territory, the review also promised an increased surveillance capability in the Arctic. In early November, the difficulties and responsibilities of the Canadian military in the Arctic were unhappily illustrated by the crash of a resupply plane on approach to the military base at Alert. Despite the courageous efforts of the rescuers, it seemed apparent that the resources needed to respond promptly to military or civilian air or sea accidents in the far north are not in place.

– DAVID COX

## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### Yugoslavia

As the role of the UN is redefined in the post-Cold War era, the limits of Security Council intervention in the internal affairs of a member state were once again tested in the case of Yugoslavia. On 25 September, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 713, which "strongly urges" the parties to the conflict in Yugoslavia to observe a ceasefire and decided that all states shall "immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia."

The foreign ministers of eleven of the fifteen Council members participated in adopting the resolution. Although some states had privately attempted to have the Council send UN peacekeepers to the area, China and the non-aligned states were said to be strongly against any such UN involvement.

On 25 October the Secretary-General issued a report that, among other things, noted that the arms embargo was being violated. He did not name those responsible. Resolution 713 imposes no penalties on states that violate the embargo.

### Cambodia

On 31 October, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 718, which formally recognized the accord signed in Paris eight days before by the combatants in the Cambodian conflict. Resolution 718 calls on the Secretary-General to submit a detailed estimate of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which will administer the country at least until free elections are held. The document brought the world body a step closer to launching what is expected to be one of the largest and

most expensive peacekeeping operations in its history.

The complexity of the undertaking is hinted at in the resolution, which calls on all the parties to the conflict in Cambodia to comply fully with the 23 October Paris peace agreement. The reason for the Council's call can be traced back to 16 October, when UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar warned of plans by the combatants to repatriate their followers to Cambodia. In a sharp statement, the Secretary-General warned that "the existence of such plans raises a doubt about the commitment of the parties concerned" to the peace accords.

On 16 October, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 717 establishing the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) whose duty is to assist in maintaining the current ceasefire and to prepare for the arrival of UNTAC. The over 250 members of UNAMIC will be responsible for facilitating communications between the military headquarters of the four Cambodian parties to the dispute, as well as to train civilians on how to avoid injury from land mines and booby traps.

### El Salvador

On 30 September, the Council reaffirmed its support for the completion of a peace process in El Salvador by unanimously adopting Resolution 714. The document also welcomed the agreement signed five days before in New York by the government and guerrillas of the *Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN).

### Haiti

On 3 October, the president of the Security Council, ambassador Chirmaya Rajaninath Gharekhan of India issued a statement which "condemned strongly" the overthrow of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The statement, which is non-binding, also urged the "restoration of the legitimate authority in Haiti." The presi-

dential statement represented a compromise between those countries pushing for more forceful action and those which feared that binding Council action could set a precedent for future international intervention.

### Iraq

On 15 August, amid reports of worsening civilian conditions inside Iraq, the Council adopted Resolution 706 which allows Baghdad to sell limited amounts of oil for the purpose of meeting essential civilian needs like food and other essentials. The resolution also demands that Baghdad comply with its obligations to co-operate in the identification and destruction of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles.

The Council held off authorizing Iraq to sell a specific amount of oil until the Secretary-General presented a report on measures to monitor the sale of oil and distribution of food. Resolution 706, which was adopted by a vote of 13 in favour, with Cuba voting against and Yemen abstaining, also requires Iraq to pay up to thirty percent of its oil revenue to a special fund intended to compensate victims of its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August.

On 19 September, the Council adopted Resolution 712, which sets a ceiling of \$1.6 billion in the amount of oil that Iraq is allowed to export in order to meet its humanitarian needs. However, Baghdad was sharply critical of the resolution and complained that as a result of the strict monitoring regime Iraq had been put under UN "trusteeship." While Baghdad stopped short of categorically ruling out any sale of oil, as of the beginning of November, no sale had taken place and as a result, no food had been purchased. An Iraqi diplomat told a reporter that his countrymen would "rather eat dirt."

On 12 October, the Council adopted Resolution 715, which in effect, established the most intrusive and wide-ranging arms con-

trol regime ever established in UN history against any country. Not only did it authorize the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to move unhindered inside Iraq, but it granted inspectors wide-ranging powers of search and seizure. Iraq's ambassador complained that the resolution turned the Special Commission into "the High Commissioner for Iraq, as in the old colonial days."

Resolution 715 was an outgrowth of the ceasefire terms for the end of the Persian Gulf War. It was adopted after weeks of diplomatic skirmishes with Baghdad that had led the US and some allied governments to warn of military action if Iraq persisted in obstructing the work of UN inspectors charged with locating and scrapping its weapons of mass destruction. Through most of September, Baghdad refused to allow three UN helicopters to operate in its airspace – a clear contravention of Resolution 707 authorizing the UN teams to use aircraft inside Iraq.

During September, Iraq also detained a UN inspection team for several days in a parking lot after UN officials discovered documents relating to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Afterwards, UN officials said the documents offered conclusive proof that the regime's secret nuclear programme was aimed at producing an atomic bomb.

### New Members

The number of UN members rose to 166 after the Security Council recommended to the General Assembly on 12 September the admission of three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On 9 August, the Council had recommended the admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea as well as of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. □

— TREVOR ROWE



## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### UN Interests

The third session of the 34th Parliament resumed on 16 September and continued until just before Christmas. Among the most tantalizing stories during the fall session was the suggestion that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was in contention for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Prime Minister made it clear, however, in response to a query from Opposition Leader Jean Chrétien on 22 October, that he had not put his name on the official list of candidates. In that case, Mr. Chrétien inquired the next day, "why the name of the Prime Minister has not been withdrawn from this list" and what instructions Canadian diplomats abroad had been given in relation to his candidacy. To this there was no definitive answer until 28 October, when Mr. Mulroney instructed Yves Fortier, Canada's ambassador to the UN, to withdraw his name from any further consideration.

The United Nations was also the subject of a special debate in the House on a private member's motion introduced by Conservative MP Walter McLean. McLean is the Prime Minister's special representative on African questions and has for some years been a mainstay for Canada in New York during the UN General Assembly each fall. Mr. McLean moved on 19 September, "that the government promote a summit level meeting at the United Nations on global security, to examine ways of implementing and strengthening the United Nations peacekeeping and enforcement mechanisms." Among the other

speakers during the debate were PC MP Louise Feltham and Liberal MPs Warren Allmand and Christine Stewart.

### The Soviet Coup and After

The House was not sitting at the time of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union on 19 August, but the Prime Minister immediately suspended the package of food aid and technical assistance that had only been restored to the Soviet Union a month before at the London economic summit of the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries. His initial show of resolve, however, was succeeded the following day by more cautious words from Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall who, in a statement that drew sharp criticism from opposition party spokespersons, warned against precipitous action against the new Soviet regime and said that Ottawa would take a wait-and-see attitude to measure the transition of power. It was the principles of democratization that Mr. Gorbachev espoused rather than his reinstatement on which Ottawa was focussing, she said.

Following a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels on 21 August, however, Mrs. McDougall said Canada was fully in accord with NATO's condemnation of the coup and insistence on the restoration of Mikhail Gorbachev to power. Moreover, on 26 August, the minister announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, making Canada one of the first Western countries to do so.

### The Coup in Haiti

On 30 September, External Affairs Minister McDougall strongly condemned the coup by rebel elements of the Haitian armed forces which ousted the

recently-elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. On 2 October, she attended an emergency Foreign Ministers' meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, which produced a tough eleven-point resolution calling for cutting all aid to Haiti and otherwise isolating it politically and economically. She also took part in an OAS mission to Haiti on 4 October and met briefly with the coup leaders in an unsuccessful attempt to convince them to restore the Aristide government.

In the Commons on 1 and 2 October, Liberal External Affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy supported the government's condemnation. He referred to a speech the Prime Minister gave at Stanford University in California on 29 September, quoting him as saying that the advancement and promotion of human rights must overtake considerations of national sovereignty. Mr. Axworthy then asked whether Canada was asking either the UN or the OAS to intervene in Haiti. While not answering the question directly, the Prime Minister did say "We want the thugs who have usurped power in Haiti out and we want the democratically elected president back in." On 8 October, the Liberal critic asked again what options the government was pursuing. In his response, the Prime Minister quoted President Aristide as saying that military intervention would not be considered and that economic and diplomatic boycotts would be the strategy of the Haitian people.

### Yugoslavia

The deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia also received the attention of the House on several occasions during the fall. On 18 September, Mrs. McDougall made it clear that the government believed it was time for the UN Security Council to consider the matter. In response to a question from Opposition Leader Jean Chrétien on 7 October, following

an attack by the Yugoslav federal military on the Croatian capital of Zagreb, Trade Minister Michael Wilson indicated that Canada supported all attempts to resolve the conflict, whether through the European Community (EC), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or some other institutional framework.

On 24 October, Liberal MP David Kilgour requested that the Speaker consider the granting of an emergency debate on the situation, following heavy shelling of Dubrovnik and the failure of an EC-brokered peace plan. The Chair refused, but called on all three parties to agree among themselves to hold such a debate. Later that day, NDP External Affairs critic Svend Robinson called on the government to condemn the attack on Croatia in the strongest possible terms and to impose with the EC sanctions against the Yugoslav government. In a supplementary question, he asked whether the government would support a UN peace-keeping force in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan to separate disputing Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In reply, Michael Wilson said that the government was discussing both matters with the EC and other partners to arrive at the most effective means of handling these conflicts.

However, on 28 October, Mrs. McDougall cast doubt on an economic embargo despite urging from Liberal External Affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy, saying it would hurt the people it is intended to help. She did agree with the Liberal critic on 1 November to raise the issue of a humanitarian airlift of goods to the besieged people of Dubrovnik with member states of the EC and the UN.

— GREGORY WIRICK

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Nuclear Arms Initiatives

■ On 27 September, President Bush announced a series of sweeping changes in the US nuclear posture. Calling on the USSR to reciprocate, he stated that the US would unilaterally withdraw and destroy all of its 2,150 ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads) deployed in Europe, South Korea, and at home. The US would also withdraw all of its naval tactical nuclear weapons from sea, including nuclear-tipped, long-range, land-attack cruise missiles (SLCMs) and bombs aboard carrier- and land-based naval aircraft. Approximately half of these (estimated to number between 1,825 and 2,525) would be destroyed, while the others (including the more modern SLCMs) would be stored in central locations from which they could be re-deployed in a crisis.

As for strategic nuclear weapons, the US would remove from alert all of its strategic bombers, as well as those intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) scheduled for deactivation under START. Elimination of the latter would be accelerated (rather than extending over the seven-year period mandated by START). At the same time, the President terminated the programmes for making mobile the existing MX and planned Mid-Getman ICBMs; cancelled the replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile (SRAM) for strategic bombers; and established a unified US Strategic Command to oversee all air-, land-, and sea-launched strategic nuclear weapons.

Turning to formal negotiations, he reiterated an earlier US proposal for a total ban on multiple-warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs, and called on the USSR to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defences

against limited ballistic missile attacks. Finally, in order to help prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, he proposed discussions with the USSR on improving safety procedures and command-and-control arrangements.

President Gorbachev more than matched the US moves in an announcement on 5 October, stating that all Soviet ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, including mines, would be destroyed; and the nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft missiles, as well as all naval tactical nuclear weapons, would be removed, some being destroyed and others stored centrally. Further, the Soviet President proposed that, "on a reciprocal basis," all naval tactical nuclear weapons be destroyed, and all nuclear bombs and missiles from the tactical air forces be removed and stored.

Regarding strategic weapons, Gorbachev announced that all heavy bombers, as well as 503 ICBMs (including 134 MIRVed ones) would be taken off alert; work on modernizing Soviet SRAMs and small mobile ICBMs would be discontinued; MIRVed, rail-mobile ICBMs would be frozen at their current number and confined to their permanent bases; and three ballistic missile submarines with 48 launchers were now being "removed from our combat forces." The USSR would reduce its number of accountable strategic nuclear warheads by 1,000 more than required by START, to a total of 5,000 within seven years. Gorbachev called for further cuts of approximately 50 percent in the remaining number of strategic offensive weapons.

On other matters, Gorbachev announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear weapons tests; called for a negotiated end to the production of fissionable weapons materials; agreed to begin "detailed dialogue" with the US on nuclear weapons safety; announced the establishment of a single operational command for all Soviet strategic

nuclear weapons; and called on all the nuclear powers to jointly pledge the "non-first-use" of nuclear weapons.

On 17 and 18 October, the NATO defence ministers welcomed the US and Soviet announcements and decided to cut in half the number of air-delivered weapons in NATO's European stockpile as well, from about 1,400 to 700. Together with the elimination of 700 short-range ballistic missiles and 1,500 nuclear artillery shells, this will amount to an 80 percent cut in NATO's existing stockpile of "sub-strategic" nuclear weapons.

French tactical nuclear weapons are not included in the NATO cut-backs, but France announced in August that it would reduce production of its new Hades short-range ballistic missile from 120 to 30 units, and place them in storage.

### Biological Weapons Review

The Third Review Conference of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention met in Geneva from 9 to 27 September. Among other things, it agreed to expand data exchanges among the Treaty's 118 parties to cover biological defence research programmes, as well as vaccine production facilities; called on the parties to ensure that biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery are not transferred to other states if there is a danger of their being used illegally (although it failed to agree on a "trigger list" of such items); and approved the establishment of an "ad hoc group of governmental experts" to identify possible future verification measures.

Just prior to the conference, on 5 September, the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed a declaration banning the development, manufacture, and use of chemical and biological weapons by their countries.

### Arms Transfers and the Five

As agreed at their Paris meeting last July, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Coun-

cil met again in October in London to develop guidelines governing the transfer of conventional weapons, especially to the Middle East. The guidelines adopted for global use listed three criteria for proposed transfers, emphasizing recipients' legitimate self-defence needs; and pledged the parties to avoid transfers that would aggravate existing armed conflicts, increase tensions in an area, or "seriously undermine" a recipient's economy. Regarding the Middle East in particular, the Five (responsible for 85 percent of arms supplies to the area) agreed to inform each other about all transfers to the region of major weapons systems. They also reaffirmed the importance of maintaining strict controls on the export of equipment related to weapons of mass destruction, agreeing to study the further harmonization of national policies

### Defence and Space Talks


At the US-Soviet Defence and Space Talks in Geneva in October, the US for the first time agreed to discuss specific limits on the scope and timing of defensive deployments, to accommodate its planned Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system. The plan would require replacement or amendment of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limits ballistic missile defences to 100 ground-based interceptors at a single site. GPALS is said to call for 750 ground-based and 1,000 space-based interceptors, capable of handling up to 200 incoming warheads at once. According to the US, however, it would not undermine the credibility of offensive retaliatory forces.

Since the failed coup in August, Soviet officials have expressed increasing interest in cooperating with the US to build such defences against inadvertent, unauthorized, or third-party nuclear attacks. However, the US has denied reports that it is willing to help build a Soviet system or plans to share its technology.

— RON PURVER



## REVIEWS



### Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of Warlord States

Dorothy V. Jones

*Chicago and London: University of  
Chicago Press, 1991, 208 pp.,  
US \$24.95, cloth.*

Dorothy Jones has produced an extraordinarily perceptive and elegantly written book on the question of peace ethics in international relations. The work was recently awarded the prestigious Lionel Gelber prize, awarded annually for the best book on international relations written in English.

The code of peace, as defined by the author, constitutes "a set of authoritative principles and rules of conduct" which guides relations between states. The code of peace, which is composed of a number of underlying principles, is intended to inhibit the war-making mode of sovereign states. With camera-like precision, Jones focuses on seemingly isolated historical episodes, individual political figures and specific conference texts and successfully integrates these diverse strands in tracing the historical development of those ethical principles which collectively constitute the code of peace.

The book advances three central propositions: first, there exist ethical standards which guide the conduct of international relations; moreover, they are not merely theoretical postulates advanced by moral philosophers or peace researchers, but principles endorsed by governments themselves after considerable experience and reflection, and registered in numerous conventions, treaties, pro-

ocols, and declarations. Second, these ethical standards which arose from a Eurocentric system have in our time become truly global in scope. Third, their existence matters, for ethical principles of peace provide a common basis to evaluate states' performance in international relations. In some instances, as for example in the context of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Accord and human rights in Eastern Europe, these principles form a common basis for action.

Concerning the first proposition, the author takes the corpus of some seventy-nine international protocols, treaties, conventions, and declarations as convincing evidence for the existence of a comprehensive code of ethics of peace. This particular peace code incorporates nine distinct principles on which states are in essential agreement: the sovereign equality of states; territorial integrity and political independence; non-intervention in the internal affairs of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; abstention from the threat or use of force; fulfilment in good faith of international obligations; cooperation with other states; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Two auxiliary principles – creation of an equitable international economic order and protection of the environment – are also listed. There exists broad, but no universal, consensus on these last two; with the differences arising less over the principles themselves than the strategies to implement them.

Historically, the development of these peace principles can be traced to the 19th century, even though many of them have their origin in the peace system of Westphalia. Prior to World War I,

there was a tendency to invoke principles, like inter-state solidarity, which were abstract and clearly at variance with the reality of acute inter-state rivalry. The League of Nations Covenant of 1919 sought to avoid the vagueness and ambiguity of such principles by shifting the argument to a set of concrete obligations and by using the League machinery as a problem-solving instrument.

In contrast, the UN Charter of 1945, in the words of the author, is a halfway house that contains some abstract statement of principles but falls short of designating the protection of human rights and essential freedoms a necessary condition for international peace and security.

With respect to the universality of the peace code, the author cites numerous regional and global declarations which reflect most or all of these principles. In this context it is interesting to note that the 1955 Bandung conference, which launched the non-alignment movement, reiterated at least seven of the nine underlying peace principles even though the latter had evolved from the Eurocentric system of power politics that the non-aligned nations strove to reject.

"In the final analysis," Ms. Jones notes, "it made little difference whether a state was new or old, African, Asian, or European. The problems of the state as a state were the same, and the principles invoked to help solve the problems were the same as well." The important contribution of the new states assembled at Bandung was to add a more dynamic element like international social justice to the more static traditional principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention.

The third key proposition contained in the book is that peace ethics do matter in the conduct of international relations. However, this section is the least developed aspect of the work. One basic

shortcoming in translating the peace code into concrete action stems from the inherent contradictions between several of its supporting principles. In policy practice, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention frequently clash with those of human rights and self-determination. Even morally scrupulous statesmen, and they are a rare breed, may be hard pressed in implementing the peace code when faced with such contradictions.

To be sure, such contradictions can sometimes be mitigated. Jones cites the 1920 Aaland Islands dispute in which the ultimate aim of the islanders for cultural and linguistic autonomy could be safeguarded by an enlightened Finnish minority policy without the formal exercise of self-determination, an option which the League ruled to be incompatible with the principle of Finnish sovereignty and integrity. In some cases these contradictions may be transcended altogether, as occurred with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accord after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War.


As a student of international relations, this reviewer would have welcomed an attempt by the author to provide a critical evaluation which sought to distinguish between the mere rhetoric of peace ethics as a public relations exercise, and their actual function in taming the warlord mode that is present in every sovereign state in the international system.

—Harald von Riekhoff

*Mr. von Riekhoff is professor of political science at Carleton University.*

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Disparaging the peace movement?

Charlotte Gray, in "Home Grown Skirmishes" (Autumn 1991), presents her disparaging assessment of Canadian peace movements, especially their responses to the Persian Gulf crisis. Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (CPPNW) is one of the groups she criticizes. Our position on the Gulf war stems from our 1988 Mission Statement which says, "because of our concern for global health, we are committed to the prevention of war and to the promotion of non-violent means to resolve conflict." CPPNW's opposition to military action by the US-led coalition was founded upon reliable evidence that sanctions were working very effectively and likely would achieve Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait without resort to bombardment and invasion.

After the fighting, our firm conviction is that the human and material costs of modern warfare, both nuclear and "conventional," are so enormous that this world cannot continue to tolerate or support such methods for solving international problems any longer. CPPNW's clear, forthright statements were anything but "a mushy middle road," as suggested in the article.

Charlotte Gray misunderstands Canada's peace movement if she thinks it was in disarray during the crisis. The differences among the various groups are trivial in comparison to the many areas of agreement, especially their shared opposition to our country becoming an aggressive partner in the vicious and unnecessary Gulf War.

Public opinion was clearly opposed to the war before Canada

joined the coalition. After the decision was made to send Canadian troops, however, public opinion shifted to support the coalition, because many people felt that it would be an act of national disloyalty to oppose a war in which Canada was engaged. For many peace workers it never was incongruous to be supportive of our armed forces who were in a war zone, under orders, and there through no fault of their own, and at the same time to oppose the Persian Gulf war.

Undoubtedly, the peace movement was short on alternatives to that war, as suggested by the author. Now the time is ripe for consideration of alternatives to all wars.

*Joanna Santa Barbara, MD,  
President, CPPNW  
Alex. M. Bryans, MD,  
Past President, CPPNW*

### "Home Grown Skirmishes" Found Wanting

A critical analysis, in *Peace & Security*, of policies advocated by groups and individuals in the peace movement, particularly in the context of the Gulf crisis, would be most welcome. It strikes me as central to the CIIPS mandate to carry out such critical challenges. Unfortunately, Charlotte Gray's piece, in my view, didn't come close to fulfilling the requirements of critical analysis. In fact, I regard it as an affront.

First, the article seriously misrepresents the status or condition of the peace movement. It is variously described as in "crisis," "disarray," "running out of power," "galvanized" by the war, and in a "brief frenzy." That there are difficulties, reassessments, debates and so on within the peace movement is certainly true, and welcome, but Ms. Gray's characterizations are simply caricatures that do not have even the remotest link to something that could be described as factual. They certainly have nothing to do

with the peace group I'm most familiar with.

In Project Ploughshares, our membership is undiminished, fundraising is on track, our influence on policy issues such as arms transfers is substantial and growing in Canada and at the United Nations, we have a joint project with CIIPS on monitoring the arms industry, etc. Perhaps you would like to supplement Ms. Gray's venting with some real information in future issues.

Second, readers are told that "peace activists did not produce solutions." And just who was it that did produce the solutions? In the same issue, the article by Janice Gross Stein makes it clear that neither the war nor those who supported it produced any solutions: the physical and economic damage to the region will take a very long time to overcome, which means that "the prospects for redistribution of wealth between the rich and the poor, and the management of conflict that grows out of inequities of resource ownership, are hardly bright"; it is "also unlikely in the foreseeable future [that] political participation and democratization in the heartland of the Arab Middle East" will be expanded; and, it turns out, "the war has also made it more, not less, difficult to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." On top of all that, Saddam Hussein remains. Are these the solutions that "peace activists" failed to produce?

We advocated reliance on sanctions. There is, it is true, no guarantee that sanctions would have solved anything in the short or even long run. But I think it turns out that we were right to warn that direct military action would not solve the fundamental conflict issues, and that the quick expulsion of Saddam's forces from Kuwait would impose a level of human and physical damage that could not be justified.

Third, is Ms. Gray's characterization of Project Ploughshares as reflecting "turn-the-other-cheek



pacifism." This is simply wrong. In fact, I am later referred to as following a just-war line of analysis. I can't escape the feeling that this is phrased in such a way – referring to the "turn-the-other-cheek pacifism of Mennonites and Quakers" – as to be dismissive of the position. The intent, it seems to me, is to characterize this as a kind of knee-jerk, sectarian point of view that doesn't need to be taken seriously.

Ms. Gray's point that the "just war" analysis which we pursue precluded military action to enforce sanctions, needs comment. The use of military force to enforce the UN sanctions was appropriate. But military enforcement of sanctions is in fact realistic if they enjoy broad support and respect. Enforcement is feasible only if there is broad voluntary adherence to the sanctions (which there was in this case), and if infractions or attempted infractions are the exception. In the event of "wholesale sanctions-busting," attempts at military enforcement would likely be futile.

Ms. Gray put it differently, saying our position precluded military action in the case of "blatant sanction-busting." In fact, our position was and is that in case of clear and blatant violations of sanctions, in a context of general adherence, monitoring and enforcement are both possible and positive. The problem arises when violations are wholesale – in other words when the situation is not one of general adherence, but of general disregard for sanctions. Then enforcement is futile.

This is analogous to police-law enforcement. Police are equipped to deal with "blatant" but isolated or occasional law-breaking, e.g. traffic violations, robberies, smuggling and so on. If, however, you have a situation of general disregard for the law, wholesale violation of laws, it soon becomes clear that the problem is not lack of enforcement capability, but lack of respect for the law. Piling on the firepower at that point does little good.

In the case of drug trafficking, for example, it is broadly understood that the wholesale violations won't be solved by more policing,

but by programmes to deal with demand and the conditions that lead to the wholesale disregard of the law. The point I was making about enforcing sanctions was the same one. As long as sanctions were generally respected and adhered to, as they were, there was a genuine role for military enforcement – dealing with blatant violators. But if the international community acted in general disregard for the sanctions, then clearly there would be no possibility of making them effective through sheer brute force.

*Peace & Security* was certainly right in wanting to examine the role of the Canadian peace movement in the context of Canada's response to the Gulf crisis – it's a job that still needs to be done. *Ernie Regehr, Project Ploughshares, Waterloo*

#### A blow to the peace movement

"Home Grown Skirmishes" by Charlotte Gray is very disturbing in its denigration of the attempts by the peace movement to provide another way of looking at international affairs in general and of the Gulf War in particular. The author would appear not to have consulted any of the vast literature produced by various peace movement organizations in Canada and in the US. Had she done so she would have seen that much of their focus is on prevention of violence in the resolution of conflict and the need to address problems of poverty, environmental destruction, torture and terror throughout the world.

Most groups want strict control of the arms trade and many would like to see an end to all military production except in very limited situations. The arms trade is seen as wasteful and harmful to all concerned since it is a mis-allocation of scarce resources, especially in the face of such grave human needs.

Nobody in the peace movement feels they have all the answers nor do they pretend to do so. Why should they be unfairly characterized as being unequal to the task of finding alternatives to military actions after they have started? Charlotte Gray's article is a blow to the peace movement. We thought that the dialogue had been elevated to a higher level in the pursuit of a peaceful world. *Jean Smith, Peace Magazine, Toronto*

#### What does Canada need armed forces for anyway?

In "Defence Policy For a Nice Country" (Autumn 1991), Desmond Morton describes the problems of designing a defence policy for Canada on the assumption that we must prepare for future military conflicts. I would ask: why? Do we need a military establishment in Canada to defend against invasion? Hardly. No country would attempt to invade Canada unless they were out for world conquest. And we couldn't stop them anyway.

Do we plan to forestall a possible future invasion of Canada by fighting abroad? If this is so, then

we must believe in fighting a nuclear war, since this is what would inevitably arise in such a scenario. Do we want to defend Canadian interests abroad? Mr. Morton must think so, for he says: "This matters to a Canada that depends utterly on world trade for its standard of living." In other words he is suggesting that we kill people in a war to maintain our living standard.

Do we need a military force to fight for world peace? I would agree that Canada could contribute to a UN police force but it should be strictly under UN command. Canada could contribute personnel or simply money.

Do we want a military force in Canada in case of domestic unrest? Mr. Morton answers: "Canadians are nearly unanimous in rejecting force as an option." If it takes an army to put down an uprising then we are obviously on the wrong track. Maintaining a military for such an eventuality is an admission of political failure.

The pragmatic answer to these five questions is that we don't need a military establishment at all, except as an emergency response team. A trained group of people could deal with all man-made or natural emergencies in a national context. Such a body need not have submarines, tanks, bomber aircraft, long-range naval craft or anything designed to fight a war.

*E.P. Wilson, Gabriola, B.C.*

#### Barton Awards Programme

The Institute invites applications for its Awards Programme, designated the Barton Awards in honour of its first Chairman, former UN Ambassador William Barton.

The programme is open to both academics and non-academics who wish to enter or continue studies in the field of international peace and security. The programme is intended to encourage expertise and scholarship in that area by supporting Canadians and permanent residents who wish to pursue their studies at institutions abroad or in Canada.

The Institute expects to make eleven awards: two fellowships valued at up to \$30,000 and nine scholarships at up to \$14,000 each. Applications will be assessed by an independent selection committee and decisions will be announced in May 1992.

Applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents whose experience or academic qualifications enable them to pursue advanced study.

The deadline for applications for the 1992–1993 academic year is 1 February 1992.

For further information and application forms please write to: The Barton Awards Programme, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 360 Albert Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7X7

#### Peace and Security Competitions Fund Procedures and Deadlines

For the semi-annual competition with deadline of 30 June 1992, the Fund will be interested in receiving applications to support projects that would make thoughtful contributions to issues related to international peace and security on the 125th anniversary of Confederation in 1992. It is our understanding that Canadians will be invited by Parliament to reflect in their various fields on the record of opportunity and achievement in that record and on challenges for the future.

30 June for an October decision

30 November for a March decision

Write to: Peace and Security Competitions Fund, c/o CIIPS

## LETTER FROM KUWAIT BY JOCELYN COULON



**The Kuwait Airways plane begins its descent to the Emirate. It is almost midnight on this early October night.**

**In a matter-of-fact voice, a flight attendant announces to the passengers that shortly they will be able to see the burning oil wells.**

As the plane approaches the landing-strip, Kuwait's oilfields are clearly visible. In a few weeks, all this will be just a bad memory. To the great relief of Kuwaitis and Kuwait's Finance Minister, teams of mainly US and Canadian firefighters will have extinguished all the oil fires. The destruction of 735 oil wells by the Iraqis, accomplished in the last few hours before they evacuated Kuwait at the end of February, cost the Emirate the tidy sum of US \$45 million in lost export revenue.

The firefighters worked hard, especially the Canadians. When they arrived in Kuwait in April they thought they could put out perhaps one fire a day. But thanks to new technology and reinforcements from countries as varied as Iran, Romania and China, by the summer they were able to accelerate the rate of fire extinctions to four a day. And it is the firefighters from a Canadian company based in Alberta which holds the record: more than 160 fires extinguished compared to the vaunted American Red Adair team who managed barely a hundred.

The oil has caused enormous environmental destruction across Kuwait – spills in huge quantities on land and sea. The oil fires formed large clouds of smoke saturating the air with millions of tiny drops of black oil – this in one of the Middle East's most modern and aseptic societies. The experience has been very traumatic for Kuwaitis. Every morning since liberation, they ask themselves whether the air they are going to breathe that day will make them sick, or whether their clothes will be soiled the moment they step outside.

If the problem of the oil well fires is almost solved, the same

cannot be said for the difficulties created by the thousands of mines and bombs strewn throughout the country. Planted across Kuwait during the Gulf War by both sides, the Iraqi forces in particular dumped and buried them along tens of kilometres of Kuwait's southern border with Saudi Arabia. The daily human tragedies caused by these mines and unexploded bombs goes largely unnoticed by the outside world.

Two types of explosive were used during the war. While the multinational coalition used bombs, the Iraqis had a predilection for mines. Every time the allies bombed the Emirate or southern Iraq, they loosed hundreds of

portant buildings and strategic sites. Here too, the allied forces began the meticulous task of defusing. The French took care of the beaches. They removed, almost always by hand, more than 15,000 mines. The Canadians looked after the demilitarized zone between Kuwait and Iraq where they have neutralized some 8,000 explosive devices. There are still more to find, and teams from the UK, Pakistan, Egypt and Bangladesh are still cleaning up, but not without tragic accidents. The day I left, six Egyptian soldiers died trying to defuse a mine.

Before setting out to visit the southern sector of the demilitarized zone, one of the most heavily mined areas of Kuwait, I paid close attention to the leaflets distributed in all the hotels. Presented was a detailed description of the size, colour and purpose of the explosives found all over the country, accompanied by a drawing of the device in question. I kept this paper with me.

**“UNIKOM has been faced with a task not foreseen in its original mandate: to spot Iraqi civilians who've come to dig up mines in Kuwait.”**

small bombs aimed at particular targets – not all of them exploded. Although the coalition forces have located and defused thousands of them, some are especially difficult to find. Equipped with small parachutes, when the wind blows they move around, making the task of locating them that much harder. A few weeks ago, some young Kuwaitis were killed in their own school yard after running over one of these devices.

But the explosives which wreak most havoc are those left by the Iraqis. Throughout their seven-month occupation of Kuwait, Iraqi forces buried all sorts of mines. They were everywhere: along the Saudi border, along the Gulf coast, in the sea itself, in among the oilfields, and in certain im-

Our helicopter leaves Dohar where the headquarters of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) has been set up temporarily. The machine heads for lookout post S4 on the border between Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. After meeting up with some of the UNIKOM staff, we take off again to fly over the minefields which are easily discernible from the air. The helicopter is piloted by two Chileans who scan the ground for Kuwaitis or Iraqis who might have penetrated the demilitarized zone. For some weeks now, UNIKOM has been faced with a task not foreseen in its original mandate: to spot Iraqi civilians who've come to dig up mines in Kuwait. In

most instances, these people – children, women and old men – are hurt, or worse, killed outright by stepping on a mine. And each time, the military personnel of UNIKOM have to rush in with a helicopter or a truck to evacuate the victims to the nearest hospital.

After about fifteen minutes in the air, the pilots point out some Iraqi civilians running across the sand. When they catch sight of the helicopter, they stand still and wave to us. One of them is carrying a long shovel used to unearth mines. If the group manages to collect a few and get back across the frontier into Iraq, the Iraqi military will pay for them. Apparently, the Iraqi army is attempting to replenish its stock of munitions. But more often than not, payment for these mad escapades into the minefields comes in the form of a trip to the hospital with a missing limb, or even death. And so it is the poorest Iraqis who pay.

For the moment, the Chilean pilots can do nothing. They relay the position of the Iraqis to headquarters from where a truck will be sent to pick up the intruders and take them back across the border – until the next time. One of the pilots told us that some Iraqis, already missing limbs, return to try their luck again. At UNIKOM headquarters, the spokesperson, Abdellatif Kabbaj, shows me photographs of maimed Iraqis.

Back in Dohar, I greet Canadian soldiers who, for six months, have been building and moving UN observation posts, and ridding the demilitarized zone of mines – all in temperatures between 40 and 65 degrees Celsius. The car which takes me back to the hotel has no air-conditioning so I decide to plunge into the ocean to cool off. But then I recall the mines, still floating about in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the bathtub in the hotel isn't so bad after all.

*Jocelyn Coulon is international affairs editor at Le Devoir*

*(translation by Veronica Baruffati and Michael Bryans)*



## LETTRE DU KOWEÏT

PAR JOCELYN COULON



**L'avion des lignes aériennes koweïtiennes amorce sa descente vers l'émirat. Il est presque minuit en cette nuit du début octobre.**

Soudain, d'une voix nonchalante, une hôtesses annonce aux passagers que, dans quelques minutes, ils pourront apercevoir les puits de pétrole en feu. Au fur et à mesure que l'avion s'approche de l'aéroport, les puits des champs pétroliers du sud du Koweït apparaissent clairement. Les flammes sont de plus en plus hautes et dégagent une épaisse fumée noire. Le ciel est illuminé et d'une étrange couleur dorée.

Dans quelques semaines tout cela ne sera qu'un mauvais souvenir. Les équipes de sapeurs-pompiers, principalement des compagnies américaines et canadiennes, auront terminé l'extinction des feux, pour le plus grand bonheur des Koweïtiens et de leur ministre des Finances. La destruction de 735 puits de pétrole par les Irakiens, quelques heures avant leur retrait du Koweït à la fin de février dernier, a fait perdre à l'émirat la pondérable somme de 45 milliards de dollars américains en exportation de pétrole. Les sapeurs-pompiers ont bien travaillé, surtout les Canadiens. Lorsque ils sont arrivés en avril, ils avaient estimé pouvoir éteindre un puits par jour. Mais des cet été, grâce à de nouvelles technologies et à des renforts venus de pays aussi différents que l'Iran, la Roumanie et la Chine, le rythme des extinctions s'est accéléré. Maintenant, ce sont quatre puits qui sont sapeurs-pompiers d'une compagnie internationale de pétrole. Les experts matinsés alors que les experts américains de la célèbre équipe de Red Adair arrivent difficilement à une centaine.

L'incendie des puits de pétrole a causé de lourds dégâts environnementaux au Koweït avec les déversements de pétrole à terre et dans la mer, la formation d'immenses nuages de fumée noire au-dessus du pays et la présence dans l'air de cette société parmi les plus modernes et les plus asseptisées du Proche-Orient, de millions de petites gouttelettes de pétrole noir. Tout cela a provoqué bien des traumatismes. Depuis la libération des champs pétroliers du sud du Koweït, les Irakiens ont été semés à travers le pays. Elles ont été semées à travers le Koweït pendant la guerre du Golfe par les forces alliées mais surtout par les Irakiens, qui en ont déversé et enterré sur des dizaines de kilomètres à la frontière entre le Koweït et l'Arabie saoudite. Ces mines et des bombes qui jonchent le pays, sont sur le point d'être réglées, il n'en va pas de même des problèmes de saccage des installations pétrolières. Si les problèmes entraînés par le sacage de quelques minutes après souilles quelques minutes après souilles, ils auront mis les pieds dehors.

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## «Depuis quelques semaines, le personnel de la MONUIK est confronté à une tâche qui n'était pas prévue dans son mandat : repérer les civils irakiens qui entrent au Koweït pour déterrer des mines.»

Irakiens. Tout au long des sept mois d'occupation, les forces irakiennes ont enterré des mines de tous formats dans certains édifices et points stratégiques. Là encore, les forces alliées ont procédé à un minutieux déminage. Les Français se sont occupés des plages de l'émirat. Ils ont enterré 8 000 engins. Néanmoins, il en reste encore et des équipes de Britanniques, de Pakistanaïses, d'Égyptiens et de Bangladaïses s'affairent tous les jours à nettoyer le pays. Non sans mal. Le jour de mon départ, six soldats égyptiens sont morts en tentant de décamorcer une de ces mines. Avant de partir visiter le secteur sud de la zone déminatisée, un des endroits les plus minés du Koweït, j'ai lu attentivement les informations présentes dans un feuillet distribué dans tous les hôtels. On y décrit la

taille, la couleur et l'usage des explosifs qu'on peut trouver dans le pays. Chaque description est accompagnée d'un dessin de la mine ou de la bombe en question. J'emporte le papier avec moi. Notre hélicoptère quitte Doha où est installé provisoirement le quartier général de la Mission d'observation des Nations Unies en Irak et au Koweït (MONUIK). L'appareil se dirige vers le poste d'observation 54 situé à la frontière entre l'Irak, le Koweït et l'Arabie saoudite. Après avoir rencontré quelques membres du personnel de la MONUIK, nous redescendons le tracé est bien visible depuis les airs. L'hélicoptère est piloté par deux Chiliens qui scrutent attentivement le sol à la recherche de Koweïtiens ou d'Irakiens qui pénètrent dans la zone déminatisée. Depuis quelques semaines, le personnel de la MONUIK est confronté à une tâche qui n'était pas prévue

Durant la guerre du Golfe, deux types d'explosifs ont été utilisés au Koweït. La coalition multinationale s'est servie de bombes tandis que les Irakiens avaient une prédilection pour les mines. Chaque fois que les alliés bombardaient l'émirat ou le sud de l'Irak, leurs avions larguaient de 200 à 300 bombes de petit format au-dessus d'objectifs particuliers et toutes n'explosaient pas. Si les militaires de la coalition en ont répétés des milliers, il n'est pas toujours facile de localiser. Certaines bombes sont munies d'un petit parachute et lorsque le vent souffle, elles peuvent se déplacer, rendant la tâche de désamorçage extrêmement difficile. Il y a quelques semaines, de jeunes Koweïtiens sont morts dans la cour d'une école après avoir heurté une de ces bombes. Mais les explosifs qui font le plus de ravage sont ceux laissés par les

dans son mandat : repérer les civils irakiens qui entrent au Koweït pour déterrer des mines. La plupart du temps, ces civils – enfants, femmes et vieillards – se blessent ou pire, meurent en sautant sur une mine. Chaque fois, les militaires de la Mission d'observation de l'ONU doivent dépêcher un véhicule ou un hélicoptère pour évacuer les victimes vers l'hôpital le plus proche. Après une quinzaine de minutes de vol, les pilotes nous montrent des civils irakiens qui courent dans le sable. À la vue de l'hélicoptère, ceux-ci s'immobilisent et nous sautent à la main. L'un d'eux transpire une longue pelle qui servira à porter une mine. Si le groupe parvient à s'emparer de plusieurs dizaines de sapes-pompiers, principalement des compagnies américaines et canadiennes, auront terminé l'extinction des feux, pour le plus grand bonheur des Koweïtiens et de leur ministre des Finances. La destruction de 735 puits de pétrole par les Irakiens, quelques heures avant leur retrait du Koweït à la fin de février dernier, a fait perdre à l'émirat la pondérable somme de 45 milliards de dollars américains en exportation de pétrole. Les sapeurs-pompiers ont bien travaillé, surtout les Canadiens. Lorsque ils sont arrivés en avril, ils avaient estimé pouvoir éteindre un puits par jour. Mais des cet été, grâce à de nouvelles technologies et à des renforts venus de pays aussi différents que l'Iran, la Roumanie et la Chine, le rythme des extinctions s'est accéléré. Maintenant, ce sont quatre puits qui sont sapeurs-pompiers d'une compagnie internationale de pétrole. Les experts matinsés alors que les experts américains de la célèbre équipe de Red Adair arrivent difficilement à une centaine.

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Journal Le Devoir.

un point de vue instinctif, secrétaire, qu'il n'est pas besoin de prendre

L'affirmation de Mme Gray, à savoir que l'analyse de la «guerre juste», qui est la nôtre et qui interdit

pour faire appliquer des sanctions, la mort qu'on s'y attèle. Le recours à la force armée pour obliger à appliquer les sanctions de l'ONU

était approuvé. Toutefois, ce n'est, en fait, réaliste que si les sanctions

beneficient d'un large soutien et du respect général. L'application n'est

possible que si l'adhésion volontaire aux sanctions est très étendue (ce

qui était le cas, en l'occurrence) et que si les infractions qu'on tentait de

cas de violations généralisées des sanctions, il serait probablement

vain d'en appeler à l'armée. Mme Gray a formulé autrement

en disant que notre position écartait la possibilité d'intervention militaire

sa cas de «violation flagrante des sanctions». Or, notre position était

et risquait en cas de violations manifestes et flagrantes des sanctions, la surveillance et l'application coercitive sont toutes des possibilités

des violations sont inévitables, l'adhésion d'un groupe

mais même après des sanctions. C'est alors que le recours à la force

grant délit. En revanche, si la communauté internationale avait en

général passé outre aux sanctions, il aurait manifestement été impossible

de les faire accepter par la force. L'article de Charlotte Gray intitulé

«Toutes incertaines» est très inquietant dans sa dénigration des

efforts déployés par le mouvement pacifiste pour jeter un autre éclair

rage sur les relations internationales en général et sur la guerre du Golfe

en particulier. L'auteur semble ne pas avoir consulté l'économie docu-

mentation publiée par différentes organisations pacifistes au Canada

qu'elle se serait aperçue qu'elles insistent essentiellement sur la

prévention de la violence dans le règlement des différends et sur la

nécessité de s'atteler à la tâche pour éradiquer la pauvreté, arrêter la

destruction de l'environnement, et faire cesser la torture et le commerce

un strict contrôle du commerce des armements et beaucoup aime-

raient voir cesser toute production militaire, sauf dans des situations

concernées, étant donné qu'on y engloberait des ressources peu

## Une gifle au mouvement pacifiste

Projet Ploughshares, Waterloo.

Ernie Regehr.

cet examen restie toujours à faire.

diens dans le contexte de la réponse

role du mouvement pacifiste cana-

ment raison de vouloir examiner le

de les faire accepter par la force.

Personne dans le mouvement

de besoins humains tellement

abondantes, notamment au regard

Le Canada a-t-il besoin

de forces armées ?

Peace Magazine, Toronto.

Jean Smith.

pacifique.

cela dans la recherche d'un monde

dialogue s'était plus élevé que

pacifistes. Nous pensions que le

Gray est une gifle au mouvement

entames ? L'article de Charlotte

venions militaires une fois celles-ci

tions de remplacement à des inter-

parce qu'ils ne trouvent pas de solu-

pacifistes de ne pas être à la hauteur

Pourquoi reprocher injustement aux

maintenant notre niveau de vie.

des gens dans une guerre pour

ment dit, il suggère que nous luttons

assure son niveau de vie.» Autre-

ment du commerce mondial pour

écrit : «C'est important pour un

Canada qui dépend fondamentale-

ment du commerce mondial pour

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## Programme de bourses Barton

Dans le cadre de son programme des «Bourses Barton», ainsi appelé en

l'honneur de son premier président, M. William Barton, ancien ambassadeur

du Canada à l'ONU, l'Institut invite les personnes intéressées à déposer leur

dossier de candidature. Le programme est ouvert aux universitaires et aux

autres personnes qui veulent entreprendre ou poursuivre des études sur la paix

et la sécurité internationales. Il entend favoriser l'accroissement des compé-

tences et des connaissances de haut niveau dans ce domaine, en appuyant

soutiendraient poursuivre des études dans des institutions au Canada et l'étranger.

L'Institut compte choisir onze récipiendaires, deux d'entre eux recevront

chacun une bourse de «fellow» de 30 000 \$ maximum et les neuf autres

bénéficient chacun d'une bourse d'étude de 14 000 \$ maximum. Un

comité de sélection indépendant évaluera les candidatures et rendra ses

décisions en mai 1992.

Les candidats doivent être citoyen(ne)s canadien(ne)s ou

immigrant(e)s reçu(e)s pourvu(e)s d'expérience ou des compétences

universitaires leur permettant de poursuivre des études supérieures.

Les candidatures pour l'année universitaire 1992-1993 doivent

être reçues avant le 30 novembre, pour la sélection de mars

et le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

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le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

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le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

## Concours «Paix et Sécurité» : procédure et échéancier

Pour la compétition dont la date limite sera le 30 juin 1992, le Fonds

étudier, en particulier, les demandes de contributions reliées à des projets

paix et la sécurité internationales lors de la célébration du 25<sup>e</sup> anniversaire

de la Confédération en 1992. Nous croyons qu'à cette occasion, les cana-

diens et canadiennes seront invités par le Parlement à réfléchir, dans

leurs champs d'activités respectifs, sur leurs réalisations et sur les défis que

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

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le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

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le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

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présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

le 30 juin, pour la sélection d'octobre

présente l'avenir.

Gabriola, C.-B.

E.P. Wilson.

des guerres.

rien de ce qui est conçu pour livrer

navires à grande autonomie ni de

matins, de chars, de bombardiers, de

corps n'aurait besoin ni de sous-

à l'intérieur de nos frontières. Ce

naturelles ou causées par l'Homme

faire face à toutes les catastrophes

de personnes entraînées pourrait

d'intervention tactique. Un groupe

militaires en dehors d'un groupe

n'avons nullement besoin d'effectifs

cinq questions est la suivante : nous

la réponse pragmatique à ces

de la politique.

Eventuellement, c'est admettre un échec

Entretenir une armée pour pareille

ment, nous sommes mal partis.

de l'armée pour écraser un soulève-

l'emploi de la force.» Si on a besoin

rejette quasi unanimement l'idée de

répond : «La population canadienne

troubles intérieurs ? M. Morton

au Canada pour faire face à des

Souhaitons-nous avoir une armée

des fonds.

onuse. Le Canada pourrait lui

clustivement sous commandement

dition que celle-ci soit placée ex-

puisse contribuer à une force de

police des Nations Unies, à la con-

diale ? J'accepterais que le Canada

qui combatte pour la paix non-

Avons-nous besoin d'une armée

maintenir notre niveau de vie.

des gens dans une guerre pour

ment dit, il suggère que nous luttons

assurer son niveau de vie.» Autre-

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## Dénigre-t-on le mouvement pacifiste ?

Dans «Jouites intestines»

(automne 1991), Charlotte Gray

présente son évaluation déformante

des mouvements pacifistes cana-

diens, notamment de leurs réactions

face à la crise du golfe Persique.

Médécins canadiens pour la préven-

tion de la guerre nucléaire (MCPGN)

est un des groupes qu'elle critique.

Notre position sur la guerre du

Golfe découle de notre énoncé de

mission de 1988 qui dit : «Parce que

notre préoccupation est la santé en

général, nous voulons contribuer

à la prévention de la guerre et à la

résolution des conflits par des

«moyens non violents.» L'opposition

de MCPGN à l'intervention mili-

taire par la coalition dirigée par

les États-Unis reposait sur des

preuves solides que les sanctions

s'avéreraient très efficaces et qu'elles

auraient probablement conduit au

retrait irakien du Koweït sans

bombardement ni invasion.

Maintenant les combats terminés,

nous sommes fermement conva-

incus que les coûts humains et

matériels d'une guerre moderne,

si énormes que le monde ne peut

continuer de tolérer que l'on prenne

les armes pour résoudre des pro-

blèmes internationaux. Les déclara-

tions claires et nettes de MCPGN

étaient tout sauf «floues bleues».

Pour reprendre les termes employés

dans l'article.

Charlotte Gray ne comprend pas

le mouvement pacifiste canadien si

elle pense que la confusion y régnait

pendant la crise. Les désaccords

entre les divers groupes sont mini-

mes comparés à leurs nombreux

points d'entente, d'autant que tous

s'opposaient à ce que notre pays

du Golfe, brutale et inutile.

L'option publique était mani-

festement contre la guerre avant que

le Canada se joigne à la coalition.

Après qu'on a eu décidé d'envoyer

des troupes, toutefois, il y a eu un

revirement et elle a pris le parti de

cette même coalition. En effet, bien

des gens pensaient que ce serait un

acte de déloyauté que de s'opposer

à un conflit dans lequel leur pays

était engagé. Pour beaucoup de

pacifistes, il n'a jamais paru incon-

gru de soutenir nos forces armées

qui se trouvaient dans la zone de

combat, sur ordre et sans l'avoir

cherché, et de s'opposer dans le

même temps à la guerre du Golfe.

Indéniablement, le mouvement

pacifiste n'avait guère d'autre solu-

tion à proposer à la place du conflit

armé, comme le laisse entendre

l'auteur. À présent, l'heure a sonné

de réfléchir à des moyens d'éviter

toutes les guerres.

*D'Joanna Santa Barbara.*

*Présidente de MCPGN.*

*D'Alex M. Bryans.*

*Président sortant de MCPGN.*

Une analyse critique des poli-

tiques préconisées par des groupes

et des individus du mouvement

pacifiste, notamment dans le con-

texte de la crise du Golfe, serait très

bien venue dans *Paix et Sécurité*.

Relever ce genre de défi est à mon

sens une des tâches essentielles

qui incombent à l'ICPSI aux termes

de son mandat. Malheureusement,

l'article de Charlotte Gray est,

un affront.

Tout d'abord, l'article dénature

gravement le statut et la situation du

mouvement pacifiste. On le décrit

soit comme étant en «crise», en

plein «désarroi», «essoufflé», «gal-

vanisé» par la guerre et secoué par

une «brève frénésie». Qu'il y ait des

difficultés, des révélations, des

débats, etc., au sein du mouvement

pacifiste, c'est certainement vrai, et

heureusement, mais l'interprétation

qu'en donne Mme Gray est simple-

ment caricaturale et sans le moindre

rapport avec la réalité. En tout cas,

je n'y retrouve en rien le groupe

pacifiste que je connais.

À Projet Ploughshares, le nombre

de nos membres ne baisse pas ; on

continue de collecter des fonds ; sur

les transferts d'armements, notre in-

fluence est importante et croissante

au Canada et aux Nations Unies ;

l'ICPSI sur la surveillance du

secteur de l'armement, etc., etc.

Vous souhaitez peut-être com-

pléter la diatribe de Mme Gray par

quelques vraies informations dans

les prochains numéros.

Ensuite, on dit aux lecteurs que

«les pacifistes n'ont pas proposé de

solutions». Mais qui en a proposé ?

Dans le même numéro [de *Paix et*

*Sécurité*], l'article de Mme Janice

Gross Stein explique clairement que

ni la guerre ni ceux qui la prônaient

n'ont apporté de solution. Il faudra

beaucoup de temps à la région pour

se remettre des dommages matériels

et économiques qu'elle a subis.

ce qui signifie que «des perspectives

de redistribution de la richesse

entre riches et pauvres, et la gestion

des conflits qui découlent de la

répartition inégale des richesses et

des ressources, ne sont guère bril-

lantes». Elle poursuit : «Une plus

grande participation et une démo-

cratisation accrue au cœur du

Moyen-Orient arabe sont elles

aussi improbables dans un proche

avenir». Et d'ajouter : «La guerre

a rendu le règlement du conflit

israélo-palésinien plus difficile, et

non le contraire.» Pour couronner

le tout, Saddam Hussein est toujours

au pouvoir. Est-ce que ce sont là

les solutions que les «pacifistes»

ont omis d'avancer ?

Nous préconisons de s'en reme-

tre aux sanctions. Certes, on ne peut

garantir qu'elles auraient réglé quoi

que ce soit à court ni même à long

terme. Cependant, je crois que nous

avons raison d'attirer l'attention sur

le fait que l'intervention militaire ne

résoudrait pas les problèmes fonda-

mentaux du conflit et que l'expul-

sion rapide des forces irakiennes du

Koweït passerait par des destructions

humaines et matérielles.

Enfin, Mme Gray décrit Projet

Ploughshares comme un mouve-

ment pacifiste où l'on prône de

«tendre l'autre joue». Elle se trompe

tout bonnement. En fait, elle me

présente plus loin dans l'article

comme participant d'une analyse de ce

qu'est une guerre juste. Je ne puis

empêcher de penser que cette


phrasede «l'autre joue» -est formulée de

manière et des Quakers, qui prône de

façon péjorative. L'intention, il me

semble, est de présenter cela comme

# LIVRES



## Le Grand Jeu. Orient arabe et

Henry Laurens

Éditions Armand Colin, Paris, 1991.

117 pages, 49,95 \$

Bien peu de régions du monde

apparaissent aussi complexes que le

Moyen-Orient. Avec les nombreuses

conversions religieuses qu'elle abrite,

les divers mouvements politiques

dont elle est l'incubatrice, lieu de

convoitises, cette région semble être

destinée à soulever les plus grandes

l'endroits de prédilection de l'instabi-

lité politique qui pourrait faire

basculer le monde dans un chaos

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analyse fouillée qui n'est ni percu-

taurie ni décevante, les principaux

faits marquants de son évolution.

En toile de fond, bien sûr, le con-

flit israélo-arabe et son rôle central

dans le développement des idéolo-

gies, de l'arabisme unitaire à l'isla-

lisme radical, en passant par les

diverses tentes du socialisme, dont

le baathisme. Variété d'idées qui té-

moignent de la difficulté des élites

de la région, à la tête d'États aux

configurations ambiguës et artificiel-

les, à se situer convenablement de-

vant un Occident de plus en plus

présent, notamment au plan culturel.

Citant le cas de l'Irak, l'auteur ré-

sulte bien l'impuissance et la limite de

l'oeuvre politique de l'élite arabe

issue de l'administration ottomane.

Elle a réussi à fonder un État dans

une société totalement hétérogène et

à le doter d'une idéologie qui en dé-

truit le cadre. En même temps, les

lites internes à cette élite, qui expro-

ment le plus souvent des initiatives

personnelles, et l'appel fait à des

puissances extérieures pour réaliser

des objectifs politiques fragilisent le

sage de l'analyse et de la réflexion

dont le but est «de favoriser le pas-

salement du processus révolutionnaire

en Europe centrale ; le rôle de la nou-

velle Allemagne unifiée ; et enfin

les enjeux et les acteurs dans la for-

mation d'une nouvelle Europe. Les

auteurs proposent ensuite dix mesures

dont le but est «de favoriser le pas-

sage de l'analyse et de la réflexion

abstraite à l'action concrète».

Si chaque chapitre retient l'atten-

tion par sa présentation équilibrée

des réalités, des espoirs et des pro-

bèmes, les dix mesures proposées

tiennent souvent de l'intépidité et

de l'audace. Ici s'impose une ques-

tion à laquelle on n'a pas encore de

réponses : est-ce que les esprits, les

structures politiques et intellectuel-

les et les hommes d'État ont suffi-

samment évolué pour aller dans les

directions proposées ? Quelle que

soit la réponse, il nous semble que

une meilleure coordination des ef-

forts d'aide déjà lancés par les pays

d'Europe de l'Ouest. Il ne serait pas

difficile alors d'assurer les autres

mesures ; privilégier l'Europe cen-

Rédigé en cinq mois et publié

avant le coup manqué en Union so-

viétique en août 1991, cet ouvrage

représente un effort intéressant d'a-

l'analyse et de prospective surtout sur

l'Europe centrale. Comme l'écrivent

les auteurs, cet essai «se veut avant

tout un guide raisonné et lucide pour

comprendre et saisir les enjeux, les

chances et les risques qui s'ouvrent

à l'Europe en devenir». L'effort

n'est pas manqué : l'ouvrage invite

effectivement à la réflexion.

Les cinq chapitres du livre exami-

nent respectivement l'importance de

l'année 1989, surtout comme aboutis-

sement du processus révolutionnaire

déclenché deux siècles plus tôt ;

l'Union soviétique et les perspec-

tives auxquelles elle est appelée à

faire face ; les difficultés de la démo-

cratie, du marché et du nationalisme

en Europe centrale ; le rôle de la nou-

velle Allemagne unifiée ; et enfin

les enjeux et les acteurs dans la for-

mation d'une nouvelle Europe. Les

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d'Europe de l'Ouest. Il ne serait pas

difficile alors d'assurer les autres

mesures ; privilégier l'Europe cen-

trale ; responsabiliser l'aide ; créer

une politique de formation et relever

le défi culturel dans les domaines du

livre et de l'audio-visuel.

La sixième mesure, la réintégra-

tion de la France dans l'OTAN, est

l'OTAN, est

l'OTAN, est

l'OTAN, est

l'OTAN, est

réalisable par elle-même, mais pour

complémentaire, c'est donc un

contexte, c'est donc un

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## CONDENSE SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS

corité mondiale, enoncés et  
priorités devant régir les trans-  
fertes et l'accès sur les besoins  
légitimes d'aide et de soutien  
financiers. Le document exho-  
rte à éviter les transferts in-  
appropriés et à privilégier les  
transferts directs aux armées en

une région donnée, ou de nuire gravement à l'économie d'un pays bénéficiant. Quant au Moyen-Orient, les Cinq (qui fournissent 85 p. 100 des armes abouissant dans la région) ont convenu de se tenir mutuellement informés sur tous les transferts de gros systèmes d'armement dans cette partie du monde. Ils ont aussi réaffirmé l'importance d'assujettir à des contrôles stricts à l'échelle de la planète l'exportation de matériels associés aux armes de destruction massive.

## Les armes défensives et spatiales

Aux pourparlers américains-soviétiques, sur les armes défensives et spatiales, qui ont eu lieu à Genève en octobre, les Etats-Unis ont accepté pour la première fois de discuter de limites bien définies quant à l'entrevue et au calendrier d'exécution des déploiements de dispositifs de défense, afin de modifier en conséquence les systèmes SPAL S-75.

l'efficacité du système GRALS (tro-  
tection globale contre des trappes  
limitées) dont ils envisagent de se  
doter. Voilà qui supposerait le rem-  
placement ou la modification du  
Traité ABM de 1972, qui limite les  
défenses contre les missiles batis-  
tiques à 100 intercepteurs basés au  
sol, à un seul endroit. Le GPALS,  
quant à lui, nécessiterait 750 inter-  
cepteurs, terrestres et 1 000 engins  
spatiaux, ce qui constituerait un  
réservoir capable d'arrêter jusqu'à  
200 ogives en même temps.

mois d'août, l'URSS s'est montrée de plus en plus désireuse de coopérer avec les États-Unis pour contraindre de telles défenses contre les attaques nucléaires déclenchées par inadvertnance, non autorisées, ou lancées par des tierces parties. Cependant, les États-Unis ont nié avoir dit qu'ils étaient prêts à aider l'URSS à doter d'un tel système, ou qu'ils envisageaient de partager leur technologie avec elle. □

il a demandé que soit négociée la fin de la production d'armes fissiles pour la fabrication d'armes, il a accepté d'amorcer un dialogue sérieux avec les États-Unis sur la sécurité dans l'emploi des armes nucléaires. Il a annoncé la mise sur pied d'un seul commandement opérationnel pour toutes les armes nucléaires stratégiques de son pays ; enfin, il a exhorté chacune des puissances nucléaires à s'engager à ne jamais recourir la première aux armes atomiques.

Les 17 et 18 octobre, les ministres de la Défense des pays de l'OTAN ont approuvé aux déclarations des États-Unis et de l'URSS et ils ont décidé de réduire de moitié le nombre d'armes air-sol existant dans l'Armée de l'Organisation en Europe, l'élimination de 700 missiles balistiques à courte portée, on obtient une réduction de 80 p. 100 des stocks existants d'armes nucléaires «pré-stratégiques» de l'OTAN.

Les armes nucléaires tactiques de la France ne sont pas touchées par les coupes effectuées par l'OTAN, mais ce pays a annoncé en août qu'il constituerait seulement trente missiles balistiques à courte portée *Hades*, au lieu de 120, et qu'il les entreposerait directement.

## Les armes biologiques

La Troisième Conférence d'examen de la Convention de 1972 sur les armes biologiques et à toxines a eu lieu à Genève du 9 au 27 septembre. Les 118 parties au notamment convenu d'assujettir aussi aux règles sur les échanges de données les programmes de recherche sur la défense biologique et les installations de production des vaccins, et de s'assurer que les agents biologiques, les toxines, les armes, l'équipement ou les vecteurs connexes ne sont pas transférés à d'autres États risquant de servir à des fins illégales.

## Les transferts d'armes

Comme ils en avaient convenu à Paris en juillet dernier, les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU se sont de nouveau réunis en octobre à Londres pour élaborer des lignes directrices sur le transfert des armes conventionnelles, surtout au Moyen-Orient. Les lignes directrices, qui ont une

L'élimination totale des ICBM mitrès, et il a invité l'URSS à autoriser le déploiement de certaines défenses non nucléaires contre des attaques limitées par missiles balistiques. Et finalement, afin d'aider à empêcher le recours par inadvert-

L'URSS de tenir des discussions sur l'amélioration des méthodes de sauvegarde et sur les dispositifs de commandement et de contrôle.


plus que donner suite aux propos de son homologue américain. Le 5 octobre en effet, il a déclaré que toutes les armes nucléaires tactiques sont-elles soviétiques, y compris les mines, seraient détruites : en outre, l'URSS retirerait du service les ogives nucléaires des missiles antiaériens et

tionnelles, les autres seraient détruites, les autres seraient entreposés en un lieu central. Le président soviétique a par ailleurs proposé que les armes nucléaires, agissant conjointement en cela, détruisent toutes les armes nucléaires tactiques navales et qu'elles retirent du service et centrent toutes les bombes et sous-missiles nucléaires équipant

les forces armées locales. S'agissant des armes stratégiques, M. Gorbatchev a annoncé que l'URSS cesserait de garder ses bom-

barriers jours en état d'alerte permanente et qu'elle ferait de même à l'égard de 503 ICBM (dont 134 engins mirvés) ; le pays mettrait fin à la modernisation de ses SRAM et de ses petits ICBM mobiles, et il n'augmenterait pas le nombre de ses ICBM mirvés montés sur rails ; en outre, ces engins n'quittraient pas les bases permanentes. Enfin, M. Gorbachev a fait savoir que s'il pays

était en train de relâcher de son ordre de bataille trois sous-marins munis de quarante-huit lanceurs de missiles balistiques. L'URSS est disposée à éliminer 1 000 ogives nucléaires stratégiques, l'entente START (5 000 se-ront donc détruites sur une période de sept ans. M. Gorbachev a par ailleurs préconisé d'éliminer envi-ron la moitié du reste des armes stratégiques offensives.



## Les armes nucléaires

■ Le 27 septembre, le président Bush a annoncé une série de changements radicaux dans l'arsenal nucléaire américain. En outre, l'URSS lui a déclaré que son pays renouvellerait et développerait unilatéralement toutes ses 2 150 armes nucléaires tactiques soi-soi (obus d'artillerie nucléaire et ogives montées sur des missiles balistiques à courte portée) déployés en Europe, en Corée du sud et aux États-Unis. Ceux-ci vont également retirer du


service toutes leurs armes nucléaires employées en mer, y compris les missiles de SLCM et les bombes équivalentes (dont les avions embarqués et les avions de l'aéronavale basés à terre). Environ la moitié de ces engins (on pense qu'il y en a entre 1 825 et 2 252) seraient détruits, tandis que le reste (dont les SLCM plus modernes) serait transféré aux États-Unis.

Quant aux armes nucléaires stra-

légiques, les États-Unis cesseraient de garder en état d'alerte permanente tous leurs bombardiers stratégiques, et ils feraient de même dans le cas des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux (ICBM) devant être détruits aux termes de l'entente START. Le pays accélérerait l'élimination de ces derniers engins (au lieu de le faire le Traité START). M. Bush a mis fin

rendre mobiles les *MX* actuels et les programmes ayant pour objet de les transformer en *CBM Midge* dans le futur. Le projet est d'ailleurs, le plus ambitieux, le plus complexe et le plus coûteux de la stratégie d'attaque à court terme (SRAM) équilibrant les bombardiers stratégiques ne sera pas remplacé par un engin plus moderne ; enfin, M. Bush a créé un Commandement stratégique unifié qui sera chargé de surveiller toutes les armes nucléaires et les stratégies air-sol.

# EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



L'ONU

La 34<sup>e</sup> législature a repris les travaux de sa trisixième session le 16 septembre et elle les poursuivra jusqu'à la veille de Noël. Le public latin voulant que le premier ministre ait droit à une rumeur persis- roney a cependant bien précisé, après avoir été interrogé par le Chef de l'Opposition, M. Jean Chrétien, de 22 octobre, qu'il n'avait pas inscrit son nom sur la liste officielle des candidats. Le lendemain, M. Chrétien s'est demandé pourquoi le nom du premier ministre n'avait pas été retiré de cette liste et quelles directives les diplomates canadiens à l'étranger avaient reçu à cet égard. Aucune réponse définitive n'a été fournie avant le 28 octobre, date où M. Mulroney a donné ordre au M. Yves Fortier, ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU, d'annuler officiellement sa candidature. Les Nations Unies ont également fait l'objet d'un débat spécial à la Chambre, par suite d'une motion déposée par le député conservateur Walter MacLean. Celui-ci est le représentant spécial du premier ministre pour les questions africaines et, tous les automnes depuis quelques années, il fait partie de la délégation canadienne à l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU à New York. M. MacLean a proposé le 19 septembre que le gouvernement réclame à l'ONU une réunion au sommet sur la sécurité mondiale, pour que les États membres cherchent des moyens de mettre en oeuvre et de renforcer les mécanismes onusiens de maintien de la paix et de l'ordre. Parmi les autres intervenants dans le débat, citons la députée conservatrice Louise

Le 2 octobre, elle a assisté à une ment élu de Jean-Bertrand Aristide. pouvoir le gouvernement récem- haïtiennes, qui avaient évincé du coup d'État perpétré par des élé- Dougall, a fortement condamné le des Affaires extérieures. Mme Mc-

## Le coup d'État en Haïti

Le 30 septembre, la ministre yougoslave. Le 18 septembre, Mme McDougall a précisé que, selon le gouvernement, le moment était venu pour le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU de se pencher sur ce dossier. Le 7 octobre, répondant à une question de M. Jean Chrétien, Chef de l'Opposition, après que les forces armées fédérales de la Yougoslavie eurent attaqué Zagreb, capitale de la Croatie, le ministre du Commerce extérieur, M. Michael Wilson, a fait savoir que le Canada

Les Communes ne siègeraient pas au moment de la tentative de coup d'État survenue en URSS le 19 août, mais le premier ministre, qui assistait alors au sommet économique de Londres réunissant les sept pays les plus industrialisés du monde, a immédiatement interrompu le programme d'aide alimentaire et technique qui venait à peine de reprendre un mois auparavant. Le lendemain cependant, la secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Mme Barbara McDougall, formulait des mois empreints de prudence, après avoir été interrogé par le Chef de l'Opposition, M. Jean Chrétien, de 22 octobre, qu'il n'avait pas inscrit son nom sur la liste officielle des candidats. Le lendemain, M. Chrétien s'est demandé pourquoi le nom du premier ministre n'avait pas été retiré de cette liste et quelles directives les diplomates canadiens à l'étranger avaient reçu à cet égard. Aucune réponse définitive n'a été fournie avant le 28 octobre, date où M. Mulroney a donné ordre au M. Yves Fortier, ambassadeur du Canada à l'ONU, d'annuler officiellement sa candidature. Les Nations Unies ont également fait l'objet d'un débat spécial à la Chambre, par suite d'une motion déposée par le député conservateur Walter MacLean. Celui-ci est le représentant spécial du premier ministre pour les questions africaines et, tous les automnes depuis quelques années, il fait partie de la délégation canadienne à l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU à New York. M. MacLean a proposé le 19 septembre que le gouvernement réclame à l'ONU une réunion au sommet sur la sécurité mondiale, pour que les États membres cherchent des moyens de mettre en oeuvre et de renforcer les mécanismes onusiens de maintien de la paix et de l'ordre. Parmi les autres intervenants dans le débat, citons la députée conservatrice Louise

## Le coup d'État soviétique et ses séquences

Stewart. Feltham et les députés libéraux Warren Allmand et Christine

## La Yougoslavie

À maintes reprises pendant la Yougoslavie, la Chambre s'est intéressée à la dégradation de la crise yougoslave. Le 18 septembre, Mme McDougall a précisé que, selon le gouvernement, le moment était venu pour le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU de se pencher sur ce dossier. Le 7 octobre, répondant à une question de M. Jean Chrétien, Chef de l'Opposition, après que les forces armées fédérales de la Yougoslavie eurent attaqué Zagreb, capitale de la Croatie, le ministre du Commerce extérieur, M. Michael Wilson, a fait savoir que le Canada

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## - GREGORY WIRICK

Dubrovnik. la population assise de l'ONU, une aide humanitaire à la CF et de par avion, avec le concours des d'examiner la possibilité d'assurer M. Axworthy, le 1<sup>er</sup> novembre, a malgré tout convenu avec qu'elle serait censée aider. Elle resse à la dégradation de la crise yougoslave. Le 18 septembre, Mme McDougall a précisé que, selon le gouvernement, le moment était venu pour le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU de se pencher sur ce dossier. Le 7 octobre, répondant à une question de M. Jean Chrétien, Chef de l'Opposition, après que les forces armées fédérales de la Yougoslavie eurent attaqué Zagreb, capitale de la Croatie, le ministre du Commerce extérieur, M. Michael Wilson, a fait savoir que le Canada

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# À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



## Yougoslavie

Alors que le rôle des Nations Unies est redéfini en cette époque de l'après-Guerre froide, les limites de l'intervention du Conseil de sécurité dans les affaires intérieures d'un État membre sont une fois de plus mises à l'épreuve par ce qui se passe en Yougoslavie. Le 25 septembre, il a adopté à l'unanimité la résolution 713, par laquelle il «exhortait vivement les parties au conflit yougoslave à observer un cessez-le-feu et demandait à tous les États de décréter «immédiatement un embargo général et total sur toutes les livraisons d'armes et de matériels militaires à la Yougoslavie».

Preuve de l'importance attachée à un règlement pacifique du différend, les ministres des Affaires étrangères des onze des quinze États membres du Conseil ont participé à l'adoption de la résolution. Alors que certains États avaient essayé à titre personnel de convaincre le Conseil d'envoyer des casques bleus dans la région, la Chine et les pays non alignés se sont fermement opposés, dit-on, à une telle intervention des Nations Unies.

Les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne s'opposaient également à une intervention de l'ONU et préféraient que l'affaire se règle grâce à des efforts régionaux déployés par les Européens. Le 25 octobre, le Secrétaire général a publié un rapport créant, entre autres, état de violation de l'engagement signé cinq jours auparavant à New York par le gouvernement et les guérilleros du *Fronte Farabundo Martí para la Liberación* (FMLN).

## El Salvador

Le 30 septembre, le Conseil a réaffirmé son soutien au processus de paix engagé au Salvador en adoptant la résolution 714, dans laquelle il se félicite également de l'accord signé cinq jours auparavant à New York par le gouvernement et les guérilleros du *Fronte Farabundo Martí para la Liberación* (FMLN).

Le 3 octobre, le président du Conseil de sécurité, l'ambassadeur Chharmaya Rajanmath Charekhan (Inde), a déclaré «condamner vigoureusement le renversement du président de Haïti, M. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. De plus, cette déclaration, force obligatoire, appelait instamment au «rétablissement de l'autorité légitime en Haïti». La

## Haïti

Le 3 octobre, le président du Conseil de sécurité, l'ambassadeur Chharmaya Rajanmath Charekhan (Inde), a déclaré «condamner vigoureusement le renversement du président de Haïti, M. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. De plus, cette déclaration, force obligatoire, appelait instamment au «rétablissement de l'autorité légitime en Haïti». La

## Cambodge

Le 31 octobre, le Conseil a adopté à l'unanimité la résolution 718 reconnaissant officiellement l'accord signé à Paris huit jours plus tôt par les parties au conflit cambodgien. La résolution 718 enjoignait au Secrétaire général de présenter un coût estimatif détaillé de l'Autorité provisoire des Nations Unies au Cambodge (APRONUC) qui administrera le pays au moins jusqu'à la tenue d'élections libres. Le document

déclarait encore l'insistance mondiale du lancement de ce qui devrait être une des opérations de maintien de la paix les plus importantes en taille et les plus chères de son histoire. La complexité de l'entreprise est sous-entendue dans la résolution qui fut cambodgienne de se conformer

## Irak


Le Conseil a continué de consacrer beaucoup de temps à ce qui se passait en Irak. Le 15 août, au vu des rapports faisant état d'une aggravation de la situation des civils dans ce pays, le Conseil a adopté la résolution 706 autorisant Bagdad à vendre des quantités limitées de pétrole afin de pouvoir faire face à des besoins civils essentiels comme la nourriture. La résolution demandait aussi à Bagdad de se conformer à ses obligations de coopération dans la recherche et la destruction d'armes chimiques, biologiques et nucléaires, ainsi que de missiles balistiques. Le Conseil s'était refusé à autoriser l'Irak à vendre une quantité donnée de pétrole tant que le Secrétaire général n'aurait pas remis son rapport sur les mesures visant à contrôler la vente de pétrole et la distribution de nourriture. Par ailleurs, la résolution 706, adoptée par treize voix contre une (Cuba) et une abstention (le Yémen), demandait à l'Irak de verser 30 p. 100 de ses revenus pétroliers à un fonds spécial destiné à dédommager les victimes de son invasion du Koweït le 2 août.

Le 12 octobre, le Conseil a adopté la résolution 715 qui, en fait, créait le régime de limitation des armements le plus indiscipliné et le plus complet jamais établi dans l'histoire

## Nouveaux membres

Le nombre des membres de l'ONU est passé à 166 après que le Conseil de sécurité a recommandé à l'Assemblée générale d'admettre les trois pays baltes, soit l'Estonie, la Lettonie et la Lituanie. Le 9 août, le Conseil avait recommandé l'admission de la République de Corée (Nord) populaire de Corée (Corée du Sud), ainsi que celle des Îles Marshall et des États fédérés de Micronésie.

## - TREVOR ROWE



# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE

## Sommet de l'OTAN à Rome

Lors du dernier Sommet de l'OTAN, tenu à Rome les 7 et 8 novembre derniers, les chefs d'État membres ont décrit dans un long communiqué le «nouveau concept stratégique» de l'Organisation. Constatant la rapidité des changements en Europe, ils ont évoqué en détail, la position unique de l'OTAN, «point» de sécurité entre l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord. «L'OTAN, ont-ils déclaré, incarne le lien transatlantique par lequel la sécurité de l'Amérique du Nord est en permanence liée à celle de l'Europe». Cela dit, ils ont demandé la création d'un «escadron d'organismes interdépendants» qui unirait les pays d'Europe et d'Amérique du Nord.

Cette réaffirmation du lien transatlantique indissoluble n'a pas empêché une certaine incertitude d'assombrir le Sommet quant aux futures conséquences d'une éventuelle expansion de la brigade mixte franco-germano-popolose par Bonn et Paris. À la mi-octobre, les présidents Mitterrand et Kohl avaient écrit à leurs homologues européens pour leur soumettre l'idée suivante : l'aire de la brigade mixte d'un corps d'unités multinationales placé sous le contrôle de l'Union ouest-européenne, ce dans le cadre d'un traité de la CE sur l'union politique. L'Union ouest-européenne, relique du début des années 1950, n'a joué qu'un rôle très mineur alors que la menace d'une attaque soviétique tissait des liens très étroits au sein de l'OTAN. Cependant, on considère aujourd'hui qu'elle pourrait former le noyau institutionnel d'un système de sécurité européen.

Le communiqué de Rome semblerait approuver cette idée, puisqu'on y parle du «processus d'élaboration de l'identité européenne en matière de sécurité» et qu'on y reconnaît qu'avait une Europe plus forte, «les membres européens de l'Alliance assumeraient une plus grande part de leur responsabilité dans la défense de leur continent». Plus officieuse-

## Les armes nucléaires en Europe orientale et occidentale

Le «nouveau concept stratégique» apporte peu de précision quant à la décision prise plus tôt de réorganiser les forces de l'OTAN en unités plus petites et plus mobiles, en insistant davantage sur leurs modalités de renforcement. Cependant, après les mesures impessionnantes annoncées par le président Bush le 27 septembre et visant à retirer les armes nucléaires tactiques basées au sol et en mer, l'OTAN se devait, dans son communiqué de Rome, de traiter de la place des armes nucléaires dans sa stratégie. Elle a donc réaffirmé que les accords pouvaient être équipés d'armes nucléaires et d'armes conventionnelles, assistés au besoin par les forces navales, continueront de fournir à l'Europe une défense «prestratégique», et maintiendront ainsi le lien transatlantique avec les forces stratégiques des États-Unis.

En outre, il a été question au Sommet de Rome des forces nucléaires soviétiques. L'OTAN se demandait avec une inquiétude croissante de savoir si elles relèvent. Peu après le coup d'État du mois d'août, M. Vladimir Lobov, le nouveau chef d'État major soviétique, a insisté sur le fait que les armes nucléaires tactiques étaient gardées sous stricte surveillance. Il a expliqué que les éléments clés de ces systèmes relevaient d'autorités distinctes dont l'accord était nécessaire pour armer les missiles. Selon des rapports américains, dans le cas des missiles *Scud*, des unités spéciales du KGB transportent les ogives dans des remorques séparées. Le KGB et l'armée dépendent de hiérarchies différentes, et tant l'une que l'autre doivent autoriser le tir du missile. Malgré ces assurances, les chefs d'État présents au Sommet de Rome ont clairement exprimé leur inquiétude au sujet des armes nucléaires soviétiques. La première ministre Mulroney aurait déclaré que les 30 000 armes nucléaires que possèdent l'URSS sont placées sous une «surveillance très peu stricte».

Malgré le désaccord de la France, les autres pays de l'OTAN – dont le Canada – ont fait savoir que toute aide future à l'URSS dépendrait de l'assurance que toutes les armes nucléaires sont placées sous la responsabilité d'une seule autorité qui applique des mesures de sécurité satisfaisantes.

## La politique de défense canadienne

Le 17 septembre, juste quatre ans après la promesse, formulée dans le Livre blanc de la défense de 1987, de renforcer considérablement l'Armée canadienne, le ministre de la Défense, M. Marcel Masse, révélait le plan révisé tant attendu de la structure future des forces armées. Se gardant de préciser à quels menaces éventuelles les forces canadiennes pourraient avoir à faire face à l'avenir, M. Masse a préféré rap-

peeler que la confrontation Est-Ouest avait fait place à «une situation mal définie, assez incertaine pour ce qui est des menaces pouvant peser sur la sécurité et sur la paix mondiale.» Si la déclaration comportait peu de surprises, certains problèmes clés semblaient cependant avoir été résolus. En premier lieu, les bases canadiennes de Baden-Soellingen et de Lahm, dans le Sud de l'Allemagne, seront fermées en 1994 et 1995 respectivement. Le Canada conservera une force opérationnelle de 1 100 militaires en Europe, son affectation et sa nature restant à définir. En outre, Ottawa continuera de fournir, suivant ses engagements, un groupe de bataillon à la Force combinée de l'OTAN, et maintiendra une brigade et deux escadrons de CF-18 à la disposition de l'Alliance, dans l'éventualité d'une crise en Europe, mais «capable aussi d'intervenir Par ailleurs, il ressort de la déclaration de M. Masse que la marine canadienne concentrera ses activités plus généralement dans les eaux côtières nationales, accordant une place moindre à la protection des lignes de communication maritimes vers l'Europe. Au lieu d'un troisième groupe de six frégates de patrouille rapides et douze bâtiments de patrouille côtière qui seront affectés à la Réserve navale

et pourront servir dans la lutte contre les mines. Apparemment, le programme de remplacement des sous-marins survit tout juste à l'examen, puisque le ministre a promis l'acquisition d'un plus grand sous-marin à propulsion classique, sur les six envisagés. Contrairement au Livre blanc de 1987, l'examen ne précise aucune échéance pour la compression et la réorganisation des forces armées. Cependant, le ministre, conscient de la réalité du déficit, a fait savoir que, «durant les toutes prochaines années», les augmentations du budget de la défense, s'il y en a, ne seraient qu'à peine supérieures au taux de l'inflation. Dans cette situation, c'est dans le pourcentage du budget alloué aux achats de nouveaux équipements que l'armée trouvera les moyens de persévérer son efficacité. Dans l'examen, on promet de faire passer ce pourcentage de 22 à 26 p. 100 en quatre ans. Outre réduire l'ensemble des effectifs militaires de 84 000 à 76 000 personnes, le ministre a aussi évoqué dans sa déclaration le souci «d'éliminer immédiatement des infrastructures inutilisées» (c.-à-d. des bases), mais en s'empareant de reconnaître que «la réalité socio-économique s'oppose à cette perspective». Des propositions de fermeture de bases sont à l'étude. [Pour plus de précisions sur le sujet, voir page 5.]

Entre autres nombreuses réflexions qui donnent à penser qu'à l'avenir, les forces seront essentiellement structurées pour la surveillance et la patrouille dans les limites du territoire canadien, on promet également une capacité de surveillance accrue dans l'Arctique. Début novembre, les difficultés et les responsabilités de l'armée canadienne dans cette région ont été tristement illustrées par l'accident d'un avion de ravitaillement qui s'est écrasé en phase d'approche de la base militaire d'Almer. Sans rien envier aux efforts ni au courage des équipes de secours, il semble évident que les ressources nécessaires pour réagir rapidement en cas d'accidents militaires ou civils, aériens ou maritimes, dans le Grand Nord ne sont pas en place.

— DAVID COX





Le dénouement du conflit cambodgien est lié à la fin des rapports conflictuels entre la Chine et le Viêt-nam. Les nécessités de la désagrégation de l'Empire soviétique ont contraint les deux protagonistes à trouver un terrain d'entente, mais il y a tout lieu de croire que de multiples dossiers bilatéraux ont figuré à l'ordre du jour des nombreuses réunions publiques et secrètes de ces derniers mois. Les Accords de Paris marquent l'échec de la politique vietnamienne en Indochine, mais le Parti communiste vietnamien a peut-être gagné la paix d'un surris qui lui assurera le soutien à venir du Parti communiste chinois. On peut également formuler comme hypothèse que Beijing aura rassuré Hanoi sur les intentions chinoises à propos des îles Paracels et des îles Spratly, objets de litiges maritimes sérieux entre les deux pays.

À ces multiples facteurs, on doit ajouter un changement des perceptions observées entre les factions de la résistance cambodgienne et le gouvernement de Phnom Penh. Il est en effet apparu ces derniers mois qu'il importait d'atténuer la puissance attribuée aux Khmers rouges et à leur capacité de reprendre le pouvoir. De multiples indicateurs font croire que l'armée régulière cambodgienne est en mesure de circonscrire leur action, et c'est d'ailleurs sur le terrain politique que les Khmers rouges ont désormais convenu de relâcher leur image.

Ce sont trois accords chapeautés par un acte final qui ont été signés à Paris le 23 octobre 1991. Le premier accord, qui a force de traité, est à l'évidence le plus important. Intitulé «Accord pour un règlement politique global du conflit du Cambodge», ce document précise les modalités de l'instauration d'un paix véritable au Cambodge et à la mise en tutelle partielle du pays par les Nations Unies. Le texte reprend l'essentiel du «document-cadre» du 26 novembre 1990, mais il clarifie les points restés vagues ou volontairement omis. On y remarquera tout spécialement les articles 15, 16 et 17 de la partie III, qui traitent des droits de l'Homme et de la violation des signataires de les promouvoir et d'empêcher que «de nouvelles atteintes aux droits de l'Homme se produisent».

Formulées pour compenser l'omission de toute condamnation du «génocide» perpétré par les Khmers rouges, ces dispositions figurent également dans l'acte final : il s'agit de quelques lignes dont le style souligne la difficulté que les parties ont eu à parvenir à un compromis. Dans ce dernier texte, en effet, un paragraphe à la facture particulièrement diplomatique traduit les compromis ayant abouti à son libellé, qui se lit ainsi : «Avant les États participant à la Conférence s'engagent à promouvoir et à encourager le respect effectif des droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales au Cambodge formués dans les instruments internationaux pertinents auxquels ils sont parties». L'annexe V du premier document reprend une formulation voisine : «La tragédie que le Cambodge a vécue récemment exige que des mesures spéciales soient prises pour assurer la protection des droits de l'Homme». Pour de nombreux observateurs, il s'agit là encore d'une faible compensation pour effacer l'Histoire et permettre aux Khmers rouges d'être partie de plein droit au processus de paix et aux prochaines élections.

Le document principal comporte cinq annexes dont les dimensions importantes soulignent le soin avec lequel on a défini diverses modalités : 1) le mandat de l'APRONUC, 2) le retrait, le cessez-le-feu et les mesures connexes, 3) les élections, 4) le rapatriement des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées cambodgiennes, l'annexe II clarifie le mieux possible les fonctions militaires de l'APRONUC. Il n'en reste pas moins que toutes les dispositions font appel à la bonne foi des protagonistes cambodgiens. Or, et c'est déjà, on est convaincu que la démobilisation de 70 p. 100 des forces armées de chacune des factions ne sera pas chose aisée. Comment obtenir concrètement des certitudes sur les chiffres de base à partir desquels les pourcentages seront calculés ?

À court terme, une des tâches les plus délicates sera le rapatriement des réfugiés. Près de 350 000 attendent dans les camps à la frontière de la Thaïlande. Sur le plan opérationnel, on a prévu que le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) supervise tous les aspects de la réinsertion de ces personnes dans leur pays d'origine. Outre les difficultés logistiques du déplacement des réfugiés sur le territoire cambodgien, divers dangers réels devront être surmontés. La dispersion des champs de mines et le banditisme (les pressions exercées par les Khmers rouges pour asservir une partie de ces personnes déplacées) constituent d'énormes contraintes sur le plan de la sécurité. En outre, il convient de s'interroger sur les conditions de la réinstallation de ces personnes : à quels droits, par exemple, peuvent-elles prétendre pour récupérer des propriétés et terres perdues depuis leur départ ? Comment les empêcher de s'agglommer, avec les soldats démobilisés, autour des villes, et plus particulièrement de Phnom Penh ? Comment enfin remédier à très court terme au manque d'écoles et d'hôpitaux et mettre en place une infrastructure pour satisfaire à des exigences de survie amplifiées maintenant par l'espoir d'une paix retrouvée ?

Pour faire face à ces difficultés, les signataires des accords de Paris ont accepté d'appuyer une «déclaration sur le relèvement et la reconstruction du Cambodge». Le document contient bon nombre de garanties d'octroi d'une aide généreuse à la reconstruction de l'État cambodgien. Il y a tout lieu de croire que ces promesses seront tenues. Le Japon, pour ne citer que ce pays, a d'ores et déjà prévu l'octroi d'une aide importante qui visera plus particulièrement le développement agricole. Mises à part ses fonctions militaires, l'APRONUC s'occupera de l'organisation et de la conduite des élections au Cambodge. Avec les élections «libres et impartiales», prévues pour le printemps de 1993, le peuple se dotera d'une assemblée constituante de 120 membres qui élaborera et approuvera une nouvelle constitution cambodgienne, puis se transformera en assemblée législative d'où sera issu le nouveau gouvernement cambodgien. Le texte signé à Paris a permis de trouver une solution à l'épineuse question de l'éligibilité comme électeur. Le point 4 de l'annexe III du document principal précise en effet ce qui suit : «Toute personne qui aura atteint l'âge de dix-huit ans lors de la présentation des demandes d'inscription sur les listes electorales, ou qui l'atteindra au cours de la période d'inscription, qui est née au Cambodge, ou dont l'un des deux parents est né au Cambodge, aura le droit de prendre part aux élections». Malgré le libellé explicite et judicieux de cette disposition, il y a tout lieu de croire qu'elle ne sera pas d'une application aisée, car certains noms figurant sur les listes electorales seront refusés. Le second accord, qui a lui aussi force de traité, s'intitule : «Accord relatif à la souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'inviolabilité territoriales, l'indépendance, l'unité nationale du Cambodge». La longueur du titre et la multiplication des termes illustrent l'engagement de la collectivité internationale est aujourd'hui sans ambiguïté : il est banal, mais d'une extrême vérité, de dire que beaucoup reposent maintenant sur les Cambodgiens eux-mêmes. Il leur appartient de reconstruire leur pays et de dénoncer avec éclat toute ingérence de certains voisins trop enclins, certainement, à considérer à plus ou moins long terme, un Cambodge neutre et non marxiste comme une menace à leur propre régime.

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# RECRIER L'ÉTAT DU CAMBODGE

Les Accords de Paris ont permis de mettre un terme à vingt  
ans de guerre au Cambodge et placent le pays sous la tutelle  
des Nations Unies jusqu'à la tenue d'élections libres.

PAR GÉRARD HERVOUET

ANS UN TEMPLE BOUDDHISTE DE PHNOM PENH, DEUX PYTHONS ONT  
été trompés. Il annoncent qu'un roi est de retour. Le signe ne peut  
signifier le 23 octobre 1991 par dix-huit ministres des Affaires étran-  
gères et le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. En attendant les effets  
concrets de la mise sous tutelle du pays par les Nations Unies, le Cambodge  
s'accroche aux symboles et, pour une grande majorité des Khmers, Norodom  
Sihanouk incarne toujours la tradition glorieuse d'Angkor.

Les 17 et 18 octobre derniers, un Congrès extraordinaire du Parti révo-

lutionnaire du peuple cambodgien a mis au rancart l'idéologie marxiste-  
léniniste. Le Congrès du parti a également affirmé que, désormais, toutes les  
libertés étaient rétablies, la libre entreprise garantie et le droit de créer un  
parti politique assuré. Dans ce contexte, peut-on considérer que l'alliance  
contre le prince Sihanouk et le premier ministre Hun Sen survivra à la cam-  
pagne électorale déjà amorcée dans les faits ? Il y a tout lieu de le croire

puisque les Khmers rouges demeurent toujours l'ennemi commun du régime  
actuel de Phnom Penh, des Sihanoukistes et de la faction de Son Sann. Pour  
s'opposer aux Khmers rouges et gagner à tout prix les élections à venir, le  
régime de Phnom Penh est donc parvenu à renier ses principes idéologiques  
fondamentaux. Le prince Sihanouk est satisfait et s'est félicité à Paris du fait

que le Cambodge soit « le premier pays d'Indochine à être décommunisé ».

En quelques mois, le Cambodge a donc, à son tour, connu les effets de  
ces extraordinaires accélérations de l'Histoire qui, depuis 1989, bousculent  
les scénarios les plus audacieux. À partir du 26 novembre 1990, « une for-  
mule cadre » avait, sous la pression des cinq membres permanents du Con-  
seil de sécurité, défini les bases fondamentales des progrès obtenus après  
des négociations extrêmement tumultueuses. Le texte avait établi les moda-  
lités de fonctionnement d'un Conseil national suprême (CNS). Ce Conseil

compte un nombre égal de représentants de chacune des trois factions de la  
résistance mais la moitié de ses membres (six) appartient au gouvernement  
actuellement au pouvoir à Phnom Penh. Le texte du 26 novembre 1990  
formulait également des propositions pour établir l'Autorité provisoire des  
Nations Unies au Cambodge (APRONUC) : il précisait le mandat de cette  
Autorité, définissait les conditions de cessez-le-feu et celles des élections  
et du rapatriement des réfugiés, et il énonçait les principes d'une nouvelle

constitution au Cambodge.

ACQUIS POSITIF INDUBITABLE, CE DOCUMENT LAISSAIT TOUTEFOIS EN SUSPENS  
au moins deux points d'achoppement à savoir : la mention du « génocide »  
de 1975, et les questions complexes de la démobilisation et du désarmement  
perpétré par les Khmers rouges lors de leur passage au pouvoir à partir  
de 1975, et les questions complexes de la démobilisation et du désarmement  
des forces en présence. Malgré un cessez-le-feu observé par les quatre fac-  
tions depuis le mois de mai 1991, aucun progrès tangible ne semblait envi-  
sageable à court terme. Au début de juin, la réunion du CNS à Djakarta fut  
considérée comme un échec souligné par la résistance des Khmers rouges à  
accepter la reconduction du cessez-le-feu. Aspect plus positif, la rencontre  
Sihanouk et de Hun Sen d'aller de l'avant en écartant les Khmers rouges.

Les 24 et 25 juin 1991, le CNS réuni dans le sud-est de la Thaïlande, à  
Pattaya, terminait ses travaux par des conclusions particulièrement encourage-  
antes. Le prince Sihanouk annonçait en effet que les parties étaient con-  
venues d'un cessez-le-feu inconditionnel et illimité à partir du 24 juin ;  
les factions s'engageaient à ne plus recevoir d'armements provenant de

l'étranger. Le CNS prévoyait également établir son quartier général à  
Phnom Penh et représenter le Cambodge aux Nations Unies. En attendant  
l'intervention des Nations Unies et la tenue d'élections générales, les  
facteurs acceptaient de respecter le *statu quo* dans la partie du territoire  
cambodgien que chacune d'elles contrôlait.

Les 16 et 17 juillet, une réunion informelle, historique et symbolique du  
CNS se tenait à Beijing. La Chine affirmait ainsi avec éclat sa volonté d'in-  
fluer sur un règlement à venir de la question cambodgienne. En rencontrant  
pour la première fois Hun Sen, elle cautionnait ce dernier et le forçait un  
peu plus à s'affranchir du Vietnam. La rencontre accéléra encore le mou-  
vement vers la paix puisque le communiqué final annoncera le choix uni-  
nime du prince Sihanouk comme président du Conseil national suprême.  
Le texte précisait aussi que le prince « a décidé dès maintenant de rester  
neutre et d'agir comme un conciliateur sans appartenir à aucune faction, ni  
à aucun parti politique ».

C'EST DE NOUVEAU À PATTAYA QUE LES MEMBRES DU CNS PARVENAIENT, DU  
26 au 29 août, à s'entendre sur deux points importants mentionnés précé-  
demment à savoir : la question du « génocide » et celle du désarmement des  
forces de chacune des factions. À propos du génocide, le gouvernement  
abandonna la formule minimale à laquelle il tenait, soit celle d'une garantie  
« contre un retour aux pratiques d'un passé récent ». Plus important encore,  
le CNS accepta une proposition de la France qui préconisait de démobiliser  
70 p. 100 des forces de chacune des factions avec armes et équipements.  
En outre, il fut accepté de regrouper le reste (30 p. 100) avec ses armements  
dans des cantonnements placés sous la surveillance de l'APRONUC. À cette  
même réunion, les parties convièrent que, si aucun consensus n'était obtenu  
pour coordonner les activités du CNS et celles de l'APRONUC, une fois  
les deux organismes établis à Phnom Penh, le prince Sihanouk, comme  
président du CNS, prendrait la décision finale.

Enfin, le 21 septembre à New York, les membres du CNS, appuyés par  
les co-présidents de la Conférence de Paris et les cinq membres permanents  
du Conseil de sécurité, s'entendirent pour adopter comme mode de scrutin  
le système de représentation proportionnelle par province auquel tenaient  
les trois factions coalisées contre le gouvernement Hun Sen.

La désintégration de l'Union soviétique a modifié le rapport des  
forces dans le système international. Le conflit cambodgien, qui avait in-  
directement découlé de l'affrontement Est-Ouest et des confrontations  
sino-soviétiques et sino-vietnamiennes, ne pouvait que bénéficier de ce re-  
tourne ment fondamental de l'Histoire contemporaine. L'intervention mas-  
sive des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité pèse lourdement sur  
la détermination des factions antagonistes. Elle a toutefois pesé davantage  
sur la politique chinoise qui, dans le contexte « post Tian anmen » et dans  
celui des turbulences de la guerre au Moyen-Orient, n'avait d'autre choix  
que celui de se refaire rapidement une certaine crédibilité.

Le soutien accordé aux Khmers rouges par les dirigeants chinois enfer-  
maît ces derniers dans un dilemme herméétique. Lors de nos visites à Beijing  
ces deux dernières années, plusieurs responsables à Beijing nous communi-  
quaient leur détermination à en finir avec une politique qui tenait à l'écart  
toute leur image à l'extérieur. La Chine ne pouvait rien concevoir  
avant de contraindre d'abord le Vietnam à plier le premier devant les  
exigences chinoises.

Une fois encore, conformément à la longue tradition des rapports con-  
flicts sino-vietnamiens, les dirigeants de Hanoi se sont rendus en Chine.  
Le 3 septembre 1990, la réunion secrète de Chengdu a rendu certainement

préjudiciablement vital entre les armes nucléaires «préstratégiques» en Europe et la force stratégique nucléaire américaine. Depuis dix ans, la Marine américaine a réussi à résister à tous les efforts déployés pour inscrire dans les négociations des armes nucléaires tactiques basées en mer. Le 27 septembre, balayant cette opposition, M. Bush a annoncé que les États-Unis démilitariseront unilatéralement la plupart des navires de leur flotte, d'essentiel étant que, dans des circonstances normales, nos bâtiments ne transporteront pas d'armes nucléaires tactiques».

Quant au lien entre les forces nucléaires en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, il était déjà sape en partie par le malaise croissant que suscite en Europe le déploiement permanent d'armes nucléaires de courte portée en Allemagne et ailleurs. Le 27 septembre, le président Bush a effectué un remarquable virage à 180° en acceptant la vieille proposition de Soviétiques et en proposant lui-même d'éliminer quelque 2 300 armes nucléaires de théâtre basées au sol. Les Soviétiques, a-t-il expliqué, «devraient marcher de concert avec nous», ce qui veut dire qu'ils devraient démanteler et éliminer «tout leur arsenal d'armes nucléaires de théâtre basées au sol».

Amén, répondent ceux que l'on a désignés à la surveillance du port de Beyrouth.

Les propositions formulées le 27 septembre par George Bush ne manquent pas d'être critiquées, mais il serait ridicule de ne pas reconnaître la rupture avec le passé qui vient d'avoir lieu. Le gouvernement Bush mettra-t-il autant d'ardeur à entreprendre d'autres changements qui entraîneraient plus encore les arsenaux nucléaires ? C'est là que certaines caractéristiques du nouveau système militeront sur les prochains gestes des Américains et sur les intérêts de leurs alliés, y compris du Canada.

Ces propositions du 27 SEPTEMBRE NE TRANCHENT PAS SEULEMENT AVEC LES PROCESSUS START, chéant pas seulement avec les processus START, elles étaient de plus présentes après un minimum de consultation avec les alliés. En fait, ils ont été «consultés» que quelques heures avant le discours afin de préserver l'effet de surprise, ce qui renforce l'impression grandissante que Washington opic pour l'unilatéralisme. Il se peut que, désormais, les ennuyeuses procédures de la diplomatie multilatérale interalliée suscitent une impatience accrue, et que les requêtes spéciales des alliés soient reçues avec une plus grande indifférence.

Dans les négociations relatives à une convention sur les armes chimiques, par exemple, les États-Unis sont revenus sur leur attachement antérieur à un régime de vérification strict, sans attendre à un régime de respect vis-à-vis des mêmes alliés, dont le Canada, qui continuait d'appuyer la position occidentale favorable aux inspections «intrusives».

Washington pourrait adopter une approche tout aussi unilatérale au sujet de la modification ou de l'abrogation du Traité ABM, pour lequel il est improbable que l'option des alliés ait de l'importance dans de futures ouvertures américaines à l'égard des Soviétiques.

Si le Canada et d'autres États veulent infléchir les attitudes changeantes des États-Unis en matière de limitation des armements, il leur faudra, dans

le courant de l'année à venir, réexaminer l'orientation et les objectifs de la politique américaine et déterminer quelles politiques servent l'ensemble des intérêts nationaux et internationaux. Voici quelques points clés à étudier.

Premièrement, contre qui les 8 000 armes stratégiques américaines de l'après-START sont-elles maintenant tournées ? En l'absence d'ennemi plus convaincant, probablement toujours contre l'Union soviétique, réfléchi par la perte des pays baltes et encore plus déconcertée par l'émergence de républiques autoproclamées non dotées d'armes nucléaires. La désintégration de l'URSS souligne donc la nécessité de réduire considérablement les forces stratégiques de manière à ce qu'il ne reste plus qu'un millier d'ogives d'ici à la fin de la décennie.

L'INTÉRÊT DU CANADA DANS CE PROCESSUS EST direct. Dans son discours du 27 septembre, le président Bush a également annoncé que toutes les forces nucléaires stratégiques seraient rassemblées sous un commandement stratégique unique. Cela rappelle un rapport du mois de janvier 1991, confirmé par des fonctionnaires canadiens, selon lequel les États-Unis envisageaient de combiner en un seul commandement



John Deeks

QU'ARTIÈREMENT, LE CANADA DEVRAIT DE nouveau s'intéresser à la question des essais nucléaires. Dans sa réponse au président Bush, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev a annoncé un moratoire d'une année sur les essais à Novaya Zemlya. Tous les États nordiques ont fortement insisté à appuyer ce moratoire et à prévenir la réactivation d'un polygone d'essais écologiquement fragile. La question de l'interdiction des essais nucléaires n'est pas aussi importante à la conférence A l'époque, l'impossibilité de s'entendre sur une telle interdiction avait enflé la conférence dans une impasse.

Le régime de la non-prolifération en est à une étape cruciale de son développement. En effet, le nombre de ses partisans, notamment parmi les États possédant officiellement l'arme nucléaire et parmi ceux qui sont sur le point de s'en doter n'a jamais été si grand, mais les techniques qui favorisent la prolifération sont de moins en moins contrôlables. Le moratoire soviétique offre l'occasion de commencer à se pré- parer bien à l'avance à la conférence de 1995. En premier lieu, on pourrait organiser une conférence réunissant tous les pays voisins de l'URSS touchés par les essais de Novaya Zemlya. Il y aurait, bien entendu, un grand absent : les États-Unis. Néanmoins, l'union n'est pas seulement garante de la sécurité mais aussi d'efficacité. Une assemblée circumpolaire à laquelle on discuterait de solutions de remplacement à la stratégie de la dissuade, ce ne sont pas des propositions qui sont nouvelles mais la conjoncture politique. Le 27 septembre, le président Bush a essayé de reprendre les rênes en matière de limitation des armes nucléaires, mais à l'Union soviétique, il n'est pas certain qu'il sera possible de maintenir le dialogue habituel sur la question. Après le coup d'État, la limitation des armements ne ressortira guère à ce qu'elle a été pendant ces vingt dernières années. Le problème dorénavant consistait à aider à définir le nouveau programme, ce qui peut commencer par le choix de la voie qu'il rendra les armes nucléaires de plus en plus dépassées.

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
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États baltes qui, comme le Canada, se trouveront confrontés à des problèmes nucléaires stratégiques en raison de leur position géographique.



## NOTE DE LA DIRECTION

Des sanctions «réfléchies» avant des armes «intelligentes».



DANS UN MONDE LIBRE DU Mur de BERLIN,

menace des armes nucléaires : nous cherchons

aussi à empêcher le recours aux armes en général.

À ce stade-ci, le passé et l'avenir se confondent.

On a renforcé grandement l'ONU elle-même et

les formules pacifiques de règlement des diffé-

rends. Parallèlement, au Koweït, un pays a lancé

un défi de taille en recourant aux armes, et en fin

de compte, c'est en déployant massivement con-

trairens à quitter le Koweït. On sait désormais

que le monde a

été erroné : Saddam n'aurait pas cédé devant

les sanctions.

ET ÊTRE UN CHERCHEUR EN VISITE À L'INSTITUT

les douze critères employés dans l'étude Hul-

bauer, et nous avons conclu qu'ils n'accorderaient

pas assez d'importance aux facteurs politico-

comportementaux. \* Nous avons constaté que

l'ajout de deux de ces facteurs aux douze autres

permettait de prédire sensiblement mieux les

chances de succès des sanctions dans une vaste

gamme de cas.

Tout d'abord, il faut voir si un régime visé par

des sanctions est à toutes fins utiles à l'abri de

l'opposition à l'intérieur de ses frontières

mêmes (songeons, par exemple, à l'URSS sous

Staline, à l'Irak de Saddam, ou la Chine commu-

niste), car la réponse (et ce n'est pas surprenant)

nous aidera beaucoup à savoir si les sanctions mo-

diffèrent le comportement du régime. Ainsi, dans

les circonstances où les dirigeants ne risquent

pas de souffrir personnellement des pressions

économiques extérieures, ceux qui voudraient en

exercer doivent soigneusement en évaluer l'effi-

cacité et la moralité, et, si possible, se soucier des

«cibles» qu'elles toucheraient précisément.

En second lieu, il faut savoir si le changement

des sanctions importe beaucoup ou peu aux yeux

du régime visé, car cela aura un effet encore plus

puissant sur les chances de succès ou d'échec des

sanctions.

Comme la plupart des conclusions de Hufbauer,

ni l'une ni l'autre des deux relations décrites ci-

dessus du modèle dépend de celle des hypothèses

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\* L'analyse de l'institut dont il est question ici a

principalement été exécutée par Rajeev Dehejia, qui

travaillait avec l'auteur.

16 HIVER 1991 1992

les sanctions comme moyen de pression, avant

«Quelqu'un fait quelque chose» au sujet d'une

situation échappant en grande partie à l'emprise

des intervenants extérieurs ! Voilà l'attrait immé-

diat des sanctions, ou pire, l'impression que cela

crée. L'incidence symbolique des sanctions, tant

sur les pays visés qu'on sur ceux les imposant, a

sans doute une certaine valeur en soi, mais il im-

porte aussi de savoir si (et quand) les pressions

exercées peuvent vraiment amener les autorités

visées à modifier leur comportement.

En janvier dernier, les auteurs du répertoire le

plus complet jamais publié sur l'histoire des

sanctions, M. Gary Hufbauer et ses collègues de

*Institute of International Economics* à Washing-

ton, se sont immergés dans le débat sur la ques-

tion. Se fondant sur un modèle probabiliste établi

à partir de 115 cas survenus depuis 1914, ils ont

affirmé qu'il était à peu près certain que l'appli-

cation de sanctions pourrait contraindre les

Irakiens à quitter le Koweït. On sait désormais

dans la plupart des milieux que ce modèle devait

être erroné : Saddam n'aurait pas cédé devant

les sanctions.

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— BERNARD WOOD

leur incombent.

d'approfondir cette analyse et que cela, en fait,

cert se disent bien qu'ils ont eux aussi les moyens

taux réclamant souvent des sanctions à court et à

temps aussi que les groupes non gouvernement-

les moyens internationaux de pression. Et il serait

celles à qui il appartient de choisir et d'appliquer

qui aurait dû être fait il y a longtemps) à ceux et à

Par mon analyse, je lance un défi pressant (ce

autrement dit, à élaborer des sanctions «réfléchies».

«cibles» beaucoup plus les sanctions dans l'avenir,

l'expérience, nous parviendrions peut-être à «ci-

de Hufbauer et de ses collègues, à la lumière de

dégâts non souhaités. En développant le travail

comme avec toute autre arme, de causer des

instrument brutal et, en y recourant, on risque,

tions économiques généralement constituant un

Même si elles peuvent être efficaces, les sanc-

un doublement favorable de la situation.

de coopérer avec le régime, ce qui aurait forcé

exerce une influence déterminante en s'abstenant

passé à moyen et à long terme, l'Occident aurait

conservé un attrait irrésistible. Dans une telle im-

tion dans la véritable économie mondiale au-

d'une aide extérieure importante et de l'intégra-

où le pays aurait été plongé, et la perspective

seraient demeurées sources d'espoir dans l'abysse

vides réformes économiques amorcées jusqu'à

voir ou les autres visions sociales. Même les ti-

populaire, ni même les autres centres de pou-

mais plus réprimés totalement le mécontentement

de façon décisive. Le régime ne pouvait désor-

lourdement dans la balance, pour ne pas dire

rait refusé toute coopération à, cela est sûr, pesé

faire marche arrière à court terme ; ainsi, la me-

elle aurait pu aussi accepter un compromis, voire

de toute évidence énormément à ses yeux, mais

LES INTÉRÊTS QUE LA JUNTE NOURRISSAIT EN RÉ-

assistait aux pressions occidentales comptant

auraient souffert des pressions extérieures.

de la nation, de sorte que les dirigeants eux-mêmes

table à l'opposition exprimée par divers secteurs

(la junte éphémère) était et serait demeuré vulné-

et la direction que la société soviétique a choisie,

grande partie l'issue de cette lutte pour le pouvoir

Certes, des facteurs internes ont déterminé en

de l'ère, comme presque jamais auparavant

avaient été efficaces et qu'elles auraient continué

guente à ce sujet, que les sanctions économiques

on a vu, sur la foi de l'Histoire d'allieurs fort élo-

tions de l'Occident au coup d'État en URSS),

Dans un cas-est important et récent (les réac-

d'émouvoir.

passé, a été marqué par la confusion et empreint

contribuer à l'amélioration du débat qui, dans le

niser la pensée sur les sanctions et ils peuvent

initiales. Cependant, ces éléments aident à orga-





# RECRIER L'ÉTAT DU CAMBODGE

Les Accords de Paris ont permis de mettre un terme à vingt et un ans de guerre au Cambodge et placent le pays sous la tutelle des Nations Unies jusqu'à la tenue d'élections libres.

PAR GÉRARD HERVOUET

ANS UN TEMPLE BOUDDHISTE DE PHNOM PENH, DEUX PYTHONS ONT été aperçus : ils annoncent qu'un roi est de retour. Le signe ne peut être trompeur, il confirme la réalité des Accords sur le Cambodge signés le 23 octobre 1991 par dix-huit ministres des Affaires étrangères et le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. En attendant les effets concrets de la mise sous tutelle du pays par les Nations Unies, le Cambodge s'accroche aux symboles et, pour une grande majorité des Khmers, Norodom Sihanouk incarne toujours la tradition glorieuse d'Angkor.

Les 17 et 18 octobre derniers, un Congrès extraordinaire du Parti révolutionnaire du peuple cambodgien a mis au rancart l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste. Le Congrès du parti a également affirmé que, désormais, toutes les libertés étaient rétablies, la libre entreprise garantie et le droit de créer un parti politique assuré. Dans ce contexte, peut-on considérer que l'alliance entre le prince Sihanouk et le premier ministre Hun Sen survivra à la campagne électorale déjà amorcée dans les faits ? Il y a tout lieu de le croire puisque les Khmers rouges demeurent toujours l'ennemi commun du régime de Phnom Penh.

Le prince Sihanouk est satisfait et s'est félicité à Paris du fait que le Cambodge soit «le premier pays d'Indochine à être démocratique». En quelques mois, le Cambodge a donc, connu les effets de ces extraordinaires accélérations de l'Histoire qui, depuis 1989, bousculent les scénarios les plus audacieux. À partir du 26 novembre 1990, «une force multiple cadre» avait, sous la pression des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, défini les bases fondamentales des progrès obtenus après des négociations extrêmement humbles. Le texte avait établi les modalités de fonctionnement d'un Conseil national suprême (CNS). Ce Conseil comptait un nombre égal de représentants de chacune des trois factions de la résistance mais la moitié de ses membres (six) appartenait au gouvernement actuel de Phnom Penh. Les Sihanoukistes et la faction de Son San. Pour s'opposer aux Khmers rouges et gagner à tout prix les élections à venir, le régime de Phnom Penh est donc parvenu à renier ses principes idéologiques fondamentaux.

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L'étranger. Le CNS prévoyait également établir son quartier général à Phnom Penh et représenter le Cambodge aux Nations Unies. En attendant l'intervention des Nations Unies et la tenue d'élections générales, les factions acceptaient de respecter le *sine qua non* dans la partie du territoire cambodgien que chacune d'elles contrôlait.

Les 16 et 17 juillet, une réunion informelle, historique et symbolique du CNS se tenait à Beijing. La Chine affirmait ainsi avec éclat sa volonté d'influer sur un règlement à venir de la question cambodgienne. En rencontrant pour la première fois Hun Sen, elle cautionnait ce dernier et le forçait un peu plus à s'affranchir du Vietnam. La rencontre accélérera encore le mouvement vers la paix puisque le communiqué final annoncera le choix unanime du prince Sihanouk comme président du Conseil national suprême. Le texte précisera aussi que le prince «a décidé des maintenant de rester neutre et d'agir comme un conciliateur sans appartenir à aucune faction, ni à aucun parti politique».

C'EST DE NOUVEAU À PATTAYA QUE LES MEMBRES DU CNS PARVENAIENT, DU 26 au 29 août, à s'entendre sur deux points importants mentionnés précédemment à savoir : la question du «génocide» et celle du désarmement des forces de chacune des factions. À propos du génocide, le gouvernement abandonna la formule minimale à laquelle il tenait, soit celle d'une garantie «contre un retour aux pratiques d'un passé récent». Plus important encore, le CNS accepta une proposition de la France qui préconisait de démobilitiser 70 p. 100 des forces de chacune des factions avec armes et équipements. En outre, il fut accepté de regrouper le reste (30 p. 100) avec ses armements dans des cantonnements placés sous la surveillance de l'APRONUC. À cette même réunion, les parties convinièrent que, si aucun consensus n'était obtenu pour coordonner les activités du CNS et celles de l'APRONUC, une fois les deux organismes établis à Phnom Penh, le prince Sihanouk, comme président du CNS, prendrait la décision finale.

Enfin, le 21 septembre à New York, les membres du CNS, appuyés par les co-présidents de la Conférence de Paris et les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, s'entendirent pour adopter comme mode de scrutin le système de représentation proportionnelle par province auquel tenaient les trois factions coalisées contre le gouvernement Hun Sen. La désintégration de l'Union soviétique a modifié le rapport des forces dans le système international. Le conflit cambodgien, qui avait indirectement découlé de l'affrontement Est-Ouest et des confrontations sino-soviétiques et sino-vietnamiennes, ne pouvait que bénéficier de ce renouveau fondamental de l'Histoire contemporaine. L'intervention massive des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité a pesé lourdement sur la détermination des factions antagonistes. Elle a toutefois pesé davantage sur celui des turbulences de la guerre au Moyen-Orient, n'ayant d'autre choix que celui de se refaire rapidement une certaine crédibilité.

Le soutien accordé aux Khmers rouges par les dirigeants chinois en ces derniers dans un dilemme hémétique. Lors de nos visites à Beijing, ces deux dernières années, plusieurs responsables à Beijing nous communiquaient leur détermination à en finir avec une politique qui tenait d'avantage chaque jour leur image à l'extérieur. La Chine ne pouvait rien concéder avant de contraindre d'abord le Vietnam à plier le premier devant les exigences chinoises.

Une fois encore, conformément à la longue tradition des rapports conflictuels sino-vietnamiens, les dirigeants de Hanoi se sont rendus en Chine. Le 3 septembre 1990, la réunion secrète de Chengdu a rendu certainement

Etats baltes qui, comme le Canada, se trouveront confrontés à des problèmes nucléaires stratégiques en raison de leur position géographique.

QUATRIÈMEMENT, LE CANADA DEVAIT DE nouveau s'intéresser à la question des essais nucléaires. Dans sa réponse au président Bush, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev a annoncé un moratoire d'une année sur les essais à Novaya Zemlya. Tous les Etats nordiques ont fortement insisté à appuyer ce moratoire et à prévenir la réactivation d'un polygone d'essais écologiquement fragile. La question de l'interdiction des essais nucléaires n'est pas si importante à la conférence d'examen du TNP en 1995 qu'elle l'a été en 1990. A l'époque, l'impossibilité de s'entendre sur une telle interdiction avait enfoncé la conférence dans une impasse.

Le régime de la non-prolifération en est à une étape cruciale de son développement. En effet, le nombre de ses participants, notamment parmi les Etats possédant officiellement l'arme nucléaire et parmi ceux qui sont sur le point de s'en doter, n'a jamais été si grand, mais les techniques qui favorisent la prolifération sont de moins en moins contrôlables. Le moratoire soviétique offre l'occasion de commencer à se pré-

parer bien à l'avance à la conférence de 1995. En premier lieu, on pourrait organiser une conférence réunissant tous les pays voisins de l'URSS touchés par les essais de Novaya Zemlya. Il y aurait, bien entendu, un grand absent : les Etats-Unis. Néanmoins, l'union soviétique n'est pas seulement garante de la sécurité mais aussi d'efficacité. Une assemblée circumpolaire à laquelle on discuterait de solutions de remplacement à la reprise des essais à Novaya Zemlya (si tout le reste échoue, pourquoi ne pas laisser les Soviétiques faire leurs essais au Nevada ?) ne pourrait pas être complètement ignorée à Washington. Des plaidoyers diens agissent isolément le

Evidemment, ce ne sont pas ces propositions qui sont nouvelles mais la conjoncture politique, Le 27 septembre, le président Bush a essayé de reprendre les rênes en matière de limitation des armes nucléaires, mais à la lumière de la désintégration inéluctable de l'Union soviétique, il n'est pas certain qu'il sera possible de maintenir le dialogue habituel sur la question. Après le coup d'Etat, la limitation des armements ne ressemble à rien de ce qu'elle a été pendant ces vingt dernières années. Le problème dorénavant consiste à aider à définir le nouveau programme, ce qui peut commencer par le choix de la voie qui rendra les armes nucléaires de plus en plus dépassées.

Kathryn Adams



le courant de l'année à venir, réexaminer l'orientation et les objectifs de la politique américaine et des intérêts nationaux et internationaux. Voici quelques points clés à étudier.

Premièrement, contre qui les 8 000 armes stratégiques américaines de l'après-TART sont-elles maintenant tournées ? En l'absence d'ennemi plus convaincant, probablement toujours contre l'Union soviétique, retirée par la perte des pays baltes et encore plus déconcertée par l'émigration de républicains auto-proclamés non dotés d'armes nucléaires. La désintégration de l'URSS souligne donc la nécessité de réduire considérablement les forces stratégiques de manière à ce qu'il ne reste plus qu'un millier d'ogives d'ici à la fin de la décennie.

L'INTÉRÊT DU CANADA DANS CE PROCESSUS EST confirmé par des fonctionnaires canadiens, selon lequel les Etats-Unis envisageaient de combiner les forces nucléaires stratégiques seraient toutes président Bush a également annoncé que toutes les forces nucléaires stratégiques seraient toutes direct. Dans son discours du 27 septembre, le

Deuxièmement, le Sénat américain appuie maintenant officiellement le déploiement d'un système ABM terrestre d'ici à 1996 et il a demandé la modification du Traité ABM pour permettre une défense du pays entier. Le système envisagé, qui couvrirait une très large portion du Canada, relèverait presque à coup sûr du commandement stratégique unique susmentionné. Il n'est donc pas prématuré de demander si le système ABM appuyé par le Sénat contribuerait à une réduction consistante des arsenaux nucléaires ou si, au contraire, la décision de déployer des défenses anti-missiles balistiques inciterait d'autres pays détenteurs d'armes nucléaires à répondre par un accroissement de leur capacité offensive.

Troisièmement, si l'Europe, qui cherche à présenter à se défendre des armes nucléaires, n'est plus le point de départ d'une confrontation américano-soviétique, les énormes arsenaux stratégiques restants seront opposés l'un à l'autre, un axe transatlantique. En conséquence, c'est peut-être le moment ou jamais d'explorer les possibilités d'une mise en commun des informations glanées par les stations de détection afin de rendre la région circumpolaire nord totalement transparente pour toutes les parties intéressées. En l'occurrence, il s'agit non seulement du Canada et des pays scandinaves, mais aussi des nouveaux

prendriment vital entre les armes nucléaires «pérestroïques» en Europe et la force stratégique nucléaire américaine. Depuis dix ans, la

Marine américaine a refusé à résister à tous les efforts déployés pour inscrire dans les négociations les armes nucléaires tactiques basées en mer. Le 27 septembre, balayant cette opposition, M. Bush a annoncé que les Etats-Unis dénucléariseraient unilatéralement la plupart des navires de leur flotte, «l'essentiel étant que, dans des circonstances normales, nos bâtiments ne transporteront pas d'armes nucléaires tactiques».

Quant au lien entre les forces nucléaires en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, il était déjà sape en partie par le malaise croissant que suscite en Europe le déploiement permanent d'armes nucléaires de courte portée en Allemagne et ailleurs. Le 27 septembre, le président Bush a effectué un remarquable virage à 180° en acceptant la vieille proposition des Soviétiques et en proposant lui-même d'éliminer quelque 2 300 armes nucléaires de théâtre basées au sol. Les Soviétiques, a-t-il expliqué, «devraient marcher de concert avec nous», ce qui veut dire qu'ils devraient démanteler et éliminer «tout leur arsenal de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD) et les forces stratégiques offensives de l'armée de l'air et de la

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# ROMPRE AVEC LES VIEILLES HABITUDES

La meilleure façon d'empêcher des pays de se constituer d'énormes  
arsenaux, c'est de convaincre les principaux marchands de cesser

de leur vendre des armes.  
PAR PAUL C. WARRKE

L'NE FAUT PAS QUE L'ÉCRASANTE VICTOIRE  
militaire des forces alliées engagées dans  
l'opération Tempête du désert masque  
l'échec politique qui est en grande partie à  
l'origine de la crise du golfe Persique. Entre 1981  
et 1988, l'Irak a acheté pour quelque 48 milliards  
de dollars d'armes modernes détenues par un pays  
occidental. C'est alors qu'avec nos alliés, nous  
avons décidé d'armer l'Irak pour en faire le

Sous le président Richard Nixon, presque  
toutes les limites ont été levées et le shah pouvait  
acheter pratiquement tout ce qu'il voulait. Pour-  
tant, ses puissants amis étrangers n'ont pu le  
sauver de ses ennemis intérieurs, et son départ  
de Téhéran a été suivi par l'arrivée de l'ayatollah  
Khomeiny et de son régime fanatiquement anti-  
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Il paraît donc manifeste que la prolifération des  
armements modernes à travers le tiers-monde est  
fondamentalement un problème d'offre. Ce qu'il  
faut, c'est une révision complète de la politique  
jusqu'aux deniers les éminents combattants. Il in-  
combe aux principaux fournisseurs, c'est-à-dire à  
l'Allemagne et au Brésil, par exemple, en plus  
des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de  
sécurité de l'ONU, d'assumer leurs responsabi-  
lités, à savoir : de ramener la sécurité dans le  
monde en imposant des restrictions sévères aux  
ventes d'armes.

Le shah d'Iran était l'un de nos principaux  
clients. Les décideurs américains voyaient en lui  
un proconsul durable qui protégerait les intérêts  
occidentaux au Moyen-Orient. Chaque printemps,  
la liste du matériel qu'il souhaitaient obtenir. En  
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Par ailleurs, pendant de nombreuses années, les  
Etats-Unis ont mis sur le shah d'Iran pour main-  
tenir la paix et la stabilité dans la région du golfe  
Persique. Force m'est de reconnaître une certaine  
complicité dans cette politique impudique puis-  
que, à la fin des années 1960, j'occupais au sein  
du gouvernement Johnson le poste de secrétaire  
adjoint à la Défense pour les affaires internationa-  
les, bureau qui assumait une grande responsabilité  
en matière de transferts d'armements.

Alors, Science.  
employés dans une estimation du Bulletin of  
Atomic Scientists.

Le Moyen-Orient est le banc d'essai logique,  
mais pas la seule région touchée. Des mesures  
utiles ont été proposées. Le président Bush a de-  
mandé que l'on prenne des dispositions pour  
prévenir la mise au point d'armes de destruction  
massive. Entre autres, il a demandé l'arrêt de la  
production et de l'exportation vers le Moyen-  
Orient de matières fissiles pouvant entrer dans la  
fabrication d'armes. La proposition devrait être  
élargie pour s'appliquer au monde entier. Les  
Etats devraient s'engager, par voie de traité, à ne  
plus produire de plutonium ni d'uranium forte-  
ment enrichi. Le président Bush a la l'embryon  
d'une bonne idée. Mais ce n'est pas une idée  
neuve, car le président Eisenhower l'avait déjà  
avancée il y a presque quarante ans.

D'autres idées saluables en matière de limita-  
tion des armements ont été présentées. Les séna-  
teurs américains John Kerry et Hank Brown ont  
proposé plus tôt cette année de faire obligation au  
président des Etats-Unis d'informer le président  
du Comité des affaires étrangères du Sénat et le  
président de la Chambre des représentants de  
toute vente d'armes au Moyen-Orient au moins  
soixante jours avant de l'annoncer officiellement.  
Le Canada a eu une idée remarquable en février  
dernier. Il a proposé que les cinq membres per-  
manents du Conseil de sécurité conviennent de ne  
plus jamais vendre aux pays du Moyen-Orient  
des armes visées par le Traité sur les forces con-  
ventionnelles en Europe (TFCB). Cela signifierait  
ne plus leur vendre de chars de combat, de véhi-  
cules de combat blindés, de pièces d'artillerie,  
d'aéronefs de combat et d'hélicoptères d'assaut.  
Quant aux matériaux pouvant servir à la fabrica-  
tion d'armes nucléaires, l'interdiction proposée  
devrait s'étendre à la terre entière.

En imposant aux fournisseurs des limites  
vingt-deux pays parties au Traité sur les FCE, on  
couvrirait la plupart des armes déséquilibrantes et  
On éviterait aussi une éventuelle conséquence  
négative du Traité susmentionné.

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Il faut, en somme, réaliser au départ que les terroristes modernes, en s'inspirant d'otages, doivent pour parvenir à leurs fins, tenir aussi la presse en otage et qu'il incombe donc à cette dernière de systématiquement résister à leur emprise. C'est une entraîne que, face au terrorisme, la presse doit parfois, pour conserver son intégrité, accepter de s'imposer le silence.

Soutenir le contraire, affirmer que la liberté de la presse n'existe que si celle-ci résiste à toute forme de censure en toute circonstance, c'est en fait limiter le rôle de la presse à n'être que le porte-voix de toutes les voix, même de celles de la dictature, de l'oppression et du mensonge.

Qu'on ne se leurre pas. La presse ne peut s'acquiescer de son rôle que si elle conserve toujours le choix de se taire, de garder le secret *off the record*, pour autant que CNN transmette une information plus vraie que les autres réseaux parce qu'elle le fait en direct et sans filtrage.

Dans cet esprit, venons-en à la question de savoir si les journalistes contribuent à la résolution des conflits ou s'ils en prolongent la durée.


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Cette nouvelle dynamique continue à mon sens à l'accélération des règlements, mais qui sait si elle n'encourage pas aussi la multiplication des crises. En simplifiant la communication, est-ce que la médiation moderne n'a pas aussi donné au moindre groupuscule l'occasion de se manifester, de s'exprimer ?

L'effondrement du bloc de l'Est n'aurait-il pas produit sans la télévision, la télécopie, le satellite, bref : la communication moderne, l'opposé, les terroristes du Hezbollah n'auraient-ils pu s'imposer, n'aurait-elle de ces mêmes instruments ?

Les médias doivent défendre systématiquement contre la censure leur «droit» de savoir et, avec la même énergie, la même détermination, dire ou de taire.



Bernie Ikenberry

L'Iran de Khomeiny, ce n'était pas le Viet-nam d'Ho Chi Minh et pourtant, la crise des otages était un second Viet-nam.

Fallait-il, en somme, que la presse s'en tienne à une réaction primaire face à la crise, sombrant dans la plus abjecte démagogie qui ferait de l'Islam en 1980, ce que fut le bolchévisme durant les années 1950, la pire des menaces à la sécurité internationale des États-Unis et le prétexte à une cruelle chasse aux sorcières ?

Cette critique se faisait entendre il y a onze ans, mais il était tellement plus «rentable» alors, pour les *networks*, de sombrer dans les sensations-lisantes d'autant plus, du reste, que Jimmy Carter, en s'enveloppant dans la crise au lieu de gouverner — croyant qu'il aurait ainsi plus facilement raison de Ted Kennedy —

Pourtant, nous ne pouvons pas nous empêcher de constater que la crise des otages en Iran aurait connu une issue différente ? Pour ma part, je le crois.

Les médias américains, en jouant à outrance sur la corde de l'humiliation patriotique, sont vite devenus eux-mêmes les otages de la crise qu'ils entendaient couvrir «objectivement».

Puis ils rendaient imprévisible le règlement rapide de la crise, plus ils jouaient le jeu des ayatollahs, qui pouvaient alors à loisir hausser les épaules.

Une prise d'otage est par définition une négociation. Il est dans l'intérêt du ravisseur d'imposer son calendrier quant aux échéances immédiates. Si les médias jouent le jeu de ces ultimatum, ils jouent le jeu des terroristes.

Il ne faut certes pas conclure ici que la presse exige de la réserve et de la mesure, le contraire est naïf. La recherche de la vérité des outils quotidiens du journaliste. Prendre le secret, le silence, font en quelque sorte partie de la diffusion de certains faits, etc.

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On ne peut aujourd'hui traiter de cette question sans parler de l'effet CNN (*Cable Network News*) dans la médiation moderne. Question : tout diffuser en direct constitue-t-il un progrès ?

Il est curieux que cette question occupe les débats journalistiques en 1991, alors qu'on croit les chaînes américaines de radio et particulièrement CBS, refusant de diffuser quoi que ce soit en différé, affirmant que tout traitement de la nouvelle brève était contraire à l'éthique de l'information.

Des journalistes comme Edward R. Murrow et William Shirer soutenaient l'inverse, affirmant que le direct n'avait un sens que si l'on pouvait

Ainsi, une équipe de télévision doit-elle accepter de monter à bord d'un avion dont les passagers sont tenus en otages ? Si la réponse d'entrée de jeu est oui, où s'arrêteront alors les concessions lorsque les terroristes réclameront la diffusion intégrale et sans traitement journalistique de leur message, sans quoi un passager sera exécuté devant les caméras ?

On voit tout de suite se dessiner une spirale infernale d'autant plus inexorable qu'à l'inverse, nul ne peut jurer qu'en optant de se tenir à l'écart, la presse aiderait les otages.

Il faut, en somme, réaliser au départ que les terroristes modernes, en s'inspirant d'otages, doivent pour parvenir à leurs fins, tenir aussi la presse en otage et qu'il incombe donc à cette dernière de systématiquement résister à leur emprise. C'est une entraîne que, face au terrorisme, la presse doit parfois, pour conserver son intégrité, accepter de s'imposer le silence.

Soutenir le contraire, affirmer que la liberté de la presse n'existe que si celle-ci résiste à toute forme de censure en toute circonstance, c'est en fait limiter le rôle de la presse à n'être que le porte-voix de toutes les voix, même de celles de la dictature, de l'oppression et du mensonge.

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# DIRE OU SE TAIRE ?

La place qu'occupent les médias dans les conflits internationaux  
et l'éthique journalistique.  
PAR JEAN PELLETIER

LES PRISES D'OTAGES, INSTRUMENTS DE CHANTAGE des plus primitifs et barbares dans les conflits humains, constituent-elles encore des outils efficaces de négociation à cause de l'omniprésence des médias modernes ? Autrement dit, y aurait-il moins de prises d'otages si les médias refusaient de s'en faire l'écho ?

Le moindre responsable des relations avec la presse dans un ministère des Affaires étrangères, répondrait à ces deux questions par l'affirmative. Sans la couverture des médias, soutiendrait-il, les terroristes perdent l'avantage qu'ils détiennent au départ, celui de forcer l'issue d'un conflit à leur profit par la terreur. Sans le concours des médias, ils ne peuvent en effet « influencer » l'électorat du pays auquel ils s'en prennent. Sans la curiosité des journalistes, toujours à l'affût de réactions officielles, ils ne peuvent forcer la porte de la Maison-Blanche, de l'Élysée ou du 10 Downing Street pour se faire entendre.

La prise d'otages est l'arme du dernier recours. C'est vrai. Une arme hautement sophistiquée néanmoins et d'autant plus foudroyante qu'elle atteint, grâce aux satellites, des millions de cibles, du simple téléspectateur (électeur) dans le confort de sa maison au plus omnipotent des chefs d'État enfermé dans son abri anti-atomique à l'autre bout du monde.

COUVRIR OU NE PAS COUVRIR ? MONTRER OU CENSURER ? Dire ou se faire ? La est la question. Il n'y a pas de réponse simple et encore moins universelle. Avant il est faux de croire que les médias se font malgré eux ravisseurs quand ils rapportent une prise d'otage, autant on ne peut soutenir que leur rôle est « neutre » quand ils deviennent, en quelque sorte, le canal par lequel la négociation se déroule. La crise des otages américains en Iran, de 1979 à 1981, aura en quelque sorte « modératisé » la prise d'otage de Khominey, entretenant au départ la certitude que son geste allait porter ses fruits contre l'Amérique de Jimmy Carter. Cette certitude, Téhéran l'avait.

Crise à un usage extrêmement habile de la médiatique moderne, le régime des ayatollahs ne s'était-il pas hissé au pouvoir et n'avait-il pas eu raison du shah avec à peine quelques coups de feu tirés ? Il savait donc en novembre 1979 que, pour gagner contre la Maison-Blanche ou à tout le moins la « tenir en respect », il lui fallait atteindre les Américains chez eux, dans leur foyer.

Du jour au lendemain, la diplomatie traditionnelle fut donc supplannée par la caméra vidéo, le correspondant en direct devenant le chargé d'affaires, le satellite, le seul canal diplomatique écoute.

LES IMAGES D'OTAGES AMÉRICAINS PARADÉS DANS LES rues de Téhéran, les yeux bandés, les mains ligotées, marqueront l'opinion publique américaine, et pour longtemps. Un an plus tard, en fait, ces images permirent l'élection d'un Ronald Reagan qui n'avait qu'une promesse, « never again ».

Les médias américains, dans ce jeu, furent des complices actifs. Particulièrement la télévision. Si aujourd'hui Ted Koppel est ce qu'il est, l'un des journalistes les plus écoutés et respectés, c'est largement à cause d'une émission quotidienne qui vit le jour en novembre 1979 intitulée « *America held Hostage* ».

Quel titre absurde quand on y pense aujourd'hui ! Ce n'était pas l'Amérique mais cinquante-trois diplomates qui étaient gardés en otage. Qu'à cela ne tienne, Jimmy Carter allait jouer le jeu, s'enfermant dans la Maison-Blanche pour ne plus en sortir, liant son sort à celui de ses compatriotes enfermés dans les sous-sols de la chancellerie américaine à Téhéran. Un titre absurde, inventé sans doute par un rédacteur de nouvelles incapable de résister à une manchette choc, allait devenir pourtant, en quelques semaines, une description objective de la réalité politique américaine. À partir du moment où la diplomatie traditionnelle se retirait du tableau, les médias allaient occuper le vide. Les journalistes dans l'Iran de Khominey, durant la crise des otages, jouaient d'une plus grande immunité diplomatique que les diplomates eux-mêmes.

La PERCEPTION DU CONFLIT PAR UN ÉLECTEUR SUR-chauffé par la presse devint plus importante que la crise ne l'était en réalité. Alors que la Maison-Blanche aurait dû se tenir au-dessus du débat que lui imposait la presse, elle choisit de s'y abaisser. À partir de ce moment-là, seule une victoire militaire aurait pu échouer l'impasse. Une opération fut certes tentée mais échoua lamentablement dans le désert iranien. Le sort politique de Jimmy Carter était alors jeté. La presse américaine, durant ces longs mois difficiles, a-t-elle eu raison de s'acquitter de son rôle comme elle D'abord, s'il est essentiel de rapporter les faits, fallait-il le faire avec un tel pathos ? Fallait-il jouer le jeu du ruban jaune, du calendrier qui s'allonge, jour après jour, sans aucun espoir de règlement prochain ?

# FERMER DES BASES MILITAIRES UNE AFFAIRE DÉLICATE

renabilité, la fermeture de bases favoriserait une meilleure affectation des fonds du Pentagone ; elle a des missions indépendantes et impartiales pour examiner la question. C'est ainsi que la Commission de la réorganisation et de la fermeture des bases (Secrétaire à la Défense) a vu le jour en mai 1988. Dans son premier rapport paru en décembre de la même année, la Commission a installations. Le Département de la Défense leur approbation.

La valeur militaire de chacune. Elle fonde de la structure des forces armées s'est demandée comment elle ait aussi pris en compte les effets de l'étude.

Accéder par la suite. Le Secrétaire à la Défense, se penche alors sur les fondations, peut différer de Congrès et le Pentagone statue en- mais ils doivent le faire sans y modifier les sont pas carrément rejetés, es sont des lors mises en oeuvre.

Faciliter le redressement des localités après la fermeture des bases militaires

Il existait depuis 1961 un programme du gouvernement américain dont l'objectif est de réduire au minimum l'incidence des décisions de la Défense sur les collectivités. Il s'appela d'abord Programme d'ajustement économique et, en 1970, il acquit un autre statut, celui de Comité présidentiel de l'ajustement économique (EAC). Cette instance comprend des représentants de dix-huit agences et départements fédéraux.

L'EAC a pour mission d'aider les localités à mettre en oeuvre des stratégies pour remédier aux effets de la fermeture des bases ou de la réduction des activités dans ces dernières. Vu la procédure adoptée par l'EAC, la création d'un conseil directeur local ou d'un groupe de travail qui comprend des représentants des divers milieux (gens d'affaires, syndicats, etc.) est considérée comme étant essentielle au processus. Comme l'EAC est un organisme «interministériel», les parties touchées ont plus facilement accès aux subventions et autres formes d'aide financière accordées par d'autres instances gouvernementales.

Selon le Département américain de la Défense, sur une période de trente ans, plus de 80 p. 100 des collectivités touchées par la fermeture d'une base ont réussi, après quelques années, à remplacer les emplois et revenus civils perdus. Entre 1961 et 1990, 158 104 emplois civils se sont substitués aux 93 424 annulations postes civils qui découlaient autrefois des activités des bases militaires ajoutant huit fermées ou réorganisées.

Le Groupe consultatif au Canada

En constituant un groupe consensuel sur la fermeture des bases, M. Masse reconnaît la nécessité de dépolitiser le processus et d'élaborer une méthode normalisée pour régler les problèmes afférents à la fermeture des bases. Le groupe consensuel ministériel sur l'infrastructure de la Défense compte trois membres civils : Harry Graschuk, comptable agréé albertain le présidera, et il aura à ses côtés Kathryn M. Bindoo, professeur et l'Université Memorial (Terre-Neuve), et Guy Fournier, ingénieur civil du Québec. Le groupe fixera les critères du processus décisionnel, il élaborera une méthode de calcul des économies nettes, il prendra en compte l'équité régionale et la dualité s'enseignera sur l'expérience acquise par d'autres gouvernements dans ce contexte. On s'attend à ce qu'il dépose son rapport d'ici mai 1992.

*Mme Boulden est chercheuse pigiste basée à Kingston.*

- JANE BOLDEN

**FER**  
**DES BASES**  
**UNE AFFAIR**

En annonçant les changements, M. Masse a été droit au but : pour réaliser des économies dès que possible, il faut immédiatement éliminer les éléments d'infrastructure inutiles. Cependant, il s'est empressé d'ajouter que la conjoncture socio-économique militait contre une telle démarche, et il a fait savoir qu'un groupe consultatif impartial serait créé pour aider le gouvernement à établir un processus décisionnel dont il pourra se servir afin de «rationaliser» l'infrastructure de la Défense canadienne.

Au cours des deux dernières années, le gouvernement a constaté que la fermeture de bases provoque de vives réactions. En 1989, le ministre de la Défense nationale (MDN) avait annoncé que sept bases fermeront et qu'il réduirait l'envergure des opérations dans sept autres, afin d'économiser près de 3 milliards de dollars sur une période de quinze ans. La nouvelle avait suscité une vive opposition de la part des collectivités visées, dont l'économie locale risquait d'être torpillée ; le gouvernement fit l'objet d'attaques violentes parce qu'il avait pris sa décision sans avoir donné aux localités le temps de songer à des formules de remplacement ou de monter pourqu岸 les bases devraient rester ouvertes.

La fermeture de bases canadiennes, dans le passé

Am cours de l'été 1991, l'État a envisagé de fermer cinq gouvernements anonymes qui étaient cités dans les rapports à prendre diverses mesures pour inciter les villes closes à ouvrir leurs portes aux investisseurs étrangers. Le gouvernement fédéral cherchait à dissiper les inquiétudes en garantissant aux villes qu'il tiendrait compte des effets économiques de la fermeture des bases et qu'aucune détérioration ne serait prise tant que les villes en question n'auraient pas eu la chance de faire valoir leurs avantages.

Depuis 1964, le MDN a fermé environ soixante-dix installations, dont vingt-quatre stations radars du vieux réseau CAPDIN/Pinterre. À la fin de 1988, dix-huit stations avaient fermé et servaient désormais à d'autres fins : parcs industriels, complexes domiciliaires, école privée pour enfants perturbés, maisons de retraite, et installations de formation et de logement pour les autochtones. Des 900 employés civils, seulement douze n'ont pas pu se trouver un autre travail. La mise sur pied de comités locaux de réaffectation des installations a favorisé la réussite de cette transition. Les comités ont bénéficié de subventions versées dans le cadre de divers programmes gouvernementaux affectés au développement industriel et à la main-d'œuvre.

Décision : où faire tomber le couperet ?

Pendant au moins une décennie, les États-Unis ont essayé de se doter d'un processus décisionnel qui empêcherait le Pentagone de faire des choix unitaires, qui éviterait de longues diatribes entre les membres du Congrès recherchant à protéger leur propre région contre l'effondrement économique et qui, parallèlement, montrerait que la fermeture de bases est nécessaire pour garantir l'efficacité et la rentabilité du réseau national des bases militaires. En 1977, le Congrès a adopté une loi qui assujettissait à son approbation la fermeture de toute base comptant au moins 300 employés civils, ou la reorganisation de toute installation qui touchait soit 1 000 employés civils, soit la moitié de la main-d'œuvre civile totale à la base. En outre, la loi obligeait expressément le Département de la Défense à se plier aux exigences procédurales de la Loi sur la politique environnementale nationale. Ces exigences étaient tellement rigoureuses qu'elles ont empêché le Département de fermer certaines bases.

En 1983, une équipe d'experts-conseils du secteur privé mise sur pied par le président pour étudier la limitation des coûts a reconnu qu'un processus



fonctions de secrétaire général du Parti. Dans un élan désespéré, le chef du Parti de Biélorussie en a appelé au Parlement en rébellion organisée pour qu'il proclame l'indépendance, ce qui présente-rat l'avantage de délier le sort du Parti biélorusse de celui du PCUS, de plus en plus menacé par la tournure radicale prise par les événements à Moscou. Les députés anti-communistes ont saisi l'occasion et, après avoir posé certaines conditions, ils ont offert d'appuyer la proposition.

Il se peut que la DIRECTION DU PARTI ait rem- porté une victoire, car ses activistes «exclusifs» du nationalisme ont provoqué au lendemain du coup d'Etat avorté des violences politiques, une polarisation et un personnelisme extrême et du pouvoir.

L'UKRAINE CONSTITUE SANS doute le cas le plus difficile pour les décideurs occidentaux. Avec plus de 50 millions d'habitants et un territoire riche en agricul- ture et en industries, l'Ukraine est, avec la Russie, la dernière de l'ancienne URSS. De son sort dépendra en partie celui de ses voisins. Il y a dans la république un fort élan démocratique. Quand le parlement ukrainien a proclamé l'indépen- dance le 24 août 1991, il a été décidé qu'un référendum aurait lieu le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre à ce sujet.

(Les résultats de ces consultations n'étaient pas connus à l'heure où le présent article a été mis sous presse.)

L'interprétation des résultats dépend d'une évaluation soignée de la procédure électorale elle-même. La question soumise à référendum était-elle formulée de façon ambiguë ? A-t-on respecté le vote à bulletin secret ? Toutes les par- ties ont-elles pu s'exprimer avant le vote ? La présidence était-elle contestée ? Dans quelle me- sure le candidat favori (le président avant l'élec- tion, M. Leonid Kravchuk) a-t-il pu influencer le vote par ses vieilles relations au sein du Parti ?

Si l'indépendance est votée à une majorité écrasante en Crimée et dans la partie orientale des russifiées de l'Ukraine, ainsi que dans la par- tie occidentale de cette dernière, on en déduira qu'il existe un consensus national solide sur la question. En revanche, si l'on note des différen- ces régionales substantielles, cela pourrait signi- fier qu'une Ukraine indépendante sera sans doute confrontée à des tensions croissantes dans des ré- gions où les Russes et autres minorités sont assez nombreuses. En cas de succès du référendum sur l'indépendance, les dirigeants de la république devront peut-être une coopération économique avec d'autres parties de l'ancienne URSS d'un oeil plus conciliant. A l'inverse, ils pourraient y trouver la légitimité d'une résistance accrue à tout compromis sur l'autonomie économique de l'Ukraine. Or, une résistance soutenue à une union économique existant avec d'autres parties

**Le nationalisme peut facilement empoisonner le terrain sur lequel les nouvelles institutions démocratiques sont édifiées.**

La culture traditionnelle, les rites garantis pas l'issue, l'absence de processus démocratique. En avril 1991, 99 p. 100 de la population se serait prononcée en faveur de l'indépendance nationale, mais des pressions ont été exercées sur les électeurs. En ef- fet, dans les régions où la majorité a voté contre l'indépendance, on a menacé les habitants de leur refusar la citoyenneté géorgienne ou des droits de propriété. L'attitude équivoque de Gamsakhurdia pendant le coup d'Etat puis la répression qu'il a organisée contre l'opposition après son échec ont déclenché des manifestations où l'on réclamait sa démission. Des heurts violents ont opposé le gou- vernement et ses détracteurs dans les rues de la

capitale. Thibault, L'entrepreneur partait violon de demandes d'autonomie émanant de minorités nationales (des Ossètes du Sud, par exemple) vivant en Géorgie a été particulièrement pernicieux. Une révolution nationale profonde a eu lieu en Géorgie, mais la révolution sociale n'a pas encore conté le pouvoir à un régime démocratique tenu de rendre des comptes à l'électorat. Gamsakhur- dia et son entourage ont rejeté le modèle com- muniste et ses institutions, mais l'absence de traditions démocratiques indigènes et la domina- tion à court terme, pour le moins, de la variante «exclusifs» du nationalisme ont provoqué au

lendemain du coup d'Etat avorté des violences politiques, une polarisation et un personnelisme extrême et du pouvoir.

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L'interprétation des résultats dépend d'une évaluation soignée de la procédure électorale elle-même. La question soumise à référendum était-elle formulée de façon ambiguë ? A-t-on respecté le vote à bulletin secret ? Toutes les par- ties ont-elles pu s'exprimer avant le vote ? La présidence était-elle contestée ? Dans quelle me- sure le candidat favori (le président avant l'élec- tion, M. Leonid Kravchuk) a-t-il pu influencer le vote par ses vieilles relations au sein du Parti ?

Si l'indépendance est votée à une majorité écrasante en Crimée et dans la partie orientale des russifiées de l'Ukraine, ainsi que dans la par- tie occidentale de cette dernière, on en déduira qu'il existe un consensus national solide sur la question. En revanche, si l'on note des différen- ces régionales substantielles, cela pourrait signi- fier qu'une Ukraine indépendante sera sans doute confrontée à des tensions croissantes dans des ré- gions où les Russes et autres minorités sont assez nombreuses. En cas de succès du référendum sur l'indépendance, les dirigeants de la république devront peut-être une coopération économique avec d'autres parties de l'ancienne URSS d'un oeil plus conciliant. A l'inverse, ils pourraient y trouver la légitimité d'une résistance accrue à tout compromis sur l'autonomie économique de l'Ukraine. Or, une résistance soutenue à une union économique existant avec d'autres parties

aggraver la désorganisation économique dont souffrir la région entière. Les gouvernements occidentaux devraient se méfier des réactions rapides ou toutes faites lan- dis qu'ils se font un chemin dans les dédales de la guerre des souverainetés qui sévit actuellement. L'ancien URSS, il faut examiner soigneuse- ment les revendications historiques, passer au crible les processus électoraux et référen- daires, et vérifier les cartes de vote de soi-disant porte-parole nationaux. En outre, il faut aussi évaluer les conséquences pratiques du soutien ap- porté à des revendications indépendantistes. Le gouvernement soviétique, aussi douteux que soit son assise morale, ou légale, a, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, maintenu une sorte de paix in- ternationale sur ces terrains rongés par les con- flits que sont l'Europe centrale et d'Asie. Il faut maintenant payer les coûts de cette «pax sovie- tica». Non seulement la «paix» était imposée par la force (une inégalité peut-être), mais en plus, en étouffant des griefs. Or, lorsqu'on étouffe des griefs, ce sont les préjugés et les stéréotypes qui supplantent dialogue et compréhension. L'identité risque de se définir en termes d'opposition à l'autre, plutôt qu'en fonction d'une connaissance de soi. Ces confusions ont un prix une fois les carcans secoués.

LES VANNES DES TROUBLES RÉGIONAUX ONT ÉTÉ grandes ouvertes par l'éclatement final du pou- voir communiste. La guerre des souverainetés alimentée déjà le brasier des violences régionales au Nagorny-Karabakh et ailleurs. De plus, le ch- mage et la course aux ressources peut aboutir à des différences régionales ont déjà causé de vio- lents affrontements dans plusieurs endroits en Asie centrale. Cependant, des problèmes encore plus graves menacent d'éclater si les États émer- gents ne trouvent pas un *modus vivendi*. Des dé- placements de population massifs, l'apparition de nouvelles dictatures régionales, des querelles frontalières et des accrochages au sein de popula- tions mélangées, une détérioration aggravée du bien-être économique, des échauffés servant de boucs émissaires et des conflits armés régionaux sont autant de conséquences possibles si l'on ne trouve pas de terrain d'entente.

Il est donc indispensable d'étudier soigneuse- ment chaque revendication d'indépendance. Dans l'ancienne URSS, au manque de tout, y compris de temps. Au cours des tout derniers mois, l'his- toire s'est emballée. En conséquence, il faut faire face simultanément à de nombreuses crises. Or, dans certaines des anciennes républiques, les dirigeants ne sont nullement rompus aux rouages des négociations, des marchandages et des compromis. Chaque groupe de population est confronté à une crise d'identité qui sera longue à apaiser.

Le savoir-faire de la collectivité internationale en matière de règlement pacifique des différends constitue sans doute un cadavre bien plus vital que la fameuse reconnaissance diplomatique. Une nouvelle accélération de l'indépendance risque- rait, dans certains cas, de faire dérailler le train de la démocratisation, des réformes économiques, d'une véritable autodétermination nationale et d'une paix authentique et durable.

En Biélorussie (qui s'est rebaptisée «Répu-  
blique de Biélorussie» le 19 septembre 1991),  
les événements ont pris un tour plus compliqué.  
Les soviétologues ont longtemps considéré les  
Biélorusses, dont l'histoire et la culture présen-  
tent de nombreux points communs avec celles  
des Russes voisins, parmi les candidats les moins  
probables à de sérieuses aspirations séparatistes.  
Jusqu'à récemment, les mouvements d'opposi-  
tion étaient bridés. Cependant, la résistance popu-  
laire à l'ordre établi a surgi en avril 1991, lorsque  
Moscou a décrété une hausse des prix d'en  
viron 170 p. 100 dans les magasins d'État,  
que l'approvisionnement ne s'est pas amélioré et  
que les salaires n'ont augmenté que de 60 roubles  
par mois, le salaire moyen mensuel étant de

dire qu'elle ne pouvait guère faire pire que l'équipe du Kremen et qu'elle pourrait sans doute faire beaucoup mieux. Le gouvernement biélorussse a commencé à sentir les tensions. Le jour du coup d'État, ceux qui étaient membres du Parti au moment de leur élection (quel-que 85 p. 100 des députés du parlement) étaient déjà de plus en plus partagés sur la bonne stratégie à adopter, même si la direction du parlement était encore aux mains de communistes loyaux envers le Parti.

À ce moment du putsch, les organes centraux du Parti ont exprimé leur soutien au Comité d'urgence. La position du Parti en a été d'autant plus délicate à l'effondrement du putsch, non seulement parce que sa direction était au moins complice par passivité, mais aussi parce que M. Gorbatchev avait ostensiblement abandonné le navire en démissionnant de ses

Dans certaines républiques, les dirigeants ne sont nullement rompus aux rouages des négociations, des marchandages et des compromis.

UN DEUXIÈME FACTEUR À EFFRAYER QUELQUES-UNS des dirigeants les plus conservateurs des républiques (par exemple, en Ouzbékistan, en Azerbaïdjan, au Tadjikistan et, enfin, au Turkménistan). Ces dirigeants, qui étaient simultanément à la tête du Parti et du gouvernement dans les républiques, sont sentis directement menacés lorsque le Congrès des députés de l'URSS a suspendu toutes les activités dudit Parti après le coup d'État. Pour ne pas avoir pris nettement position pour ou contre ouvertement appuyé les putschistes, ils marchaient déjà sur des œufs depuis l'échec du coup d'État. Ils essayaient de sauver leur propre base de soutien politique en sauvant les mêmes organisations communistes et les bureaucraties en place.

Tandis que ces dirigeants n'aborde pas leurs casquettes nationales, certains abandonnent le navire du Parti, d'autres se sont enfoncés en adhérent à des partis nouvellement formés, succédant locaux du vieux communisme central, et d'autres encore étaient évincés du pouvoir par leurs parlementaires, car leur comportement compromet tant était trop évident pour garantir ne fût-ce qu'un minimum de crédibilité. À l'opposé de ce qui se passait dans les pays baltes, la soutien déclaré de l'élite à l'indépendance traduit l'occurrence d'une tentative pour conserver d'anciennes relations au pouvoir au lieu d'en forger de nouvelles.

Le nationalisme des dirigeants n'avait pas grand chose à voir avec des aspirations à l'autocratie nationale et à la démocratie mais beaucoup avec la préservation d'une élite. Dans ces régions, la révolution sociale en est à ses premières étapes ou reste à déclencher, mais jusqu'à-là, il ne faudrait confondre l'indépendance avec une stratégie clairement définie pour

l'entente de gigantisme et dont la stratégie consiste à relier toutes les régions entre elles par un réseau d'entreprises exerçant un semi-monopole. Ces usines ont injecté quantité de Russes dans la région baltic à mesure que les ministères moscovites chargés de l'économie recrutèrent de la main-d'œuvre pour les nouveaux géants. Les recenseurs russes atteignaient considérablement le poids des nationaux estoniens et lettons, renforçant ainsi la détermination des populations autochtones à résister farouchement à toute assimilation à la culture russe et soviétique. Dans certains endroits, les Russes constituaient aujourd'hui le gros de la main-d'œuvre.

Lorsque ces usines et entreprises seront privatisées, rationalisées ou scindées en plus petites unités, il est presque certain qu'il y aura du chômage et que des ouvriers devront aller ailleurs ; dans certaines régions, les Russes seront les principales victimes. Les épreuves que réserve la réforme économique pourraient donc être considérées comme les signes d'une discrimination technique et ajouter des tensions ethniques la longue liste des autres souffrances qui front de partir avec la mélanomphose économique et politique. En dernière analyse, cependant, il se peut fort que les Baltes soient capables de gérer ces heurts avec une relative civilité, comme leur combat pour l'indépendance de ces dernières années l'a déjà démontré. Toutefois, ailleurs dans l'ancienne URSS, les tensions prennent déjà un tour plus agressif.

Si l'échec du coup d'Etat a permis aux Baltes de faire valoir leur vieille revendication d'indépendance, les lendemains radicaux du putsch fourni à des dirigeants d'autres républiques des raisons différentes d'entrer dans la ronde indépendante. Deux événements ont revêtu une importance particulière. Premièrement, si la défaite des putschistes a été une victoire pour la Russie, comme on le clame haut et fort là-bas et à



**A**près le putsch manqué du mois d'août en URSS, une vague nationaliste a balayé les couloirs des gouvernements de l'empire agonisant. En novembre, treize des quinze républiques soviétiques avaient proclamé leur indépendance. Certaines, comme les trois républiques baltes (la Lettonie, la Lituanie et l'Estonie), l'Arménie et la Géorgie, avaient déjà manifesté avant le coup d'Etat leur intention d'accéder à l'indépendance, mais entre la fin août et la fin octobre, la plupart des autres ont été gagnées par la fièvre indépendantiste.

SEULS LA RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRATIVE DE RUSSIE ET LE

Kazakhstan (peuple de presque autant de Russes que de Kazakhs) ont fait tache, probablement parce qu'ils formeront le cœur de toute nouvelle union à dominante russe et que, l'ancien centre étant mort, ils ne feraient, en définitive, que se déclarer indépendants par rapport à eux-mêmes.

(Cette nouvelle fureur indépendantiste laissait une impression de déjà vu parmi les soviéto-logues, car en 1989 et 1990, une «fanfare de souverainetés» avait traversé le pays de part en part. Cette fois, cependant, les républiques ne réclamaient pas seulement la direction de leurs propres affaires, mais elles affirmaient aussi, du moins en apparence, leur droit à la pleine reconnaissance au sein de la communauté internationale.

Le coup d'Etat lui-même constituait à la fois une réponse et un stimulant à cette marée montante de nationalismes. À la veille même de la signature d'un nouveau traité de l'union, les lieutenants déloyaux de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev sont passés à l'action pour empêcher l'accord qui aurait trans-

féré nombre de pouvoirs du centre aux républiques qui s'affirmaient. Seules cinq républiques entendaient signer la nouvelle entente le 20 août (la République fédérative de Russie, le Kazakhstan, la Biélorussie, le Tadjikistan et l'Ouzbékistan), suivies peu-être de quatre autres (l'Ukraine, le Turkménistan, le Kirghizistan et l'Azerbaïdjan) au cours du mois suivant.

Ceux qui ont organisé le coup d'Etat ont bien compris que le 20 août marquerait la capitulation du Kremlin devant les exigences fondamentales des républiques, au risque d'entraîner le dépérissement de l'Etat soviétique, quoique guère au sens où Marx et Lénine l'entendaient. Paradoxalement, la tentative de putsch a accéléré le processus même que ses instigateurs essayaient d'enrayer. Comme l'a fait remarquer un commentateur soviétique :

Si dans d'autres pays, un putsch est habituellement l'affaire d'une douzaine de matraqueurs qui sont ensuite jetés en prison alors que les anciens dirigeants continuent de vivre comme si de rien n'était, le putsch du mois d'août est sans précédent. Pratiquement toute la direction de l'Union [soviétique] – l'appareil répressif..., le pouvoir législatif..., le Parti..., tous les dirigeants pouvaient être simultanément inculpés en vertu de divers articles du code pénal.

De plus, lorsque tout l'appareil gouvernemental, constitué de criminels ou de leurs complices, est à ce point désavoué par le peuple, il ne peut

## LA CAVALCADE DES NATIONALISMES

La face cachée

des souverainetés en

ébullition en URSS.

PAR JOAN DEBARDELEBEN



Toy Malar

reser en place. L'entière direction gouvernementale s'effondre dans un néant politique d'où naît un autre gouvernement. Cela a été le cas, mais ce n'est pas un seul gouvernement qui a émergé.\*

Les actes des conspirateurs ont révélé la corruption, la trahison, la stupidité et l'arrogance profondes qui gouvernaient les décisions des organes centraux, ce qui a alimenté les forces centrifuges qui déchiraient l'union. Le projet de traité de l'union a été sabordé et, le 21 août, quand le putsch a tourné au fiasco, les concessions qu'il comportait étaient déjà trop limitées pour satisfaire même les républiques les plus conscientes.

Si l'on examine la carte géographique, on se demande où certaines républiques voulaient en venir avec leurs déclarations. Les régions plus petites ou moins développées pouvaient-elles vraiment espérer et souhaiter accéder à une pleine indépendance ? Qui se cache derrière leurs superbes discours, et quoi ? Par ces déclarations, revendiquent-elles vraiment leur droit à l'autodétermination nationale et à la souveraineté populaire, comme l'Occident aimerait à le croire ? Ou, tel Janus, ont-elles un second visage, plus sombre et peu reluisant ?

Comme tout dans l'ancienne URSS aujourd'hui, les généralisations vont bon train et sont habituellement erronées. Or, malgré la gloriole, il faut toujours lire entre les lignes pour discerner le vrai message. Les déclarations d'indépendance signifient-elles tout ce qu'on veut qu'elles signifient ? Au-dessus de tout ce qu'une des anciennes républiques doit être comprises selon ses propres termes. Néanmoins, le sens des proclamations varie considérablement d'un endroit à l'autre, même si l'on retrouve quelques tendances communes.

POUR LES BALTES, LES DÉCLARATIONS TRADUISSENT sans nul doute une volonté véritable d'accès à l'indépendance, aspiration nationale depuis que leurs pays sont devenus les pions de plus grandes puissances à la signature du perfide Pacte Molotov-Ribbentrop, en 1939. Le 6 septembre 1991, l'Etat soviétique lui-même a reconnu l'indépendance des républiques baltes par un rejet patial des institutions et du pouvoir communiste. De nouvelles procédures et de nouvelles institutions démocratiques sont à peu près mises en place et, depuis deux ans, on assiste à une authentique révolution nationale et sociale.

Certes, des problèmes subsistent et il arrive que le nationalisme se monte sous son visage le plus inquiétant. Par exemple, les droits de l'individu seront-ils aussi bien protégés que la collectivité des peuples baltes qui s'affirment ? Comment les minorités nationales seront-elles

\*Maksim Sokolov, «Slavna Bogu, perestroika konchilas» (Dieu merci, on en a fini de la perestroïka), Kommersant (19-26 août 1991), p. 1.

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
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prendre garde, car depuis l'effon-  
drement du communisme central en  
URSS, la porte est grande ouverte  
aux dictatures régionales.  
Le retour du prince Sihanouk  
au Cambodge est de bon augure  
pour la population khmère. Avec les  
accords signés à Paris en octobre  
dernier, le pays sera désormais sous  
la tutelle des Nations Unies jusqu'à  
la tenue d'élections libres. Gérard  
Hervouet soutient que des tâches  
très délicates attendent les membres  
de la mission de l'ONU dans ce  
pays au cours des prochains mois,  
et qu'il revient d'abord et avant tout  
à la population cambodgienne de  
reconstituer le pays.  
Richard Steyn affirme que "il ne  
faudra rien de moins qu'un miracle  
politique pour assurer l'instauration  
de la démocratie en Afrique du  
Sud. Il analyse une série de facteurs  
pouvant influencer la situation en  
ce temps où le Parti national de  
M. F.W. de Klerk et le Congrès na-  
tional africain de M. N. Mandela  
vivent encore leur «lune de miel».  
Dire ou se taire ? Dire à tout  
prix, quand on est journaliste ?  
Jean Pelletier dit non. Evoquant  
l'expérience qu'il a vécue comme  
correspondant du journal *La Presse*  
qui a débuté en 1979, M. Pelletier  
affirme que les médias doivent  
défendre leur droit de savoir, mais  
force leur droit de dire ou de taire.

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Document de travail n° 37,

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octobre 1991, 41 pages.

Les propositions faites par le pré-  
sident George Bush le 27 septembre  
dernier ont donné une nouvelle tou-  
nure aux négociations sur les arme-  
ments nucléaires. David Cox passe  
en revue les propositions américaines  
et recommande de surveiller de près  
certains points clés de la politique  
des États-Unis en matière de limi-  
tation des armements dans les  
prochains mois.  
À l'évidence, la meilleure façon  
d'empêcher des pays de se consti-  
tuer des arsenaux, c'est de convain-  
cre les fournisseurs de cesser de leur  
vendre des armes. Paul Warnke  
soutient que la prolifération des  
armements modernes dans le tiers-  
monde est d'abord et avant tout  
fonction de l'offre. Il faut rétablir la  
sécurité dans le monde en limitant  
rigoureusement les ventes d'armes.  
Le Groupe  
consultatif ministériel sur l'infras-  
tructure de la Défense, qui déposera  
son rapport au printemps de 1992,  
tient des audiences un peu partout  
au Canada. Jane Boulden résume  
l'expérience américaine concernant  
la fermeture de bases militaires.  
Enfin, Jocelyn Coulon, qui s'est  
rendu au Koweït en octobre dernier  
décrir des drames humains que les  
médias internationaux passent trop  
souvent sous silence.

— Hélène Samson

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# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ



## LA CAVALCADE DES NATIONALISMES

QUE PENSER DU RÉVEIL DES  
SOUVERAINETÉS NATIONALES DANS L'ANCIENNE URSS ?

par Joan DeBardeleben

Jean Pelletier  
Les médias  
et le terrorisme  
international.

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CANADIAN  
INSTITUTE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE AND  
SECURITY

# PEACE & SECURITY

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## JAPAN ASCENDANT

WEALTH, POWER,  
RESPONSIBILITY IN A  
TURBULENT WORLD

*An International Roundtable*

*Ryukichi Imai*

*Hisanori Isomura*

*Seizabro Sato*

*Akihiko Tanaka*



**John Badgley**  
Myanmar's junta,  
Burma's agony.

**Edgar Dosman  
and John Kirk**  
Fidel Castro and  
Operation Zero.

**Abdelhamid  
Gmati**  
Fighting God  
in the Maghreb.

**David Runnalls**  
Why the June  
UN earth summit  
matters.

**Susan Greenberg**  
Letter from Prague.

**Frédéric Bozo**  
Making defence  
policy in France.



Also in this issue:

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## Editorial Board:

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## Circulation:

Dick Seldenthuis

## Word Processing:

Veronica Suarez

## Translation:

(except where otherwise indicated)  
Denis Bastien, Sogestran Inc.

## Design and Production:

Spencer Francey Peters

## Printing:

Somerset Graphics

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## NOTE FROM THE EDITORS

This is, in all probability, the final issue of *Peace & Security* magazine which will be published by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. As reported inside, the Minister of Finance announced in his budget statement of 25 February that it was the intention of the Government to disband the Institute.

*Peace & Security* began life in the spring of 1986, and its intended readership was what we termed the "interested, but non-expert public" – readers who wanted to know about an international issue, but who had neither the time nor the inclination to read weighty tomes. Its design and illustration were intended to attract readers, to expand the numbers of people interested in the issues, to put superior international affairs writing and quality design into an intelligent and engaging bilingual magazine.

*Peace & Security* grew and changed during its six-year history. Originally twelve pages in each language, it became twenty-four. Our distribution list began in 1986 at 2,500; this issue will be mailed to 8,500 addresses.

From the very beginning the only preconceived notion the editors had about what constituted a good article for our readers was that it be intellectually honest, with a fair regard for the facts of an issue, and that it fit into the relatively limited space we had available. Neither we nor the Institute in general had an ideological axe to grind. We were tough on our writers and are convinced that this usually resulted in better writing for our readers.

Something else we tried from the very beginning was to publish quality original writing in both official languages. While editing and publishing in two languages simultaneously is expensive, and presents formidable editorial challenges, the magazine and, we believe, its readers, gained enormously from the increased range and quality of writing this enabled us to present. We made conscious effort to bring to our readers perspectives from outside Canada as well.

We are grateful to a number of people who provided advice and counsel during *Peace & Security's* brief life: **Geoffrey Pearson**, the Institute's first executive director, supported the development of the magazine; his successor, **Bernard Wood**, has been an enthusiastic participant in its growth. **John Walker**, **Mary Taylor**, **David Cox**, **Roger Hill**, **Mark Heller**, **Hilary Mackenzie**, **Madeleine Poulin**, **Charlotte Gray** and **Jocelyn Coulon** were all members of the editorial board at one time or another and contributed ideas, excellent articles, and much needed constructive criticism.

Staff members **Dianne DeMille**, **Bradley Feasey**, **Eva Bild**, **Veronica Baruffati**, **Samantha Hayward**, **Dick Seldenthuis** and **Veronica Suarez** played roles at various times. Staff of the Institute library, in particular **Susan Connell** and **Katherine Laundry**, provided timely and indispensable research support to the editors. **Philip Lemieux** and his staff supplied crucial administrative and budgetary help, not to mention well-

timed moral support. Our translators at Sogestran Inc., under the direction of **Denis Bastien**, were instrumental in helping us provide high quality, other-language versions of our stories. And, of course, we are grateful to members of the Institute's Board of Directors who over the years continued to underwrite what must have seemed at the beginning to have been an improbable venture.

Finally, **Jeannette Hanna** of Spencer Francey Peters, was present at the creation and has been the inspiration behind the design and "look" of the magazine and its evolution over the years. Jeannette and **Kathy Dyer**, responsible for electronic production, were indefatigable in their support for this slightly unusual enterprise. The magazine's printers from the start, Somerset Graphics in the person of **Ian Budge**, consistently gave us results of the highest quality.

This issue's cover story features a roundtable on Japan. *Peace & Security* magazine brought together four Japanese international affairs specialists and commentators in Tokyo to talk about how they saw their country's place in the community of nations. The resulting conversation provides some surprising insights into the much written about but little understood subject of how Japanese view themselves and the rest of the world.

As for the editors of *Peace & Security*, the only thing left for us to say is *sayonara*.

– **Nancy Gordon**, **Michael Bryans**  
and **Hélène Samson**

## Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

360 Albert Street  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada K1R 7X7  
Telephone (613) 990-1593  
Fax (613) 563-0894

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## NEW INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS IN THE LAST QUARTER

**International Peace and Security Database Factsheet**, Information Services, Fall 1991.

**Civilian Aspects of United Nations' Peacekeeping**, by Robin Hay, Background Paper 38, October 1991, 8 pages.

**Naval Arms Control**, by Ron Purver, Background Paper 39, December 1991, 8 pages.

**The Role of the Media in International Conflict, A Report On An International Conference, Ottawa, 12–13 September 1991**, by Christopher Young, Working Paper 38, December 1991, 80 pages.

*Other Publications From the Institute include:*  
*Occasional Papers • Background Papers • Working Papers • Factsheets • Annual Guide to Canadian Policies • Director's Annual Review • Institute's Annual Report.*

**A Time of Hope and Fear: A New World Order and a New Canada**, Director's Annual Statement, by Bernard Wood, January 1992, 40 pages.

**Arms Export Controls to Limit Weapons Proliferation, Summary of An International Conference, Ottawa, 19–21 June 1991**, by Jean-François Rioux, Working Paper 39, January 1992, 65 pages.

**The CSCE and Future Security in Europe, A report of a two-day conference held in Prague, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 4–5 December 1991**, by Michael Bryans, Working Paper 40, March 1992, 95 pages.



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John Badgley is Curator of the John M. Echols Southeast Asia Collection, Cornell University and President of the Institute for the Rockies; Frédéric Bozo is a researcher at the *Institut français des relations internationales* (IFRI) in Paris; Edgar J. Dosman is Director of the Canada-Latin America Forum at the North-South Institute in Ottawa; Abdelhamid Gmati is a journalist based in Montreal and former editor-in-chief of the Tunis daily newspaper *La Presse*; Susan Greenberg is the Prague correspondent for the British daily *The Guardian*; John M. Kirk is a professor in the Department of Spanish at Dalhousie University in Halifax; and David Runnalls is Director of the Sustainable Development Programme at the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Ottawa.

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## FROM THE DIRECTOR

# The Future of the Institute and *Peace & Security Magazine*

**U**NDER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, MICHAEL Bryans, the editor of *Peace & Security* has offered me this page in my capacity as representative of his publisher (the Institute) to communicate with our 9,000 readers about some vital developments.

In the Federal Budget of 25 February 1992, the Minister of Finance announced the Government's intention to "wind up" or otherwise eliminate twenty-one diverse entities financed by the Federal Government, including the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

The Institute's Board of Directors has stated that the Government's decision is completely unjustified in the light of the record of performance under the Institute's mandate from Parliament and is likely to result in a major loss of the Canadian taxpayers' investment. The Board and many others, inside and outside Canada, have called for the decision to be reversed. The dissolution of such a body would be especially damaging and untimely in a period when the international situation is undergoing such radical change and when the Institute, and collaborators under its programmes, have been in the forefront of shaping Canadian understanding, response and initiative.

The Government's totally unexpected decision seems in part to have been based on an image of all crown corporations as inefficient, duplicative and bureaucratic bodies. Such a view has no application whatever to our small and lean organization. It has been custom-built and honed to fill the gaps and strengthen the critical mass in Canada's national capabilities as envisaged by all parties in Parliament in 1984. Its functions of independent, imaginative and risk-taking activity cannot be filled by government. Its achievements in upgrading and concerting the efforts of universities, non-governmental organizations and others across the country could now be lost, as will the focal point and clearing-house for this work in Canada which has come to be widely known and respected around the world.

The distinguished Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Lincoln Bloomfield, one of the non-Canadian members of the Board, believes that this decision will "give a powerful negative message to the world about Canada's role in this new era, where Canadian leadership is more essential than ever." Numerous reactions of a similar character are flowing in from other countries as the news reaches them.

The Institute's Board of Directors has received legal counsel as to its responsibilities under the law in these extraordinary circumstances. As the Government recognizes, the Institute will continue to exist, and must continue to pursue the purposes set out in

its Act, until that Act is repealed by Parliament. Moreover, the Minister of Finance is obliged under law to continue allocating funds, at the minimum rate of \$5 million annually, until the Act is repealed. It cannot be predicted with any certainty when the new law (Bill C-63) will receive final passage, although it received first reading in Parliament on 10 March.

In the meanwhile, as prudent managers, the Institute's Board, while continuing to pursue its functions under the law, must take into account the unequivocal intention of the Government to wind up the Institute and to "transfer the necessary continuing resources to the Department of External Affairs."

We are thus seeking clarification of the government's intention and discussing what will be required to discharge the Institute's existing commitments, to continue to execute its mandate while winding down in anticipation of the repeal of the Act, and to ensure the maximum conservation and use for Canada of the extremely valuable assets which have been built up in its programmes and its people.

Specifically, the Institute wishes to provide assurance of its intention to:

- honour its firm existing commitments to present holders of scholarships, fellowships, grants and contracts;

- protect the rights and interests of its employees up to the best levels of public and private sector practice;

- obtain the earliest possible indications from the Government of whether it will be possible to proceed further with pending projects and with competitions for scholarships, fellowships and grants. All applicants will be advised as soon as any information is available and they are requested *not* to contact our offices; and

- honour all its normal commercial commitments.

This magazine, of course, has earned a place of central importance and respect in both the Institute's work and in the dialogue among the communities concerned with peace and security, across Canada and abroad. The Institute's Board members and many others, are deeply conscious of the hard-earned value of this asset, and the need to do everything possible to sustain it in some acceptable way.

We hope that this is not the last issue of *Peace & Security* that you will receive, but it may be. If so, we will all be much the poorer in the future, but not less responsible for maintaining the effort to deepen knowledge and understanding of these vital questions in an era of incredible change and challenge. □

— BERNARD WOOD

## To Express Your Concern ...

*Because of the need for parliamentary action to implement the Government's stated intentions, and the special all-party support for the Institute from its conception, the Commons Standing Committees on External Affairs and/or National Defence would thus be the most appropriate forum in which Canadians and others could raise their interests, concerns and suggestions. The addresses are:*

*Clerk and Members of the  
Standing Committee on  
External Affairs  
180 Wellington Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A6  
Facsimile: (613) 996-1962  
and/or*

*Clerk and Members of the  
Standing Committee on  
National Defence  
(same address as above)  
Facsimile: (613) 992-7974*



# JAPAN ASCENDANT

*Wealth, Power, Responsibility in a Turbulent World*

## ROUNDTABLE

### THE PANELISTS

#### RYUKICHI IMAI

*is the former ambassador of Japan to Kuwait, Mexico and the Conference on Disarmament. He holds a doctorate in nuclear engineering.*

#### HISANORI ISOMURA

*is a consultant based in Tokyo, and was most recently the Director General of NHK, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. The many positions he has held in his career at NHK include foreign correspondent, bureau chief and region director general in Southeast Asia, Washington and Paris respectively.*

#### SEIZABRO SATO

*is Director of Research at the International Institute for Global Peace in Tokyo, and Director of the international institutions project of the Japan Forum on International Relations.*

#### AKIHIKO TANAKA

*is Associate Professor of International Politics at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. His specialties include contemporary international relations in East Asia, theories of international politics and Japan-US relations.*

*This roundtable is based on a discussion held in Tokyo on 7 February 1992. The moderator was Bernard Wood, Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.\**

**Bernard Wood:** We are meeting very soon after the visit of Mr. Bush to Tokyo with all the publicity that surrounded it, and the recrimination that has followed. Our challenge is to step back from those immediate events and look a little more deeply at some of the long-term trends in relation to Japan's power and responsibility in the world.

The first question that I would like to raise relates to the long-standing assumption about the basis of Japanese foreign policy. I remember, as recently as the 1970s, a classic analysis of Japanese foreign policy based on the idea of Japan's vulnerability – a resource poor country dependent on foreign markets, on secure sea lines of communication and so on – a Japan always forced to compensate for vulnerability. Is this still an underlying long-term perception in Japan, because, of course, the view now in much of the rest of the world is of a Japan of overpowering strength?

**Akihiko Tanaka:** There are many Japanese who still behave on the assumption you have just described: Japan as a country that is resource poor, and vulnerable to the changes in the world. On the other hand, there is an increasing sense of power. But many in this society do not define what this power constitutes and what it implies. In the late 1980s, among influential Japanese opinion circles, topics such as the decline of the United States, became very

of the system is undergoing great change. I have the sense that in among these uncertainties, there are dangerous attitudes among some Japanese who believe in a more ominous kind of Japanese power, and at the same time they are neglecting the responsibilities entailed by having these notions. Statements made by some politicians in this country after the Bush visit reflect a strange combination of arrogance and irresponsibility.

**Seizabro Sato:** I'd like to differentiate between two levels: one is the Japanese perception of the weakness of Japan, and the other is of Japanese readiness to take on the kind of role larger responsibilities in the international community would involve. Since the 1970s, there have been tremendous changes in Japanese perception of their own strengths and weaknesses. Following the oil crisis of 1973, there was a very strong national consensus on Japan's vulnerability. We were desperate, given that ninety-nine percent of our oil came outside, primarily from the Middle East where there was a lot of instability. Within ten years, Ezra Vogel wrote a famous book, *Japan As Number One: Lessons For America*.

Then our second oil crisis began, ignited by the Iranian revolution and our sense of vulnerability increased. But by the mid-1980s the world energy market changed from a seller's market to a buyer's market, for various reasons, and our self-confidence came back. When the Gulf War started, there was very strong opinion in Japanese society that we did not need to participate. Of course, this neglected the basic nature of the crisis, but there was no serious sense among Japanese regarding the potential for an oil crisis.

**Wood:** Not even as much as there should have been because of Japan's vulnerability?

fashionable. Even before Paul Kennedy's, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* became a best seller, there had been several similar books which sold very well in this country. So the Japanese are somehow saying that US power is declining, at least in the relative sense, while Japanese power is on the ascendancy. Bush's recent visit to Japan, in the eyes of many Japanese, reflected this change.

We also need to consider the end of the Cold War. Many believe that the fundamental nature

\*For their invaluable assistance in arranging this roundtable the editors wish to thank Yasuko Itoh, Ron Purver, and Mary Taylor.

**Sato:** "Even if Hussein occupies Kuwait, they still have to sell their oil, and as long as we have money we can get it." This was a widely shared opinion among the Japanese. So the sense of vulnerability that comes from a poor resource base has almost disappeared. The second process of change in the Japanese system was already pointed out by Professor Tanaka: the end of the Cold War and of *Pax Americana*. Most Japanese now think that the international game has changed from a game based on military power, to a wealth game based on economic capabilities. According to this way of thinking, we are then in a much better position.

**Hisanori Isomura:** Because all the other participants here are scholars or eminent diplomats, I'd like to contribute a common man's view. The Japanese still harbour a strong persecution complex toward the outside world, although, as you might well know, Japan in the past has often been the perpetrator – especially towards our Asian friends. For example, in its history Japan has been faced with three "Black Ship" periods. The first, everyone knows, was the flotilla commanded by Commodore Perry in 1853, that contributed to the end of Japan's century-old isolation. The second Black Ship, in my judgement, was the arrival of occupation forces for the first time in our history, led by General MacArthur, which naturally changed the entire system of pre-war Japan. The third one is now in the offing, led by President Bush surrounded by eighteen prominent businessmen. This black ship is in the form of what has become internationally known as *Gaiatsu* or outside pressure, which alters our direction.

Another example: the President of *Keidanren* [Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations] last year made a trip around Europe and all the members of this delegation were struck by the fact that Europeans are feeling threatened by Japanese economic power – especially in key sectors like automobiles, semiconductors and computers. Even our closest friends among the Europeans – the Germans – judging by what its leaders say about Japan, have come to sound like Mrs. Cresson [Prime Minister of France]: "If we let Japanese expansion go on like this, one day we will be conquered." While we still feel vulnerable to many outside pressures, these outsiders look on Japan as a giant.

**Ryukichi Imai:** It is very unfortunate that the perception of newly acquired power is taking the form of believing that other people are not

really as good as we are. This is the wrong way to look at this power if we are to make use of it.

**Wood:** The idea of interdependence is one which recognizes that you have power, but that nobody has unlimited power and that you are dependent on others. Has that idea sunk in?

I don't think it has sunk in within our societies, but because Japan has gone through this transition in the last two decades perhaps it might have taken hold?

## A Common European House in which there will be two guest rooms ...

**Sato:** Japan being dependent on foreign countries is nothing new. Japan has a relatively long history, since the very beginning, about 1,500 years, of being dependent on Chinese civilization. And as Western powers came to East Asia, in the last 450 years we have been importing more advanced technologies, etcetera from them. So being dependent is a natural condition for most Japanese; it is taken for granted.

And now that more and more Japanese realize that other countries are also dependent on Japan, there is no difficulty for Japanese to recognize interdependence. But Japanese perception is quite different from the American. Americans started their country as completely independent from the old world in Europe. Independence is a natural state for Americans. So it has to be more difficult for Americans to accept the reality of interdependence. For Japanese, interdependence is an improvement on vulnerability.

**Tanaka:** We have long been accustomed to dependency that is true, but I am not sure that the Japanese can behave more or less naturally in a state of mutual dependency. It may be the case that the Japanese are accustomed to the situation where when you are dependent, you are then subject to those who you depend on. But when you have some other party dependent on you, then some Japanese behave as if they were in a superior position.

**Sato:** For reasons why it is so difficult for many Japanese to behave naturally in a world that is entering the age of interdependence, look at two possibilities, both of which are unique to Japanese history. Japan was at the edge of the Chinese Empire from the very beginning until the mid-19th century. And since the mid-19th century Japan has been at the periphery of Western civilization, until

quite recently. So there is a sense of being a victim, of being smaller, that is widely shared. It is natural among Japanese that they are not asked to play a role as a leading power in the world. Setting the rules for the international community is not what we are accustomed to.

The other reason is that there is a very strong sense of uniqueness. Japan is different from Korea; we are separated by sea from the Chinese mainland so there is a very strong sense of being different from China. And this sense of being unique persists when we deal with Westerners. Japan is a member of the G-7, but Japan is the only non-Caucasian member. And among Asians there is also a real sense of being different from other Asians.

**Wood:** Somebody said once that prestige is the price paid to power. And I wonder to what extent prestige, that sense of power and confidence and the sense of not being on the periphery any more, is now an important thing for the Japanese people?

**Isomura:** I should say rather mixed. We have such a persecution complex and a kind of Buddhist fatalism. We live in a land where there are constantly natural disasters like earthquakes and tidal waves. So even if Ezra Vogel called us "number one" – while this naturally sounds very agreeable to us – I do not think the common Japanese people believe this kind of compliment. We always feel vulnerable.

**Tanaka:** As a general observation, I agree, but in the last five or six years I have sometimes sensed a rising confidence among business people and some bureaucrats who deal with economic affairs in the country – a sense that what Japan has done in the past forty-five years is essentially correct, that these achievements should be acknowledged, and that some of the elements of Japanese success could constitute a model for other parts of the world.

The areas where the Japanese are most confident, of course, are Japanese management in business. But even in foreign affairs I have heard an increasing number of Japanese engaged in economic assistance programmes saying that the manner in which Japan has conducted economic assistance in the developing countries has essentially proven sound.

**Imai:** Without being able to define what this power really is all about, an element that is not well recognized or embodied in our foreign policy is the sense of *noblesse oblige*. People

... one for  
Canadians, the  
other for Americans,  
but none  
for Asians.



still consider the pros and cons, counter-proposals, and level of comfort and so on. The problem, and this may be one of the debatable points, is how Japanese policy is decided internally. Put very bluntly, the policies are formulated by the bureaucrats, passed on to politicians and then they express themselves.

When you look at the actual mechanism of when you have the Prime Minister say something about something, you can see two people walking around saying, "well, what should he say, what have you negotiated with the Ministry of Finance, what did the Minister of Finance say? Well, they say they haven't any money and so we will have to change the speech in such a way so as to not to give a clear commitment but only to indicate..." and so on. That is how policy is actually made, I am afraid, and if that is the case, we certainly do not have much room for imaginative and forward looking ideas in foreign policy.

**Wood:** We have been discussing primarily internal factors, but what about the external climate – the danger that the more or less open multilateral systems are going to close down. In the sweep of a decade, is there a concern now that the Americans and the Europeans feel so threatened, and are so internally preoccupied, that protectionism will become the rule, that this GATT round will fail and the multilateral system is just not going to be what it used to be?

**Sato:** There is a lot of concern, but at the same time there is a very strong conviction that even if this regionalism and protectionism continues to grow, the world economy will not be broken down into blocs such as we saw in the 1930s. We have invested so massively both in North America and Europe that Japanese economic activities are already firmly rooted in these economic zones. They could not exclude us anyway. That is the optimists' view. If the Europeans and the Americans are foolish enough to try to exclude us they will suffer from that.

**Wood:** But the idea of an Asian bloc, even as an insurance policy, is not taken seriously in Japan?

**Isomura:** I have just returned from a trip to Europe where I sensed a lot of fear on the part of Europeans that one day the United States, and perhaps Canada, will gang up with Asia or with Japan and confront them. That was just after the visit of President Bush to Japan where Japanese and American governments concluded a *de facto* managed trade agreement. The Europeans, naturally, are not very happy about that.

And this is our nightmare, that one day the Americans might do the same with the Europeans, from whom they are descended. Again, from the Japanese common man's perspective, Japan should be permitted to at least knock at

the door of the common European house – a house in which there will be two guest rooms – one for Canadians, the other for Americans, but none for Asians.

**Sato:** There are pessimists worrying about the widening gap between North and South. Because of the end of the Cold War, wealthy northern countries are likely to neglect the importance of the South. As long as the Soviet Union supported radical leaders in the South, we had to support the moderates. But now that the USSR has stopped supporting national liberation movements in the Third World, we can safely neglect many of the developing countries. In addition, the simultaneous economic recessions spreading throughout the Western world, including Japan, are discouraging the new effort to provide economic assistance and markets to the Third World. And last, the changes in the former communist countries are so fascinating that attention – and money follows attention – will cause the North-South gap to grow. This in the long run will cause serious trouble.

**Imai:** The Rio conference in June will certainly bring out the environmental problems, and we will not be able to maintain the "polluter pay" principle. The advanced, industrial countries will have to pay for the pollution caused by developing countries, otherwise their economies won't stand up. We are heading for a North-South confrontation. Whether you can make economic sense out of it, gain from it or lose, is very much up to the most powerful players.

**Wood:** I remember it was conscious decision made in Japan more than a decade ago to focus more on North-South relations than most of the members of the G-7. In Canada we felt very comfortable with that emphasis; we were your natural allies in the G-7 on that. Since then, Japan has become the largest ODA [Official Development Assistance] donor in the world. You mentioned, Professor Sato, the distraction of attention towards Eastern Europe, but obviously Japan has not been swept away totally by this. There is a sense in Japan that to some degree ODA has worked, not a sense widely shared in most of the industrialized countries. Do you think that emphasis will continue?

**Sato:** Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing pressure in Japan as well as the Western democracies to reduce military expen-

ditures. And at the same time, there is almost a national consensus here that ODA should continue to grow. But having said that, Japan's position in Asia – and I am including not only Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, but South Asia including Bangladesh, Pakistan and so on – is that the share of the Japanese economy in these huge areas which includes nearly half the population of the world, is seventy percent. This is about the same proportion as the US economy is of the Western hemisphere, and much bigger than Germany's position in Europe.

So while among Europeans there is a built-in anxiety regarding the omnipresence of the Germans, our economy is twice as big as that of unified Germany and there are no big economies in Asia like the UK or Italy. So you can understand Asian sentiment towards Japan. It cannot be very comfortable sitting just next door to such a giant; as a Canadian you can understand that. Many parts of Asia were occupied and colonized by the Japanese, so they have a built-in fear. The best solution for Japan is to get together with North Americans and Europeans; other Asians welcome that.

**There are  
so many frustrations  
with our friends across  
the Pacific that there is  
a risk of a repetition  
of the past.**

**Wood:** So the multilateral order really is a very important insulator?

**Sato:** Yes.

**Tanaka:** Even in economic terms I think the importance of having a multilateral framework can be demonstrated. Last year, Japan's exports to east Asia exceeded Japan's exports to the United States. This argument says that Japan has now an option of choosing between East Asia and North America. But economically it is erroneous because those East Asian countries depend very much upon the markets in North America. You simply cannot cut these in two and consider that the Asian market has the same value as the North American. So the option to go with Asia doesn't make any sense.

**Wood:** We have to assume the irrational could happen. Look at the GATT negotiations now: they drag and drag, and from the point of view of consumers all over the world it makes absolute sense for a successful conclusion, yet they could still fail. If GATT failed and Japan felt that it had to choose an option, does the alliance with North America make more sense than the Asian option? Or is that an unfair question?

**Tanaka:** If for political reasons, we have somehow to confront the options you've set out – to choose between the North American and Asian markets – that means we have completely failed in our diplomacy.

**Wood:** The rest of us, too...

The end of the Cold War obviously changes the chessboard in a dramatic way. I heard a very interesting analysis the other day which pointed out that among the four great powers of the North Pacific region – Japan, US, China, and Russia – the only bilateral relationship which has never really been good in this century, is that of Japan and Russia. All the others have fluctuated in alliances and confrontations, but the one that has consistently been bad is Japan and Russia. Obviously the continuing territorial problem, the long legacy of hostility or, frostiness at a minimum, between Japan and the Soviet Union doubled the logic of the American alliance as the basic security arrangement for Japan. How much of that has now disappeared?

**Sato:** The major purpose of the US-Japan alliance since WW II has been to deter the Soviet Union. But the interesting thing is that in spite of the diminishing of the Soviet or Russian threat, the importance of US alliance remains almost the same. There is no plan for the US to radically reduce its military presence in Japan. The US is withdrawing from the Philippines. And once North Korea changes its policies and the Korean peninsula is united, on the basis of the South's economy – and it will be, sooner or later – then the US will withdraw from South Korea as well. But the US will not withdraw from Japan, and the reason why is very obvious: it nicely fits American interests, and Japan's, and the interests of most Asian countries as well.

**Wood:** And this continues to be a first-priority interest for Japan as well, in the sense that it removes the need for Japan to increase its own military expenditures?

**Sato:** It's important not only for Japan, but the US is the only country whose military presence is welcomed by most Asian countries, and Japan's facilities are an absolute precondition for the US maintaining forward deployment of forces in the Eastern Pacific. So this security arrangement has very formal roots and it supported by the international community in the region.

**Isomura:** Basically I agree, however, there is a beginning of what some critics call the *Kembei* phenomenon in the minds of some Japanese. Translated literally, *Kembei* means a dislike of the United States. It's not straight forward anti-Americanism, but still, we are a little fed up with the fact that we have always been under the US umbrella and always dependent on it.

## Most Japanese think that the international game has changed ...

During the crisis in the Gulf, the mass media in Japan often referred to the fact that whenever President Bush picked up his phone to call Mr. Kaifu, our then Prime Minister, he called it the "Bush phone." [In Japan, fast calling, touch tone phones are called "push phones."] In a way, the Japanese delivered an Automatic Teller Machine. Secretary Baker referred to it as the cheque book diplomacy of Japan, but it was ATM diplomacy. This weakness of our politicians has also contributed to a kind of self-hatred for our politicians. However, most reasonable people say that we should have close ties with the United States for the foreseeable future. But there are some nuances to it.

**Wood:** I see a lot of different strands of opinion and concern in Japan which converge on this issue. There is *Kembei*, there is traditional pacifism, there is what you might call a risk-minimizing strategy which says we continue to pursue economic diplomacy and economic goals which have served us well and if there is reduced threat and reduced relevance of military power generally, then so much the better. There is the internationalist view which could be compatible with the sense of taking more direct responsibility, some of it channelled towards the United Nations. And then there are strong nationalist views, cutting across *Kembei*, but more assertive.

**Isomura:** This is not emerging as a national sentiment, and that is fortunate for us. But still, Japanese feel like we are being cornered by our European friends – a cornered rat bites the cat. And that was the cause of our surprise attack at Pearl Harbour. We were encircled by the Americans, British, Dutch and so on. There are so many frustrations in the economic field with our friends across the Pacific and with our friends in Europe, that there is a slight risk of a repetition of the past.

**Imai:** A natural arrangement is for Japan and the US to cooperate. The burden-sharing will be different, but between us we have forty percent of world GNP, and it is an appropriate arrangement for the two countries to be militarily allied. There is a major restructuring of the relationship, and obviously when you go through that sort of process there will be some strong expressions of different views.

As for the problem of Russia, we don't really know what Russia is going to be like – whether it is going to be a country, many coun-

tries with nuclear weapons or what. It is fortunate in a way that we have the Northern Territories issue which will prevent us from having to make quick decisions about what to do about Russia. It is time to wait. We really don't know what is going to happen.

**Tanaka:** In the past, the strongest argument for the maintenance of the alliance [with the Americans] was the fact of the Soviet Union. And the strongest argument in opposition to the alliance was the possible entanglement in a US-USSR world war. So with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the strongest arguments both for and against the alliance have also disappeared. The reasonable argument for the alliance, what was probably the more enduring factor, is emerging – which is what Professor Sato mentioned. But this may not have taken root among the general public and whether it does depends very much on relations with the United States. This is what is important about such sentiments among Japanese.

In my generation, under forty, I don't believe there is any anti-Russian sentiment at all. There is indifference, but then many of us don't know much about Russia. And the value of the Northern Territories issues among the Japanese, particularly under forty, is decreasing. The territories issue has long been a very symbolic one, but it doesn't mean much in material terms. The islands don't have much of a natural resource base, except for fishing. And the territorial issue was once symbolic because it was unjustly occupied by an evil empire, and now that the evil empire is gone, to many Japanese it seems futile simply to press and press for the return of the islands.

As Ambassador Imai said, the general consensus about Russia is that we should wait. But since everybody knows that a large-scale financial contribution to Russia is impractical in any case, I think Japan

should at least make a real symbolic commitment to the betterment of the Russian federation now and had better not wait.

If the Russians are successful, then I think it is important in terms of our international interest for the Japanese to be the ones to help the Russians. If they fail, it is better for the Japanese to have committed to the success of a democratic Russia, otherwise the Japanese may be criticized by others for the Russian failure.

**Sato:** About the Japan-US alliance: there is an argument against the alliance that says, let's replace the bilateral alliance by a multilateral, CSCE-type one.

... from a  
game based on  
military power,  
to a wealth game  
based on economic  
capabilities.



**Wood:** Or even Secretary Baker's references to APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation] and the ASEAN first ministers conferences as a mechanism.

**Sato:** But this argument is not convincing. First of all, even in Europe the CSCE has failed to solve the many regional conflicts, like Yugoslavia, and between Russia and Ukraine. Second, in the Asian region it is much more difficult to establish that kind of huge, region-wide, multi-lateral security framework. We might have some regional framework like ASEAN, and a Two plus Four scheme on the Korean peninsula is possible, but it is premature for us to think about a region-wide security framework.

**Wood:** We have been talking essentially about what the industrialized market economies should be doing. And the interesting question that underlies a lot of this is how do we make this "we" more effective. The G-7 has been a kind of framework, although there is great debate as to how much coordination of what kinds can be managed through the G-7. Your traditional special link with the Americans is very important, but with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has begun to be effective. How are we going to manage these political consultation issues among the industrialized market democracies?

**Isomura:** Among industrial democracies, Japan is the only country which has no framework for political consultations in a multilateral forum. So the G-7, for the time being, is the only high-level consultation forum in which Japan can participate. And inside G-7 France objects to talking about political things there, so the G-7 will not be a political forum for multilateral consultation. The fact is, though, they do talk about a little about political subjects. From the European side, there is a growing interest in having a permanent political consultation with Japan. This type of forum should be expanded or otherwise, and this is more delicate problem, Japan should have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This is more difficult, probably.

**Wood:** It is not a difficult thing from a Canadian point of view, we have been urging this for years, but I know there are some others...

**Sato:** In the UN, Japan's role should grow and in order to encourage the Japanese to take on a bigger responsibility, other countries should accept Japan as a member of the Security Council. Otherwise, it is going to be very difficult for the government to convince the Japanese people to pay higher taxes for a bigger contribution to the UN. Maybe we can change the decision making process of the

Council – abolishing vetoes and having a two-thirds majority decision, something like that. Then there is the strengthening of the G-7.

**Tanaka:** I am not sure whether the Japanese are ready to fulfil the responsibilities that a permanent seat on the Security Council entails. Unless the Japanese domestic process could somehow produce the framework by which Japan could fulfil the responsibility of a permanent member, it could be rather irresponsible of the Japanese to accept a seat.

**Wood:** You raise the question about accepting responsibilities, but perhaps we are at the stage of redefining the responsibilities as well. Japan is a major power. One way or another it will accept major responsibilities for security. It is not a nuclear weapon state and we should not assume that being a nuclear state and being a permanent member of the Security Council is synonymous. What does the responsibility of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council mean?

**Imai:** I think even in *Asahi Shimbun* [a large daily newspaper in Tokyo] there will be an editorial in favour of some arrangement. They will have conditions, but they will be generally in favour of the idea. And that represents a change of opinions and perceptions in Japan. In due course you will have to redefine some of the obligations under Chapter Seven threat to peace and security. But one has to expect a convergence of the willingness to accept responsibilities of some kind, if they are well defined. And permanent membership is a problem not only for Japan but for Germany as well, because then you are talking about three West European countries and the General Assembly is certainly not going to accept that.

**Sato:** Look at China. What kind of responsible role has China been playing? They didn't send any troops to the Gulf, and their contribution is limited to 0.77 percent of the total cost of the UN. Japan is assessed at two and a half percent. If China is a legitimate permanent member of the Security Council, why not Japan? The Permanent Five scheme won't survive. That is the other side of the coin of my argument for the importance of the G-7. The G-7 is a club of wealthy, advanced democracies, which naturally has a bigger responsibility over the management of the global affairs. But the United Nations includes everybody and the decision making process should be more democratic.

**Wood:** The quality of the relationship between Canada and Japan is very different from that of the US or Europe with Japan. We have relatively few frictions, for a number of reasons, and the phenomenon of Japan bashing is hardly known in Canada. Ambassador Kitamura takes the view that among the G-7 partners Canada could potentially be especially useful to Japan because it is a logical bridge to North America and to Europe, and because of the relative depth of the experience in Canada in multilateral diplomacy generally, peace keeping and so on – areas that are now so important to Japan. I have a sense that this potential strategy expressed from a Japanese viewpoint is not very widely shared, and that Canada does not loom large enough in Japanese thinking to be seen as useful. Is that true; is he overstating the case?

**Tanaka:** In terms of multilateralism, Japan should pay more attention to Canada. For example, without having permanent membership on the Security Council Canada has been quite influential in the UN. We could learn a lot. And then peacekeeping operations – I am in great favour of Japanese participation in peace-keeping operations. Also, in the regional area, in order to prevent the complete failure of policy to which you alluded – Japan being forced to choose between Asia and the Pacific – it is important for Japan to realize that the United States is not in North America all alone.

**Isomura:** In the media business, bad news always makes good news and it is fortunate that we have few points of contention with you. But from my experience as being responsible for national television in Japan, I had the opportunity to meet with my colleagues in Canada. I don't know if Canadians are aware of the merit of being able to play the role of bridge between different countries. You need to be aware of the tremendous effect you can have being able to mediate between different places. Especially after 1993, Europe will be a huge entity and Japan should know much more about it. Canada can play a mediator role, and let us know what the European trends are.

**Imai:** I think of Canada as representing what was for the Western alliance a characteristic that Europe increasingly lacks and what the only remaining superpower lacks, and that is a good, commonsense approach to international relationships. That is what you have referred to as a bridge, and we appreciate that. We will need to call on your capabilities as a bridge, more and more.

## If China is a legitimate permanent member of the Security Council, why not Japan?

# FRANCE'S NUCLEAR ALBATROSS

*France is burdened with thirty years of defence doctrines and nuclear hardware that are irrelevant in the new Europe.*

BY FRÉDÉRIC BOZO

**W**ITH THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE EAST AND THE END OF THE Cold War, France lost the central tenet that justified and organized its defence policy. In the years to come, the nation's principal challenge – France being constantly in need of a mission – will be either to invent a new policy, or more probably, live without one.

To understand what is at stake in adapting France's defence capabilities to the post-Cold War period, one has to begin with the legacy of the past. This legacy consists, in the first instance, of a conceptual framework, which from the time of Charles de Gaulle to the present has been made up of three core beliefs: the permanence and centrality of the nation state as player in the international strategic game; the inevitable evolution of European and global systems beyond the US-USSR bipolar confrontation; and finally, the necessity for the North Atlantic alliance (NATO) to mature into a strategic alliance tying Europe and the United States together as equals.

The legacy also consists of hardware – a complex of military forces – and the doctrines and processes for using them, the most important characteristic of which is the almost complete primacy afforded to nuclear weapons. Under these doctrines, France has created and deployed over three decades a unique nuclear weapons arsenal – one that would make it into a “mini-superpower.” From this springs the desire for real technological independence, and the determination to deploy the complete spectrum of nuclear systems, strategic and tactical, organized into the familiar air, land and sea “triad.” In spite of subscribing to “minimum deterrence” as a theory, France has continually modernized and expanded its nuclear arsenal. And, of course, this nuclear preoccupation represents a considerable cost, usually making up more than thirty percent of the country's total annual expenditures on military equipment.

THE MILITARY EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE PAST THIRTY years was a carefully chosen strategic doctrine which focussed above all on the prevention of a conflict that could escalate uncontrollably towards a nuclear apocalypse. Hence the rationale behind France's opposition to NATO's doctrine of “flexible response,” which was seen by France as risking the reintroduction of large scale conflict to Europe.

Since the 1960s, France's conventional armed forces, the poor cousin in the French military, have been structured on the basis that nuclear weapons were the preeminent force. Even the idea of protracted combat in Central Europe was ruled out by strategic concepts that emphasized nuclear deterrence. As a result, French conventional forces were characterized until now, by relatively modest quantities of both equipment and soldiers.

This military legacy is also tied up with France's relationship to NATO. France's military break with NATO in 1966 was at the time mostly attributed to the country's search for greatness, and by some commentators to a temptation towards achieving a status of “non-belligerence.” In fact, however, the break had more subtle objectives, and was pragmatic

in the way it was carried out. While the restoration of a certain amount strategic sovereignty to France was no doubt an issue, the rupture with NATO was above all a question of anticipating the obsolescence and disintegration of the two military blocs. France looked to the day when the idea of a strategically autonomous Western Europe would actually come to pass.

If France's 1966 decision truly marked a rupture within the alliance, it also left room afterwards for a France-NATO relationship that was unique. This relationship was perfectly satisfying from a military point of view, meeting France's commitments to the common defence and obligations as a Western ally, while at the same time reinforcing the country's own strategic and military independence.

SINCE 1989, HOWEVER, THREE STRATEGIC REVOLUTIONS HAVE BROUGHT these essential principles of French defence and security policy into serious question: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the crisis and war in the Gulf in 1990 and 1991, and the Maastricht summit of the European Community in 1991. First of all, the primacy of nuclear weapons as an instrument for balancing Europe's tensions can only become more doubtful as time goes on. While the atom bomb remains an essential component in France's security, most of the scenarios for conflict one can envisage in Europe (Yugoslavia, for example) are not likely to engage France's vital interests and therefore do not justify recourse to the threat to use nuclear weapons, much less to their effective use. So atomic weapons have become for France, like they have for other nuclear states, “weapons of last resort.” Having invested so much, France must now reduce the part nuclear weapons play in its defence policy, both in terms of hardware and in strategic doctrine.

Of course, the role and structure of conventional forces must now also change. Configured to face the massive threat in Europe, trained and equipped for a brief but violent confrontation; these forces are ill-adapted to the new European situation. France's participation in collective security operations now requires mobile forces capable of prolonged engagement, far from their bases, regardless of whether they engage in combat or not.

CLEARLY, FRANCE ANTICIPATED THESE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS TO SOME extent in the early 1980s by creating a rapid action force, or *Force d'action rapide* (FAR), and beginning in 1989, sketching out an ambitious project for rationalizing and restructuring the army – the *Armées 2000* plan. Nevertheless, the effort needs to be deepened, and in the end what should emerge is an army that is smaller in size, better equipped, more capable of operating with forces of other countries, and more able to take part in distant operations.

As for new regional conflicts around the world with which France must be prepared to deal, the nature of the security problems in the “South” are not essentially different from those of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, or the former Soviet Union: border conflicts, confrontations among minorities, the dangers associated with the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and nuclear and chemical weapons. France's participation



in "Desert Storm" highlighted the difficulties of adapting the military instrument to these new strategic realities. Operation "Daguet," involving barely 16,000 soldiers out of a total of close to 500,000, was not essential to the mostly American plan for the liberation of Kuwait. However, the French division, well adapted to its role on the American forces' flank, showed obvious competence and was a useful contribution to the campaign overall.

While sending this division was the result of maximum effort on the part of France, it was still too small, both in comparison with the UK, which managed to send twice as many soldiers, and in comparison with France's own ambitions. The Gulf experience brought out the true extent of the French forces' deficiencies in logistics and mobility. But the main reason for the modest showing in numbers of soldiers fielded stems from a more fundamental structural problem: conscription. While national service may be appropriate to a military whose primary vocation is defending the country's vital interests, conscription is incompatible with missions stemming from collective security which necessarily involve operations far from home territory.

FOR THE SAME REASONS, THE CONFLICT ALSO CONFIRMED THAT A DEFENCE policy resting primarily on nuclear weapons is hardly suitable for international policing missions. Implicity recognizing this during the conflict, President François Mitterrand excluded the possibility of French resort to nuclear weapons, regardless of what course the hostilities might take. Even if the risks of nuclear proliferation in the South (and now in the East) justify the maintenance of a sizeable French nuclear deterrent, the new strategic environment obliges France to re-focus its defence efforts in favour of conventional forces.

A third strategic revolution emerges from the likely future course of the former Western bloc. The Maastricht summit of late 1991 opened the path to political union and eventual common defence among EC members. Much is at stake here for France, because a Europe politically and strategically united would demand more harmony in these areas than did NATO – an alliance which France kept at arm's length. And so there is a double challenge: France must at one and same time continue to be the engine for the strategic unification of Western Europe, of which Maastricht was just the start, by proposing concrete initiatives in the areas of defence and security; and France must also accept the consequences this process will have, both real and symbolic, for its own strategic independence. Obviously, the stakes are especially serious in the nuclear domain, where the *national* character of nuclear decision-making will no doubt be retained for some time to come, but where the *European* dimension of the nuclear deterrent must inevitably grow in importance. In the same manner, to the extent that a single European strategic entity becomes a reality, the issue of NATO also grows in significance.

In this context, greater French participation in NATO's decision-making processes seems necessary – in the Military or the Defence Planning Committees, for example. A return to integrated military structures, however, would not be appropriate, as this would make little sense in the contemporary European political context, and what's more, no one is asking for it.

The challenges presented to French defence policy makers are thus considerable. However, the transformation of the French defence forces, both in its doctrines and internal structures, will be all the more difficult for two reasons. First, there is politics. Until now, the national consensus on defence policy has been in favour of a clear and convincing doc-

trine based on the assumption that France has a role and mission in the world, things that today are rather difficult to imagine. Further, the new strategic realities that influence defence policy call into question central assumptions of French national culture – the most important among these being conscription. And finally, the exigencies of current domestic politics – particularly the upcoming series of elections – is highly unfavourable for a long-term effort aimed to resolve these problems.

Then there are the constraints caused by economic trends and France's financial situation. It would be an illusion to imagine that defence spending is going to exceed 3 percent of GDP, and the current trend is somewhere between 2.8 and 2.9 percent. And money is not the only problem: there are considerable economic and social stakes for the country involved in the future health of French defence industries. In sum, the options available to the government are very few and would tend to favour carrying on more or less as before.

THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCERNABLE MOVEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR weapons front in the last few months, however. While one hesitates to speak of reductions in the nuclear arsenal, it is clear that the growth in their numbers has been interrupted – something unimaginable a few years ago. A plausible outcome is that the strategic ground-to-ground element of the nuclear triad will be abandoned because of the imminent obsolescence of the missiles deployed on the Albion Plateau, and the

decision not to proceed with a mobile ground-based missile. The sea-based weapons will remain the backbone of the deterrent force thanks to a new generation of ballistic missile submarines. And last, the decision to postpone indefinitely the operational deployment of Hades missiles, and the possibility that these will be included in treaty bargaining that would eliminate short-range mis-

siles in Europe, means that France is heading towards the abandonment of a tactical (or "pre-strategic") nuclear capacity. Eventually, the French deterrent will rest exclusively on a simple strategic "dyad." In short, the preeminence of nuclear weapons is plainly under challenge.

At the same time, the new structure of conventional forces is becoming evident – especially the ground forces. By 1995 the current level of 280,000 will decline to about 225,000. To help achieve this objective, the length of compulsory military service has been reduced to ten months, and the professional, voluntary units within the *Force rapide* will be reinforced. Furthermore, a new command structure will be adopted for the army, placing more emphasis on inter-army operations, and on creating "modular" military formations allowing for more flexible management of the forces during crisis situations.

IN SPITE OF THESE NEW TRENDS, HOWEVER, FRANCE'S DEFENCE POLICY IN 1992 is characterized by great uncertainty. Crucial choices remain to be made in many cases – the largest outstanding one being what to do about conscription. This system has been in crisis for many years, it responds less and less to the republican requirement of universality, is ill-equipped to cope with the new strategic realities, and is too far gone for a quick fix. Other painful decisions will also need to be taken in the years to come: equipment and programmes, defence industries, nuclear doctrine, and relations with NATO and Europe – items that have been put off until now. Perhaps even more serious is the fact that France has yet to engage in a true national debate on defence and security issues. Such a debate is essential in order to clarify the choices the future holds and above all, to elicit the nation's consent.



Jerry Kolacz

# A CLEAR GATHERING OF MIRACULOUS SUCCESS

*Winning the Nobel Peace Prize drew world attention to Aung San Suu Kyi's political struggle, and to Myanmar's brutal authorities.*

BY JOHN BADGLEY

**T**HE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR 1991 awarded Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi focused world opinion upon her, and upon the country's dreaded junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Expecting to crush her spirit and the upstart opposition she led, SLORC, as it is known, had placed her under house arrest in July 1989. Instead, the tactic backfired and her National League for Democracy captured eighty percent of the seats in elections in May 1990. In eschewing armed resistance, Aung San Suu Kyi's electoral success stripped Burma's regime of any lingering legitimacy, and revealed its power base to be simply guns and a willingness to use them.

Decrees issued since SLORC's coup d'état on 18 September 1988 have justified brutal oppression with regulations originally written and used by the British during colonial rule, and with edicts created by U Nu, the country's first prime minister, who resorted briefly to martial law during his own term of office.

Since the coup, a series of historical treatises published by SLORC's chairman, General Saw Maung, and its intelligence chief, Major General Khin Nyunt, reveal extraordinary xenophobia and distortions of fact. An indicator of their mindset was the redesignation of Burma as "Myanmar," the Burmese language term used by ethnic Burmans for their empire – a step akin to that of the Khmer Rouge in changing Cambodia to Kampuchea, and the Nazi determination that Germany should be called the Third Reich.

Tyrants generally rewrite their own history, but the innovation of SLORC's new Historical Commission was to pretend allegiance to the rule of law by holding free elections, then flagrantly violate the very civil codes and criminal laws it claimed to preserve while securing enormous financial benefits for its confederates.

BURMA'S CIVIL STRIFE OVER THE FOUR DECADES since independence in 1948 has been labelled an "insurgency." Both ethnic and ideological guerrilla forces have fought Rangoon's armies, usually in isolation from each other, and with devastating consequences for the economy and for Burma's people. General Saw Maung estimated the population has suffered over a

million casualties, probably an exaggeration but closer to the truth than ever admitted by General Ne Win, the *éminence grise* who overtly governed between 1958 and 1960, and again from 1962 to 1988. Ne Win has covertly guided policy since, but remains obscured behind the State Council, a demonic wizard in a land not unlike Oz, where the Queens of Light and Darkness struggle for dominance.

THANKS TO THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, THE world has now met the good queen, Aung San Suu Kyi – literally, "clear gathering of miraculous success" – daughter of Aung San. Her father founded Burma's independence army during the Japanese occupation, and later led the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in its drive for independence. Ne Win, one of his trusted lieutenants, took over his military role when Aung San became president of the AFPFL. Aung San's task was two-fold: negotiate independence from Britain, and find common ground among fractious domestic groups, Burma's two communist parties and the larger ethnic minorities. He was remarkably successful on both counts, but tragically was assassinated six months before independence.

Ne Win struggled for years to build the army into a force able to dominate the various rebels in order to enable U Nu's democratically elected government to create a rational economic process that would modernize the entire country. But the government's devout socialism frightened foreign investors, already uncertain about profits in a nation plagued by ideological and ethnic warfare. Burma slowly fell behind most of its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Justifying his coup d'état by the failings in the economy and threats to the constitutional structure from minorities, Ne Win led the military from the battlefield into politics in 1962. He launched an aggressive development scheme, the "Burmese Way to Socialism," which was, in fact, motivated by xenophobic fears of indigenous Chinese and Indian owned business. But Ne Win's goals were compromised by his own political and administrative ineptitude: corruption grew and the insurgencies continued to smoulder. By 1988, the stage was set for

a major explosion that led to his resignation as chairman of Burma's only legal political party, the Burma Socialist Program Party.

Two governments came and went in quick succession. The first, lead by Ne Win's amanuensis and former body guard, General Sein Lwin, attempted to suppress mounting popular demonstrations by force, mowing down thousands in the streets. It ended after only eighteen days. The second regime, led by Dr. Maung Maung (one of Burma's leading authors and jurists) lasted ten days longer than the first, but was marked by strong peace overtures to the National League for Democracy (NLD), and promises of an open economy, freedom of the press, and liberalization of travel. Still the demonstrations grew larger.

On 26 August 1988, five hundred thousand people gathered in the shadow of Rangoon's most famous shrine, the Shwe Dagon Pagoda, to hear Aung San Suu Kyi speak out for freedom. She had returned to Burma only months before after twenty years abroad.\* Among those listening was Dr. Sanda Win, Ne Win's favourite daughter, a British-trained physician, and no less ambitious than Aung San's daughter. Watching her father being challenged by Aung San Suu Kyi, she perceived a competing queen for the throne.

SANDA WIN SET ABOUT REDEEMING HER FATHER'S place in history. Playing on his obsession with security, she moved from her post as a gynaecologist in a medical school to major in the army, with sole responsibility for the old man's health. Ne Win's daughter not only became his chief diagnostician, but also his gate-keeper. With Military Intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt's help, she kept him informed about his enemies.

Sanda Win's capacity for malevolence was observed during the uprisings of 1988, when fellow doctors allege she supplied pain-deadening, fear-suppressing narcotics to agents who were then sent out to give poisoned drinking water to student marchers and demonstrators. The agents were themselves then hacked to death

\*Aung San Suu Kyi left Burma at age fifteen, continued her education in India, earned history honours at Oxford University and established a career in New York at the United Nations. Her key writings are found in *Freedom From Fear*, Viking Press, 1991.



by mobs. Captured Burmese soldiers report a similar fear-suppressing drug being used in suicide attacks against entrenched insurgent armies.

Perhaps most frightening to the Burmese public is her association with Military Intelligence, which has a well-documented reputation for torturing students and opposition politicians. According to Amnesty International some ten thousand people have "disappeared," and thousands more languish in prisons. While it is a bit romantic to see Sanda Win as the Queen of Darkness – a demonic reincarnation from a classic Ramayana tale – it is nonetheless a powerful incentive among followers of Aung San Suu Kyi who see her pitted against Sanda Win in an epic contest.

Complicating this struggle between good and evil by the daughters of modern Burma's founding fathers, is the reality of a society of forty-one million people, where over a hundred ethnic dialects are spoken, and where ethnic Burmans constitute two-thirds of the population, Karens another ten percent, the Shans and Arakanese some one and a half to two million each, and all the other minorities totalling under a million.

ALTHOUGH BURMA IS A SHANGRI-LA TOURIST destination, a land of meditation centres and serene beauty, it shares with all societies a lively connection between money and politics. While the vast majority of people live barely above subsistence level, the national economy is dominated by a few hundred families, military officers and civilian collaborators who award import-export licenses, regulate investment ventures, connive with smugglers, and surreptitiously trade heroin and opium. Ne Win has been especially adept in protecting loyal officers, who "triple-dip" with high salaries as members of the military, as civilian administrators, and through pensions of land, businesses, and access to scarce foreign goods denied even most middle class Burmese.

Like a giant pyramid scheme, a generation of Burmese have tolerated increasing corruption and abuse of human rights with the hope that they too would come out ahead; but tragedy is now upon them. The government has passed into the hands of Orwellian criminals who govern by using every form of double-speak and intimidation. The good people who struggled to make the system just and workable, now despair for their children.

For decades after independence a tacit arms embargo by the international community kept warfare in Burma at a low intensity. Limited amounts of Chinese weapons flowed to the Burma Communist Party (BCP), Western countries and private corporations supplied



Rangoon's military, while the ethnic insurgents traded teak, jade, opium, and cattle for arms and ammunition from China and Thailand. Few modern weapons were introduced into the savage little battles that characterized Burmese warfare. However, Beijing's decision to stop aiding the BCP reflected a change in their political judgement as to how China's interests could best be served. Recurrent animosity with India and the ongoing struggle with Vietnam through the 1980s prompted a desire for a stable southeastern frontier. The Chinese sought allies with the military in both Bangkok and Rangoon, and large weapons sales to Thailand in the mid-1980s were followed by a US \$1.2 billion deal with Burma in 1990.

Aircraft, helicopters, large field guns, medical and logistic supplies, and vast amounts of ammunition boosted Burma's military almost overnight. In the fall of 1991 the Karens successfully reopened their insurgency in the Irawaddy delta, and set battles against entrenched positions have become more frequent as Rangoon's armies have grown (from 160,000 to 280,000 in five years), and the numbers of casualties have increased accordingly.

A major irony is the financial gain SLORC has received from Western petroleum companies, which have poured millions into Burma since 1988, even while their governments have condemned the human rights abuses. Engaging in the hunt for oil and gas contributes hard currency vital to keeping the regime afloat, and despite recent widespread condemnation by the world's democracies, an unprecedented unanimous resolution by the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly demanding the release of all political prisoners and recognition of the 1990 election results – the situation remains unchanged.

IT IS ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT INSIDE THE country and the greed of the leadership that is likely to prove the regime's undoing. Although goods are plentiful, inflation has driven the prices of imports and even basic foods beyond the reach of many people. Even the families of

soldiers, protected in the past from such hardships, are now suffering. Anyone not linked to SLORC struggles for survival. It is also true that the opposition that briefly coalesced around the NLD in the 1990 elections seems shattered; the multiple fractures of ethnicity, competing economic interests, and the corruption endemic in Burma's massive narcotics trade (over half the heroin on the world market now comes from the Golden Triangle in the Shan States) gives little hope that any well-managed regime can pull itself quickly out of the ruins when SLORC finally collapses.

The international community must be prepared to move quickly in helping Aung San Suu Kyi reform the NLD and carry out the mandate given by the population in the 1990 election. Time will be needed to form a new constitution responsive at last to minority interests, and to recruit the thousands of Burmese, abroad and at home, who are competent to manage government. New textbooks must be written, the universities and education system restructured, the courts reformed, and private corporations given a chance to grow apart from the machinations of public officials. A United Nations presence will very probably be called for, and substantial economic assistance required.

AUNG SAN SUU KYI IS A NOVICE POLITICIAN and an inexperienced administrator, although her UN work on administrative and budget questions engaged her in large policy issues. Assuming she survives incarceration, she will have rough sailing ahead indeed, given the fractious divisions within Burma, and the enormous problems left by Ne Win and SLORC.

Burma's neighbours will play a decisive role in shaping a successor government. The ASEAN countries, China, and India have common interests in stability. With the manoeuvring necessary to survive the Cold War a waning habit, abetting a neighbour's corruption and state terror is not in the interest of adjacent governments who are themselves seeking foreign investment, millions of tourists, and leadership roles in the region.

Burma's immediate future is bleak, but the longer run could well be brighter. Japan and the other Western democracies will be important sources of finance, as they are in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, but their roles will be most crucial in helping the country re-enter the world after nearly thirty years of isolation. The abuse of its citizens by Ne Win and the regimes he fostered has cost an entire generation its birthright. Until very recently, no foreign government condemned his policies – a contradiction it has taken far too long to correct.

# OPERATION ZERO – FIDEL'S LAST HURRAH?

*For the first time since the 1959 revolution Fidel Castro's charisma might not be enough to keep the old regime alive.*

BY EDGAR J. DOSMAN AND JOHN M. KIRK

**W**ITH THE OVERTHROW OF COMMUNISM in Eastern Europe, it was commonplace in 1989 to predict that Cuba's Fidel Castro would himself soon be overthrown. And without doubt, Cuba is now facing the most severe crisis of its thirty-three year revolution: shortages in fuel have led to many problems, food has been rationed more seriously than at any time in the last thirty years, the number of buses in use has been cut by almost half, the workday reduced by nearly thirty percent, and subsidized workplace meals eliminated.

But a political analogy with Central and Eastern Europe fails to take into account the basic differences between Cuba and the Eastern bloc countries. Unlike them Cuba was not carved out of post-World War II Europe, but rather saw a popular revolution unite opponents of dictator Fulgencio Batista in a widely supported coalition. And unlike leaders in Eastern Europe, Fidel Castro has remained popular among important sectors of his population. Finally, the short-sighted obsession with Cuba held by Washington has been skilfully used by Castro to rally nationalistic sentiment behind the revolution.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA HAS SOUGHT TO lessen the difficulties faced by Cubans by imaginative means: some 700,000 bicycles have been imported from China, 100,000 oxen have been trained for agricultural work (with another 100,000 currently in training) carrier pigeons are being used again to deliver some mail, baby chicks have been provided to households for people to raise, and a massive effort has been put in place to encourage people to work in the countryside producing food. Comparisons with Eastern Europe aside, the question remains whether all this will suffice to shore up the Castro government – or whether the long-suffering populace will rebel against continued adversity.

The most obvious cause of the current crisis is the demise of the Soviet Union, upon which Cuba has depended since the United States broke off diplomatic relations in January 1961. Some basic statistics show the level of that

dependency: 75% of Cuba's trade, 40% of its food imports and 90% of its fuel were tied up with the Soviet Union. The demise of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe had some impact on Cuba's centrally planned economy, but the unravelling of the USSR sealed its fate. Its principal market and supplier have disappeared in one fell swoop, and the disorganization and in-fighting among the Commonwealth of Independent States augurs ill for Cuba's trade prospects with this traditional market.

A FURTHER FACTOR TO BE EXAMINED IS THE ROLE of the Cuban government. For more than three decades, the ruthless, brilliant, cantankerous, innovative and single-minded leadership of Fidel Castro has directed the national political strategy. To a large degree it has worked: Cuba's social network (particularly in the fields of education, health care and job creation) is exemplary for any country, developed or not. In short, the model was a viable development option for Cuba – as long as the relationship with Moscow held firm.

In a speech given in November 1991 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the massive literacy campaign of 1961 (which reduced illiteracy from 24% to 4%) President Castro explained the essential strength of the Cuban revolutionary model. He compared his government's approach to the current "special period," with measures capitalist governments typically employ in tough economic times. In Cuba no workers had been laid off, no schools or hospitals closed, no factories boarded up. Supplies had been severely reduced, he noted, but this had been done on a basis that was equitable for all. In this he was absolutely correct, for the revolutionary ethos encountered in Cuban society – unlike the system found in the former socialist bloc – clearly has fostered a political "conciencia" or social awareness.

What Fidel did not explain was that instead of dividing up available resources equitably (so that all Cubans received similar benefits), the "pie" could have been far larger if the government – and he in particular – had been more pragmatic. For more than thirty years his gov-

ernment has shrugged off adversity, developing its personalistic approach to politics, while ignoring all those who disagreed. It worked in the past – but then he had always had the Soviet safety net.

Even in today's omnipresent difficulties – the *Comandante en Jefe* embodies many national characteristics. Fidel is the person who has brought this small country – population eleven million – to the centre of the world stage on many occasions, and who has carefully nurtured the nationalism and sense of dignity which is such a component of the Cuban identity, and which is so often misunderstood by Western political commentators.

Fidel Castro still enjoys widespread personal popularity in Cuba. His tireless endeavours on behalf of his people, electrifying public rapport, and widely recognized communication skills are legendary. Yet it is also true that his power base and popularity are slowly and steadily shrinking, and that many are quietly questioning whether Fidel is up to the challenges posed by a post-Soviet world. The irony of the current dilemma is that, for most Cubans, the revolution without Fidel is inconceivable, yet in order to progress in the 1990s it is abundantly clear that a radically new approach is required. It is a paradox which has to be resolved if the Cuban revolution is to survive, since the traditional policy of "muddling through" by means of charismatic appeals and political voluntarism is no longer viable.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA – LIKE ITS First Secretary – is also facing a crisis of identity. Despite small perquisites for its members, the party has never been the elitist organization found in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Cubans are not rushing out to burn their party cards or renounce their memberships. Yet the October 1991 congress of the party showed clearly that it has to reform itself radically if it wants to retain the loyalty of the Cuban people.

One major step taken in October was to allow Cubans – for the first time – to elect their deputies to the National Assembly. That this absolutely necessary first step should only be taken more than thirty years after the revolutionary victory speaks volumes about the



reasons behind the political crisis facing Cuba. During all that time, Cubans have been socialized to believe that the government knew best, and responded en masse with cries of *Comandante en Jefe, ordene!* ("Commander in Chief, tell us what to do"). The time has clearly arrived for the revolutionary government to have more faith in the population at large, and to decentralize its authority.

THE WESTERN MEDIA TRADITIONALLY MISREPRESENTS Cuba, largely because it does not understand the revolutionary ethic which permeates its very essence. The Cuban people are indeed a revolutionary people: they have put the entire "developed" world to shame by their extremely generous civilian and humanitarian aid programmes throughout the developing world, and traditionally have inculcated a spirit of cooperation and sharing in domestic chores. Perhaps just as important, they are fully aware that life for Cuban exiles in the United States is not that easy – with scarce job opportunities, as well as racism and limited access to health care facing exiles there.

At the same time they are distraught at the idea of continued (and apparently endless) belt-tightening that is expected of them. An increasing number also feel that it is time for them to have more say in the direction of the government's policies, and to be given greater access to information. The world has changed irrevocably, they claim, yet the government – Fidel Castro especially – continue with the basic approaches of three decades ago. The economic model is clearly unworkable, the Communist Party largely incapable of resolving the nation's difficulties, and significant political change is needed if Cuba is to weather the international storm roaring all around it. Yet so far the government has given little indication that it means to make any significant changes.

ONE INNOVATIVE IDEA BEING PURSUED BY THE government shows the degree of desperation felt by Fidel Castro. It involves a piece of legislation – Law 50, enacted a decade ago, but only recently pursued with some determination – that eagerly seeks foreign investment. Joint enterprises are sought, combining foreign investment and resources with domestic plant and skilled labour. Generous provisions in the law allow profits to be repatriated in hard currency, with the industry eventually passing to Cuban hands.

At the same time that foreign capital is being wooed, individual Cubans are largely forbidden from seeking to develop their own

talents. This approach to the idea of capitalism as a catalyst for socialist development is of course heresy from the perspective of Marxist theory. The fact that a double standard should be applied to the Cuban people is, moreover, a matter for great concern. In addition, the continued emphasis on foreign tourism to bring in badly-needed hard currency, continues to frustrate Cubans who are increasingly isolated from the best beaches, hotels and restaurants, and excluded from the "dollar stores" where foreigners only can shop.

IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY WHAT WILL evolve in Cuba. A direct military intervention by the United States (as seen in Grenada or

to the revolutionary cause, encouraging them to tighten their belt and wait for better days. Yet this is a process of ever-diminishing returns, and for the first time in thirty-three years the charisma might not be sufficient.

Whether Castro succeeds or not, it is clearly time for a series of dramatic changes – both of the revolutionary leadership and of the economic model – and not just the relative tinkering that resulted from the recent party congress. While the Cuban population is clearly in favour of maintaining the gains of the revolution, they want the same rights being offered foreign investors, and they seek a greater political say over their lives. Perhaps most important, they seek some hope for a stable economic environment in which they can again have sufficient food and medicine.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN CUBA confronts Canadian policy-makers with the need to evaluate alternative scenarios. It is not impossible to imagine one which would benefit Canadian interests and harmonize with Canada's traditional policy of support for Cuba's right to determine its own destiny. Such an option would involve an evolution of democratic electoral practices and the introduction of sufficient market mechanisms to allow the reintegration of Cuba in the inter-American family. This process of gradual change would

take place within the context of the revolution, building on its foundations in the post-Soviet era under internal Cuban leadership. This option would be heartily endorsed by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil, Cuba's most significant Latin American neighbours. For Canada this scenario would permit not merely the retention but the expansion of trade, investment and scientific and technological cooperation, building on our well-deserved prestige within Cuba for having maintained relations since the revolution in 1959.

While Canada has a clear interest in Cuba's gradual, peaceful integration into the inter-American system, our ability to influence the course of events is severely constrained. Canada's divergence from US policy towards Cuba from the time of the revolution, and its intermittent criticisms of American actions against Cuba, have become a symbol of our autonomy in inter-American foreign policy. Unfortunately these policy differences have had little impact in Washington. In these circumstances, the reintegration of Cuba in the Americas will be a formidable test for Canadian foreign policy as we seek an active and constructive role with our Latin partners in the newly emerging inter-American system.



Panama) is unlikely, as is an internal coup. Yet pressure is building from below with the economic squeeze, and this may embolden extremist elements in the powerful US Cuban community. A combination of seige mentality in Havana and the triumphalist noose-tightening in Miami could aggravate the present crack-down on dissidents in the face of a perceived national security threat. However, the continued popularity of Fidel Castro – despite the awesome economic difficulties facing the nation – should not be underestimated.

The most likely scenario, therefore, is the continuation of the current approach by the government, with Castro again seeking to kickstart an ailing economy while acting as a catalyst for revolutionary unity. It has worked on many occasions before, although never have the storm clouds gathering on the horizon loomed so ominously. The government's strategy will entail an ongoing appeal to nationalist sentiment, while the economy grinds down relentlessly, and the next stage of the official plan (gloomily, but accurately entitled "Operation Zero") is steadily prepared. In the past, Fidel Castro's clear convictions and charisma have been sufficient to rally Cubans

# FIGHTING GOD, MAGHREB'S POLITICAL TURMOIL

*The successes achieved by Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria's first democratic elections are a serious threat to peace and stability throughout the region.*

BY ABDELHAMID GMATI

**T**HE SPECTACULAR SUCCESS OF THE Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria's first democratic elections\* last December has profound implications for the varied populations and governments of the North Africa Maghreb region, other Arab countries, and the rest of the free world. The precedent of Iran is disquieting – an unease only increased by the fact that FIS's victories were won at the ballot box, whereas in Iran, Islamists seized power by force.

Reactions to the win were immediate and intense: "Algeria's future was ruined," "freedom and human rights buried." An immense demonstration on 2 January drew more than 300,000 people into the streets "to save democracy." FIS and its sympathizers were conciliatory; "Algeria is not Iran," they said. But what is going on? Is there reason to fear these new Islamists? Are they a threat to the region and to the stability of international relations in general?

WHILE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM HAS RECENTLY become a political and social force that cannot be ignored, the origins of the movement go back to the beginning of this century, and to Egypt. Here, theologians advocated fundamentalism as a weapon against colonial masters and as a safeguard for Arab-Muslim culture against the dangers of assimilation. Islamic political movements gradually took shape supporting embryonic Arab nationalism where it was strong, and at the same time trying to fill the political vacuum whenever nationalism failed. Even former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who for a while was the standard-bearer of Arab unity and nationalism, had serious problems with his "muslim brothers." Nasser violently suppressed the fundamentalists and they remained a minority grouping confined to Egypt and Sudan, only heard from via occasional acts of violence.

\*The first round of voting in the legislative elections was held 26 December 1991. The fundamentalists of FIS emerged victorious, with 24.9% of the 13.3 million registered voters and 47.5% of the votes cast: very close to an absolute majority (188 seats out of 430). The second round, planned for 16 January 1992, was postponed following the resignation on 11 January of the President of the Republic, Chadli Benjedid.

Towards the middle of the 1970s, Islamism appeared in the countries of the Maghreb. First in the mosques, where the speeches of the new *imams* had become political, virulently denouncing the governments of the region and the West; then in the street, where the first of the beards and veils, or *hidjab*, began to appear. The wearing of beard and veil sprang from the desire of fundamentalists to be separate from what they judged to be an "impure" environment.

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT IT WAS THE EXISTING regimes themselves that fostered fundamentalist movements. The moment they achieved independence, the countries of the Maghreb launched into vast development efforts centred on secularism and modernity. But at the same time, they sought to serve their own ends and advance reforms more effectively by embracing religion on behalf of the state. Furthermore, beginning in the 1960s, they played religion off against the political left in order to counteract the Marxists, by introducing religious instruction into the schools, multiplying the number of places of worship, encouraging theological teaching and promoting, to the point of excess, programmes for Arabization and Islamization.

Before long, however, the Maghreb countries were in crisis. To failed economic policies, the absence of democracy, and the monolithic nature of single party governments, were added the leaderships' corruption and poor management. The omnipresence of the state fostered a privileged class and created a welfare mentality among the population. Existing inequalities were exacerbated, unemployment rose and out-migration from rural areas led to overcrowding in urban regions – a whole population felt itself abandoned and destitute. The young felt utterly disoriented by the arrival of consumer culture and found themselves excluded from the system. With the resulting profound identity crisis, and in the absence of another motivating ideology, the return to ancestral values and to religion became for many the only recourse.

It was in this climate of widespread disaffection that fundamentalism flourished. First, in Tunisia, it profited from the secularism of the regime that had promulgated the *Code du statut personnel*, a law that abolished polygamy

and gave women equal rights with men. Enshrining as it did the emancipation of women, the law was never completely accepted either within the country, or in the wider Arab world. In fact, Tunisian authorities had to retreat before Algerian and Saudi pressure, among others, and abandon plans for more reform to the laws of succession, inheritance and adoption.

Finding their recruits from among unemployed and disenchanting youth, the fundamentalists did well for themselves denouncing Tunisia's impious, atheistic regime for being incapable of resolving society's problems, enslaved to the West, and at one with the devil. In vain, the regime tried to outdo the Islamists at their own game by broadcasting prayers on radio and television, closing bars, and instituting programmes of Islamic instruction and the like. But nothing helped; the agitation continued and the fundamentalism of the "barbus" – the beards – permeated all layers of society.

The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) which in 1989 took on the name *Ennahdha*, the "rebirth," in order to get around Tunisia's new election laws prohibiting open political party affiliation with religious groups, arranged a series of violent incidents at universities and in tourist centres. The response of the government oscillated between repression and rapprochement.

A SIMILAR SCENARIO UNFOLDED IN ALGERIA, where the situation was exacerbated by the socialist economic experiment, even though care had been taken to eliminate expressions such as "the class struggle" or "the abolition of private property" from public discourse. The current of fundamentalism spread to the mosques, the university, the coffee houses, and the street. While many factions sprang up, it was the Islamic Salvation Front, created in February 1989, that proved to be the most steadfast. The first to profit from the new winds of democracy that followed the 1988 riots in the capital Algiers, FIS quickly obtained legal recognition, and in 1990 carried off municipal elections brilliantly, winning mayoralty races in the large cities, including Algiers.

In Morocco the story is different. As early as 1961 the then King Mohammed V (father of



the current sovereign Hassan II) established himself both as head of state and as leader of the religious community. Claiming to be descended from the prophet Mohammed, he marginalized the traditional religious leaders so as to personally embody Islamic legitimacy. Despite Morocco's multi-party approach to politics generally, the King holds his power by "divine right" and is above the law. No one can criticize him, put his person in question, or contest his acts. As a result, fundamentalist movements in Morocco have been confined mostly to the cultural realm and have not been able to present alternative political solutions. This may be changing, judging from recent bloody events at the university, where Islamic fundamentalist students clashed violently with their leftist counterparts. The resulting arrests, injuries, and deaths from this episode, almost certainly guarantee there will be other incidents.

WHAT IS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM? CONTRARY to appearances, it is not an organized movement; at its core it is a feeling of shared identification, of affirmation of self and of one's differences, in the cultural sense. As the Egyptian historian Mohammed Said Al-Ashmaoui states in his book *L'Islamisme contre l'Islam*, it is not a question of theological controversy, but rather of being against certain kinds of political regimes. The Koran is invoked mostly as a substitute for existing norms and socio-political reference points, as a way to clearly set the movement apart from the cultures of the West, and not as a metaphysical and religious resource. Generally, people become attached to a charismatic personality in the movement, rather than to an organization and its particular programme.

The ultimate goal of Islamic fundamentalism is the creation of "Islamic Republics" along the lines of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Nothing substantial is spelled out in the economic, political and social arenas, other than that democracy will be guaranteed by the *Choura* – or, as its name in Arabic indicates, consultative assembly, itself not defined. The judicial apparatus will be regulated by the *Charia*, Islamic law, based above all on tradition – the Koran contains only eighty verses dedicated to legal matters, out of a total of 6,200. There is also the rejection of Western democracy, and above all a diminution in the status of women – something of a major preoccupation of the fundamentalists.

Until now, the Islamists' strategy has been limited to harassment and violent action. In Algeria, three weeks before last December's elections, they attacked a frontier post of the National Guard, causing injuries and some deaths. The army retaliated, arresting

the majority of the members of the group responsible, who, it turned out, had been trained in Afghanistan. In Tunisia, the fundamentalist plot uncovered last May aimed at assassinating the Chief of State would have used, among other sophisticated weapons, American *Stinger* missiles furnished by the Afghan *moudjahidin*.

The Iranian revolution has undoubtedly served as catalyst, an example that was followed in Sudan and Pakistan. And all of these fundamentalist groups, while forthrightly nationalistic, have not neglected to cultivate relationships among themselves. They have even established a kind of fundamentalist "internationale," with headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan. But Iran of the Shia and Saudi Arabia of the Wahhabi are to some extent competing for the leadership of these fundamentalist forces. The competition is purely political of course, since in the religious domain both practice a conception of Islam that closes the door to all progress and turns in on itself.

For the middle class as well as for most of the senior government and private sector officials, Islamic fundamentalism is regressive and retrograde – an obstacle to scientific and technological progress. And even though disenchantment with the present social and economic conditions runs throughout the population, many still refuse to come out in favour of the *barbus* – the "beards."

IN ALGERIA, IT WAS THE ARMY THAT DECIDED TO put a brake on fundamentalist power, which it regarded as an obstacle to its own power and ambitions. An April 1991 editorial in the army newspaper *Al Jaich* explained the concerns of a military traumatized by the Gulf War, and made a point of opposing what it considered to be the beginnings of Western hegemony. At the same time, it did not hesitate to brand the fundamentalists the "objective allies of this Western strategy." Still, the army is anxious to accelerate the country's access to science and technology, and to rebuild its own military arsenal, nuclear weapons not excluded.

For fundamentalists the "Satanism" of the West is a recurrent theme, with the Americans and French being the most strongly condemned for their actions during the Gulf crisis. This position has religious roots to be sure, but secularism and all that stems from it – like democracy – is a threat to the fundamentalists' power and is held up to ridicule. But this position serves electoral purposes as well.

As in the case of Iran, a fundamentalist regime needs an external enemy. There would certainly be relationships with the West, based on economic self-interest, but these would be limited and difficult. For the Maghreb as a whole, the prices of raw materials and energy (oil and gas) would likely be unstable and OPEC's internal dynamics would change substantially with the reinforcement of the "hard-line" camp (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria). The Maghreb market, representing nearly 100 million people, could not long remain the private preserve of France – something Islamic leaders have already hinted at.

Since the fundamentalists are nationalists first and are not united, even if they do forge links among themselves, it is unlikely that their nations' international policies can be unified. We can expect conflict where national interests diverge, and some observers believe that in the Maghreb and elsewhere, the question of borders inherited from the colonial era will be the first point of confrontation. "Little" Tunisia thus has everything to fear from an Algeria ruled by fundamentalists. Tunisia's social and political system, tilting towards democracy and economic liberalism under the current leadership, would be under severe threat.

THE PROBLEM NOW IS HOW TO CONFRONT AND combat what a significant portion of the population considers to be a serious menace. The regimes in power have not been able to subdue the fundamentalists, either by repression, or conciliation – as former Algerian president Benjedid learned to his cost. While the wind of democracy has begun to blow through the region – in Tunisia and Algeria – fundamentalism amounts to religious dictatorship, and those in power ask themselves: "must we allow the enemies of democracy to use democracy to destroy it?"

The installation in Algeria of the High State Council to run the country and wage a fierce battle against FIS is hotly debated by democratic purists. Some see in the Council the only hope for a democratic transition; the only chance to plant democracy on solid foundations. There are still others who go as far as to prefer a military dictatorship – at least the people can rise up against the army; it is much harder to fight God.



# MOVING MOUNTAINS IN RIO

*We should probably not expect very much from June's UN "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro – then again, maybe we'll be surprised.*

BY DAVID RUNNALLS

**I**N JUNE, UP TO SEVENTY-FIVE PRIME MINISTERS AND PRESIDENTS WILL meet in Rio de Janeiro to discuss the fate of the earth. Before you conclude that this is just more alarmist eco-babble, consider the basic question facing the Earth Summit. If we cannot adequately provide for the present population of the planet without placing undue strains on the environment, is it realistic to expect to be able to furnish a decent standard of living for twice as many?

Few would deny that our present population is already putting severe strains on many of the planet's vital systems, yet many of the almost five and a half billion people in the world place relatively small burdens on the environment. More than one and a half billion people live in wretched poverty, garbage dumps, shanty towns or resourceless rural areas. In the last fifteen years, the number of poor people have increased by 81% in Africa, 55% in Asia and more than doubled in Latin America. The United Nations estimates that 500 million people in the Third World are either unemployed or underemployed – equal to the entire work force of the industrialized world. At the same time, the demographers tell us that we cannot escape a doubling of world population to ten billion by the middle of the next century and some place it as high as fourteen billion.

THIS IS PRECISELY THE QUESTION WHICH FACED THE WORLD COMMISSION on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission, after its Chair, the Norwegian Prime Minister). In its ground breaking 1987 report, the Commission pointed out that the earth's economy and its ecology were so closely interlocked that economic policies which ignored that reality were bound for failure. One of the keys to its new, "sustainable development" agenda which has made it so popular is that it appears to be a "win-win" programme. It points toward a world which is more prosperous as well as ecologically more sustainable by merging elements of the traditional environmental agenda with elements of the traditional economic agenda. The result is growth of a radically different kind: growth which is far less energy and raw material intensive, which helps to preserve the world's ecological capital rather than run it down, and which is far more equitably distributed both within and among the nations of the world. Although some are deeply suspicious of such an approach, it has found a good deal of favour with the Canadian public.

Brundtland made the environment into a mainstream economic issue of the same level of importance as job creation, export growth and the like. Recognizing this, the Secretary-General of the Rio meeting, Maurice Strong, decided to raise the ante. Strong persuaded the UN General Assembly that at least part of the meeting should be a heads-of-government summit, bringing together those with real economic power.

Unfortunately, the delegates to the UN General Assembly who laid out the work programme for the Rio conference did not learn the lessons of the Brundtland Report. Instead of planning a conference on sustainable development, they set the conference down the path toward a discussion of environment and development (the official name for the Rio

meeting is the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development – UNCED). Inevitably, this has led the delegates to the meetings preparing for the conference back into stale 1970s rhetoric about whether or not environment and development are compatible goals. This in turn has led to a serious North-South split which has crystallized around two separate and largely contradictory agendas.

CANADA'S AGENDA FOR 1992, LIKE THAT OF MOST OF THE NORTHERN developed world, is mainly focused on climate change, the loss of biological diversity in the tropics, deforestation, and the health of the oceans. Although global conventions for the first two are currently being negotiated on tracks separate from the 1992 conference, these issues will be at the centre of the Brazil meeting. The 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere has been succeeded by a series of meetings designed to produce a framework convention on global warming by the time of the Rio Conference, but recent sessions have concluded with little agreement being reached. The US remains adamantly opposed to any targets for the reduction of carbon-dioxide emissions and the critical Japanese delegation has yet to definitively declare itself.

The second convention, on biological diversity, is moving very slowly, the victim of a North-South dispute over the use of genetic material in biotechnology. Many developing countries are unwilling to devote more resources to protecting their vast store of genetic material unless they can derive some benefit from the value of that material to the Northern pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. At the moment, they receive no financial compensation for genetic material removed from their tropical forests, for example, and used in the development of new drugs.

Canada has also been involved in efforts to begin negotiations on a new international forestry convention. This convention would be concerned with forestry in the temperate regions as well as in the tropics. The convention has been put on hold indefinitely because of the strong opposition of many of the tropical forestry exporting countries, led by Malaysia. It is likely that UNCED will produce only a statement of principles.

THE SOUTHERN AGENDA IS BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MOST OF these global problems have been caused, or at least aggravated, by the industrialized countries. The Northern OECD countries contain roughly 20% of the world's population and yet produce 80% of the greenhouse gases which are changing the world's climate. Over 90% of the chlorofluorocarbon gases which are destroying the planet's ozone layer are produced in the developed world. Yet, most of the discussions in the negotiations so far have focused on the developing world, rather than on the steps the North must take to lessen its own impacts in these areas.

The developing countries have feared this programme from the beginning. Although many realize that global environmental change may affect them even more than the industrialized countries, an agenda which is exclusively environmental threatens to divert attention away from their priorities for economic development. Furthermore, many of them feel that an action plan derived from an environmental agenda will hamstring them with new conditions for foreign aid and loans,



restrictions on their use of fossil fuels and new "green" import barriers confronting their export products to the North.

Instead, they want the conference to address the whole range of issues relating to the availability of resources for development, including debt, declining raw material and commodity prices, the problem of market access for their products, and increased funds from both development assistance agencies and from the private sector. And for once in an international negotiation, the developing countries feel that they have a reasonable card to play. None of the major global environmental problems can be solved without their full co-operation.

For instance, even if the US and the other developed countries took steps to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, this effort would be reduced to naught if India and China pursue their ambitious goals to build some three hundred new coal-fired generating stations over the next two decades. In the words of a document prepared by the South Secretariat (an organization of developing countries) for the recent meeting of the Group of 15 developing countries in Caracas: "UNCED is an international conference where the North is seeking environmental concessions from the South, and where the South can make such concessions in return for firm concessions from the North to restructure global economic relations."

WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED FROM RIO DE JANEIRO IN JUNE? MANY FEEL THAT the solution to these problems will eventually lie in some sort of "grand bargain" between the North and the South. Such a compact would involve a commitment by the developed countries to substantially reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases and to leave enough "ecological space" for the developing countries to increase their emissions as they develop.

This is emerging as a key demand from the Third World. It would involve substantial transfers of new financial resources to the developing countries to be used not only to ease the transition to more sustainable forms of energy use and forestry practices, but also to help eliminate some of the present deficits of food, housing, clean water and unemployment. Some estimates place the amount of money required at about US \$130 billions a year. In exchange, the developing countries would make commitments to more sustainable forestry practices, reductions in population growth rates, decreases in military spending and more sustainable patterns of energy use. At best, the Rio meeting will make a modest start in this direction.

How far can UNCED get in merging the competing agendas and unblocking the financial channels? At the moment, prospects look decidedly glum. In the words of Maurice Strong, "never have the rich felt so poor." The governments have agreed to talk about money at what will be the final conference preparatory meeting in New York in March. There is a rumour that Japan might be preparing a rich financial package – as much as US \$10 billions. On the other hand, the Americans are broke and the Europeans are obsessed with Eastern Europe. Technology transfer is also a staple of these international discussions, but when the developing country rhetoric of technology transfer on "preferential and non-commercial terms" and the developed country homilies on the sanctity of intellectual property are stripped away, little progress seems to have been achieved.



The substantive centrepiece of the Rio conference is an ambitious set of documents called "Agenda 21." This document runs to hundreds of pages and contains a set of action plans on everything from toxic wastes to poverty, economic growth and the environment. It will also contain a series of price tags, adding up to the sorts of billions of dollars mentioned earlier. Previous international conferences have seen most such documents "pre-negotiated" in preparatory committees, but little progress has been made with the stickier parts of Agenda 21 and governments will have to work at least minor miracles in New York to get it ready for Rio.

There seems surprisingly little pressure on governments to come to

agreements at Rio. The developing countries seem determined to hold out for a comprehensive deal. In fact, many of their delegations would be given a hostile reception if they returned home with only an action plan on "northern" issues. At the same time, the multi-billion dollar price tag on this deal has allowed many of the developed countries to ignore the whole thing as unrealistic. The present US administration under George Bush, worried about a neo-isolationist opposition determined to criticize it for excessive attention to foreign issues, and leery of substantive changes in US energy policy, will attempt to block real progress on climate change.


And Canada? The Canadian delegation under John Bell of External Affairs and Arthur Campeau of Environment Canada, has been consistently among the best led and most effective in the preparatory process. However, now that the conference is entering its last, most crucial session, it is becoming clear that Canada has little to offer on many of the key questions. These require the kind of Cabinet involvement and high level political leadership that has not yet been forthcoming.

PREVIOUS UN CONFERENCES ON THE ENVIRONMENT, WATER, DESERTS AND renewable energy have concentrated exclusively on the problems of developing countries, but this time the global nature of the issues facing UNCED will require the developed countries to take the first step towards a solution. At home, there seems to be little understanding of the relationship between Canadian domestic policy and our ability to influence the course of the negotiations. Agenda 21 presents a vast array of issues, many of them areas of provincial jurisdiction. If Canada is to play a positive role, much remains to be done in setting our priorities and consulting with provinces on central issues such as forestry, climate change and fisheries.

For instance, Canada is the highest per capita user of energy in the developed world. Although the government has pledged to freeze carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, it is well known that few steps have been taken to achieve that goal. Canada has led the discussions on forestry in the Rio preparatory process, yet our domestic forestry policies are widely perceived to be unsustainable. The epithet "Brazil of the North," coined by the Brazilian Environment Minister, is beginning to stick.

In early February, in a move that offers at least the hope that Cabinet is now seized with the problem, the Prime Minister gave his old friend Mr. Campeau, in addition to his current responsibilities at Environment, the job as his Personal Representative to UNCED with ambassadorial rank. Nonetheless, if the Prime Minister is to join his other colleagues in some meaningful actions in Rio, several mountains will need to be moved in the next two months. [

## DEFENCE NOTES



### Soviet Nuclear Arsenal

Amidst continued political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, the command and control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal dominated defence issues through the winter months. The specific location of strategic nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union is well understood because the data exchanges required by the recently completed agreement between the US and USSR to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (START) provide detailed information on their deployments. Russia aside, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are home to 352 ICBMs, 70 strategic bombers and 3,138 associated nuclear warheads. The largest concentration is in the Ukraine, which has 176 ICBMs and two heavy bomber bases. Kazakhstan has one bomber base and 104 of the formidable SS-18 ten-warhead ICBMs. Belarus is the base for 72 mobile SS-25 ICBMs.

In contrast to the geographically limited deployment of the strategic nuclear forces, approximately fifteen thousand tactical nuclear weapons are distributed throughout the CIS republics. Of these, more than 9,000 are in Russia, 2,700 in Ukraine, 650 in Kazakhstan, and in excess of 1,000 in Belarus. In contrast also to the strategic weapons, the tactical weapons may be subject to less strict control, including the possibility that older systems might be fired mechanically without the use of an electronic key.

Meeting in Brest on 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed a declaration creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In Article 6 of the declaration the parties agreed to "common control over nuclear armaments which will be regulated by special agreement."

Two weeks later, at Alma Ata

Two weeks later, at Alma Ata on 21 December, Kazakhstan, the fourth of the republics home to Soviet strategic nuclear forces, joined the others in the nuclear weapons agreement. The four republics also designated Marshall Yevgeny Shaposhnikov as commander of the armed forces. Since the larger republics later made plans to establish their own armed forces, it seemed likely that Shaposhnikov's most important task would be to command the strategic forces under the joint control of the four republics.

Following his resignation on 25 December, Mikhail Gorbachev handed Shaposhnikov a black briefcase containing the nuclear command codes for Soviet strategic forces. In early January, Shaposhnikov was reported to have said that only two such briefcases existed: "One is in the possession of the President of Russia, and the other is in my hands." At about the same time, however, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk was quoted as saying: "In a few days a device will be installed in my office that will be able to, when necessary, block the nuclear button."

Meeting in Minsk on 30 December, the eleven CIS republics formally recognized "the need for joint command of strategic forces and for maintaining unified control of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction" of the former Soviet Union. The power of decision on the use of nuclear weapons was conferred on the president of the Russian Federation "in agreement with" the heads of the three other nuclear republics.

The Minsk agreement also described plans for the elimination of all nuclear weapons outside the Russian Federation. The Ukraine will dismantle its strategic nuclear weapons by the end of 1994, and its tactical weapons by July 1992. No schedule is set out for Belarus, but in both cases the elimination will involve the "participation" of Russia. Some ambiguities remained about the republic commit-

ments to denuclearization. Belarus officials, for example, have since indicated that their desire to become non-nuclear will necessarily be affected by political considerations, especially diplomatic recognition by the West.

The elimination of the strategic forces in Kazakhstan is not mentioned in the Minsk agreement. At the Alma Ata meeting Kazakhstan declined to join the other republics in promising to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, giving rise to fears that Kazakhstan might seek to obtain sole possession of the nuclear weapons on its territory.

Finally, although the Ukraine has reiterated its intention to eliminate the strategic nuclear forces on its territory, military and political tensions between the Ukraine and Russia have raised further questions about the disposition of tactical nuclear weapons. In particular, the two republics have been at odds over the disposition of the Black Sea fleet. In early February it was still unclear how the balance of the Black Sea fleet – 2 helicopter carriers, 54 submarines and 43 surface combatants – would be divided. Elements of the fleet are known to be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

### US Nuclear Arsenal and Defence Budget

In his State of the Union message on 29 January, President Bush announced cuts in the US strategic arsenal which, as subsequently elaborated in the administration's 1993 budget request, bring the existing plans for force modernization to a halt. Bush announced that B-2 bomber production would end after completion of the twenty planes already procured. The small, mobile ICBM programme (Midgetman) is cancelled, as is the SSN-21 Seawolf attack submarine. All new production of the MX ten-warhead missile will be stopped, the production of the advanced cruise missile will be ended at 640 missiles, and production of the advanced W-88 warhead for the Trident II missile

will be halted. With the end of the W-88, all new warhead production in the US has ended.

Combined with a number of other changes in US military force development, the thrust of the administration's 1993 defence budget request is to change the emphasis of US military posture from the previous concern with war in Europe, to flexible forces able to respond to regional conflicts. The budget request is for US\$277.9 billion, which constitutes a 7 percent reduction from 1992.

### Star Wars

In the midst of cuts in the strategic forces, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) appears to be prospering. The SDI budget will increase approximately 30 percent in FY 1993 to US\$4.36 billion. The programme is now intended to provide Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), defined as the capability to repel an attack consisting of 200 warheads. It is focused on early deployment of a ground-based ballistic missile defence, followed by the addition of a space-based system. Brilliant Pebbles is now defined as system that would place 1,000 small, non-explosive missiles in orbit. Brilliant Eyes is a space-based surveillance and tracking system.

While both Brilliant Eyes and Brilliant Pebbles would require amendment or abrogation of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed by the US and USSR in 1972, the ground-based system proposed for deployment in 1996 would, in its first phase, be compatible with the treaty. Boris Yeltsin is apparently less concerned than his predecessor about the preservation of the ABM Treaty. In addressing the January summit of the Security Council, he called for a joint SDI programme, arguing that it would engage Soviet scientists who might otherwise "drift abroad and spread nuclear technology into other countries." □

— DAVID COX



## REPORT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL



### New Secretary-General

On 21 November, the Security Council voted to elect Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General. He officially replaced Javier Perez de Cuellar on 1 January. Boutros-Ghali, who received eleven yes votes and four abstentions in a secret ballot, won out over Zimbabwe's Finance Minister, Bernard Chidzero. His election was portrayed as a victory for African countries who had insisted the next leader of the world body be someone from their continent.

### Summit Of The 15

On 31 January, with the publicly declared aim of reinforcing the new Secretary-General and the world body as a whole, British Prime Minister John Major organized and presided over a special summit session of the Security Council. Major, who is expected to call an election this year, and whose profile was generally expected to be enhanced by the summit, succeeded in drawing the heads of government of thirteen out of fifteen Council members to the event, with the foreign ministers of Hungary and Zimbabwe filling in for their heads of government.

During their meeting, the leaders adopted a joint declaration calling for, among other things: the Secretary-General to submit to the Council by July 1992 recommendations for "strengthening and making more efficient ... the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping," and further suggesting that the analysis cover the role of the UN in "identifying potential crises and areas of instability"; a worldwide ban on chemical weap-

ons; and greater efforts to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

### Mission to Cambodia

In a possible prelude to an equal, if not larger, peacekeeping operation, the Council voted unanimously 8 January to dispatch 1,124 UN personnel to Cambodia. The task of this mission, was to begin clearing mines, and to train local personnel in mine clearance. The force would join the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) which is already there. The action was prompted by a desire to facilitate the later deployment of the much larger United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

### Condemning Israeli Deportations

On 6 January, the Council voted unanimously to adopt a resolution that "strongly condemns" Israel's decision to deport twelve Palestinian civilians from the Occupied Territories. It was the strongest language ever backed by the US against Israel in the UN. The vote came as the Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian negotiators postponed their departures for peace talks in Washington in protest of Israel's plan. After the vote, the delegations announced they would travel to Washington to resume negotiations.

### Yugoslavia's Fragile Cease-fire

On 27 November, the Council voted unanimously to "strongly" urge the parties in the Yugoslav conflict to comply with a cease-fire agreement signed four days earlier in Geneva, Switzerland. However, fighting continued and on 15 December, the Council voted unanimously that "conditions for establishing a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia still do not exist." At the same time it endorsed an offer by the Secretary-General to send a small group of military and civilian personnel to prepare for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. The group was to be attached to the

mission of his personal envoy to Yugoslavia, former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.

On 8 January, the Council voted unanimously to send fifty military liaison officers to Yugoslavia as a cease-fire entered its fifth day (adopted 3 January). It was the fifteenth cease-fire adopted by the warring parties. The liaison officers were posted in the military headquarters of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army and the Croatian People's Guard. Among other things, the role of the officers was to facilitate communication between the two sides and help them resolve difficulties. Council members hoped that the dispatch of the liaison officers would be a prelude to a much larger operation possibly involving up to 10,000 UN troops.

### Embargo Against Somalia

On 23 January, the Council voted unanimously to impose an arms embargo against Somalia and to call for a cease-fire in the ongoing conflict. Prompted by humanitarian concerns, the action was viewed as further proof of the Council's willingness to intervene in domestic conflicts. The UN arms embargo is the fourth currently in effect. Apart from Somalia, they have been imposed against Yugoslavia, Iraq and South Africa.

### Peace in El Salvador

On 14 January, the Security Council voted unanimously to enlarge the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) to include verification and monitoring of peace agreements. The move came on the same day that Salvadoran rebel and government leaders reached a final peace accord here during UN-sponsored negotiations. Apart from monitoring the separation of the two warring sides, the 1,098 UN personnel will ensure the maintenance of public order while a new national civilian police is created. The peace accord was viewed as another in a long string

of diplomatic victories for the UN in the wake of the Cold War and the efforts by the superpowers to resolve regional disputes.

### UNFICYP's Overdraft

On 12 December, the council unanimously extended the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months. During a speech, deputy Canadian Ambassador Philippe Kirsch warned that UNFICYP's financial problems had reached crisis proportions. Over the years, Canada along with Britain and Austria, have sought to have UNFICYP funded through assessed contributions rather than voluntary ones, but a majority of permanent members are not in favour. The result, said Kirsch, is that accumulated arrears in UNFICYP's account stood at US\$186.1 million and continue to grow.

Kirsch also said Canada was disturbed by the lack of a negotiated settlement. He warned, as Ottawa has many times in the past, that if a settlement continued to elude the UN, it would be necessary for the Council to undertake a thorough review of the long-term future of the force. The Secretary-General noted in a report to the Council that UNFICYP's financial crisis "imposes a most unfair burden on the troop-contributing countries."

### Other Council Business

On 23 January, the Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly that the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan be granted UN membership. This was the first non-Baltic republic to be admitted. The Council was weighing the application of four others - Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

On 29 November, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) which has been supervising the cease-fire between Israel and Syria since 1974.

- TREVOR ROWE

## REPORT FROM THE HILL



### Foreign Policy Priorities

In a speech on 10 December, the Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall outlined three major foreign policy priorities for Canada in the 1990s: strengthening cooperative security, creating sustainable prosperity, and securing democracy and respect for human values.

As defined by the Minister, strengthening cooperative security refers to the desirability of establishing a more cooperative world order based on the rule of law, especially through a stronger UN. Sustainable prosperity means sustaining a high standard of living through improved productivity, an attractive investment environment for industries of the future, and secure access to international markets through international trade negotiations. Securing democracy and respect for human values involves the encouraging of respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratic principles and sound government.

### McDougall's Travels

The Minister visited Kiev, Moscow and Prague for a series of important meetings at the end of January. In Kiev, she held talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and signed a declaration formally establishing diplomatic relations between Canada and the Ukraine, as well as upgrading the status of Canada's consulate general in Kiev to that of an embassy.

From Kiev, McDougall travelled to Moscow where she led the Canadian delegation to the multilateral round of the Middle East peace negotiations, 28 and 29 January. The meeting established five international working groups on key issues affecting the Middle East: arms control, environment, economic development, water shar-

ing, and refugees. Ms. McDougall agreed that Canada would chair the working group on refugees, which is first expected to meet in Ottawa in late April or early May.

Finally, the Minister was in Prague to attend the second meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In her speech to the Council, she stressed Canada's concern about nuclear non-proliferation and conventional arms transfers. A decision was taken by the Council to admit ten new republics, most of them in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus region, of the former Soviet Union.

### MPs in China

Earlier in January, three Members of Parliament found themselves embroiled in controversy during a visit to the People's Republic of China. The privately-sponsored trip, organized by Chinese-Canadian advocacy groups which have flourished since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Peking, involved NDP External Affairs critic Svend Robinson (Burnaby-Kingsway), Conservative Geoff Scott (Hamilton-Wentworth), and Liberal Beryl Gaffney (Nepean). During their visit, the MPs had aggressively pursued human rights abuses with an itinerary which included visits with the families of dissidents and a request to visit a normally off-limits Beijing jail holding many prominent political prisoners.

On 6 January, however, the MPs' van was surrounded by about one hundred armed police officers and soldiers who escorted them to the airport and forced them to board a plane bound for Hong Kong. External Affairs Minister McDougall denounced the expulsions as an "affront to the institution of Parliament."

### Peacekeeping Force in Trouble

A report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate released on 5 Febru-

ary condemned the United Nations for failing to respond to ceasefire violations and threats by Moroccan forces to fire on unarmed British, American, Canadian and other officers acting as UN military observers in Western Sahara. It suggested that the peacekeeping operation was in jeopardy because of mismanagement and possible financial irregularities. It also stated that the peacekeepers' military commander, General Armand Roy of Canada, was on the verge of recommending that Canada withdraw its military contingent. This was subsequently denied by the Department of National Defence, but it was clear that substantial difficulties persist.

### Activity in the Commons

The House of Commons resumed sitting on 3 February, following its Christmas break. In February, the Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade opened a series of four weekly panel sessions on the new republics of the former Soviet Union and Canadian relations with them.

The Commons Defence Committee visited Europe from 29 January through 12 February to examine Canada's security role on the continent. The Committee, chaired by Arnold Malone (Crowfoot), held hearings on the issue before the Christmas break. It travelled to Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Berlin and Brussels.

In early December, the chair of the Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, John Bosley (Don Valley West), spoke at a conference held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, organized by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the Institute for International Affairs, Prague. The conference was held to discuss and evaluate the future role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and its various processes and mechanisms. Mr. Bosley reminded the participants of Canada's founding role in

the CSCE and of the government's commitment to its continued growth and evolution.

### Budget Fallout

On 25 February, Don Mazankowski tabled his first budget since becoming Minister of Finance. The government's determination to fight Canada's deficit without raising taxes had important implications for a number of organizations, including the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. In an effort to "streamline" certain governmental operations, a total of forty-six agencies, boards, commissions or corporations were eliminated, consolidated, deferred or privatized. Among those eliminated were CIIPS, the Economic Council of Canada, the Science Council of Canada, and the Law Reform Commission, all with headquarters in Ottawa, and the International Centre for Ocean Development in Halifax.

Bernard Wood, CIIPS Chief Executive Officer, told a 2 March press conference that the Institute would continue to exist until Parliament passed legislation to dismantle it. The Institute was created by an act of Parliament in 1984. However, Wood also said that the Institute's management must take into account "the unequivocal intention of the Government to wind up the Institute and to 'transfer the necessary continuing resources to the Department of External Affairs.'"

Another significant change announced in the budget was to advance the planned withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe, and to end plans for Canadian involvement in a task force stationed in Europe. Although Canada remains committed to sending a brigade back to Europe in an emergency, the Finance Minister predicted that these and other changes would cut defence spending by a total of \$2.2 billion over the next five years. □

— GREGORY WIRICK



## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### New Reductions in Nuclear Weapons

In his State of the Union Message on 29 January, President Bush revealed that he had told President Yeltsin that if the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) accepted the earlier American proposal for a total ban on land-based, multiple-warhead (MIRVed) ballistic missiles, the US would reduce the number of its submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads "by about one-third," and would also convert a "substantial portion" of its strategic bombers to "primarily conventional use."

The earlier American proposal had been rejected on the grounds that it would eliminate the strongest element of the (former) Soviet missile force while leaving untouched the submarine-launched and bomber-carried weapons in which the US remains superior.

Under the new Bush proposal, the US would totally eliminate its force of 50 MX missiles with 500 warheads (the most modern element of its ICBM force), 1,000 of its Minuteman III ICBM warheads, and 1,156 of its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads, as well as a "substantial" but unspecified number of bomber-delivered weapons. Each side would reduce its total of strategic nuclear warheads to between 4,400 and 5,000, in the US case approximately half the number permitted under the START Treaty (and almost 7,000 fewer than at present).

Despite Bush's characterization of Yeltsin's "early response" as "very positive," the Russian President, in a wide-ranging speech on Russian television the following day, did not directly address the American offer. Yeltsin proposed the creation of an international agency for nuclear arms reduc-

tion, eventually to control the entire "nuclear cycle" from the production of fissionable materials to the dumping of nuclear waste.

Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, he announced a series of unilateral cuts and pledged to reduce overall strategic weapons totals to START-mandated levels within three years, instead of the planned seven (or even more quickly, "if there is mutual understanding with the United States"). He also proposed the mutual renunciation of the development of new types of long-range, air-launched cruise missiles; the scrapping of all existing long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles; and ending the "combat patrols" of ballistic missile submarines. Finally, Yeltsin announced that proposals for deeper reductions, to the level of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on each side, had been prepared. Yeltsin reiterated Russia's allegiance to the ABM Treaty as "an important factor of maintaining strategic stability in the world," but also declared: "We are ready to develop, then create and jointly operate a global defence system, instead of the SDI system."

On other arms control matters, he announced that Russia intended to join the Missile Technology Control Regime; would abandon its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning the right of retaliation with biological weapons; and would adopt domestic legislation to regulate the export of materials, equipment, and technologies that could be used to make nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or "combat missiles." He indicated there would be a delay in the timetable for the destruction of chemical weapons under a 1990 agreement with the US.

After meeting at Camp David on 1 February, Bush and Yeltsin announced that two summit meetings would be held later in the year. They were unable to reach agreement on any specific arms control proposals, but announced that detailed negotiations would

begin with a visit by US Secretary of State Baker to Moscow in mid-February. The following day, US Defence Secretary Dick Cheney reportedly rejected Yeltsin's proposal for deeper cuts in strategic offensive arms, stressing the importance of preserving adequate numbers of ballistic missile submarines for stability. While calling the Russian proposal for joint missile defence "a major breakthrough," he nevertheless declined to alter the US position against sharing such technology with Moscow.

### North Korea and the Bomb

Concern escalated during the fall about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programme. The North signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but had since failed to meet the requirement to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

On 11 December, at a meeting of the two Korean prime ministers, South Korea disclosed that all US nuclear weapons had been removed from its soil and proposed simultaneous "pilot" inspections of the Kunsan Air Base in the South (where the last American nuclear weapons were believed to have been stored) and Yongbyon in the North (where a reprocessing facility was believed to be under construction). Two days later, the two Koreas signed an Agreement on Reconciliation and Non-aggression. Among other things, it called for the creation within three months of its entry into force of a "Joint Military Committee" to "discuss and carry out" various confidence-building measures and phased arms reductions.

After a series of expert meetings at the end of December, North and South declared agreement in principle not to "test, manufacture, produce, accept, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" or "possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities," and to "implement inspections of installations selected by the other

side and agreed upon by both sides," following procedures to be specified by a Joint Committee for Nuclear Control to be set up one month after the Declaration's entry into force. North Korea also reportedly promised to sign and ratify the IAEA safeguards accord before the next prime ministerial meeting in February if the US and South Korea cancelled their annual "Team Spirit" military exercises (which they announced a week later they would do).

The Non-Nuclearization Declaration was signed by the two prime ministers on 20 January, and expected to enter into force (along with the Reconciliation and Non-aggression Agreement) a month later. On 30 January, the North signed its IAEA safeguards agreement, but a senior official reportedly suggested that the ratification process could take as long as six months. In direct talks with the North, the US was said to have given it a deadline (possibly April) to allow inspection of its nuclear sites or face international sanctions. Many analysts feared that a delay, especially given the Iraqi experience in successfully hiding its nuclear weapons program from IAEA inspectors, would allow North Korea to do likewise.

### UN Arms Register Created

The UN General Assembly on 9 December voted 150-0, with two abstentions, to establish a Register of Conventional Arms. The proposal grew out of an old idea, revived by Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney in February 1991, to discourage excessive arms transfers by publicizing them. The voluntary register, opened on 1 January 1992, initially applies only to transfers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles, and missile systems. An expert group is to report next year on ways of extending it to include lighter arms, production sites, and national weapon stocks.

— RON PURVER

## REVIEWS



### **Battle Lines: The American Media and the Intifada** Jim Lederman

New York: Henry Holt and Company,  
1992, 342 pp., \$37.95 cloth

Jim Lederman's study is not so much about the media and the *intifada*, as about the way in which international protagonists, policy-makers and the fourth estate are caught in a dangerous dance of manipulation and influence. Lederman's exploration of this dynamic "information loop" raises important issues about the power and responsibility of the media in the new information age.

Lederman grounds his analysis in long field experience in the region: a foreign correspondent stationed in Jerusalem since 1966, he has worked for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and National Public Radio. A great strength of this work is that the analysis does not treat the media's reaction to the *intifada* as a piece of isolated history. The author deftly illustrates that the reporting that took place during the *intifada*, and the *intifada* itself, were the result of cumulative incremental changes in relationships and perceptions of the four protagonists he analyzes: Israel, the Palestinians, the American media and American foreign policy makers.

The author's desire to provide historical context to his analysis is laudable, yet in a book of such an ambitious scope, gaps are inevitable. The danger with gaps when writing on the Middle East is that they can be regarded as an indication of bias. Scholars and journalists alike have suffered attacks against their "objectivity" while treading in this political minefield.

Although no political agenda is declared, *Battle Lines* is a political book. Lederman is skilled at dishing out criticism to all of the players he scrutinizes; however, he is much less attuned to the nuances on the Palestinian side of the divide. One gap in understanding is the failure to capture the dynamic nature of the interaction between Palestinians resident in the occupied territories and those living in the diaspora. This linkage is important because it plays a principal role in creating grassroots support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) among Palestinians in the occupied territories. Lederman uncritically subscribes to the argument that there is no indigenous support for the PLO and that the PLO imposes its leadership there through cooptation and intimidation. No doubt this was one tool employed by the PLO to guard against rival leadership from time to time, however, it is only part of the story and belittles the genuine grassroots loyalty to the organization.

This same paradigm is used to negate the role of the PLO in the unfolding of the *intifada*. Lederman is accurate when describing the frustration of the younger generation of Palestinians at the corruption of the "cadillac revolutionaries." But again, this is only part of the story. The widespread Palestinian recognition of the problems in the PLO and the need for reform is more akin to airing dirty laundry than disowning the PLO entirely.

Lederman's impatient dismissal of the *intifada*'s political impact is curious given his obvious concern for history:

The PLO's inability to extricate itself from its old and bankrupt presumptions was the death knell for the *intifada*. The eventual tacit acceptance of Israel's right to exist extracted by the

United States from Yasir Arafat that autumn with such obvious difficulty was too little, too late. By the fall of 1988, one year after it began, the fate of the *intifada* had been decided.

True, the PLO was unable to fully seize the political opportunity presented by the *intifada*, but it can be argued that there has been a fundamental shift in the way in which the international community perceives the Palestinian problem. The current peace process, the leverage that the US is willing to mount against Israel, and the recognition of the centrality of the Palestinian question, is in part a function of the learning curve of an international community (especially North American audiences) highly influenced by the *intifada*.

A final example of insensitive political interpretation is the one-sided use of the word "terrorism." Lederman uses the term often to describe violent Palestinian acts against both civilian and military targets. However, many journalists working in the Middle East concur that the word "terrorism" has been so widely abused in Middle East politicking, it has become virtually meaningless. Robert Fisk, veteran Middle East correspondent, has written: "'Terrorism' no longer means 'terrorism.' It is not a definition; it is a political contrivance. 'Terrorists' are those who use violence against the side that is using the word." If the term is to be used at all, it should be applied evenhandedly, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators.

This book's true value is that it raises important issues concerning the impact of the media on foreign policy decision making: why are some countries chosen for coverage and others not; is the reporting fair to all parties to a conflict; what is the place of the press in the modern political firmament; how much of a story is shaped by a reporter's personality and views.

In a fascinating expose of what he calls "Washington rules,"

Lederman contends that the American media are driven by the need to make highly complex problems both comprehensible and relevant to "Joe-Six-Pack." Once a simplistic story-line has become entrenched, it can distort the perception of events, preventing both journalists and audiences from acquiring new understanding. It is in the discussion of this "information loop" that *Battle Lines* makes a singular contribution.

As described by Lederman, the loop works this way: a correspondent's report on an event or conflict, together with reaction from US officials if the story is important enough, gets looped back to the local population by satellite or facsimile, shaping the perceptions and actions of the local participants. Lederman says that in the case of the *intifada*, this feed-back caused Palestinians to realize that had carried their cause to the highest echelons of the American administration, adding further momentum to the uprising. Meanwhile, television images created pressure in the US for immediate action, resulting, in this instance, in Secretary of State George Schultz's ill-fated peace mission. The media helps to make revolution in foreign lands, then walks away to leave the consequences to the local people.

While *Battle Lines* is bound to create controversy, it would be a shame if the debate focussed only on Lederman's political interpretations to the exclusion of his piercing analysis of the relationships between the media and policy-makers. — Deirdre Collings  
Ms. Collings is a research fellow at the Institute and coordinator of the Institute's project on Lebanon. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.



## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR



### Why We Are In Europe

Regarding the back-to-back of articles on Canadian defence policy ("Defence Policy for Nice Country") and European security ("Waking Up to Reality in Post-Revolution Europe") in your Autumn 1991 edition: It would have been useful to have [had] an unfortunately-absent third article. Desmond Morton stated the obvious in noting the importance of examining the entrails of the past when attempting to peer into the fog of the future. We appear once again determined to undertake one of our periodic withdrawals into our North American shell while awaiting to be drawn into the next European conflict. That this has occurred twice in this century already seems of little consequence.

Very little has changed in Europe. A unified multi-polar Europe was to be the motor for a new world order. Instead, it has produced yet another conflagration in the Balkans, the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and a resurgent Germany. Hardly the recipe for a peaceful future. Canadian strategic priorities obtain from our geographic position in the world and our traditional historical relationships with other nations – strong ties with Europe, and a need to balance the overwhelming influence of the US in North America.

Unfortunately, National Defence policy planners, in constantly seeking to reinvent the wheel, seem to be no students of history. Missing the obvious connection between current events in Europe and the future of Canadian security highlights the chronic myopia of Canadian political and military decision-makers. It implies that we are doomed to distinguish ourselves once again in future battles which we should have been able to prevent in the first place.

Canadian security interests are best defended by preventing conflicts beyond our shores. Active engagement – politically, economically and militarily – in the restructuring of post-Cold War Europe is the most effective means of ensuring these security interests are met.  
*R.E. Stansfield, Aylmer, Quebec*

### Stein and Gray, Comic Relief

The articles by Janet Gross Stein and Charlotte Gray [Autumn, 1991] on the aftermath of the Gulf War in the Middle East and Canada provided welcome comic relief. Stein writes that the war was "launched to defend the principle of state sovereignty and the legitimacy of state borders," while Gray claims that "for the first time ever, in August 1990, the Security Council was unanimous."

The Security Council has come to many unanimous decisions, but some are rather instructive. Consider the Security Council's 15-0 vote on 5 June 1982 calling for a ceasefire along the Israel-Lebanon border. (Israel replied by invading Lebanon the next day.) That day a unanimous vote demanded that "Israel withdraw all its forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally-recognized boundaries of Lebanon." However, no steps were taken to enforce these and many other resolutions and Israeli soldiers remain in southern Lebanon.

Consider the 15-0 vote on 22 December 1975 after the Indonesian army's invasion of East Timor, demanding that Indonesia "withdraw without delay" and "respect the territorial integrity of East Timor." However, as with the votes on Lebanon, this was just a show. The

American UN Ambassador, Daniel Moynihan, had orders from the State Department to ensure that "the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook," as he candidly explained in his memoirs. Thus Indonesian soldiers remain in East Timor. So much for the "principle" of sovereignty and the legitimacy of borders.

Stein also states "the three principal American political objectives for the post-war period": "economic redistribution from rich to poor in the Arab world, expansion of political participation, and a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict." She rightly concludes that "none are likely to be met." But were these the real post-war American objectives or just propaganda?

Previous strong US support for anti-democratic Arab monarchies and dictatorships (who have no interest in income redistribution) and two decades of blocking an Arab-Israeli settlement offer more than a little evidence. Stein invites us to believe that US planners are altruistic bumblerers who seek peace, democracy, and a just distribution of income for people less fortunate than themselves. They utterly fail to attain these noble goals, but apparently by accident attain for the US unprecedented power and influence. As Daffy Duck likes to say, "It is to laugh." *Rod Hill, Department of Economics, University of New Brunswick, Saint John*

### Defining Journalistic Boundaries

With regard to Jean Pelletier's "When To Speak Out, When To Keep Silent," [*Peace & Security*, Winter 1991/92] I covered the same

story from Teheran that he did – the 444-day American hostage crisis. I admired his journalism but I take issue with two of his hypotheses: "The ayatollahs knew in November '79 that in order to get their own way with the US, they would have to reach into the living rooms of America," Pelletier writes.

First, there was no cabal of ayatollahs plotting strategy against the Americans. By then, Khomeini was the single source of spiritual guidance of the largely Western-educated cabinet of Mahdi Bazar-gan. The other four grand ayatollahs had been shunted aside. Second, neither Khomeini nor the populist Islamic grassroots movement cared a whit about the West. The ones who did – Bazargan and his cabinet of westernized technocrats – were overthrown precisely because of it. Third, the hostage-taking was engineered by a few dozen angry, mis-guided students. There's no proof that the government, let alone Khomeini, had advance knowledge.

The siege did take on a life of its own, especially with increasing American media and White House attention. It was then hijacked by militant clergymen to force out the moderates and grab power. But the event certainly was not an ayatollah-ian plot to "blackmail" Jimmy Carter through TV images.

In his prescription for media reportage of hostage-taking, Pelletier writes: "The search for truth demands caution and a sense of what the boundaries are." Fine, except that he never defines those boundaries. It's one thing to bemoan, as he does, American proclivity to exaggeration – hyped-up hostage news coverage, yellow ribbons, xenophobia. It's quite another to come up with sensible guidelines for reporting hostage-taking incidents, international or local. Would Pelletier have not aired the FLQ communique, while the lives of Pierre Laporte and James Cross hung in balance?

*Haroon Siddiqui, Editorial Page Editor, The Toronto Star*

### Institute Grants and Scholarship Programmes – An Important Notice

With the winding up of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the future of its grants and scholarships programmes (as well as all its other programmes) is not known. We intend to honour existing commitments and to obtain the earliest possible indications from the Government of whether it will be possible to proceed further with existing competitions for scholarships and grants. All applicants will be advised as soon as any information is available. In the meantime, they are requested not to contact our offices on this matter.

## LETTER FROM PRAGUE BY SUSAN GREENBERG



**The pictures on the evening news were compelling, and the whole country watched. The television clip showed leading figures in the Czechoslovak parliament, radical advocates of the anti-communist "purge," displaying secret files to an American journalist to prove their point about a disputed case.**

Just a few weeks earlier, one of them, parliamentary deputy Stanislav Devaty, had denied ever meeting the journalist. His special investigating commission had allowed its evidence against fellow deputy Jan Kavan – accused of being a police collaborator – because of the need to protect state secrets.

At the very least, then, the film appeared to catch a blatant lie; at most, a criminal offence. The hunter was being hunted. The "Commission-gate" episode which ended the January session of parliament dominated the news, not least because the commission had set itself up as a guardian of moral purity. Parliament devoted hours of drawling discussion to the issue, ignoring piles of urgent legislation.

The accused commission members responded with a paranoia which typifies the current mood of Czechoslovakia; they argued that the television clip should not have been shown and denounced a plot to discredit their work. Anything which makes them look ridiculous was subversive because it made parliament and democracy look ridiculous – so the ridicule must stop.

The Kavan case is controversial, and will probably be debated for years to come. But Commission-gate was not the only thing to weaken parliament's popularity. Just a few days earlier, the session had thrown out a whole set of proposals offered by the president, arch-democrat Vaclav Havel, to prevent a constitutional crisis over Slovak demands for greater autonomy. They would have allowed him more powers to break a deadlock in parliament – for example, by calling a referendum.

It was not just a personal defeat for Havel, it was a defeat for parliament too. A constituent assembly elected nearly two years ago after the "velvet revolution" had failed in its specified task to agree on a new constitution. Havel launched the initiative two months earlier, when politicians failed again to agree on a formula to keep the country together. In dramatic speeches – including an appearance at a balcony above Wenceslas Square – he called on the public to take the matter out of the hands of politicians by showing their support for a referendum.

**"The changes, designed to make an unworkable parliament more workable, couldn't pass because the parliament was already unworkable."**

Over a million signatures were piled high on the parliament's plenum to meet his call, but the gesture meant nothing. The changes, designed to make an unworkable parliament more workable, couldn't pass because the parliament was already unworkable. A split of the country into Czechs and Slovaks is still hanging over the horizon – an ever-present worry, like having a friend with a terrible illness and always expecting the telephone to ring with news of the worst.

But now there is something to take everyone's minds off the problem – "Kuponova privatizace." In a country where the word "stock market" used to be criminal, every teacher and taxi driver discusses how to invest their coupon books and swap tips about companies. Once the sell-off begins in earnest,

probably in April, the coupon books can be exchanged for shares in the thousands of state-owned companies being sold to private hands – the biggest mass-privatization in history.\*

There have been inevitable problems and fears, fuelled by the complete lack of regulation and the growth of investment management funds. Especially to Western eyes, accustomed to gloomy stories of financial scandal, the behaviour of many local funds is alarming. Many have made risky promises of "guaranteed" high returns – at odds with the experimental nature of the programme – and others have been criticized for aggressive selling techniques. Agents of one fund were found promising food hampers to the inmates of an old people's home if they signed over their coupon books.

The funds have taken their cue from the finance ministry in charge of the whole scheme, which argued for minimal regulations. Finance

the politician is now clearly paramount. His former close friend Tomas Jezek, privatization minister for the Czech republic, has argued several times for a delay in the launch of the voucher scheme. He was concerned to encourage competing projects for each business, so the current "old structure" company managers didn't win control by default.

More recently, he has argued that people would have been encouraged to invest directly into a company as the government preferred, rather than rush to the funds, if the finance ministry had waited until a list of companies available had been made public before the scheme opened for business. Mr. Klaus has resisted any delay on economic grounds, saying it would cost the country money and give the wrong message about their determination to press ahead with quick change. But he also has a political agenda. Each voucher has the finance minister's signature on it, and he has calculated on vouchers turning into votes at the June elections.

After two generations of unfreedom, it is hard to find the right balance. Extreme mood swings – from total state control to official chaos – are all part of growing up. But it can lead to some trying moments. That's why the courts in Bratislava are frightened to risk charges of censorship by bringing charges against the Slovak publisher of the notorious anti-semitic forgery, *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. That's why the manager of a trendy – and noisy – new disco pooh-poohs the hurt feelings of local residents, and insists that planning permission is unknown in a market economy.

And that's why the car park attendant outside my home, dreaming every night of the car that got away, screamed "Bolshevik!" when I insisted on my right to free residents' parking. □

– Susan Greenberg is the Prague correspondent for the British daily *The Guardian*.

\*Book of coupons or vouchers are purchased by Czechoslovak citizens and can be invested, singly or in multiples, into various state-owned enterprises. This can be done in two ways, directly into an industry or factory of the coupon-holder's choice, or by signing over coupons to "investment funds" which, in exchange for future returns, accumulate large numbers of coupons for investment in many enterprises. Some eight million people have purchased coupons, twice as many as was anticipated.



## LETTRE DE PRAQUE

PAR SUSAN GREENBERG



Les images aux informations du soir  
étaient convaincantes, et tout le pays  
les regardait.

On y voyait des personnages clés du

Partement tchécoslovaque, partisans

communistes, montrer des dossiers

secrès à un journaliste américain

pour étayer leur argument dans l'af-

faire. Quelques semaines plus tôt,

il n'avait nié avoir jamais rencon-

tré le journaliste. S'abritant derrière

le secret d'État, sa commission

refusait d'expliquer quelles preuves

elle détenait contre un autre député,

M. Jan Kavan, accusé d'avoir

collaboré avec la police.

Les images télévisées révélèrent

donc, pour tout le moins, un flagrant

mensonge et, au plus, un acte cri-

minel. Le chasseur était chassé.

L'épisode de la « commission-gate »

dominait les nouvelles, surtout

parce que la commission s'était

constituée en gardienne de la pureté

moral. Oubliant des piles de lois

conscrites des heures épuisantes à

débatte du sujet.

Les membres de la commission

mis en cause réagirent en faisant

preuve d'une paranoïa typique de

l'humour accablée en Tchécoslo-

vaquie. Ils firent valoir que le re-

portage n'aurait pas dû être diffusé

et dénoncèrent un complot visant à

discréditer leur travail. Tout ce qui

les rend ridicules est subversif parce

que la démocratie elle-même est

ridiculisée par contre-coup. Il faut

donc que cesse le ridicule.

L'affaire Kavan est controversée

et on en parlera probablement pen-

dant des années encore. Mais ce

scandale n'est pas la seule chose qui

fait fléchir la popularité du Parle-

ment. Quelques jours à peine avant,

des députés avaient rejeté tout un

ensemble de propositions formulées

par le 6<sup>e</sup> comblen démocraté presi-

dent Vaclav Havel afin d'empêcher

que les revenanticoes d'autonomie

accrue des Slovaques provoquent

une crise constitutionnelle. Eussent-

elles été acceptées, le président

aurait disposé de plus de pouvoirs

pour sortir le pays de l'impasse

parlementaire, en demandant un

référendum, par exemple.

Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une

détailée personnel pour Vaclav Havel.

mais aussi d'un échec pour les par-

lementaires. Une assemblée consti-

tuante, élue il y a bientôt deux ans à

l'issue de la « révolution de velours »,

ne s'est pas acquittée de son mandat

précis, à savoir : s'entendre sur une

nouvelle constitution. Le président a

lancé l'initiative deux mois après la

van, alors que la classe politique

n'était toujours pas parvenue à con-

venir d'une formule pour préserver

l'unité du pays. Dans des discours

théâtraux, dont un prononcé d'un

balcon qui domine la place Vences-

las, scène des grands rassemblements

de la révolution, il a appelé la popu-

lation à prendre les choses en mains

en se montrant favorable à un

référendum.

Plus d'un million de signatures,

nombre important pour un si petit

pays, se sont emmassées sur le bureau

du plénum de l'assemblée en réponse

à cet appel, mais sans résultat. Les

grande opération de privatisation

II y a d'énormes problèmes et

des cratères, alimentées par une ab-

sence totale de réglementation et par

la croissance des caisses ou fonds -

ments et, idéalement, répartissent-

les risques. Les Occidentaux notam-

ment, habitués à de sombres histoires

de scandales financiers, jugent alar-

quant le comportement de nombreux

financiers locaux. On a découvert que

des employés d'une caisse promet-

taient des paniers de nourriture aux

personnages d'une maison de re-

traite s'ils leur confiaient leurs livrets

de coupons. Par ailleurs, il n'existe

rien pour prévenir des délits d'inités.

Les caisses prennent exemple sur

le ministre des Finances, respon-

sable de toute l'opération et qui prône

une réglementation minimale. Le

ministre des Finances Vaclav Klaus,

qui s'enorgueillit de favoriser les

seules forces du marché, est aussi à

la tête du plus important parti de

droite, le Parti démocratique civique.

Pour lui et pour ses partisans, règle-

mentation égale socialisme, et les

conseillers occidentaux prudents

n'ont rien d'utile à dire parce qu'ils

ne « connaissent pas la situation lo-

cale ». N'empêche, il a reconnu que

la popularité de ces caisses est une

surprise décevante et il a dû répon-

dre aux pressions du gouvernement

qui lui demandait d'accélérer la

réglementation.

Cette dernière année, Klaus l'éco-

nomiste et Klaus l'homme politique

se sont livrés bataille, or c'est ce der-

nier qui l'emporte manifestement.

Son ancien proche Tomas Jizek,

ministre de la Privatisation pour la

\* Les citoyens tchécoslovaques achètent

des livrets de coupons ou de bons qu'ils

peuvent investir séparément ou non,

dans diverses entreprises d'État. Le dé-

tournement de coupons peut soit les investir

directement dans un secteur d'activité ou

une usine de son choix, soit les confier à

des « caisses ou fonds d'investissement »

en accumulant de grands nombres dont

ils diversifient le placement. Quelque

8 millions de personnes ont acheté des

coupons, soit deux fois plus que prévu.

république tchèque, a préconisé

plusieurs fois de repousser le lance-

ment de l'échange des coupons. Il

tenait à encourager des emplois, de

currents pour chaque entreprise,

structure actuelle n'en prenait

pas la direction par défaut, et il

voulait plus de temps pour que son

ministère puisse s'acquitter du

travail supplémentaire.

Plus récemment, il a fait valoir

que, si le ministère des Finances

avait attendu qu'une liste de com-

pagnies privatisables soit publiée

avant de lancer l'opération, les gens

auraient été encouragés à investir

directement dans une société, comme

le gouvernement le préférerait, plutôt

que de se ruier sur les caisses et autres

fonds. M. Klaus a refusé tout suris

pour des raisons économiques en

affirmant que retarder l'opération

coûterait cher au pays et donnerait

de mauvais messages quant à sa déter-

mination à effectuer rapidement des

changements. Mais il a aussi un pro-

gramme politique. Chaque coupon

porte la signature du ministre des

Finances, qui fait le calcul suivant :

ces coupons se transfèrent en

voix aux élections de juin. « Tous

ceux qui ont acheté des livrets partent

en fait sur Klaus et donc sur nous »,

a déclaré un proche allié politique.

Après deux générations de musc-

lage, il est toujours difficile de trou-

ver le juste équilibre. Les mouvements

de balanciers extrêmes, soit le pas-

sage d'un complet contrôle étatique

ou au chaos officiel, font partie de l'ap-

prentissage de la liberté. En revanche,

ils peuvent causer quelques épreuves.

C'est pourquoi les tribunaux de

Bratislava craignent d'être taxés de

censure en incriminant l'édifice slo-

vaque des *Protocoles des sages de*

*Slon*, célèbre faux antisémitique. C'est

pourquoi le directeur d'une nouvelle

stationnement devant chez moi, qui


à la hantise des resquilleurs, m'a

hurlié « Bolchevique ! » lorsque j'ai

gratuité en tant que locataire. □

Susan Greenberg est correspon-

dante à Prague du quotidien  
britannique The Guardian.



Pourquoi nous sommes en Europe

Je suppose que présenter à la suite, dans un numéro de l'automne 1991, un article sur la politique de défense canadienne (Savor prévoir) et un autre sur la sécurité européenne («Querelles d'Europe nouvelle») était une décision stratégique visant à montrer une relation inhérente entre les deux. Il aurait donc été utile d'examiner de près cette relation dans un troisième article, malheureusement absent.

Desmond Morton parle d'évidencede lorsqu'il fait remarquer qu'il est important d'examiner les traités de la Guerre froide que l'on pourra le mieux veiller sur nos intérêts.

R.E. Stansfield, Ayliner (Québec)

Les intérêts de la défense canadienne sont mieux défendus en prévenant des conflits à l'étranger qu'en y prenant part. C'est en participant à la résolution de la crise des Balkans, nous avons fait passer de la guerre à la paix.

Les articles de Janice Gross Stein nous ont fait sourire

Le Conseil de sécurité est arrivé à un consensus pour condamner l'attaque israélienne contre l'Irak. C'est une victoire pour la paix.

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
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## LIVRES



### L'un sans l'autre

André Fontaine  
Éditions Fayard, Paris, 1991.  
372 pages, 34,95 \$

En dépit de l'avertissement fait

au lecteur qu'il ne s'agit pas ici d'un livre d'histoire, c'est bien de cela

qu'il s'agit dans ce merveilleux petit livre écrit d'une plume alerte et

toujours pertinente. Après l'annonce de la fin de l'histoire par Francis Fukuyama, on parle

de la revanche de l'histoire sur la politique. Il faut remercier Fontaine d'avoir écrit ce livre. Il

vient, à point nommé, dresser un magistral bilan des grandes lignes de l'histoire américaine, celle de l'Europe et du Japon, ainsi que celle que

l'on appelait encore hier l'URSS. Le lecteur trouvera dans ces lignes

du Fontaine à son meilleur, car il brosse à grands coups de pinceaux

historiques les réalités profondes des transformations de la

« L'un sans l'autre » se subdivise en trois parties. La première retrace les

pépites des naufrages de la planète Marx; la seconde est consacrée aux

grands bouleversements qui agitent le Sud, y compris le réveil des religions et le retour au fondamentalisme

religieux – en passant par l'hindouisme, l'islamisme et le judaïsme, sans oublier de retracer les opposi-

tions millénaires entre l'Europe et le Proche-Orient –, et la troisième situe le Japon sur le grand échiquier

international. Relativement au Japon, Fontaine insiste à bon droit sur le

fait qu'il n'est pas « d'autres exemples de civilisation qui se soit développée aussi à l'écart de l'Europe et

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et la guerre du Golfe dont les États-Unis sont sortis à ce point victorieux qu'on est en droit de se demander si

le monde n'est pas devenu du même coup unipolaire. Fontaine a raison de trouver l'image excessive, car « un globe ne peut avoir un seul pôle ». De toute façon, écrit-il, « la spéculation mondiale en puissance des vaincus de la dernière guerre, face à des empires fatigués pour l'un, ruine pour l'autre, relativise le poids, dans la compétition internationale, de la composante militaire ». Ceci étant dit, Fontaine ne manque pas de noter ce que les démocrates reprochent au Parti républicain de Bush : les énormes problèmes intérieurs de la société américaine. Il se pourrait même que la grande Amérique soit reploi sur elle-même. Les Américains annoncent pour 1995 « la fermeture des dix mille six cents bases à l'étranger, et la réduction de moitié – de 300 000 à 150 000 – de leurs effectifs en Europe ».

L'interrogation fondamentale de Fontaine est centrale à son ouvrage. L'Amérique n'a jamais été aussi près d'exercer l'hégémonie mondiale. Il est grand temps pour l'Europe et le Japon de se réveiller, « si elle ne veut pas que le nouvel ordre international en gestation consacre son effacement ». L'auteur évoque à juste titre la marche de l'Europe vers son

notion économique et politique. Il nous rappelle que l'histoire de la

« L'un sans l'autre » se subdivise en trois parties. La première retrace les pépites des naufrages de la planète Marx; la seconde est consacrée aux grands bouleversements qui agitent le Sud, y compris le réveil des religions et le retour au fondamentalisme religieux – en passant par l'hindouisme, l'islamisme et le judaïsme, sans oublier de retracer les opposi-

tions millénaires entre l'Europe et le Proche-Orient –, et la troisième situe le Japon sur le grand échiquier international. Relativement au Japon, Fontaine insiste à bon droit sur le fait qu'il n'est pas « d'autres exemples de civilisation qui se soit développée aussi à l'écart de l'Europe et loupée aussi à l'écart de l'Europe et au défi de la modernité ». L'auteur, cela va de soi, reste prudent. Tout le monde sait et craint le

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La drogue, l'argent et les armes

Alain Labrousse  
Éditions Fayard, Paris, 1991.  
485 pages, 41,95 \$

Les lecteurs des diverses collections de *L'état du monde* sont familiers avec le nom d'Alain Labrousse

qui a signé, de 1988 à 1990, trois articles sur le sujet de la drogue et de la politique. Le même auteur a aussi

à son actif sept ouvrages sur divers pays sud-américains, qu'il a écrit seul ou en collaboration, entre 1971

et 1989. Alain Labrousse est aussi membre de l'Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, « association qui conduit des recherches sur les contextes militaires, politiques et sociaux de la production et du trafic des drogues ». Il était donc tout désigné pour publier une somme sur « la drogue, l'argent et les armes ».

Outre ses propres enquêtes et enrevues, Labrousse semble avoir lu tout ce qui s'est publié d'important sur le sujet au cours des dernières années. Cependant, le procédé a le défaut de ses qualités. Son livre fournit de chiffres, de noms et de dates, mais il manque d'une certaine profondeur anthropologique. Nous faisons le tour du monde de la

drogue et de l'argent pour en sortir un peu étourdi – pour ne pas dire drogué – par tant de détails et si peu de mises en perspective. Qu'on en juge par la table des matières de ce bouquin. Le prototype est une longue entrevue en argot parisien avec un jeune drogué français recouvert à l'aide humanitaire en Afghanistan. Puis nous sautons dans la première partie sur les « armes de l'héroïne », où l'auteur nous transporte en neuf chapitres du Pendjab à l'Indonésie en passant par le Liban, les Balkans, la Sicile et

visée en six chapitres, est consacrée aux « armes de la cocaïne » et elle traite de la quasi-totalité des pays de

l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes. Enfin, la troisième et dernière partie ne comporte que deux chapitres dont l'un porte sur les États-Unis tandis que l'autre est consacré à certains pays latino-américains. Il n'y a pas de conclusion, et le lecteur est abruti par des membres et correspondants de l'Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, soit environ quatre-vingt chercheurs, journalistes et organismes rattachés au domaine. Heureusement, Labrousse a ajouté la table qui illustre bien la production, la table des tableaux statistiques

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
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## CONDENSÉ SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS



### Nouvelles réductions des armements nucléaires

Le 29 janvier, dans son message

sur l'état de l'Union, le président Bush a révélé avoir dit au président Eltsine que, si la Communauté des États indépendants (CEI) acceptait la proposition antérieure de Washington d'interdire totalement les missiles balistiques mirvés basés au sol, les États-Unis réduiraient «d'un tiers environ» le nombre des ogives montées sur leurs missiles balistiques lancés depuis des sous-marins et confirmeraient une «part substantielle» de leurs bombardiers stratégiques pour «une utilisation essentiellement classique».

La proposition précédente avait été rejetée parce qu'elle aurait privé l'ex-arsenal soviétique de missiles de son point fort sans toucher aux ogives lancées depuis des sous-marins ou aéroports, domaine dans lequel les États-Unis gardent la supériorité. George Bush propose à présent que les États-Unis éliminent totalement leurs missiles MX, soit cinquante unités plus 500 ogives (l'élément le plus moderne de leur force ICBM), 1 000 des ogives ICBM qui équipent leurs *Minuteman III* et 156 des ogives montées sur les missiles balistiques à lanceurs sous-marins (SLBM), plus un nombre «substantiel» mais non précisé d'engins largués par des bombardiers. Les deux parties ne conserveraient que 4 400 à 5 000 ogives nucléaires stratégiques, soit pour les États-Unis environ la moitié moins que les y autorises le Traité START (et presque 7 000 de moins qu'actuellement).

Bien que le président Bush ait qualifié la «première réaction» de Boris Eltsine de «très positive», ce dernier, dans une allocution diffusée le lendemain à la télévision russe et dans laquelle il abordait de nombreux sujets, n'a pas parlé directement de la proposition américaine. En revanche, il a proposé de créer une agence internationale pour la réduction des armes nucléaires qui, par la suite, surveillerait tout le «cycle nucléaire», de la production de matières fissiles à l'élimination des déchets nucléaires.

S'agissant des armes nucléaires stratégiques, il a annoncé une série de réductions unilatérales et il s'est engagé à abaisser le nombre de aux seuls convenus dans le Traité START en trois ans, au lieu des sept prévus (voir plus rapidement,

«en cas d'entente mutuelle avec les États-Unis»). Il a aussi proposé que les deux puissances renouencent d'un commun accord à mettre au point de nouveaux types de missiles de croisière à longue portée et qu'elles éliminent tous les missiles de croisière nucléaires de longue portée à aéroports de longue portée; qu'elles éliminent tous les missiles nucléaires stratégiques alignés de part et d'autre, avaient été préparés. Il a répété que la Russie continuerait de respecter le Traité ABM, «facilement importun du maintien de la stabilité stratégique dans le monde», mais il a également déclaré : «Nous sommes prêts à élaborer, puis à créer et exploiter conjointement un système de défense mondial qui remplacera le système IDS.»

Toujours à propos de la limitation des armements, il a fait savoir que la Russie entendait adhérer au Régime de contrôle des technologies relatives aux missiles, qu'elle abandonnerait ses réserves relatives au Protocole de Genève de 1925 concernant le droit d'utiliser des armes biologiques en représailles, et qu'elle adopterait une législation nationale qui réglementerait l'exportation de matières, menterait l'exportation de matières de matières et de techniques pour servir à fabriquer des armes nucléaires, chimiques ou biologiques clés, les missiles de combat». Il a précisé qu'il y aurait du retard dans le calendrier de destruction des armes chimiques arrêté dans un accord conclu en 1990 avec les États-Unis et annoncé qu'en 1992, il n'y aurait pas de manœuvres militaires engageant plus de 13 000 soldats dans aucune région européenne ou asiatique de la CEI.

Après leur rencontre de Camp David, le 1<sup>er</sup> février, M.M. Bush et Eltsine ont annoncé deux réunions au sommet pour cette année. Ils n'ont pu s'entendre sur aucune des propositions relatives à la limitation des armements, mais ils ont révélé que des négociations détaillées commencent à la mi-février avec une visite du secrétaire d'État américain James Baker à Moscou. Le lendemain, le secrétaire à la Défense des États-Unis, M. Dick Cheney, aurait rencontré des premiers ministres, en février, si les États-Unis et la Corée du Sud annulaient leurs manœuvres militaires annuelles baptisées «Ebs» (pour «équilibre») ce qu'ils ont accepté, a-t-on appris une semaine après).

La Déclaration de non-nucléarisation a été signée le 20 janvier par les deux premiers ministres. Elle doit entrer en vigueur le 20 février, tout comme l'Accord de réconciliation et de non-agression. Le 30 janvier, le Nord a signé son accord de garanties avec l'AIEA, mais un haut fonctionnaire aurait laissé entendre que le processus de ratification pourrait durer six mois. Dans des pourparlers directs avec Pyeong Yang, Washington aurait fixé un ultimatum (peut-être avril) : soit le Nord autorise l'inspection de ses sites nucléaires, soit il s'expose à des sanctions internationales. Beaucoup d'analystes redoutent qu'à la faveur d'un succès, les Nord-Coréens réussissent, comme les Irakiens, à dissimuler leur programme nucléaire militaire aux inspecteurs de l'AIEA.

Le 9 décembre, par 150 voix, aucune opposition et deux abstentions, l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU a créé un Régistre des armes conventionnelles. La proposition s'inspirait d'une vieille idée, relancée en février 1991 par le premier ministre du Canada, M. Mulroney, et visant à décongréter, par la publicité qui en est faite, les transferts d'armement excessifs. Dans un premier temps, le registre volontaire, ouvert le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1992, répertorie les transferts uniquement dans les catégories suivantes : chars de combat, véhicules blindés de combat, avions de combat, missiles et systèmes de guerre, missiles, Un groupe d'experts doit remettre l'an prochain un rapport sur les façons d'étendre le registre aux armes plus légères, aux lieux de production et aux arsenaux nationaux, ce afin qu'il soit moins discriminatoire à l'égard des États importateurs d'armes.

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# EN DIRECT DE LA COLLINE PARLEMENTAIRE



## Les priorités de la politique extérieure

Dans une allocution prononcée le

10 décembre, la secrétaire d'État

bara McDougall a défini trois grandes

priorités du Canada en matière de

politique étrangère pour les années

1990 : renforcer la sécurité coopéra-

tive, créer une prospérité durable et

garantir la démocratie et le respect

des valeurs humaines. Ces priorités

reposent sur les grandes lignes de

la politique étrangère présentées

plus longuement dans un document

divulgué à la presse juste avant

l'allocution.

Comme l'a précisé la ministre, on

entend par renforcement de la secu-

rité coopérative la volonté de créer

un ordre mondial plus coopératif

reposant sur le droit, que l'on fera

primer notamment en donnant plus

de pouvoirs à l'ONU. Prospérité

durable signifie conserver un niveau

de vie élevé en améliorant la pro-

ductivité, en offrant aux industries

de demain un contexte d'investisse-

ment attrayant et en assurant un

accès aux marchés internationaux

par le biais de négociations commer-

ciales internationales. Garantir la

démocratie et le respect des valeurs

humaines suppose que l'on encou-

rage à respecter les droits de la

personne, la primauté du droit, les

principes démocratiques et un

gouvernement sain.

Déplacements de Mme McDougall

Fin janvier, la ministre s'est ren-

massivement prononcés pour

l'indépendance de leur république.

De Kiev, Mme McDougall s'est

rendue à Moscou, où elle a pris la

tête de la délégation canadienne à la

serie multilatérale des négociations

de paix sur le Moyen-Orient, qui

s'est déroulée les 28 et 29 janvier.

Cinq groupes de travail informa-

noux y ont été constitués. Ils étudie-

ront des problèmes clés du Moyen-

Orient : la limitation des armements,

le développement économique, le

partage de l'eau et les réfugiés.

Canada présidera le groupe de travail

sur les réfugiés, qui se réunira pour

la première fois à la fin avril ou au

début mai, à Ottawa.

Enfin, la ministre est allée à

Prague assister à la deuxième réu-

nion du Conseil des ministres de la coopé-

Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopé-

ration en Europe (CSCPE). Dans son

allocution au Conseil, elle a souligné

que le Canada accordait beaucoup

d'importance à la non-prolifération

des armes nucléaires et s'inquiétait

des transferts d'armes convention-

nelles. Le Conseil a décidé d'admet-

tre dix nouvelles républiques de

l'ancienne URSS, la plupart d'Asie

centrale et de la région transcauca-

sienne. Fin décembre, le Canada avait

reconnu pratiquement tous ces pays.

## Députés en Chine

Début janvier, trois parlemen-

taires se sont trouvés au cœur d'une

controverse alors qu'ils séjournaient

en République populaire de Chine.

Le voyage des trois députés —

M. Svend Robinson (Bumaby-  
Kingsway), critique du NPD pour

les affaires extérieures; M. Geoff Scott

(Hamilton-Wentworth), du Parti

conservateur; et Mme Beryl Gaffney

(Nepaan), du Parti libéral —, était

partrainé par le secteur privé, et orga-

nisé par des groupes de pression

en Europe du 29 janvier au 12 fé-

vrier pour étudier le rôle du Canada

sur ce continent en matière de

sécurité. Le Comité, présidé par

M. Arnold Malone (PC, Crowfoot),

a tenu des audiences sur la question

avant Noël.

20 PRINTemps 1992

## Force de maintien de la paix prise à parti

Dans un rapport publié le 5 fé-

vrier, le Comité des affaires étran-

gères du Sénat américain reproche

aux Nations Unies de ne pas avoir

réagi aux violations de cessez-le-feu

perpétrées par l'armée marocaine qui

menageait de tirer sur les officiers non

armés britanniques, américains, cana-

diens et autres envoyés comme ob-

servateurs militaires de l'ONU au

Sahara occidental. Le rapport laisse

entendre que l'opération de maintien

de la paix est en danger à cause d'une

mauvaise gestion et de possibles

irrégularités financières. Il affirme

de la gestion gouvernementale.

quarante-six organismes, conseils,

commissions et sociétés au total

sont soupçonnés, regroupés, diffé-

rents. Parmi les premières

se trouvent l'ICPSI, le Conseil

économique du Canada, le Conseil

des sciences du Canada et la Com-

mission de réforme du droit, qui ont

toutes leur siège à Ottawa, et le

Centre international d'exploitation

des océans, qui a le sien à Halifax.

M. Bernard Wood, Directeur

général de l'ICPSI, a déclaré au

cours d'une conférence de presse, le

2 mars, que l'Institut continuerait

d'exister jusqu'à ce que le Parle-

ment adopte une loi le démantelant.

L'Institut a été créé en 1984 en vertu

d'une loi du Parlement. Cependant,

M. Wood a également déclaré que la

direction de l'Institut doit tenir

compte de « l'intention sans équi-

voque du gouvernement de liquider

l'Institut et de transférer au mini-

ère des Affaires extérieures les

ressources nécessaires aux activités

dont la continuité s'impose.

Un autre changement important

apparaît dans le nouveau budget. En

effet, le gouvernement entend avan-

cer le retrait prévu des troupes cana-

diennes se trouvant en Europe et ne

pas faire partie de la force opéra-

tionnelle qui y sera stationnée. Bien

que le Canada maintienne sa pro-

messe d'envoyer une brigade en Eu-

rope en cas d'urgence, le ministre

des Finances a prédit que ces chan-

gements, entre autres, réduiraient les

dépenses de défense de 2,2 milliards

de dollars au cours des cinq années

à venir. □

## À L'ORDRE DU JOUR DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ



### Nouveau Secrétaire général

Le 21 novembre, le Conseil de sécurité a élu à bulletin secret Secrétaire général des Nations Unies l'Égyptien Boutros Boutros-Ghali, jusqu'alors vice premier ministre de son pays. Il a officiellement remplacé M. Javier Pérez de Cuellar le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier. C'est par onze voix et quatre abstentions qu'il a été préféré à M. Bernard Chidzero, ministre des Finances du Zimbabwe. Son élection a été accueillie comme une victoire par l'Afrique, qui insistait pour que le successeur de M. de Cuellar soit un Africain.

### Sommet des Quinze

À la fin publiquement déclarée de soutenir le nouveau Secrétaire général et de renforcer l'organisation mondiale dans son entier, le premier ministre britannique, M. John Major, a organisé et présidé une réunion au Conseil de sécurité, qui a eu lieu le 31 janvier. M. Major, qui devrait convoquer des élections cette année et dont le sommet devrait redorer le blason, a réuni les chefs de quinze pays membres du Conseil de sécurité, les deux autres, à savoir : la Hongrie et le Zimbabwe, étant représentés par leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères. Pendant cette réunion, les dirigeants ont adopté une déclaration commune demandant, entre autres choses, au Secrétaire général de présenter au Conseil, avant juillet 1992, des recommandations visant à «renforcer les Nations Unies et les rendre plus efficaces en matière de diplomatie préventive, d'établissement de la paix et de maintien de la paix». Les chefs de gouvernement y ont soutenu, en outre, que l'analyse dans «l'identification de crises et de régions instables éventuelles». Ils proposaient également l'interdiction mondiale des armes chimiques et de grands efforts pour restreindre la

prolifération des armes nucléaires et des armes de destruction massive.

### Yugoslavie : fragile cessez-le-feu

Le 27 novembre, le Conseil s'est prononcé à l'unanimité pour exhorter les parties au conflit yougoslave à respecter un accord de cessez-le-feu signé quatre jours plus tôt à Genève (Suisse). Cependant, les combats ont continué et, le 15 décembre, il a décidé, par un nouveau vote unanime, que les conditions nécessaires à l'organisation d'une opération de maintien de la paix en Yougoslavie n'étaient toujours pas réunies. Parallèlement, il a approuvé la proposition du Secrétaire général d'envoyer un petit groupe de civils et de militaires de l'ONU préparer le déploiement d'une force de maintien de la paix. Le groupe devait être rattaché à la mission de son envoi personnel sur place, l'ancien secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Cyrus Vance.

### Mission au Cambodge

Le 8 janvier, en prélude peut-être à une opération de maintien de la paix aussi importante, sinon plus, le Conseil a voté à l'unanimité l'envoi de 124 soldats de l'ONU au Cambodge. Leur mission serait d'abord de déminer le pays puis de former des démineurs cambodgiens. La force rejoindrait la Mission préparatoire des Nations Unies au Cambodge (MPRONUC), qui se trouve déjà sur place. La décision répond à la volonté de préparer un retour en ordre et sans danger des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées, et de fa-

### Paix au Salvador

Le 14 janvier, le Conseil a décidé par un vote unanime d'élargir le mandat de la Mission d'observation des Nations Unies au El Salvador (ONUSAL) pour y inclure la vérification et la surveillance des accords de paix. La décision intervenait le jour même où les dirigeants rebelles et gouvernementaux concluaient à New York, aux termes de négociations placées sous les auspices de l'ONU, un accord de paix final. Outre la Mission veilleront au maintien de l'ordre public le temps qu'une nouvelle police nationale civile soit créée. L'accord de paix est considéré comme une victoire diplomatique de plus pour l'ONU au lendemain de la Guerre froide et pour les superpu-

### Embargo contre la Somalie

Le 23 janvier, le Conseil a voté à l'unanimité un embargo sur les armes à l'encontre de la Somalie et demandé instantanément un cessez-le-feu dans le conflit en cours. Prise de décision apparaît comme une preuve pour des raisons humanitaires, la demande d'arrêt immédiat du conflit en cours. Prise de décision apparaît comme une preuve pour des raisons humanitaires, la demande d'arrêt immédiat du conflit en cours. Prise de décision apparaît comme une preuve pour des raisons humanitaires, la demande d'arrêt immédiat du conflit en cours.

### Condamnation des expulsions israéliennes

Le 6 janvier, le Conseil a adopté à l'unanimité une résolution «condamnant fermement» la décision d'Israël d'expulser douze civils palestiniens des territoires occupés. C'est la plus ferme langage jamais approuvé par les Etats-Unis contre Israël aux Nations Unies. La résolution a été votée alors que les délégations jordanienne, libanaise, palestinienne et syrienne annon-

### UNFICYP : mandat prolongé

Le 12 décembre, le Conseil a décidé à l'unanimité de prolonger de six mois le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre (UNFICYP).

Pendant son intervention, l'ambassadeur adjoint du Canada auprès des Nations Unies, M. Philippe Kirsch, a souligné que les problèmes financiers de la Force atteignaient des proportions de crise. Depuis des années, avec la Grande-Bretagne et l'Australie, le Canada soutient que l'UNFICYP soit financée par des contributions mises en recouvrement et non par des contributions volontaires, mais la majorité des membres permanents s'y opposent. En conséquence, a déclaré M. Kirsch, les arriérés accumulés à l'UNFICYP, qui s'élevaient à 181,1 millions de dollars américains, continuent d'augmenter.


M. Kirsch a fait savoir que le Canada regrette l'absence d'un règlement négocié. Il a prévenu, comme Ottawa l'a fait maintes fois par le passé, que si l'ONU ne parvenait toujours pas à trouver une entente entre les parties, il serait nécessaire que le Conseil étudie de près l'avenir à long terme de la Force. Abondant dans le sens du Canada, le Secrétaire général a fait remarquer dans un rapport au Conseil que la crise financière de l'UNFICYP «pénalise injustement les pays qui fournissent un contingent».

### Divers

Le 23 janvier, le Conseil a recommandé à l'unanimité l'Assemblée générale d'accorder le statut de membre de l'ONU à l'ancien République soviétique du Kazakhstan, qui est la première de la région, depuis les républiques baïes, à être admises. Le Conseil examine la candidature de quatre autres républiques de l'ex-URSS, qui sont l'Arménie, le Kirghizistan, l'Ouzbékistan et le Tadjikistan. Le 29 novembre, le Conseil a renouvelé le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le cessez-le-feu entre Israël et la Syrie depuis 1974.



# CHRONIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE



## Arsenal nucléaire soviétique

L'ancienne URSS étant en pleines convulsions politiques, le commandement et le contrôle de l'arsenal nucléaire soviétique ont dominé les questions de défense durant les mois d'hiver. On connaît l'emplacement précis des armes nucléaires stratégiques de l'ancienne URSS grâce aux échanges de données convenus aux termes du récent accord conclu entre les Etats-Unis et l'URSS en vue de réduire les armes nucléaires stratégiques (START) et qui ont fourni des informations détaillées sur leur déploiement. En dehors de la Russie, l'Ukraine, le Kazakhstan et la Biélorussie servent de base à 352 ICBM et à soixante-dix bombardiers stratégiques ainsi qu'à 3 138 ogives nucléaires servant à les équiper. La plus grande concentration se trouve en Ukraine, qui compte 176 ICBM et deux bases de bombardiers lourds. Le Kazakhstan possède une base de bombardiers et 104 des redoutables ICBM de type SS-18 dix ogives. Quant à la Biélorussie, elle a sur son sol 72 ICBM mobiles SS-25.

Contrairement aux forces nucléaires stratégiques dont le déploiement conjoint des forces stratégiques et du maintien d'un contrôle unifié des armes nucléaires et des autres armes de destruction massive» d'après l'accord avec «ses homologues des trois autres républiques doies d'armes nucléaires.

L'accord conclu à Minsk prévoit également l'élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires en dehors de la Fédération de Russie. L'Ukraine démantèlera ses armes stratégiques d'ici à la fin 1994 et ses armes tactiques, d'ici à juillet 1992. Aucun échéancier n'a été fixé pour la Biélorussie, mais dans les deux cas, l'élimination se fera avec la «participation» de la Russie. Il reste quelque-uns autres républiques qui sera régi par un accord particulier.

ambiguïtés sur les engagements des républiques en matière de dénucléarisation. Par exemple, des responsables belarusses ont fait savoir depuis que des considérations politiques, notamment la reconnaissance diplomatique par l'Occident, influent sur leur désir de se débarrasser des armes nucléaires.

Il n'est pas fait mention, dans l'accord de Minsk, de l'élimination des forces stratégiques implantées au Kazakhstan. A la rencontre de l'Armée, il semble que la tâche la plus importante du maréchal sera de garantir la suite de leur production par la suite de leur production par la suite de leur production.

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## Arsenal nucléaire et budget de la défense américains

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## Guerre des étoiles

Alors que l'on réduit les forces stratégiques, l'initiative de défense stratégique (IDS) semble prospérer. Son budget sera augmenté d'environ 30 p. 100 pour l'exercice 1993, ce qui le fera passer à 4,36 milliards de dollars. Le programme a maintes fois été révisé, mais la dernière version, datant de 1992, prévoit une réduction de 7 p. 100 par rapport à 1992.

Combiné à plusieurs autres changements dans l'évolution de l'Armée américaine, le budget de la défense proposera pour 1993 une réduction de 10 p. 100 par rapport à 1992.

- DAVID COX

nouvelles restrictions quant à l'utilisation de combustibles fossiles et de nouveaux obstacles «verts» à l'importation pour les produits qui ils vendent au Nord.

Ce qu'ils veulent, c'est que la conférence examine tout un ensemble de questions liées aux ressources nécessaires au développement (dette, chute du cours des matières premières et des denrées, accès aux marchés pour leurs produits, augmentation des fonds accordés par les organismes d'aide au développement et par le secteur privé, etc.). Car, pour une fois dans des pourparlers internationaux, les pays en développement ont l'impression d'avoir une carte à jouer, puisque aucun des grands problèmes mondiaux de l'environnement ne peut être résolu sans leur entière coopération.

Par exemple, même si les États-Unis et les autres pays industriels prennent des mesures pour diminuer les émissions d'acide carbonique, leur effort sera réduit à néant si l'Inde et la Chine poursuivent leur objectif ambitieux, qui est de construire quelques 300 nouvelles centrales thermiques au cours des vingt prochaines années. Pour reprendre les termes d'un document préparé par le Secrétaire du Sud (organisme regroupant des pays en développement) pour la récente rencontre du Groupe des 15 pays en développement à Caracas : «La CNUCED est une conférence internationale où le Nord cherche à obtenir du Sud des concessions environnementales et où le Sud peut faire de telles concessions si le Nord s'engage fermement à redéfinir les relations économiques mondiales.»

QUE PEUT-ON ATTENDRE DE RIO DE JANEIRO EN JUIN ? D'AVUCUNS PENSENT QUE la solution à ces problèmes reposera sur une sorte de «grand marché» entre le Nord et le Sud. Les pays du Nord s'engageraient à réduire considérablement leurs émissions de gaz responsables de l'effet de serre et à laisser à ceux du Sud un «espace écologique» suffisant pour qu'ils puissent augmenter leurs propres émissions pendant qu'ils se développent. Le tiers-monde insiste énormément sur ce point. Un tel engagement supposerait des transferts substantiels vers les pays en développement, de nouveaux capitaux qui serviraient non seulement à faciliter le passage à des formes plus durables d'utilisation de l'énergie et d'exploitation forestière, mais aussi à venir à bout de certains déficits sur le plan de l'alimentation, du logement, de l'eau potable et du chômage. D'après certaines estimations, il en coûterait environ 130 milliards de dollars américains par an.

En échange, les pays en développement s'engageraient à exploiter leurs forêts suivant des critères de viabilité, à réduire leurs taux de croissance démographique, à diminuer leurs dépenses militaires et à opter pour une consommation énergétique plus durable. Au mieux, on fera un timide premier pas dans ce sens à Rio.

Dans quelle mesure la CNUCED peut-elle combiner les objectifs concurrents et débouquer les sources financières ? Pour le moment, les perspectives sont incontestablement sombres. Comme le dit Maurice Strong, «jamais les riches ne se sont sentis si pauvres». Les gouvernements ont accepté de parler d'argent en mars, à New York, au cours de ce qui sera la dernière réunion préparatoire. Le bruit court que le Japon prépare peut-être une grosse enveloppe, de 10 milliards de dollars américains. Les Américains, l'Est. Les transferts de technologie sont aussi au menu de ces discussions internationales, mais les pays en développement prônant que ces transferts s'opèrent sur «une base préférentielle et non commerciale» et les pays développés se prévalant de la sacro-sainte propriété intellectuelle, on ne semble guère progresser.

La pièce de résistance de la Conférence de Rio est un ensemble ambitieux de documents appelés «Programme 21». Le tout, qui représente des centaines de pages, contient une série de plans d'action touchant à des sujets



Michael Wadlow

allant des déchets toxiques à la pauvreté, en passant par la croissance économique et l'environnement. On en mentionne aussi le prix, qui s'apparente aux milliards susmentionnés. Lors de conférences internationales précédentes, la plupart des documents de ce genre ont été «pré-négociés» par des commissions préparatoires, mais on n'a peu avancé sur les points les plus épineux du «Programme 21» et les gouvernements devront réaliser de petits mirages à New York pour qu'il soit prêt pour Rio.

Etonnamment, on semble peu presser les gouvernements de conclure des accords à Rio. Les pays en développement paraissent déterminer à n'accepter qu'une entente globale. En fait, beaucoup de leurs délégations seraient mal accueillies si elles rentraient chez elles avec un plan d'action pour les seuls problèmes du Nord. En même temps, sous prétexte qu'une telle entente coûterait des milliards de dollars et serait donc irréaliste, bien des pays industriels font la sourde oreille. L'actuel gouvernement américain, dirigé par George Bush, inquiet par une opposition néo-isolationniste décidée à l'accuser de modifications importantes dans la politique énergétique des États-Unis, essaiera d'empêcher tout réel progrès sur la question du changement climatique.

Et le Canada ? Sa délégation, conduite par MM. John Bell des Affaires extérieures et Arthur Campeau d'Environnement Canada, a constamment été parmi les mieux dirigées et les plus efficaces pendant la phase préparatoire. Cependant, à présent que la conférence entre dans sa session finale, la plus cruciale, il devient évident que le Canada offrira peu dans nombre des dossiers clés. Le contraire supposerait un engagement du Cabinet et un exemple politique de haut niveau qui ne se sont pas encore manifestés.

Lors d'autres conférences de l'ONU sur l'environnement, l'eau, les déserts et l'énergie renouvelable, on s'est concentré exclusivement sur les problèmes des pays en développement, mais cette fois, les problèmes sur lesquels la CNUCED se penchera étant mondiaux, les pays industriels devront faire les premiers pas vers une solution. Au Canada, on ne semble guère comprendre le lien entre la politique intérieure du pays et sa capacité à infléchir le cours des négociations. Le Programme 21 porte sur des thèmes très divers, dont bon nombre relèvent de la compétence provinciale. Si le Canada veut jouer un rôle positif, il lui reste encore beaucoup à faire pour définir ses priorités et consulter les provinces sur des questions essentielles comme l'exploitation forestière, les changements climatiques et les pêches maritimes.

AINSI, LE CANADA EST LE PREMIER CONSOMMATEUR D'ÉNERGIE PAR HABITANT dans les pays industriels. Bien que le gouvernement se soit engagé à geler les émissions d'acide carbonique aux quantités de 1990 d'ici à l'an 2000, il est bien connu que peu de mesures ont été prises pour y parvenir. Le Canada a mené les discussions sur l'exploitation forestière pendant la phase préparatoire; pourtant, ses politiques intérieures en la matière sont généralement jugées non durables. Le surnom de «Brésil du Nord» donné par le ministre de l'Environnement brésilien commence à lui coller à la peau. Début février, dans un geste qui donne au moins à espérer que le Cabinet est maintenant saisi du problème, le premier ministre a confié à son vice-ami M. Campeau, en plus de ses responsabilités actuelles à l'Environnement, la tâche de le représenter personnellement à la CNUCED, au rang d'ambassadeur. Néanmoins, si le premier ministre doit prendre des décisions importantes avec ses autres collègues à Rio, il leur faudra déplacer plusieurs montagnes au cours des deux mois à venir. □



# RIO : DES MONTAGNES À DÉPLACER

Nous ne devrions probablement pas attendre grand chose du  
«Sommet de la Terre», mais nous pourrions bien être surpris.

PAR DAVID RUNNALLS

**E**N JUIN, À RIO DE JANEIRO, QUELQUE SOIXANTE-DIX PREMIERS MINISTRES et présidents se pencheront sur le sort de la planète. Avant de conclure qu'il s'agira encore de bavardages écologistes alarmistes, Sommer, Si nous montrons incapables de satisfaire aux besoins de la population mondiale actuelle sans perturber inutilement l'environnement, est-il réaliste de penser que nous saurons mieux assurer un niveau de vie décent à deux fois plus de gens ?

Peu nombreux sont ceux qui nieraient que la population actuelle épuise 5 milliards et demi d'êtres humains qui peuplent le monde menacé nombre de systèmes vitaux de la Terre, pourtant beaucoup de presques relativement peu l'environnement. Plus d'un milliard et demi d'entre eux vivent dans une misère noire, dans des décharges poubliques, dans des bidonvilles ou dans des zones rurales sans ressources. Ces quinze dernières années, le nombre des pauvres a augmenté de 81 p. 100 en Afrique, de 55 p. 100 en Asie et a plus que doublé en Amérique latine. L'ONU estime que 500 millions de personnes dans le tiers-monde sont sans emploi ou sous-employées — ce qui équivaut à toute la main-d'oeuvre réunie des pays industrialisés. Parallèlement, les démographes nous disent que nous ne pouvons échapper au doublement de la population, ce qui nous mettra à 10 milliards d'habitants sur Terre d'ici la moitié du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, si ce n'est à 14 milliards.

Or, c'est précisément la question à laquelle s'est intéressée la Commission mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement, autrement appelée Commission Brundtland, du nom de sa présidente, le premier ministre de Norvège. Dans son rapport novateur de 1987, la Commission soulignait que l'économie du monde et son écologie étaient si étroitement imbriquées que les politiques économiques qui ignoraient cette réalité étaient vouées à l'échec. Une des clés de son programme nouveau de «développement durable», qui l'a rendue si populaire, est qu'on y a apparemment «tout à gagner». Il propose, en reliant les éléments des programmes environnementaux classiques aux éléments des programmes économiques classiques, un monde plus prospère et plus durable du point de vue écologique. Il en résulte une croissance d'une toute autre sorte qui utilise beaucoup moins d'énergie et de matières premières, qui contribue à préserver le capital écologique de la planète au lieu de l'épuiser, et qui est bien équilibrée et répartie tant à l'intérieur des pays qu'entre les pays du monde. Bien qu'une telle démarche en laisse d'aucuns très dubitatifs, elle est bien reçue par les Canadiens et Canadiennes.

La Commission Brundtland a fait de l'ENVIRONNEMENT UNE QUESTION économique au même titre que la création d'emplois et la croissance des exportations, entre autres. D'accord avec elle, le Secrétaire général de la Conférence de Rio, M. Maurice Strong, a décidé de placer la barre plus haut. Il a persuadé l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU qu'une partie au moins de la Conférence devait être l'occasion de réunir au sommet des chefs de gouvernement, dont ceux qui ont un réel pouvoir économique. Malheureusement, les délégués de l'Assemblée générale qui ont défini le programme de Rio n'ont pas tiré les leçons du Rapport Brundtland. Au lieu de planifier une conférence sur le développement durable, ils en ont préparé une qui traitera de l'environnement et du développement. D'ailleurs, elle s'appelle officiellement Conférence des Nations Unies sur

Les objectifs du Canada pour 1992, comme ceux de la plupart des pays industriels du Nord, ont principalement trait au changement climatique, à la perte de diversité biologique aux tropiques, à la déforestation et à la santé des océans. Bien que des conventions internationales soient actuellement négociées sur les deux premiers points, séparément de la Conférence de 1992, ces questions seront au centre des débats au Brésil. La Conférence de Toronto sur l'atmosphère en évolution (1988) a été suivie d'une série de rencontres devant déboucher, avant la Conférence de Rio, sur une convention cadre sur le réchauffement de la planète, mais on n'a guère trouvé de points d'entente aux dernières réunions. Les États-Unis restent farouchement opposés à l'idée de fixer des objectifs pour la réduction des émissions d'acide carbonique et la très importante délégation japonaise doit encore se prononcer.

Pour ce qui est de la deuxième convention, qui porte sur la diversité biologique, on progresse très lentement, à cause d'un différend Nord-Sud sur l'utilisation des matériels génétiques en biotechnologie. Peu de pays en développement sont disposés à consacrer davantage de ressources à la protection de leur immense réserve de matériels génétiques, sauf s'ils les industries pharmaceutiques et biotechniques du Nord. Pour l'instant, ils ne reçoivent aucun dédommagement financier pour les matériels génétiques prélevés dans leurs forêts tropicales pour mettre au point de nouveaux médicaments.

Le Sud fonde ses objectifs sur le fait avéré que la plupart des problèmes planétaires sont causés, ou du moins aggravés, par les pays industrialisés. Les pays de l'OCDE, donc du Nord, regroupent plus ou moins 20 p. 100 de la population mondiale mais produisent 80 p. 100 des gaz responsables de l'effet de serre et donc des changements climatiques mondiaux. Plus de 90 p. 100 des chlorofluorocarbures qui détruisent la couche d'ozone sont produits dans les pays industriels. Pourtant, jusqu'ici, la plupart des négociations ont été axées sur les régions en développement, plutôt que sur les mesures que le Nord doit prendre pour diminuer sa propre pollution.

Les pays en développement se méfient de ce programme depuis le début. Même si beaucoup se rendent compte que des changements écologiques mondiaux les touchent sans doute plus durement encore que les pays industrialisés, un ordre du jour consacré exclusivement à l'environnement risque d'éloigner l'attention de leurs priorités, c'est-à-dire de leur développement économique. En outre, nombre d'entre eux pensent qu'un plan d'action découlant d'un ordre du jour environnemental leur imposerait de nouvelles conditions pour l'obtention de l'aide et des prêts étrangers, de

Maroc, des affrontements sanglants ont opposé, en décembre, l'Université, les islamistes et les gauchistes, et il y a eu plusieurs victimes.

L'EXEMPLE DE L'IRAN A INDÉMENTABLEMENT SERVI DE catalyseur. Et il a été suivi au Soudan et au Pakistan. Tous ces groupes, qui adoptent des discours nationaux, ne cultivent pas moins des relations entre eux. On a même établi l'existence d'une «Internationale intégriste» mais le siège se trouve à Khartoum (Soudan). Mais l'Iran, chérie, et l'Arabie saoudite, wahabite, se livre une certaine concurrence pour s'allier ces partis intégristes, et cela, pour des raisons politiques, car sur le plan religieux, les deux paraissent une conception fondamentalement de l'islam qui refuse tout progrès et est fermée à toute ouverture vers l'extérieur.


Pour la masse des classes moyennes salariées et pour la majorité des cadres supérieurs, l'islamisme signifierait un retour en arrière, un blocage de l'évolution, un obstacle aux progrès scientifiques et technologiques. Même si le désenchânement et l'exaspération touchent toutes les couches de la population, certains hésitent à rejeter pour les «barbus».

L'armée algérienne a décidé de mettre un frein à son pouvoir islamiste, considéré comme un obstacle à son propre pouvoir et à ses ambitions. Dans un éditorial d'avril 1991, le journal de l'armée *Al Jaich* expliquait les orientations et les ambitions des militaires algériens, trahumatisés par la guerre du Golfe et soucieux de s'opposer à ce qu'ils considéraient comme le début d'une hégémonie occidentale. Et ils n'hésitent pas à dire des islamistes que ce sont des «alliés objectifs de cette stratégie occidentale». Ils tiennent à acceller l'accès aux sciences et à la technologie et à développer leur armement, sans exclure le nucléaire.

La «satanisation» de l'Occident, en particulier des Américains et des Français, condamnés pour leur attitude lors de la crise du Golfe, constitue un thème fondamental, en particulier pour les intégristes.

JUSQU'ICI, LES ISLAMISTES ONT UTILISÉ LA SEULE stratégie qu'ils aient élaborée : le harcèlement et l'action violente. En Algérie, trois semaines avant les élections, ils ont attaqué un poste frontalier de la garde nationale, ce qui a fait des morts et des blessés. L'armée nationale leur a fait la guerre et a arrêté la majorité des membres du groupe coupable. Il s'est avéré qu'ils avaient été formés et entraînés en Afghanistan. En Tunisie, le complot déjoué en mai dernier visait à assassiner le chef de l'Etat au moyen d'armements sophistiqués, particulièrement des missiles *Singer* américains fournis par les moudjahidins algériens. Auparavant, ils avaient utilisé le terrorisme, faisant exploser des bombes et lançant des attentats à l'acide sulfurique contre la population, à la sorte des bureaux pour mieux désinstaller le régime. Au

comme solutions politiques de rechange. Encore que la tendance n'est pas exclusive si l'on en juge par les derniers événements sanglants à l'Université et des étudiants islamistes se sont heurtés à des étudiants de gauche; des morts, des blessés et des arrestations ont constitué le bilan d'autres opérations qui en annoncent certainement d'autres. Qu'est-ce que l'islamisme ? Contrairement à ce que l'on pense, ce n'est pas un mouvement organisé; c'est, à l'origine, un sentiment partagé d'identification, d'affirmation de soi et de sa différence, au sens culturel du terme. Les mouvements qui se sont greffés sur ce courant sont en fait politiques. Comme le montre l'historien égyptien Mohammed Saïd Al-Ashmouni, dans son livre «L'islamisme contre l'islam», il ne s'agit pas de controverses théologiques mais bien de critiques de régimes politiques. Le Coran, quand on l'invoque, sert surtout comme substitut aux normes et aux références socio-politiques en vigueur et comme instrument de démarcation par rapport aux cultures occidentales, et non comme ressource métaphysique et religieuse. Généralement, on s'attache, non pas à une personnalisation, mais à une



Bernard L. Hoffman

griotes. Pour des raisons religieuses, bien sûr, mais aussi parce que la laïcité et tout ce qui en découle — comme la démocratie — sont honteux et menacent leur pouvoir. Les visées électoralistes ne sont pas, non plus, à exclure dans cette attitude. Comme c'est le cas pour l'Iran, le régime a besoin d'un ennemi extérieur, fixe, fixe. Les relations avec l'Occident seront, bien sûr, basées sur les intérêts économiques, mais elles seront limitées et difficiles. Dans la région, il est à prévoir que les prix des matières premières et de l'énergie (pétrole, gaz) ne seront pas stables et que les délibérations au sein de l'OPEP changeront sensiblement avec le renforcement du camp des «durs» (Iran, Irak, Libye, Algérie). Le marché maghrébin, qui représentera près de 100 millions de personnes d'ici la fin du siècle, ne restera pas longtemps une chasse-gardée française. Certains dirigeants islamistes l'ont déjà laissé entendre.

DANS CES CONDITIONS, LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES s'en ressentiront. D'abord, entre les Etats musulmans, car les islamistes sont essentiellement nationalistes et fort peu unitaires. Même s'ils ont tissé des liens entre eux, il est peu probable que leurs politiques soient unifiées. On peut même s'attendre à des conflits, dès lors que les intérêts nationaux divergeront. Certains pensent qu'au Maghreb et ailleurs, la question des frontières héritée du colonialisme constituera une prémière et importante source de conflit. En ce sens, la «petite» Tunisie a tout à craindre d'une Algérie gouvernée par les intégristes. Pour les raisons évoquées plus haut, mais aussi parce que son système socio-politique, que les dirigeants actuels soutiennent vers la démocratie, les libertés et le libéralisme économique, sera fortement menacé. Telles est la situation, tels sont les enjeux. Comment combattre ce qu'une partie importante de la population considère comme un danger mortel ? Jusqu'ici, les pouvoirs en place n'ont pu mater les islamistes, ni par la répression, ni par le rapprochement, comme l'a fait à ses dépens l'ancien président algérien. Alors que le souffle de la démocratie commence à toucher la région (Tunisie, Algérie), l'intégrisme promet une dictature religieuse. Et les pouvoirs s'interrogent : faut-il permettre aux «ennemis de la démocratie pour mieux l'écraser» ? L'instauration, en Algérie, d'un Haut Comité d'Etat qui livre une lutte acharnée au FIS, est fortement discutée par les puristes de la démocratie. D'autres y voient, au contraire, la seule voie vers une transition démocratique et la seule chance d'asseoir la démocratie sur des bases solides. Certains vont même jusqu'à accepter l'éventualité d'une dictature militaire, parce que le peuple peut s'insurger contre des militaires, mais il ne peut contester Dieu.



# LES «BARBUS» : UNE MENACE POUR LA PAIX ?

*La percée des islamistes aux premières élections démocratiques algériennes fait peser une menace dans toute la région sur la démocratie et les relations internationales.*

PAR ABDELHAMID GMATI

dénonce avec virulence le régime et l'Occident; dans la rue, ensuite, où les premiers «barbus» et les «voiles» (*hidjab*) font leur apparition. Le port de la barbe et du voile procède d'une volonté de libération de se démarquer d'un environnement jugé «impur».

et de l'adoption.  
Recentant dans la masse des laissés-pour-compte, des chômeurs et des jeunes désœuvrés, les islamistes avaient beau jeu pour dénoncer un régime athée, impie, incapable de résoudre les problèmes de la société, inféodé à l'Occident et asservi au diable. Le régime avait beau surcharger et déformer les exigences des islamistes (prières diffusées à la radio et à la télé, fermeture de bars, programmes d'enseignement islamique, etc.) rien n'y fit : l'agitation était permanente, rouages et toutes les institutions. Le Mouvement d'Ennahdha des 1989, pour mieux participer au débat démocratique, se développe et mène une série d'actions violentes aussi bien dans les universités que dans les centres touristiques. La réponse de l'Etat a oscillé entre la répression et les tentatives de rapprochement.

ON PEUT AFFIRMER QUE CE SONT LES RÉGIMES EN place qui ont contribué à la création et au développement du mouvement islamiste. Au lendemain de leur accession à l'indépendance, les pays du Maghreb se lancent dans une vaste entreprise de développement axée sur la modernité et la laïcité. Mais en même temps, pour mieux faire passer leurs réformes, les régimes récupèrent la religion et la soumettent à la raison d'Etat. Et à partir des années 1960, pour contre-carrer la violence des mouvements de gauche, marxistes-socialistes, ils jouent la religion contre le socialisme. Pour ce faire, ils introduisent l'enfermement religieux dans les écoles, multiplient les lieux de culte, encouragent l'enseignement théologique et développent des programmes d'arabisation et d'islamisation à outrance.

L'absence de démocratie, le monolithisme des régimes à parti unique, l'omnipotence des dirigeants, la corruption et la mauvaise gestion ajoutent aux échecs des différentes politiques économiques pour aboutir aux crises des systèmes. L'omniprésence de l'Etat favorise une classe de privilèges et crée une mentalité d'assistés dans la population. Les inégalités s'exacerbent, le chômage augmente, l'exode rural grossit les banlieues urbaines, la pauvreté augmente. Le mal-élu gagne toute une population de laissés-pour-compte. L'émigration se trouve exclue du système. La crise d'identité se profile et, en l'absence d'une idéologie motivante, le retour aux valeurs ancestrales et la religion devient l'unique recours. C'est dans ce climat d'exaspération que se développe l'islamisme. En Tunisie, d'abord, où il profite du laïcisme du régime qui avait promu- gué un *Code du statut personnel*, qui abolissait la polygamie et octroyait à la femme les mêmes droits qu'à l'homme. Ce texte de loi qui consacrait l'existence des pays arabes et musulmans pour ces dispositions juridiques du droit positif. Les autorités tunisiennes ont même dû reculer devant les pressions algériennes et saoudiennes, et abandonner leur projet de

L'exemple de l'Iran suscite l'inquiétude, exacerbée par le fait que, contrairement à ce dernier pays et à d'autres où les islamistes sont arrivés au pouvoir, les réactions ont été immédiates et alarmistes ; on estimait l'« avenir handicapé », « les libertés enfreintes et les droits de l'Homme baroques », au point qu'une manifestation monstre ait fait (le 2 janvier) plus de 300 000 personnes dans la rue, « pour sauver la démocratie ». Les membres du FIs et ses sympathisants se montrent conciliants, affirmant que « l'Algérie n'est pas l'Iran ». Qu'en est-il, en réalité ? Faut-il craindre les islamistes et leur comportement ? Ou bien leur menace pour la région et les relations internationales ?

origines du mouvement remontent au début du siècle, plus spécifiquement en Égypte, alors que les théologiens et les religieux préconisaient le fondamentalisme pour mieux lutter contre les colonialismes et sauvegarder l'identité et la culture arab-musulmanes contre les risques d'assimilation. Petit à petit, des mouvements se structurèrent et se lancèrent dans l'activisme politique, soutenant le nationalisme arabe naissant et menant de se substituer à lui à chaque échec. Même l'ancien président égyptien, Jamal Abdel Nasser, qui fut pendant un moment porte-drapeau du nationalisme et de l'unité arabes, fut des pro-blichés cernés avec ses «frères musulmans», qu'il assujettit à une répression violente. Jusq'au début des années 1970, l'islamisme se cantonna en Égypte et au Soudan et resta minoritaire, ne se manifestant que par des actions de violence. Ce n'est que vers le milieu des années 1970 que l'islamisme se manifesta dans les pays du Maghreb. Dans les mosquées, d'abord, où des concours des nouveaux *imams* devient politique et

\*Le premier tour de scrutin des élections législatives, tenu le 26 décembre 1991, donna la victoire aux islamistes du FIS, avec 24,9 p. 100 des 13,3 millions d'inscrits et 47,5 p. 100 des suffrages exprimés, ce qui est très proche de la majorité absolue (188 sièges sur 430). Le second tour, prévu pour le 16 janvier 1992, fut reporté par suite de la démission, le 11 janvier, du président de la République Chadli Bendjedid.

la théorie marxiste. Le fait que la population soit nourrie beaucoup. En plus, les efforts incessants déployés par les autorités pour attirer des touristes étrangers, source de devises qui font cruellement défaut, continuent de fruster les Cubains, que l'on tient de plus en plus à l'écart des meilleures plages, hôtels et restaurants, et qu'on exclut des «boutiques à dollars» où seuls

le meilleur juge et elle répondait en masse au cri de *Commandante en chef, ordne!* («Commandant en chef, ordonne-nous!»). À l'évidence, l'heure a sonné pour le gouvernement révolutionnaire de faire davantage confiance à l'ensemble de la population et de décentraliser son autorité.

LES MÉDIAS OCCIDENTAUX DONNENT HABITUELLEMENT une image erronée de Cuba, en grande partie parce qu'ils ne comprennent pas l'éthique révolutionnaire qui l'imprègne en profondeur. Le peuple cubain est bien un peuple révolutionnaire : entier avec ses programmes d'aide civile et humanitaire extrêmement généreux offerts partout en esprit de coopération et de partage des tâches.

Parallèlement, il est angossé par le prix exorbitant.

racisme et des soins médicaux si rose, avec le chômage, les exilés cubains n'ont pas une vie ment qu'aux États-Unis, les tant peut-être, il sait parfaite- quodienne. Tout aussi impor-

de toujours devoir se serrer un peu plus la ceinture. De plus en plus les Cubains pensent aussi qu'il est temps pour eux d'avoir leur mot à dire dans l'orientation des politiques gouvernementales et d'avoir un plus grand accès à l'information. Le monde a changé irrémédiablement, affirment-ils, et pourtant, le gouvernement, Fidel Castro notamment, suivent les mêmes démarches de base qu'il y a trente ans. Le modèle économique ne peut manifestement fonctionner, le parti communiste est nettement incapable de trouver des solutions aux difficultés nationales et un changement politique s'impose si Cuba veut se sortir de la tempête qui lui fait rage tout au long de l'année. Cependant, jusqu'ici, le gouvernement ne donne guère à penser qu'il entend opérer des changements importants.

Toutefois, il ne faudrait pas sous-estimer la population de Fidel Castro, continue en dépit des terribles difficultés économiques qu'assailent Cuba.

Le scénario le plus plausible est donc que Fidel Castro essaiera de relancer une économie d'horizon court en agissant en catalyseur de l'unité révolutionnaire. Cela a déjà marché à l'horizon n'ont jamais été si noirs. Dans sa stratégie, le gouvernement fera appel au sentiment national, alors que l'économie se désagrège impitoyablement. Entre-temps, il continue de préparer soigneusement la prochaine étape du plan officiel (après du nom sinistre mais juste de «opération zéro»). Par le passé, les convictions et le châtiment sans faille de Fidel Castro ont suffi à rallier les Cubains à la cause révolutionnaire, à les encourager à se serrer la ceinture en attendant des jours meilleurs. Cependant, ce système de punitions et de récompenses, qui a permis de faire de Cuba un pays de moins en moins de fruits et, pour la

de 1959.

Quant au Canada, ce scénario lui permettrait non seulement de garder mais d'augmenter le commerce, les investissements et la coopération scientifique et technologique, en profitant de son prestige auprès des Cubains, bien mérité après avoir maintenu des relations depuis la révolution



oblige les décideurs canadiens à évaluer différents scénarios. Il n'est pas impossible d'en imaginer un qui servirait les intérêts du Canada et conviendrait à sa politique traditionnelle à l'égard de Cuba, qui est de lui reconnaître le droit de décider de sa propre destinée. Une telle option supposerait une évolution de la démocratie électorale et l'introduction de mécanismes de marché suffisants pour permettre à Cuba de réintégrer la famille inter-américaine. Ce changement progressif se produirait dans le cadre de la révolution en s'appuyant sur ses fondations dans l'ère post-soviétique, sous une direction cubaine intérieure. Le Mexique, le Venezuela, la Colombie et le Brésil, voisins latino-américains les plus impor-



# CUBA : TOUJOURS FIDÈLE ?

Pour la première fois depuis la révolution de 1959, le charisme de Fidel Castro risque de ne pas suffire à sauver le vieux régime.

PAR EDGAR J. DOSMAN ET JOHN KIRK

AVEC LE RENVERSSEMENT DU COMMUNISME en Europe de l'Est, il était facile en 1989 de prédire qu'à Cuba, Fidel Castro ne

aurait pu être beaucoup plus gros. Pendant plus de trente ans, son gouvernement a fait fi de l'adversité, adoptant une démarche politique ultra-castriste et ignorant ceux qui n'étaient pas d'accord. Cela marchait, mais avec le filet de sécurité soviétique constamment tendu.

Même aujourd'hui, dans les difficultés omniprésentes, le *Comandante en jefe* incarne bien ces traits nationaux. Fidel est celui qui a mis de la scène mondiale à maintes occasions et qui a soigneusement nourri le nationalisme et le sentiment de dignité si importants dans l'identité cubaine — et sur lesquels les commentateurs politiques occidentaux se méprennent si souvent. Fidel Castro jouit encore d'une grande popularité personnelle à Cuba. Ses inlassables efforts au nom du peuple, ses rapports électrisants avec le public et ses qualités indéniables de communist-cateur sont légendaires. Cependant, il est vrai aussi que son assise et sa popularité s'amoindrissent lentement mais régulièrement et que d'aucuns demandent à voix basse s'il saura surmonter les problèmes posés par la chute de l'empire soviétique. L'ironie du dilemme actuel, pour la plupart des Cubains, c'est que la révolution sans Fidel cubaine doit survivre, puisque la politique habituelle, qui consiste à «vivre au jour le jour» au rythme d'appels charismatiques et par un volontarisme politique n'est plus viable.

À l'instar de son premier secrétaire, le Parti communiste de Cuba (PCC) traverse également une crise d'identité. Malgré de petits profits pour ses membres, il n'a jamais joué sur l'Élitisme comme les partis d'URSS ou d'Europe de l'Est. Les Cubains ne se précipitent pas dans la rue pour brûler leurs cartes de membres ou quitter le Parti. Pourtant, le congrès du PCC d'octobre 1991 montre clairement qu'il doit se réformer de fond en comble s'il veut conserver la loyauté du peuple cubain.

Une des grandes décisions prises en octobre a été de permettre aux Cubains d'être, pour la première fois, leurs députés à l'Assemblée nationale. Que ce premier pas indispensable ne survienne que plus de trente ans après la victoire révolutionnaire en dit long sur les raisons de la crise politique cubaine. Pendant tout ce temps, on a fait croire à la population que le gouvernement était

Le gouvernement de La Havane cherche à atténuer les difficultés auxquelles sont confrontés les Cubains en faisant preuve d'imagination. Ainsi, il a importé 700 000 bicyclettes de Chine; 1 000 000 boeufs ont été dressés aux travaux agricoles (1 000 000 autres le sont en ce moment); on se sert de nouveau de pigeons voyageurs pour livrer du courrier; on a distribué des poussins aux familles pour qu'ils les élèvent; et on s'efforce d'encourager les gens à travailler aux champs pour produire de la nourriture. Comparaisons avec l'Europe de l'Est mises à part, il reste à savoir si tout cela suffira à consolider le gouvernement Castro, ou si la population depuis longtemps soumise à des privations se rebellera contre une adversité qui n'en finit pas.

LA CAUSE LA PLUS ÉVIDENTE DE LA CRISE ACTUELLE est la mort de l'Union soviétique, dont Cuba dépendait depuis la rupture des relations diplomatiques par les États-Unis, en janvier 1961. Voici quelques chiffres qui illustrent bien la situation : Cuba était à la remorque de l'URSS pour 75 p. 100 de son commerce, 40 p. 100 de ses

DANS UN DISCOURS PRONONCÉ EN NOVEMBRE 1991 à l'occasion du trentième anniversaire de l'immense campagne d'alphabétisation lancée en 1961, qui a fait passer l'analphabétisme de 24 à 4 p. 100, le président Castro a expliqué la force essentielle du modèle révolutionnaire cubain. Il a comparé la démarche de son gouvernement dans la «période particulière» actuelle à des mesures auxquelles les gouvernements capitalistes recourent volontiers en période de crise économique. À Cuba, aucun travailleur n'a été mis à pied, aucune école ni aucun hôpital n'a fermé, aucune usine n'a été condamnée. Les approvisionnement sont réduits de manière drastique, mais il a tout à fait raison.

Le système existant dans le reste de l'ancien bloc soviétique — a manifestement favorisé cette socialiste — mais Fidel n'a pas expliqué, c'est que si, au lieu de répartir équitablement les ressources disponibles (pour mettre tous les Cubains sur un pied d'égalité), le gouvernement — et lui en particulier — s'étaient montés plus pragmatiques, le

beaucoup trop tardé à rectifier.

de l'état de fermeté.  
L'avenir immédiat de la Birmanie est peu encourageant, mais à plus long terme, il pourrait fort se révéler plus brillant. Le Japon et les démocraties occidentales sont des sources de financement importantes, comme pour l'Europe de l'Est et les anciennes républiques soviétiques, mais il sera des plus crucial que ces pays aident la Birmanie à rentrer dans le monde après bientôt trente ans d'isolement. Les amis communs par Ne Win et les régimes qu'il a encouragés ont contribué à toute une génération de Birmanis leur patrimoine. Jusqu'à tout dernièrement, aucun gouvernement étranger ne condamnait ses poli-

et le CEROL. Les voisins de la Birmanie joueront un rôle décisif dans la formation du prochain gouvernement. Les pays de l'ANASE, la Chine et l'Inde nous mènent à la stabilité. Les intriques nécessaires pour survivre à la Guerre froide diminuant, il ne serait pas dans l'intérêt des États limitrophes, qui eux-mêmes courtisent les investisseurs étrangers, chercher à attirer des millions de touristes et veulent servir d'exemple dans la région, de se faire les complices de la corruption et

économique substantielle. AUNG SAN SUU KUI EST NOVICE EN POLITIQUE ET inexpérimentée pour ce qui est de la gestion d'un pays, malgré son travail à l'ONU où, s'occupant de questions administratives et budgétaires, elle s'est familiarisée avec les grandes questions politiques. Si elle survit à l'incarcération, elle aura encore bien des tempêtes à essayer, étant donné les scissions énormes marquées en Birmanie et les problèmes énormes laissés par Ne Win

nouvelle constitution tenant en compte des minorités et pour recruter, à l'étranger et au pays, les milliers de Birmans qui possèdent les compétences pour gouverner. De nouveaux manuels scolaires doivent être écrits, les universités et le système éducatif doivent être restructurés, et les tribunaux, réformés. Les sociétés privées doivent pouvoir prendre de l'expansion loin des machinations des fonctionnaires. Une présence onusienne sera très probablement demandée, ainsi qu'une aide

tionie autour de la LND pour les élections de 1990 semble avoir volé en éclats. De plus, les multiples fractures ethniques, les intérêts économiques concurrents et la corruption endémique de la moitié de l'horizon vendue sur le marché mondial provient maintenant du Triangle d'or, dont fait partie l'Elat des Chans, donnent peu d'espoir que tout régime bien géré puisse relever les ruines laissées par le CEROL après son effondrement final. La communauté internationale doit se préparer à aider rapidement Aung San Suu Kui à réformer la LND et à remplir le mandat populaire qui lui est confié de par les élections de 1990. Il faudra du temps pour élaborer un

C'EST UNE MAUVAISE GESTION ÉCONOMIQUE À l'intérieur du pays et la cupidité des dirigeants qui mènent probablement le régime à la perte. Bien que les marchandises abondent, l'inflation mène les importations et même les aliments de base hors de portée de la plupart des gens. Même les familles des soldats, protégées de ces privations avec le CEROL, il faut lutter pour survivre. Il est vrai aussi que l'opposition qui s'est précédemment

La même financière que le CEROL reçoit de sociétés pétrolières occidentales n'est pas le moindre des paradoxes. En effet, alors que leurs gouvernements condamnent les violations des droits de la personne en Birmanie, depuis 1988, elles y déversent des millions. La chasse au pétrole et au gaz rapporte des devises vitales pour maintenir le régime à flot et, malgré une récente condamnation générale par les démocrates occidentaux, malgré une résolution unanime et sans précédent de la Troisième Commission de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU exigeant la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques et la validation des résultats des élections de 1990, la situation reste inchangée.

avec la Birmanie en 1990. Pratiquement du jour au lendemain, l'armée birmane reçut des avions, des hélicoptères, de gros canons de campagne, des fournitures médicales, du matériel logistique et de grandes quantités de munitions. A l'automne 1991, les Karens rejoignirent avec succès leur insurrection dans le delta de l'Irawady, et les batailles rangées autour des positions retranchées sont devenues très fréquentes à mesure que les rangs de l'armée régulière grossissaient (de 160 000 à 280 000 soldats en cinq ans). Le nombre des morts a augmenté

leur appartenance dans les accablantes feroces qui caractérisaient la guerre birmann. Toutefois, ayant réfléchi à ce qui servirait le mieux ses intérêts politiques, Pékin décida de cesser d'aider le PCB. Un regain d'amitié avec l'Inde et les tensions conjuguées avec le Viêt-nam durant les années 1980 lui faisaient souhaiter une frontière stable au Sud-Est. Les Chinois cherchèrent à s'allier avec les armées de Rangoon et de Bangkok, d'importantes ventes d'armes à la Thaïlande au milieu des années 1980 furent suivies d'un marché de 1,2 milliard de dollars américains


communauté internationale a appliqué tacitement à l'encontre de la Birmanie un embargo sur les armements grâce auquel les conflits armés en-ternes sont restés circonscrits. Le Parti communiste de Birmanie (PCB) recevait de Chine des armes en quantités limitées; l'Occident – pays et sociétés privées – approvisionnait l'armée de Rangoon, tandis que les ethnies insurgées échangeaient, avec la Chine et la Thaïlande, du teck, du jade, de l'opium et du bétail contre des armes et des munitions. Peu d'armes modernes tiraient

La petite bourgeoisie locale. Assimilant le système à une pyramide géante dont on finit toujours par gravir les marches, une génération de Birmans a toléré une corruption croissante et des violations des droits de la personne de plus en plus nombreuses, mais une tragédie plane maintenant au-dessus de sa tête. Le pouvoir est à présent entre les mains de criminels-orwelliens qui gouvernent en tenant continuellement un double langage et en usant de toutes les formes d'intimidation.

LA BIRMANIE EST UNE DESTINATION TOURISTIQUE de rêve, une terre de méditation et de beauté sereine, mais comme ailleurs, la politique et l'argent y sont très liés. Alors que l'immense majorité de la population vit tout juste au-dessus du minimum d'existence, l'économie est dominée par quelques centaines de familles, d'officiers et de collaborateurs ciels qui détiennent des licences d'import-export, fixent les règles des investissements spécifiques, manœuvrent avec les tréquants et trempent en coulisse dans le commerce de l'heroiné et de l'opium. Ne Win a toujours mis un point d'honneur à protéger les officiers loyaux, qui s'enthousiasent en touchant de hauts salaires en tant que membres de l'armée et de conseils d'administration dans le civil, puis des terres de terres et d'entreprises, et ont accès à des biens étranges hors d'atteinte même pour

Ce qui est sans doute le plus effrayant pour la population birmane, c'est son association avec le renseignement militaire, dont on sait, à l'évidence, qu'il apporte et étaye les preuves de l'oppression. Selon Amnesty International, quelque 10 000 personnes ont « disparu » et des milliers d'autres croupillent en prison. Il est certes un peu romantique de voir Sанда Win comme la reine des Ténchères – réincarnation démontaque d'un conte ramayana classique –, mais l'image séduite par les partisans d'Aung San Suu Kyi qui la contre sa rivale.

Pour compliquer les choses, s'ajoute à la lutte entre le bien et le mal qui se joue entre les filles des pères fondateurs de la Birmanie moderne la réalité d'une société qui compte 41 millions d'habitants, où l'on parle une bonne centaine de dialectes ethniques et où les Birmanes représentent les deux tiers de la population; les Karens, les Chans et les Arakanais, quelques 2 millions chacun; et les autres minorités, un peu plus de 1 million chacune.



Jonnie Bennett



# PARADIS PERDU ?

Le prix Nobel de la paix salue la lutte politique de

Aung San Suu Kwei et attire l'attention du monde sur la

dictature brutale au pouvoir au Myanmar.

PAR JOHN BADGLEY

**E**n décembre le prix Nobel de la paix a été remis à Mme Aung San Suu Kwei, le comité de Stockholm a attiré l'attention mondiale sur elle et aussi sur le Conseil d'Etat pour la restauration de l'ordre et de la loi (CEROL), la redoutable junte qui gouverne le Myanmar. Les militaires avaient placé Mme Aung San Suu Kwei en résidence surveillée en juillet 1989, dans l'espoir de la faire plier et de dégrader le mouvement d'opposition qu'elle dirigeait. Au lieu de cela, la mesure se retourna contre eux, puisque la Ligue nationale pour la démocratie (LND) emporta 80 p. 100 des sièges lors des élections de mai 1990. En préférant un compromis pacifique à la résistance armée, Aung San Suu Kwei réussit, par sa victoire électorale, à retirer au Conseil d'Etat tout vernis de légitimité et à prouver qu'il ne s'appuyait que sur une clique armée prête à faire usage des armes.

Fidèle à la tradition des tyrans, le CEROL a cherché une Commission historique de réécriture son histoire. Il a cependant innové en prétendant respecter le droit – n'a-t-il pas organisé des élections libres ? –, mais s'est ensuite empressé de violer les mêmes codes civil et pénal qu'il jurait protéger pour permettre à ses acolytes d'amasser des sommes d'argent colossales. Depuis le coup d'Etat qui l'a porté au pouvoir le 18 septembre 1988, le CEROL justifie une oppression brutale par des décrets qui remettent en vigueur des règlements jadis édictés par les Britanniques et par des élites du premier ministre birman, M. U Nu, qui a recouru à la loi martiale "travaillant pendant son mandat.

Depuis septembre 1988, une série de traités publiés par le général Saw Maung, président du CEROL, et par le major-général Khin Nyunt, son chef des services secrets, révèle une extraordinaire xénophobie et d'incroyables déformations des faits. Témoin de leur état d'esprit, la décision de rebaptiser la Birmanie «Myanmar», nom birman de l'ancien empire. Décision qui n'est pas sans rappeler celle des Khmers rouges d'appeler le Cambodge «Kampuchéa», ou celle des nazis de ne plus parler d'Allemagne mais de «Troisième Reich».

Les troubles civils qui secouent le pays depuis son indépendance, en 1948, sont qualifiés d'«insurrectionnels». Des guerillas ethniques et idéologiques combattent l'armée de Rangoon, chacune de son côté en général, et ce, au prix de lourds sacrifices pour l'économie et pour la population birmanes. Le général Saw Maung estime qu'il y a eu un million de victimes dans la population, chiffre probablement gonflé mais plus

proche de la réalité que ceux jamais admis par le général Ne Win, l'émancipe grisé qui gouverna de fait de 1958 à 1960, puis de 1962 à 1988. Ce dernier reste influent dans l'ombre du Conseil d'Etat, tel un magicien démoniaque dans un pays qui n'est pas sans rappeler celui d'Oz et où les reines de la Lumière et des Ténébres se disputent le pouvoir.

GRÂCE AU PRIX NOBEL DE LA PAIX, LE MONDE connaît maintenant la bonne reine, Aung San Suu Kwei, fille d'Aung San. Ce dernier fonda l'armée d'Indépendance birmane pendant l'occupation japonaise, puis dirigea la Ligue anti-fasciste populaire pour la liberté (LAPFL) dans sa lutte pour l'indépendance. Ne Win, l'un de ses fidèles lieutenants, prit ses fonctions militaires lorsque Aung San devint président de la LAPFL. La tâche de celui-ci était double : négocier l'indépendance de la Birmanie, alors colonie britannique, et trouver un terrain d'entente entre groupes nationaux indociles, notamment, les deux partis communistes et les plus grandes minorités ethniques du pays. Il réussit fort bien sur

Ne Win se battit pendant des années pour faire de l'armée une force capable de mater les divers groupes rebelles afin que le gouvernement démocratiquement élu d'U Nu puisse créer un processus économique rationnel qui permettrait de moderniser tout le pays. Toutefois, le socialisme fervent du gouvernement effraya les investisseurs étrangers, déjà peu sûrs de réaliser des bénéfices dans un pays ravagé par des conflits idéologiques et ethniques. La Birmanie se retrouva peu à peu à la traîne derrière la plupart de ses voisins du Sud-Est asiatique.

En 1962, invoquant pour justifier son coup d'Etat la gabegie économique et les menaces que les minorités faisaient peser contre la structure constitutionnelle, Ne Win fit passer l'armée de la guerre à la politique. Il lança un plan de développement, en fait motivé par des craintes xénophobes à l'égard des commerçants chinois et indiens de Birmanie. Cependant, les objectifs de Ne Win étaient compromis par sa propre sottise politique et administrative. La corruption grandissante et les inspections continuaient de couvrir l'Etat, tout était en place pour une grande explosion qui conduisit à sa démission de la présidence du parti unique, le Parti du programme socialiste birman.

Deux gouvernements se succédèrent en court laps de temps. Le premier, dirigé par le général Sein Lwin, réprima par la force et dans le sang des manifestations populaires croissantes. Il ne tint que dix-huit jours. Le second, dirigé par Maung Meaung (émminent écrivain et juriste birmann), resta en place dix jours de plus, mais il fut marqué par de réelles ouvertures de paix en direction de la Ligue nationale pour la démocratie et il permit une économie de marché, la liberté de la presse et la libéralisation des déplacements. Pourant, les manifestations s'amplifièrent.

Le 26 août 1988, 500 000 personnes se rassemblèrent autour du temple le plus célèbre de Rangoon, la pagode de Shwe Dagon, pour écouter Aung San Suu Kwei s'exprimer au nom de la liberté. Elle n'était rentrée en Birmanie que depuis quelques mois après vingt années passées à l'étranger. \* L'écouait, entre autres, le Dr Sunda Win, médecin formé en Grande-Bretagne et fille préférée de Ne Win, pas moins ambiteuse que l'oratrice du jour. De voir son père défilé par Aung San Suu Kwei, elle sentit en cette dernière une autre concurrente au trône.

SANDA WIN DECIDA DE REDONNER À SON PÈRE SA place dans l'histoire. Arguant de son obsession de la sécurité, elle quitta son poste de gynécologue dans une école de médecine pour s'engager dans l'armée où sa seule fonction, au rang de commandant, serait de veiller sur la santé du vieil homme. Elle devint non seulement son médecin chef, mais aussi le passage obligé pour l'approcher. Avec l'aide du général Khin Nyunt, chef du renseignement militaire, elle le tint informé au sujet de ses ennemis.

On eut la preuve de toute la malveillance de Sunda Win pendant les soulèvements de 1988, lorsque des médecins rapportèrent qu'elle avait fourni des drogues analgésiques et supprime la peur à des agents qui furent ensuite envoyés distribuer de l'eau empoisonnée aux étudiants qui manifestaient. Ces agents furent lynchés par la foule. Des soldats birmanes capturés racontèrent dans des attaques suicides contre les armées rebelles retranchées.

\*Aung San Suu Kwei a quitté la Birmanie à l'âge de quinze ans, a poursuivi sa scolarité en Inde, puis a suivi des études d'histoire à l'Université d'Oxford, dont elle est diplômée. Après quoi, elle est entrée aux Nations Unies, à New York. Ses principaux écrits sont réunis dans Freedom From Fear, publié chez Viking Press, en 1991.

de défense remettent en cause certains des fondements mêmes de la culture nationale, au premier rang desquels figure la conscription. Enfin, plus ponctuellement, parce que la conjoncture politique intérieure — et particulièrement le programme électoral — n'est guère favorable, dans les mois qui viennent, à un effort qui viserait à long terme à résoudre ces problèmes. Contrairement à ce que l'on croit, le budget de la défense, la barre des 3 p. 100 du produit intérieur brut, la tendance actuelle semblant même converger vers 2,8 ou 2,9 p. 100. Mais le problème n'est pas seulement budgétaire : que l'on songe à l'enjeu économique et social que représente le fait de ce qui figure actuellement dans les programmes. Elles expliquent tout comme la mise en demeure de cette dernière, apparaît insuffisamment engagée, comme le confirme le retard pris par le gouvernement dans l'élaboration d'une nouvelle loi sur les programmes militaires. Toutefois, un certain nombre de tendances nouvelles se font jour depuis quelques mois, d'abord dans le domaine nucléaire : sans que l'on assiste à proprement parler à des réductions, se profile une interruption de l'expansion de l'arsenal, perspective impensable il y a seulement quelques années. L'hypothèse de l'abandon à terme de la composante stratégique sol-sol, par obsolescence des installations du plateau d'Albion (un missile mobile ayant été définitivement exclu), apparaît désormais vraisemblable. Quant à la composante mer-sol, qui devrait demeurer, grâce aux sous-marins lanceurs d'engins de nouvelle génération (SNLE-NG) qui constituent l'épine dorsale de la dissuasion française, elle sera sans doute ramenée, d'ici l'an 2010, à un maximum de quatre sous-marins. Enfin, la décision de différer *sine die* le déploiement opérationnel du missile *Hades* et la possibilité de l'inclure dans un marchandage en vue de l'élimination des armes nucléaires à courte portée en Europe conduisent très certainement le pays à renoncer à une composante nucléaire expressément stratégique. Des lors, la dissuasion française devrait, à terme, reposer exclusivement sur une simple dyade stratégique. Somme toute, c'est bel et bien au début discret d'une remise en cause de la priorité nucléaire que l'on assiste. PARALLÈLEMENT, S'ÉBOUSSE LA NOUVELLE STRUCTURE DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES ET, PARTICULIÈREMENT, DE L'ARMÉE DE TERRE. Forte actuellement de 280 000 hommes, celle-ci sera vraisemblablement réduite à environ 225 000 d'ici 1995. On a ramené à dix mois la durée du service militaire actif pour tenir compte de cet objectif, tandis que le renforcement des unités professionnelles de la FAR doit être entrepris. En outre, on adoptera une nouvelle structure des opérations et sur la modularité des formations, afin d'adapter les forces aux conditions futures de la gestion des crises. En matière d'équipement, la priorité est nettement accordée au renforcement des moyens de commandement et de contrôle (C3I) afin d'accroître les capacités françaises et européennes de gestion des crises. Pourtant, malgré l'amorce de tendances nouvelles, la situation de la politique de défense de la France en 1992 se caractérise par une très grande incertitude. Dans nombre de cas, les choix cruciaux restent à faire. L'exemple le plus frappant est celui de la conscription, système en crise déjà depuis de nombreuses années et répondant de moins en moins à l'exigence républicaine d'universalité; le système est mal adapté à la nouvelle situation stratégique et il ne peut sans doute plus faire l'objet, à ce stade, d'une simple adaptation. Mais d'autres décisions souvent déchantées s'imposeront sur divers plans dans les années à venir : équipement et programmes, industries de défense, doctrine nucléaire, relations avec l'OTAN et construction européenne. Jus-qu'ici, on n'a fait que les reporter. Plus grave peut-être, un véritable débat national n'a pas encore été engagé; il est pourtant indispensable pour éclairer les choix dans l'avenir et, surtout, pour susciter le consentement du pays.



quant à la troisième révolution stratégique, elle relève du devenir du conventionnel. de sa politique de défense en faveur France à rééquilibrer les priorités nouvelle donne stratégique oblige la quence de dissuasion. Il reste que la le maintien d'une capacité consé- tion nucléaire au Sud (et maintenant à l'Est) justifient incontestablement au cours du conflit en déclarant qu'il excluait le recours à cette arme dans ce niale. C'est ce que le président François Mitterrand a implicitement reconnu prédomine le nucléaire ne convient pas aux missions de police internationale. Pour les mêmes raisons, le conflit a confirmé que la posture de défense ou professionnalisation de l'armée.

marginales. La guerre du Golfe a donc révélé l'insuffisance du taux de collective, à l'exception de formules de volontariat possibles mais la conscription est incompatible avec des opérations relevant de la sécurité les intérêts vitaux du pays, mission qui justifie le recours au contingent. Bien adaptée à un outil militaire ayant comme vocation première de défendre relève d'un problème structurel plus fondamental : le système de conscription raison principale du volume limité de forces participant à l'opération Daguet des équipements ou des hommes, mais plutôt quant à la logistique. Mais la suffisance a démontré en vraie grandeur l'inadéquation des capacités conven- sienne), mais aussi et surtout au regard des ambitions de la France. Cette in- projection des forces britanniques dans le Golfe (presque le double de la qui a pourtant résulté d'un effort maximum de la part de la France, s'est ré- contestable et utile à l'ensemble des opérations. Reste que cette contribution,

qui a pourtant résulté d'un effort maximum de la part de la France, s'est ré- contestable et utile à l'ensemble des opérations. Reste que cette contribution, valoir la dimension européenne de la dissuasion nucléaire. De même, dans la mesure où se concrétisera l'entité stratégique euro-péenne, se posera pour la France la question de l'OTAN. Car si, d'un point de vue militaire, le rôle de la France dans l'Alliance apparaît pleinement satisfaisant (ce qu'a amplement démontré l'opération «Tempête du désert», première expression concrète des arrangements élaborés entre la France et l'OTAN pour le théâtre de l'Europe du Centre), il demeure un considérable enjeu politique. Tant le sommet de Rome que celui de Maastricht ont mis en évidence la nécessité d'une compatibilité entre la construction européenne en matière de sécurité et de défense, d'une part, et l'OTAN, d'autre part. Mais il reste à se mettre d'accord sur les modalités concrètes de cette compatibilité, ce qui suppose à la fois la transparence et le partage des rôles. Dans ce contexte, une plus grande participation de la France au processus décision-niel de l'Alliance apparaît indispensable (on pense, par exemple, au Comité militaire ou au Comité des plans de défense), à l'exclusion évidemment sens et que, du reste, personne ne demande. Telles sont les tendances auxquelles la politique de défense de la France, héritée des années de Guerre froide, va devoir s'adapter. La mutation de la de-fense française, tant dans ses concepts que dans ses structures, sera d'autant plus difficile à mener qu'elle s'effectuera sous une double contrainte. Contrairement de défense s'est jusqu'ici affirmé à la faveur d'un concept clair et convaincant, sous-tendu par l'idée d'un rôle et d'une mission pour la France dans le monde, lesquels sont aujourd'hui bien difficiles à concevoir. Ensuite parce que les nouveaux déterminants stratégiques qui pèsent sur la politique



# LE POIDS DE L'HÉRITAGE

Pour mesurer les enjeux de l'adaptation de la défense française à l'après-Guerre froide, il faut partir de l'héritage du passé.

PAR FRÉDÉRIC BOZO

HÉRITAGE, C'EST D'ABORD UN CADRE CONCEPTUEL, FORMÉ, DEPUIS Charles de Gaulle et jusqu'à maintenant, par un triple postulat: le postulat de la permanence et de la centralité de l'État-nation comme élément irréductible du jeu stratégique; celui de l'inéluctable transformation du système européen et mondial au-delà d'un affrontement bipolaire qui ne pouvait qu'être une parenthèse historique; celui, enfin, de la nécessaire

évolution de l'Alliance en un arrangement stratégique liant, à partir,

l'Amérique à l'Europe.

L'héritage, c'est ensuite un système de forces dont les structures et les doctrines d'emploi se sont inscrites dans ce cadre conceptuel. La priorité presque absolue donnée au nucléaire en a évidemment constitué la caractéristique principale. C'est en son nom que la France a mis sur pied, en trois décennies, un arsenal nucléaire unique en son genre, celui d'une mini-superpuissance, dotée de tout ou presque, même s'il est à la mesure, évidemment réduit à ce que peut faire une simple puissance moyenne. D'où le souci d'une réelle indépendance technologique et la volonté de disposer d'une panoplie complète de systèmes d'armes, stratégiques et préstratégiques, organisés en une triade. D'où, malgré une conception théoriquement minimale de la dissuasion, un effort constant de modernisation, d'adaptation et d'expansion de l'arsenal. D'où, enfin, un coût financier considérable, absorbant le plus souvent plus de 30 p. 100 des dépenses d'équipement militaire du pays.

Mais la priorité nucléaire des trente dernières années, ce fut aussi une doctrine stratégique bien précise, mettant plus que toute autre l'accent sur la prévention d'un conflit d'entraînement une escalade rapide et incontrôlée vers l'apocalypse nucléaire. De là l'opposition, au sein de l'OTAN, à une «rétrograde» jugée de nature à réintroduire l'éventualité d'un grand conflit en Europe. Dès lors, parent pauvre de la défense française, les forces conventionnelles ont naturellement été, depuis les années 1960, configurées en fonction du primat du nucléaire. L'idée même d'un combat prolongé en Europe centrale étant exclue par un concept stratégique privilégiant la manœuvre de dissuasion, les forces classiques ont donc été jusqu'ici caractérisées par un format, un volume d'équipement et une durabilité relativement réduits. L'héritage, c'est enfin une approche particulière de l'Alliance. Mais ce qui a été mis presque exclusivement sur le compte d'une quête de la grandeur, voire, par certains, d'une tentation de «non-belligérance», à savoir la décision prise en 1966 de rompre avec l'intégration atlantique, a été en réalité beaucoup plus subtil quant aux objectifs, et beaucoup plus pragmatique quant aux modalités. Car s'il s'agissait de restaurer une certaine souveraineté stratégique française, il s'agissait aussi et surtout d'anticiper le dépassement des blocs. Et peut-être plus encore de prendre date pour le jour où, enfin, le projet d'une Europe de l'Ouest stratégiquement autonome pourrait se concrétiser.

EN SOMME, À BIEN DES ÉGARDS, LE RETRAIT FRANÇAIS PAR RAPPORT À L'OTAN s'est inscrit dans une perspective non pas étroitement nationale, mais également européenne. Quant aux modalités de ce retrait, si la décision de 1966 a bien marqué une rupture avec l'organisation intégrée, elle a laissé la place, après les accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer en 1967, à une relation France-OTAN unique en son genre. Cette dernière était parfaitement satisfaisante du point de vue militaire au regard des engagements de la France envers la défense commune, surtout que politiquement, elle était de nature à lui rendre sa personnalité et sa solidité d'allié à part entière. Tel est, décrit à grands traits, l'héritage. Or, depuis 1989, trois révolutions stratégiques remettent profondément en cause les postulats de la politique française de défense et de sécurité et constituent pour elle un défi à long terme. La chute du mur de Berlin en 1989, la guerre du Golfe en 1990-1991

et enfin, le sommet de Maastricht en 1991 : tels sont les événements qui vont de pair avec le triptyque stratégique constitué par la désintégration à l'Est, les nouveaux désordres mondiaux, et l'intégration en Europe de l'Ouest. Désintégration à l'Est, tout d'abord. Avec la fin de la Guerre froide, la France perd un concept à la fois explicatif et organisateur de sa politique de défense. Le principal défi, pour une nation qui a constamment besoin d'une mission, sera, dans les années à venir, soit de s'en inventer une nouvelle, soit, beaucoup plus probablement, de vivre sans un concept stratégique fort. Mais beaucoup plus concrètement, la fin de l'affrontement bipolaire met en cause le système de forces et le corps de doctrines mis au point au cours de trois décennies. Constat qui s'impose en premier lieu pour l'arme nucléaire, dont la primauté comme instrument d'équilibre des tensions en Europe ne peut que s'estomper. Certes, l'atome demeure, pour la France, un ressort essentiel de la sécurité. Mais, désormais, la plupart des scénarios de conflit sur le Vieux Continent, parce qu'ils ne sont pas susceptibles d'intéresser ses intérêts vitaux (que l'on pense à la crise yougoslave) ne justifient pas, de ce fait le recours à la menace du nucléaire, encore moins son emploi effectif. En cela, l'atome devient bien, pour la France comme pour les autres, une «arme de dernier recours». Après y avoir tant investi, elle devra donc réduire la part du nucléaire dans sa politique de défense, tant pour ce qui concerne la programmation que la doctrine. La nouvelle situation stratégique oblige la France, pour la première fois peut-être, à mettre en oeuvre un régime de dissuasion réellement minimale.

DE MÊME, LE RÔLE ET LA STRUCTURE DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES DEVONT ÉVOLUER. Configurées pour faire face, en Europe, à une menace massive et à la perspective d'un affrontement violent mais bref, ces forces sont aujourd'hui mal adaptées au nouveau contexte européen. La participation de la France à des opérations de sécurité collective, dans un éventail de missions qui peut s'étendre de l'interposition à la coercition, requiert des forces mobiles et capables d'un engagement prolongé, loin de leurs bases, qu'il y ait ou non combat. Certes, la France a des spécificités stratégiques en se dotant de la Force d'action rapide (FAR) et en esquisant, dès 1989, un projet de rationalisation et de reconstruction ambitieux de ses armées (le plan «Armées 2000»). Mais c'est une armée beaucoup plus ramassée dans ses effectifs, mieux équipée, capable d'opérations interarmées et d'interventions lointaines en synergie avec d'autres forces nationales, qui devra émerger. D'où les enjeux des nouveaux désordres mondiaux. La nature des problèmes de sécurité du «Sud», n'est désormais plus essentiellement différente de celle des problèmes de sécurité de l'Europe orientale et balkanique, voire chimiques, tels sont les principaux ingrédients du nouveau désordre mondial avec lequel la France doit se tenir prête à compter.

La participation française aux opérations «Bouclier du désert» puis «Tempête du désert» a évidemment mis en relief les problèmes d'adaptation de l'outil militaire à ces nouvelles réalités stratégiques. L'opération «Dague», qui a fait intervenir à peine 16 000 hommes sur près de 500 000, n'a certes pas constitué un apport essentiel au dispositif, principalement américain, mis en oeuvre pour libérer le Koweït. Mais elle aura été plus qu'un simple appoint, dans la mesure où la division française, bien adaptée à son rôle sur le flanc des forces américaines, aura permis de mettre en valeur un savoir-faire in-

disent «remplaçons-la par une alliance

**M. Wood** : Votre par un mécanisme comme les conférences des premiers ministres de l'APEC [Coopération économique de l'Asie et du Pacifique] et de l'ANASE, comme l'a suggéré M. Baker.

**M. Sato** : Mais cet argument n'est pas convaincant. Tout d'abord, même en Europe, la CSCE ne parvient pas à régler les conflits régionaux, par exemple en Yougoslavie ou entre la Russie et l'Ukraine. Ensuite, en Asie, il est bien plus difficile de mettre en place ce genre d'énorme structure de sécurité régionale. Il y a peut-être l'ANASE, et une entente en qui commence la péninsule coréenne est possible, mais il est prématuré pour nous de penser à une telle structure.

nel du Conseil, par exemple, abolir le droit de veto et faire prendre les décisions par une majorité de deux tiers. Ensuite, il y a le renforcement du G-7. Il est important qu'on y discute de questions relatives à la politique en matière de sécurité et que l'on instaure à cette fin des réunions de «sherpas». Puis, il y a les institutions de Bretton Woods au sein desquelles le rôle du Japon s'accroît nettement. Au niveau régional, celui de l'Asie-Pacifique, le renforcement de l'APEC et de l'ANASE est extrêmement important. Quant aux relations bilatérales, nul besoin est de souligner leur importance.

**M. Tanaka** : Je ne suis pas certain que les Japonais soient prêts à assumer les responsabilités d'un siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité. À moins que le processus interne nippon puisse d'une manière ou d'une autre créer la structure qui permettrait au Japon de les assumer, ce serait assez irresponsable de leur part d'accepter un tel siège.

**M. Wood** : Nous avons parlé essentiellement de ce

que les pays industriels à économie de marché devraient faire. Or, la question intéressante sous-jacente, c'est de savoir comment rendre ce «nous» plus efficace. Le G-7 est une sorte de structure, encore que l'on s'interroge beaucoup sur le degré de coordination auquel on peut arriver par son biais. Votre lien traditionnel particulier avec les États-Unis est très important, mais avec la fin de la Guerre froide, le Conseil de sécurité a commencé à se montrer efficace. Comment allons-nous gérer ces problèmes de consultation politique entre démocraties industrialisées

à économie de marché ?

**M. Isomura** : Parmi ces démocraties, le Japon est le seul pays à ne pas disposer de cadre de consultations politiques dans une instance multilatérale. En conséquence, le G-7 est pour le moment la seule instance de consultations à un haut niveau à laquelle le Japon puisse participer. Or, la France s'opposant à des discussions d'ordre politique au sein du G-7, ce dernier ne sera pas une instance politique de consultations multilatérales. Le fait est, cependant, qu'on y parle un peu de sujets politiques. Côté européen, on manifeste un intérêt croissant pour une consultation politique permanente avec le Japon. Ce type de tribune devrait être élargi, sinon ..., et le problème est plus délicat. Le Japon devrait disposer d'un siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Ce qui est probablement plus difficile.

**M. Wood** : Pas d'un point de vue canadien, car nous le demandons instamment depuis des années. Pour d'autres, en revanche...

**M. Sato** : Le Japon devrait jouer un plus grand rôle aux Nations Unies et, pour encourager les Japonais à prendre de plus grandes responsabilités, les autres pays devraient accepter que le Japon siège au Conseil de sécurité. Autrement, il va être très difficile au gouvernement de convaincre la population de payer plus d'impôts pour verser une plus forte contribution à l'ONU. Peut-être pouvons-nous changer le processus de décision-...

**M. Sato** : Prenez la Chine. Quelle responsabilité assume-t-elle ? Elle n'a envoyé aucun soldat dans le Golfe et sa contribution est plafonnée à 0,77 p. 100 du budget total de l'ONU. Celle du Japon est fixée à 2,5 p. 100. Si la Chine est un membre permanent légitime du Conseil, pourquoi pas le Japon ? Le système des cinq permanents ne survivra pas. C'est l'autre facette de mon argument sur l'importance du G-7. Le G-7 est un club de démocraties riches, avancées qui a naturellement une plus grande responsabilité dans la gestion des affaires mondiales. Les Nations Unies, en revanche, accueillent tout le monde inacceptable.

**M. Imai** : Je pense que même dans l'*Asahi Shimbun*, grand quotidien de Tokyo, on publiera un éditorial en faveur de quelque arrangement. On y posera des conditions, mais on y sera, de manière générale, favorable à l'idée. Or, cela représente un changement d'opinions au Japon. En temps voulu, il faudra redéfinir quelques-unes des obligations énoncées au chapitre 7 relativement aux menaces contre la paix et la sécurité. Cependant, il faut s'attendre à une convergence de la volonté d'accepter des responsabilités quelconques, si elles sont bien définies. En outre, devenir membre permanent n'est pas seulement un problème pour le Japon, mais aussi pour l'Allemagne, parce qu'avec elle, le nombre de pays d'Europe de l'Ouest membres permanents du Conseil passerait à trois, ce que l'Assemblée générale ne manquera pas de juger

## Si la Chine est un membre permanent légitime du Conseil, pourquoi pas le Japon ?

**M. Isomura** : Pour les médias, les mauvaises nouvelles sont toujours une aubaine et il est d'accrochages avec vous. En tant que dirigeant de la télévision nationale au Japon, j'ai eu l'occasion de rencontrer des collègues du Canada. Je ne sais pas si les Canadiens sont conscients de l'homme que cela représente de jouer le rôle de lien entre différents pays. Il faut avoir conscience de l'incidence fantastique que l'on peut avoir lorsque l'on peut jouer le rôle de médiateur. Surtout après 1993, l'Europe sera beaucoup plus sur elle. Le Canada peut jouer un rôle de médiateur et nous dire quelles sont les tendances européennes.

**M. Wood** : Le Canada et le Japon entretiennent des rapports d'une qualité très différente de ceux qui existent entre les États-Unis ou l'Europe et le Japon. Il y a relativement peu de frictions entre nous, pour plusieurs raisons, et le phénomène de démigration systématique du Japon est pratiquement inconnu au Canada. L'ambassadeur Kitamura est d'avis qu'au sein du G-7, le Canada pourrait se révéler très utile au Japon parce qu'il constitue un pont logique avec l'Amérique du Nord et l'Europe et à cause de son expérience assez vaste de la diplomatie multilatérale en général, du maintien de la paix, etc. — domaines aujourd'hui importants aux yeux du Japon. J'ai l'impression que l'on n'est guère d'accord avec cette stratégie possible énoncée par un japonais et que le Canada n'est pas assez au premier plan, d'un point de vue nippon, pour être utile. Est-ce vrai, ou est-ce exagéré ?

**M. Imai** : Je vois dans le Canada quelque chose qui, pour l'Alliance occidentale, manque de plus en plus à l'Europe et que la seule superpuissance japonaise à prendre de plus grandes responsabilités, les autres pays devraient accepter que le Japon siège au Conseil de sécurité. Autrement, il va être très difficile au gouvernement de convaincre la population de payer plus d'impôts pour verser une plus forte contribution à l'ONU. Peut-être pouvons-nous changer le processus de décision-...





d'avantage que la plupart des membres du G-7 sur les relations Nord-Sud. Au Canada, nous avons beaucoup apprécié, car nous étions vos alliés naturels sur la question au sein du G-7. Depuis lors, le Japon est devenu le plus grand pays donateur d'aide publique au développement (APD) dans le monde. Vous parlez, Professeur Sato, de l'attention qui se reportait sur l'Europe de l'Est, mais le Japon ne s'est manifestement pas laissé totalement emporter par cette tendance. On a le sentiment chez vous que, dans une certaine mesure, on insiste de plus en plus pour que l'on réduise les dépenses militaires. Parallèlement, il y a presque un consensus national en matière d'APD, à savoir qu'elle devrait continuer d'augmenter. Cela dit cependant, la position du Japon par rapport à l'Asie – et j'y incluis non seulement l'Asie du Nord-Est et du Sud-Est, mais aussi l'Asie du Sud y compris le Bangladesh, le Pakistan, etc. – est que la part de l'économie nipponne dans ces immenses régions où vit près de la moitié de la population mondiale est de 70 p. 100. C'est à peu près la même part que celle de l'économie américaine dans l'hémisphère occidental, mais une part bien supérieure à celle de l'Allemagne en Europe. Bien qu'en Asie, il existe une ambiguïté innée face à l'omniprésence germanique, notre économie représente deux fois celle de l'Allemagne unifiée et il n'y a pas en Asie de grandes économies comparables à celles du Royaume-Uni ou de l'Italie. Vous pouvez donc comprendre le sentiment des Asiatiques vis-à-vis du Japon. On ne peut se sentir très à l'aise dans le voisinage immédiat d'un tel géant. En tant que Canadien, vous devez le comprendre. Bien des endroits en Asie ont été occupés et colonisés par les Japonais. Il y a donc une peur innée. La meilleure solution pour le Japon, c'est de s'unir avec les Nord-Américains et les Européens. Les autres Asiatiques en sont heureux.

## Les frustrations sont telles avec nos amis d'outre-Pacifique qu'il y a un risque de répétition de l'histoire.

**M. Sato** : Depuis la fin de la Guerre froide, au Japon comme dans les démocraties occidentales, on insiste de plus en plus pour que l'on réduise les dépenses militaires. Parallèlement, il y a presque un consensus national en matière d'APD, à savoir qu'elle devrait continuer d'augmenter. Cela dit cependant, la position du Japon par rapport à l'Asie – et j'y incluis non seulement l'Asie du Nord-Est et du Sud-Est, mais aussi l'Asie du Sud y compris le Bangladesh, le Pakistan, etc. – est que la part de l'économie nipponne dans ces immenses régions où vit près de la moitié de la population mondiale est de 70 p. 100. C'est à peu près la même part que celle de l'économie américaine dans l'hémisphère occidental, mais une part bien supérieure à celle de l'Allemagne en Europe. Bien qu'en Asie, il existe une ambiguïté innée face à l'omniprésence germanique, notre économie représente deux fois celle de l'Allemagne unifiée et il n'y a pas en Asie de grandes économies comparables à celles du Royaume-Uni ou de l'Italie. Vous pouvez donc comprendre le sentiment des Asiatiques vis-à-vis du Japon. On ne peut se sentir très à l'aise dans le voisinage immédiat d'un tel géant. En tant que Canadien, vous devez le comprendre. Bien des endroits en Asie ont été occupés et colonisés par les Japonais. Il y a donc une peur innée. La meilleure solution pour le Japon, c'est de s'unir avec les Nord-Américains et les Européens. Les autres Asiatiques en sont heureux.

**M. Wood** : Donc, l'ordre multilatéral constitue réellement une protection très importante ?

**M. Sato** : Oui.

**M. Tanaka** : Même du point de vue économique, je pense que l'on peut démontrer l'importance d'une structure multilatérale. L'an dernier, le Japon a plus exporté vers l'Asie que vers les États-Unis. Cela pour dire que le Japon a désorienté le choix entre l'Est asiatique et l'Amérique du Nord. Mais c'est une erreur économiquement parlant, parce que ces pays de l'Asie orientale dépendent beaucoup des marchés nord-américains. On ne peut tout simplement les couper en deux et considérer que le marché asiatique a la même valeur que le marché nord-américain. L'option asiatique n'est donc pas sensée du tout.

**M. Wood** : Mais l'idée d'un bloc asiatique, même comme police d'assurance, n'est pas prise au sérieux au Japon ?

**M. Isomura** : Je rentre tout juste d'un voyage en Europe, où j'ai senti que les Européens redoutaient beaucoup qu'un jour, les États-Unis, et peut-être le Canada, s'allient contre eux avec l'Asie ou avec le Japon. C'était juste avant la visite de M. Bush au Japon, pendant laquelle les gouvernements américains et nippon ont conclu un accord *de facto* d'encadrement du commerce. Les Européens n'en sont évidemment pas ravis. Notre cauchemar, c'est qu'un jour, les Américains en fassent autant avec les Européens, dont ils sont les descendants. Une fois encore, pour le Japonais moyen, on devrait au moins permettre au Japon de frapper à la porte de la maison communautaire européenne, une maison dans laquelle il y aura deux chambres d'amis. L'une pour les Canadiens, l'autre pour les Américains, mais aucune pour les Asiatiques.

**M. Sato** : Des pessimistes s'inquiètent du fossé qui se creuse de plus en plus entre le Nord et le Sud. La Guerre froide étant terminée, des pays riches du Nord négligent probablement l'impertinence du Sud. Tant que l'URSS soutenait des dirigeants radicaux du Sud, nous devions soutenir les modérés. Mais à présent qu'elle a cessé d'appuyer des mouvements de libération nationale dans le tiers-monde, nous pouvons venir en toute sécurité négliger beaucoup de pays en développement. En plus, les récessions économiques simultanées qui frappent l'Occident, y compris le Japon, découragent le renouvellement de l'aide économique au tiers-monde et l'ouverture des marchés. Enfin, les changements dans les anciens pays communistes sont si fascinants que l'attention que nous leur accordons – et qui dit attention, dit bien sûr leur accord – ne fera que creuser davantage encore le fossé entre le Nord et le Sud. À long terme, cela causera de sérieux problèmes.

**M. Imai** : L'augmentation de la consommation d'énergie dans les pays en développement est beaucoup plus rapide que dans les pays industrialisés. Très bientôt, nous nous arracherons les hydrocarbures et nous devrons décider quel type d'énergie utiliser, qui fera quoi, où et comment.

La Conférence de Rio, en juin, fera certainement ressortir les problèmes environnementaux et nous ne pourrions pas maintenir le principe selon lequel «le pollueur est le payeur». Les pays industriels avancés devront payer la note de la pollution causée par les pays en développement, dont les économies ne se redresseront pas autrement. Nous nous achèminons vers une confrontation Nord-Sud. En tirer une leçon économique, y gagner ou y perdre, dépend beaucoup des acteurs les plus puissants.

**M. Wood** : Je me rappelle qu'il y a plus de dix ans, le Japon a décidé sciemment de se concentrer

fautra modifier le discours de façon à ne prendre clairement aucun engagement mais seulement à indiquer que ... et ainsi de suite. C'est ainsi que tel est le cas, il n'y a guère de place pour des idées imaginatives et ouvertes sur l'avenir. Nous sommes impatients de voir de quelle façon la fin de la Guerre froide moulera la structure de ce que j'appelle souvent le Conseil d'administration du «nouvel ordre mondial» cher à M. Bush.

**M. Imai** : Quand j'étais dans le monde arabe, beaucoup de gens me demandaient comment faire pour reproduire avec succès la réussite de la révolution Meiji et du Japon de l'après-Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Je leur répondais que ce serait très difficile. Il faut être extrêmement chanceux pour y parvenir. Il faut évidemment travailler avec diligence, etc. Mais ce n'est pas une garantie de réussite. Avec l'époque Meiji est venu un système économique, technologique et financier complet et bien assis. C'était avant la révolution industrielle, sur laquelle nous n'avons eu un retard que de dix ou vingt ans, il n'a donc pas été très difficile de le rattraper. Nous avons assez de temps. La chance, en revanche, est quelque chose de difficile à reproduire.

À la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale nous attendaient toutes sortes de nouvelles technologies moyennant redevances. Nous n'avons pas eu à refaire tout le cheminement de la recherche et de développement. Puis il y a eu la guerre de Corée, qui a relancé l'économie japonaise à l'époque et rendu son décollage possible. La encore, une chance extrême était avec nous. Mes réponses n'ont pas satisfait nombre de mes amis arabes, mais je n'en ai pas de mortel. Il faut être chanceux, et si la chance n'est pas avec vous, ne comptez pas copier la réussite japonaise.

**M. Wood** : Nous avons surtout parlé de facteurs internes, mais qu'en est-il du climat externe, du danger que des systèmes multilatéraux plus ou moins ouverts se referment ? S'inquiète-t-on à présent de ce que les Américains et les Européens se sentent si menacés et si préoccupés par leurs situations intérieures qu'en l'espace de dix ans, le protectionnisme deviendra la règle, les négociations actuelles du GATT échoueront et le système multilatéral ne sera plus ce qu'il était ?

**Sato** : On s'inquiète beaucoup, mais en même temps, on est persuadé que l'économie mondiale ne se scindera pas en blocs comme dans les années 1930, même si le régionalisme et le protectionnisme continuent de croître. Le Japon a investi si massivement en Amérique du Nord et en Europe que les activités économiques n'importe sont déjà fermement ancrées dans ces zones économiques. Elles ne pourraient pas nous exclure de toute façon. C'est l'avis des optimistes. Si les Américains et les Européens sont assez bêtes pour essayer de nous exclure, ils en souffriront.



longtemps que nous avons de l'argent, nous pouvons en acheter». C'est ce que pensaient la grande majorité des Japonais. Le sentiment de vulnérabilité propre à un pays pauvre en ressources naturelles a donc presque disparu. Le professeur Tanaka a déjà souligné le deuxième processus de changement dans le système nippon, celui déclenché par la fin de la Guerre froide et la fin de la Pax Americana. La plupart des Japonais sont convaincus aujourd'hui que les règles du jeu international ont changé, que désormais il repose non plus sur la puissance militaire, mais sur la richesse fondée sur les capacités économiques, ce en quoi nous sommes bien mieux placés.

M. Hisanori Isomura : Tous les autres participants à cette table ronde étant des universitaires ou des diplomates, j'aimerais honorer l'avis de l'homme du commun. Tout d'abord, les Japonais souffrent toujours d'un fort complexe de persécution face au monde. Encore que, comme vous le savez sans doute, le Japon ait souvent été le persécuteur par le passé, notamment de nos amis Asiatiques. Dans son histoire, le Japon a traversé trois époques de «batailles noires». La première, chacun le sait, à l'arrivée de la flottille du commodore Perry, en 1853, qui a contribué à mettre fin à l'isolement séculaire du Japon. La deuxième, à mon sens, a commencé avec l'arrivée de troupes d'occupation, pour la première fois de notre histoire, sous le commandement du général MacArthur, ce qui, naturellement, a changé le régime entier dans le Japon de l'après-guerre. La troisième, qui en train de s'éloigner, était menée par le président Bush, accompagné de dix-huit importants hommes d'affaires. L'arrivée de ce genre de bateau noir porte le nom aujourd'hui mondialisme connu de *Globalis*, la pression qu'il nous fait modifier notre cap.

Autre exemple, lorsque le président du Keidanren (Fédération des organisations économiques) a effectué une tournée en Europe l'an dernier, tous les membres de sa délégation ont été frappés de voir que les Européens se sentent effectivement menacés par la puissance économique japonaise, surtout dans des secteurs comme l'automobile, les semi-conducteurs et les ordinateurs. À écouter les dirigeants, même nos amis les plus proches sur ce continent, les Allemands, en viennent à parler comme Mme Cresson (Premier ministre français), soit à dire : «Si nous laissons les Japonais poursuivre leur expansion, un jour, ils nous conquerront.» Nous nous sentons toujours vulnérables face à nombre de pressions extérieures, mais eux considèrent le Japon comme un géant.

M. Ryukichi Imai : Il est très malheureux que, face à une puissance nouvellement acquise, l'on se comporte comme qu'un autre, mais aussi que l'on considère cette puissance si l'on veut l'utiliser. M. Wood : Dans la notion d'interdépendance, on reconnaît la puissance d'autrui, mais aussi que

## La maison commune européenne dans laquelle il y aura deux chambres d'amis ...

M. Saito : Dire que le Japon dépend de pays étrangers n'a rien de neuf. Il y a longtemps, quelque 1 500 ans, soit depuis le tout début de son histoire, que le Japon dépend de pays étrangers, que le Japon dépend de la civilisation chinoise. Au cours des 450 dernières années, soit depuis que les puissances occidentales sont venues en Extrême-Orient, nous importons des techniques plus avancées de chez elles. Être dépendant est donc naturel; pour la plupart des Japonais, cela va de soi.

À présent que de plus en plus de Japonais se rendent compte que les autres pays dépendent également du Japon, il n'y a pas de problème pour eux à reconnaître l'interdépendance que le Japon a avec les autres pays. Ce doit être plus difficile pour les Américains. Ce doit être plus difficile pour les Américains que pour les Japonais d'accepter la réalité de l'interdépendance. En effet, pour ces derniers, l'interdépendance marque une amélioration par rapport à la vulnérabilité.

M. Tanaka : Nous sommes habitués depuis longtemps à la dépendance, c'est vrai. Pourtant, je ne suis pas certain que les Japonais puissent se conduire plus ou moins naturellement dans un état de dépendances mutuelles. Il est possible qu'ils soient habitués au fait que, lorsque l'on dépend d'autrui, on se soumet à lui. Cependant, quand l'inverse se produit, certains Japonais se conduisent en êtres supérieurs.

M. Saito : Pour comprendre pourquoi il est si difficile pour beaucoup de Japonais de se conduire naturellement dans un monde qui entre dans une ère d'interdépendance, il faut considérer deux éléments. Le Japon a vécu dans l'ombre de l'Empire chinois du commencement du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle jusqu'au milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Et, depuis le milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle jusqu'à assez récemment, le Japon a été à la périphérie de la civilisation occidentale. D'une part, il y a donc le sentiment largement partagé d'être victime et plus petit. Les Japonais trouvent naturel qu'on ne leur demande pas de jouer un rôle important de grande puissance. Nous n'avons pas l'habitude de franchir les règles pour la communauté internationale. D'autre part, il y a les très fort sentiment d'être uniques. Le Japon est différent de la Corée, par exemple. Comme nous sommes séparés de la Chine continentale par une mer, nous nous en sentons différents aussi. Ce sentiment d'être

## ... l'une pour les Canadiens, l'autre pour les Américains, mais aucune pour les Asiatiques.

M. Wood : Quelqu'un a dit un jour que le prix du pouvoir, c'est la prestige. Or, je me demande dans quelle mesure le prestige, ce sentiment de puissance et d'assurance et l'impression de ne plus se trouver à la périphérie sont importants maintenant aux yeux des Japonais ?

M. Isomura : Je dirais que c'est assez mitigé. Nous avons un énorme complexe de persécution doublé d'une sorte de fatalisme bouddhiste. Nous vivons dans un pays où il y a continuellement des catastrophes naturelles – séismes et raz de marée. Ezra Vogel a donc beau nous placer au premier rang, ce qui est évidemment très aimable, je ne pense pas que le Japonais moyen croie ce genre de compliments. Nous nous sentons toujours vulnérables.

M. Tanaka : Je suis d'accord, pour ce qui est de l'observation générale, mais ces cinq ou six dernières années, il m'est arrivé de sentir chez certains Japonais, notamment dans les milieux d'affaires et parmi les bureaucrates qui s'occupent de l'économie du pays, une certitude croissante que ce que le Japon a accompli au cours des quarante-cinq dernières années est correct pour l'essentiel. Ces réalisations devraient être reconnues et certains éléments de la réussite nipponne pourraient servir d'exemples àilleurs dans le monde. Les domaines dans lesquels les Japonais ont le plus confiance en eux sont, évidemment, la gestion commerciale et même la gestion des relations internationales. À propos de ces dernières, j'entends de plus en plus de Japonais qui travaillent dans l'aide économique dire que la façon dont nous menons nos programmes d'aide économique dans les pays en développement s'avère bonne pour l'essentiel.

M. Imai : Sans pouvoir définir ce qu'est exactement cette puissance, il y a un autre élément qui n'est pas vraiment reconnu ou intégré dans notre politique étrangère : le sentiment que «noblesse oblige». On continue de réfléchir au pour et aux contre, à des contre-propositions, au degré de confort, et je pense que c'est peut-être là un des points discutables, c'est la façon dont la politique nipponne est décidée au niveau interne. Pour parler franchement, les politiques sont formulées par les bureaucrates, qui les transmettent aux hommes politiques, qui s'expriment alors. Si l'on regarde le mécanisme même, lorsque le premier ministre s'exprime sur un sujet, derrière, on peut s'imaginer deux personnes qui ont fait les cent pas en demandant ce qu'il devrait dire, ce qui avait été négocié avec le ministre des Finances. Comme il n'y a pas d'argent, il

# L'ASCENSION DU JAPON

Richesse, puissance et responsabilités  
dans un monde tourmenté



## LES MEMBRES DU GROUPE

RYUKICHI IMAI

ancien ambassadeur du Japon au Koweït,  
au Mexique et à la Conférence du désarmement.

Il est docteur en génie nucléaire.

HISANORI ISOMURA

expert-consulté établi à Tokyo et, tout  
dernièrement encore, directeur général de

NHK, la société de télévision nipponne. Pendant

sa carrière à NHK, il a été notamment

correspondant à l'étranger dans le Sud-Est

asiatique, chef de bureau à Washington et

directeur général régional à Paris.

SEIZABURO SATO

directeur de recherche à l'Institut international

pour la paix mondiale, à Tokyo, et

directeur du projet sur les institutions

internationales du Forum japonais sur les

relations internationales.

AKIHIKO TANAKA

professeur agrégé de politique internationale

à l'Institut de culture orientale, à l'Université de

Tokyo. Ses domaines de prédilection sont, entre

autres, les relations internationales

contemporaines en Asie orientale, les théories

de la politique internationale et les relations

entre les États-Unis et le Japon.

très bien vendus chez nous. Donc, les Japonais

disent que la puissance américaine décline, du

moins relativement, tandis que la puissance

nipponne augmente. Aux yeux de nombre de

Japonais, la récente visite de M. Bush reflétait

ce changement.

Nous devons aussi prendre en considération la

fin de la Guerre froide. Bien des gens croient que

Le présent article rapporte un débat qui a eu  
lieu à Tokyo le 7 février 1992. L'animateur  
en était M. Bernard Wood, Directeur général  
de l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité  
internationales.

**M. Bernard Wood** : Nous sommes réunis très peu  
de temps après la visite très entouée de publicité  
de M. Bush et les récriminations qui ont suivi. Il  
nous faut donc un peu de recul par rapport à ces  
événements pour examiner de plus près certaines  
des tendances à long terme quant à la puissance  
et aux responsabilités du Japon dans le monde.  
La première question que j'aimerais poser  
se rapporte à l'hypothèse émise de longue date  
relativement aux fondements de la politique  
étrangère japonaise. Je me rappelle que, dans les  
années 1970 encore, selon une analyse classique,  
cette politique était dictée par la vulnérabilité du  
pays — qu'il fallait sans arrêt compenser —, un  
pays pauvre en ressources naturelles, dépendant  
des marchés étrangers, de lignes de communica-  
tion maritimes sûres, etc. Est-ce que cela sous-  
tend toujours les perspectives du Japon à long  
terme, parce qu'aujourd'hui, évidemment, le  
reste du monde voit surtout la superpuissance  
du Japon ?

**M. Akihiko Tanaka** : D'une part, il y a beaucoup  
de japonais qui continuent de se comporter sui-  
vant l'hypothèse que vous venez d'énoncer,  
c'est-à-dire que le Japon est pauvre en ressources  
naturelles et à la merci des changements qui  
surviennent dans le monde. D'autre part, il y a  
un sentiment croissant de puissance. Cependant,  
bien des gens ne définissent pas cette puissance  
ni ce qu'elle entraîne. À la fin des années 1980,  
était devenu très à la mode de parler du déclin des  
États-Unis. Même avant que *The Rise and Fall of*  
*the Great Powers* de Paul Kennedy soit un succès  
de librairie, plusieurs livres similaires s'étaient  
\* Les rédacteurs souhaitent remercier Mme Yasuko Itoh  
et M. Ron Purver ainsi que Mme Mary Taylor pour  
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table ronde

la nature même du système est en train de subir  
de profonds changements. J'ai l'impression que,  
dans ces incertitudes, il y a des attitudes dan-  
gereuses parmi les Japonais qui croient en une sorte  
de puissance japonaise menaçante. En même  
temps, ils négligent les responsabilités que peu-  
vent entraîner ces idées. Les déclarations de cer-  
tains hommes politiques dans ce pays après la  
visite de M. Bush traduisaient un mélange  
étrange d'arrogance et d'irresponsabilité.  
**M. Seizaburo Sato** : J'aimerais faire la distinction  
entre deux choses : la façon dont les Japonais  
perçoivent la faiblesse de leur pays et leur vo-  
lonté de jouer le rôle que de plus grandes respon-  
sabilités dans le monde supposeraient. Depuis  
les années 1970, les Japonais perçoivent très  
différemment leurs points forts et leurs points  
faibles. Après la crise pétrolière de 1973, il y a eu  
un grand consensus national sur la vulnérabilité  
du Japon. Nous étions désespérés, car 99 p. 100  
de notre pétrole venaient de l'étranger, princi-  
palement du Moyen-Orient, région qui était  
très instable.  
Puis, moins de dix ans après, Ezra Vogel a écrit  
un livre célèbre, *Japan as Number One : Lessons*  
*for America*. Mais est arrivée la deuxième crise  
pétrolière, déclenchée par la révolution iranienne,  
la raison fondamentale de cette crise, mais les  
Toujours, au milieu des années 1980, le marché  
énergétique mondial est passé d'un marché de  
forte demande à un marché d'offre abondante.  
Pour diverses raisons, et nous avons repris con-  
science dans la société nipponne que nous n'avions  
pas besoin d'y participer. Bien sûr, c'était oublier  
la raison fondamentale de cette crise, mais les  
Japonais n'avaient pas réellement l'impression  
qu'il risquait d'y avoir une crise pétrolière.  
**M. Wood** : Pas même un peu à l'idée de la  
vulnérabilité du Japon ?  
**M. Sato** : « Même si l'Irak occupe le Koweït, ils  
devront toujours vendre leur pétrole et, aussi



# L'avenir de l'Institut et de la revue Paix et Sécurité

**E**N RAISON DES CIRCONSTANCES EXTRAORDINAIRES actuelles, Michael Bryans, rédacteur en chef de *Paix et Sécurité*, m'a offert d'écrire cette page en tant que représentant de son éditeur (l'Institut), afin de com-

muniquer à nos 9 000 lecteurs quelques développements essentiels.

Dans le budget fédéral publié le 25 février 1992, le ministre des Finances annonçait l'intention du gouvernement de «liquider» ou supprimer vingt et un organismes financés par le gouvernement fédéral, dont l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Le Conseil d'administration de l'Institut a déclaré que la décision du gouvernement est tout à fait injustifiée, étant donné la manière dont l'Institut s'acquitte du mandat qui lui a confié le Parlement, et qu'elle risque de se traduire par une grande perte pécuniaire pour les contribuables canadiens. Le Conseil et de nombreuses personnes, au Canada et à l'étranger, ont demandé que le gouvernement revienne sur sa décision. La dissolution d'un tel organisme serait fort préjudiciable et inopportune alors que le monde connaît de véritables bouleversements et que l'Institut et ceux qui collaborent à sa compréhension, les réactions et les initiatives

canadiennes.

La décision totalement inattendue du gouvernement semble en partie reposer sur l'idée selon laquelle toutes les sociétés de la Couronne sont des organes bureaucratiques inefficaces et faisant double emploi. Or, cette image ne s'applique nullement à notre modeste organisation, qui a été taillée sur mesure pour combler des lacunes et renforcer la masse critique de capacités nationales du Canada de la manière convenue par tous les parlementaires en 1984. Le gouvernement ne peut faire preuve de la même indépendance, de la même imagination ni prendre les mêmes risques que l'Institut. Ce que ce dernier a réussi à faire en amélioration et confirmation des efforts d'universités, d'organismes non gouvernementaux et autres entités dans le pays entier risque d'être perdu, tout comme le pôle et le bureau central de ce genre de travail au Canada, pour tant connu et respecté partout dans le monde aujourd'hui.

L'éminent professeur Lincoln Bloomfield de l'Institut de technologie du Massachusetts, qui est un des membres étrangers du Conseil, estime que cette décision «donnera au monde un message extrêmement négatif quant au rôle du Canada dans cette ère nouvelle où l'exemple canadien est plus essentiel que jamais». De nombreuses réactions similaires afflueront de l'étranger à mesure que la nouvelle se répand.

Le Conseil d'administration de l'Institut a sollicité des conseils juridiques quant à ses responsabilités légales en ces circonstances extraordinaires. Ainsi que le gouvernement l'admet, l'Institut continuera d'exister, et doit continuer de poursuivre les objectifs qui lui ont été fixés par la Loi, tant que ladite Loi n'est pas abrogée

## Pour faire connaître votre opinion ...

Le Parlement devant intervenir pour concrétiser les intentions déclarées du gouvernement et l'Institut ayant bénéficié du soutien de tous les partis à sa conception, le Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures (et ou) le Comité permanent de la Défense nationale sont les instances les plus appropriées à qui les canadiens, Canadiennes et autres personnes intéressées peuvent faire part de leur intérêt, de leurs préoccupations et de leurs propositions.

En voici les adresses :

MM. les Greffier et membres du Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures  
180, rue Wellington  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
K1A 0A6  
Télécopieur : (613) 996-1962  
et (ou)

MM. les Greffier et membres du Comité permanent de la Défense nationale  
(même adresse)  
Télécopieur : (613) 992-7974

— BERNARD WOOD  
de défis incroyables. □

Cette revue, qui est respectée, occupe bien entendu une place centrale dans les travaux de l'Institut et dans le dialogue entre les communautés s'intéressant à la paix et la sécurité, au Canada et à l'étranger. Les membres du Conseil de l'Institut et beaucoup d'autres personnes sont très conscients du renom dûment acquis de cet atout et de ce qu'il faut tout faire pour que la revue survive sous une forme acceptable.

Nous espérons que ce n'est pas le dernier numéro de *Paix et Sécurité* que vous recevrez. Cependant, si tel était le cas, nous nous sentirions tous appauvris, mais pas moins tenus de continuer de nous efforcer d'approfondir les connaissances et la compréhension de ces questions essentielles dans une ère de changements et

ordinaires.

de ne pas appeler nos bureaux; et honorer tous ses engagements commerciaux

Plus précisément, l'Institut souhaite assurer l'honneur des engagements fermes pris envers les bénéficiaires actuels de bourses d'études et de recherche, de subventions et de contrats; protéger les droits et intérêts de ses employé(e)s au mieux de ce qui se fait dans les secteurs public et privé; obtenir le plus tôt possible du gouvernement qu'il précise si l'Institut pourra poursuivre des projets en cours et donner suite aux concours relatifs aux diverses bourses et subventions. Tous les candidats seront avisés dès que nous en saurons plus et nous leur demandons

En attendant, en gestionnaire prudent, le Conseil de l'Institut, qui poursuit son travail conformément à la Loi, doit tenir compte de l'intention sans équivoque du gouvernement de liquider l'Institut et de transférer au ministère des Affaires extérieures les ressources nécessaires aux activités dont la continuité s'impose.

Nous cherchons donc à obtenir des éclaircissemements sur l'intention du gouvernement et nous discutons des mesures qui seront nécessaires pour libérer l'Institut de ses engagements, pour qu'il continue d'exercer son mandat à un rythme d'activité ralenti en attendant l'abrogation de la Loi, et pour garantir que le Canada conserve et utilise au maximum les atouts extrêmement précieux constitués grâce à ses programmes et à ses membres.

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par le Parlement. De plus, le ministre des Finances est tenu juridiquement de continuer à lui allouer des fonds, d'un montant minimal de 5 millions de dollars par an, jusqu'à l'abrogation susmentionnée. Nul ne peut prédire avec certitude quand la nouvelle loi (projet de loi C-63) sera adoptée, bien que le Parlement l'ait examinée en première lecture le 10 mars.

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# PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ

## L'ASCENSION DU JAPON

RICHESSSE, PUISSANCE  
ET RESPONSABILITÉS  
DANS UN MONDE  
TOURMENTÉ

*Table ronde internationale*  
Ryukichi Imai  
Hisanori Isomura  
Seizaburo Sato  
Akihiko Tanaka



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